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Revert "3.4.83rc"

This reverts commit 404b13c4bfcf36916d7f92beba540ea259c8dd18.
3.4.83 stable kernel version
proc: pid/status: show all supplementary groups

commit 8d238027b87e654be552eabdf492042a34c5c300 upstream.

We display a list of supplementary group for each process in
/proc/<pid>/status.  However, we show only the first 32 groups, not all of
them.

Although this is rare, but sometimes processes do have more than 32
supplementary groups, and this kernel limitation breaks user-space apps
that rely on the group list in /proc/<pid>/status.

Number 32 comes from the internal NGROUPS_SMALL macro which defines the
length for the internal kernel "small" groups buffer.  There is no
apparent reason to limit to this value.

This patch removes the 32 groups printing limit.

The Linux kernel limits the amount of supplementary groups by NGROUPS_MAX,
which is currently set to 65536.  And this is the maximum count of groups
we may possibly print.

Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
audit: wait_for_auditd() should use TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE

commit f000cfdde5de4fc15dead5ccf524359c07eadf2b upstream.

audit_log_start() does wait_for_auditd() in a loop until
audit_backlog_wait_time passes or audit_skb_queue has a room.

If signal_pending() is true this becomes a busy-wait loop, schedule() in
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE won't block.

Thanks to Guy for fully investigating and explaining the problem.

(akpm: that'll cause the system to lock up on a non-preemptible
uniprocessor kernel)

(Guy: "Our customer was in fact running a uniprocessor machine, and they
reported a system hang.")

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Guy Streeter <streeter@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
printk: Fix rq->lock vs logbuf_lock unlock lock inversion

commit dbda92d16f8655044e082930e4e9d244b87fde77 upstream.

commit 07354eb1a74d1 ("locking printk: Annotate logbuf_lock as raw")
reintroduced a lock inversion problem which was fixed in commit
0b5e1c5255 ("printk: Release console_sem after logbuf_lock"). This
happened probably when fixing up patch rejects.

Restore the ordering and unlock logbuf_lock before releasing
console_sem.

Signed-off-by: ybu <ybu@qti.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/E807E903FE6CBE4D95E420FBFCC273B827413C@nasanexd01h.na.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
compiler-gcc.h: Add gcc-recommended GCC_VERSION macro

commit 3f3f8d2f48acfd8ed3b8e6b7377935da57b27b16 upstream.

Throughout compiler*.h, many version checks are made.  These can be
simplified by using the macro that gcc's documentation recommends.
However, my primary reason for adding this is that I need bug-check
macros that are enabled at certain gcc versions and it's cleaner to use
this macro than the tradition method:

  #if __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ => 2)

If you add patch level, it gets this ugly:

  #if __GNUC__ > 4 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && (__GNUC_MINOR__ > 2 || \
      __GNUC_MINOR__ == 2 __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__ >= 1))

As opposed to:

  #if GCC_VERSION >= 40201

While having separate headers for gcc 3 & 4 eliminates some of this
verbosity, they can still be cleaned up by this.

See also:

  http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/cpp/Common-Predefined-Macros.html

Signed-off-by: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
ipc, msg: fix message length check for negative values

commit 4e9b45a19241354daec281d7a785739829b52359 upstream.

On 64 bit systems the test for negative message sizes is bogus as the
size, which may be positive when evaluated as a long, will get truncated
to an int when passed to load_msg().  So a long might very well contain a
positive value but when truncated to an int it would become negative.

That in combination with a small negative value of msg_ctlmax (which will
be promoted to an unsigned type for the comparison against msgsz, making
it a big positive value and therefore make it pass the check) will lead to
two problems: 1/ The kmalloc() call in alloc_msg() will allocate a too
small buffer as the addition of alen is effectively a subtraction.  2/ The
copy_from_user() call in load_msg() will first overflow the buffer with
userland data and then, when the userland access generates an access
violation, the fixup handler copy_user_handle_tail() will try to fill the
remainder with zeros -- roughly 4GB.  That almost instantly results in a
system crash or reset.

  ,-[ Reproducer (needs to be run as root) ]--
  | #include <sys/stat.h>
  | #include <sys/msg.h>
  | #include <unistd.h>
  | #include <fcntl.h>
  |
  | int main(void) {
  |     long msg = 1;
  |     int fd;
  |
  |     fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/msgmax", O_WRONLY);
  |     write(fd, "-1", 2);
  |     close(fd);
  |
  |     msgsnd(0, &msg, 0xfffffff0, IPC_NOWAIT);
  |
  |     return 0;
  | }
  '---

Fix the issue by preventing msgsz from getting truncated by consistently
using size_t for the message length.  This way the size checks in
do_msgsnd() could still be passed with a negative value for msg_ctlmax but
we would fail on the buffer allocation in that case and error out.

Also change the type of m_ts from int to size_t to avoid similar nastiness
in other code paths -- it is used in similar constructs, i.e.  signed vs.
unsigned checks.  It should never become negative under normal
circumstances, though.

Setting msg_ctlmax to a negative value is an odd configuration and should
be prevented.  As that might break existing userland, it will be handled
in a separate commit so it could easily be reverted and reworked without
reintroducing the above described bug.

Hardening mechanisms for user copy operations would have catched that bug
early -- e.g.  checking slab object sizes on user copy operations as the
usercopy feature of the PaX patch does.  Or, for that matter, detect the
long vs.  int sign change due to truncation, as the size overflow plugin
of the very same patch does.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust context
 - Drop changes to alloc_msg() and copy_msg(), which don't exist]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
idr: idr_for_each_entry() macro

commit 9749f30f1a387070e6e8351f35aeb829eacc3ab6 upstream.

Inspired by the list_for_each_entry() macro

Signed-off-by: Philipp Reisner <philipp.reisner@linbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>