Staging: zram: Fix access of NULL pointer

commit 46a51c80216cb891f271ad021f59009f34677499 upstream.

This patch fixes the bug in reset_store caused by accessing NULL pointer.

The bdev gets its value from bdget_disk() which could fail when memory
pressure is severe and hence can return NULL because allocation of
inode in bdget could fail.

Hence, this patch introduces a check for bdev to prevent reference to a
NULL pointer in the later part of the code. It also removes unnecessary
check of bdev for fsync_bdev().

Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Staging: zram: Fix memory leak by refcount mismatch

As suggested by Minchan Kim and Jerome Marchand "The code in reset_store
get the block device (bdget_disk()) but it does not put it (bdput()) when
it's done using it. The usage count is therefore incremented but never
decremented."

This patch also puts bdput() for all error cases.

Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[steven@steven676.net: make apply to 3.0+zram backports]
lib/lzo: Rename lzo1x_decompress.c to lzo1x_decompress_safe.c

Rename the source file to match the function name and thereby
also make room for a possible future even slightly faster
"non-safe" decompressor version.

Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
lib/lzo: Update LZO compression to current upstream version

This commit updates the kernel LZO code to the current upsteam version
which features a significant speed improvement - benchmarking the Calgary
and Silesia test corpora typically shows a doubled performance in
both compression and decompression on modern i386/x86_64/powerpc machines.

Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
ARM: 7493/1: use generic unaligned.h

This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the
benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+
compilers.

As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct"
version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version
for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the
"byteshift" implementation for both.

Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis:

Test case:

int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }

With the current ARM version:

foo:
	ldrb	r3, [r0, #2]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
	ldrb	r1, [r0, #1]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
	ldrb	r2, [r0, #0]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
	mov	r3, r3, asl #16	@ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
	ldrb	r0, [r0, #3]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
	orr	r3, r3, r1, asl #8	@, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
	orr	r3, r3, r2	@ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
	orr	r0, r3, r0, asl #24	@,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
	bx	lr	@

bar:
	stmfd	sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}	@,
	mov	r2, #0	@ tmp184,
	ldrb	r5, [r0, #6]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B]
	ldrb	r4, [r0, #5]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B]
	ldrb	ip, [r0, #2]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
	ldrb	r1, [r0, #4]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
	mov	r5, r5, asl #16	@ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B],
	ldrb	r7, [r0, #1]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
	orr	r5, r5, r4, asl #8	@, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B],
	ldrb	r6, [r0, #7]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B]
	orr	r5, r5, r1	@ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
	ldrb	r4, [r0, #0]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
	mov	ip, ip, asl #16	@ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
	ldrb	r1, [r0, #3]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
	orr	ip, ip, r7, asl #8	@, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
	orr	r3, r5, r6, asl #24	@,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B],
	orr	ip, ip, r4	@ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
	orr	ip, ip, r1, asl #24	@, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
	mov	r1, r3	@,
	orr	r0, r2, ip	@ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194
	ldmfd	sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
	bx	lr

In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal.  One may wonder why
wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example.  And all
the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc.

Now with the asm-generic version:

foo:
	ldr	r0, [r0, #0]	@ unaligned	@,* x
	bx	lr	@

bar:
	mov	r3, r0	@ x, x
	ldr	r0, [r0, #0]	@ unaligned	@,* x
	ldr	r1, [r3, #4]	@ unaligned	@,
	bx	lr	@

This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for
ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do
unaligned word access.  This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we
remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows:

long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; }

then the resulting code is:

bar:
	ldmia	r0, {r0, r1}	@ x,,
	bx	lr	@

So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have
influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above
unaligned code results are not just an accident.

Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the
resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation.  Let's see with an
ARMv5 target:

foo:
	ldrb	r3, [r0, #0]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp139,* x
	ldrb	r1, [r0, #1]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp140,
	ldrb	r2, [r0, #2]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp143,
	ldrb	r0, [r0, #3]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp146,
	orr	r3, r3, r1, asl #8	@, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
	orr	r3, r3, r2, asl #16	@, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
	orr	r0, r3, r0, asl #24	@,, tmp145, tmp146,
	bx	lr	@

bar:
	stmfd	sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}	@,
	ldrb	r2, [r0, #0]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp139,* x
	ldrb	r7, [r0, #1]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp140,
	ldrb	r3, [r0, #4]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp149,
	ldrb	r6, [r0, #5]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp150,
	ldrb	r5, [r0, #2]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp143,
	ldrb	r4, [r0, #6]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp153,
	ldrb	r1, [r0, #7]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp156,
	ldrb	ip, [r0, #3]	@ zero_extendqisi2	@ tmp146,
	orr	r2, r2, r7, asl #8	@, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
	orr	r3, r3, r6, asl #8	@, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150,
	orr	r2, r2, r5, asl #16	@, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
	orr	r3, r3, r4, asl #16	@, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153,
	orr	r0, r2, ip, asl #24	@,, tmp145, tmp146,
	orr	r1, r3, r1, asl #24	@,, tmp155, tmp156,
	ldmfd	sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
	bx	lr

Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I
couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself.

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
[steven@steven676.net: backport to 3.0: don't depend on asm-generic
wrapper support in Kbuild]
ARM: 7583/1: decompressor: Enable unaligned memory access for v6 and above

Modern GCC can generate code which makes use of the CPU's native
unaligned memory access capabilities.  This is useful for the C
decompressor implementations used for unpacking compressed kernels.

This patch disables alignment faults and enables the v6 unaligned
access model on CPUs which support these features (i.e., v6 and
later), allowing full unaligned access support for C code in the
decompressor.

The decompressor C code must not be built to assume that unaligned
access works if support for v5 or older platforms is included in
the kernel.

For correct code generation, C decompressor code must always use
the get_unaligned and put_unaligned accessors when dealing with
unaligned pointers, regardless of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
ARM: 7928/1: kconfig: select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for CPUv6+ && MMU

Modern ARM CPUs can perform efficient unaligned memory accesses in
hardware and this feature is relied up on by code such as the dcache
word-at-a-time name hashing.

This patch selects HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for these cores and
reworks the kconfig select logic for DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS to use the new
symbol.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
[steven@steven676.net: backport to 3.0: remove DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS stuff,
not present in 3.0]
encore_cm11_defconfig: enable memory cgroups for CM11

We need memory cgroups for Android 4.4's swap awareness to function
correctly.  Enabling this option results in 2 MB memory overhead --
hopefully the ability to use swap efficiently will more than make up for
this.
n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode

commit 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00 upstream.

The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST.  And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.

If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
  int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
  struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
  ...
  memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
  ...
  tb->used += space;

so the race of the two can result in something like this:
              A                                B
__tty_buffer_request_room
                                  __tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
                                  memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM

B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.

Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes.  This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.

Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.

js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call

References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[steven@steven676.net: backport to 3.0: ldata->output_lock is
tty->output_lock in older kernels]
net: ipv4: current group_info should be put after using.

Plug a group_info refcount leak in ping_init.
group_info is only needed during initialization and
the code failed to release the reference on exit.
While here move grabbing the reference to a place
where it is actually needed.

Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu <chuansheng.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Dongxing <dongxing.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: xiaoming wang <xiaoming.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[steven@steven676.net: backport to 3.0: no kgid_t in 3.0]
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check

commit 866293ee54227584ffcb4a42f69c1f365974ba7f upstream.

Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

commit f0d71b3dcb8332f7971b5f2363632573e6d9486a upstream.

We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

commit e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8 upstream.

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

commit b3eaa9fc5cd0a4d74b18f6b8dc617aeaf1873270 upstream.

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state.  If
it has, return -EINVAL.  The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up.  Subsequent calls will fail as well.  Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

commit 13fbca4c6ecd96ec1a1cfa2e4f2ce191fe928a5e upstream.

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex.  So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists.  That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[steven@steven676.net: make apply to 3.0]
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream.

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex.  We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit
or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path
or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address.  This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

       Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

  [1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
  [2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

  [3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

  [4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
  [5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

  [6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

  [7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

  [8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
  [9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
  [10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

 [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

 [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

 [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

 [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

 [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

 [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

 [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

 [8] Owner and user space value match

 [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>