net/ipv6/addrconf: IPv6 tethering enhancement

Added new procfs flag to toggle the automatic addition of prefix
routes on a per device basis. The new flag is accept_ra_prefix_route.
Defaults to 1 as to not break existing behavior.

Change-Id: If25493890c7531c27f5b2c4855afebbbbf5d072a
CRs-Fixed: 504095
Signed-off-by: Harout Hedeshian <harouth@codeaurora.org>
msm_fb: display: Fix interleaved 422 input format register settings

Check to update chroma sample information in source format register is
based on fetch plane value, which does not take into account for
interleaved 422 input format. Remove this check and set chroma sample
values for RGB formats as well.

CRs-Fixed: 501035
Change-Id: If8fd47b6d47b326efd1cb70ce9701ac1d457dcfd
Signed-off-by: Mayank Chopra <makchopra@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Padmanabhan Komanduru <pkomandu@codeaurora.org>
msm: mdp: Adjust bandwidth parameters

720p video on 1080p panel have upscaling, mdp clk should not be
increased for this case. Also slightly increase mdp ib to make
sure there is no bw access bottleneck.

Signed-off-by: Huaibin Yang <huaibiny@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: naseer <naseer@codeaurora.org>
msm: mdp: vsync waitqueue for lcdc and dtv interfaces

This is a follow up commit to "msm: mdp: Use a waitqueue for
vsync notification". DTV and LCDC changes were not made on the
earlier commit.

Signed-off-by: Naseer Ahmed <naseer@codeaurora.org>
msm: mdp: Wait unconditionally in internal vsync waits

Do not wait for timestamp to change for internal waits as the
waitqueue can be woken up from places where the vsync timestamp
doesn't change.

Signed-off-by: Naseer Ahmed <naseer@codeaurora.org>
msm: msm_fb: wait for VSYNC instead of DMA_P for commit completion.

In the current implementation, we are waiting for DMA_P interrupt
in commit call to signal completion. This can cause 2 commits happening
in the same vsync period due to which IOMMU page faults can happen when
vsync comes while second commit is programming resgisters. To avoid this,
wait for DMA_P is replaced by wait for VSYNC.

Change-Id: I68d4d4b4e7a574f86faecd5b4812e1f5852f4209
Signed-off-by: Vishnuvardhan Prodduturi <vproddut@codeaurora.org>
msm: msm_fb: Replace wait for DMA_P with VSYNC in Pan_display Path.

This is a follow up change on gerrit 442946. Wait for DMA_P has to be
replaced with VSYNC even in Pan Display Path.

Change-Id: I8d600022cfa63f54d5b72ea5f64fc55315079b3a
Signed-off-by: Vishnuvardhan Prodduturi <vproddut@codeaurora.org>
Revert "msm: display: command mode panel release fence"

This reverts commit c3f006a19812e257a6f2efe8c555303870b70be6.

Revert "video: msm: Use the new fence release logic for video panel too"

This reverts commit d61a6e1131104333df864dc24fbeab6f82704f9f.

Revert "msm: mdp: Change msmfb kworker to kthread"

This reverts commit 0d0a46e8e1610d04c31e06a77b95f85b64be6e0f.

Revert "msm: mdp: Increase base fence timeout"

This reverts commit e14dd2a83b329372f40b0b31850addd41a2412dd.
awifi: mdp: adjust bandwidth multipliers
n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode

The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST.  And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.

If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
  int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
  struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
  ...
  memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
  ...
  tb->used += space;

so the race of the two can result in something like this:
              A                                B
__tty_buffer_request_room
                                  __tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
                                  memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM

B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.

Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes.  This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.

Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.

js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call

References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.4: output_lock is a member of struct tty_struct]

Change-Id: I11d1685056e18f107c970fbe2cab5176ca3a91c4
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Change-Id: I155eafa98f365408450527e34998893dcdd64801
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Change-Id: I155eafa98f365408450527e34998893dcdd64802
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: I155eafa98f365408450527e34998893dcdd64803
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: I155eafa98f365408450527e34998893dcdd64804
Merge pull request #1 from CyanogenMod/cm-11.0

Update