fs/sync: Make sync() satisfy many requests with one invocation

Dave Jones reported RCU stalls, overly long hrtimer interrupts, and
amazingly long NMI handlers from a trinity-induced workload involving
lots of concurrent sync() calls (https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/7/23/369).
There are any number of things that one might do to make sync() behave
better under high levels of contention, but it is also the case that
multiple concurrent sync() system calls can be satisfied by a single
sys_sync() invocation.

Given that this situation is reminiscent of rcu_barrier(), this commit
applies the rcu_barrier() approach to sys_sync().  This approach uses
a global mutex and a sequence counter.  The mutex is held across the
sync() operation, which eliminates contention between concurrent sync()
operations.  The counter is incremented at the beginning and end of
each sync() operation, so that it is odd while a sync() operation is in
progress and even otherwise, just like sequence locks.

The code that used to be in sys_sync() is now in do_sync(), and sys_sync()
now handles the concurrency.  The sys_sync() function first takes a
snapshot of the counter, then acquires the mutex, and then takes another
snapshot of the counter.  If the values of the two snapshots indicate that
a full do_sync() executed during the mutex acquisition, the sys_sync()
function releases the mutex and returns ("Our work is done!").  Otherwise,
sys_sync() increments the counter, invokes do_sync(), and increments
the counter again.

This approach allows a single call to do_sync() to satisfy an arbitrarily
large number of sync() system calls, which should eliminate issues due
to large numbers of concurrent invocations of the sync() system call.

Changes since v1 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/7/24/683):

o	Add a pair of memory barriers to keep the increments from
	bleeding into the do_sync() code.  (The failure probability
	is insanely low, but when you have several hundred million
	devices running Linux, you can expect several hundred instances
	of one-in-a-million failures.)

o	Actually CC some people who have experience in this area.

Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Curt Wohlgemuth <curtw@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
cpuquiet: balanced: make it possible to set defaults for idle_top_freq and idle_bottom_freq
dm: handle requests beyond end of device instead of using BUG_ON

commit ba1cbad93dd47223b1f3b8edd50dd9ef2abcb2ed upstream.

The access beyond the end of device BUG_ON that was introduced to
dm_request_fn via commit 29e4013de7ad950280e4b2208 ("dm: implement
REQ_FLUSH/FUA support for request-based dm") was an overly
drastic (but simple) response to this situation.

I have received a report that this BUG_ON was hit and now think
it would be better to use dm_kill_unmapped_request() to fail the clone
and original request with -EIO.

map_request() will assign the valid target returned by
dm_table_find_target to tio->ti.  But when the target
isn't valid tio->ti is never assigned (because map_request isn't
called); so add a check for tio->ti != NULL to dm_done().

Reported-by: Mike Christie <michaelc@cs.wisc.edu>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I421ad803bb717d570e55718856e49c19e8dabab7
dm: fix deadlock with request based dm and queue request_fn recursion

commit a8c32a5c98943d370ea606a2e7dc04717eb92206 upstream.

Request based dm attempts to re-run the request queue off the
request completion path. If used with a driver that potentially does
end_io from its request_fn, we could deadlock trying to recurse
back into request dispatch. Fix this by punting the request queue
run to kblockd.

Tested to fix a quickly reproducible deadlock in such a scenario.

Acked-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: If8d1556f89586d0a9737a4ae5e1ac0fa8719c575
md: protect against crash upon fsync on ro array

commit bbfa57c0f2243a7c31fd248d22e9861a2802cad5 upstream.

If an fsync occurs on a read-only array, we need to send a
completion for the IO and may not increment the active IO count.
Otherwise, we hit a bug trace and can't stop the MD array anymore.

By advice of Christoph Hellwig we return success upon a flush
request but we return -EROFS for other writes.
We detect flush requests by checking if the bio has zero sectors.

This patch is suitable to any -stable kernel to which it applies.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Riemer <sebastian.riemer@profitbricks.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by: Paul Menzel <paulepanter@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I6373514b4da0fd9b7a570d5a572c80381e4e986c
dm ioctl: prevent unsafe change to dm_ioctl data_size

commit e910d7ebecd1aac43125944a8641b6cb1a0dfabe upstream.

Abort dm ioctl processing if userspace changes the data_size parameter
after we validated it but before we finished copying the data buffer
from userspace.

The dm ioctl parameters are processed in the following sequence:
 1. ctl_ioctl() calls copy_params();
 2. copy_params() makes a first copy of the fixed-sized portion of the
    userspace parameters into the local variable "tmp";
 3. copy_params() then validates tmp.data_size and allocates a new
    structure big enough to hold the complete data and copies the whole
    userspace buffer there;
 4. ctl_ioctl() reads userspace data the second time and copies the whole
    buffer into the pointer "param";
 5. ctl_ioctl() reads param->data_size without any validation and stores it
    in the variable "input_param_size";
 6. "input_param_size" is further used as the authoritative size of the
    kernel buffer.

The problem is that userspace code could change the contents of user
memory between steps 2 and 4.  In particular, the data_size parameter
can be changed to an invalid value after the kernel has validated it.
This lets userspace force the kernel to access invalid kernel memory.

The fix is to ensure that the size has not changed at step 4.

This patch shouldn't have a security impact because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is
required to run this code, but it should be fixed anyway.

Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I49bbf88aa8ba464bf8fbcb6a970ee905a301b21d
cpuquiet_balanced: fix typo
Sound Control: expose direct register manipulations to userspace

bump driver version to 3.3

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
Sound Control: Misc clean up for newer WCD9xxx SOCs

Bump driver version to 3.4

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
Sound Control: let register lock be dependent on different hw revisions

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
Sound Control: separate locking mechanism for recording and playback

with newer hardware revisions coming from Qualcomm, single register lock
control isn't sufficient to cover both playback and recording usage scenarios

bump to version 3.5

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>