bdi: allow block devices to say that they require stable page writes

This patchset ("stable page writes, part 2") makes some key
modifications to the original 'stable page writes' patchset.  First, it
provides creators (devices and filesystems) of a backing_dev_info a flag
that declares whether or not it is necessary to ensure that page
contents cannot change during writeout.  It is no longer assumed that
this is true of all devices (which was never true anyway).  Second, the
flag is used to relaxed the wait_on_page_writeback calls so that wait
only occurs if the device needs it.  Third, it fixes up the remaining
disk-backed filesystems to use this improved conditional-wait logic to
provide stable page writes on those filesystems.

It is hoped that (for people not using checksumming devices, anyway)
this patchset will give back unnecessary performance decreases since the
original stable page write patchset went into 3.0.  Sorry about not
fixing it sooner.

Complaints were registered by several people about the long write
latencies introduced by the original stable page write patchset.
Generally speaking, the kernel ought to allocate as little extra memory
as possible to facilitate writeout, but for people who simply cannot
wait, a second page stability strategy is (re)introduced: snapshotting
page contents.  The waiting behavior is still the default strategy; to
enable page snapshotting, a superblock flag (MS_SNAP_STABLE) must be
set.  This flag is used to bandaid^Henable stable page writeback on
ext3[1], and is not used anywhere else.

Given that there are already a few storage devices and network FSes that
have rolled their own page stability wait/page snapshot code, it would
be nice to move towards consolidating all of these.  It seems possible
that iscsi and raid5 may wish to use the new stable page write support
to enable zero-copy writeout.

Thank you to Jan Kara for helping fix a couple more filesystems.

Per Andrew Morton's request, here are the result of using dbench to measure
latencies on ext2:

3.8.0-rc3:
   Operation      Count    AvgLat    MaxLat
   ----------------------------------------
   WriteX        109347     0.028    59.817
   ReadX         347180     0.004     3.391
   Flush          15514    29.828   287.283

  Throughput 57.429 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=287.290 ms

3.8.0-rc3 + patches:
   WriteX        105556     0.029     4.273
   ReadX         335004     0.005     4.112
   Flush          14982    30.540   298.634

  Throughput 55.4496 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=298.650 ms

As you can see, for ext2 the maximum write latency decreases from ~60ms
on a laptop hard disk to ~4ms.  I'm not sure why the flush latencies
increase, though I suspect that being able to dirty pages faster gives
the flusher more work to do.

On ext4, the average write latency decreases as well as all the maximum
latencies:

3.8.0-rc3:
   WriteX         85624     0.152    33.078
   ReadX         272090     0.010    61.210
   Flush          12129    36.219   168.260

  Throughput 44.8618 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=168.276 ms

3.8.0-rc3 + patches:
   WriteX         86082     0.141    30.928
   ReadX         273358     0.010    36.124
   Flush          12214    34.800   165.689

  Throughput 44.9941 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=165.722 ms

XFS seems to exhibit similar latency improvements as ext2:

3.8.0-rc3:
   WriteX        125739     0.028   104.343
   ReadX         399070     0.005     4.115
   Flush          17851    25.004   131.390

  Throughput 66.0024 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=131.406 ms

3.8.0-rc3 + patches:
   WriteX        123529     0.028     6.299
   ReadX         392434     0.005     4.287
   Flush          17549    25.120   188.687

  Throughput 64.9113 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=188.704 ms

...and btrfs, just to round things out, also shows some latency
decreases:

3.8.0-rc3:
   WriteX         67122     0.083    82.355
   ReadX         212719     0.005     2.828
   Flush           9547    47.561   147.418

  Throughput 35.3391 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=147.433 ms

3.8.0-rc3 + patches:
   WriteX         64898     0.101    71.631
   ReadX         206673     0.005     7.123
   Flush           9190    47.963   219.034

  Throughput 34.0795 MB/sec  4 clients  4 procs  max_latency=219.044 ms

Before this patchset, all filesystems would block, regardless of whether
or not it was necessary.  ext3 would wait, but still generate occasional
checksum errors.  The network filesystems were left to do their own
thing, so they'd wait too.

After this patchset, all the disk filesystems except ext3 and btrfs will
wait only if the hardware requires it.  ext3 (if necessary) snapshots
pages instead of blocking, and btrfs provides its own bdi so the mm will
never wait.  Network filesystems haven't been touched, so either they
provide their own wait code, or they don't block at all.  The blocking
behavior is back to what it was before 3.0 if you don't have a disk
requiring stable page writes.

This patchset has been tested on 3.8.0-rc3 on x64 with ext3, ext4, and
xfs.  I've spot-checked 3.8.0-rc4 and seem to be getting the same
results as -rc3.

[1] The alternative fixes to ext3 include fixing the locking order and
page bit handling like we did for ext4 (but then why not just use
ext4?), or setting PG_writeback so early that ext3 becomes extremely
slow.  I tried that, but the number of write()s I could initiate dropped
by nearly an order of magnitude.  That was a bit much even for the
author of the stable page series! :)

This patch:

Creates a per-backing-device flag that tracks whether or not pages must
be held immutable during writeout.  Eventually it will be used to waive
wait_for_page_writeback() if nothing requires stable pages.

Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Ron Minnich <rminnich@sandia.gov>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
remove a OOP from the frequency table as it only causes overhead
Revert "arch: omap: export current IVA clock to userspace, make GPU+IVA exports match"

This reverts commit bbac1a60c1c7a1d0b348ae5963374aeda086a279.
Revert "tty: omap-serial: Enable IDLE MODE on runtime suspend"

This reverts commit 559dae339e90f71cb6f8eedd7e6f1ac3082f54ce.
kernel/futex.c:update
futex: Allow architectures to skip futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() test

If an architecture has futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() implemented and there
is no runtime check necessary, allow to skip the test within futex_init().

This allows to get rid of some code which would always give the same result,
and also allows the compiler to optimize a couple of if statements away.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140302120947.GA3641@osiris
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: revert back to the explicit waiter counting code

Srikar Dronamraju reports that commit b0c29f79ecea ("futexes: Avoid
taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up") causes java threads
getting stuck on futexes when runing specjbb on a power7 numa box.

The cause appears to be that the powerpc spinlocks aren't using the same
ticket lock model that we use on x86 (and other) architectures, which in
turn result in the "spin_is_locked()" test in hb_waiters_pending()
occasionally reporting an unlocked spinlock even when there are pending
waiters.

So this reinstates Davidlohr Bueso's original explicit waiter counting
code, which I had convinced Davidlohr to drop in favor of figuring out
the pending waiters by just using the existing state of the spinlock and
the wait queue.

Reported-and-tested-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Original-code-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake

Jan Stancek reported:
 "pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
  occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.

  Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
  Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
  which calls:

      futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)

  This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
  tries to wake up another thread:

      futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)

  If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
  requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"

The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.

This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks.  It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: update documentation for ordering guarantees

Commits 11d4616bd07f ("futex: revert back to the explicit waiter
counting code") and 69cd9eba3886 ("futex: avoid race between requeue and
wake") changed some of the finer details of how we think about futexes.
One was a late fix and the other a consequence of overlooking the whole
requeuing logic.

The first change caused our documentation to be incorrect, and the
second made us aware that we need to explicitly add more details to it.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check

Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Trifan <jimsth@gmail.com>
clean