Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()

In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.

Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
epoll: prevent missed events on EPOLL_CTL_MOD

commit 128dd1759d96ad36c379240f8b9463e8acfd37a1 upstream.

EPOLL_CTL_MOD sets the interest mask before calling f_op->poll() to
ensure events are not missed.  Since the modifications to the interest
mask are not protected by the same lock as ep_poll_callback, we need to
ensure the change is visible to other CPUs calling ep_poll_callback.

We also need to ensure f_op->poll() has an up-to-date view of past
events which occured before we modified the interest mask.  So this
barrier also pairs with the barrier in wq_has_sleeper().

This should guarantee either ep_poll_callback or f_op->poll() (or both)
will notice the readiness of a recently-ready/modified item.

This issue was encountered by Andreas Voellmy and Junchang(Jason) Wang in:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1408782/

Signed-off-by: Eric Wong <normalperson@yhbt.net>
Cc: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@infradead.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andreas Voellmy <andreas.voellmy@yale.edu>
Tested-by: "Junchang(Jason) Wang" <junchang.wang@yale.edu>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
initrd: fix lz4 decompress with initrd

During testing initrd (>2G) support, find decompress/lz4 does not work
with initrd at all.

decompress_* should support:
1. inbuf[]/outbuf[] for kernel preboot.
2. inbuf[]/flush() for initramfs
3. fill()/flush() for initrd.

in the unlz4 does not handle case 3, as input len is passed as 0, and it
failed in first try.

Fix that add one extra if (fill) checking, and get out if EOF from the
fill().

Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: Test for pi_mutex on fault in futex_wait_requeue_pi()

If fixup_pi_state_owner() faults, pi_mutex may be NULL. Test
for pi_mutex != NULL before testing the owner against current
and possibly unlocking it.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: Fix bug in WARN_ON for NULL q.pi_state

The WARN_ON in futex_wait_requeue_pi() for a NULL q.pi_state was testing
the address (&q.pi_state) of the pointer instead of the value
(q.pi_state) of the pointer. Correct it accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c85d97f6e5f79ec389a4ead3e367363c74bd09a.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly

Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the
owner died and provided a workaround.
See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076

The detailed problem analysis shows:

Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and
PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes.

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the
       pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T3 --> observes inconsistent state

This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible
kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that
certain configurations are more likely to expose it.

So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit:

	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {

We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the
futex unconditionally if that's true.

AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner
case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale.

Now the proposed change

-	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
+       if (unlikely(ownerdied ||
+                       !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) {

solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the
"stale WAITERS bit" case.

What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked
on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which
in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3
to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via
pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved!

Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem
because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it
returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to
return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set.

Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the
user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available
pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3
blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the
rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the
user space futex.

lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to
find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that
fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available
nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with
the hash bucket lock held.

So the above scenario changes to:

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between
T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It
also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over.

Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less
dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the
possible wreckage which might be inflicted.

As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts
so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of
avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip
out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as
user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking
about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should
nevertheless :)

Reported-and-tested-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionos
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: avoid wake_futex() for a PI futex_q

Dave Jones reported a bug with futex_lock_pi() that his trinity test
exposed.  Sometime between queue_me() and taking the q.lock_ptr, the
lock_ptr became NULL, resulting in a crash.

While futex_wake() is careful to not call wake_futex() on futex_q's with
a pi_state or an rt_waiter (which are either waiting for a
futex_unlock_pi() or a PI futex_requeue()), futex_wake_op() and
futex_requeue() do not perform the same test.

Update futex_wake_op() and futex_requeue() to test for q.pi_state and
q.rt_waiter and abort with -EINVAL if detected.  To ensure any future
breakage is caught, add a WARN() to wake_futex() if the same condition
is true.

This fix has seen 3 hours of testing with "trinity -c futex" on an
x86_64 VM with 4 CPUS.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy up the WARN()]
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: Revert "futex: Mark get_robust_list as deprecated"

This reverts commit ec0c4274e33c0373e476b73e01995c53128f1257.

get_robust_list() is in use and a removal would break existing user
space. With the permission checks in place it's not longer a security
hole. Remove the deprecation warnings.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
hugetlbfs: fix mmap failure in unaligned size request

The current kernel returns -EINVAL unless a given mmap length is
"almost" hugepage aligned.  This is because in sys_mmap_pgoff() the
given length is passed to vm_mmap_pgoff() as it is without being aligned
with hugepage boundary.

This is a regression introduced in commit 40716e29243d ("hugetlbfs: fix
alignment of huge page requests"), where alignment code is pushed into
hugetlb_file_setup() and the variable len in caller side is not changed.

To fix this, this patch partially reverts that commit, and adds
alignment code in caller side.  And it also introduces hstate_sizelog()
in order to get proper hstate to specified hugepage size.

Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=56881

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning when CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE=n]
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reported-by: <iceman_dvd@yahoo.com>
Cc: Steven Truelove <steven.truelove@utoronto.ca>
Cc: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: Take hugepages into account when generating futex_key

The futex_keys of process shared futexes are generated from the page
offset, the mapping host and the mapping index of the futex user space
address. This should result in an unique identifier for each futex.

Though this is not true when futexes are located in different subpages
of an hugepage. The reason is, that the mapping index for all those
futexes evaluates to the index of the base page of the hugetlbfs
mapping. So a futex at offset 0 of the hugepage mapping and another
one at offset PAGE_SIZE of the same hugepage mapping have identical
futex_keys. This happens because the futex code blindly uses
page->index.

Steps to reproduce the bug:

1. Map a file from hugetlbfs. Initialize pthread_mutex1 at offset 0
   and pthread_mutex2 at offset PAGE_SIZE of the hugetlbfs
   mapping.

   The mutexes must be initialized as PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED because
   PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE mutexes are not affected by this issue as
   their keys solely depend on the user space address.

2. Lock mutex1 and mutex2

3. Create thread1 and in the thread function lock mutex1, which
   results in thread1 blocking on the locked mutex1.

4. Create thread2 and in the thread function lock mutex2, which
   results in thread2 blocking on the locked mutex2.

5. Unlock mutex2. Despite the fact that mutex2 got unlocked, thread2
   still blocks on mutex2 because the futex_key points to mutex1.

To solve this issue we need to take the normal page index of the page
which contains the futex into account, if the futex is in an hugetlbfs
mapping. In other words, we calculate the normal page mapping index of
the subpage in the hugetlbfs mapping.

Mappings which are not based on hugetlbfs are not affected and still
use page->index.

Thanks to Mel Gorman who provided a patch for adding proper evaluation
functions to the hugetlbfs code to avoid exposing hugetlbfs specific
details to the futex code.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <zhang.yi20@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Biao <jiang.biao2@zte.com.cn>
Tested-by: Ma Chenggong <ma.chenggong@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: 'Mel Gorman' <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: 'Darren Hart' <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: 'Peter Zijlstra' <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/000101ce71a6%24a83c5880%24f8b50980%24@com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: fix handling of read-only-mapped hugepages

The hugepage code had the exact same bug that regular pages had in
commit ("futexes: Remove rw parameter from get_futex_key()").

The regular page case was fixed by commit 9ea71503a8ed ("futex: Fix
regression with read only mappings"), but the transparent hugepage case
(added in a5b338f2b0b1: "thp: update futex compound knowledge") case
remained broken.

Found by Dave Jones and his trinity tool.

Reported-and-tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
mm: fix aio performance regression for database caused by THP

I am working with a tool that simulates oracle database I/O workload.
This tool (orion to be specific -
<http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E11882_01/server.112/e16638/iodesign.htm#autoId24>)
allocates hugetlbfs pages using shmget() with SHM_HUGETLB flag.  It then
does aio into these pages from flash disks using various common block
sizes used by database.  I am looking at performance with two of the most
common block sizes - 1M and 64K.  aio performance with these two block
sizes plunged after Transparent HugePages was introduced in the kernel.
Here are performance numbers:

		pre-THP		2.6.39		3.11-rc5
1M read		8384 MB/s	5629 MB/s	6501 MB/s
64K read	7867 MB/s	4576 MB/s	4251 MB/s

I have narrowed the performance impact down to the overheads introduced by
THP in __get_page_tail() and put_compound_page() routines.  perf top shows
>40% of cycles being spent in these two routines.  Every time direct I/O
to hugetlbfs pages starts, kernel calls get_page() to grab a reference to
the pages and calls put_page() when I/O completes to put the reference
away.  THP introduced significant amount of locking overhead to get_page()
and put_page() when dealing with compound pages because hugepages can be
split underneath get_page() and put_page().  It added this overhead
irrespective of whether it is dealing with hugetlbfs pages or transparent
hugepages.  This resulted in 20%-45% drop in aio performance when using
hugetlbfs pages.

Since hugetlbfs pages can not be split, there is no reason to go through
all the locking overhead for these pages from what I can see.  I added
code to __get_page_tail() and put_compound_page() to bypass all the
locking code when working with hugetlbfs pages.  This improved performance
significantly.  Performance numbers with this patch:

		pre-THP		3.11-rc5	3.11-rc5 + Patch
1M read		8384 MB/s	6501 MB/s	8371 MB/s
64K read	7867 MB/s	4251 MB/s	6510 MB/s

Performance with 64K read is still lower than what it was before THP, but
still a 53% improvement.  It does mean there is more work to be done but I
will take a 53% improvement for now.

Please take a look at the following patch and let me know if it looks
reasonable.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comments]
Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
mm: hugetlbfs: fix hugetlbfs optimization

Commit ("mm: fix aio performance regression for database caused by THP")
can cause dereference of a dangling pointer if
split_huge_page runs during PageHuge() if there are updates to the
tail_page->private field.

Also it is repeating compound_head twice for hugetlbfs and it is running
compound_head+compound_trans_head for THP when a single one is needed in
both cases.

The new code within the PageSlab() check doesn't need to verify that the
THP page size is never bigger than the smallest hugetlbfs page size, to
avoid memory corruption.

A longstanding theoretical race condition was found while fixing the
above (see the change right after the skip_unlock label, that is
relevant for the compound_lock path too).

By re-establishing the _mapcount tail refcounting for all compound
pages, this also fixes the below problem:

  echo 0 >/sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages

  BUG: Bad page state in process bash  pfn:59a01
  page:ffffea000139b038 count:0 mapcount:10 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
  page flags: 0x1c00000000008000(tail)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 6 PID: 2018 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.0+ #25
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    dump_stack+0x55/0x76
    bad_page+0xd5/0x130
    free_pages_prepare+0x213/0x280
    __free_pages+0x36/0x80
    update_and_free_page+0xc1/0xd0
    free_pool_huge_page+0xc2/0xe0
    set_max_huge_pages.part.58+0x14c/0x220
    nr_hugepages_store_common.isra.60+0xd0/0xf0
    nr_hugepages_store+0x13/0x20
    kobj_attr_store+0xf/0x20
    sysfs_write_file+0x189/0x1e0
    vfs_write+0xc5/0x1f0
    SyS_write+0x55/0xb0
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Pravin Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <jweiner@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Guillaume Morin <guillaume@morinfr.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: fix kernel-doc notation and spello

Fix kernel-doc warning in futex.c and convert 'Returns' to the new Return:
kernel-doc notation format.

  Warning(kernel/futex.c:2286): Excess function parameter 'clockrt' description in 'futex_wait_requeue_pi'

Fix one spello.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futex: move user address verification up to common code

When debugging the read-only hugepage case, I was confused by the fact
that get_futex_key() did an access_ok() only for the non-shared futex
case, since the user address checking really isn't in any way specific
to the private key handling.

Now, it turns out that the shared key handling does effectively do the
equivalent checks inside get_user_pages_fast() (it doesn't actually
check the address range on x86, but does check the page protections for
being a user page).  So it wasn't actually a bug, but the fact that we
treat the address differently for private and shared futexes threw me
for a loop.

Just move the check up, so that it gets done for both cases.  Also, use
the 'rw' parameter for the type, even if it doesn't actually matter any
more (it's a historical artifact of the old racy i386 "page faults from
kernel space don't check write protections").

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futexes: Clean up various details

- Remove unnecessary head variables.
- Delete unused parameter in queue_unlock().

Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-2-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance

Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.

This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.

Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.

Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.

For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:

 +---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
 | threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
 +---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
 |     512 |              32426 | 50531  (+55.8%)        | 255274  (+687.2%)     | 292553  (+802.2%)             |
 |     256 |              65360 | 99588  (+52.3%)        | 443563  (+578.6%)     | 508088  (+677.3%)             |
 |     128 |             125635 | 200075 (+59.2%)        | 742613  (+491.1%)     | 835452  (+564.9%)             |
 |      80 |             193559 | 323425 (+67.1%)        | 1028147 (+431.1%)     | 1130304 (+483.9%)             |
 |      64 |             247667 | 443740 (+79.1%)        | 997300  (+302.6%)     | 1145494 (+362.5%)             |
 |      32 |             628412 | 721401 (+14.7%)        | 965996  (+53.7%)      | 1122115 (+78.5%)              |
 +---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+

Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futexes: Document multiprocessor ordering guarantees

That's essential, if you want to hack on futexes.

Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
futexes: Avoid taking the hb->lock if there's nothing to wake up

In futex_wake() there is clearly no point in taking the hb->lock
if we know beforehand that there are no tasks to be woken. While
the hash bucket's plist head is a cheap way of knowing this, we
cannot rely 100% on it as there is a racy window between the
futex_wait call and when the task is actually added to the
plist. To this end, we couple it with the spinlock check as
tasks trying to enter the critical region are most likely
potential waiters that will be added to the plist, thus
preventing tasks sleeping forever if wakers don't acknowledge
all possible waiters.

Furthermore, the futex ordering guarantees are preserved,
ensuring that waiters either observe the changed user space
value before blocking or is woken by a concurrent waker. For
wakers, this is done by relying on the barriers in
get_futex_key_refs() -- for archs that do not have implicit mb
in atomic_inc(), we explicitly add them through a new
futex_get_mm function. For waiters we rely on the fact that
spin_lock calls already update the head counter, so spinners
are visible even if the lock hasn't been acquired yet.

For more details please refer to the updated comments in the
code and related discussion:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/11/26/556

Special thanks to tglx for careful review and feedback.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-5-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>