diag: dci: Safeguard to prevent integer overflow

At certain point in diag driver there can be integer overflow
thus can lead to memory leak. Added a safegaurd for it.

Change-Id: I9347405d8f1f95ed42fe0abf35cbf4c362281bdf
CRs-fixed: 565160
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
diag: dci: Safeguard to prevent Integer Underflow and Memory Leak

At certain point in diag driver there can be integer underflow
thus can lead to memory leak. Added a safeguard for that.

Change-Id: I2a0304f5b9888fe12ca9ef5fbaa9a68ee4ab9c15
Crs-fixed: 556860
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
arm: mach-msm: fix integer overflow in DFE ioctls for reg arr rw

Added error checks for upper limit of param.num in DFE ioctls
for register array r/w

Change-Id: I62d2eac38024c6c64f8d2d0f6d65f409569b2a76
Acked-by: John Nicholas <jnichola@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Yadav Abbarapu <quicvenkat@codeaurora.org>
arm: mach-msm: fix integer overflow in DFE_IOCTL_COMMAND

Added error checks for upper limit of param.num in
DFE_IOCTL_COMMAND

Change-Id: I0143813d38ec7a5dfa7a8307b075daf7d4a4d101
Acked-by: John Nicholas <jnichola@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Venkatesh Yadav Abbarapu <quicvenkat@codeaurora.org>
n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode

The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.

If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
  int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
  struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
  ...
  memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
  ...
  tb->used += space;

so the race of the two can result in something like this:
          A                             B
   __tty_buffer_request_room
                                  __tty_buffer_request_room
   memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
   tb->used += space;
                                 memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM

B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.

Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.

Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.

js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call

Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I9e235db6ec2bb950f26bd8a23f6145dab5dc0a15
Git-commit: 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
[rsiddoji@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar S <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
Merge "n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode"
msm_bam_rmnet: Fix potential memory corruption

Usage of legacy string manipulation function sprintf could lead to
memory corruption as the number of bytes to be written to the
destination is not bounded. Replace sprintf with snprintf where the
number of bytes to be written is explicitly specified.

CRs-fixed: 672202
Change-Id: Iab7516ad0e2540eb619fe96e26a3516c7adf86cc
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Merge "msm_bam_rmnet: Fix potential memory corruption"
Staging: android: binder: More offset validation.

Make sure offsets don't point to overlapping flat_binder_object
structs.

Conflicts:
	drivers/staging/android/binder.c

Change-Id: I425ab0c46fbe2b00ed679c5becf9e8140395eb40
Signed-off-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Git-commit: 457c3cd05958b8397211ae1f6dd3c3d325f4c0ea
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/
Signed-off-by: Neeti Desai <neetid@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ajay Dudani <adudani@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Nirmal Abraham <nabrah@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Prados Das <prados@codeaurora.org>
Merge "Staging: android: binder: More offset validation."
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: I9ee5c8a87cc43c7b1e1dc2796949e7c20c74ddf4
Git-commit: e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Divya Sharma <c_shard@codeaurora.org>
Merge "futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)"
msm: ocmem: Call restore_sec_config() after every power collapse.

As the QRIB is enabled, after every power collapse of ocmem, the
QRIB is reset to the maximum security state. Due to this the apps
processor cannot access the ocmem register space.

The restore_sec_config() scm call needs to be called before any
register is accessed after a power collapse to ensure that the
security configuration is restored. The clocks need to be turned
on before every call that is made into TZ to ensure that there
is no power collapse.

Conflicts:

	arch/arm/mach-msm/include/mach/ocmem_priv.h
	arch/arm/mach-msm/ocmem.c
	arch/arm/mach-msm/ocmem_core.c
	arch/arm/mach-msm/ocmem_sched.c

CRs-Fixed: 651324, 660089
Change-Id: Ieb6b635142057e219de29e811c93749f6500cec5
Signed-off-by: Neeti Desai <neetid@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Gurram <c_abhina@codeaurora.org>
Merge "msm: ocmem: Call restore_sec_config() after every power collapse."
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all
such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

[On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes,
and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission
is granted in policy.  In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for
root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current
AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery
console which has a legitimate need for it.  The other potential vector
is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches
xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard).  However, the end result is
only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG.  This fix is
queued for 3.14.]

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

[sds:  commit message edited to note Android implications and
to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit]

Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413
Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sivasri Kumar Vanka <sivasri@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj Deenadayalan <adeena@codeaurora.org>
diag: Safeguard for bound checks and integer underflow

At certain point in diag driver there can be integer underflow
and thus can lead to memory leak. Bound checks are placed to
ensure correct behavior of condition statements.

Change-Id: I47e02f764c2c7412db6f90fd42192fee32a761d3
CRs-fixed: 549470
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Merge "arm: mach-msm: fix integer overflow in DFE_IOCTL_COMMAND"
Merge "SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts."
Merge "diag: Safeguard for bound checks and integer underflow"
Merge "diag: dci: Safeguard to prevent integer overflow"