ARM: kconfig: select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for CPUv6+ && MMU

Modern ARM CPUs can perform efficient unaligned memory accesses in
hardware and this feature is relied up on by code such as the dcache
word-at-a-time name hashing.

[pawitp: adapt to kernel 3.0]

Change-Id: I41559fc9255229e2601f4bef28aa8d48246156b7
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
tenderloin_defconfig: Enable HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
spi_qsd: Remove check for unaligned  length during input_irq.

QUP_IRQ  complete is triggered  before  dmov_rx callback.
Which will initiate SPI to start next transfer, due to
this earlier DMOV_CMD is blocked  and results in kernel panic.

Current  Implementation  make sure that transfer complete waits
For  DMOV callback only in case of aligned lengths , This patch
ensures   transfer trigger only after DMOV  RX call back for
unaligned length also.

CRs-Fixed: 583126
Change-Id: I090cf9f2c0abb21907cf5786829d5351c23a9314
Signed-off-by: Sana Venkat Raju <c_vsana@codeaurora.org>

Conflicts:

	drivers/spi/spi_qsd.c
jbd2: optimize jbd2_journal_force_commit

Current implementation of jbd2_journal_force_commit() is suboptimal because
result in empty and useless commits. But callers just want to force and wait
any unfinished commits. We already have jbd2_journal_force_commit_nested()
which does exactly what we want, except we are guaranteed that we do not hold
journal transaction open.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>

Change-Id: I5c041a1898838e880714a913b5a915f105a8dfb9
timer: optimize apply_slack()

__fls(mask) is equivalent to find_last_bit(&mask, BITS_PER_LONG), but cheaper.
find_last_bit was showing up high on the list when I was profiling for stalls
on icache misses on a system with very small cache size (MIPS).

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: edoko <r_data@naver.com>

Change-Id: I8a5021a2fb2936c00ffd456663a76cb1b23e3100
writeback: Fix occasional slow sync(1)

In case when system contains no dirty pages, wakeup_flusher_threads()
will submit WB_SYNC_NONE writeback for 0 pages so wb_writeback() exits
immediately without doing anything. Thus sync(1) will write all the
dirty inodes from a WB_SYNC_ALL writeback pass which is slow.

Fix the problem by using get_nr_dirty_pages() in
wakeup_flusher_threads() instead of calculating number of dirty pages
manually. That function also takes number of dirty inodes into account.

Change-Id: I458027ae08d9a5a93202a7b97ace1f8da7a18a07
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Paul Taysom <taysom@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads

We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@...art.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@...com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@...hat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@...hat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@...utronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I7444c58d00cbded35b078331a8740e8431cb13a5
futex: Add another early deadlock detection check

Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@...hat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa62451 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@...art.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@...com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@...hat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...k.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@...hat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@...hat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@...utronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

Change-Id: I245f77622443435cf36bbd157b98798c235acdb0
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
then dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an
exploitable condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() into line with
futex_wait_requeue_pi() which performs the same check as per commit
6f7b0a2a5 (futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi())

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Change-Id: Iea1dfe1d877d63a374db2623dca6cea4e7a544b9
futex: Validate atomic acquisition in futex_lock_pi_atomic()

We need to protect the atomic acquisition in the kernel against rogue
user space which sets the user space futex to 0, so the kernel side
acquisition succeeds while there is existing state in the kernel
associated to the real owner.

Verify whether the futex has waiters associated with kernel state. If
it has, return -EINVAL. The state is corrupted already, so no point in
cleaning it up. Subsequent calls will fail as well. Not our problem.

[ tglx: Use futex_top_waiter() and explain why we do not need to try
  	restoring the already corrupted user space state. ]

Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Change-Id: I6c19ae4a5e85fbc9c560723e672d5136c4786ab6
futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi

If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.

Clean it up unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: Ic84473a62bdf3e5702f46e04b266afa38e9ec40e

Conflicts:

	kernel/futex.c
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust

The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of
the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel
even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters
bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi
path or from user space just for fun.

The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case
that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space
address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some
circumstances.

Handle the cases explicit:

     Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID      | uODIED | ?

[1]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | 0         | 0/1    | Valid
[2]  NULL   | ---      | ---       | >0        | 0/1    | Valid

[3]  Found  | NULL     | --        | Any       | 0/1    | Invalid

[4]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | 0         | 1      | Valid
[5]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | >0        | 1      | Invalid

[6]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 1      | Valid

[7]  Found  | Found    | NULL      | Any       | 0      | Invalid

[8]  Found  | Found    | task      | ==taskTID | 0/1    | Valid
[9]  Found  | Found    | task      | 0         | 0      | Invalid
[10] Found  | Found    | task      | !=taskTID | 0/1    | Invalid

[1]  Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
     came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.

[2]  Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
     thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.

[3]  Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex

[4]  Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
     value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.

[5]  The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
     and exit_pi_state_list()

[6]  Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
     the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.

[7]  pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.

[8]  Owner and user space value match

[9]  There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
     except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
     FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]

[10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
     TID out of sync.

Backport to 3.13
  conflicts: kernel/futex.c

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Change-Id: I967e3bb07b239941ea51af6b09d61d7b08138f40
arm: Fix compatibility with linaro toolchain

Conflicts:

	arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
char: Added Fast Random generator support (frandom)

Frandom is a Linux kernel random number generator, which is 10-50
times faster than what you get from Linux' built-in /dev/urandom.
And it uses very little (/dev/frandom) or none (/dev/erandom) of
the kernel's entropy pool, so it is very useful for applications
that require a handy source for lots of random data.

Conflicts:

	drivers/char/Makefile
rwsem: Optimized ARM RWSEM algorithm

RWSEM implementation for ARM using atomic functions.
Heavily based on arch/sh/include/asm/rwsem.h

Conflicts:

	arch/arm/include/asm/rwsem.h
rwsem-spinlock: Implement writer lock-stealing for better scalability

We (Linux Kernel Performance project) found a regression
introduced by commit:

  5a505085f043 mm/rmap: Convert the struct anon_vma::mutex to an rwsem

which converted all anon_vma::mutex locks rwsem write locks.

The semantics are the same, but the behavioral difference is
quite huge in some cases. After investigating it we found the
root cause: mutexes support lock stealing while rwsems don't.

Here is the link for the detailed regression report:

  https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/1/29/84

Ingo suggested adding write lock stealing to rwsems:

    "I think we should allow lock-steal between rwsem writers - that
     will not hurt fairness as most rwsem fairness concerns relate to
     reader vs. writer fairness"

And here is the rwsem-spinlock version.

With this patch, we got a double performance increase in one
test box with following aim7 workfile:

    FILESIZE: 1M
    POOLSIZE: 10M
    10 fork_test

 /usr/bin/time output w/o patch                       /usr/bin/time_output with patch
 -- Percent of CPU this job got: 369%                 Percent of CPU this job got: 537%
 Voluntary context switches: 640595016                Voluntary context switches: 157915561

We got a 45% increase in CPU usage and saved about 3/4 voluntary context switches.

Reported-by: LKP project <lkp@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yuanhan Liu <yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1359716356-23865-1-git-send-email-yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Conflicts:

	lib/rwsem-spinlock.c
rwsem: Implement writer lock-stealing for better scalability

Commit 5a505085f043 ("mm/rmap: Convert the struct anon_vma::mutex
to an rwsem") changed struct anon_vma::mutex to an rwsem, which
caused aim7 fork_test performance to drop by 50%.

Yuanhan Liu did the following excellent analysis:

    https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/1/29/84

and found that the regression is caused by strict, serialized,
FIFO sequential write-ownership of rwsems. Ingo suggested
implementing opportunistic lock-stealing for the front writer
task in the waitqueue.

Yuanhan Liu implemented lock-stealing for spinlock-rwsems,
which indeed recovered much of the regression - confirming
the analysis that the main factor in the regression was the
FIFO writer-fairness of rwsems.

In this patch we allow lock-stealing to happen when the first
waiter is also writer. With that change in place the
aim7 fork_test performance is fully recovered on my
Intel NHM EP, NHM EX, SNB EP 2S and 4S test-machines.

Reported-by: lkp@linux.intel.com
Reported-by: Yuanhan Liu <yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@intel.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/1/29/84
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1360069915-31619-1-git-send-email-alex.shi@intel.com
[ Small stylistic fixes, updated changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
rwsem: make the waiter type an enumeration rather than a bitmask

We are not planning to add some new waiter flags, so we can convert the
waiter type into an enumeration.

Background: David Howells suggested I do this back when I tried adding
a new waiter type for unfair readers. However, I believe the cleanup
applies regardless of that use case.

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
rwsem: shorter spinlocked section in rwsem_down_failed_common()

This change reduces the size of the spinlocked and TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE
sections in rwsem_down_failed_common():

- We only need the sem->wait_lock to insert ourselves on the wait_list;
  the waiter node can be prepared outside of the wait_lock.

- The task state only needs to be set to TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE immediately
  before checking if we actually need to sleep; it doesn't need to protect
  the entire function.

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>

Conflicts:

	lib/rwsem.c
rwsem: move rwsem_down_failed_common code into rwsem_down_{read,write}_failed

Remove the rwsem_down_failed_common function and replace it with two
identical copies of its code in rwsem_down_{read,write}_failed.
This is because we want to make different optimizations in
rwsem_down_{read,write}_failed; we are adding this pure-duplication
step as a separate commit in order to make it easier to check the
following steps.

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>