ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name

A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.

[Backport of net-next cf970c002d270c36202bd5b9c2804d3097a52da0]

Bug: 12780426
Change-Id: I29d9cb95ef05ec76d37517e01317f4a29e60931c
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
nf: xt_qtaguid: fix handling for cases where tunnels are used.

* fix skb->dev vs par->in/out
When there is some forwarding going on, it introduces extra state
around devs associated with xt_action_param->in/out and sk_buff->dev.
E.g.
   par->in and par->out are both set, or
   skb->dev and par->out are both set (and different)
This would lead qtaguid to make the wrong assumption about the
direction and update the wrong device stats.
Now we rely more on par->in/out.

* Fix handling when qtaguid is used as "owner"
When qtaguid is used as an owner module, and sk_socket->file is
not there (happens when tunnels are involved), it would
incorrectly do a tag stats update.

* Correct debug messages.

Bug: 11687690
Change-Id: I2b1ff8bd7131969ce9e25f8291d83a6280b3ba7f
Signed-off-by: JP Abgrall <jpa@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2b71479d6f5fe8f33b335f713380f72037244395)
SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: Revert to retain the kernel API format.

Reverted Change-Id: Iaeca5dd2d7878c0733923ae03309a2a7b86979ca

Change-Id: I0e0a4f60ec14330d8d8d1c5a508fa058d9919e07
Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <ashishsharma@google.com>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

[On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes,
and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission
is granted in policy.  In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for
root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current
AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery
console which has a legitimate need for it.  The other potential vector
is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches
xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard).  However, the end result is
only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG.  This fix is
queued for 3.14.]

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

[sds:  commit message edited to note Android implications and
to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit]

Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413
Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Merge remote-tracking branch 'aosp-common/android-3.0' into kk-notest
staging: zcache: support multiple clients, prep for KVM and RAMster

This is version 3 of an update to zcache, incorporating feedback from the list.
This patch adds support to the in-kernel transcendent memory ("tmem") code
and the zcache driver for multiple clients, which will be needed for both
RAMster and KVM support.  It also adds additional tmem callbacks to support
RAMster and corresponding no-op stubs in the zcache driver.  In v2, I've
also taken the liberty of adding some additional sysfs variables to
both surface information and allow policy control.  Those experimenting
with zcache should find them useful.  V3 clarifies some code walking
and declaring arrays.

Signed-off-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>

[v3: error27@gmail.com: fix array bounds/walking]
[v2: konrad.wilk@oracle.com: fix bools, add check for NULL, fix a comment]
[v2: sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com: add info/tunables for poor compression]
[v2: marcusklemm@googlemail.com: add tunable for max persistent pages]
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: fix zcache building

zcache is only building tmem.c and not building zcache.c. To keep the
module name, zcache.c must be renamed if symbols from tmem.c are to
remain unexported.

Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@holoscopio.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: module is GPL

This avoids tainting the kernel as if a proprietary module was loaded.
The kernel will still be tainted because this is a staging driver.

Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@holoscopio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: include module.h for MODULE_LICENSE

The oncoming cleanup of module.h usage requires the explicit inclusion
of module.h when it was otherwise being included indirectly. Otherwise,
building zcache will fail.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@holoscopio.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
zcache: Use div_u64 for 64-bit division

xv_get_total_size_bytes returns a u64 value and it's used in a division.
This causes build failures in 32-bit architectures, as reported by Randy
Dunlap.

Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@holoscopio.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
zcache: Fix build error when sysfs is not defined

Signed-off-by: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: fix possible sleep under lock

zcache_new_pool() calls kmalloc() with GFP_KERNEL which has
__GFP_WAIT set.  However, zcache_new_pool() gets called on
a stack that holds the swap_lock spinlock, leading to a
possible sleep-with-lock situation. The lock is obtained
in enable_swap_info().

The patch replaces GFP_KERNEL with GFP_ATOMIC.

v2: replace with GFP_ATOMIC, not GFP_IOFS

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: fix typos

The patch fixes two typos in zcache-main.c

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: fix crash on high memory swap

zcache_put_page() was modified to pass page_address(page) instead of the
actual page structure. In combination with the function signature changes
to tmem_put() and zcache_pampd_create(), zcache_pampd_create() tries to
(re)derive the page structure from the virtual address.  However, if the
original page is a high memory page (or any unmapped page), this
virt_to_page() fails because the page_address() in zcache_put_page()
returned NULL.

This patch changes zcache_put_page() and zcache_get_page() to pass
the page structure instead of the page's virtual address, which
may or may not exist.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Staging: zcache: signedness bug in tmem_get()

"ret" needs to be signed for the error handling to work properly.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: fix cleancache crash

After commit c5f5c4db3938 ("staging: zcache: fix crash on high memory
swap") cleancache crashes on the first successful get.  This was caused
by a remaining virt_to_page() call in zcache_pampd_get_data_and_free()
that only gets run in the cleancache path.

The patch converts the virt_to_page() to struct page casting like was
done for other instances in c5f5c4db3938.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-By: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
staging: zcache: fix crash on cpu remove

In the case that a cpu is taken offline before zcache_do_preload() is
ever called on the cpu, the per-cpu zcache_preloads structure will
be uninitialized.  In the CPU_DEAD case for zcache_cpu_notifier(),
kp->obj is not checked before calling kmem_cache_free() on it.
If it is NULL, a crash results.

This patch ensures that both kp->obj and kp->page are not NULL before
calling the respective free functions. In practice, just checking
one or the other should be sufficient since they are assigned together
in zcache_do_preload(), but I check both for safety.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: reduce tmem bucket lock contention

tmem uses hash buckets each with their own rbtree and lock to
quickly lookup tmem objects.  tmem has TMEM_HASH_BUCKETS (256)
buckets per pool.  However, because of the way the tmem_oid is
generated for frontswap pages, only 16 unique tmem_oids are being
generated, resulting in only 16 of the 256 buckets being used.
This cause high lock contention for the per bucket locks.

This patch changes SWIZ_BITS to include more bits of the offset.
The result is that all 256 hash buckets are potentially used resulting in a
95% drop in hash bucket lock contention.

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
staging: zcache: remove zcache_direct_reclaim_lock

zcache_do_preload() currently does a spin_trylock() on the
zcache_direct_reclaim_lock. Holding this lock intends to prevent
shrink_zcache_memory() from evicting zbud pages as a result
of a preload.

However, it also prevents two threads from
executing zcache_do_preload() at the same time.  The first
thread will obtain the lock and the second thread's spin_trylock()
will fail (an aborted preload) causing the page to be either lost
(cleancache) or pushed out to the swap device (frontswap). It
also doesn't ensure that the call to shrink_zcache_memory() is
on the same thread as the call to zcache_do_preload().

Additional, there is no need for this mechanism because all
zcache_do_preload() calls that come down from cleancache already
have PF_MEMALLOC set in the process flags which prevents
direct reclaim in the memory manager. If the zcache_do_preload()
call is done from the frontswap path, we _want_ reclaim to be
done (which it isn't right now).

This patch removes the zcache_direct_reclaim_lock and related
statistics in zcache.

Based on v3.1-rc8

Signed-off-by: Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>