rtc: rtc-at91rm9200: fix infinite wait for ACKUPD irq

commit 2fe121e1f5aa3bf31b418a9790db6c400e922291 upstream.

The rtc user must wait at least 1 sec between each time/calandar update
(see atmel's datasheet chapter "Updating Time/Calendar").

Use the 1Hz interrupt to update the at91_rtc_upd_rdy flag and wait for
the at91_rtc_wait_upd_rdy event if the rtc is not ready.

This patch fixes a deadlock in an uninterruptible wait when the RTC is
updated more than once every second.  AFAICT the bug is here from the
beginning, but I think we should at least backport this fix to 3.10 and
the following longterm and stable releases.

Signed-off-by: Boris BREZILLON <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Reported-by: Bryan Evenson <bevenson@melinkcorp.com>
Tested-by: Bryan Evenson <bevenson@melinkcorp.com>
Cc: Andrew Victor <linux@maxim.org.za>
Cc: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com>
Cc: Jean-Christophe Plagniol-Villard <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C

commit 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f upstream.

This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.

This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:

   Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
   for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
   Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
   connection if it occurs.

Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()

commit 0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad upstream.

Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
[  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[  106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750241] PGD 0
[  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>]  [<ffffffff811ec7da>]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
[  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[  106.750962] Stack:
[  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[  106.751149] Call Trace:
[  106.751172]  [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[  106.751199]  [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[  106.751225]  [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[  106.751250]  [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[  106.751276]  [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[  106.751301]  [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[  106.751327]  [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[  106.751355]  [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[  106.751382]  [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[  106.751407]  [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[  106.751432]  [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[  106.751457]  [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[  106.751483]  [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[  106.751509]  [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[  106.751536]  [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  106.751562]  [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[  106.751587]  [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[  106.751612]  [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[  106.751637]  [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[  106.751662]  [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  106.751687]  [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[  106.751712]  [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[  106.751738]  [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[  106.751763]  [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[  106.751788]  [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[  106.751814]  [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  106.752185] RIP  [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.752214]  RSP <ffff880400fcba60>
[  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.

Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.

This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value

commit 2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4 upstream.

Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netlink: Rename netlink_capable netlink_allowed

[ Upstream commit 5187cd055b6e81fc6526109456f8b20623148d5f ]

netlink_capable is a static internal function in af_netlink.c and we
have better uses for the name netlink_capable.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: Move the permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo to packet_diag_dump

[ Upstream commit a53b72c83a4216f2eb883ed45a0cbce014b8e62d ]

The permission check in sock_diag_put_filterinfo is wrong, and it is so removed
from it's sources it is not clear why it is wrong.  Move the computation
into packet_diag_dump and pass a bool of the result into sock_diag_filterinfo.

This does not yet correct the capability check but instead simply moves it to make
it clear what is going on.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: Add variants of capable for use on on sockets

[ Upstream commit a3b299da869d6e78cf42ae0b1b41797bcb8c5e4b ]

sk_net_capable - The common case, operations that are safe in a network namespace.
sk_capable - Operations that are not known to be safe in a network namespace
sk_ns_capable - The general case for special cases.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages

[ Upstream commit aa4cf9452f469f16cea8c96283b641b4576d4a7b ]

netlink_net_capable - The common case use, for operations that are safe on a network namespace
netlink_capable - For operations that are only known to be safe for the global root
netlink_ns_capable - The general case of capable used to handle special cases

__netlink_ns_capable - Same as netlink_ns_capable except taking a netlink_skb_parms instead of
		       the skbuff of a netlink message.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages

[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]

It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.

To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.

Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations

[ Upstream commit 2d7a85f4b06e9c27ff629f07a524c48074f07f81 ]

It was possible to get a setuid root or setcap executable to write to
it's stdout or stderr (which has been set made a netlink socket) and
inadvertently reconfigure the networking stack.

To prevent this we check that both the creator of the socket and
the currentl applications has permission to reconfigure the network
stack.

Unfortunately this breaks Zebra which always uses sendto/sendmsg
and creates it's socket without any privileges.

To keep Zebra working don't bother checking if the creator of the
socket has privilege when a destination address is specified.  Instead
rely exclusively on the privileges of the sender of the socket.

Note from Andy: This is exactly Eric's code except for some comment
clarifications and formatting fixes.  Neither I nor, I think, anyone
else is thrilled with this approach, but I'm hesitant to wait on a
better fix since 3.15 is almost here.

Note to stable maintainers: This is a mess.  An earlier series of
patches in 3.15 fix a rather serious security issue (CVE-2014-0181),
but they did so in a way that breaks Zebra.  The offending series
includes:

    commit aa4cf9452f469f16cea8c96283b641b4576d4a7b
    Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    Date:   Wed Apr 23 14:28:03 2014 -0700

        net: Add variants of capable for use on netlink messages

If a given kernel version is missing that series of fixes, it's
probably worth backporting it and this patch.  if that series is
present, then this fix is critical if you care about Zebra.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
netlink: rate-limit leftover bytes warning and print process name

[ Upstream commit bfc5184b69cf9eeb286137640351c650c27f118a ]

Any process is able to send netlink messages with leftover bytes.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.

The warning is supposed to help find userspace bugs, so print the
triggering command name to implicate the buggy program.

[v2: Use pr_warn_ratelimited instead of printk_ratelimited.]

Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: tunnels - enable module autoloading

[ Upstream commit f98f89a0104454f35a62d681683c844f6dbf4043 ]

Enable the module alias hookup to allow tunnel modules to be autoloaded on demand.

This is in line with how most other netdev kinds work, and will allow userspace
to create tunnels without having CAP_SYS_MODULE.

Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: fix inet_getid() and ipv6_select_ident() bugs

[ Upstream commit 39c36094d78c39e038c1e499b2364e13bce36f54 ]

I noticed we were sending wrong IPv4 ID in TCP flows when MTU discovery
is disabled.
Note how GSO/TSO packets do not have monotonically incrementing ID.

06:37:41.575531 IP (id 14227, proto: TCP (6), length: 4396)
06:37:41.575534 IP (id 14272, proto: TCP (6), length: 65212)
06:37:41.575544 IP (id 14312, proto: TCP (6), length: 57972)
06:37:41.575678 IP (id 14317, proto: TCP (6), length: 7292)
06:37:41.575683 IP (id 14361, proto: TCP (6), length: 63764)

It appears I introduced this bug in linux-3.1.

inet_getid() must return the old value of peer->ip_id_count,
not the new one.

Lets revert this part, and remove the prevention of
a null identification field in IPv6 Fragment Extension Header,
which is dubious and not even done properly.

Fixes: 87c48fa3b463 ("ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
team: fix mtu setting

[ Upstream commit 9d0d68faea6962d62dd501cd6e71ce5cc8ed262b ]

Now it is not possible to set mtu to team device which has a port
enslaved to it. The reason is that when team_change_mtu() calls
dev_set_mtu() for port device, notificator for NETDEV_PRECHANGEMTU
event is called and team_device_event() returns NOTIFY_BAD forbidding
the change. So fix this by returning NOTIFY_DONE here in case team is
changing mtu in team_change_mtu().

Introduced-by: 3d249d4c "net: introduce ethernet teaming device"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: fix cwnd undo on DSACK in F-RTO

[ Upstream commit 0cfa5c07d6d1d7f8e710fc671c5ba1ce85e09fa4 ]

This bug is discovered by an recent F-RTO issue on tcpm list
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tcpm/current/msg08794.html

The bug is that currently F-RTO does not use DSACK to undo cwnd in
certain cases: upon receiving an ACK after the RTO retransmission in
F-RTO, and the ACK has DSACK indicating the retransmission is spurious,
the sender only calls tcp_try_undo_loss() if some never retransmisted
data is sacked (FLAG_ORIG_DATA_SACKED).

The correct behavior is to unconditionally call tcp_try_undo_loss so
the DSACK information is used properly to undo the cwnd reduction.

Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: filter: fix typo in sparc BPF JIT

[ Upstream commit 569810d1e3278907264f5b115281fca3f0038d53 ]

fix typo in sparc codegen for SKF_AD_IFINDEX and SKF_AD_HATYPE
classic BPF extensions

Fixes: 2809a2087cc4 ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for sparc")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: filter: fix sparc32 typo

[ Upstream commit 588f5d629b3369aba88f52217d1c473a28fa7723 ]

Fixes: 569810d1e327 ("net: filter: fix typo in sparc BPF JIT")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: qmi_wwan: add Olivetti Olicard modems

[ Upstream commit ba6de0f5304ccdc45ae260e7e0feb6e0ef2dd558 ]

Lars writes: "I'm only 99% sure that the net interfaces are qmi
interfaces, nothing to lose by adding them in my opinion."

And I tend to agree based on the similarity with the two Olicard
modems we already have here.

Reported-by: Lars Melin <larsm17@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: force a list_del() in unregister_netdevice_many()

[ Upstream commit 87757a917b0b3c0787e0563c679762152be81312 ]

unregister_netdevice_many() API is error prone and we had too
many bugs because of dangling LIST_HEAD on stacks.

See commit f87e6f47933e3e ("net: dont leave active on stack LIST_HEAD")

In fact, instead of making sure no caller leaves an active list_head,
just force a list_del() in the callee. No one seems to need to access
the list after unregister_netdevice_many()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipip, sit: fix ipv4_{update_pmtu,redirect} calls

[ Upstream commit 2346829e641b804ece9ac9298136b56d9567c278 ]

ipv4_{update_pmtu,redirect} were called with tunnel's ifindex (t->dev is a
tunnel netdevice). It caused wrong route lookup and failure of pmtu update or
redirect. We should use the same ifindex that we use in ip_route_output_* in
*tunnel_xmit code. It is t->parms.link .

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>