BACKPORT: Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs

With this change, calling
  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time.  For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set.  The same is true for file capabilities.

Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.

To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
  prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)

This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series.  By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.

Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged.  For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.

Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use.  It is fixed in a subsequent patch.

Change-Id: I716224c8b99811a04e183ac2e21c4dff67969a0f
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I6773a8084c3fec3276fd3bb11b47513dae117864
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21356
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

Conflicts:
	include/linux/prctl.h
	kernel/sys.c
BACKPORT: Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS

Change-Id: I83c8188bc5204235a48b2b48ea5fa80b3c60fe10
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I080350852580d49ea0002db04bfcfbc7a34f9c0e
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21357
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W

Introduces a new BPF ancillary instruction that all LD calls will be
mapped through when skb_run_filter() is being used for seccomp BPF.  The
rewriting will be done using a secondary chk_filter function that is run
after skb_chk_filter.

The code change is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER which is added,
along with the seccomp_bpf_load() function later in this series.

This is based on http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/3/2/141

v15: include seccomp.h explicitly for when seccomp_bpf_load exists.
v14: First cut using a single additional instruction
... v13: made bpf functions generic.

Change-Id: Id8c0649cc7891b0822e2e91bd8fe9e565c124b00
Suggested-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I05fa6a025f1126eb3641133f7f9c5530dfd0382c
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21358
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog

Any other users of bpf_*_filter that take a struct sock_fprog from
userspace will need to be able to also accept a compat_sock_fprog
if the arch supports compat calls.  This change allows the existing
compat_sock_fprog be shared.

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

Change-Id: I687cf3c371fdde619db076a46c13b69065e694d4
v18: tasered by the apostrophe police
v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v11: introduction

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I8935e627c4152f28856c069e966fd236a74bcd92
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21359
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef

Replaces the seccomp_t typedef with struct seccomp to match modern
kernel style.

v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v8-v11: no changes
v7: struct seccomp_struct -> struct seccomp
v6: original inclusion in this series.

Change-Id: I5d01940529110854b3e1dbda0aad7dd317994f97
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I115bf1bb0348623d14fa5cc3818be298e039cf12
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21360
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch

Adds a stub for a function that will return the AUDIT_ARCH_* value
appropriate to the supplied task based on the system call convention.

For audit's use, the value can generally be hard-coded at the
audit-site.  However, for other functionality not inlined into syscall
entry/exit, this makes that information available.  seccomp_filter is
the first planned consumer and, as such, the comment indicates a tie to
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.

Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

Change-Id: Ia6d20afa8610285513c22089d58613a54731c361
v18: comment and change reword and rebase.
v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v11: fixed improper return type
v10: introduced

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I64f9bf538e978e2225938d1df64c5baa3de38f81
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21361
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h

Add syscall_get_arch() to export the current AUDIT_ARCH_* based on system call
entry path.

Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

Change-Id: I84d3c875a396b720e3157c96d8721d3ee3787077
v18: - switch to is_ia32_task()
     - rebase to v3.4-rc2
v17: rebase and reviewed-by
v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I795db3bb6c76408761f583c66f47854b6d630e30
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21362
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF

[This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch:
   https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264
 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here:
   https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp
 Complete diff here:
   https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp
]

This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2.  Mode 2 introduces the
ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering
policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program.
This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call
the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format
of struct seccomp_data.

A filter program may be installed by calling:
  struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... };
  ...
  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog);

The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is
allowed to proceed or denied.  If the first filter program installed
allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly
by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel.  All attached
programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to
proceed.

Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
(!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task.  This
ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).

There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
as follows:
- BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time
- BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood
- Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
  arguments
- No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
- system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying
  required for system call policy decisions.

Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable
HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.  In this patch, the primary dependency is on
syscall_get_arguments().  The full desired scope of this feature will
add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series.
Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be
the desired additional functionality.

No architectures are enabled in this patch.

v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2
     - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org)
     - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu)
     - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@)
     - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@)
     - added acked-by
v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com)
     - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000
v16: - no change
v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter
       size (indan@nul.nu)
     - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu)
     - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu)
     - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu)
     - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu)
     - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu)
     - exit_code -> exit_sig
v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct
       (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org)
     - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user
     - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c
     - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB
     - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation
       (all of the above: indan@nul.nu)
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com)
     - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu)
     - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu)
v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com)
     - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu)
     - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu)
     - pare down Kconfig doc reference.
     - extra comment clean up
v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing
       (hpa@zytor.com)
     - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch.
       This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters.
       (hpa@zytor.com)
     - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!)
 v9: - n/a
 v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns
     - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu:
     -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code,
     -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat.
     -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch
        dependencies
 v7:  (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others)
     - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
     - merged into seccomp.c
     - minimal seccomp_filter.h
     - no config option (part of seccomp)
     - no new prctl
     - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h
       (works but arg access always fails)
     - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ...
     - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths
     - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter
 v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
     - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
       installation. (luto@mit.edu)
     - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com)
     - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com)
     - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
 v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
       (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org)
      - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
        handle endianness.  Compromises between the two alternate
        proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
        endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
        (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu)
      - update Kconfig description
      - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
      - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
      - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com)
 v4:  - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
      - now uses current->no_new_privs
        (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com)
      - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
      - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
      - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
 v3:  - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com)
      - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com)
      - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com)
      - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com)
      - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
        torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu
 v2:  - (patch 2 only)

Change-Id: I119ae609503db75c9170afba60f421c4111a2ea1
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: Ibd7ca0e2b0c7c962533ef2ba915b4a4695f09060
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21363
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging

[NOTE! When backporting to 3.2, we dropped audit_seccomp. 3.4+ supports
       this but we still need to integrate better.
]

This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
details to the audit log.

Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

v18: make compat= permanent in the record
v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org
     (suggested by eparis@redhat.com)
v*: original by keescook@chromium.org

Change-Id: I57dc5224f9a359f2c6e0a6d404b7ad2479522372

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I9b7b317f6729fdc4cc417338f97bdd8cebad442a
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21364
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO

This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
seccomp filter.  Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno.  16-bits is more than
enough for the errno-base.h calls.

Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
for kernel attack surface reduction.  For example, a linux container
could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
all new ones with errnos.  This would keep a logically static attack
surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.

v18: - fix up comments and rebase
v16-v17: ...
v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@redhat.com)
     - clean up and pad out return codes (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - no change/rebase
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL
       (oleg@redhat.com, luto@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org)
     - return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@chromium.org)
     - change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered
       errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned.
       (keeschook@chromium.org)
v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org)
v10: - change loaders to fn
 v9: - n/a
 v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
     - reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
     - made the for loop a little less indent-y
 v7: - introduced

Change-Id: I06445655cb7df24a4e9879c4ba4052abb2d424c1
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I27e4a8b79fd6883af8e0c99096060c644939055f
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21365
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous.

This change enables SIGSYS, defines _sigfields._sigsys, and adds
x86 (compat) arch support.  _sigsys defines fields which allow
a signal handler to receive the triggering system call number,
the relevant AUDIT_ARCH_* value for that number, and the address
of the callsite.

SIGSYS is added to the SYNCHRONOUS_MASK because it is desirable for it
to have setup_frame() called for it. The goal is to ensure that
ucontext_t reflects the machine state from the time-of-syscall and not
from another signal handler.

The first consumer of SIGSYS would be seccomp filter.  In particular,
a filter program could specify a new return value, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
which would result in the system call being denied and the calling
thread signaled.  This also means that implementing arch-specific
support can be dependent upon HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.

v18: - added acked by, rebase
v17: - rebase and reviewed-by addition
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - reworded changelog (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - fix dropped words in the change description
     - added fallback copy_siginfo support.
     - added __ARCH_SIGSYS define to allow stepped arch support.
v10: - first version based on suggestion

Change-Id: I6dd226ee5a1ac5d91a54f2d0a65f705c682135fe
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I8ed23490d14b73a3fc4fdc671d1bda54c609cd54
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21366
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP

Adds a new return value to seccomp filters that triggers a SIGSYS to be
delivered with the new SYS_SECCOMP si_code.

This allows in-process system call emulation, including just specifying
an errno or cleanly dumping core, rather than just dying.

v18: - acked-by, rebase
v15: - use audit_seccomp/skip
     - pad out error spacing; clean up switch (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - n/a
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - rebase on to linux-next
v11: - clarify the comment (indan@nul.nu)
     - s/sigtrap/sigsys
v10: - use SIGSYS, syscall_get_arch, updates arch/Kconfig
       note suggested-by (though original suggestion had other behaviors)
v9:  - changes to SIGILL
v8:  - clean up based on changes to dependent patches
v7:  - introduction

Change-Id: Ic17b43e960242039054f98460e07084a15d22a43
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: If82899f6d6bd5fedd6ee060455e224e7e722a26f
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21367
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support

This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP,
and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.

When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the
tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that
results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.  The 16-bit
SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as
the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.

If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no
system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified.

If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno
will be returned to userspace.

This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path.  Any future
efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to
address this restriction.

v18: - rebase
     - comment fatal_signal check
     - acked-by
v17: - ...
v16: - update PT_TRACE_MASK to 0xbf4 so that STOP isn't clear on SETOPTIONS call (indan@nul.nu)
       [note PT_TRACE_MASK disappears in linux-next]
v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes
     - clean up style (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
       (Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.)
v12: - rebase to linux-next
     - use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency
     - drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator
       (indan@nul.nu)
v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP
v9:  - n/a
v8:  - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef
v7:  - introduced

Change-Id: I1a6b98cc3dad0be83f856279f850f718a9888b53
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I1ba0786303612deae64878f8a8396541a9553a89
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21368
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER

Enable support for seccomp filter on x86:
- syscall_get_arch()
- syscall_get_arguments()
- syscall_rollback()
- syscall_set_return_value()
- SIGSYS siginfo_t support
- uses __secure_computing_int() or secure_computing()
- secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
- secure_computing return value is checked (see below).

SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_TRAP may result in seccomp needing to
skip a system call without killing the process.  This is done by
returning a non-zero (-1) value from secure_computing.  This change
makes x86 respect that return value.

To ensure that minimal kernel code is exposed, a non-zero return value
results in an immediate return to user space (with an invalid syscall
number).

v18: rebase and tweaked change description, acked-by
v17: added reviewed by and rebased
v..: all rebases since original introduction.

Change-Id: I9d1ddd01636f7bb0c9d0278856334838614d6447
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: I329f3bde44256d7dfbb0d2e70a5cdef42f986707
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21369
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

(MOVED HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER UP TO SIMPLIFY BRANCH MERGES)
BACKPORT: Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter

Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet
Filter programs works and how it may be used.
Includes an example for x86 and a semi-generic
example using a macro-based code generator.

v18: - acked by
v17: - remove @compat note and add Pitfalls section for arch checking
       (keescook@chromium.org)
v16: -
v15: -
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - comment on the ptrace_event use
     - update arch support comment
     - note the behavior of SECCOMP_RET_DATA when there are multiple filters
       (keescook@chromium.org)
     - lots of samples/ clean up incl 64-bit bpf-direct support
       (markus@chromium.org)
     - rebase to linux-next
v11: - overhaul return value language, updates (keescook@chromium.org)
     - comment on do_exit(SIGSYS)
v10: - update for SIGSYS
     - update for new seccomp_data layout
     - update for ptrace option use
v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL
v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples.
v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE
    - only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now
    - fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com)
    - adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler
v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of
      PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu)
v5: - update sample to use system call arguments
    - adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator
    - cleaned up bpf in the sample
    - update docs to mention arguments
    - fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com)
    - language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
v4: - update for no_new_privs use
    - minor tweaks
v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
    - document use of tentative always-unprivileged
    - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64
v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net)

Change-Id: I69fb6cdedee2b383147b12088ee573c595688980
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=Run samples/seccomp/bpf-direct and bpf-fancy and dropper on the target
     Run github.com/redpig/seccomp/tests on the platform: all must pass.
     Will merge those tests into the minijail.hgit repository later most likely.

Change-Id: I3d16a92bd9532fa3be84c68e4ae2731b9ce989e8
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21370
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: use a static inline for a function stub

Fixes this error message when CONFIG_SECCOMP is not set:

arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c: In function 'do_syscall_trace_enter':
arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c:1713:2: error: statement with no effect [-Werror=unused-value]

Change-Id: I3dee518d481fd8b442f063698d948b9239794b49
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@ozlabs.au.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: Ic2c0515b0f140d02894145f835b77e6402a2266e
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21371
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: ignore secure_computing return values

This change is inspired by
  https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/16/14
which fixes the build warnings for arches that don't support
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.

In particular, there is no requirement for the return value of
secure_computing() to be checked unless the architecture supports
seccomp filter.  Instead of silencing the warnings with (void)
a new static inline is added to encode the expected behavior
in a compiler and human friendly way.

v2: - cleans things up with a static inline
    - removes sfr's signed-off-by since it is a different approach
v1: - matches sfr's original change

Change-Id: I6d3b03b7adb4e456a56ad311c571d13727e5ebe9
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: Iaf5dc2b311ac91fa1d4dd9226ac3d36c64b8f4e5
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21372
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: seccomp: fix build warnings when there is no CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER

If both audit and seccomp filter support are disabled, 'ret' is marked
as unused.

If just seccomp filter support is disabled, data and skip are considered
unused.

This change fixes those build warnings.

Change-Id: I2ec787dc6703cf5055e8e19b0800c2e80d0e73f4
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: Id501094847dfb3bd67f1d3e91996939e495ab712
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21373
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
BACKPORT: samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros

This change fixes the compilation error triggered here for
i386 allmodconfig in linux-next:
  http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/buildresult/6123842/

Logic attempting to predict the host architecture has been
removed from the Makefile.  Instead, the bpf-direct sample
should now compile on any architecture, but if the architecture
is not supported, it will compile a minimal main() function.

This change also ensures the samples are not compiled when
there is no seccomp filter support.

(Note, I wasn't able to reproduce the error locally, but
 the existing approach was clearly flawed.  This tweak
 should resolve your issue and avoid other future weirdness.)

Change-Id: Ieaddc6134662fd06cdd0e7f741861c709f655819
Reported-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=none. Part of a much larger stack that really should merge together.

Change-Id: Ide9e1eb0d8201794b96b7ec28d34148b2e5cc92e
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21374
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CHROMIUM: arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace; respect return code

There is very little difference in the TIF_SECCOMP and TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE
patsh in entry-common.S. In order to add support for
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER without mangling the assembly too
badly, seccomp was moved into the syscall_trace() handler.

Additionally, the return value for secure_computing() is now checked
and a -1 value will result in the system call being skipped.

(Reworked for 3.4 merge to just piggyback on the audit enter path.)

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

BUG=chromium-os:27878
TEST=compiles for arm. Need to test on a live machine.

Change-Id: I9493f28c30356a10eccb320e0a2d1a141388af9a
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/21376
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>