CIFS: Fix wrong pos argument of cifs_find_lock_conflict

and use generic_file_aio_write rather than __generic_file_aio_write
in cifs_writev.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
cifs: sanity check length of data to send before sending

We had a bug discovered recently where an upper layer function
(cifs_iovec_write) could pass down a smb_rqst with an invalid amount of
data in it. The length of the SMB frame would be correct, but the rqst
struct would cause smb_send_rqst to send nearly 4GB of data.

This should never be the case. Add some sanity checking to the beginning
of smb_send_rqst that ensures that the amount of data we're going to
send agrees with the length in the RFC1002 header. If it doesn't, WARN()
and return -EIO to the upper layers.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
audit: Use struct net not pid_t to remember the network namespce to reply in

In struct audit_netlink_list and audit_reply add a reference to the
network namespace of the caller and remove the userspace pid of the
caller.  This cleanly remembers the callers network namespace, and
removes a huge class of races and nasty failure modes that can occur
when attempting to relook up the callers network namespace from a
pid_t (including the caller's network namespace changing, pid
wraparound, and the pid simply not being present).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
cifs: mask off top byte in get_rfc1002_length()

The rfc1002 length actually includes a type byte, which we aren't
masking off. In most cases, it's not a problem since the
RFC1002_SESSION_MESSAGE type is 0, but when doing a RFC1002 session
establishment, the type is non-zero and that throws off the returned
length.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
audit: Send replies in the proper network namespace.

In perverse cases of file descriptor passing the current network
namespace of a process and the network namespace of a socket used by
that socket may differ.  Therefore use the network namespace of the
appropiate socket to ensure replies always go to the appropiate
socket.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
mac80211: consider virtual mon when calculating min_def

When calculating the current max bw required for
a channel context, we didn't consider the virtual
monitor interface, resulting in its channel context
being narrower than configured.

This broke monitor mode with iwlmvm, which uses the
minimal width.

Reported-by: Ido Yariv <idox.yariv@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
cfg80211: remove racy beacon_interval assignment

In case of AP mode, the beacon interval is already reset to
zero inside cfg80211_stop_ap(), and in the other modes it
isn't relevant. Remove the assignment to remove a potential
race since the assignment isn't properly locked.

Reported-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
ASoC: n810: fix init with DT boot

Since 3.14-rc1 only DT boot has been supported on N810, so this
file fails to init. Make a minimal fix to retain functionality.
This file should be properly converted to DT in longer term.

There seems to be still other unresolved issues with N810 audio support,
but this patch is needed at minimum as otherwise the machine driver
probing would completely fail.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@linaro.org>
iwlwifi: mvm: don't WARN when statistics are handled late

Since the statistics handler is asynchrous, it can very well
be that we will handle the statistics (hence the RSSI
fluctuation) when we already disassociated.
Don't WARN on this case.

This solves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1071998

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.10+]
Fixes: 2b76ef13086f ("iwlwifi: mvm: implement reduced Tx power")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
iwlwifi: fix and add 7265 series HW IDs

Update of the HW IDs for the 7265 series.

Signed-off-by: Oren Givon <oren.givon@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
wl1251: use skb_trim to make skb shorter

the current code is directly setting skb->len, which is not correct and
brings problems with HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS enabled in config

Signed-off-by: Ivaylo Dimitrov <ivo.g.dimitrov.75@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Merge branch 'for-john' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/iwlwifi/iwlwifi-fixes
ASoC: pcm: free path list before exiting from error conditions

dpcm_path_get() allocates dynamic memory to hold path list.
Corresponding dpcm_path_put() must be called to free the memory.
dpcm_path_put() is not called under several error conditions.
This leads to memory leak.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Lai <plai@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
mac80211: clear sequence/fragment number in QoS-null frames

Avoid leaking data by sending uninitialized memory and setting an
invalid (non-zero) fragment number (the sequence number is ignored
anyway) by setting the seq_ctrl field to zero.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3f52b7e328c5 ("mac80211: mesh power save basics")
Fixes: ce662b44ce22 ("mac80211: send (QoS) Null if no buffered frames")
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
net: fix for a race condition in the inet frag code

I stumbled upon this very serious bug while hunting for another one,
it's a very subtle race condition between inet_frag_evictor,
inet_frag_intern and the IPv4/6 frag_queue and expire functions
(basically the users of inet_frag_kill/inet_frag_put).

What happens is that after a fragment has been added to the hash chain
but before it's been added to the lru_list (inet_frag_lru_add) in
inet_frag_intern, it may get deleted (either by an expired timer if
the system load is high or the timer sufficiently low, or by the
fraq_queue function for different reasons) before it's added to the
lru_list, then after it gets added it's a matter of time for the
evictor to get to a piece of memory which has been freed leading to a
number of different bugs depending on what's left there.

I've been able to trigger this on both IPv4 and IPv6 (which is normal
as the frag code is the same), but it's been much more difficult to
trigger on IPv4 due to the protocol differences about how fragments
are treated.

The setup I used to reproduce this is: 2 machines with 4 x 10G bonded
in a RR bond, so the same flow can be seen on multiple cards at the
same time. Then I used multiple instances of ping/ping6 to generate
fragmented packets and flood the machines with them while running
other processes to load the attacked machine.

*It is very important to have the _same flow_ coming in on multiple CPUs
concurrently. Usually the attacked machine would die in less than 30
minutes, if configured properly to have many evictor calls and timeouts
it could happen in 10 minutes or so.

An important point to make is that any caller (frag_queue or timer) of
inet_frag_kill will remove both the timer refcount and the
original/guarding refcount thus removing everything that's keeping the
frag from being freed at the next inet_frag_put.  All of this could
happen before the frag was ever added to the LRU list, then it gets
added and the evictor uses a freed fragment.

An example for IPv6 would be if a fragment is being added and is at
the stage of being inserted in the hash after the hash lock is
released, but before inet_frag_lru_add executes (or is able to obtain
the lru lock) another overlapping fragment for the same flow arrives
at a different CPU which finds it in the hash, but since it's
overlapping it drops it invoking inet_frag_kill and thus removing all
guarding refcounts, and afterwards freeing it by invoking
inet_frag_put which removes the last refcount added previously by
inet_frag_find, then inet_frag_lru_add gets executed by
inet_frag_intern and we have a freed fragment in the lru_list.

The fix is simple, just move the lru_add under the hash chain locked
region so when a removing function is called it'll have to wait for
the fragment to be added to the lru_list, and then it'll remove it (it
works because the hash chain removal is done before the lru_list one
and there's no window between the two list adds when the frag can get
dropped). With this fix applied I couldn't kill the same machine in 24
hours with the same setup.

Fixes: 3ef0eb0db4bf ("net: frag, move LRU list maintenance outside of
rwlock")

CC: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
CC: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
bridge: multicast: add sanity check for query source addresses

MLD queries are supposed to have an IPv6 link-local source address
according to RFC2710, section 4 and RFC3810, section 5.1.14. This patch
adds a sanity check to ignore such broken MLD queries.

Without this check, such malformed MLD queries can result in a
denial of service: The queries are ignored by any MLD listener
therefore they will not respond with an MLD report. However,
without this patch these malformed MLD queries would enable the
snooping part in the bridge code, potentially shutting down the
according ports towards these hosts for multicast traffic as the
bridge did not learn about these listeners.

Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net/mlx4: Support shutdown() interface

In kexec scenario, we failed to load the mlx4 driver in the
second kernel because the ownership bit was hold by the first
kernel without release correctly.

The patch adds shutdown() interface so that the ownership can
be released correctly in the first kernel. It also helps avoiding
EEH error happened during boot stage of the second kernel because
of undesired traffic, which can't be handled by hardware during
that stage on Power platform.

Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <shangw@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Wei Yang <weiyang@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
r8152: disable the ECM mode

There are known issues for switching the drivers between ECM mode and
vendor mode. The interrup transfer may become abnormal. The hardware
may have the opportunity to die if you change the configuration without
unloading the current driver first, because all the control transfers
of the current driver would fail after the command of switching the
configuration.

Although to use the ecm driver and vendor driver independently is fine,
it may have problems to change the driver from one to the other by
switching the configuration. Additionally, now the vendor mode driver
is more powerful than the ECM driver. Thus, disable the ECM mode driver,
and let r8152 to set the configuration to vendor mode and reset the
device automatically.

Signed-off-by: Hayes Wang <hayeswang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk

While working on ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.

Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48a9 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:

Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..u^..X.........
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
    [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
    [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
    [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
    [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
    [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
    [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
    [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
    [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
    [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380

What happens is that commit bbd0d59809f9 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.

The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.

While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.

Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
net: macb: Check DMA mappings for error

With CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG enabled the following warning is printed:
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 619 at lib/dma-debug.c:1101 check_unmap+0x758/0x894()
 macb e000b000.ethernet: DMA-API: device driver failed to check map error[device address=0x000000002d171c02] [size=322 bytes] [mapped as single]
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 619 Comm: udhcpc Not tainted 3.14.0-rc3-xilinx-00219-gd158fc7f36a2 #63
 [<c001516c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0011df8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
 [<c0011df8>] (show_stack) from [<c03c7714>] (dump_stack+0x7c/0xc8)
 [<c03c7714>] (dump_stack) from [<c00245cc>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x60/0x84)
 [<c00245cc>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c0024670>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2c/0x3c)
 [<c0024670>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0228244>] (check_unmap+0x758/0x894)
 [<c0228244>] (check_unmap) from [<c0228588>] (debug_dma_unmap_page+0x64/0x70)
 [<c0228588>] (debug_dma_unmap_page) from [<c02aba64>] (macb_interrupt+0x1f8/0x2dc)
 [<c02aba64>] (macb_interrupt) from [<c006c6e4>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2c/0x178)
 [<c006c6e4>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c006c86c>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c)
 [<c006c86c>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c006f548>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb8/0x100)
 [<c006f548>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c006c148>] (generic_handle_irq+0x20/0x30)
 [<c006c148>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c000f35c>] (handle_IRQ+0x64/0x8c)
 [<c000f35c>] (handle_IRQ) from [<c0008528>] (gic_handle_irq+0x3c/0x60)
 [<c0008528>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0012904>] (__irq_svc+0x44/0x78)
 Exception stack(0xed197f60 to 0xed197fa8)
 7f60: 00000134 60000013 bd94362e bd94362e be96b37c 00000014 fffffd72 00000122
 7f80: c000ebe4 ed196000 00000000 00000011 c032c0d8 ed197fa8 c0064008 c000ea20
 7fa0: 60000013 ffffffff
 [<c0012904>] (__irq_svc) from [<c000ea20>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
 ---[ end trace 478f921d0d542d1e ]---
 Mapped at:
  [<c0227184>] debug_dma_map_page+0x48/0x11c
  [<c02aaca0>] macb_start_xmit+0x184/0x2a8
  [<c03143c0>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x334/0x470
  [<c032c09c>] sch_direct_xmit+0x78/0x2f8
  [<c0314814>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x318/0x708

due to missing checks of the dma mapping. Add the appropriate checks to fix
this.

Signed-off-by: Soren Brinkmann <soren.brinkmann@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>