msm: cpr-regulator: calculate quotient adjustment dynamically

Replace the fixed quotient adjustment algorithm with a new algorithm
that calculates quotient adjustments dynamically.

Calculate the quotient scaling factor according to fused target
quotients and application processor clock frequencies. A different
quotient adjustment value is applied to each voltage corner.

The formula for calculating the quotient adjustment value for each
voltage corner is:
quot_adjust = (freq_turbo_MHZ - freq_corner_MHZ) * scaling / 1000
where the "scaling" is determined using this equation:
scaling = min(max_scaling_factor,
1000 * (QUOT(fused_turbo) - QUOT(fused_norm)) /
(Freq_turbo_MHZ - Freq_normal_MHZ)).

In msm8x26 cpr-regulator device tree node, add a corner to frequency
mapping table, a speedbin + PVS version to max SVS/normal/turbo fuse
corner mapping table, a maximum quotient adjustment scaling factor,and
PVS version eFuse information. With the frequency to corner mapping
table specified in msm8x26 clock-a7 device tree node, this ensures that
1.6G/1.8G msm8226v2 and msm8926 parts receive power saving when running
at turbo frequencies below the maximum possible turbo frequency.

CRs-Fixed: 597721
Change-Id: Ideecccc2f81762bed3668cfdf27d942c00df76ea
Signed-off-by: Wu Fenglin <fenglinw@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ke Liu <keliu@codeaurora.org>
msm: cpr-regulator: Improve CPR interrupt handling

disable_irq() is not an efficient call and could cause potential deadlock.
Improve the interrupt handling by removing disable_irq and enable_irq
completely, and instead, checking the state of the interrupt source
(LOOP_EN and BUSY bits) in ISR to bail out immediately if any condition is
not met.

CRs-Fixed: 630182
Change-Id: Ieedadf4f0db4febc41ab85f383af683bdaf34615
Signed-off-by: Tirupathi Reddy <tirupath@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ke Liu <keliu@codeaurora.org>
msm: cpr-regulator: change the sequence for handling corner switch

Clear all of the CPR control and configuration registers before switching
to a new voltage corner and then restore their values after corner
switching is complete. This sequence ensures that spurious up or down
interrupts are not received when CPR is re-enabled after corner switching
is complete.

Change-Id: I646c747c9bfa7474bd421074dc2f6e2b28ef347c
CRs-Fixed: 604782
Signed-off-by: Ke Liu <keliu@codeaurora.org>
ion: invalidate buffers before zero'ing

Currently, we invalidate the cache for buffers being zero'd *after* we
zero them. However, this is racey since a dirty cache line from an
earlier mapping could be written out to memory between the zero'ing and
the invalidation. Fix this by invalidating the cache *before* zero'ing
the buffer.

Before this change, I was seeing corruption with:

    $ cat <<EOF | ./memory_prof -e -i -
    simple_alloc,1,ION_SYSTEM_HEAP_ID,ION_FLAG_CACHED,0x100000,1MB
    simple_basic_sanity,1
    simple_profile,1
    simple_free,1
    EOF

After this change, no corruption.

CRs-Fixed: 585524
Change-Id: I1f2603604efc9be4ebf9112b06728e0aeca60ea0
Signed-off-by: Mitchel Humpherys <mitchelh@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Add new API's to track device mutex owner

Add new API's kgsl_mutex_lock/unlock to track device mutex owner.
Mutex owner is an atomic variable and all operations set/clear on
it are also atomic to avoid any race conditions.

If a thread tries to acquire the mutex using new API, try to acquire
the mutex only if mutex owner is not same as current thread. This is
to prevent deadlocks which can happen if a thread tries to acquire
mutex with mutex held.

Change-Id: I3da4d0427ede5458f6a663043c57a4799b72d8fd
Signed-off-by: Tarun Karra <tkarra@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Flush TLB when mapping to IOMMU pagetable

Flush TLB when mapping to IOMMU pagetable, this is a requirement
for current IOMMU hardware.

Change-Id: I82e766f4869c737c1f5b73934eacaada40d46e10
Signed-off-by: Tarun Karra <tkarra@codeaurora.org>
msm: camera: sensor: Update CCI WR comamnd buffer size to 11 bytes

I2C command length is of 11 bytes, it includes 10 bytes of data and
one byte of WR command. Use 11 bytes char array to create command.

Change-Id: Idf330fef6b8da79c6b7f5a2839d88a68e10a96f9
Signed-off-by: Rajesh Bondugula <rajeshb@codeaurora.org>
qseecom: Validate pointer offset in qseecom_send_modfd_cmd

Validate cmd_req_buf pointer offset in qseecom_send_modfy_cmd, and
make sure cmd buffer address to be within shared bufffer.

Change-Id: I431511a92ab2cccbc2daebc0cf76cc3872689a97
Signed-off-by: Zhen Kong <zkong@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Mark the IOMMU setstate memory as read only

Mark the IOMMU setstate memory as read only in the pagetable.

Change-Id: Ic0dedbadb19e499c749cd744c3e89be3bcb4c2a2
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Enable protected register mode for A3XX

Turn on protected register mode for the A3XX GPU family and add 0x63
(RBBM_INT_0_MASK) to the list of protected registers.

Conflicts:

        drivers/gpu/msm/adreno.h
        drivers/gpu/msm/adreno_a3xx.c

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad10ebfa6eb6d3d815b5aa9b6b6f0e8e35
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Digish Pandya <digishp@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Protect CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX

Put CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX and CP_STATE_DEBUG_DATA under protection
to keep it from being written from an IB1. Doing so however opens
up a subtle "feature" in the microcode: memory read opcodes turn off
protected mode in the microcode to do the read and then turns it
back on regardless of the initial state. This is a problem if the
memory read happens while protected mode is turned off and then we
try to access a protected register which then complains and goes boom.

To account for this irregularity explicitly turn back off protected
mode in all the places where we know this will be a problem.

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad1397ca9b80132241ac006560a615e042
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Digish Pandya <digishp@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Fix protected mode for A3XX

Prior merges of the A3XX protected mode code were incorrect. Fix
up the changes to get the branch fully updated with the changes
from msm-3.10.

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad5a0e1aea181141de1527d74b42002e3c
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Protect SMMU registers from being written by the GPU

Put the SMMU register range in protected mode to shield them from
IB1/IB2 writes from userspace.

CRs-Fixed: 599971
Change-Id: Ic0dedbad8c03fc1c54ff73221231e2440d3c34dd
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
lowmemorykiller: Account for highmem during kswapd reclaim

Currenlty most memory reclaim is done through kswapd.
Since kswapd uses a gfp mask of GFP_KERNEL, and because
the lowmemorykiller is zone aware, the lowmemorykiller will
ignore highmem most of the time.
This results in the lowmemorykiller being overly aggressive.

The fix to this issue is to allow the lowmemorykiller to
count highmem when being called by the kswapd if the lowmem
watermarks are satisfied.

Change-Id: I938644584f374763d10d429d835e74daa4854a38
Signed-off-by: Liam Mark <lmark@codeaurora.org>
n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode

The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.

If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
  int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
  struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
  ...
  memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
  ...
  tb->used += space;

so the race of the two can result in something like this:
          A                             B
   __tty_buffer_request_room
                                  __tty_buffer_request_room
   memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
   tb->used += space;
                                 memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM

B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.

Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.

Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.

js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call

Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I9e235db6ec2bb950f26bd8a23f6145dab5dc0a15
Git-commit: 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Avijit Kanti Das <avijitnsec@codeaurora.org>
[rsiddoji@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar S <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)

If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call.  If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.

This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")

[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
  	different depending on the mapping ]

Fixes CVE-2014-3153.

Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Change-Id: I9ee5c8a87cc43c7b1e1dc2796949e7c20c74ddf4
Git-commit: e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
Signed-off-by: Divya Sharma <c_shard@codeaurora.org>
net: ipv4: current group_info should be put after using.

Plug a group_info refcount leak in ping_init.
group_info is only needed during initialization and
the code failed to release the reference on exit.
While here move grabbing the reference to a place
where it is actually needed.

Change-Id: I38d476f49e7ae300bc1168bc4b2c1b67274a51ca
Signed-off-by: Chuansheng Liu <chuansheng.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Dongxing <dongxing.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: xiaoming wang <xiaoming.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Git-commit:b04c46190219a4f845e46a459e3102137b7f6cac
Git-repo: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/davem/net.git
Signed-off-by: Divya Sharma <c_shard@codeaurora.org>
[rsiddoji@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar S <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
netlink: fix possible spoofing from non-root processes

Non-root user-space processes can send Netlink messages to other
processes that are well-known for being subscribed to Netlink
asynchronous notifications. This allows ilegitimate non-root
process to send forged messages to Netlink subscribers.

The userspace process usually verifies the legitimate origin in
two ways:

a) Socket credentials. If UID != 0, then the message comes from
   some ilegitimate process and the message needs to be dropped.

b) Netlink portID. In general, portID == 0 means that the origin
   of the messages comes from the kernel. Thus, discarding any
   message not coming from the kernel.

However, ctnetlink sets the portID in event messages that has
been triggered by some user-space process, eg. conntrack utility.
So other processes subscribed to ctnetlink events, eg. conntrackd,
know that the event was triggered by some user-space action.

Neither of the two ways to discard ilegitimate messages coming
from non-root processes can help for ctnetlink.

This patch adds capability validation in case that dst_pid is set
in netlink_sendmsg(). This approach is aggressive since existing
applications using any Netlink bus to deliver messages between
two user-space processes will break. Note that the exception is
NETLINK_USERSOCK, since it is reserved for netlink-to-netlink
userspace communication.

Still, if anyone wants that his Netlink bus allows netlink-to-netlink
userspace, then they can set NL_NONROOT_SEND. However, by default,
I don't think it makes sense to allow to use NETLINK_ROUTE to
communicate two processes that are sending no matter what information
that is not related to link/neighbouring/routing. They should be using
NETLINK_USERSOCK instead for that.

Change-Id: I6382c2ecf3dc9ada1f6b7298ebb8bd08453d3a28
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
arm: mach-msm: Remove the unused rmt_storage code

The rmt_storage module is no longer used.
Remove the unused module and cleanup the makefile and kconfig.

CRs-Fixed: 549951
Change-Id: Ie9ebaa2209ea9fa0df05dc892504fcb882f00f29
Signed-off-by: Nikhilesh Reddy <reddyn@codeaurora.org>
Import 18.3.A.0.31, 18.3.B.0.31, and 18.3.C.0.37

into LNX.LA.3.5.1-02910-8x26.0

Change-Id: I8d673db40d14a5197fb652d6ad0e84a76cfc163d