Revert "LOAD_FREQ (4*HZ+61) avoids loadavg Moire"

This reverts commit 355b89e10ebebb671610965a3898e8866ddf86d5.
kernel:sched: LOAD_FREQ (4*HZ+61) avoids loadavg Moire

LOAD_FREQ is (5*HZ+1) to avoid high load average when idle:
http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/linux-kernel/2007/10/3/328568

I suggest (4*HZ+61) for a better distribution.

With some seconds based load (like SSL heartbeats)
and LOAD_FREQ at (5*HZ+1) I see Moire patterns like inverse sawtooth,
since 2 or 3 probes hit the jobs (load increases quickly),
followed by several probes missing it.

A 4.61 sec interval gives optimal distribution over when within a
second a probe is taken, as .61 is close to golden ratio phi 1.618...
(test in http://ripke.com/goldenratio.c).

12*4.61 = 55.32 secs is still close to a minute,
and 13*4.61=59.93 is even closer than the current 12*5.01=60.12
(with exponents EXP_x adjusted to a ratio of 13 instead of 12).

Change-Id: Ibad59fe4e5eea2655125ab64810ad6d9e24acc97
Staging: android: fixed white spaces coding style issue in
 logger.c

This patch fixes some space-before-tabs warnings found by checkpatch tool on the staging android driver file logger.c

Change-Id: I20226ed7b76070d4fd2de3fca1f78b029db6351d
Signed-off-by: Marco Navarra <fromenglish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
cpufreq: Report correct min/max frequencies.
random: increase entropy levels (both read and write)
mmc/core: disable crc to improve performance
mmc-core: Increase timeout limits to improve when using bad sd cards

Change-Id: I00f088e923e146229b483c4859d465ad77e44779
cpufreq: update lpj only if frequency has changed

During scaling up of cpu frequency, loops_per_jiffy
is updated upon invoking PRECHANGE notifier.
If setting to new frequency fails in cpufreq driver,
lpj is left at incorrect value.

Hence update lpj only if cpu frequency is changed,
i.e. upon invoking POSTCHANGE notifier.

Penalty would be that during time period between
changing cpu frequency & invocation of POSTCHANGE
notifier, udelay(x) may not gurantee minimal delay
of 'x' us for frequency scaling up operation.

Perhaps a better solution would be to define
CPUFREQ_ABORTCHANGE & handle accordingly, but then
it would be more intrusive (using ABORTCHANGE may
help drivers also; if any has registered notifier
and expect POST for a PRECHANGE, their needs can
be taken care using ABORT)

Change-Id: I91c755ad74480aed17b3ea8f4bac76290d368aa4
Signed-off-by: Afzal Mohammed <afzal@ti.com>
random: run random_int_secret_init() run after all late_initcalls

commit 47d06e532e95b71c0db3839ebdef3fe8812fca2c upstream.

The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason.  So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.

Change-Id: Ifc7ed1c9fafcadea67396606042b07b97b01071d
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: fix accounting race condition with lockless irq entropy_count update

commit 10b3a32d292c21ea5b3ad5ca5975e88bb20b8d68 upstream.

Commit 902c098a3663 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt
path") turned IRQ path from being spinlock protected into lockless
cmpxchg-retry update.

That commit removed r->lock serialization between crediting entropy bits
from IRQ context and accounting when extracting entropy on userspace
read path, but didn't turn the r->entropy_count reads/updates in
account() to use cmpxchg as well.

It has been observed, that under certain circumstances this leads to
read() on /dev/urandom to return 0 (EOF), as r->entropy_count gets
corrupted and becomes negative, which in turn results in propagating 0
all the way from account() to the actual read() call.

Convert the accounting code to be the proper lockless counterpart of
what has been partially done by 902c098a3663.

Change-Id: I1c057050633441e64d43c97897e77117510cdaeb
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random32: fix off-by-one in seeding requirement

[ Upstream commit 51c37a70aaa3f95773af560e6db3073520513912 ]

For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have
a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15.

Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced
a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the
errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions.

However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as:
"return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1),
__seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15
would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually
be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise
an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect
that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured.

Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel.

 [1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
 [2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps

Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.

Change-Id: I53ee85d2fd2f8503b09fa2cce623e6e24fbda2c2
Fixes: 697f8d0348a6 ("random32: seeding improvement")
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>