cypress-touchkey: Support Sweep2Sleep and cleanup implementations

Works just like sweep2wake, but buttons should be swept from right to left, as oppose to left to right. s2w_sensitive also may apply to this.

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
sweep2wake: Add sequence timeout

End button listener after 3 seconds.

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
Enable s2s by default

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
selinux: add a ugly workaround to bail early when selinux tries to free a socket that is still in use and it ends in a Kernel panic. These lines are from opensource.samsung.com. While this will most likely put a bandaid over this Kernel panic it does not fix the bug so it might occur somewhere else if the same conditions are met but since I have only seen panics from this hook then we may as well sleep in peace.

Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: Reduce overhead of mls_level_isvalid() function call

Date	Mon, 10 Jun 2013 13:55:08 -0400

v4->v5:
  - Fix scripts/checkpatch.pl warning.

v3->v4:
  - Merge the 2 separate while loops in ebitmap_contains() into
    a single one.

v2->v3:
  - Remove unused local variables i, node from mls_level_isvalid().

v1->v2:
 - Move the new ebitmap comparison logic from mls_level_isvalid()
   into the ebitmap_contains() helper function.
 - Rerun perf and performance tests on the latest v3.10-rc4 kernel.

While running the high_systime workload of the AIM7 benchmark on
a 2-socket 12-core Westmere x86-64 machine running 3.10-rc4 kernel
(with HT on), it was found that a pretty sizable amount of time was
spent in the SELinux code. Below was the perf trace of the "perf
record -a -s" of a test run at 1500 users:

  5.04%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] ebitmap_get_bit
  1.96%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] mls_level_isvalid
  1.95%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] find_next_bit

The ebitmap_get_bit() was the hottest function in the perf-report
output.  Both the ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions
were, in fact, called by mls_level_isvalid(). As a result, the
mls_level_isvalid() call consumed 8.95% of the total CPU time of
all the 24 virtual CPUs which is quite a lot. The majority of the
mls_level_isvalid() function invocations come from the socket creation
system call.

Looking at the mls_level_isvalid() function, it is checking to see
if all the bits set in one of the ebitmap structure are also set in
another one as well as the highest set bit is no bigger than the one
specified by the given policydb data structure. It is doing it in
a bit-by-bit manner. So if the ebitmap structure has many bits set,
the iteration loop will be done many times.

The current code can be rewritten to use a similar algorithm as the
ebitmap_contains() function with an additional check for the
highest set bit. The ebitmap_contains() function was extended to
cover an optional additional check for the highest set bit, and the
mls_level_isvalid() function was modified to call ebitmap_contains().

With that change, the perf trace showed that the used CPU time drop
down to just 0.08% (ebitmap_contains + mls_level_isvalid) of the
total which is about 100X less than before.

  0.07%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] ebitmap_contains
  0.05%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] ebitmap_get_bit
  0.01%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] mls_level_isvalid
  0.01%            ls  [kernel.kallsyms]     [k] find_next_bit

The remaining ebitmap_get_bit() and find_next_bit() functions calls
are made by other kernel routines as the new mls_level_isvalid()
function will not call them anymore.

This patch also improves the high_systime AIM7 benchmark result,
though the improvement is not as impressive as is suggested by the
reduction in CPU time spent in the ebitmap functions. The table below
shows the performance change on the 2-socket x86-64 system (with HT
on) mentioned above.

+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
|   Workload   | mean % change | mean % change  | mean % change   |
|              | 10-100 users  | 200-1000 users | 1100-2000 users |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
| high_systime |     +0.1%     |     +0.9%      |     +2.6%       |
+--------------+---------------+----------------+-----------------+
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: use ARRAY_SIZE

ARRAY_SIZE is more concise to use when the size of an array is divided
by the size of its type or the size of its first element.

The Coccinelle semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:

// <smpl>
@@
type T;
T[] E;
@@

- (sizeof(E)/sizeof(E[...]))
+ ARRAY_SIZE(E)
// </smpl>

Signed-off-by: Himangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: possible NULL deref in context_struct_to_string

It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext.  However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad.  Instead just return the len.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranav Vashi <neobuddy89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: include definition of new capabilities

The kernel has added CAP_WAKE_ALARM and CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP.  We need to
define these in SELinux so they can be mediated by policy.

Change-Id: I8a3e0db15ec5f4eb05d455a57e8446a8c2b484c2
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
[sds: rename epollwakeup to block_suspend to match upstream merge]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 upstream.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: bigendian problems with filename trans rules

commit 9085a6422900092886da8c404e1c5340c4ff1cbf upstream.

When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class
of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian.  On
x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like
ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from
le32_to_cpu.  So the values are all screwed up.  Write the values in le
format like it should have been to start.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()

commit 3dc91d4338d698ce77832985f9cb183d8eeaf6be upstream.

While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
  CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
  Hardware name:                  /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
  task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>]  [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
  RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
  R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
  CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
  Call Trace:
    security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
    __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
    inode_permission+0x18/0x50
    link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
    path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
    do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
    do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
    SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
    system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
  RIP  selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
  CR2: 0000000000000020

Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.

in selinux_inode_permission():

	isec = inode->i_security;

	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);

Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files.  I was not able to recreate this via normal files.  But I'm not
sure they are safe.  It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.

What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().

The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct.  Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here.  (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).

Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand.  A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback.  But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work.  For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
selinux: fix broken peer recv check

commit 46d01d63221c3508421dd72ff9c879f61053cffc upstream.

Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails.  If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.

Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>
selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets

commit 817eff718dca4e54d5721211ddde0914428fbb7c upstream.

Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.

Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Chet Kener <Cl3Kener@gmail.com>