block: do not notify urgent request, when flush with data in flight


MMC device driver implements URGENT request execution with priority
(using stop flow), as a result currently running (and prepared) request
may be reinserted back into I/O scheduler. This will break block layer
logic of flushes (flush request should not be inserted into I/O scheduler).

Block layer flush machinery keep q->flush_data_in_flight list updated with
started but not completed flush requests with data (REQ_FUA).

This change will not notify underling block device driver about pending
urgent request during flushes in flight.

Change-Id: I8b654925a3c989250fcb8f4f7c998795fb203923
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Dorfman <kdorfman@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Tatyana Brokhman <tlinder@codeaurora.org>
fat: limit the number of error prints

Use fat_fs_error_ratelimit instead of fat_fs_error so as to
avoid large number of prints.

Change-Id: I458df6c2c7a53c0902f2b388b5992007b719cb86
Signed-off-by: Asutosh Das <asutoshd@codeaurora.org>
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.

Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.

Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.

[On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes,
and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission
is granted in policy.  In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for
root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current
AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery
console which has a legitimate need for it.  The other potential vector
is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches
xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard).  However, the end result is
only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG.  This fix is
queued for 3.14.]

Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo

Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.

BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[  474.556058] Stack:
[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[  474.690461] Call Trace:
[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---

[sds:  commit message edited to note Android implications and
to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit]

Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413
Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sivasri Kumar Vanka <sivasri@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Enable protected mode for A3XX

Enable protected register mode for A3XX with these commits from
msm-3.10:

msm: kgsl: Enable protected register mode for A3XX
msm: kgsl: Print the register that causes a protected mode error
msm: kgsl: Unprotect the VBIF performance counters

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad950ffbd063fd861d9440bb5dce8d5fb1
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Protect SMMU registers from being written by the GPU

Put the SMMU register range in protected mode to shield them from
IB1/IB2 writes from userspace.

CRs-Fixed: 599971
Change-Id: Ic0dedbad8c03fc1c54ff73221231e2440d3c34dd
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
msm: kgsl: Protect CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX

Put CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX and CP_STATE_DEBUG_DATA under protection
to keep it from being written from an IB1. Doing so however opens
up a subtle "feature" in the microcode: memory read opcodes turn off
protected mode in the microcode to do the read and then turns it
back on regardless of the initial state. This is a problem if the
memory read happens while protected mode is turned off and then we
try to access a protected register which then complains and goes boom.

To account for this irregularity explicitly turn back off protected
mode in all the places where we know this will be a problem.

Change-Id: Ic0dedbad1397ca9b80132241ac006560a615e042
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
Merge "SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts."
Merge "msm: kgsl: Enable protected mode for A3XX"
Merge "msm: kgsl: Protect SMMU registers from being written by the GPU"
Merge "msm: kgsl: Protect CP_STATE_DEBUG_INDEX"
Merge "fat: limit the number of error prints"
ASoC: msm: qdsp6v2: do not free memory that is not unmapped from DSP

The memory that is not unmapped from DSP should not be used until
DSP clears it. Do not free ion memory if the DSP unmap has
failed.

CRs-fixed: 599780
Change-Id: I4ceae34e0f8d6381efc34ce642babbc30ca5e57e
Signed-off-by: Damir Didjusto <damird@codeaurora.org>
Merge "ASoC: msm: qdsp6v2: do not free memory that is not unmapped from DSP"
Revert "msm: kgsl: Protect SMMU registers from being written by the GPU"

This reverts commit dc013ee8d76e5f0e538bc52943eadbf234099702.

Change-Id: I446a679f1059aa00efb7730a4081ae67b47d70f5
Signed-off-by: Michael Vines <mvines@codeaurora.org>
Revert "msm: kgsl: Enable protected mode for A3XX"

This reverts commit 21cfa7f0a736532f3ddd17897f78171093e88b7c.

Change-Id: I0ab2f12e506c18c93193ae91ff8ef48336285390
Signed-off-by: Michael Vines <mvines@codeaurora.org>
Update to AU_LINUX_ANDROID_JB_3.2.04.03.00.112.529

Change-Id: I56d0572b6cfd53406cac642ff6beb14ee374d807
Signed-off-by: B2G User <b2guser@localhost>
Merge "Update to AU_LINUX_ANDROID_JB_3.2.04.03.00.112.529"
Update to AU_LINUX_ANDROID_JB_3.2.04.03.00.112.530

Change-Id: I970f4f0cfe7c80675cf6703ed565159582a86146
Signed-off-by: B2G User <b2guser@localhost>
Merge "Update to AU_LINUX_ANDROID_JB_3.2.04.03.00.112.530"
msm_bam_rmnet: Fix potential memory corruption

Usage of legacy string manipulation function sprintf could lead to
memory corruption as the number of bytes to be written to the
destination is not bounded. Replace sprintf with snprintf where the
number of bytes to be written is explicitly specified.

CRs-fixed: 672202
Change-Id: Iab7516ad0e2540eb619fe96e26a3516c7adf86cc
Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>