panic: force console_unlock() in panic()

If panic() is called when console is locked,
oops message can't be printed in console.
Especially, android ram_console doesn't have any information in this case.
Thus, console_unlock() in panic() if console is locked.

Change-Id: Ifbac48875ac189c35ed380b67734d0411bed2c08
Signed-off-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com>
panic: resume console if panic after console suspend.

Device rebooted by kernel panic but no panic message.
This helps to get the panic messages in this case.

Bug: 10184128
Change-Id: I24545b1ce2f9e3e239795089d8564c2cc5f89fe7
Signed-off-by: shihhao.feng <shihhao.feng@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Devin Kim <dojip.kim@lge.com>
perf/arm: Fix armpmu_map_hw_event()

Fix constraint check in armpmu_map_hw_event().

Reported-and-tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

Change-Id: I070836fe588390efa73123d7422505367e4b3c29
ARM: 7809/1: perf: fix event validation for software group leaders

It is possible to construct an event group with a software event as a
group leader and then subsequently add a hardware event to the group.
This results in the event group being validated by adding all members
of the group to a fake PMU and attempting to allocate each event on
their respective PMU.

Unfortunately, for software events wthout a corresponding arm_pmu, this
results in a kernel crash attempting to dereference the ->get_event_idx
function pointer.

This patch fixes the problem by checking explicitly for software events
and ignoring those in event validation (since they can always be
scheduled). We will probably want to revisit this for 3.12, since the
validation checks don't appear to work correctly when dealing with
multiple hardware PMUs anyway.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

Change-Id: Ife76dc862a2bac4db7595c0e3ddae995de2ac782
random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin.google.com>

Change-Id: I4677ccb8a30a3c4f2b908305adcec13cb738c456
random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path

commit 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c upstream.

The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Change-Id: I1d04163c117e5869f10757091dc780b51d42e1f3
random: create add_device_randomness() interface

commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream.

Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).

[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
  in question. ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>

Change-Id: I53763dfe50e724df5c8624f4036d4aa07f47fb3e
random: use the arch-specific rng in xfer_secondary_pool

commit e6d4947b12e8ad947add1032dd754803c6004824 upstream.

If the CPU supports a hardware random number generator, use it in
xfer_secondary_pool(), where it will significantly improve things and
where we can afford it.

Also, remove the use of the arch-specific rng in
add_timer_randomness(), since the call is significantly slower than
get_cycles(), and we're much better off using it in
xfer_secondary_pool() anyway.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Change-Id: I8f0b7bc9d6bced6c16aa703aa6f90c541909d61b
random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function

commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream.

Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present.  Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.

The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door.  (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)

It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
  --- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener.  Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel.  Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.

Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.

This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities.  The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.

For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Change-Id: Ieee3d8c973ca1da3c330cc4748926aafffd99be8
random: remove rand_initialize_irq()

commit c5857ccf293968348e5eb4ebedc68074de3dcda6 upstream.

With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.

[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
  rand_initialize_irq() ]

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Tjin <pattjin@google.com>
Change-Id: I9bb01d7dc6cd69c08e47a33228bed785d93ee71e
ALSA: core: Expose sound card online/offline state

Expose sound card online/offline state to procfs so userspace application
can poll and read sound card's state.

Change-Id: Icafb2a8b970fb53ebc3eb7c44d075f1c01985072
Signed-off-by: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Glenn Kasten <gkasten@google.com>
futex: use freezable blocking call

Avoid waking up every thread sleeping in a futex_wait call during
suspend and resume by calling a freezable blocking call.  Previous
patches modified the freezer to avoid sending wakeups to threads
that are blocked in freezable blocking calls.

This call was selected to be converted to a freezable call because
it doesn't hold any locks or release any resources when interrupted
that might be needed by another freezing task or a kernel driver
during suspend, and is a common site where idle userspace tasks are
blocked.

Change-Id: I9ccab9c2d201adb66c85432801cdcf43fc91e94f
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Linux 3.4.0 > 3.4.75

Change-Id: I6b7272cc59176bb4a06d1497696cb69bf6c02714
Signed-off-by: houst0nn <houstonn@gmail.com>
Implement kexec-hardboot

ported to g2 by Ayysir

"Allows hard booting (i.e., with a full hardware reboot) to a kernel
previously loaded in memory by kexec.  This works around the problem of
soft-booted kernel hangs due to improper device shutdown and/or
reinitialization."
More info in /arch/arm/Kconfig.

Original author: Mike Kasick <mike@kasick.org>

Vojtech Bocek <vbocek@gmail.com>:
  I've ported it to hammerhead, it is based of my mako/grouper port, which is
  based of Asus TF201 patch ported by Jens Andersen <jens.andersen@gmail.com>

  Hammerhead is the first device I've ported this patch to which uses
  device tree binary instead of atags. It is also rather picky - its
  bootloader erases first 128MB of RAM on reboot, so following hacks had
  to be applied:
  * Copy dtb to location passed in r2 before jumping to kexecd' kernel,
    the kernel would just freeze when I left dtb above 128MB of RAM.
  * Copy kexecd' kernel to location in the first 128MB before jumping to it,
    the decompressor operates very slowly if the kernel is above the cached
    area, copying it lower and decompressing it afterwards is much faster.

  Same as my mako/flo patches, the guest kernel does not require any
  modifications, kexec-hardboot is equivalent to standard kexec.

  To support dtb, following commit was backported from the mainline:
    commit 4cabd1d9625c7d88acd143f4021fbef75394f154
    Author: Matthew Leach <matthew.leach@arm.com>
    Date:   Fri Sep 21 18:56:02 2012 +0100

      ARM: 7539/1: kexec: scan for dtb magic in segments

      This patch allows a dtb to be passed to a new kernel using the kexec
      mechinism.

      When loading segments from userspace, scan each segment's first four
      bytes for the dtb magic. If this is found set the kexec_boot_atags
      parameter to the relocate_kernel code to the phyical address of this
      segment.

  and fixes of this commit:
    c564df4db85aac8d1d65a56176a0a25f46138064
    2456f44dd7a9aaffc2cd21a13f78198b3d94da08

ayysir <dresadd09691@gmail.com>:
  kexec: use mem_text_write_kernel_word to set reboot_code_buffer args
  in order to avoid protection faults (writes to read-only
  kernel memory) when CONFIG_STRICT_MEMORY_RWX is enabled.

Change-Id: Id5d9bd18a2351e53c94ffbaa1b512d6c8f1fdd8b
Signed-off-by: Vojtech Bocek <vbocek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>
remove unnecessary defconfigs

if your device needs it, then add it.

Change-Id: If7d06e876097442d5d78eb12f51496bad98328d1
exFAT support

Signed-off-by: flar2 <asegaert@gmail.com>

Change-Id: I0dd518e30cb6bc15c843e3071d15e4d9f81f1a98
cpufreq: ondemand: sync with caf

Change-Id: I6b38aa4039b708857c9536aaeb08e06cc644a555
add extra free kbytes tunable

Add a userspace visible knob to tell the VM to keep an extra amount
of memory free, by increasing the gap between each zone's min and
low watermarks.

This is useful for realtime applications that call system
calls and have a bound on the number of allocations that happen
in any short time period.  In this application, extra_free_kbytes
would be left at an amount equal to or larger than than the
maximum number of allocations that happen in any burst.

It may also be useful to reduce the memory use of virtual
machines (temporarily?), in a way that does not cause memory
fragmentation like ballooning does.

[ccross]
Revived for use on old kernels where no other solution exists.
The tunable will be removed on kernels that do better at avoiding
direct reclaim.

Change-Id: I765a42be8e964bfd3e2886d1ca85a29d60c3bb3e
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel<riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Git-commit: 92189d47f66c67e5fd92eafaa287e153197a454f
Git-repo: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/
[bhargavuln@codeaurora.org: resolve trivial merge conflicts]
Signed-off-by: Bhargav Upperla <bhargavuln@codeaurora.org>
enable exfat

Change-Id: I5afdddbf1b23a25bc83e9a5a6dfcfb58d23c1ac6
ASoC: msm: qdsp6v2: fix the crash issues due to NULL pointer

If adsp subsystem restart happens, ac and apr handles are not valid
any more. While recovering subsystem restart and reassign proper
handles protection from accessing NULL pointer is required.

CRs-fixed: 513414
Change-Id: Idb60d3504a37c0de708846a4f8517f9d75eb9078
Signed-off-by: Fred Oh <fred@codeaurora.org>