SCHEDULER: Autogroup patch group by current user android UID instead of task ID
Makefile: add some optimization flags

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
defconfig: remove kernel debugging in general

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
d2: add support for panel color shifting based on a sysfs interface

Adapted from work by morfic and ktoonsez

Creates a syfs interface here:
  /sys/devices/virtual/sec/tsp/panel_colors

Will accept 0-4 for parameters:
  0 - Cold (more blues)
  1 - Cool
  2 - Normal (stock colors)
  3 - Warm
  4 - Hot (more reds)

Change-Id: I387de07c56b7007606233e29744fb1d91171a0e3
d2: relocate sysfs interface for panel_colors

Now at:
  /sys/class/lcd/panel/panel_colors

Change-Id: I41de182eb6faecca0a8b6c832803ac045c6e441d
dynamic fsync: add reboot notifier to force flush outstanding data

this should further prevent data corruption from kernel panics and
forced reboots

bump version to 1.2

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
mdp4_util: reduce dmesg log spam

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
tspdrv: reduce dmesg log spam

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
mdp4_overlay.c: reduce dmesg spam

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
immvibespi.c: reduce dmesg log spam

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
intellidemand: minor clean up and fix up for LMF compilation issues

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
random: sync with kernel.org

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
fix typo/thinko in get_random_bytes()

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator we use it
to acquire randomness one "long" at a time.  We should put these random
words into consecutive words in the result buffer - not just overwrite
the first word again and again.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
random: Use arch_get_random_int instead of cycle counter if avail

We still don't use rdrand in /dev/random, which just seems stupid. We
accept the *cycle*counter* as a random input, but we don't accept
rdrand? That's just broken.

Sure, people can do things in user space (write to /dev/random, use
rdrand in addition to /dev/random themselves etc etc), but that
*still* seems to be a particularly stupid reason for saying "we
shouldn't bother to try to do better in /dev/random".

And even if somebody really doesn't trust rdrand as a source of random
bytes, it seems singularly stupid to trust the cycle counter *more*.

So I'd suggest the attached patch. I'm not going to even bother
arguing that we should add more bits to the entropy estimate, because
that's not the point - I don't care if /dev/random fills up slowly or
not, I think it's just stupid to not use the bits we can get from
rdrand and mix them into the strong randomness pool.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFwn59N1=m651QAyTy-1gO1noGbK18zwKDwvwqnravA84A@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores.  Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
random: Adjust the number of loops when initializing

When we are initializing using arch_get_random_long() we only need to
loop enough times to touch all the bytes in the buffer; using
poolwords for that does twice the number of operations necessary on a
64-bit machine, since in the random number generator code "word" means
32 bits.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
drivers/char/random.c: fix boot id uniqueness race

/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently by userspace
processes.  If two (or more) user-space processes concurrently read
boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race can occur making
boot_id differ between the reads.  Because the whole point of the boot id
is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this by protecting this
operation with a spinlock.

Given that this operation is not frequently used, hitting the spinlock
on each call should not be an issue.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
random: fix up sparse warnings

Add extern and static declarations to suppress sparse warnings

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path

The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org