TOR is a tool intended to enable online anonymity. However, like many other anonymizing tools, it can still succumb to many surveillance and censorship programs. One of the main problems encountered by TOR is the fact that censors can easily confirm when someone is hosting a TOR bridge. The main purpose of these bridges is to allow people suffering from the censoring of normal TOR relays to connect to the TOR network. In this project, we designed and implemented a solution that makes TOR bridges more resistant against censorship by preventing a censor from easily identifying them. This project required modifications to the TOR Client and the TOR Bridge source code. With this solution a TOR bridge forwards incoming traffic by default to a web server, unless the client presents the required secret key, which in turn gives the client access to the TOR service. The authentication phase happens at the bridge, after the TLS handshake. Once the client has proven to have the secret key, the bridge responds as a normal TOR bridge. The secret key is only shared with the intended users of the bridge, along with the IP address and the port number. Without the key, the bridge assumes the user is a potential censor and forwards traffic to the web server, which functions as a normal HTTPS server. Therefore the censor will not be able to confirm their suspicion of a TOR bridge running on that host.  More about TOR - https://www.torproject.org/