UBUNTU: Start new release

Ignore: yes
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
llc: fix info leak via getsockname()

CVE-2012-6542

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156743

The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.

Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 3592aaeb80290bda0f2cf0b5456c97bfc638b192)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()

CVE-2012-6544

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156751

The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit 792039c73cf176c8e39a6e8beef2c94ff46522ed)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>

Conflicts:
	net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)

CVE-2012-6544

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156751

The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit e15ca9a0ef9a86f0477530b0f44a725d67f889ee)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()

CVE-2012-6545

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156757

The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 9344a972961d1a6d2c04d9008b13617bcb6ec2ef)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)

CVE-2012-6545

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156757

The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.

Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit f9432c5ec8b1e9a09b9b0e5569e3c73db8de432a)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>

Conflicts:
	net/bluetooth/rfcomm/tty.c
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
atm: fix info leak via getsockname()

CVE-2012-6546

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156759

The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit 3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>

Conflicts:
	net/atm/pvc.c
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
atm: fix info leak in getsockopt(SO_ATMPVC)

CVE-2012-6546

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156759

The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit e862f1a9b7df4e8196ebec45ac62295138aa3fc2)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>

Conflicts:
	net/atm/common.c
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
udf: avoid info leak on export

CVE-2012-6548

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156768

For type 0x51 the udf.parent_partref member in struct fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
(cherry picked from commit 0143fc5e9f6f5aad4764801015bc8d4b4a278200)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
KVM: x86: fix for buffer overflow in handling of MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME (CVE-2013-1796)

CVE-2013-1796

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1158254

If the guest sets the GPA of the time_page so that the request to update the
time straddles a page then KVM will write onto an incorrect page.  The
write is done byusing kmap atomic to get a pointer to the page for the time
structure and then performing a memcpy to that page starting at an offset
that the guest controls.  Well behaved guests always provide a 32-byte aligned
address, however a malicious guest could use this to corrupt host kernel
memory.

Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>

(cherry picked from commit c300aa64ddf57d9c5d9c898a64b36877345dd4a9)
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()

CVE-2013-0349

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1134503

The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.

Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:

$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af

("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
(back ported from commit 0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: SAUCE: (no-up) apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network mediation

This fixes a bug in the apparmor networking patch that is not upstream
because it is being replaced by a newer patch.

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1163259

If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
   tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
   should have resulted in the application being killed did not.

2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
   This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
   they had been specifically marked as quieted.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()

CVE-2013-1774

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1143817

The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.

This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.

Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.

[   56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[   56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[   56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[   56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[   56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[   56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[   56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[   56.282744] Modules linked in:
[   56.283512] CPU 1
[   56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[   56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>]  [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[   56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0  EFLAGS: 00010046
[   56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[   56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[   56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[   56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[   56.283512] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   56.283512] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[   56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[   56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[   56.283512] Stack:
[   56.283512]  0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[   56.283512]  ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[   56.283512]  ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[   56.283512] Call Trace:
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[   56.283512]  [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[   56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[   56.283512] RIP  [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[   56.283512]  RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[   56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[   56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---

Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811)
Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
x86/xen: don't assume %ds is usable in xen_iret for 32-bit PVOPS.

CVE-2013-0228

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1143796

This fixes CVE-2013-0228 / XSA-42

Drew Jones while working on CVE-2013-0190 found that that unprivileged guest user
in 32bit PV guest can use to crash the > guest with the panic like this:

-------------
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/devices/vbd-51712/block/xvda/dev
Modules linked in: sunrpc ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4
iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6
xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables ipv6 xen_netfront ext4
mbcache jbd2 xen_blkfront dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last
unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]

Pid: 1250, comm: r Not tainted 2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1
EIP: 0061:[<c0407462>] EFLAGS: 00010086 CPU: 0
EIP is at xen_iret+0x12/0x2b
EAX: eb8d0000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 08049860 EDX: 00000010
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 003d0f00 EBP: b77f8388 ESP: eb8d1fe0
 DS: 0000 ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 00e0 SS: 0069
Process r (pid: 1250, ti=eb8d0000 task=c2953550 task.ti=eb8d0000)
Stack:
 00000000 0027f416 00000073 00000206 b77f8364 0000007b 00000000 00000000
Call Trace:
Code: c3 8b 44 24 18 81 4c 24 38 00 02 00 00 8d 64 24 30 e9 03 00 00 00
8d 76 00 f7 44 24 08 00 00 02 80 75 33 50 b8 00 e0 ff ff 21 e0 <8b> 40
10 8b 04 85 a0 f6 ab c0 8b 80 0c b0 b3 c0 f6 44 24 0d 02
EIP: [<c0407462>] xen_iret+0x12/0x2b SS:ESP 0069:eb8d1fe0
general protection fault: 0000 [#2]
---[ end trace ab0d29a492dcd330 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Pid: 1250, comm: r Tainted: G      D    ---------------
2.6.32-356.el6.i686 #1
Call Trace:
 [<c08476df>] ? panic+0x6e/0x122
 [<c084b63c>] ? oops_end+0xbc/0xd0
 [<c084b260>] ? do_general_protection+0x0/0x210
 [<c084a9b7>] ? error_code+0x73/
-------------

Petr says: "
 I've analysed the bug and I think that xen_iret() cannot cope with
 mangled DS, in this case zeroed out (null selector/descriptor) by either
 xen_failsafe_callback() or RESTORE_REGS because the corresponding LDT
 entry was invalidated by the reproducer. "

Jan took a look at the preliminary patch and came up a fix that solves
this problem:

"This code gets called after all registers other than those handled by
IRET got already restored, hence a null selector in %ds or a non-null
one that got loaded from a code or read-only data descriptor would
cause a kernel mode fault (with the potential of crashing the kernel
as a whole, if panic_on_oops is set)."

The way to fix this is to realize that the we can only relay on the
registers that IRET restores. The two that are guaranteed are the
%cs and %ss as they are always fixed GDT selectors. Also they are
inaccessible from user mode - so they cannot be altered. This is
the approach taken in this patch.

Another alternative option suggested by Jan would be to relay on
the subtle realization that using the %ebp or %esp relative references uses
the %ss segment.  In which case we could switch from using %eax to %ebp and
would not need the %ss over-rides. That would also require one extra
instruction to compensate for the one place where the register is used
as scaled index. However Andrew pointed out that is too subtle and if
further work was to be done in this code-path it could escape folks attention
and lead to accidents.

Reviewed-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
(back ported from commit 13d2b4d11d69a92574a55bfd985cfb0ca77aebdc)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft <andy.whitcroft@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: Ubuntu-2.6.32-46.108

Signed-off-by: Steve Conklin <sconklin@canonical.com>
UBUNTU: Start new release

Ignore: yes
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check

CVE-2013-1928

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1167061

The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments.  This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.

Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 12176503366885edd542389eed3aaf94be163fdb)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks

CVE-2013-2634

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1158965

The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
  copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
  so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
  for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
  struct,

Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(back ported from commit 29cd8ae0e1a39e239a3a7b67da1986add1199fc0)

Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow

CVE-2013-1860

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156784

The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(back ported from commit c0f5ecee4e741667b2493c742b60b6218d40b3aa)

Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
isofs: avoid info leak on export

CVE-2012-6549

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1156774

For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
(cherry picked from commit fe685aabf7c8c9f138e5ea900954d295bf229175)
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>