Added exfat-nofuse driver
Conflicts:
	fs/Kconfig
added http://www.tuxera.com/community/ntfs-3g-download/

to build for arm open a cmd and go to:

/fs/ntfs-3g_ntfsprogs

enter: sh build_for_arm.sh
EXFAT 1.2.5
Add Exfat Support
Remove '+' symbol from kernel version string

Signed-off-by: franciscofranco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Francisco Franco <franciscofranco.1990@gmail.com>
ARM: vfp: fix a hole in VFP thread migration

Fix a hole in the VFP thread migration.  Lets define two threads.

Thread 1, we'll call 'interesting_thread' which is a thread which is
running on CPU0, using VFP (so vfp_current_hw_state[0] =
&interesting_thread->vfpstate) and gets migrated off to CPU1, where
it continues execution of VFP instructions.

Thread 2, we'll call 'new_cpu0_thread' which is the thread which takes
over on CPU0.  This has also been using VFP, and last used VFP on CPU0,
but doesn't use it again.

The following code will be executed twice:

		cpu = thread->cpu;

		/*
		 * On SMP, if VFP is enabled, save the old state in
		 * case the thread migrates to a different CPU. The
		 * restoring is done lazily.
		 */
		if ((fpexc & FPEXC_EN) && vfp_current_hw_state[cpu]) {
			vfp_save_state(vfp_current_hw_state[cpu], fpexc);
			vfp_current_hw_state[cpu]->hard.cpu = cpu;
		}
		/*
		 * Thread migration, just force the reloading of the
		 * state on the new CPU in case the VFP registers
		 * contain stale data.
		 */
		if (thread->vfpstate.hard.cpu != cpu)
			vfp_current_hw_state[cpu] = NULL;

The first execution will be on CPU0 to switch away from 'interesting_thread'.
interesting_thread->cpu will be 0.

So, vfp_current_hw_state[0] points at interesting_thread->vfpstate.
The hardware state will be saved, along with the CPU number (0) that
it was executing on.

'thread' will be 'new_cpu0_thread' with new_cpu0_thread->cpu = 0.
Also, because it was executing on CPU0, new_cpu0_thread->vfpstate.hard.cpu = 0,
and so the thread migration check is not triggered.

This means that vfp_current_hw_state[0] remains pointing at interesting_thread.

The second execution will be on CPU1 to switch _to_ 'interesting_thread'.
So, 'thread' will be 'interesting_thread' and interesting_thread->cpu now
will be 1.  The previous thread executing on CPU1 is not relevant to this
so we shall ignore that.

We get to the thread migration check.  Here, we discover that
interesting_thread->vfpstate.hard.cpu = 0, yet interesting_thread->cpu is
now 1, indicating thread migration.  We set vfp_current_hw_state[1] to
NULL.

So, at this point vfp_current_hw_state[] contains the following:

[0] = &interesting_thread->vfpstate
[1] = NULL

Our interesting thread now executes a VFP instruction, takes a fault
which loads the state into the VFP hardware.  Now, through the assembly
we now have:

[0] = &interesting_thread->vfpstate
[1] = &interesting_thread->vfpstate

CPU1 stops due to ptrace (and so saves its VFP state) using the thread
switch code above), and CPU0 calls vfp_sync_hwstate().

	if (vfp_current_hw_state[cpu] == &thread->vfpstate) {
		vfp_save_state(&thread->vfpstate, fpexc | FPEXC_EN);

BANG, we corrupt interesting_thread's VFP state by overwriting the
more up-to-date state saved by CPU1 with the old VFP state from CPU0.

Fix this by ensuring that we have sane semantics for the various state
describing variables:

1. vfp_current_hw_state[] points to the current owner of the context
   information stored in each CPUs hardware, or NULL if that state
   information is invalid.
2. thread->vfpstate.hard.cpu always contains the most recent CPU number
   which the state was loaded into or NR_CPUS if no CPU owns the state.

So, for a particular CPU to be a valid owner of the VFP state for a
particular thread t, two things must be true:

 vfp_current_hw_state[cpu] == &t->vfpstate && t->vfpstate.hard.cpu == cpu.

and that is valid from the moment a CPU loads the saved VFP context
into the hardware.  This gives clear and consistent semantics to
interpreting these variables.

This patch also fixes thread copying, ensuring that t->vfpstate.hard.cpu
is invalidated, otherwise CPU0 may believe it was the last owner.  The
hole can happen thus:

- thread1 runs on CPU2 using VFP, migrates to CPU3, exits and thread_info
  freed.
- New thread allocated from a previously running thread on CPU2, reusing
  memory for thread1 and copying vfp.hard.cpu.

At this point, the following are true:

	new_thread1->vfpstate.hard.cpu == 2
	&new_thread1->vfpstate == vfp_current_hw_state[2]

Lastly, this also addresses thread flushing in a similar way to thread
copying.  Hole is:

- thread runs on CPU0, using VFP, migrates to CPU1 but does not use VFP.
- thread calls execve(), so thread flush happens, leaving
  vfp_current_hw_state[0] intact.  This vfpstate is memset to 0 causing
  thread->vfpstate.hard.cpu = 0.
- thread migrates back to CPU0 before using VFP.

At this point, the following are true:

	thread->vfpstate.hard.cpu == 0
	&thread->vfpstate == vfp_current_hw_state[0]

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
ARM: vfp: ensure that thread flushing works if preempted

Prevent a preemption event causing the initialized VFP state being
overwritten by ensuring that the VFP hardware access is disabled
prior to starting initialization.  We can then do this in safety
while still allowing preemption to occur.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
ARM: vfp: Fix the comment to make it consistent with the code.

Function vfp_force_reload() clears vfp_current_hw_state, so
update the comment accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@ti.com>
ARM: vfp: reset current HW state only if actually reloaded

Signed-off-by: Andrei F <luxneb@gmail.com>
ashmem: fix deadlock when system is low on memory
ARM: add support for kernel mode NEON

In order to safely support the use of NEON instructions in
kernel mode, some precautions need to be taken:
- the userland context that may be present in the registers (even
  if the NEON/VFP is currently disabled) must be stored under the
  correct task (which may not be 'current' in the UP case),
- to avoid having to keep track of additional vfpstates for the
  kernel side, disallow the use of NEON in interrupt context
  and run with preemption disabled,
- after use, re-enable preemption and re-enable the lazy restore
  machinery by disabling the NEON/VFP unit.

This patch adds the functions kernel_neon_begin() and
kernel_neon_end() which take care of the above. It also adds
the Kconfig symbol KERNEL_MODE_NEON to enable it.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>

Conflicts:
	arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
ARM: crypto: add NEON accelerated XOR implementation

Add a source file xor-neon.c (which is really just the reference
C implementation passed through the GCC vectorizer) and hook it
up to the XOR framework.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
vfs: d_invalidate() should leave mountpoints alone

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
VFS: Log the fact that we've given ELOOP rather than creating a loop

To prevent an NFS server from being used to create a directory loop in an NFS
superblock on the client, the following patch was committed:

	commit 1836750115f20b774e55c032a3893e8c5bdf41ed
	Author: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
	Date:   Tue Jul 12 21:42:24 2011 -0400
	Subject: fix loop checks in d_materialise_unique()

This causes ELOOP to be reported to anyone trying to access the dentry that
would otherwise cause the kernel to complete the loop.

However, no indication is given to the caller as to why an operation that ought
to work doesn't.  The fault is with the kernel, which doesn't want to try and
solve the problem as it gets horrendously messy if there's another mountpoint
somewhere in the trees being spliced that can't be moved[*].

[*] The real problem is that we don't handle the excision of a subtree that
gets moved _out_ of what we can see.  This can happen on the server where a
directory is merely moved between two other dirs on the same filesystem, but
where destination dir is not accessible by the client.

So, given the choice to return ELOOP rather than trying to reconfigure the
dentry tree, we should give the caller some indication of why they aren't being
allowed to make what should be a legitimate request and log a message.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>