xen/arm: Basic support for sunxi/sun7i platform.

Specifically cubieboard2

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
xen/arm: Blacklist sun7i UARTs

These are in the same page as the UART which is used as the Xen console. We are
not currently smart enough to avoid passing them through to the guest,
accidentally giving the guest access to the Xen console UART.

we blacklist them all, if necessary in the future we can split the list into
two halves and make a per platform decision about which half should be
blacklisted on a given platform depending on which UART is wired up as the
console.

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
xen: arm: consitfy platform compatibility lists and use __initconst

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
libxl/hotplug: add support for getting domid

This patch writes Dom0 domid on xenstore (like it's done for other
guests), and adds a libxl helper function to fetch that domid from
xenstore.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ ijc -- dropped xencommons hunk, same change was made independently
  in 02ebea7768fe ]
libxl: remove unneeded libxl_domain_info in wait_device_connection

The info fetched by libxl_domain_info is not used anywere in the
function.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
libxl: make hotplug execution conditional on backend_domid == domid

libxl currently refuses to execute hotplug scripts if the backend
domid of a device is different than LIBXL_TOOLSTACK_DOMID. This will
prevent libxl from executing hotplug scripts when running on a domain
different than LIBXL_TOOLSTACK_DOMID, we should instead check if
backend_domid is different than current domid.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
.config: Allow all URL(s) to be specified in .config

This allow building of XEN from source on a system without internet
access using either the environment or .config

Do the same with XEN_EXTFILES_URL, QEMU_REMOTE, IPXE_GIT_URL, and
IPXE_TARBALL_URL as QEMU_UPSTREAM_URL, SEABIOS_UPSTREAM_URL, etc.

Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
x86/HVM: 32-bit IN result must be zero-extended to 64 bits

Just like for all other operations with 32-bit operand size.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
x86: command line parameter to disable ARAT

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/viridian: Time Reference Count MSR

This viridian MSR is a read-only source of time (in units of 100ns) since the
domain started.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
x86/viridian: TSC and APIC Frequency MSRs

These viridian MSRs are read-only sources of the TSC and APIC frequency (in
units of Hz)

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
VMX: disable EPT when !cpu_has_vmx_pat

Recently Oracle developers found a Xen security issue as DOS affecting,
named as XSA-60. Please refer http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-60.html
Basically it involves how to handle guest cr0.cd setting, which under
some environment it consumes much time resulting in DOS-like behavior.

This is a preparing patch for fixing XSA-60. Later patch will fix XSA-60
via PAT under Intel EPT case, which depends on cpu_has_vmx_pat.

This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.

Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
VMX: remove the problematic set_uc_mode logic

XSA-60 security hole comes from the problematic vmx_set_uc_mode.
This patch remove vmx_set_uc_mode logic, which will be replaced by
PAT approach at later patch.

This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.

Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
VMX: fix cr0.cd handling

This patch solves XSA-60 security hole:
1. For guest w/o VT-d, and for guest with VT-d but snooped, Xen need
do nothing, since hardware snoop mechanism has ensured cache coherency.

2. For guest with VT-d but non-snooped, cache coherency can not be
guaranteed by h/w snoop, therefore it need emulate UC type to guest:
2.1). if it works w/ Intel EPT, set guest IA32_PAT fields as UC so that
guest memory type are all UC.
2.2). if it works w/ shadow, drop all shadows so that any new ones would
be created on demand w/ UC.

This patch also fix a bug of shadow cr0.cd setting. Current shadow has a
small window between cache flush and TLB invalidation, resulting in possilbe
cache pollution. This patch pause vcpus so that no vcpus context involved
into the window.

This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.

Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
VMX: flush cache when vmentry back to UC guest

This patch flush cache when vmentry back to UC guest, to prevent
cache polluted by hypervisor access guest memory during UC mode.

The elegant way to do this is, simply add wbinvd just before vmentry.
However, currently wbinvd before vmentry will mysteriously trigger
lapic timer interrupt storm, hung booting stage for 10s ~ 60s. We still
didn't dig out the root cause of interrupt storm, so currently this
patch add flag indicating hypervisor access UC guest memory to prevent
interrupt storm -- though it still leaves aspects un-addressed, i.e.
speculative reads, and multi-vCPU issues, etc.

Whenever the interrupt storm got root caused and fixed, the protection
flag can be removed -- that would be final clean and elegant approach
dealing with cache flushing before vmentry.

This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.

Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
MAINTAINERS: Add FIFO-based event channel ABI maintainer

Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
evtchn: don't lose pending state if FIFO event array page is missing

When the FIFO-based ABI is in use, if an event is bound when the
corresponding event array page is missing any attempt to set the event
pending will lose the event (because there is nowhere to write the
pending state).

This wasn't initially considered an issue because guests were expected
to only bind events once they had expanded the event array, however:

1. A domain may start with events already bound (by the toolstack).

2. The guest does not know what the port number will be until the
   event is bound (it doesn't know how many already bound events there
   are), so it does not know how many event array pages are required.
   This makes it difficult to expand in advanced (the current Linux
   implementation expands after binding for example).

To prevent pending events from being lost because there is no array
page, temporarily store the pending state in evtchn->pending.  When an
array page is added, use this state to set the port as pending.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
call sched_destroy_domain before cpupool_rm_domain

The domain destruction code, removes a domain from its cpupool
before attempting to destroy its scheduler information.  Since
the scheduler framework uses the domain's cpupool information
to decide on which scheduler ops to use, this results in the
the wrong scheduler's destroy domain function being called
when the cpupool scheduler and the initial scheduler are
different.

Correct this by destroying the domain's scheduling information
before removing it from the pool.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Studer <nate.studer@dornerworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
MAINTAINERS: remove Jacob Shin

As was requested by him, now that he left AMD.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/acpi: Warn about multiple HPET tables

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>