Revert "exynos_mem: an alternative temporary workaround for exynos-mem security hole"

This reverts commit 858bff06e4692191b05cb306204401d861f5adf0.
exynos-mem: Fix major security hole, + small fimc allow.

This fixes the exynos-mem device security hole. The driver allowed any user
to access all of the device's lowmem through the provided mmap functionality.

We create a small little framework collecting the actual CMA memory blocks
that exist on the device; they are the root cause of the existence of this device
driver. We white-list only the CMA memory spaces as parameters to the mmap
function and deny access to any other memory space requests.

We furthermore just allow access to the "s3c-fimc" memory block as this is
seemingly the only space which upon access denial actually breaks functionality.

This patch was modified to be suitable for Exynos 4210 by
Andrew Dodd <atd7@cornell.edu> from Andrei's original Exynos 4412 patch.

Change-Id: Ie5335c1ca81293dc071e919c00524f1e6765e70e
Signed-off-by: Andrew Dodd <atd7@cornell.edu>
opp: De-obscurify OPP structs and disclose find_device_opp

Move definitions of OPP structs in the header file so that its
members are public and the struct is no longer obscure.

Define interface for find_device_opp in the header file.
binfmt_elf.c: use get_random_int() to fix entropy depleting

Changes:
--------
v4->v3:
- s/random_stack_user()/get_atrandom_bytes()/
- Move this function to ahead of its use to avoid the predeclaration.

v3->v2:
- Tweak code comments of random_stack_user().
- Remove redundant bits mask and shift upon the random variable.

v2->v1:
- Fix random copy to check up buffer length that are not 4-byte multiples.

v3 can be found at:
http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59597.html
v2 can be found at:
http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59418.html
v1 can be found at:
http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg59128.html

Thanks,
-Jeff

Entropy is quickly depleted under normal operations like ls(1), cat(1),
etc...  between 2.6.30 to current mainline, for instance:

$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
3428
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2911
$cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2620

We observed this problem has been occurring since 2.6.30 with
fs/binfmt_elf.c: create_elf_tables()->get_random_bytes(), introduced by
f06295b44c296c8f ("ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for glibc PRNG seeding").

/*
 * Generate 16 random bytes for userspace PRNG seeding.
 */
get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, sizeof(k_rand_bytes));

The patch introduces a wrapper around get_random_int() which has lower
overhead than calling get_random_bytes() directly.

With this patch applied:
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2731
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2802
$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail
2878

Analyzed by John Sobecki.

Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <aedilger@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnn@arndb.de>
Cc: John Sobecki <john.sobecki@oracle.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>