ptrace/arm: revert "hw_breakpoints: Fix racy access to ptrace breakpoints"

This reverts commit bf0b8f4b55e5 ("hw_breakpoints: Fix racy access to
ptrace breakpoints").

The patch was fine but we can no longer race with SIGKILL after commit
9899d11f6544 ("ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race
with SIGKILL"), the __TASK_TRACED tracee can't be woken up and
->ptrace_bps[] can't go away.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ARM: 7337/1: ptrace: fix ptrace_read_user for !CONFIG_MMU platforms

Commit 68b7f715 ("nommu: ptrace support") added definitions for
PT_TEXT_ADDR and friends, as well as adding ptrace support for reading
from these magic offsets.

Unfortunately, this has probably never worked, since ptrace_read_user
predicates reading on off < sizeof(struct user), returning -EIO
otherwise.

This patch moves the offset size check until after we have tried to
match it against either a magic value or an offset into pt_regs.

Cc: Paul Brook <paul@codesourcery.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
ARM: introduce handle_IRQ() not to dump exception stack

On Mon, Jul 11, 2011 at 3:52 PM, Russell King - ARM Linux
<linux@arm.linux.org.uk> wrote:

...

> The __exception annotation on a function causes this to happen:
>
> [<c002406c>] (asm_do_IRQ+0x6c/0x8c) from [<c0024b84>]
> (__irq_svc+0x44/0xcc)
> Exception stack(0xc3897c78 to 0xc3897cc0)
> 7c60:                                                       4022d320 4022e000
> 7c80: 08000075 00001000 c32273c0 c03ce1c0 c2b49b78 4022d000 c2b420b4 00000001
> 7ca0: 00000000 c3897cfc 00000000 c3897cc0 c00afc54 c002edd8 00000013 ffffffff
>
> Where that stack dump represents the pt_regs for the exception which
> happened.  Any function found in while unwinding will cause this to
> be printed.
>
> If you insert a C function between the IRQ assembly and asm_do_IRQ,
> the
> dump you get from asm_do_IRQ will be the stack for your function,
> not
> the pt_regs.  That makes the feature useless.
>

When __irq_svc - or any of the other exception handling assembly code -
calls the C code, the stack pointer will be pointing at the pt_regs
structure.

All the entry points into C code from the exception handling code are
marked with __exception or __exception_irq_enter to indicate that they
are one of the functions which has pt_regs above them.

Normally, when you've entered asm_do_IRQ() you will have this stack
layout (higher address towards top):

       pt_regs
       asm_do_IRQ frame

If you insert a C function between the exception assembly code and
asm_do_IRQ, you end up with this stack layout instead:

       pt_regs
       your function frame
       asm_do_IRQ frame

This means when we unwind, we'll get to asm_do_IRQ, and rather than
dumping out the pt_regs, we'll dump out your functions stack frame
instead, because that's what is above the asm_do_IRQ stack frame
rather than the expected pt_regs structure.

The fix is to introduce handle_IRQ() for no exception stack dump, so
it can be called with MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER is selected and a C function
is between the assembly code and the actual IRQ handling code.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric Miao <eric.y.miao@gmail.com>
ARM: move vector stubs

Move the machine vector stubs into the page above the vector page,
which we can prevent from being visible to userspace.  Also move
the reset stub, and place the swi vector at a location that the
'ldr' can get to it.

This hides pointers into the kernel which could give valuable
information to attackers, and reduces the number of exploitable
instructions at a fixed address.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Code sync for vmlinux.lds.S and entry-armv.S