arm/crypto: Add optimized AES and SHA1 routines

Add assembler versions of AES and SHA1 for ARM platforms.  This has provided
up to a 50% improvement in IPsec/TCP throughout for tunnels using AES128/SHA1.

Platform   CPU SPeed    Endian   Before (bps)   After (bps)   Improvement

IXP425      533 MHz      big     11217042        15566294        ~38%
KS8695      166 MHz     little    3828549         5795373        ~51%

Signed-off-by: David McCullough <ucdevel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: faux123 <reioux@gmail.com>
fs/sync: Make sync() satisfy many requests with one invocation

Dave Jones reported RCU stalls, overly long hrtimer interrupts, and
amazingly long NMI handlers from a trinity-induced workload involving
lots of concurrent sync() calls (https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/7/23/369).
There are any number of things that one might do to make sync() behave
better under high levels of contention, but it is also the case that
multiple concurrent sync() system calls can be satisfied by a single
sys_sync() invocation.

Given that this situation is reminiscent of rcu_barrier(), this commit
applies the rcu_barrier() approach to sys_sync().  This approach uses
a global mutex and a sequence counter.  The mutex is held across the
sync() operation, which eliminates contention between concurrent sync()
operations.  The counter is incremented at the beginning and end of
each sync() operation, so that it is odd while a sync() operation is in
progress and even otherwise, just like sequence locks.

The code that used to be in sys_sync() is now in do_sync(), and sys_sync()
now handles the concurrency.  The sys_sync() function first takes a
snapshot of the counter, then acquires the mutex, and then takes another
snapshot of the counter.  If the values of the two snapshots indicate that
a full do_sync() executed during the mutex acquisition, the sys_sync()
function releases the mutex and returns ("Our work is done!").  Otherwise,
sys_sync() increments the counter, invokes do_sync(), and increments
the counter again.

This approach allows a single call to do_sync() to satisfy an arbitrarily
large number of sync() system calls, which should eliminate issues due
to large numbers of concurrent invocations of the sync() system call.

Changes since v1 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/7/24/683):

o	Add a pair of memory barriers to keep the increments from
	bleeding into the do_sync() code.  (The failure probability
	is insanely low, but when you have several hundred million
	devices running Linux, you can expect several hundred instances
	of one-in-a-million failures.)

o	Actually CC some people who have experience in this area.

Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Curt Wohlgemuth <curtw@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <jaxboe@fusionio.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
sync: don't block the flusher thread waiting on IO

When sync does it's WB_SYNC_ALL writeback, it issues data Io and
then immediately waits for IO completion. This is done in the
context of the flusher thread, and hence completely ties up the
flusher thread for the backing device until all the dirty inodes
have been synced. On filesystems that are dirtying inodes constantly
and quickly, this means the flusher thread can be tied up for
minutes per sync call and hence badly affect system level write IO
performance as the page cache cannot be cleaned quickly.

We already have a wait loop for IO completion for sync(2), so cut
this out of the flusher thread and delegate it to wait_sb_inodes().
Hence we can do rapid IO submission, and then wait for it all to
complete.

Effect of sync on fsmark before the patch:

FSUse%        Count         Size    Files/sec     App Overhead
.....
     0       640000         4096      35154.6          1026984
     0       720000         4096      36740.3          1023844
     0       800000         4096      36184.6           916599
     0       880000         4096       1282.7          1054367
     0       960000         4096       3951.3           918773
     0      1040000         4096      40646.2           996448
     0      1120000         4096      43610.1           895647
     0      1200000         4096      40333.1           921048

And a single sync pass took:

  real    0m52.407s
  user    0m0.000s
  sys     0m0.090s

After the patch, there is no impact on fsmark results, and each
individual sync(2) operation run concurrently with the same fsmark
workload takes roughly 7s:

  real    0m6.930s
  user    0m0.000s
  sys     0m0.039s

IOWs, sync is 7-8x faster on a busy filesystem and does not have an
adverse impact on ongoing async data write operations.

Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Voltage Control: initial voltage control for MSM S4-Pro SOC

Signed-off-by: faux123 <reioux@gmail.com>

Conflicts:
	arch/arm/mach-msm/Kconfig

Conflicts:

	arch/arm/mach-msm/Kconfig
Voltage Control: allow for lower minimums

this allows the low CPU frequencies to take advantage of UV control

Signed-off-by: faux123 <reioux@gmail.com>

Conflicts:

	arch/arm/mach-msm/board-m7-regulator.c
Voltage Control: add sysfs interface

Signed-off-by: faux123 <reioux@gmail.com>
ARM: 7583/1: decompressor: Enable unaligned memory access for v6 and above

Modern GCC can generate code which makes use of the CPU's native
unaligned memory access capabilities.  This is useful for the C
decompressor implementations used for unpacking compressed kernels.

This patch disables alignment faults and enables the v6 unaligned
access model on CPUs which support these features (i.e., v6 and
later), allowing full unaligned access support for C code in the
decompressor.

The decompressor C code must not be built to assume that unaligned
access works if support for v5 or older platforms is included in
the kernel.

For correct code generation, C decompressor code must always use
the get_unaligned and put_unaligned accessors when dealing with
unaligned pointers, regardless of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
ARM: 7492/1: add strstr declaration for decompressors

With the generic unaligned.h, more kernel headers get pulled in including
dynamic_debug.h which needs strstr. As it is not really used, we only need
a declaration here.

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
timer: optimize apply_slack()

__fls(mask) is equivalent to find_last_bit(&mask, BITS_PER_LONG), but cheaper.
find_last_bit was showing up high on the list when I was profiling for stalls
on icache misses on a system with very small cache size (MIPS).

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: edoko <r_data@naver.com>
update CLFAGS
update CFLAGS
cpufreq: properly sync current scaling governor across all cores.

Previously (like a lot of CAF based kernels) the cpu governor, when changed would only
be applied to whatever cores were online at the time. This corrects that behavior.

Change-Id: Ieff1cdea24586b85a4fb72df52405101a8859217
cpufreq_interactive.c:  update defaults
video: msm: Maintain histogram LUT state through suspend resume

Make sure LUT state is maintained after suspend resume. Required to ensure
HistLUT and backlight scale are in sync.

CRs-Fixed: 476491
Change-Id: Icc999aa0b04cad93ceed334426f61b71cbdd0a13
Signed-off-by: Carl Vanderlip <carlv@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Mekala Natarajan <mekalan@codeaurora.org>

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
drivers/video/msm: restore update_lcdc_lut capabilities for MDP devices

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
hwrng: add randomness to system from rng sources

When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
per-boot differences.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Signed-off-by: Paul Reioux <reioux@gmail.com>
random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function

Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present.  Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.

The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door.  (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)

It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
random: create add_device_randomness() interface

Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).

[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
  in question. ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
random: fix up sparse warnings

Add extern and static declarations to suppress sparse warnings

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org