ARM: OMAP2+: OPP: Fix cherry-pick
displays back to LG's liking
net: Allow driver to limit number of GSO segments per skb

[ Upstream commit 30b678d844af3305cda5953467005cebb5d7b687 ]

A peer (or local user) may cause TCP to use a nominal MSS of as little
as 88 (actual MSS of 76 with timestamps).  Given that we have a
sufficiently prodigious local sender and the peer ACKs quickly enough,
it is nevertheless possible to grow the window for such a connection
to the point that we will try to send just under 64K at once.  This
results in a single skb that expands to 861 segments.

In some drivers with TSO support, such an skb will require hundreds of
DMA descriptors; a substantial fraction of a TX ring or even more than
a full ring.  The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger
the TX watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried
after the TX reset).  This particularly affects sfc, for which the
issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.

Therefore:
1. Add the field net_device::gso_max_segs holding the device-specific
   limit.
2. In netif_skb_features(), if the number of segments is too high then
   mask out GSO features to force fall back to software GSO.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size

[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]

Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue.  The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset).  This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.

Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100.  This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700.  Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.

To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: Apply device TSO segment limit earlier

[ Upstream commit 1485348d2424e1131ea42efc033cbd9366462b01 ]

Cache the device gso_max_segs in sock::sk_gso_max_segs and use it to
limit the size of TSO skbs.  This avoids the need to fall back to
software GSO for local TCP senders.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net_sched: gact: Fix potential panic in tcf_gact().

[ Upstream commit 696ecdc10622d86541f2e35cc16e15b6b3b1b67e ]

gact_rand array is accessed by gact->tcfg_ptype whose value
is assumed to less than MAX_RAND, but any range checks are
not performed.

So add a check in tcf_gact_init(). And in tcf_gact(), we can
reduce a branch.

Signed-off-by: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
isdnloop: fix and simplify isdnloop_init()

[ Upstream commit 77f00f6324cb97cf1df6f9c4aaeea6ada23abdb2 ]

Fix a buffer overflow bug by removing the revision and printk.

[   22.016214] isdnloop-ISDN-driver Rev 1.11.6.7
[   22.097508] isdnloop: (loop0) virtual card added
[   22.174400] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff83244972
[   22.174400]
[   22.436157] Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.5.0-bisect-00018-gfa8bbb1-dirty #129
[   22.624071] Call Trace:
[   22.720558]  [<ffffffff832448c3>] ? CallcNew+0x56/0x56
[   22.815248]  [<ffffffff8222b623>] panic+0x110/0x329
[   22.914330]  [<ffffffff83244972>] ? isdnloop_init+0xaf/0xb1
[   23.014800]  [<ffffffff832448c3>] ? CallcNew+0x56/0x56
[   23.090763]  [<ffffffff8108e24b>] __stack_chk_fail+0x2b/0x30
[   23.185748]  [<ffffffff83244972>] isdnloop_init+0xaf/0xb1

Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net/core: Fix potential memory leak in dev_set_alias()

[ Upstream commit 7364e445f62825758fa61195d237a5b8ecdd06ec ]

Do not leak memory by updating pointer with potentially NULL realloc return value.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Signed-off-by: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
af_packet: remove BUG statement in tpacket_destruct_skb

[ Upstream commit 7f5c3e3a80e6654cf48dfba7cf94f88c6b505467 ]

Here's a quote of the comment about the BUG macro from asm-generic/bug.h:

 Don't use BUG() or BUG_ON() unless there's really no way out; one
 example might be detecting data structure corruption in the middle
 of an operation that can't be backed out of.  If the (sub)system
 can somehow continue operating, perhaps with reduced functionality,
 it's probably not BUG-worthy.

 If you're tempted to BUG(), think again:  is completely giving up
 really the *only* solution?  There are usually better options, where
 users don't need to reboot ASAP and can mostly shut down cleanly.

In our case, the status flag of a ring buffer slot is managed from both sides,
the kernel space and the user space. This means that even though the kernel
side might work as expected, the user space screws up and changes this flag
right between the send(2) is triggered when the flag is changed to
TP_STATUS_SENDING and a given skb is destructed after some time. Then, this
will hit the BUG macro. As David suggested, the best solution is to simply
remove this statement since it cannot be used for kernel side internal
consistency checks. I've tested it and the system still behaves /stable/ in
this case, so in accordance with the above comment, we should rather remove it.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel.borkmann@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: addrconf: Avoid calling netdevice notifiers with RCU read-side lock

[ Upstream commit 4acd4945cd1e1f92b20d14e349c6c6a52acbd42d ]

Cong Wang reports that lockdep detected suspicious RCU usage while
enabling IPV6 forwarding:

 [ 1123.310275] ===============================
 [ 1123.442202] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
 [ 1123.558207] 3.6.0-rc1+ #109 Not tainted
 [ 1123.665204] -------------------------------
 [ 1123.768254] include/linux/rcupdate.h:430 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section!
 [ 1123.992320]
 [ 1123.992320] other info that might help us debug this:
 [ 1123.992320]
 [ 1124.307382]
 [ 1124.307382] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
 [ 1124.522220] 2 locks held by sysctl/5710:
 [ 1124.648364]  #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81768498>] rtnl_trylock+0x15/0x17
 [ 1124.882211]  #1:  (rcu_read_lock){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81871df8>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x0/0x29
 [ 1125.085209]
 [ 1125.085209] stack backtrace:
 [ 1125.332213] Pid: 5710, comm: sysctl Not tainted 3.6.0-rc1+ #109
 [ 1125.441291] Call Trace:
 [ 1125.545281]  [<ffffffff8109d915>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x109/0x112
 [ 1125.667212]  [<ffffffff8107c240>] rcu_preempt_sleep_check+0x45/0x47
 [ 1125.781838]  [<ffffffff8107c260>] __might_sleep+0x1e/0x19b
[...]
 [ 1127.445223]  [<ffffffff81757ac5>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x4a/0x4f
[...]
 [ 1127.772188]  [<ffffffff8175e125>] dev_disable_lro+0x32/0x6b
 [ 1127.885174]  [<ffffffff81872d26>] dev_forward_change+0x30/0xcb
 [ 1128.013214]  [<ffffffff818738c4>] addrconf_forward_change+0x85/0xc5
[...]

addrconf_forward_change() uses RCU iteration over the netdev list,
which is unnecessary since it already holds the RTNL lock.  We also
cannot reasonably require netdevice notifier functions not to sleep.

Reported-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
atm: fix info leak in getsockopt(SO_ATMPVC)

[ Upstream commit e862f1a9b7df4e8196ebec45ac62295138aa3fc2 ]

The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
atm: fix info leak via getsockname()

[ Upstream commit 3c0c5cfdcd4d69ffc4b9c0907cec99039f30a50a ]

The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)

[ Upstream commit e15ca9a0ef9a86f0477530b0f44a725d67f889ee ]

The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak via getsockname()

[ Upstream commit 3f68ba07b1da811bf383b4b701b129bfcb2e4988 ]

The HCI code fails to initialize the hci_channel member of struct
sockaddr_hci and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via the
getsockname() syscall. Initialize hci_channel with 0 to avoid the
info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)

[ Upstream commit f9432c5ec8b1e9a09b9b0e5569e3c73db8de432a ]

The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.

Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()

[ Upstream commit 9344a972961d1a6d2c04d9008b13617bcb6ec2ef ]

The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()

[ Upstream commit 792039c73cf176c8e39a6e8beef2c94ff46522ed ]

The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
llc: fix info leak via getsockname()

[ Upstream commit 3592aaeb80290bda0f2cf0b5456c97bfc638b192 ]

The LLC code wrongly returns 0, i.e. "success", when the socket is
zapped. Together with the uninitialized uaddrlen pointer argument from
sys_getsockname this leads to an arbitrary memory leak of up to 128
bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall.

Return an error instead when the socket is zapped to prevent the info
leak. Also remove the unnecessary memset(0). We don't directly write to
the memory pointed by uaddr but memcpy() a local structure at the end of
the function that is properly initialized.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)

[ Upstream commit 7b07f8eb75aa3097cdfd4f6eac3da49db787381d ]

The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)

[ Upstream commit 2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680 ]

If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>