libceph: implement RECONNECT_SEQ feature

This is an old protocol extension that allows the client and server to
avoid resending old messages after a reconnect (following a socket error).
Instead, the exchange their sequence numbers during the handshake.  This
avoids sending a bunch of useless data over the socket.

It has been supported in the server code since v0.22 (Sep 2010).

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit a66ad08866f7f4f73f120b88b99b0d89c863f44f)
libceph: clear messenger auth_retry flag when we authenticate

We maintain a counter of failed auth attempts to allow us to retry once
before failing.  However, if the second attempt succeeds, the flag isn't
cleared, which makes us think auth failed again later when the connection
resets for other reasons (like a socket error).

This is one part of the sorry sequence of events in bug

	http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4282

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit 31723a4aa0bcd51a16015fe274c15b481aa76c70)
libceph: fix authorizer invalidation

We were invalidating the authorizer by removing the ticket handler
entirely.  This was effective in inducing us to request a new authorizer,
but in the meantime it mean that any authorizer we generated would get a
new and initialized handler with secret_id=0, which would always be
rejected by the server side with a confusing error message:

 auth: could not find secret_id=0
 cephx: verify_authorizer could not get service secret for service osd secret_id=0

Instead, simply clear the validity field.  This will still induce the auth
code to request a new secret, but will let us continue to use the old
ticket in the meantime.  The messenger code will probably continue to fail,
but the exponential backoff will kick in, and eventually the we will get a
new (hopefully more valid) ticket from the mon and be able to continue.

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit 134a86e37936b1d029ed2ecd39de7fc23433fa4d)
libceph: add update_authorizer auth method

Currently the messenger calls out to a get_authorizer con op, which will
create a new authorizer if it doesn't yet have one.  In the meantime, when
we rotate our service keys, the authorizer doesn't get updated.  Eventually
it will be rejected by the server on a new connection attempt and get
invalidated, and we will then rebuild a new authorizer, but this is not
ideal.

Instead, if we do have an authorizer, call a new update_authorizer op that
will verify that the current authorizer is using the latest secret.  If it
is not, we will build a new one that does.  This avoids the transient
failure.

This fixes one of the sorry sequence of events for bug

	http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4282

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7fb4da46fd63acc4fd1a74e633087d4f9ab74fa1)
libceph: wrap auth ops in wrapper functions

Use wrapper functions that check whether the auth op exists so that callers
do not need a bunch of conditional checks.  Simplifies the external
interface.

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit 301866ce2cb94e1e18971c2f3c27994bc67026bf)
libceph: wrap auth methods in a mutex

The auth code is called from a variety of contexts, include the mon_client
(protected by the monc's mutex) and the messenger callbacks (currently
protected by nothing).  Avoid chaos by protecting all auth state with a
mutex.  Nothing is blocking, so this should be simple and lightweight.

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8383641e69f61a97ba7c878ce29a01970703f032)
rbd: do a safe list traversal in rbd_img_request_submit()

It's possible that the reference to the object request dropped
inside the loop in rbd_img_request_submit() will be the last
one, in which case the content of the object pointer can't be
trusted.

Use a safe form of the object request list traversal to avoid
problems.

This resolves:
    http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/4705

Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Durgin <josh.durgin@inktank.com>
(cherry picked from commit d80acadba1d01ab1834c51c0aa268f1170d52dc0)