I get confused here. PFS in TLS has to do with the initial key-exchange, not the encryption itself. Using ECDH for key exchange is not considered as perfectly forward secure, because the parameters do not change (this is only the case with ECDH<b>E</b>). Also, DH<b>E</b> is considered to offer PFS, but ECDH is not really better than DH. Once your (EC)DH parameters are exposed, encryption keys can be computed from previously collected traffic affecting all past and future connections. 

Furthermore, RSA is not in competition for key-exchange, it is used to deliver the certificate(s). It's counterpart is not ECDH but ECDSA. Comparing ECDH and RSA is complete rubbish. You compare a key-exchange method with a cipher. ECDH is not a cipher!

Also, this wording gives the idea that PFS cannot be achieved with RSA, but again DHE_RSA _is_ perfectly forward secure!

Please fix this paragraph.