fs: Fix close_on_exec pointer in alloc_fdtable

alloc_fdtable allocates space for the open_fds and close_on_exec
bitfields together, as 2 * nr / BITS_PER_BYTE.  close_on_exec needs to
point to open_fds + nr / BITS_PER_BYTE, not open_fds + nr /
BITS_PER_LONG, as introducted in 1fd36adc: Replace the fd_sets in
struct fdtable with an array of unsigned longs.

Signed-off-by: Bobby Powers <bobbypowers@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1329888587-3087-1-git-send-email-bobbypowers@gmail.com
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
make get_unused_fd_flags() a function

... and get_unused_fd() a macro around it

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
take rlimit check to callers of expand_files()

... except for one in android, where the check is different
and already done in caller.  No need to recalculate rlimit
many times in alloc_fd() either.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
new helper: __alloc_fd()

Essentially, alloc_fd() in a files_struct we own a reference to.
Most of the time wanting to use it is a sign of lousy API
design (such as android/binder).  It's *not* a general-purpose
interface; better that than open-coding its guts, but again,
playing with other process' descriptor table is a sign of bad
design.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
don't bother with call_rcu() in put_files_struct()

At that point nobody can see us anyway; everything that
looks at files_fdtable(files) is separated from the
guts of put_files_struct(files) - either since files is
current->files or because we fetched it under task_lock()
and hadn't dropped that yet, or because we'd bumped
files->count while holding task_lock()...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
trim free_fdtable_rcu()

embedded case isn't hit anymore

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
move put_unused_fd() and fd_install() to fs/file.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
expose a low-level variant of fd_install() for binder

Similar situation to that of __alloc_fd(); do not use unless you
really have to.  You should not touch any descriptor table other
than your own; it's a sure sign of a really bad API design.

As with __alloc_fd(), you *must* use a first-class reference to
struct files_struct; something obtained by get_files_struct(some task)
(let alone direct task->files) will not do.  It must be either
current->files, or obtained by get_files_struct(current) by the
owner of that sucker and given to you.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
take fget() and friends to fs/file.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
take descriptor-related part of close() to file.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
take close-on-exec logics to fs/file.c, clean it up a bit

... and add cond_resched() there, while we are at it.  We can
get large latencies as is...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
take purely descriptor-related stuff from fcntl.c to file.c

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
coredump: ensure the fpu state is flushed for proper multi-threaded core dump

Nalluru reported hitting the BUG_ON(__thread_has_fpu(tsk)) in
arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c:__sanitize_i387_state() during the coredump
of a multi-threaded application.

A look at the exit seqeuence shows that other threads can still be on the
runqueue potentially at the below shown exit_mm() code snippet:

		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&core_state->nr_threads))
			complete(&core_state->startup);

===> other threads can still be active here, but we notify the thread
===> dumping core to wakeup from the coredump_wait() after the last thread
===> joins this point. Core dumping thread will continue dumping
===> all the threads state to the core file.

		for (;;) {
			set_task_state(tsk, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
			if (!self.task) /* see coredump_finish() */
				break;
			schedule();
		}

As some of those threads are on the runqueue and didn't call schedule() yet,
their fpu state is still active in the live registers and the thread
proceeding with the coredump will hit the above mentioned BUG_ON while
trying to dump other threads fpustate to the coredump file.

BUG_ON() in arch/x86/kernel/xsave.c:__sanitize_i387_state() is
in the code paths for processors supporting xsaveopt. With or without
xsaveopt, multi-threaded coredump is broken and maynot contain
the correct fpustate at the time of exit.

In coredump_wait(), wait for all the threads to be come inactive, so
that we are sure all the extended register state is flushed to
the memory, so that it can be reliably copied to the core file.

Reported-by: Suresh Nalluru <suresh@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1336692811-30576-2-git-send-email-suresh.b.siddha@intel.com
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()

... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
consolidate pipe file creation

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path

When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump
pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files
to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with
user-controlled content.

This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of
CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges.

  $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable
  2
  $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
  core
  $ ulimit -c unlimited
  $ cd /
  $ ls -l core
  ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory
  $ touch core
  touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied
  $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 &
  $ pid=$!
  $ sleep 1
  $ kill -SEGV $pid
  $ ls -l core
  -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core
  $ sudo strings core | grep evil
  OHAI=evil-string-here

While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any
parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read
any file present and skip unparsable lines.

Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of
mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk
via relative path).  Most users of mode 2 (e.g.  Chrome OS) already use
a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them.  For the
situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still
active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths.  If a
relative path is defined (e.g.  the default "core" pattern), dump
attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully
qualified path.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
coredump: warn about unsafe suid_dumpable / core_pattern combo

When suid_dumpable=2, detect unsafe core_pattern settings and warn when
they are seen.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
coredump: fix wrong comments on core limits of pipe coredump case

In commit 898b374af6f7 ("exec: replace call_usermodehelper_pipe with use
of umh init function and resolve limit"), the core limits recursive
check value was changed from 0 to 1, but the corresponding comments were
not updated.

Signed-off-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
new helper: replace_fd()

analog of dup2(), except that it takes struct file * as source.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>