arm: mach-tegra: Tweak voltages.  Getting to much battery drain
Signed-off-by: Paul Beeler <sparksco@gmail.com>
arm: mach-tegra: Tweak voltages.  Getting to much battery drain
Signed-off-by: Paul Beeler <sparksco@gmail.com>
use -gdwarf-2 when using -g + gcc 4.8
Signed-off-by: Paul Beeler <sparksco@gmail.com>
NFS: Don't allow NFS silly-renamed files to be deleted, no signal

commit 5a7a613a47a715711b3f2d3322a0eac21d459166 upstream.

Commit 73ca100 broke the code that prevents the client from deleting
a silly renamed dentry.  This affected "delete on last close"
semantics as after that commit, nothing prevented removal of
silly-renamed files.  As a result, a process holding a file open
could easily get an ESTALE on the file in a directory where some
other process issued 'rm -rf some_dir_containing_the_file' twice.
Before the commit, any attempt at unlinking silly renamed files would
fail inside may_delete() with -EBUSY because of the
DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED flag.  The following testcase demonstrates
the problem:
  tail -f /nfsmnt/dir/file &
  rm -rf /nfsmnt/dir
  rm -rf /nfsmnt/dir
  # second removal does not fail, 'tail' process receives ESTALE

The problem with the above commit is that it unhashes the old and
new dentries from the lookup path, even in the normal case when
a signal is not encountered and it would have been safe to call
d_move.  Unfortunately the old dentry has the special
DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED flag set on it.  Unhashing has the
side-effect that future lookups call d_alloc(), allocating a new
dentry without the special flag for any silly-renamed files.  As a
result, subsequent calls to unlink silly renamed files do not fail
but allow the removal to go through.  This will result in ESTALE
errors for any other process doing operations on the file.

To fix this, go back to using d_move on success.
For the signal case, it's unclear what we may safely do beyond d_drop.

Reported-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
SUNRPC: Don't start the retransmission timer when out of socket space

commit a9a6b52ee1baa865283a91eb8d443ee91adfca56 upstream.

If the socket is full, we're better off just waiting until it empties,
or until the connection is broken. The reason why we generally don't
want to time out is that the call to xprt->ops->release_xprt() will
trigger a connection reset, which isn't helpful...

Let's make an exception for soft RPC calls, since they have to provide
timeout guarantees.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
ARM: VFP: fix emulation of second VFP instruction

commit 5e4ba617c1b584b2e376f31a63bd4e734109318a upstream.

Martin Storsjö reports that the sequence:

        ee312ac1        vsub.f32        s4, s3, s2
        ee702ac0        vsub.f32        s5, s1, s0
        e59f0028        ldr             r0, [pc, #40]
        ee111a90        vmov            r1, s3

on Raspberry Pi (implementor 41 architecture 1 part 20 variant b rev 5)
where s3 is a denormal and s2 is zero results in incorrect behaviour -
the instruction "vsub.f32 s5, s1, s0" is not executed:

        VFP: bounce: trigger ee111a90 fpexc d0000780
        VFP: emulate: INST=0xee312ac1 SCR=0x00000000
        ...

As we can see, the instruction triggering the exception is the "vmov"
instruction, and we emulate the "vsub.f32 s4, s3, s2" but fail to
properly take account of the FPEXC_FP2V flag in FPEXC.  This is because
the test for the second instruction register being valid is bogus, and
will always skip emulation of the second instruction.

Reported-by: Martin Storsjö <martin@martin.st>
Tested-by: Martin Storsjö <martin@martin.st>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
ARM: fix scheduling while atomic warning in alignment handling code

commit b255188f90e2bade1bd11a986dd1ca4861869f4d upstream.

Paolo Pisati reports that IPv6 triggers this warning:

BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/0/0/0x40000100
Modules linked in:
[<c001b1c4>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf0) from [<c0503c5c>] (__schedule_bug+0x48/0x5c)
[<c0503c5c>] (__schedule_bug+0x48/0x5c) from [<c0508608>] (__schedule+0x700/0x740)
[<c0508608>] (__schedule+0x700/0x740) from [<c007007c>] (__cond_resched+0x24/0x34)
[<c007007c>] (__cond_resched+0x24/0x34) from [<c05086dc>] (_cond_resched+0x3c/0x44)
[<c05086dc>] (_cond_resched+0x3c/0x44) from [<c0021f6c>] (do_alignment+0x178/0x78c)
[<c0021f6c>] (do_alignment+0x178/0x78c) from [<c00083e0>] (do_DataAbort+0x34/0x98)
[<c00083e0>] (do_DataAbort+0x34/0x98) from [<c0509a60>] (__dabt_svc+0x40/0x60)
Exception stack(0xc0763d70 to 0xc0763db8)
3d60:                                     e97e805e e97e806e 2c000000 11000000
3d80: ea86bb00 0000002c 00000011 e97e807e c076d2a8 e97e805e e97e806e 0000002c
3da0: 3d000000 c0763dbc c04b98fc c02a8490 00000113 ffffffff
[<c0509a60>] (__dabt_svc+0x40/0x60) from [<c02a8490>] (__csum_ipv6_magic+0x8/0xc8)

Fix this by using probe_kernel_address() stead of __get_user().

Reported-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Paolo Pisati <p.pisati@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
cifs: ensure that cifs_get_root() only traverses directories

commit ce2ac52105aa663056dfc17966ebed1bf93e6e64 upstream.

Kjell Braden reported this oops:

[  833.211970] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[  833.212816] IP: [<          (null)>]           (null)
[  833.213280] PGD 1b9b2067 PUD e9f7067 PMD 0
[  833.213874] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP
[  833.214344] CPU 0
[  833.214458] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs vboxvideo drm snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_rawmidi snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq bnep rfcomm snd_timer bluetooth snd_seq_device ppdev snd vboxguest parport_pc joydev mac_hid soundcore snd_page_alloc psmouse i2c_piix4 serio_raw lp parport usbhid hid e1000
[  833.215629]
[  833.215629] Pid: 1752, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.0.0-rc7-bisectcifs-fec11dd9a0+ #18 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[  833.215629] RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>]  [<          (null)>]           (null)
[  833.215629] RSP: 0018:ffff8800119c9c50  EFLAGS: 00010282
[  833.215629] RAX: ffffffffa02186c0 RBX: ffff88000c427780 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  833.215629] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88000c427780 RDI: ffff88000c4362e8
[  833.215629] RBP: ffff8800119c9c88 R08: ffff88001fc15e30 R09: 00000000d69515c7
[  833.215629] R10: ffffffffa0201972 R11: ffff88000e8f6a28 R12: ffff88000c4362e8
[  833.215629] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88001181aaa6
[  833.215629] FS:  00007f2986171700(0000) GS:ffff88001fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  833.215629] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[  833.215629] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001b982000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  833.215629] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  833.215629] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  833.215629] Process mount.cifs (pid: 1752, threadinfo ffff8800119c8000, task ffff88001c1c16f0)
[  833.215629] Stack:
[  833.215629]  ffffffff8116a9b5 ffff8800119c9c88 ffffffff81178075 0000000000000286
[  833.215629]  0000000000000000 ffff88000c4276c0 ffff8800119c9ce8 ffff8800119c9cc8
[  833.215629]  ffffffff8116b06e ffff88001bc6fc00 ffff88000c4276c0 ffff88000c4276c0
[  833.215629] Call Trace:
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8116a9b5>] ? d_alloc_and_lookup+0x45/0x90
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff81178075>] ? d_lookup+0x35/0x60
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8116b06e>] __lookup_hash.part.14+0x9e/0xc0
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8116b1d6>] lookup_one_len+0x146/0x1e0
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff815e4f7e>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x20
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffffa01eef0d>] cifs_do_mount+0x26d/0x500 [cifs]
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff81163bd3>] mount_fs+0x43/0x1b0
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8117d41a>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6a/0xd0
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8117e584>] do_kern_mount+0x54/0x110
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8117fdc2>] do_mount+0x262/0x840
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff81108a0e>] ? __get_free_pages+0xe/0x50
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8117f9ca>] ? copy_mount_options+0x3a/0x180
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff8118075d>] sys_mount+0x8d/0xe0
[  833.215629]  [<ffffffff815ece82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  833.215629] Code:  Bad RIP value.
[  833.215629] RIP  [<          (null)>]           (null)
[  833.215629]  RSP <ffff8800119c9c50>
[  833.215629] CR2: 0000000000000000
[  833.238525] ---[ end trace ec00758b8d44f529 ]---

When walking down the path on the server, it's possible to hit a
symlink. The path walking code assumes that the caller will handle that
situation properly, but cifs_get_root() isn't set up for it. This patch
prevents the oops by simply returning an error.

A better solution would be to try and chase the symlinks here, but that's
fairly complicated to handle.

Fixes:

    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=53221

Reported-and-tested-by: Kjell Braden <afflux@pentabarf.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
tty: Correct tty buffer flush.

commit 64325a3be08d364a62ee8f84b2cf86934bc2544a upstream.

  The root of problem is carelessly zeroing pointer(in function __tty_buffer_flush()),
when another thread can use it. It can be cause of "NULL pointer dereference".
  Main idea of the patch, this is never free last (struct tty_buffer) in the active buffer.
Only flush the data for ldisc(buf->head->read = buf->head->commit).
At that moment driver can collect(write) data in buffer without conflict.
It is repeat behavior of flush_to_ldisc(), only without feeding data to ldisc.

Signed-off-by: Ilya Zykov <ilya@ilyx.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
ftrace: Update the kconfig for DYNAMIC_FTRACE

commit db05021d49a994ee40a9735d9c3cb0060c9babb8 upstream.

The prompt to enable DYNAMIC_FTRACE (the ability to nop and
enable function tracing at run time) had a confusing statement:

 "enable/disable ftrace tracepoints dynamically"

This was written before tracepoints were added to the kernel,
but now that tracepoints have been added, this is very confusing
and has confused people enough to give wrong information during
presentations.

Not only that, I looked at the help text, and it still references
that dreaded daemon that use to wake up once a second to update
the nop locations and brick NICs, that hasn't been around for over
five years.

Time to bring the text up to the current decade.

Reported-by: Ezequiel Garcia <elezegarcia@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
decnet: Fix disappearing sysctl entries

When decnet is built as a module a simple:
echo 0.0 >/proc/sys/net/decnet/node_address

results in most of the sysctl entries under /proc/sys/net/decnet and
/proc/sys/net/decnet/conf disappearing.

For more details see http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg226123.html.

This change applies the same workaround used in
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c and net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c of creating
a skeleton of decnet sysctl entries before doing anything else.

The problem first appeared in kernel 2.6.27.  The later rewrite of
sysctl in kernel 3.4 restored the previous behavior and eliminated the
need for this workaround.

This patch was heavily inspired by a similar but more complex patch by
Larry Baker.

Reported-by: Larry Baker <baker@usgs.gov>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
vfs: fix pipe counter breakage

commit a930d8790552658140d7d0d2e316af4f0d76a512 upstream.

If you open a pipe for neither read nor write, the pipe code will not
add any usage counters to the pipe, causing the 'struct pipe_inode_info"
to be potentially released early.

That doesn't normally matter, since you cannot actually use the pipe,
but the pipe release code - particularly fasync handling - still expects
the actual pipe infrastructure to all be there.  And rather than adding
NULL pointer checks, let's just disallow this case, the same way we
already do for the named pipe ("fifo") case.

This is ancient going back to pre-2.4 days, and until trinity, nobody
naver noticed.

Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
ext3: Fix format string issues

commit 8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc upstream.

ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.

The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.

Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()

commit 0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2013-1792.

There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created.  It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.

Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.

	THREAD A			THREAD B
	===============================	===============================
					==>call install_user_keyrings();
	if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
	==>call install_user_keyrings()
					...
					user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
	if (user->uid_keyring)
		return 0;
	<==
	key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
					user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
	atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]

At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.

The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.

This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel.  However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.

Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
signal: always clear sa_restorer on execve

commit 2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 upstream.

When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is
not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to
children.  This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by
examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction().

Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only
matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed
until the exec).  But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer,
this is where it should be fixed.

Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written
since this would be the only use.  Instead, we use
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places.

Example of the leak before applying this patch:

  $ cat /proc/$$/maps
  ...
  7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
  ...
  $ ./leak
  ...
  7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
  ...
  1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
  2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
  3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
  4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
  ...

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
batman-adv: bat_socket_read missing checks

commit c00b6856fc642b234895cfabd15b289e76726430 upstream.

Writing a icmp_packet_rr and then reading icmp_packet can lead to kernel
memory corruption, if __user *buf is just below TASK_SIZE.

Signed-off-by: Paul Kot <pawlkt@gmail.com>
[sven@narfation.org: made it checkpatch clean]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
batman-adv: Only write requested number of byte to user buffer

commit b5a1eeef04cc7859f34dec9b72ea1b28e4aba07c upstream.

Don't write more than the requested number of bytes of an batman-adv icmp
packet to the userspace buffer. Otherwise unrelated userspace memory might get
overridden by the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <lindner_marek@yahoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists

commit 08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1 upstream.

When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists().  But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.

online_pages() {
	build_all_zonelists()
	.....
	node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}

Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()

    ->__build_all_zonelists()
	->build_zonelists()
	    ->find_next_best_node()
		->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)

So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure.  So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().

Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
block: use i_size_write() in bd_set_size()

commit d646a02a9d44d1421f273ae3923d97b47b918176 upstream.

blkdev_ioctl(GETBLKSIZE) uses i_size_read() to read size of block device.
If we update block size directly, reader may see intermediate result in
some machines and configurations.  Use i_size_write() instead.

Signed-off-by: Guo Chao <yan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Guo Chao <yan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: M. Hindess <hindessm@uk.ibm.com>
Cc: Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@suse.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
loopdev: fix a deadlock

commit 5370019dc2d2c2ff90e95d181468071362934f3a upstream.

bd_mutex and lo_ctl_mutex can be held in different order.

Path #1:

blkdev_open
 blkdev_get
  __blkdev_get (hold bd_mutex)
   lo_open (hold lo_ctl_mutex)

Path #2:

blkdev_ioctl
 lo_ioctl (hold lo_ctl_mutex)
  lo_set_capacity (hold bd_mutex)

Lockdep does not report it, because path #2 actually holds a subclass of
lo_ctl_mutex.  This subclass seems creep into the code by mistake.  The
patch author actually just mentioned it in the changelog, see commit
f028f3b2 ("loop: fix circular locking in loop_clr_fd()"), also see:

	http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=123806169129727&w=2

Path #2 hold bd_mutex to call bd_set_size(), I've protected it
with i_mutex in a previous patch, so drop bd_mutex at this site.

Signed-off-by: Guo Chao <yan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Guo Chao <yan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: M. Hindess <hindessm@uk.ibm.com>
Cc: Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@suse.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>