ECDSA classes
Create an ECDSA/P256 keypair and serialize it to the node-reference
Generate a persistent ECC keypair for each node
Ensure that all noderefs are signed/verified using either DSA or ECDSA
Padded signatures. (First part of original commit "negType 9: use ECDSA/P256 sigs instead of DSA/2048 (91e5d98e6d2b895b7d8e9b6de0ce8408d3c17f04)")
negType 9: use ECDSA/P256 sigs instead of DSA/2048 (second half - actually implement negtype9)
Ensure that all DER-encoded ECDSA signatures are no longer than maxSize
Follow the new revision of the spec (not the RFC draft):

Send Ni' in JFK1 and JFK2 to ensure that an attacker can't commit
 a CPU DoS (forcing an ECDSA verification) without
 committing to do a network round-trip
Merge a few of the changes suggested by Eleriseth
Use a 128bit nonce instead of a 64bit one for negType9
Use ECDSA pubkey hashes rather than random identities in JFK
Fix comment
Logging: Unless something goes seriously wrong, log full nonces/keys/etc at DEBUG, not minor.
modulusSize is an upper bound; keys can be shorter than this but not longer.
Check for negType9 if no ECDSA key.
Real fix. For negType 8 we need both ECDH and DSA signatures, for now. (We can get rid later)
Fix anonymous initiator breaking due to guessed negTypes
Use a single KeyAgreementSchemeContext object, so signature corresponds to exponential, and clearer code.
Compute the DSA signature correctly.
Fix breaking unknownInitiator.