xen/hvc: handle backend CLOSED without CLOSING

Backend drivers shouldn't transistion to CLOSED unless the frontend is
CLOSED.  If a backend does transition to CLOSED too soon then the
frontend may not see the CLOSING state and will not properly shutdown.

So, treat an unexpected backend CLOSED state the same as CLOSING.

Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
xen pv-on-hvm: add pfn_is_ram helper for kdump

Register pfn_is_ram helper speed up reading /proc/vmcore in the kdump
kernel. See commit message of 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook
to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages") for details.

It makes use of a new hvmop HVMOP_get_mem_type which was introduced in
xen 4.2 (23298:26413986e6e0) and backported to 4.1.1.

The new function is currently only enabled for reading /proc/vmcore.
Later it will be used also for the kexec kernel. Since that requires
more changes in the generic kernel make it static for the time being.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
mm, slab: release slab_mutex earlier in kmem_cache_destroy()

Commit 1331e7a1bbe1 ("rcu: Remove _rcu_barrier() dependency on
__stop_machine()") introduced slab_mutex -> cpu_hotplug.lock dependency
through kmem_cache_destroy() -> rcu_barrier() -> _rcu_barrier() ->
get_online_cpus().

Lockdep thinks that this might actually result in ABBA deadlock,
and reports it as below:

=== [ cut here ] ===
 ======================================================
 [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
 3.6.0-rc5-00004-g0d8ee37 #143 Not tainted
 -------------------------------------------------------
 kworker/u:2/40 is trying to acquire lock:
  (rcu_sched_state.barrier_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff810f2126>] _rcu_barrier+0x26/0x1e0

 but task is already holding lock:
  (slab_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81176e15>] kmem_cache_destroy+0x45/0xe0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 (slab_mutex){+.+.+.}:
        [<ffffffff810ae1e2>] validate_chain+0x632/0x720
        [<ffffffff810ae5d9>] __lock_acquire+0x309/0x530
        [<ffffffff810ae921>] lock_acquire+0x121/0x190
        [<ffffffff8155d4cc>] __mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x450
        [<ffffffff8155d9ee>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3e/0x50
        [<ffffffff81558cb5>] cpuup_callback+0x2f/0xbe
        [<ffffffff81564b83>] notifier_call_chain+0x93/0x140
        [<ffffffff81076f89>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0x9/0x10
        [<ffffffff8155719d>] _cpu_up+0xba/0x14e
        [<ffffffff815572ed>] cpu_up+0xbc/0x117
        [<ffffffff81ae05e3>] smp_init+0x6b/0x9f
        [<ffffffff81ac47d6>] kernel_init+0x147/0x1dc
        [<ffffffff8156ab44>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10

 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}:
        [<ffffffff810ae1e2>] validate_chain+0x632/0x720
        [<ffffffff810ae5d9>] __lock_acquire+0x309/0x530
        [<ffffffff810ae921>] lock_acquire+0x121/0x190
        [<ffffffff8155d4cc>] __mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x450
        [<ffffffff8155d9ee>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3e/0x50
        [<ffffffff81049197>] get_online_cpus+0x37/0x50
        [<ffffffff810f21bb>] _rcu_barrier+0xbb/0x1e0
        [<ffffffff810f22f0>] rcu_barrier_sched+0x10/0x20
        [<ffffffff810f2309>] rcu_barrier+0x9/0x10
        [<ffffffff8118c129>] deactivate_locked_super+0x49/0x90
        [<ffffffff8118cc01>] deactivate_super+0x61/0x70
        [<ffffffff811aaaa7>] mntput_no_expire+0x127/0x180
        [<ffffffff811ab49e>] sys_umount+0x6e/0xd0
        [<ffffffff81569979>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

 -> #0 (rcu_sched_state.barrier_mutex){+.+...}:
        [<ffffffff810adb4e>] check_prev_add+0x3de/0x440
        [<ffffffff810ae1e2>] validate_chain+0x632/0x720
        [<ffffffff810ae5d9>] __lock_acquire+0x309/0x530
        [<ffffffff810ae921>] lock_acquire+0x121/0x190
        [<ffffffff8155d4cc>] __mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x450
        [<ffffffff8155d9ee>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3e/0x50
        [<ffffffff810f2126>] _rcu_barrier+0x26/0x1e0
        [<ffffffff810f22f0>] rcu_barrier_sched+0x10/0x20
        [<ffffffff810f2309>] rcu_barrier+0x9/0x10
        [<ffffffff81176ea1>] kmem_cache_destroy+0xd1/0xe0
        [<ffffffffa04c3154>] nf_conntrack_cleanup_net+0xe4/0x110 [nf_conntrack]
        [<ffffffffa04c31aa>] nf_conntrack_cleanup+0x2a/0x70 [nf_conntrack]
        [<ffffffffa04c42ce>] nf_conntrack_net_exit+0x5e/0x80 [nf_conntrack]
        [<ffffffff81454b79>] ops_exit_list+0x39/0x60
        [<ffffffff814551ab>] cleanup_net+0xfb/0x1b0
        [<ffffffff8106917b>] process_one_work+0x26b/0x4c0
        [<ffffffff81069f3e>] worker_thread+0x12e/0x320
        [<ffffffff8106f73e>] kthread+0x9e/0xb0
        [<ffffffff8156ab44>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   rcu_sched_state.barrier_mutex --> cpu_hotplug.lock --> slab_mutex

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(slab_mutex);
                                lock(cpu_hotplug.lock);
                                lock(slab_mutex);
   lock(rcu_sched_state.barrier_mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***
=== [ cut here ] ===

This is actually a false positive. Lockdep has no way of knowing the fact
that the ABBA can actually never happen, because of special semantics of
cpu_hotplug.refcount and its handling in cpu_hotplug_begin(); the mutual
exclusion there is not achieved through mutex, but through
cpu_hotplug.refcount.

The "neither cpu_up() nor cpu_down() will proceed past cpu_hotplug_begin()
until everyone who called get_online_cpus() will call put_online_cpus()"
semantics is totally invisible to lockdep.

This patch therefore moves the unlock of slab_mutex so that rcu_barrier()
is being called with it unlocked. It has two advantages:

- it slightly reduces hold time of slab_mutex; as it's used to protect
  the cachep list, it's not necessary to hold it over kmem_cache_free()
  call any more
- it silences the lockdep false positive warning, as it avoids lockdep ever
  learning about slab_mutex -> cpu_hotplug.lock dependency

Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
xen/bootup: allow read_tscp call for Xen PV guests.

The hypervisor will trap it. However without this patch,
we would crash as the .read_tscp is set to NULL. This patch
fixes it and sets it to the native_read_tscp call.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
xen/bootup: allow {read|write}_cr8 pvops call.

We actually do not do anything about it. Just return a default
value of zero and if the kernel tries to write anything but 0
we BUG_ON.

This fixes the case when an user tries to suspend the machine
and it blows up in save_processor_state b/c 'read_cr8' is set
to NULL and we get:

kernel BUG at /home/konrad/ssd/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:100!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Pid: 2687, comm: init.late Tainted: G           O 3.6.0upstream-00002-gac264ac-dirty #4 Bochs Bochs
RIP: e030:[<ffffffff814d5f42>]  [<ffffffff814d5f42>] save_processor_state+0x212/0x270

.. snip..
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff810733bf>] do_suspend_lowlevel+0xf/0xac
 [<ffffffff8107330c>] ? x86_acpi_suspend_lowlevel+0x10c/0x150
 [<ffffffff81342ee2>] acpi_suspend_enter+0x57/0xd5

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches.

The commit 254d1a3f02ebc10ccc6e4903394d8d3f484f715e, titled
"xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: shutdown watches from old kernel" assumes that the
XenBus backend can deal with reading of values from:
 "control/platform-feature-xs_reset_watches":

    ... a patch for xenstored is required so that it
    accepts the XS_RESET_WATCHES request from a client (see changeset
    23839:42a45baf037d in xen-unstable.hg). Without the patch for xenstored
    the registration of watches will fail and some features of a PVonHVM
    guest are not available. The guest is still able to boot, but repeated
    kexec boots will fail."

Sadly this is not true when using a Xen 3.4 hypervisor and booting a PVHVM
guest. We end up hanging at:

  err = xenbus_scanf(XBT_NIL, "control",
                        "platform-feature-xs_reset_watches", "%d", &supported);

This can easily be seen with guests hanging at xenbus_init:

NX (Execute Disable) protection: active
SMBIOS 2.4 present.
DMI: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 3.4.0 05/13/2011
Hypervisor detected: Xen HVM
Xen version 3.4.
Xen Platform PCI: I/O protocol version 1
... snip ..
calling  xenbus_init+0x0/0x27e @ 1

Reverting the commit or using the attached patch fixes the issue. This fix
checks whether the hypervisor is older than 4.0 and if so does not try to
perform the read.

Fixes-Oracle-Bug: 14708233
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
[v2: Added a comment in the source code]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Merge branch 'slab/urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/penberg/linux

Pull SLAB fix from Pekka Enberg:
 "This contains a lockdep false positive fix from Jiri Kosina I missed
  from the previous pull request."

* 'slab/urgent' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/penberg/linux:
  mm, slab: release slab_mutex earlier in kmem_cache_destroy()
Merge tag 'stable/for-linus-3.7-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen

Pull Xen fixes from Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk:
 "This has four bug-fixes and one tiny feature that I forgot to put
  initially in my tree due to oversight.

  The feature is for kdump kernels to speed up the /proc/vmcore reading.
  There is a ram_is_pfn helper function that the different platforms can
  register for.  We are now doing that.

  The bug-fixes cover some embarrassing struct pv_cpu_ops variables
  being set to NULL on Xen (but not baremetal).  We had a similar issue
  in the past with {write|read}_msr_safe and this fills the three
  missing ones.  The other bug-fix is to make the console output (hvc)
  be capable of dealing with misbehaving backends and not fall flat on
  its face.  Lastly, a quirk for older XenBus implementations that came
  with an ancient v3.4 hypervisor (so RHEL5 based) - reading of certain
  non-existent attributes just hangs the guest during bootup - so we
  take precaution of not doing that on such older installations.

  Feature:
   - Register a pfn_is_ram helper to speed up reading of /proc/vmcore.
  Bug-fixes:
   - Three pvops call for Xen were undefined causing BUG_ONs.
   - Add a quirk so that the shutdown watches (used by kdump) are not
     used with older Xen (3.4).
   - Fix ungraceful state transition for the HVC console."

* tag 'stable/for-linus-3.7-rc0-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen:
  xen/pv-on-hvm kexec: add quirk for Xen 3.4 and shutdown watches.
  xen/bootup: allow {read|write}_cr8 pvops call.
  xen/bootup: allow read_tscp call for Xen PV guests.
  xen pv-on-hvm: add pfn_is_ram helper for kdump
  xen/hvc: handle backend CLOSED without CLOSING