x86: Simplify code by removing a !SMP #ifdefs from 'struct cpuinfo_x86'

commit 141168c36cdee3ff23d9c7700b0edc47cb65479f and
commit 3f806e50981825fa56a7f1938f24c0680816be45 upstream.

Several fields in struct cpuinfo_x86 were not defined for the
!SMP case, likely to save space.  However, those fields still
have some meaning for UP, and keeping them allows some #ifdef
removal from other files.  The additional size of the UP kernel
from this change is not significant enough to worry about
keeping up the distinction:

	   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
	4737168	 506459	 972040	6215667	 5ed7f3	vmlinux.o.before
	4737444	 506459	 972040	6215943	 5ed907	vmlinux.o.after

for a difference of 276 bytes for an example UP config.

If someone wants those 276 bytes back badly then it should
be implemented in a cleaner way.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com>
Cc: Steffen Persvold <sp@numascale.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324428742-12498-1-git-send-email-kjwinchester@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Redefine ATOMIC_INIT and ATOMIC64_INIT to drop the casts

commit a119365586b0130dfea06457f584953e0ff6481d upstream.

The following build error occured during a ia64 build with
swap-over-NFS patches applied.

net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant
net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: (near initialization for 'memalloc_socks')
net/core/sock.c:274:36: error: initializer element is not constant

This is identical to a parisc build error. Fengguang Wu, Mel Gorman
and James Bottomley did all the legwork to track the root cause of
the problem. This fix and entire commit log is shamelessly copied
from them with one extra detail to change a dubious runtime use of
ATOMIC_INIT() to atomic_set() in drivers/char/mspec.c

Dave Anglin says:
> Here is the line in sock.i:
>
> struct static_key memalloc_socks = ((struct static_key) { .enabled =
> ((atomic_t) { (0) }) });

The above line contains two compound literals.  It also uses a designated
initializer to initialize the field enabled.  A compound literal is not a
constant expression.

The location of the above statement isn't fully clear, but if a compound
literal occurs outside the body of a function, the initializer list must
consist of constant expressions.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
SUNRPC: return negative value in case rpcbind client creation error

commit caea33da898e4e14f0ba58173e3b7689981d2c0b upstream.

Without this patch kernel will panic on LockD start, because lockd_up() checks
lockd_up_net() result for negative value.
From my pow it's better to return negative value from rpcbind routines instead
of replacing all such checks like in lockd_up().

Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
nilfs2: fix deadlock issue between chcp and thaw ioctls

commit 572d8b3945a31bee7c40d21556803e4807fd9141 upstream.

An fs-thaw ioctl causes deadlock with a chcp or mkcp -s command:

 chcp            D ffff88013870f3d0     0  1325   1324 0x00000004
 ...
 Call Trace:
   nilfs_transaction_begin+0x11c/0x1a0 [nilfs2]
   wake_up_bit+0x20/0x20
   copy_from_user+0x18/0x30 [nilfs2]
   nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode+0x7d/0xcf [nilfs2]
   nilfs_ioctl+0x252/0x61a [nilfs2]
   do_page_fault+0x311/0x34c
   get_unmapped_area+0x132/0x14e
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x44b/0x490
   __set_task_blocked+0x5a/0x61
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x76/0x87
   __set_current_blocked+0x30/0x4a
   sys_ioctl+0x4b/0x6f
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
 thaw            D ffff88013870d890     0  1352   1351 0x00000004
 ...
 Call Trace:
   rwsem_down_failed_common+0xdb/0x10f
   call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x13/0x20
   down_write+0x25/0x27
   thaw_super+0x13/0x9e
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x1f5/0x490
   vm_mmap_pgoff+0x76/0x87
   sys_ioctl+0x4b/0x6f
   filp_close+0x64/0x6c
   system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

where the thaw ioctl deadlocked at thaw_super() when called while chcp was
waiting at nilfs_transaction_begin() called from
nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode().  This deadlock is 100% reproducible.

This is because nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode() first locks sb->s_umount in
read mode and then waits for unfreezing in nilfs_transaction_begin(),
whereas thaw_super() locks sb->s_umount in write mode.  The locking of
sb->s_umount here was intended to make snapshot mounts and the downgrade
of snapshots to checkpoints exclusive.

This fixes the deadlock issue by replacing the sb->s_umount usage in
nilfs_ioctl_change_cpmode() with a dedicated mutex which protects snapshot
mounts.

Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Fernando Luis Vazquez Cao <fernando@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pcdp: use early_ioremap/early_iounmap to access pcdp table

commit 6c4088ac3a4d82779903433bcd5f048c58fb1aca upstream.

efi_setup_pcdp_console() is called during boot to parse the HCDP/PCDP
EFI system table and setup an early console for printk output.  The
routine uses ioremap/iounmap to setup access to the HCDP/PCDP table
information.

The call to ioremap is happening early in the boot process which leads
to a panic on x86_64 systems:

    panic+0x01ca
    do_exit+0x043c
    oops_end+0x00a7
    no_context+0x0119
    __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x0138
    bad_area_nosemaphore+0x000e
    do_page_fault+0x0321
    page_fault+0x0020
    reserve_memtype+0x02a1
    __ioremap_caller+0x0123
    ioremap_nocache+0x0012
    efi_setup_pcdp_console+0x002b
    setup_arch+0x03a9
    start_kernel+0x00d4
    x86_64_start_reservations+0x012c
    x86_64_start_kernel+0x00fe

This replaces the calls to ioremap/iounmap in efi_setup_pcdp_console()
with calls to early_ioremap/early_iounmap which can be called during
early boot.

This patch was tested on an x86_64 prototype system which uses the
HCDP/PCDP table for early console setup.

Signed-off-by: Greg Pearson <greg.pearson@hp.com>
Acked-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm: fix wrong argument of migrate_huge_pages() in soft_offline_huge_page()

commit dc32f63453f56d07a1073a697dcd843dd3098c09 upstream.

Commit a6bc32b89922 ("mm: compaction: introduce sync-light migration for
use by compaction") changed the declaration of migrate_pages() and
migrate_huge_pages().

But it missed changing the argument of migrate_huge_pages() in
soft_offline_huge_page().  In this case, we should call
migrate_huge_pages() with MIGRATE_SYNC.

Additionally, there is a mismatch between type the of argument and the
function declaration for migrate_pages().

Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <js1304@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ARM: 7479/1: mm: avoid NULL dereference when flushing gate_vma with VIVT caches

commit b74253f78400f9a4b42da84bb1de7540b88ce7c4 upstream.

The vivt_flush_cache_{range,page} functions check that the mm_struct
of the VMA being flushed has been active on the current CPU before
performing the cache maintenance.

The gate_vma has a NULL mm_struct pointer and, as such, will cause a
kernel fault if we try to flush it with the above operations. This
happens during ELF core dumps, which include the gate_vma as it may be
useful for debugging purposes.

This patch adds checks to the VIVT cache flushing functions so that VMAs
with a NULL mm_struct are flushed unconditionally (the vectors page may
be dirty if we use it to store the current TLS pointer).

Reported-by: Gilles Chanteperdrix <gilles.chanteperdrix@xenomai.org>
Tested-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm: mmu_notifier: fix freed page still mapped in secondary MMU

commit 3ad3d901bbcfb15a5e4690e55350db0899095a68 upstream.

mmu_notifier_release() is called when the process is exiting.  It will
delete all the mmu notifiers.  But at this time the page belonging to the
process is still present in page tables and is present on the LRU list, so
this race will happen:

      CPU 0                 CPU 1
mmu_notifier_release:    try_to_unmap:
   hlist_del_init_rcu(&mn->hlist);
                            ptep_clear_flush_notify:
                                  mmu nofifler not found
                            free page  !!!!!!
                            /*
                             * At the point, the page has been
                             * freed, but it is still mapped in
                             * the secondary MMU.
                             */

  mn->ops->release(mn, mm);

Then the box is not stable and sometimes we can get this bug:

[  738.075923] BUG: Bad page state in process migrate-perf  pfn:03bec
[  738.075931] page:ffffea00000efb00 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x8076
[  738.075936] page flags: 0x20000000000014(referenced|dirty)

The same issue is present in mmu_notifier_unregister().

We can call ->release before deleting the notifier to ensure the page has
been unmapped from the secondary MMU before it is freed.

Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mac80211: cancel mesh path timer

commit dd4c9260e7f23f2e951cbfb2726e468c6d30306c upstream.

The mesh path timer needs to be canceled when
leaving the mesh as otherwise it could fire
after the interface has been removed already.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
x86, nops: Missing break resulting in incorrect selection on Intel

commit d6250a3f12edb3a86db9598ffeca3de8b4a219e9 upstream.

The Intel case falls through into the generic case which then changes
the values.  For cases like the P6 it doesn't do the right thing so
this seems to be a screwup.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-lww2uirad4skzjlmrm0vru8o@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: Add support for architectural random hooks

commit 63d77173266c1791f1553e9e8ccea65dc87c4485 upstream.

Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed
random number generator interfaces.  This patchset does not use the
architecture random number generator interfaces for the
userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus
eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool
pointer.

Changes in version 3:
- Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes().
- Changes the hooks to inlines.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fix typo/thinko in get_random_bytes()

commit bd29e568a4cb6465f6e5ec7c1c1f3ae7d99cbec1 upstream.

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator we use it
to acquire randomness one "long" at a time.  We should put these random
words into consecutive words in the result buffer - not just overwrite
the first word again and again.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: Use arch_get_random_int instead of cycle counter if avail

commit cf833d0b9937874b50ef2867c4e8badfd64948ce upstream.

We still don't use rdrand in /dev/random, which just seems stupid. We
accept the *cycle*counter* as a random input, but we don't accept
rdrand? That's just broken.

Sure, people can do things in user space (write to /dev/random, use
rdrand in addition to /dev/random themselves etc etc), but that
*still* seems to be a particularly stupid reason for saying "we
shouldn't bother to try to do better in /dev/random".

And even if somebody really doesn't trust rdrand as a source of random
bytes, it seems singularly stupid to trust the cycle counter *more*.

So I'd suggest the attached patch. I'm not going to even bother
arguing that we should add more bits to the entropy estimate, because
that's not the point - I don't care if /dev/random fills up slowly or
not, I think it's just stupid to not use the bits we can get from
rdrand and mix them into the strong randomness pool.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFwn59N1=m651QAyTy-1gO1noGbK18zwKDwvwqnravA84A@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store

commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream.

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores.  Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: Adjust the number of loops when initializing

commit 2dac8e54f988ab58525505d7ef982493374433c3 upstream.

When we are initializing using arch_get_random_long() we only need to
loop enough times to touch all the bytes in the buffer; using
poolwords for that does twice the number of operations necessary on a
64-bit machine, since in the random number generator code "word" means
32 bits.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/char/random.c: fix boot id uniqueness race

commit 44e4360fa3384850d65dd36fb4e6e5f2f112709b upstream.

/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently by userspace
processes.  If two (or more) user-space processes concurrently read
boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race can occur making
boot_id differ between the reads.  Because the whole point of the boot id
is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this by protecting this
operation with a spinlock.

Given that this operation is not frequently used, hitting the spinlock
on each call should not be an issue.

Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: make 'add_interrupt_randomness()' do something sane

commit 775f4b297b780601e61787b766f306ed3e1d23eb upstream.

We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.

This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool.  Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool.  This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.

(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)

Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path

commit 902c098a3663de3fa18639efbb71b6080f0bcd3c upstream.

The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
random: create add_device_randomness() interface

commit a2080a67abe9e314f9e9c2cc3a4a176e8a8f8793 upstream.

Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot).  This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).

[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
  variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
  in question. ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
usb: feed USB device information to the /dev/random driver

commit b04b3156a20d395a7faa8eed98698d1e17a36000 upstream.

Send the USB device's serial, product, and manufacturer strings to the
/dev/random driver to help seed its pools.

Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>