Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs

With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
subverting privileged binaries.

This patch completely breaks apparmor.  Someone who understands (and
uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W

Introduces a new BPF ancillary instruction that all LD calls will be
mapped through when skb_run_filter() is being used for seccomp BPF.  The
rewriting will be done using a secondary chk_filter function that is run
after skb_chk_filter.

The code change is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER which is added,
along with the seccomp_bpf_load() function later in this series.

This is based on http://lkml.org/lkml/2012/3/2/141

v15: include seccomp.h explicitly for when seccomp_bpf_load exists.
v14: First cut using a single additional instruction
... v13: made bpf functions generic.

Suggested-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog

Any other users of bpf_*_filter that take a struct sock_fprog from
userspace will need to be able to also accept a compat_sock_fprog
if the arch supports compat calls.  This change let's the existing
compat_sock_fprog be shared.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v11: introduction
seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef

Replaces the seccomp_t typedef with struct seccomp to match modern
kernel style.

v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v8-v11: no changes
v7: struct seccomp_struct -> struct seccomp
v6: original inclusion in this series.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h

Add syscall_get_arch() to export the current AUDIT_ARCH_* based on system call
entry path.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch

Adds a stub for a function that will return the AUDIT_ARCH_*
value appropriate to the supplied task based on the system
call convention.

For audit's use, the value can generally be hard-coded at the
audit-site.  However, for other functionality not inlined into
syscall entry/exit, this makes that information available.
seccomp_filter is the first planned consumer and, as such,
the comment indicates a tie to HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.  That
is probably an unneeded detail.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>

v14: rebase/nochanges
v13: rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: rebase on to linux-next
v11: fixed improper return type
v10: introduced
seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF

[This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch:
   https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264
 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here:
   https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp
 Complete diff here:
   https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp
 A GPG signed tag 'seccomp/v14/posted' will be pushed shortly.
]

This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2.  Mode 2 introduces the
ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering
policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program.
This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call
the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format
of struct seccomp_data.

A filter program may be installed by calling:
  struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... };
  ...
  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog);

The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is
allowed to proceed or denied.  If the first filter program installed
allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly
by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel.  All attached
programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to
proceed.

Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
(!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task.  This
ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).

There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
as follows:
- BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time
- BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood
- Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
  arguments
- No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
- system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying
  required for system call policy decisions.

Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable
HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.  In this patch, the primary dependency is on
syscall_get_arguments().  The full desired scope of this feature will
add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series.
Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be
the desired additional functionality.

No architectures are enabled in this patch.

v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter
       size (indan@nul.nu)
     - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu)
     - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu)
     - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu)
     - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu)
     - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu)
     - exit_code -> exit_sig
v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct
       (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org)
     - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user
     - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c
     - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB
     - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation
       (all of the above: indan@nul.nu)
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com)
     - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu)
     - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu)
v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com)
     - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu)
     - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu)
     - pare down Kconfig doc reference.
     - extra comment clean up
v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing
       (hpa@zytor.com)
     - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch.
       This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters.
       (hpa@zytor.com)
     - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!)
 v9: - n/a
 v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns
     - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu:
     -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code,
     -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat.
     -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch
        dependencies
 v7:  (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others)
     - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
     - merged into seccomp.c
     - minimal seccomp_filter.h
     - no config option (part of seccomp)
     - no new prctl
     - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h
       (works but arg access always fails)
     - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ...
     - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths
     - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter
 v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
     - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
       installation. (luto@mit.edu)
     - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com)
     - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com)
     - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
 v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
       (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org)
      - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
        handle endianness.  Compromises between the two alternate
        proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
        endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
        (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu)
      - update Kconfig description
      - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
      - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
      - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com)
 v4:  - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
      - now uses current->no_new_privs
        (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com)
      - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
      - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
      - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
 v3:  - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com)
      - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com)
      - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com)
      - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com)
      - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
        torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu
 v2:  - (patch 2 only)

Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging

This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
details to the audit log.

Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

v15: added a return code to the audit_seccomp path by wad@chromium.org
seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO

This change adds the SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO as a valid return value from a
seccomp filter.  Additionally, it makes the first use of the lower
16-bits for storing a filter-supplied errno.  16-bits is more than
enough for the errno-base.h calls.

Returning errors instead of immediately terminating processes that
violate seccomp policy allow for broader use of this functionality
for kernel attack surface reduction.  For example, a linux container
could maintain a whitelist of pre-existing system calls but drop
all new ones with errnos.  This would keep a logically static attack
surface while providing errnos that may allow for graceful failure
without the downside of do_exit() on a bad call.

v15: - use audit_seccomp and add a skip label. (eparis@redhat.com)
     - clean up and pad out return codes (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - no change/rebase
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - move to WARN_ON if filter is NULL
       (oleg@redhat.com, luto@mit.edu, keescook@chromium.org)
     - return immediately for filter==NULL (keescook@chromium.org)
     - change evaluation to only compare the ACTION so that layered
       errnos don't result in the lowest one being returned.
       (keeschook@chromium.org)
v11: - check for NULL filter (keescook@chromium.org)
v10: - change loaders to fn
 v9: - n/a
 v8: - update Kconfig to note new need for syscall_set_return_value.
     - reordered such that TRAP behavior follows on later.
     - made the for loop a little less indent-y
 v7: - introduced

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous.

This change enables SIGSYS, defines _sigfields._sigsys, and adds
x86 (compat) arch support.  _sigsys defines fields which allow
a signal handler to receive the triggering system call number,
the relevant AUDIT_ARCH_* value for that number, and the address
of the callsite.

SIGSYS is added to the SYNCHRONOUS_MASK because it is desirable for it
to have setup_frame() called for it. The goal is to ensure that
ucontext_t reflects the machine state from the time-of-syscall and not
from another signal handler.

The first consumer of SIGSYS would be seccomp filter.  In particular,
a filter program could specify a new return value, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP,
which would result in the system call being denied and the calling
thread signaled.  This also means that implementing arch-specific
support can be dependent upon HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.

v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - reworded changelog (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - fix dropped words in the change description
     - added fallback copy_siginfo support.
     - added __ARCH_SIGSYS define to allow stepped arch support.
v10: - first version based on suggestion

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP

Adds a new return value to seccomp filters that triggers a SIGSYS to be
delivered with the new SYS_SECCOMP si_code.

This allows in-process system call emulation, including just specifying
an errno or cleanly dumping core, rather than just dying.

v15: - use audit_seccomp/skip
     - pad out error spacing; clean up switch (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - n/a
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - rebase on to linux-next
v11: - clarify the comment (indan@nul.nu)
     - s/sigtrap/sigsys
v10: - use SIGSYS, syscall_get_arch, updates arch/Kconfig
       note suggested-by (though original suggestion had other behaviors)
v9:  - changes to SIGILL
v8:  - clean up based on changes to dependent patches
v7:  - introduction

Suggested-by: Markus Gutschke <markus@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support

This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP,
and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.

When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the
tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that
results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.  The 16-bit
SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as
the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.

If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no
system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified.

If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno
will be returned to userspace.

This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path.  Any future
efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to
address this restriction.

v15: - add audit support for non-zero return codes
     - clean up style (indan@nul.nu)
v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
       (Brings back a change to ptrace.c and the masks.)
v12: - rebase to linux-next
     - use ptrace_event and update arch/Kconfig to mention slow-path dependency
     - drop all tracehook changes and inclusion (oleg@redhat.com)
v11: - invert the logic to just make it a PTRACE_SYSCALL accelerator
       (indan@nul.nu)
v10: - moved to PTRACE_O_SECCOMP / PT_TRACE_SECCOMP
v9:  - n/a
v8:  - guarded PTRACE_SECCOMP use with an ifdef
v7:  - introduced

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER

Enable support for seccomp filter on x86:
- asm/tracehook.h exists
- syscall_get_arguments() works
- syscall_rollback() works
- ptrace_report_syscall() works
- secure_computing() return value is honored (see below)

This also adds support for honoring the return
value from secure_computing().

SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and SECCOMP_RET_TRAP may result in seccomp needing to
skip a system call without killing the process.  This is done by
returning a non-zero (-1) value from secure_computing.  This change
makes x86 respect that return value.

To ensure that minimal kernel code is exposed, a non-zero return value
results in an immediate return to user space (with an invalid syscall
number).

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter

Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet
Filter programs works and how it may be used.
Includes an example for x86 and a semi-generic
example using a macro-based code generator.

v14: - rebase/nochanges
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - comment on the ptrace_event use
     - update arch support comment
     - note the behavior of SECCOMP_RET_DATA when there are multiple filters
       (keescook@chromium.org)
     - lots of samples/ clean up incl 64-bit bpf-direct support
       (markus@chromium.org)
     - rebase to linux-next
v11: - overhaul return value language, updates (keescook@chromium.org)
     - comment on do_exit(SIGSYS)
v10: - update for SIGSYS
     - update for new seccomp_data layout
     - update for ptrace option use
v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL
v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples.
v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE
    - only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now
    - fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com)
    - adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler
v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of
      PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu)
v5: - update sample to use system call arguments
    - adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator
    - cleaned up bpf in the sample
    - update docs to mention arguments
    - fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com)
    - language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
v4: - update for no_new_privs use
    - minor tweaks
v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
    - document use of tentative always-unprivileged
    - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64
v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net)

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>