menuconfig: Replace CIRCLEQ by list_head-style lists.

sys/queue.h and CIRCLEQ in particular have proven to cause portability
problems (reported on Debian Sarge, Cygwin and FreeBSD)

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Tested-by: Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowitz@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly

Siddhesh analyzed a failure in the take over of pi futexes in case the
owner died and provided a workaround.
See: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14076

The detailed problem analysis shows:

Futex F is initialized with PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT and
PTHREAD_MUTEX_ROBUST_NP attributes.

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Succeeds due to the check for F's userspace TID field == 0
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes T2 via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains real ownership of the
       pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

T3 --> observes inconsistent state

This problem is independent of UP/SMP, preemptible/non preemptible
kernels, or process shared vs. private. The only difference is that
certain configurations are more likely to expose it.

So as Siddhesh correctly analyzed the following check in
futex_lock_pi_atomic() is the culprit:

	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {

We check the userspace value for a TID value of 0 and take over the
futex unconditionally if that's true.

AFAICT this check is there as it is correct for a different corner
case of futexes: the WAITERS bit became stale.

Now the proposed change

-	if (unlikely(ownerdied || !(curval & FUTEX_TID_MASK))) {
+       if (unlikely(ownerdied ||
+                       !(curval & (FUTEX_TID_MASK | FUTEX_WAITERS)))) {

solves the problem, but it's not obvious why and it wreckages the
"stale WAITERS bit" case.

What happens is, that due to the WAITERS bit being set (T2 is blocked
on that futex) it enforces T3 to go through lookup_pi_state(), which
in the above case returns an existing pi_state and therefor forces T3
to legitimately fight with T2 over the ownership of the pi_state (via
pi_state->mutex). Probelm solved!

Though that does not work for the "WAITERS bit is stale" problem
because if lookup_pi_state() does not find existing pi_state it
returns -ERSCH (due to TID == 0) which causes futex_lock_pi() to
return -ESRCH to user space because the OWNER_DIED bit is not set.

Now there is a different solution to that problem. Do not look at the
user space value at all and enforce a lookup of possibly available
pi_state. If pi_state can be found, then the new incoming locker T3
blocks on that pi_state and legitimately races with T2 to acquire the
rt_mutex and the pi_state and therefor the proper ownership of the
user space futex.

lookup_pi_state() has the correct order of checks. It first tries to
find a pi_state associated with the user space futex and only if that
fails it checks for futex TID value = 0. If no pi_state is available
nothing can create new state at that point because this happens with
the hash bucket lock held.

So the above scenario changes to:

T1 lock_futex_pi(F);

T2 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> T2 blocks on the futex and creates pi_state which is associated
       to T1.

T1 exits
   --> exit_robust_list() runs
       --> Futex F userspace value TID field is set to 0 and
           FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit is set.

T3 lock_futex_pi(F);
   --> Finds pi_state and blocks on pi_state->rt_mutex

T1 --> exit_pi_state_list()
       --> Transfers pi_state to waiter T2 and wakes it via
       	   rt_mutex_unlock(&pi_state->mutex)

T2 --> acquires pi_state->mutex and gains ownership of the pi_state
   --> Claims ownership of the futex and sets its own TID into the
       userspace TID field of futex F
   --> returns to user space

This covers all gazillion points on which T3 might come in between
T1's exit_robust_list() clearing the TID field and T2 fixing it up. It
also solves the "WAITERS bit stale" problem by forcing the take over.

Another benefit of changing the code this way is that it makes it less
dependent on untrusted user space values and therefor minimizes the
possible wreckage which might be inflicted.

As usual after staring for too long at the futex code my brain hurts
so much that I really want to ditch that whole optimization of
avoiding the syscall for the non contended case for PI futexes and rip
out the maze of corner case handling code. Unfortunately we can't as
user space relies on that existing behaviour, but at least thinking
about it helps me to preserve my mental sanity. Maybe we should
nevertheless :)

Reported-and-tested-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LFD.2.02.1210232138540.2756@ionos
Acked-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
ledtrig-cpu: kill useless mutex to fix sleep in atomic context

Seeing the following every time the CPU enters or leaves idle on a
Beagleboard:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/mutex.c:269
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
no locks held by swapper/0/0.
[<c001659c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c05aaa7c>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x380)
[<c05aaa7c>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x380) from [<c043bd1c>] (ledtrig_cpu+0x38/0x88)
[<c043bd1c>] (ledtrig_cpu+0x38/0x88) from [<c000f4b0>] (cpu_idle+0xf4/0x120)
[<c000f4b0>] (cpu_idle+0xf4/0x120) from [<c07e47c8>] (start_kernel+0x2bc/0x30c)

Miles Lane has reported seeing similar splats during system suspend.

The mutex in struct led_trigger_cpu appears to have no function: it
resides in a per-cpu data structure which never changes after the
trigger is registered.  So just remove it.

Reported-by: Miles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <ntl@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan Wu <roc@roc-samos.(none)>
clk: ux500: Register i2c clock lookups for u8500

Cc: Ben Dooks <ben-linux@fluff.org>
Cc: Wolfram Sang <w.sang@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
clk: ux500: Register ssp clock lookups for u8500

Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
clk: ux500: Register msp clock lookups for u8500

Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
clk: ux500: Update rtc clock lookup for u8500

Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
clk: ux500: Register slimbus clock lookups for u8500

At the same time the prcc bit for the kclk is corrected to
bit 8 instead of 3.

Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Turquette <mturquette@linaro.org>
KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461)

On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger
oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest
cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN
ioctl.

invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP
Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables
...
Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G      D      3.2.0-3-686-pae
EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0
EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm]
EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0
task.ti=d7c62000)
Stack:
 00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000
 ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0
 c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80
Call Trace:
 [<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm]
...
 [<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74
1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01
d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89
EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP
0068:d7c63e70

QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked
out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with
X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with
X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be
susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well.

Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support.

Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull futex fix from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Single fix for a long standing futex race when taking over a futex
  whose owner died.  You can end up with two owners, which violates
  quite some rules."

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  futex: Handle futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly
Merge branch 'fixes-for-3.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cooloney/linux-leds

Pull LED fix from Bryan Wu.

* 'fixes-for-3.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cooloney/linux-leds:
  ledtrig-cpu: kill useless mutex to fix sleep in atomic context
Merge branch 'rc-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mmarek/kbuild

Pull menuconfig portability fix from Michal Marek:
 "Here is a fix for v3.7 that makes menuconfig compile again on systems
  whose C library is lacking CIRCLEQ_* macros.  I thought I sent it
  earlier, but apparently I did not."

* 'rc-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mmarek/kbuild:
  menuconfig: Replace CIRCLEQ by list_head-style lists.
Merge tag 'clk-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.linaro.org/people/mturquette/linux

Pull ux500 clk fixes from Mike Turquette:
 "Missing clkdev entries are causing regressions on the U8500 platform.
  This pull request contains those missing clkdev entries which are
  needed to boot that platform."

* tag 'clk-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.linaro.org/people/mturquette/linux:
  clk: ux500: Register slimbus clock lookups for u8500
  clk: ux500: Update rtc clock lookup for u8500
  clk: ux500: Register msp clock lookups for u8500
  clk: ux500: Register ssp clock lookups for u8500
  clk: ux500: Register i2c clock lookups for u8500
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull KVM fix from Marcelo Tosatti:
 "A correction for user triggerable oops"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461)
Larry the COW