android: logger: Allow a UID to read it's own log entries

Modify the kernel logger to record the UID associated with
the log entries. Always allow the same UID which generated a
log message to read the log message.

Allow anyone in the logs group, or anyone with CAP_SYSLOG, to
read all log entries.

In addition, allow the client to upgrade log formats, so they
can get additional information from the kernel.

Change-Id: Ie48fb614b43c9302a07ad2673b78dd8749b492b6
Signed-off-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
perf tools: Incorrect use of snprintf results in SEGV

commit b832796caa1fda8516464a003c8c7cc547bc20c2 upstream.

I have a workload where perf top scribbles over the stack and we SEGV.
What makes it interesting is that an snprintf is causing this.

The workload is a c++ gem that has method names over 3000 characters
long, but snprintf is designed to avoid overrunning buffers. So what
went wrong?

The problem is we assume snprintf returns the number of characters
written:

    ret += repsep_snprintf(bf + ret, size - ret, "[%c] ", self->level);
...
    ret += repsep_snprintf(bf + ret, size - ret, "%s", self->ms.sym->name);

Unfortunately this is not how snprintf works. snprintf returns the
number of characters that would have been written if there was enough
space. In the above case, if the first snprintf returns a value larger
than size, we pass a negative size into the second snprintf and happily
scribble over the stack. If you have 3000 character c++ methods thats a
lot of stack to trample.

This patch fixes repsep_snprintf by clamping the value at size - 1 which
is the maximum snprintf can write before adding the NULL terminator.

I get the sinking feeling that there are a lot of other uses of snprintf
that have this same bug, we should audit them all.

Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Yanmin Zhang <yanmin_zhang@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120307114249.44275ca3@kryten
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: fix syncookie regression

[ Upstream commit dfd25ffffc132c00070eed64200e8950da5d7e9d ]

commit ea4fc0d619 (ipv4: Don't use rt->rt_{src,dst} in ip_queue_xmit())
added a serious regression on synflood handling.

Simon Kirby discovered a successful connection was delayed by 20 seconds
before being responsive.

In my tests, I discovered that xmit frames were lost, and needed ~4
retransmits and a socket dst rebuild before being really sent.

In case of syncookie initiated connection, we use a different path to
initialize the socket dst, and inet->cork.fl.u.ip4 is left cleared.

As ip_queue_xmit() now depends on inet flow being setup, fix this by
copying the temp flowi4 we use in cookie_v4_check().

Reported-by: Simon Kirby <sim@netnation.com>
Bisected-by: Simon Kirby <sim@netnation.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: Don't dev_hold(dev) in ip6_mc_find_dev_rcu.

[ Upstream commit c577923756b7fe9071f28a76b66b83b306d1d001 ]

ip6_mc_find_dev_rcu() is called with rcu_read_lock(), so don't
need to dev_hold().
With dev_hold(), not corresponding dev_put(), will lead to leak.

[ bug introduced in 96b52e61be1 (ipv6: mcast: RCU conversions) ]

Signed-off-by: RongQing.Li <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Linux 3.0.26
futex: Cover all PI opcodes with cmpxchg enabled check

commit 59263b513c11398cd66a52d4c5b2b118ce1e0359 upstream.

Some of the newer futex PI opcodes do not check the cmpxchg enabled
variable and call unconditionally into the handling functions. Cover
all PI opcodes in a separate check.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sysfs: Fix memory leak in sysfs_sd_setsecdata().

commit 93518dd2ebafcc761a8637b2877008cfd748c202 upstream.

This patch fixies follwing two memory leak patterns that reported by kmemleak.
sysfs_sd_setsecdata() is called during sys_lsetxattr() operation.
It checks sd->s_iattr is NULL or not. Then if it is NULL, it calls
sysfs_init_inode_attrs() to allocate memory.
That code is this.

iattrs = sd->s_iattr;
if (!iattrs)
                iattrs = sysfs_init_inode_attrs(sd);

The iattrs recieves sysfs_init_inode_attrs()'s result,  but sd->s_iattr
doesn't know the address. so it needs to set correct address to
sd->s_iattr to free memory in other function.

unreferenced object 0xffff880250b73e60 (size 32):
  comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294683888 (age 94.553s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    73 79 73 74 65 6d 5f 75 3a 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 5f  system_u:object_
    72 3a 73 79 73 66 73 5f 74 3a 73 30 00 00 00 00  r:sysfs_t:s0....
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff814cb1d0>] kmemleak_alloc+0x73/0x98
    [<ffffffff811270ab>] __kmalloc+0x100/0x12c
    [<ffffffff8120775a>] context_struct_to_string+0x106/0x210
    [<ffffffff81207cc1>] security_sid_to_context_core+0x10b/0x129
    [<ffffffff812090ef>] security_sid_to_context+0x10/0x12
    [<ffffffff811fb0da>] selinux_inode_getsecurity+0x7d/0xa8
    [<ffffffff811fb127>] selinux_inode_getsecctx+0x22/0x2e
    [<ffffffff811f4d62>] security_inode_getsecctx+0x16/0x18
    [<ffffffff81191dad>] sysfs_setxattr+0x96/0x117
    [<ffffffff811542f0>] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x73/0xd9
    [<ffffffff811543d9>] vfs_setxattr+0x83/0xa1
    [<ffffffff811544c6>] setxattr+0xcf/0x101
    [<ffffffff81154745>] sys_lsetxattr+0x6a/0x8f
    [<ffffffff814efda9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
    [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
unreferenced object 0xffff88024163c5a0 (size 96):
  comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294683888 (age 94.553s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 ed 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....A..........
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 64 42 4f 00 00 00 00  .........dBO....
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff814cb1d0>] kmemleak_alloc+0x73/0x98
    [<ffffffff81127402>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xc4/0xee
    [<ffffffff81191cbe>] sysfs_init_inode_attrs+0x2a/0x83
    [<ffffffff81191dd6>] sysfs_setxattr+0xbf/0x117
    [<ffffffff811542f0>] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x73/0xd9
    [<ffffffff811543d9>] vfs_setxattr+0x83/0xa1
    [<ffffffff811544c6>] setxattr+0xcf/0x101
    [<ffffffff81154745>] sys_lsetxattr+0x6a/0x8f
    [<ffffffff814efda9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
    [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
`

Signed-off-by: Masami Ichikawa <masami256@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tty: moxa: fix bit test in moxa_start()

commit 58112dfbfe02d803566a2c6c8bd97b5fa3c62cdc upstream.

This is supposed to be doing a shift before the comparison instead of
just doing a bitwise AND directly.  The current code means the start()
just returns without doing anything.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
bootmem/sparsemem: remove limit constraint in alloc_bootmem_section

commit f5bf18fa22f8c41a13eb8762c7373eb3a93a7333 upstream.

While testing AMS (Active Memory Sharing) / CMO (Cooperative Memory
Overcommit) on powerpc, we tripped the following:

  kernel BUG at mm/bootmem.c:483!
  cpu 0x0: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c000000000c03940]
      pc: c000000000a62bd8: .alloc_bootmem_core+0x90/0x39c
      lr: c000000000a64bcc: .sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x84/0x29c
      sp: c000000000c03bc0
     msr: 8000000000021032
    current = 0xc000000000b0cce0
    paca    = 0xc000000001d80000
      pid   = 0, comm = swapper
  kernel BUG at mm/bootmem.c:483!
  enter ? for help
  [c000000000c03c80] c000000000a64bcc
  .sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x84/0x29c
  [c000000000c03d50] c000000000a64f10 .sparse_init+0x12c/0x28c
  [c000000000c03e20] c000000000a474f4 .setup_arch+0x20c/0x294
  [c000000000c03ee0] c000000000a4079c .start_kernel+0xb4/0x460
  [c000000000c03f90] c000000000009670 .start_here_common+0x1c/0x2c

This is

        BUG_ON(limit && goal + size > limit);

and after some debugging, it seems that

	goal = 0x7ffff000000
	limit = 0x80000000000

and sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node ->
sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_pgdat_section calls

	return alloc_bootmem_section(usemap_size() * count, section_nr);

This is on a system with 8TB available via the AMS pool, and as a quirk
of AMS in firmware, all of that memory shows up in node 0.  So, we end
up with an allocation that will fail the goal/limit constraints.

In theory, we could "fall-back" to alloc_bootmem_node() in
sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node(), but since we actually have HOTREMOVE
defined, we'll BUG_ON() instead.  A simple solution appears to be to
unconditionally remove the limit condition in alloc_bootmem_section,
meaning allocations are allowed to cross section boundaries (necessary
for systems of this size).

Johannes Weiner pointed out that if alloc_bootmem_section() no longer
guarantees section-locality, we need check_usemap_section_nr() to print
possible cross-dependencies between node descriptors and the usemaps
allocated through it.  That makes the two loops in
sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node() identical, so re-factor the code a
bit.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: code simplification]
Signed-off-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ben Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Robert Jennings <rcj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode

commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.

In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode.  In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.

It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds).  The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().

Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously.  This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this.  For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.

Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).

The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value.  Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care.  If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).

All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd.  The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds).  I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).

		if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
			if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
				VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
				split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
			} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
				continue;
			/* fall through */
		}
		if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))

Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.

The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.

====== start quote =======
      mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
      kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!

    At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
    following is logged on the console:

      mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).

    The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
    the page's PMD table entry.

        143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
        144 {
    ->  145         pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
        146         pmd_clear(pmd);
        147 }

    After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
    between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
    and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
    is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.

       1381         if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
       1382                 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
       1383                        mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
    -> 1384         BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));

    The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
    process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
    been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
    system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.

               virtual address space
              .---------------------.
              |                     |
              |                     |
            .-|---------------------|
            | |                     |
            | |                     |<-- B(fault)
            | |                     |
      2 MB  | |/////////////////////|-.
      huge <  |/////////////////////|  > A(range)
      page  | |/////////////////////|-'
            | |                     |
            | |                     |
            '-|---------------------|
              |                     |
              |                     |
              '---------------------'

    - Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
      on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.

    sys_madvise
      // Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
      down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem)
      ...
      madvise_vma
        switch (behavior)
        case MADV_DONTNEED:
             madvise_dontneed
               zap_page_range
                 unmap_vmas
                   unmap_page_range
                     zap_pud_range
                       zap_pmd_range
                         //
                         // Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
                         // I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
                         //
                         if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
                             // We don't get here due to the above assumption.
                         }
                         //
                         // Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
             .---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
             |           //
             |           if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
             |               {
             |                 if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
             |                     pmd_clear_bad
             |                     {
             |                       pmd_ERROR
             |                         // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
             |                       pmd_clear
             |                         // Clear the page's PMD entry.
             |                         // Thread B incremented the map count
             |                         // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
             |                         // now the page is no longer mapped
             |                         // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
             |                     }
             |               }
             |
             v
    - Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
      in the picture.

    ...
    do_page_fault
      __do_page_fault
        // Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
        down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
        ...
        handle_mm_fault
          if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
              // We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
              do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
                alloc_hugepage_vma
                  // Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
                ...
                __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
                  ...
                  spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
                  ...
                  page_add_new_anon_rmap
                    // Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
                    atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
                  set_pmd_at
                    // Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
                    // when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
                  ...
                  spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)

    The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
    it in shared mode (down_read).  Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
    the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated.  However, Thread A
    does not synchronize on that lock.

====== end quote =======

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
md/bitmap: ensure to load bitmap when creating via sysfs.

commit 4474ca42e2577563a919fd3ed782e2ec55bf11a2 upstream.

When commit 69e51b449d383e (md/bitmap:  separate out loading a bitmap...)
created bitmap_load, it missed calling it after bitmap_create when a
bitmap is created through the sysfs interface.
So if a bitmap is added this way, we don't allocate memory properly
and can crash.

This is suitable for any -stable release since 2.6.35.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ext4: flush any pending end_io requests before DIO reads w/dioread_nolock

commit dccaf33fa37a1bc5d651baeb3bfeb6becb86597b upstream.

(backported to 3.0 by mjt)

There is a race between ext4 buffer write and direct_IO read with
dioread_nolock mount option enabled. The problem is that we clear
PageWriteback flag during end_io time but will do
uninitialized-to-initialized extent conversion later with dioread_nolock.
If an O_direct read request comes in during this period, ext4 will return
zero instead of the recently written data.

This patch checks whether there are any pending uninitialized-to-initialized
extent conversion requests before doing O_direct read to close the race.
Note that this is just a bandaid fix. The fundamental issue is that we
clear PageWriteback flag before we really complete an IO, which is
problem-prone. To fix the fundamental issue, we may need to implement an
extent tree cache that we can use to look up pending to-be-converted extents.

Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer

commit 15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3 upstream.

journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.

This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one.  Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.

Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing.  I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.

Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ext4: ignore EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA flag with delalloc

commit 3d2b158262826e8b75bbbfb7b97010838dd92ac7 upstream.

Ext4 does not support data journalling with delayed allocation enabled.
We even do not allow to mount the file system with delayed allocation
and data journalling enabled, however it can be set via FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
so we can hit the inode with EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA set even on file
system mounted with delayed allocation (default) and that's where
problem arises. The easies way to reproduce this problem is with the
following set of commands:

 mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdd
 mount /dev/sdd /mnt/test1
 dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/test1/file bs=1M count=4
 chattr +j /mnt/test1/file
 dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/test1/file bs=1M count=4 conv=notrunc
 chattr -j /mnt/test1/file

Additionally it can be reproduced quite reliably with xfstests 272 and
269. In fact the above reproducer is a part of test 272.

To fix this we should ignore the EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA inode flag if
the file system is mounted with delayed allocation. This can be easily
done by fixing ext4_should_*_data() functions do ignore data journal
flag when delalloc is set (suggested by Ted). We also have to set the
appropriate address space operations for the inode (again, ignoring data
journal flag if delalloc enabled).

Additionally this commit introduces ext4_inode_journal_mode() function
because ext4_should_*_data() has already had a lot of common code and
this change is putting it all into one function so it is easier to
read.

Successfully tested with xfstests in following configurations:

delalloc + data=ordered
delalloc + data=writeback
data=journal
nodelalloc + data=ordered
nodelalloc + data=writeback
nodelalloc + data=journal

Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ext4: check for zero length extent

commit 31d4f3a2f3c73f279ff96a7135d7202ef6833f12 upstream.

Explicitly test for an extent whose length is zero, and flag that as a
corrupted extent.

This avoids a kernel BUG_ON assertion failure.

Tested: Without this patch, the file system image found in
tests/f_ext_zero_len/image.gz in the latest e2fsprogs sources causes a
kernel panic.  With this patch, an ext4 file system error is noted
instead, and the file system is marked as being corrupted.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42859

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
vfs: fix d_ancestor() case in d_materialize_unique

commit b18dafc86bb879d2f38a1743985d7ceb283c2f4d upstream.

In d_materialise_unique() there are 3 subcases to the 'aliased dentry'
case; in two subcases the inode i_lock is properly released but this
does not occur in the -ELOOP subcase.

This seems to have been introduced by commit 1836750115f2 ("fix loop
checks in d_materialise_unique()").

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
[ Added a comment, and moved the unlock to where we generate the -ELOOP,
  which seems to be more natural.

  You probably can't actually trigger this without a buggy network file
  server - d_materialize_unique() is for finding aliases on non-local
  filesystems, and the d_ancestor() case is for a hardlinked directory
  loop.

  But we should be robust in the case of such buggy servers anyway. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
slub: Do not hold slub_lock when calling sysfs_slab_add()

commit 66c4c35c6bc5a1a452b024cf0364635b28fd94e4 upstream.

sysfs_slab_add() calls various sysfs functions that actually may
end up in userspace doing all sorts of things.

Release the slub_lock after adding the kmem_cache structure to the list.
At that point the address of the kmem_cache is not known so we are
guaranteed exlusive access to the following modifications to the
kmem_cache structure.

If the sysfs_slab_add fails then reacquire the slub_lock to
remove the kmem_cache structure from the list.

Reported-by: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: fix napi_reuse_skb() skb reserve

[ Upstream commit 2a2a459eeeff48640dc557548ce576d666ab06ed ]

napi->skb is allocated in napi_get_frags() using
netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(), with a reserve of NET_SKB_PAD +
NET_IP_ALIGN bytes.

However, when such skb is recycled in napi_reuse_skb(), it ends with a
reserve of NET_IP_ALIGN which is suboptimal.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Linux 3.0.27