Add stable v3.0.46 patches into stable-patches folder

Signed-off-by: Giam Teck Choon <choon@choon.net>
mn10300: only add -mmem-funcs to KBUILD_CFLAGS if gcc supports it

commit 9957423f035c2071f6d1c5d2f095cdafbeb25ad7 upstream.

It seems the current (gcc 4.6.3) no longer provides this so make it
conditional.

As reported by Tony before, the mn10300 architecture cross-compiles with
gcc-4.6.3 if -mmem-funcs is not added to KBUILD_CFLAGS.

Reported-by: Tony Breeds <tony@bakeyournoodle.com>
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Koichi Yasutake <yasutake.koichi@jp.panasonic.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kbuild: make: fix if_changed when command contains backslashes

commit c353acba28fb3fa1fd05fd6b85a9fc7938330f9c upstream.

The call if_changed mechanism does not work when the command contains
backslashes.  This basically is an issue with lzo and bzip2 compressed
kernels.  The compressed binaries do not contain the uncompressed image
size, so these use size_append to append the size.  This results in
backslashes in the executed command.  With this if_changed always
detects a change in the command and rebuilds the compressed image even
if nothing has changed.

Fix this by escaping backslashes in make-cmd

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Luebbe <jlu@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Bernhard Walle <bernhard@bwalle.de>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
media: rc: ite-cir: Initialise ite_dev::rdev earlier

commit 4b961180ef275035b1538317ffd0e21e80e63e77 upstream.

ite_dev::rdev is currently initialised in ite_probe() after
rc_register_device() returns.  If a newly registered device is opened
quickly enough, we may enable interrupts and try to use ite_dev::rdev
before it has been initialised.  Move it up to the earliest point we
can, right after calling rc_allocate_device().

Reported-and-tested-by: YunQiang Su <wzssyqa@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ACPI: run _OSC after ACPI_FULL_INITIALIZATION

commit fc54ab72959edbf229b65ac74b2f122d799ca002 upstream.

The _OSC method may exist in module level code,
so it must be called after ACPI_FULL_INITIALIZATION

On some new platforms with Zero-Power-Optical-Disk-Drive (ZPODD)
support, this fix is necessary to save power.

Signed-off-by: Lin Ming <ming.m.lin@intel.com>
Tested-by: Aaron Lu <aaron.lu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
PCI: acpiphp: check whether _ADR evaluation succeeded

commit dfb117b3e50c52c7b3416db4a4569224b8db80bb upstream.

Check whether we evaluated _ADR successfully.  Previously we ignored
failure, so we would have used garbage data from the stack as the device
and function number.

We return AE_OK so that we ignore only this slot and continue looking
for other slots.

Found by Coverity (CID 113981).

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
[bwh: Backported to 2.6.32/3.0: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
lib/gcd.c: prevent possible div by 0

commit e96875677fb2b7cb739c5d7769824dff7260d31d upstream.

Account for all properties when a and/or b are 0:
gcd(0, 0) = 0
gcd(a, 0) = a
gcd(0, b) = b

Fixes no known problems in current kernels.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@gnu.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kernel/sys.c: call disable_nonboot_cpus() in kernel_restart()

commit f96972f2dc6365421cf2366ebd61ee4cf060c8d5 upstream.

As kernel_power_off() calls disable_nonboot_cpus(), we may also want to
have kernel_restart() call disable_nonboot_cpus().  Doing so can help
machines that require boot cpu be the last alive cpu during reboot to
survive with kernel restart.

This fixes one reboot issue seen on imx6q (Cortex-A9 Quad).  The machine
requires that the restart routine be run on the primary cpu rather than
secondary ones.  Otherwise, the secondary core running the restart
routine will fail to come to online after reboot.

Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Giam Teck Choon <giamteckchoon@gmail.com>
drivers/scsi/atp870u.c: fix bad use of udelay

commit 0f6d93aa9d96cc9022b51bd10d462b03296be146 upstream.

The ACARD driver calls udelay() with a value > 2000, which leads to to
the following compilation error on ARM:

  ERROR: "__bad_udelay" [drivers/scsi/atp870u.ko] undefined!
  make[1]: *** [__modpost] Error 1

This is because udelay is defined on ARM, roughly speaking, as

	#define udelay(n) ((n) > 2000 ? __bad_udelay() : \
		__const_udelay((n) * ((2199023U*HZ)>>11)))

The argument to __const_udelay is the number of jiffies to wait divided
by 4, but this does not work unless the multiplication does not
overflow, and that is what the build error is designed to prevent.  The
intended behavior can be achieved by using mdelay to call udelay
multiple times in a loop.

[jrnieder@gmail.com: adding context]
Signed-off-by: Martin Michlmayr <tbm@cyrius.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
workqueue: add missing smp_wmb() in process_one_work()

commit 959d1af8cffc8fd38ed53e8be1cf4ab8782f9c00 upstream.

WORK_STRUCT_PENDING is used to claim ownership of a work item and
process_one_work() releases it before starting execution.  When
someone else grabs PENDING, all pre-release updates to the work item
should be visible and all updates made by the new owner should happen
afterwards.

Grabbing PENDING uses test_and_set_bit() and thus has a full barrier;
however, clearing doesn't have a matching wmb.  Given the preceding
spin_unlock and use of clear_bit, I don't believe this can be a
problem on an actual machine and there hasn't been any related report
but it still is theretically possible for clear_pending to permeate
upwards and happen before work->entry update.

Add an explicit smp_wmb() before work_clear_pending().

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto

[ Upstream commit 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 ]

ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the
sequence number counters are always up to date. However,
this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed.

If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence
number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of
the sequence number. This leads to a DOS.

We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number,
(used for authentication) with the upper sequence number
computed after the async processing. We drop the packet
if these numbers are different.

To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this
check in the ESN case.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL

[ Upstream commit 864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 ]

When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.

This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL #2

[ Upstream commit c25463722509fef0ed630b271576a8c9a70236f3 ]

When dump_one_policy() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm policy, xfrm_policy_netlink() returns
NULL instead of an error pointer. But its caller expects an error
pointer and therefore continues to operate on a NULL skbuff.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm: fix a read lock imbalance in make_blackhole

[ Upstream commit 433a19548061bb5457b6ab77ed7ea58ca6e43ddb ]

if xfrm_policy_get_afinfo returns 0, it has already released the read
lock, xfrm_policy_put_afinfo should not be called again.

Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth()

[ Upstream commit 4c87308bdea31a7b4828a51f6156e6f721a1fcc9 ]

copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.

Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_state()

[ Upstream commit f778a636713a435d3a922c60b1622a91136560c1 ]

The memory reserved to dump the xfrm state includes the padding bytes of
struct xfrm_usersa_info added by the compiler for alignment (7 for
amd64, 3 for i386). Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the buffer
to avoid the info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_policy()

[ Upstream commit 7b789836f434c87168eab067cfbed1ec4783dffd ]

The memory reserved to dump the xfrm policy includes multiple padding
bytes added by the compiler for alignment (padding bytes in struct
xfrm_selector and struct xfrm_userpolicy_info). Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the buffer to avoid the heap info leak.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()

[ Upstream commit 1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 ]

The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.

Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: don't copy esn replay window twice for new states

[ Upstream commit e3ac104d41a97b42316915020ba228c505447d21 ]

The ESN replay window was already fully initialized in
xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(). No need to copy it again.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid

[ Upstream commit ecd7918745234e423dd87fcc0c077da557909720 ]

The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:

1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
   code later on.

2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
   memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
   CAP_NET_ADMIN).

Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (<http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/>). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.

To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.

To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@revosec.ch>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>