Fixed a timing attack on AUTH (Issue #560).

The way we compared the authentication password using strcmp() allowed
an attacker to gain information about the password using a well known
class of attacks called "timing attacks".

The bug appears to be practically not exploitable in most modern systems
running Redis since even using multiple bytes of differences in the
input at a time instead of one the difference in running time in in the
order of 10 nanoseconds, making it hard to exploit even on LAN. However
attacks always get better so we are providing a fix ASAP.

The new implementation uses two fixed length buffers and a constant time
comparison function, with the goal of:

1) Completely avoid leaking information about the content of the
password, since the comparison is always performed between 512
characters and without conditionals.
2) Partially avoid leaking information about the length of the
password.

About "2" we still have a stage in the code where the real password and
the user provided password are copied in the static buffers, we also run
two strlen() operations against the two inputs, so the running time
of the comparison is a fixed amount plus a time proportional to
LENGTH(A)+LENGTH(B). This means that the absolute time of the operation
performed is still related to the length of the password in some way,
but there is no way to change the input in order to get a difference in
the execution time in the comparison that is not just proportional to
the string provided by the user (because the password length is fixed).

Thus in practical terms the user should try to discover LENGTH(PASSWORD)
looking at the whole execution time of the AUTH command and trying to
guess a proportionality between the whole execution time and the
password length: this appears to be mostly unfeasible in the real world.

Also protecting from this attack is not very useful in the case of Redis
as a brute force attack is anyway feasible if the password is too short,
while with a long password makes it not an issue that the attacker knows
the length.
Fixed comment typo into time_independent_strcmp().
REPLCONF internal command introduced.

The REPLCONF command is an internal command (not designed to be directly
used by normal clients) that allows a slave to set some replication
related state in the master before issuing SYNC to start the
replication.

The initial motivation for this command, and the only reason currently
it is used by the implementation, is to let the slave instance
communicate its listening port to the slave, so that the master can
show all the slaves with their listening ports in the "replication"
section of the INFO output.

This allows clients to auto discover and query all the slaves attached
into a master.

Currently only a single option of the REPLCONF command is supported, and
it is called "listening-port", so the slave now starts the replication
process with something like the following chat:

    REPLCONF listening-prot 6380
    SYNC

Note that this works even if the master is an older version of Redis and
does not understand REPLCONF, because the slave ignores the REPLCONF
error.

In the future REPLCONF can be used for partial replication and other
replication related features where there is the need to exchange
information between master and slave.

NOTE: This commit also fixes a bug: the INFO outout already carried
information about slaves, but the port was broken, and was obtained
with getpeername(2), so it was actually just the ephemeral port used
by the slave to connect to the master as a client.
Typo in comment.
mark fd as writable when EPOLLERR or EPOLLHUP is returned by epoll_wait.
Don't assume that "char" is signed.

For the C standard char can be either signed or unsigned, it's up to the
compiler, but Redis assumed that it was signed in a few places.

The practical effect of this patch is that now Redis 2.6 will run
correctly in every system where char is unsigned, notably the RaspBerry
PI and other ARM systems with GCC.

Thanks to Georgi Marinov (@eesn on twitter) that reported the problem
and allowed me to use his RaspBerry via SSH to trace and fix the issue!
Allow Pub/Sub in contexts where other commands are blocked.

Redis loading data from disk, and a Redis slave disconnected from its
master with serve-stale-data disabled, are two conditions where
commands are normally refused by Redis, returning an error.

However there is no reason to disable Pub/Sub commands as well, given
that this layer does not interact with the dataset. To allow Pub/Sub in
as many contexts as possible is especially interesting now that Redis
Sentinel uses Pub/Sub of a Redis master as a communication channel
between Sentinels.

This commit allows Pub/Sub to be used in the above two contexts where
it was previously denied.
Check that we have connection before enabling pipe mode
Merge remote-tracking branch 'up/2.6' into 2.6