# Talk:Soviet cruiser Molotov

This review is transcluded from Talk:Soviet cruiser Molotov/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.
Reviewer: Kevin Murray (talk) 03:47, 23 September 2010 (UTC)
Questions/Comments:

I woould split the lead into two paragraphs at: She was extensively modernized.
Done
Can you find an alternative to "She was" for beginning sentences?
Done
The photo seems weak and there is a fairly clear photo at: File:Molotov-1.jpg.  Why would you not use that?
Done
The first sentence of the Description section seems a bit long.  Irt conveys the message, but I might reorder it for better flow.   That's not always easy.
How does it read now.
There is too much going on in the first paragraph too.  I'd break it into a couple of paragraphs.  I assume that there is not enough information to expand this into several sections.  There isn't much ore to this paragraph than could be handled in a chart.
Done
It would be nice to know what the improvements were from the Proj. 26 to Proj. 26b, and how the 26 series evolved from prior designs and why.  Were they successful in their objective?  How did they compare to international contemporaries?
Most of that material is covered in the class article.
Why were the 47mm guns swapped for 37mm?
They were fully automatic, the 45 mm guns were only semi-automatic.
"She landed her catapult" becomes clear in the context of the paragraph, but seems like unnecessary jargon, that distracts the reader from the flow -- why not use standard words like "removed"
Done
might talk a bit more about the radar.  Being the only ship in the navy with it seems pertinent
Don't know much more about it. It's function is the most important thing anyways.
In both the WWII and Postwar sections, there is no continuity to the paragraphs.  They seem to flow like a timeline with random breaks.  I know that this isn't easy, but is there a way to make the prose something more than a string of dates and facts?  I don't think that this is a bad article, but how can you grab the reader's interest and bring some continuity to the story?
Don't have much of the interstitial information that would be needed to make it flow more smoothly. You're welcome to make a stab at it yourself.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 17:23, 23 September 2010 (UTC)
GA review – see WP:WIAGA for criteria

Is it reasonably well written?
A. Prose quality: 

B. MoS compliance for lead, layout, words to watch, fiction, and lists: 

Is it factually accurate and verifiable?
A. References to sources: 

B. Citation of reliable sources where necessary: 

C. No original research: 

Is it broad in its coverage?
A. Major aspects: 

B. Focused: 

Is it neutral?
Fair representation without bias: 

Is it stable?
No edit wars, etc: 

Does it contain images to illustrate the topic?
A. Images are copyright tagged, and non-free images have fair use rationales: 

B. Images are provided where possible and appropriate, with suitable captions: 

Overall:
Pass or Fail: 

I think this has met the standards for GA acceptance.  It is about as good as it can get without more information, which is likely dificult to obtain.  Not everything that I suggested could be done, but those suggestions far exceeded the GA requirements.  --Kevin Murray (talk) 19:24, 23 September 2010 (UTC)

THE TORPEDOING OF THE SOVIET CRISER MOLOTOV on 3 AUGUST 1942
According to the pages of the report of the cruiser MOLOTOV, which were sent to me in copy by the famous Russian naval historian Miroslav Morozov, with whom I recently had a fruitful exchange of e-mails on the matter, MOLOTOV was hit by the torpedo at 01.26 (and not at 01.27) of 3 August 1943 and the plane, simultaneously shot down, crashed into the sea near the cruiser at 01.33. That is, after a full seven minutes? If the He.111 falls into flames at the same time or shortly after the explosion of the torpedo we must assume that this happened at 01.26 - 01.27. Unless it was another plane that attacked at 01.33, and it was the one shot down, but in this case it could not hit the MOLOTOV which, at 01.30, had already been reached by a torpedo of the MAS 568. If we insist on the thesis that the MOLOTOV was attacked by the German plane and at the same time the cruiser was hit, it must be said that in the seven minutes spent in the escape maneuver, at 01.33 the torpedo bombers must have been several miles away from the Soviet ship. 
In that case it must be agreed that, at the very least, the Soviet timetables, as I have already pointed out, were wrong; or that the German plane attacked and was actually shot down at 01.33, after the MAS 568 had hit the MOLOTOV at 01.30, believing it sank it having noticed, a few minutes after the explosion of its torpedo, another explosion with a large fire that went out in about four minutes. Meanwhile, while the MAS 568 was disengaging, escaping the pursuit of the destroyer KHARKOV, the attacked cruiser was no longer in sight. The KHARKOV (according to his schedule) had sighted the MAS 568, at 01.28, after the torpedoing of the MOLOTOV, and had chased it without success. 
It should be considered that the times transcribed on the Molotov could not be exact compared to those of the Italian unit, as they differed by thirteen minutes at the time of the first sighting of the same Mas 568 by the Soviet cruiser. And this is confirmed by the rising of the moon which is reported for both, MOLOTOV and MAS 658, at 11.15 pm on August 2, 1942. 
I remember how the air attack, alleged or truthful, was described by the commander of the MOLOTOV, who with his belated and questionable statements, expressed many years after the episode in an interview, raised a series of controversies, all against the official Italian version, which until then was fully shared by the Germans. 
At 01.19 a first torpedo bomber was seen approaching the cross beam of the cruiser, on the left side. The Romanov captain ordered to turn right, and one of the two torpedoes launched from the aircraft passed along the starboard side of the MOLOTOV. After five minutes, at 01.26, a simultaneous attack by two other torpedo bombers followed. One of the He 111s headed for the right flank of the cruiser, the other on the left flank with 110 ° azimuth. Due to the unfavorable moonlight the second plane was sighted late. At a distance of 3,600 meters, the 180 mm heavy guns of the MOLOTOV opened fire with an accelerated rhythm and the cruiser began to maneuver to the left, facing on the right the attack of the first torpedo bomber, which with a heading angle of 150 ° launched two torpedoes, seen passing aft of the MOLOTOV. 
The other plane, the one that had been spotted late, launched its two torpedoes, of which, again according to the Soviet version, one passed on the left side of the cruiser, while the other, at 01.27, hit it in stern on the right side [sic]. 
If you accept the version of the commander of the MOLOTOV, or of those who transcribed it after many years in the interview with Captain Romanov, we would really like to know how the pilot of the German aircraft attacking from the bow to the left could have done cruiser aft of the opposite flank. 
It must be considered that the torpedoes must have been logically released from the He.111 aircraft, which could not waste time being under fire, one after the other, and there was very little room for maneuver for the cruiser on the left side. It would take the Molotov a few minutes to complete a wide full circle, in order to present the stern of the right flank. 
Francesco Mattesini
Simultaneously with the attack of the German torpedo bombers it was made under the Mas 568 of the ship lieutenant Emilio Legnani, who, received from the radiotelegraphic station of Feodosia the detection signal "Enemy units bombard the coast", after having passed the signal to Mas 569 ( which, however, received it with a delay of about an hour), maneuvering at full strength, with the conditions of the sea force 3, he had brought to the area where the Soviet ships had begun the bombing, coming into contact with them, as mentioned , “At 01.18… at a point 3-4 miles to the SE from the area where the action of 573 "took place at 00.15. 
In the roar of artillery, the commander Legnani believed he was framed by the large calibers of the enemy ships, which he had not yet seen since he was "on the unfavorable side with respect to the moon" which illuminated the horizon, while, instead, the Molotov, who according to his report was engaged by the German torpedo bombers, perceived the new insidious threat fired on the Mas 568 with the machine guns. 
Lieutenant Legnani, after having escaped the cruiser's fire, maneuvering at high speed with the sea to the bluebottle and with his Mas covered with foam for the other sprays of the sea that hit him, he moved, from the favor side to the moonlight, in the bow and on the right flank of the Soviet ships, and then launched its two torpedoes on a cruiser "of an unspecified type", which proceeded slowly, from a distance of 800 meters, "aiming at the area in the center of the bow on the black silhouette of the ship ”, and he believed he had hit her at 01.30, fore and aft, with both weapons. Shortly thereafter on that ship, which in maneuvering to port to avoid the torpedoes and develop the maximum volume of fire showed the stern, a violent explosion with flames (and smoke) which went out after four minutes, suggesting that on board the Mas 568 that the cruiser had sunk. At the same time, the Mas immediately approached to escape the enemy reaction in the darkness. 
The frigate captain Francesco Mimbelli, Commander of the 4th Flotilla wrote about it: 
“The two torpedoes launched at a short distance both hit the major unit which ignited and exploded violently after a few minutes. The explosion was also distinctly observed by the other Mas [Mas 573], which in the meantime had gone to anchor under the coast, [and] by the armaments of the Germanic coastal batteries and from the lookout stations”. 
So only after the launch of the torpedoes of the Mas 568 were explosions and flames seen enveloping the Molotov, which therefore could not have been hit in the previous minutes of the alleged air attack. Nor could the violent explosion have occurred, as some have argued, at the moment when the German plane fell overboard after being hit by the Molotov cocktails; also because the He.111 aircraft, we recall, was shot down, according to the cruiser's report, at 01.33, that is, three minutes after the attack of Mas 568. 
To learn more, see the author's essay on his Academia Edu page.
FRANCESCO MATTESINI - Rome, 23 October 2020  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.45.235.216 (talk) 17:16, 23 October 2020 (UTC) 

In the course of the attack of Mas 573 and 568, always considered by the Soviet torpedo boats, Rear Admiral Basistiy, Commander of the Black Sea Cruisers Division argued, in his book "Sea and Shore" (in Russian Море и берег, More i bereg, 1970 Moscow), that after the cessation of firing against the port of Feodosia, the naval formation, being under the gun of German artillery probably using radar, and which enemy ships were ready to strike, hastily headed south, chased by three torpedo boats, one of which caught under the dense and well-aimed fire of the cruiser MOLOTOV was considered hit, and the enemy attack was interrupted. Previously the destroyer KHARKOV had targeted and sunk another torpedo boat, which was seen in flames by the Molotov. Statements that were illusions, since none of the Italian Mas reported the slightest damage. A book, that of Basistiy, which is only a novel, of which it has almost nothing historian. I wonder how it could have been taken into consideration over the years in half the world by historians who consider themselves serious, given that Basistiy does not bring a timetable, a direction of route, not to mention the knowledge of the Italian and German forces, and of the maneuvering their attacks. He only reported chatter made in hindsight.
Francesco Mattesini  — Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.45.224.14 (talk) 17:24, 24 October 2020 (UTC)