# Talk:Battle of the Bowling Alley

This review is transcluded from Talk:Battle of the Bowling Alley/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.
Reviewer: Ian Rose (talk) 00:24, 13 November 2010 (UTC)
Hi there, always glad to look over another contribution to WP's Korean War coverage.  May not be able to get to it in earnest for a few more days but thought you'd like to know that someone's prepared to pick it up...! Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 00:24, 13 November 2010 (UTC)

Okay, performed review and copyedit, mainly to reduce repetition and mix things up a bit. Just one remaining point under Prelude: The US 27th Infantry Regiment of the US 25th Infantry Division was mopping up North Korean resistance from the southern part of the Naktong Bulge area while attached to the US 24th Infantry Division sector when the North Korean pressure north of Taegu caused new alarm. -- this is a very long sentence, can we split/rephrase?
Apart from that, prose, structure, coverage, referencing, and supporting materials look good.  A neat account of a very interesting battle; the early subterfuge by the UN forces was fascinating and you told it well. If you can just check I haven't inadvertently altered any meaning with my copyedit, and see about the above sentence, I'll be happy to pass. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 11:37, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
Changed it to two sentences. —Ed!(talk) 16:29, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
Removed a repeated word but apart from that it looked fine. Passing -- well done! Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 23:46, 21 November 2010 (UTC)
This article is beyond repair. Why so much information that has absolute nothing to do with Battle of Bowling Alley? Kadrun (talk) 04:55, 10 July 2022 (UTC)

This is just a part of Battle of Dabu-Dong. Too much description which as nothing to do with the Bowling Alley and casualties are all wrong. Kadrun (talk) 04:42, 10 July 2022 (UTC)
The bottom section is taken out from the main article. These should go elsewhere, such as the Battle of Tabu-dong or Battle of Cheonpyeong (to be precise).
Since the title of the article is "Battle of the Bowling Alley", it should be limited to that specific battle.


### Deadlock
The ROK 1st Infantry Division, with 7,500 men had held the line around the Bowling Alley since August 12. The Bowling Alley area was selected because of its advantageous high ground which provided natural barriers to funnel KPA troops into smaller fronts where ROK defenses could attack them from the high ground in concealed positions. In the meantime, the KPA 3rd, 13th, and 15th Divisions were advancing south and preparing to close on Taegu. The KPA 13th Division converged on the Tabu-dong corridor and a vicious melee ensued between the KPA and ROK troops, with ROK 1st Division's 11th, 12th and 13th Regiments committed against the KPA 13th Division's 19th, 21st and 23rd Regiments. The fight became a battle of attrition. As the two sides closed on one another, the battle took a brutal turn by August 15 as supplies ran low and units were locked in close quarters combat with little ammunition for the weapons. Fighting across the entire front became hand-to-hand combat and grenade fights at close range. The two divisions were so evenly matched that neither could make any appreciable gains for days of fighting and huge numbers of casualties.
The bloody fighting obliged Paik to call for emergency reinforcements to hold the line. The Eighth Army responded immediately by sending the US 27th Infantry as well as the ROK 10th Regiment, 8th Division to reinforce the ROK 1st Division's three regiments. US Air Force aircraft also conducted a carpet bombing campaign against the advancing KPA positions to undetermined effect. Around that time the KPA 15th Division, which had been supporting the KPA 13th Division, withdrew from the front to attack elsewhere, leaving the ROK 1st Division, with the US 27th Infantry and the KPA 13th Division as principal opponents in the conflict that followed.


### US infantry advance
As the 27th Infantry's trucks rolled northward from Tabu-dong and approached their Line of Departure, the men inside could see the KPA and ROK fighting on the ridges overlooking the road. The infantry dismounted and deployed an attacking line, with the 1st Battalion on the left of the road and the 2nd Battalion on the right. With US tanks leading the infantry on the road, the two battalions crossed the line at 13:00. The tanks opened fire against the mountain escarpments to aid the ROK infantry engaged there. The US infantry on either side of the road swept the lower hills, as the tanks on the road paced their advance with the infantry. A KPA outpost line in the valley withdrew and there was almost no KPA opposition during the first hour of the US advance. KPA outpost lines were 2.5 miles (4.0 km) in front of their main positions. The 27th Infantry had reached a point about 2 miles (3.2 km) north of Tabu-dong when Michaelis was informed that neither of the ROK regiments on the high ground flanking the valley road had been able to advance. He was ordered to halt and form a perimeter defense with both battalions astride the road.
The two battalions of the 27th Infantry went into a perimeter defense just north of the village of Soi-ri. The 1st Battalion, on the left of the road, took a position with C Company on high ground in front, and with A Company on a ridge behind it. On their right, B Company was placed parallel to A Company, and carried the line across the stream and the narrow valley to the road. There the 2nd Battalion took up the defense line with E Company on the road and F Company on its right, while G Company held a ridge behind F Company. Thus, the two battalions presented a four-company front, with one company holding a refused flank position on either side. A platoon of tanks took positions on the front line, two tanks on the road and two in the stream bed, with four more tanks in reserve. The artillery went into firing positions behind the force. Six bazooka teams took up positions in front of the infantry positions along the road and in the stream bed. At the same time, the ROK 1st Division remained in control of the high ground on either side of the 27th Infantry positions.Bold


### Stalemate
On the morning of August 19, the ROK 11th and 13th Regiments launched counterattacks along the ridges with some gains, however the fight continued to produce heavy casualties for both sides. Walker ordered another reserve unit, a battalion of the ROK 10th Regiment, to the Taegu front to close a gap between the ROK 1st and 6th Divisions. Later in the day, Walker also ordered the US 23rd Infantry Regiment, under command of Colonel Paul L. Freeman, Jr., to move up and establish a defense perimeter around the 8th and 37th Field Artillery Battalions at their positions 8 miles (13 km) north of Taegu, to protect them from KPA attack. This was the only occasion during the war that two US regiments were assigned to a ROK command. The 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry took up a defensive position around the artillery while the 2nd Battalion occupied a defensive position on the road behind the 27th Infantry. The next day the two battalions exchanged places. ROK troops, suffering losses from the fighting, began recruiting students and civilians from nearby villages to fight.

There was little fighting on the ground during the day on August 20. However, US aircraft attacked KPA positions around Taegu repeatedly during the day, often in close proximity to American ground forces. As night fell, KPA troops launched a second attack, firing a barrage of 120–mm. mortar shells into the 27th Infantry's Heavy Weapons Company area at 17:00; several of their tanks also began advancing down the corridor. The US troops responded with artillery and mortar fire, hitting the KPA column and its accompanying infantry. Waiting Americans held their small arms and machine gun fire until the KPA were within 200 feet (61 m) of their positions. The combined fire of all the US weapons repulsed this attack.
The next morning, August 21, a US patrol of two platoons of infantry and M26 Pershing tanks went up the road toward the KPA positions. White flags had appeared in front of the American line, and civilians in the area said many KPA wanted to surrender. The US patrol's mission was to investigate this situation and to form an estimate of KPA losses. The patrol advanced about 1 mile (1.6 km), engaging small KPA groups and receiving some artillery fire. On its way it destroyed five disabled KPA tanks with thermite grenades. The patrol also found a 37 mm anti-tank gun, two SU-76 self-propelled guns, and a 120 mm mortar among the destroyed KPA equipment, as well as recognizing a large number of KPA dead. At the point of farthest advance, the patrol found and destroyed an abandoned T-34 tank in a village schoolhouse courtyard.


### August 18 attack
The first of seven successive KPA night attacks struck the 27th Infantry defensive perimeter shortly after dark that night, August 18. KPA mortars and artillery fired a heavy preparation for the general attack for several hours. Two T-34 tanks and an SU-76 self-propelled gun moved out of the village of Sinjumak 2 miles (3.2 km) in front of the 27th Infantry lines. Infantry followed them, some in trucks and others on foot. The lead tank moved slowly and without firing, apparently observing, while the second one and the SU-76 fired repeatedly into F Company's position. As the tanks drew near, a 3.5-inch bazooka team from F Company destroyed the second one in the line.
Bazooka teams also hit the lead tank, causing its crew to abandon it. Fire from the 8th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out the self-propelled gun, destroyed two trucks, and killed or wounded an estimated 100 KPA troops at the point of the advance. US First Lieutenant Lewis Millett, an artillery forward observer and later a Medal of Honor winner after he transferred to the infantry, directed this artillery fire on the KPA, even as a T-34 tank approached within 50 feet (15 m) of his position. Three more T-34s had come down the road but, on realizing that the Americans had effective anti-tank weapons, they switched on their running lights and retreated north without engaging the UN troops. Around 00:30 on August 19 the first KPA attack had stalled and they withdrew. KPA troops made a second effort, much weaker than the first, around 02:30, but artillery and mortar fire dispersed them before they reached the UN lines.
Over the course of the next week, the US troops were able to discern the KPA system of attack and use it to their advantage. The KPA used a system of flares to signal various actions and coordinate them. It quickly became apparent to the defending Americans that green flares were used to signal an attack on a given area. So the 27th Infantry obtained its own green flares and then, after the KPA attack had begun, fired them over its main defensive positions. This confused the attacking forces and often drew them to the points of greatest US strength where they suffered massive casualties from defensive machine-gun crossfire. The US troops also began using land mines in front of their positions to stall the KPA. The mines stopped the tanks and the infantry tried to remove them. When this happened, US troops fired flares to illuminate the scene and pre-registered artillery and mortar fire blasted the immobilized KPA. This tactic was effective in inflicting further significant casualties.


### North Korean flanking moves
During the night battle, KPA forces infiltrated along the high ridge line around the east flank of the 27th Infantry and appeared the next day at about 12:00 6 miles (9.7 km) in the rear of that regiment and only 9 miles (14 km) from Taegu. This force was a regiment of the KPA 1st Division and was 1,500 men strong. The regiment had just arrived from the Kunwi area to join in the battle for Taegu. It began ambushing supply lines to the American forces in the valley. One of the regiment's companies attacked the ROK 1st Division's headquarters with intent to capture Paik, but was repulsed by the ROK 10th Regiment.
About this time, Michaelis sent an urgent message to Eighth Army saying that the ROK troops on his left had given way and that "those people are not fighting." One of the battalions of the ROK 11th Regiment had been driven back and was retreating in disarray. Prisoners told him that about 1,000 KPA were on his west flank. He asked for an air strike. Had these ROK troops been driven from this high ground, the perimeter position of the 27th Infantry Regiment would have been untenable. Paik bitterly resented Michaelis' charge that his men were not fighting, and in the argument, Eighth Army Korean Military Advisory Group advisers visited each ROK unit to ensure they were remaining in position. Paik personally rallied the ROK 11th Regiment for a charge back into its positions, impressing Michaelis. Later, Michaelis apologized to Paik though their relationship for the remainder of the battle remained strained.
On the afternoon of August 22, 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, guarding the support artillery behind the 27th Infantry, came under attack by the KPA 1st Division troops that had passed around the forward positions. Freeman reported to Eighth Army at 16:40 that the KPA had shelled the rear battery of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, that KPA infantry were between the US 27th and US 23rd Regiments on the road, and that other KPA groups had passed around the east side of his forward battalion. An intense artillery barrage began falling on the headquarters area of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at 16:05, and 25 minutes later two direct hits destroyed the fire direction center, killing four officers and two non-commissioned officers. The individual batteries quickly took over control of the battalion fires and continued to support the infantry, while the battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company withdrew under fire.
UN aircraft launched air strikes on the KPA-held ridge east of the road and on the valley beyond. That night, Walker released control of the 23rd Infantry, less the 1st Battalion, to the US 1st Cavalry Division with orders for it to clear the KPA from the road and the commanding ground overlooking the main supply route.
About 10:00, Lieutenant Colonel Chong Pong Uk, commanding the artillery regiment supporting the KPA 13th Division, walked up alone to a ROK 1st Division position 3 miles (4.8 km) north of Tabu-dong and defected. Chong, the highest ranking KPA prisoner of war thus far in the war, gave precise information on the location of his artillery. According to him, there were seven 122 mm howitzers and thirteen 76 mm guns emplaced and camouflaged in an orchard 4.5 miles (7.2 km) north of Tabu-dong, in a little valley on the north side of Yuhak-san. Upon receiving this information, Eighth Army immediately prepared to destroy the KPA weapons. Fighter-bombers attacked the orchard site with napalm, and US artillery took the location under fire. Chong was eventually commissioned in South Korea's armed forces.


### Final moves
During the night of August 22–23, the KPA launched a weak attack against the 27th Infantry, which was quickly repulsed. Just before 12:00 on August 23, however, a violent action occurred some distance behind the front line when about 100 KPA soldiers, undetected, succeeded in reaching the positions of K Company, 27th Infantry and of the 1st Platoon, C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion. They overran parts of these positions before being driven off and suffering 50 killed. Meanwhile, as ordered by Walker, the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, after repelling several KPA night attacks, counterattacked at dawn and seized the high ground overlooking the road at the artillery positions. At the same time the 3rd Battalion started an all-day attack that swept a stretch of high ground east of the road. This action largely cleared the KPA from the area behind and on the flanks of the 27th Infantry. At 13:35, Michaelis reported from the Bowling Alley to Eighth Army that the KPA 13th Division had blown the road to his front, had mined it, and was withdrawing.
The next day, August 24, the 23rd Infantry continued clearing the rear areas and by night it estimated that there were fewer than 200 KPA behind the forward positions. The Bowling Alley front was quiet during the day. Shortly after midnight on August 24 the KPA launched what had by now become their regular nightly attack down the Bowling Alley. This attack was in an estimated two-company strength supported by a few tanks. The 27th Infantry broke up the attack and two more KPA tanks were destroyed by the supporting artillery fire. This was the last night the 27th Infantry Regiment spent in the Bowling Alley.
With the KPA turned back north of Taegu, Walker issued orders for the 27th Infantry to leave the Bowling Alley and return to the 25th Division in the Masan area. The ROK 1st Division was to assume responsibility for the Bowling Alley, but the 23rd Infantry was to remain north of Taegu in its support. ROK relief of the 27th Infantry began at 18:00, 25 August, and continued throughout the night until completed at 03:45 August 26. Survivors of the 1st Regiment, KPA 1st Division, joined the rest of that division in the mountains east of the Taegu–Sangju road near the walled summit of Ka-san. Prisoners reported that the 1st Regiment was down to about 400 men and had lost all its 120 mm mortars, 76 mm howitzers, and antitank guns as a result of its action on the east flank of the KPA 13th Division at the Bowling Alley.