MQ-9A, T/N 10-4114 CENTCOM AOR 24 November 2015 On 24 November 2015, at approximately 1434 Zulu time (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-9A, tail number 10-4114, assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV) and operated by the 138th Attack Squadron (138 ATKS), 174th Attack Wing (174 AKTW), crashed while on an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission in the United Stated (U.S.) Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). MA impacted the ground and damage to U.S. government property totaled $9,931,234.00. Wreckage was not recovered. There were no fatalities, injuries or damage to civilian property. Two different Launch and Recovery Elements (LRE) were involved in the mishap, the home station LRE and alternate LRE. The mission control element (MCE) consisted of a mishap instructor pilot (MIP), mishap pilot (MP), and mishap sensor operator (MSO). At approximately 1155Z, MCE gained control of MA from the home station LRE. At approximately 1315Z, MCE observed a “battery leaking current” warning message on the heads down display. MCE diagnosed this as a starter generator failure and began accomplishing the checklist for this situation. After conferring with the mission crew coordinator (MCC), MCE declared an emergency and requested MCC communicate with the Wing Operations Center (WOC) to coordinate a handoff with the closest alternate LRE in accordance with current guidance. Before the handover was attempted, MCE completed all emergency checklists and noted there was enough battery power to complete the handover and land the MA at the alternate, undisclosed LRE. All required aircraft information was passed on from the MCC to the alternate LRE. It is the responsibility of the gaining LRE to accomplish the required gaining checklists prior to assuming control of an aircraft based on that information. At approximately 1432Z and at 14,000 feet (ft) mean sea level (MSL), the alternate LRE established link with MA and assumed control of MA from MCE. Immediately after the handover, MCE noticed a “beta” indication on the heads up display, meaning MA entered a reverse thrust mode. Additionally, MCE saw MA airspeed drop to 75 knots. MA quickly stalled, lost altitude, and lost link with the alternate LRE. The alternate LRE asked MCE to “take it back” and MCE then regained control of MA via satellite link and noticed that MA had lost 8,000 ft in less than one minute. MCE observed that all three Flight Control Assemblies (FCA) had failed as a result of the out of control condition. The FCAs are essential because they enable controlled flight of the aircraft. The failure of all three FCAs meant that the aircraft was not fully controllable or landable by MCE or alternate LRE. At approximately 1434Z, MIP was forced to guide the MA into the ground in an unpopulated area. The alternate LRE then stated that their detent calibrations were set wrong, meaning that they had not properly calibrated their Ground Control Station (GCS) to fly the MQ-9A. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation (AAIB) Board President (BP) found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the failure of the alternate LRE to correctly calibrate the GCS to fly the MQ- 9A aircraft. The AAIB BP found by a preponderance of the evidence that the following factor substantially contributed to the mishap: starter-generator failure resulting in the need to divert to the nearest alternate LRE location.