kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
F-15D, T/N 86-0182 NEAR SPALDING, LINCOLNSHIRE, UNITED KINGDOM 8 OCTOBER 2014 On 8 October 2014 at 15:26 hours local time, an F-15D aircraft, tail number (T/N) 86-0182, assigned to the 493d Fighter Squadron, 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, entered into a spin and crashed while conducting a basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) training mission in East Anglia airspace north of RAF Lakenheath. During the mission’s final planned engagement, the mishap pilot (MP) maneuvered the mishap aircraft (MA) into a series of descending vertical maneuvers. At 15,200 feet mean sea level (MSL), the MP executed an abrupt aft-stick pull that spiked the MA’s angle of attack (AOA). The MA then experienced an uncommanded nose-slice to the left, constituting a loss of aircraft control. The MA then entered a flat spin, reaching a peak yaw rate of 111° per second at approximately 12,200 feet MSL. The MP attempted to regain aircraft control by following MA Spin Recovery Display commands. Without indications of aircraft recovery, the MP ejected at 5,450 feet MSL, sustaining minor injuries. There were no civilian injuries or fatalities. The MA was destroyed upon impact at an estimated cost of $44,608,743.00. Private property damage included fire and impact damage to a farmer’s field. Post-mishap analysis revealed a larger than normal gap between the body of the radome, or aircrafi nose, and the metallic cover for the tip of the radome, called a nose cap. The sealant used to secure the nose cap in place extruded from under the nose cap. ‘This sealant extended onto the radome body and formed an uneven aerodynamic surface. A series of aerodynamic studies has shown that similar radome imperfections are capable of generating yaw forces that can both induce a spin and delay spin recovery. These radome imperfections do not significantly affect aircraft performance except in infrequent cases where a pilot commands extreme AOA at certain airspeeds. In this mishap, the MP’s abrupt aft-stick pull placed the MA in this flight regime. Imperfections of the MA’s radome then generated sufficient yaw to cause a spin and delay the MA’s recovery beyond the prescribed bailout altitude for an uncontrolled aircraft. Additionally, in comparison with the single seat F-15C, two seat F-15Ds such as the MA can exhibit reduced yaw stability under conditions of rapid AOA onset rates. The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence that the mishap was caused by a combination of two factors. First, the MP’s abrupt aft-stick pull placed the MA in an extreme AOA flight regime. Second, while in that aerodynamic regime, imperfections with the radome’s nose cap assembly generated sufficient yaw forces for a spin entry and delayed spin recovery beyond the minimum uncontrolled bailout altitude. By a preponderance of evidence, the Board President also found that the inherent reduced stability of the F-15D model was a significant contributing factor to the mishap.
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413 Nevada Test and Training Range 4 April 2018 On 4 April 2018, the mishap pilot (MP), flying a F-16CM, tail number (T/N) 91-0413, assigned to the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron, the “Thunderbirds,” 57th Wing, Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), engaged in a routine aerial demonstration training flight at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) near Creech AFB, NV. During the training flight, at approximately 1029 local time, the mishap aircraft (MA) impacted the ground and fatally injured the MP, without an ejection attempt. The mishap mission was planned and authorized as a practice of a Thunderbirds aerial demonstration in the south part of the NITR. The mishap flight was a formation of six F-16CMs (Thunderbirds #1-6), the standard Thunderbirds aerial demonstration flight. Thunderbird #4 was the MA/MP. During the High Bomb Burst Rejoin, an aerial maneuver near the scheduled end of the aerial demonstration training flight, the MP flew the MA for approximately 22 seconds in inverted flight between 5,500 and 5,700 feet above ground level. During this time, the MP experienced a change in force due to acceleration measured in multiples of the acceleration of gravity felt at the earth’s surface (G), between -0.5 to -2.06 G’s. While experiencing -2.06 G’s in inverted flight, the MP initiated a descending half-loop maneuver (Split-S). After five seconds in the Split-S, the MP attained a maximum +8.56 G’s. The MP experienced G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) and absolute incapacitation at the end of that five-second period. For approximately the next five seconds, the MP remained in a state of absolute incapacitation and made no deliberate flight control inputs as the MA accelerated toward the ground. Approximately one second prior to ground impact, the MP began deliberate flight control inputs as he transitioned from absolute to relative incapacitation. The MA impacted the ground at 57 degrees nose low with 89 degrees of left bank and the MP was fatally injured on impact, without an ejection attempt. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP’s G-LOC during the Split-S portion of the High Bomb Burst Rejoin maneuver. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of evidence two factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the MP’s diminished tolerance to +G’s induced by the physiology of the MP’s exposure to —G’s (“Push-Pull Effect”) and (b) an associated decrease in the effectiveness of the MP’s Anti-G straining maneuver under those conditions.
MQ-1B, T/N 07-3204 Jalalabad Air Base, Afghanistan 5 June 2011 On 5 June 2011, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator T/N 07-3204, was flying an operational mission supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. The MRPA was assigned to the 432d Wing but was being flown by the 20" Reconnaissance Squadron (20 RS) out of Whiteman AFB, Missouri. The MPRA was presumed to have crashed northeast of Jalalabad Air Base (AB) after flying 19.5 hours of a tasked surveillance mission. There are no known injuries and there was no known damage to other government or private property. The estimated loss is valued at $4.4M and includes the MRPA and one Hellfire missile. After normal maintenance and pre-flight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed Jalalabad AB at approximately 1648Z on 4June 2011. The Launch and Recovery Element at Jalalabad AB accomplished an uneventful hand-off to the Mission Control Element (MCE) at Whiteman AFB at 1702Z. On 5 June 2011, at 12:18Z, 19.5 hours into flight, the MCE lost satellite link with the MRPA. At that time the MRPA was supporting troops on the ground who were in contact with the enemy, and was flying in clouds near convective activity. The last known position of the MRPA was approximately 60 nautical miles northeast of Jalalabad Air Base in a mountainous area that is known for the rapid development of thunderstorms. The MRPA’s datalogs showed that it was in controlled flight and that all systems, to include the engine and datalink, were operating normally right up until the time of the loss of the satellite link. Subsequent intermittent data updates showed that the MRPA was out of control and descending rapidly. The MRPA was not found and was presumed to have crashed in a remote mountainous area of Afghanistan before it could complete its emergency return-to-base profile. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board president found by clear and convincing evidence that hazardous weather and, specifically, a lighting strike during the MRPA’s sortie, caused the loss of communications and subsequent crash. Historical weather data showing the high potential for the rapid development of hazardous weather in the MRPA’s operating area, weather forecasts ont he day of the mishap, satellite imagery showing the rapid development of thunderstorms, witness statements, and the analysis of the MRPA’s datalogs indicated “several factors that were the characteristics of a lightning strike as determined by analysis and prior lightning strike events” all support this conclusion.
MQ-1B T/N 08-3228, Republic of Djibouti 14 JANUARY 2011 On 14 January 2011, at 1617 Zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), a MQ- 1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 08-3228, crashed in the Gulf of Aden while returning to an undisclosed base approximately nine and a half hours after takeoff. Destruction of the MRPA with two missiles was assessed to be a financial loss of $4,120,000. No injuries, damage to other government property, or damage to private property occurred as a result of the mishap. The aircraft belonged to the 432d Wing at Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, but was deployed at the time in support of Operation HORN OF AFRICA. The crew flying the aircraft at the time of the mishap was from the 3rd Special Operations Squadron at Cannon AFB. Maintenance support was provided by the 49th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Holloman AFB. After normal pre-flight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at 0702Z. Handover procedures from the Launch and Recovery Element to the first Mission Control Element (MCE) were uneventful. At 1330Z the MRPA oil pressure became erratic with momentary deviations below 30 pounds per square inch with no other engine abnormalities. The MCE ran appropriate procedures and elected to return to the FOB. On the return leg no further abnormal engine indications were observed and the MCE crew swapped out with the mishap crew (MC). The MC began a descent from the cruise altitude into the approach control structure approximately 144 miles from the FOB. During an intermediate level off the MC noticed erratic and low oil pressure indications which prompted the MC to run the low oil pressure procedures. The MC then descended the MRPA to 12,500 feet, leveled off for approximately 25 minutes until a piston, piston ring, valve, valve spring, push-rod, or rocker-arm in cylinder #3 experienced a catastrophic failure. The cylinder head and piston were likely heavily damaged and pumped engine oil out of the cylinder. The wind-milling engine continued driving the oil pump, which pumped the remaining oil out of the tank until the oil tank was empty and the engine seized. The MRPA glided approximately 30 miles before making a forced water-landing three miles off-shore. The MRPA was a total loss and not recovered. The Accident Investigation Board President determined by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was engine failure. Specifically, the catastrophic failure of the #3 cylinder resulted in the depletion of the oil system and subsequent engine seizure. The Board President was not able to determine the cause of the cylinder failure since the MRPA’s engine was not recovered.
F-16CM TIN 92-3907 Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 16 July 2013 On 16 July 2013, at approximately 18:07 hours local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an F-16CM, tail number 92-3907 assigned to the 55th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, after a routine training mission at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, skidded off the runway and crashed after a normal approach and landing. At 0.75 seconds after touchdown, the right main landing gear (RMLG) collapsed. As a result, the MA’s right station 6 external fuel tank contacted the runway surface along with the MA’s station 8 air intercept missile (AIM) -9. The MA drifted right on its nose landing gear (NLG), left main landing gear (LMLG), station 6 external fuel tank and station 8 AIM-9 until it skidded off the runway 5 seconds later, approximately 9 seconds after touchdown, 2,000 feet from its touchdown point. Two seconds after the MA skidded off the runway, the NLG collapsed and the MA’s nose dug into the ground, and the MA flipped and rolled. The MA came to rest in the grass to the right of the runway 16 seconds after touchdown and 3,000 feet from the touchdown point. The MA was destroyed. The mishap pilot (MP) incurred a minor back injury during the mishap. The MP egressed the aircraft and fire recovery personnel recovered him for medical care. There was no damage to private property. Estimated government loss is $33,483,954.56. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of this mishap was the collapse of the right main landing gear by the unlocking of the toggle and link assembly in the right main landing gear drag brace assembly. Additionally, the AIB president found, by a preponderance of evidence that each of the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) the installation of an incorrect pivot pin that connected the upper drag brace assembly to the main drag brace assembly and (2) natural resonant vibrations of the drag brace assembly, when combined with the vibrations created by wheel spin up and spring back phenomena unlocked the toggle and link drag brace assembly, thereby unlocking the RMLG. The RMLG collapsed as the weight of the aircraft settled onto it. Specifically, during normal operations, the toggle and link assembly may move towards an unlocked position. The probability of achieving an unlocked condition increases under certain conditions. Several of these conditions existed during the mishap: an incorrect drag brace assembly pin (connects the upper drag brace with the drag brace assembly) was installed, high vertical velocity during touchdown, normal wheel spin up and spring back of the landing gear, and compression loads on the landing gear. Each of these conditions had a cumulative effect on moving the RMLG toggle and link assembly far enough to reach an unlocked condition. As the weight of the aircraft settled onto the RMLG, the unlocked drag brace assembly collapsed, which in turn allowed the entire RMLG to collapse.
F-16CM, T/N 90-0771 OSAN AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA 21 MARCH 2012 On 21 March 2012, at 12:07 local Korea time an F-16CM, tail number 90-0771, experienced an engine malfunction during a routine training mission 34 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea (ROK). The engine never recovered from the malfunction. The mishap pilot (MP) ejected safely from the aircraft and was recovered by search and rescue personnel. The mishap aircraft (MA) was based at Osan AB, ROK and assigned to the 36th Fighter Squadron, 51st Operations Group, 51st Fighter Wing. The MA impacted the ground near the small town of Hwachon-ri, Hwayang-Myeon, Seocheon, Chungcheongnam, ROK; approximately 14 nm northeast of Kunsan Air Base, ROK. The mishap sortie was uneventful until the engine malfunction. The pilot performed the appropriate emergency checklist procedures in an attempt to recover the engine, but it did not respond and continued operating in a degraded state until impact. After safely ejecting, the MP was transported to Kunsan Air Base medical clinic by the 6th Search and Rescue Group, Republic of Korea Air Force. The clinic examination revealed the MP sustained no injuries. The MP’s actions during the mishap sequence were focused, precise and appropriate. His actions or lack of actions did not contribute to the mishap. Although engine maintenance was causal, a thorough review of maintenance procedures revealed no systemic problems or adverse trends that were causal. The AJB president found clear and convincing evidence to determine the mishap engine (ME) experienced catastrophic failure and a subsequent engine stall following the liberation of two fifth stage compressor blades. The two fifth stage compressor blades experienced higher than normal high cycle and vibrDIRQinduced fatigue. The high cycle fatigue and vibrations were caused by uneven compressor pressure in the fifth stage region. The uneven pressure was caused by an incorrectly installed stage 5 stator blade sector. The AIB president further found by a preponderance of evidence that procedural guidance substantially contributed to the mishap by failing to instruct maintenance members with suitable detail in the manner in which the error could occur as well as failing to represent the magnitude of the risk associated with the error. Financial loss to the Air Force totaled $21,606,116.29 in lost aircraft and an additional $187,419.05 in environmental cleanup costs.
ABBREVIATED ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION MQ-1B PREDATOR, T/N 01-3075 NEAR CREECH AIR FORCE BASE, NEVADA 13 MAY 2013 On 13 May 2013, at approximately 2113 hours Zulu time (Z), an MQ-1B remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), hereinafter referred to as the mishap RPA (MRPA), tail number 01-3075, impacted the ground approximately 11 nautical miles west of Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), 5.6 hours into a local training mission. The MRPA was operated by the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron (11 RS), 432d Wing (432 WG), Creech AFB, NV. The MRPA and one M-36 training missile were destroyed on impact. The total damage to United States government property was assessed to be $4,511,500.00. There were no injuries or damage to other government or civilian property. On 13 May 2013, at approximately 1536Z, the MRPA departed for takeoff and landing practice at Creech AFB, NV. At 15:44:57Z, approximately 19 seconds after full power was applied to the MRPA, the propeller pitch angle unintentionally became fixed at 14.5 degrees and remained in that position for the next 5.4 hours. Three crews cycled through the ground control station (GCS) and conducted syllabus-directed training before handing over MRPA control to the mishap crew (MC). Beginning at 21:11:04Z, the propeller pitch decreased to -3 degrees, which generated a reverse thrust situation, and remained at that position for the duration of the flight. By 21:11:21Z, the MRPA had descended 300 feet below the commanded altitude. The MRPA continued to descend with a vertical velocity exceeding -1,000 feet per minute (FPM). At 21:11:22Z, the MC, which consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), mishap evaluator sensor operator (MESO), and mishap upgrade sensor operator (MUSO), received a propeller pitch servomotor failure warning message, among others, on the heads down display (HDD). These messages were the first indication to the MC of a problem with the variable pitch propeller (VPP) servomotor, which controls propeller pitch angles. Shortly thereafter, the MC lost link to the MRPA and it impacted the ground at approximately 2113Z. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the cause of the mishap was a VPP system failure. A cable that provides electrical current to the VPP servomotor was found to have produced inconsistent electrical current. This lack of electrical power to the VPP servomotor resulted in a fixed propeller position of 14.5 degrees for 5.4 hours, followed by a subsequent un-commanded propeller pitch shift down to -3 degrees, which put the MRPA into a thrust deficient situation from which it could not recover. The AAIB president also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the human factor of misinterpreted instrument readings substantially contributed to the mishap.
MQ-9A, T/N 12-4175 US CENTCOM AOR 6 May 2017 On 6 May 2017, at about 2238 Zulu Time (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-9A, tail number 12-4175, assigned to the 432d Wing (432 WG), and operated by the 361st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (361 ERS), 332d Air Expeditionary Wing (332 AEW), crashed in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility after MA handover from the Mission Control Element (MCE) to the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE). The MA was destroyed following impact with terrain and no wreckage was recovered. The loss of Government property was valued at $10,310,434. There were no reported fatalities, injuries or damage to civilian property. At about 2003Z, the LRE mishap crew (MC) gained control of the MA. The MC consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), the mishap instructor pilot, and the mishap sensor operator. After handover, the MC ran through standard checklists. In accordance with the checklists, the MP updated the emergency mission (EM) start point and attempted to send the EM to the MA. The MP elected to power down the Interim Modem Assembly (IMA) before landing, which severed the MA’s link to the MCE. At about 2025Z, the Ground Control Station lost downlink from the MA on final approach to the airfield due to interference by another MQ-9A transmitting on high power on the ground. As a result, the MC lost situational awareness of the MA. Approximately one minute after the loss of downlink, the MC terminated uplink in accordance with emergency procedures, which caused the MA to execute its EM. The MP’s attempt to send the LRE EM to the MA, as required after handover, was unsuccessful. Therefore, the MA executed the last EM received from the MCE. In accordance with the MCE EM, the MA flew away from the airfield with its downlink transmitters disabled. Despite efforts, neither the LRE nor MCE could recover link to the MA. The MCE crew did not delete any EM waypoints before handover to LRE. As a result, the MA had insufficient fuel to fly through all EM waypoints before returning to the LRE airfield. The MA crashed while executing the MCE EM two hours and 13 minutes after losing downlink. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the causes of the mishap were: (1) the unintentional downlink interference from a ground-based MQ-9A transmitting on high power, and (2) the failure to successfully send an LRE EM to the MA after handover from the MCE. The AAIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that factors that substantially contributed to the mishap were: (1) the LRE practice of disabling the IMA before landing, and (2) the MCE practice of not deleting EM waypoints before LRE handover.
BOARD F-16C+, SN 87-0242 TRUAX FIELD, WISCONSIN 7 JUNE 2011 On 7 June 2011, at 1316 local time, an F-16C+, serial number 87-0242, impacted the ground approximately 57 nautical miles northwest of Truax Field, Wisconsin. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) and Mishap Pilot (MP), assigned to the 176th Fighter Squadron, 115th Fighter Wing, Truax Field, Wisconsin, were participating in a training mission when the MA experienced a sudden loss of thrust approximately one hour and twenty-three minutes after takeoff. The MP was unable to achieve a successful engine restart. The MP ejected safely and sustained only minor scratches and bruises. The MA impacted near an unoccupied private residence and both were completely destroyed. There were no civilian injuries. The MA was valued at $25,691,100.30. The mishap mission was briefed as a continuation training basic fighter maneuver mission which involved simulated air-to-air “dogfights” between the MP and the mishap wingman, each in their own F-16 aircraft. As the mishap flight prepared to return to base, the MA experienced a sudden loss of thrust. The MP had cockpit indications of an engine failure and immediately began a turn to the nearest suitable runway while simultaneously initiating air start procedures to recover the engine. The MP jettisoned his empty external fuel tanks to reduce drag once clear of a populated area below the MA. The MP continued to attempt to recover the engine by executing air start procedures until the MA descended to the recommended minimum controlled ejection altitude. The engine never fully recovered and the MP initiated a successful ejection at 1,500 feet above the ground. The MA impacted the ground with the engine stabilized at a sub-idle RPM of approximately 50%. Distance to the nearest recovery field was beyond the MA’s glide capabilities, thus negating any chance of safely recovering the MA. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was a failure of the power take-off shaft forward main bearing assembly within the Accessory Gearbox (AGB). Additionally, the AIB President found clear and convincing evidence the failure was caused by inadequate lubrication of the bearing assembly due to a complete or partial blockage of the AGB oil supply line with debris.