kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
COLUMBUS AIR FORCE BASE, MISSISSIPPI T-38C, S/N 65-0337, 11 FEBRUARY 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS .......cccsssssscssssssssccssssssssesessssscssssessessssssssesessesssseesassssssesesssessasessessseseenes ii TABLE OF CONTENTS - iii COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATION S i SUMMARY OF FACTS tase oes well 1. AUTHORITY and PURPOSE.........cccscsscsssssssssscsssescsssssssssssssesssssssssssssessssesssessassssssesesssessesees 1 A. AUThOTity.........csccsesscsccssesscsesssscessssessessssessessessesessessesessessssessessesesseesessssessesseseesessesseseesers 1 b. Purpose wee 2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY .......ccscssssssssssssssssssssesssessssssessesssssessesssesesseseesesessseesasessssesssssessesessees 1 3. BACKGROUND ........cccssssssscsssscsssssssessscsessessssesesssesssssssssssessssssessssssssseesessssseesasssssesesssessasessees 3 a. Air Education and Training Command... wed Db. 19th Air FOrce .......ccscscsssseessseseeseesseseee wed c. 14th Flying Training Wing wd d. 14th Operations Group...............+ wd e. 14th Operations Support Squadron... wed f. 50th Flying Training Squadron... wed G. T-38A/C Aircraft.......cccccccsscscsssscsssessesssscssssssesssessssesssssessesssssssssssssesessssesssesessesessseeseseee 4 h. Dyncorp Intermational..............scscsscsssssssssssssessesscssssessesssssssessesessecsesseseesesseseesessesesseeses 5 4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS a. Mission Coordination .. b. Pre-mission and First Sortie ............cccsccssssssssssssssecsssssssesssssssssssesesessseessssseesesesssessesees 5 C. MiSSION «0... csesseeeeeceeeereee 5 d. Planning and Briefing . +6 e. Second Sortie......... +6 f. Third Sortie g. Fourth Sortie Briefing and Preflight..............sccsssssssssscsssssssssssssssesessseessseseesesesssessesees 7 h. Takeoff and Enroute. i. Arrival in East Sector of Houston Approach Airspace seeseesssssesssesseessesssssnsseessesssessosen 8 j. Ellington Sector of Houston Approach Airspace...........csssscssssssssessscssesssssseesessssseeees 9 k. Ellington Tower Airspace soee 10 1. Impact... m. Runway skid...... 18 n. Runway Departure.. o. Pilot Egress... 20 p. Aircrew Flight Euipment.. 20 G. Simulator Amallysis............ssccssssccssssesssssssssssssssscsessseessssssssecssssessesssssssseseesesessseesaseseesess 20 T. Mishap Animation............csccscsssccsssscssssscsssssssessssssssssessssssssssessesessessessesessessessesessersesees 23 5. MAINTENANCE A. Forms Documentation ...........sccccsscsssssssssssscsssssssssscsccsscsscsscsssssscssassessecssscsscssessessessssees 23 T-38C, S/N 65-0337, Aircraft Accident, 11 February 2011 iii
F-16C Mishap, Clinton, MD F-16C, T/N 87-0306 CLINTON, MD 5 APRIL 2017 On 5 April 2017, at 09:13 hours local time (L), an F-16C impacted the ground southwest of Joint Base Andrews (JBA), in Clinton, Maryland (MD). The mishap pilot (MP) safely ejected and did not sustain any injuries. The mishap aircraft (MA) tail number 87-0306 and the MP are assigned to the 113th Wing, 121st Fighter Squadron, JBA, MD. The MA, valued at $22,198,075, was destroyed. The MA’s two external fuel tanks were jettisoned prior to MP ejection and impacted private property located east of the Potomac River shoreline and approximately 1,750 feet south of National Harbor, MD. The MA impacted a wooded area 3.4 nautical miles southwest of JBA. There were no personnel injured on the ground. The area upon which the MA and external fuel tanks landed was disturbed by the respective impacts, resulting fireball (from the MA), and associated fluids and debris. The environmental clean-up cost was $856,777. The mishap occurred as part of a four aircraft F-16 formation on departure from JBA. The flight was planned as a basic surface attack training mission to be conducted at Fort Indiantown Gap (Restricted Area: R-5802), Pennsylvania. The MA was the number two aircraft in the formation. During the departure, the MA experienced an uncommanded engine acceleration, followed by a loss of thrust. The uncontrollable engine resulted in an engine core overspeed, over temperature, fire and engine failure. The distance to the nearest suitable recovery airfield was beyond MA glide capabilities, negating any chance of safely recovering the MA. The MP successfully executed a controlled ejection at 09:16:55 L, after maneuvering the disabled MA over a non-residential area. JBA first responders arrived on scene at the MP’s location at 09:26 L. The MP was evacuated by the 1st Helicopter Squadron (1 HS), which was conducting a local training mission with a flight surgeon onboard. The | HS transported the MP to JBA for further evaluation by medical personnel at Malcom Grow Medical Center. The Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of evidence the cause of this mishap was the incorrect assembly of the main engine control (MEC) differential pressure pilot valve, which was missing a required 600-degree retaining ring and the anti-rotation pin. The misassembled differential pressure pilot valve caused the MEC to malfunction and to incorrectly meter abnormally high fuel flow to the engine. The uncontrolled engine operation caused severe engine overspeed, severe engine over-temperature, and engine fire, which resulted in a catastrophic engine failure. A substantially contributing factor to the mishap was the 552d Commodities Maintenance Squadron, MEC Overhaul Shop, Oklahoma City, Air Logistics Complex, lack of an adequate procedural requirement for MEC parts accountability.
QF-4E, T/N 74-1629, HOLLOMAN AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO 7 FEBRUARY 2014 On 7 February 2014, at 16:07:22 Zulu (Z) time, a QF-4E Phantom II aircraft, tail number (T/N) 74-1629, on approach for landing, impacted the ground in the White Sands National Monument approximately 5 miles southwest of runway 04 at Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico (NM). The mishap aircraft (MA) was assigned to Detachment 1, 82d Aerial Targets Squadron (82 ATRS) and based at Holloman AFB, NM. Detachment 1, 82 ATRS reports to the 53rd Weapons Evaluation Group (53 WEG), 53rd Wing (53 WG), Tyndall AFB, Florida (FL). The MA was destroyed on impact. The total damage to Department of Defense (DoD) property was assessed to be $4,890,429. Damage to non-DoD but other government property included two road signs/posts and a small (3’x 1’) impact crater on a road; DoD paid for new signs and repaired the road. At 16:02:01Z, and approximately 15 miles from recovery, the Mishap Controller (MC) commanded automatic landing of the MA via the White Sands Integrated Target Control System (WITS) Operating Console. At 16:06:48Z, the Chase Pilot (CP) notified the MC “we’re rocking a little bit.” However, when the MC crosschecked the flight instruments on the WITS Operating Console right screen the wings appeared level. At 16:07:03Z, the MA made an aggressive left roll to approximately 70 degrees angle of bank, which caused the MA to lose altitude, turn left and then roll out wings level. At 16:07:17Z, the MC switched the MA into manual control. The MC checked the attitude indicator on the WITS Operating Console right screen and noted the MA’s pitch attitude moving downwards. The MC determined the MA was in an unusual attitude and began performing the “Unusual Attitude Recovery” emergency procedure (EP) checklist by selecting All Attitude Recovery (AAR). The MA continued to oscillate up and down after the MC selected AAR; therefore, the MC selected Automatic Takeoff (ATO). The MA did not respond so the MC completed the “Unusual Attitude Recovery” EP checklist by selecting Backup Automatic Flight Control System (BUAFCS) on the WITS Operating Console control stick followed by AAR. At 16:07:22Z, the CP observed the MA impact the ground. There were no aural tones over the controller radio frequencies during the mishap sequence indicating a loss of transmission between the MA and the WITS. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of this mishap was a brief failure of the pitch and roll attitude gyro, the instrument used to inform the MC of the MA’s orientation relative to Earth’s horizon, which sent erroneous inputs to the MA’s Automatic Flight Control Computer (AFCC). The MA subsequently responded by driving the stabilator, the aircraft component that moves the aircraft up and down, into a stall prevention mode as quickly as possible resulting in a continuous cycle of overcorrection of the MA’s pitch and an increase in pitch oscillations. This cycle continued despite the MC’s efforts to recover the MA until the MA impacted the ground.
MQ-1B, T/N 03-0111 CENTCOM AOR 18 SEPTEMBER 2012 ‘On 18 September 2012, at approximately 0926 Zulu (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number 03-0111, operated by the 20th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS) at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, crashed and was destroyed on impact in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. The 20th RS is assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech AFB, Nevada. At the time of the crash, the Mishap Crew (MC) was controlling the MRPA from Whiteman AFB. The MRPA was destroyed at an estimated loss of $4.4 million. There were no casualties, and there was no reported damage to any property at the crash site other than the MRPA itself. The MRPA took off from a forward operating base at 0102Z. Prior to the MC taking control of the MRPA, there was difficulty with the satellite data link that allows the MRPA to communicate with its crew. However, the issue was resolved by resetting the connection to the MRPA and the mission proceeded. At approximately 0919Z the primary navigation system began to diverge from the secondary navigation system by approximately .1 Nautical Mile (NM), to a maximum divergence of .25 NM. Normally, these systems record the same, or approximately the same, location for the MRPA. At 0921:53Z the MRPA satellite data link disconnected (known as a “lost link”). In response, the Mishap Pilot ran the appropriate checklist, but was unsuccessful in reestablishing a satellite link. At approximately 0926Z the MRPA impacted about 3.25 NM south-southwest from the point of “lost link.” The post mishap investigation revealed no anomalies with the Ground Control Station, MC, maintenance, or operations any time prior to the “lost link” at 0921:53Z. Prior to the “lost link,” the satellite signal strength was normal and the MRPA was responsive. .There was no evidence of negative maintenance trends or issues, and maintenance records showed no relevant - discrepancies. The MC reported no anomalies with the operation of the MRPA immediately prior to the mishap. The MC followed all established checklist procedures and executed them in a timely manner. The only known anomaly was the navigation system divergence, there was no evidence to indicate this anomaly caused the mishap. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President could not determine any cause of, or factor that substantially contributed to, this mishap.
MQ-1B Predator, T/N 98-3040 USCENTCOM AOR 8 November 2015 On 8 November 2015, at approximately 1653 Zulu time (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 98-3040, forward deployed from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, conducted a combat support mission in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). At the time of the mishap, the mishap launch and recovery element (MLRE) from the 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron operated the MRPA from a deployed location in the USCENTCOM AOR. The MRPA experienced a left tail control surface failure, departed controlled flight, and crashed en route to the intended base of landing. The estimated cost of aircraft and munitions is $5.3 million. There were no reported injuries, deaths, or personal property damages. At approximately 1638Z, the MLRE took handover of the MRPA from the mission control element. The aircraft was returning early due to an Outside Air Temperature sensor failure. The handover was uneventful. Over the next 15 minutes, the MLRE began a descent for landing and started working through appropriate checklist procedures for descent and arrival. Evidence showed that the left tail and tail insert fell off the MRPA. Consequently, the MRPA became uncontrollable. The aircraft entered an unrecoverable spin and the impact destroyed the aircraft. All indications are that the maintenance personnel correctly complied with all maintenance actions and were not a factor to this mishap. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the failure of the left tail clamp and/or left tail clamp bolts. The failure resulted in the airborne loss of the left tail insert and attached left tail. The loss of the left tail insert and the attached left tail surface resulted in an unrecoverable departure from controlled flight.
MQ-1B Predator, T/N 05-3136 CENTCOM AOR 17 October 2015 On 17 October 2015, at approximately 0300 hours zulu (Z), while conducting a combat support mission in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator aircraft, tail number 05-3136, forward deployed from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, experienced electronic flight control component failure resulting in loss of aircraft control. The MRPA impacted the ground and was destroyed. At the time of the mishap, the MRPA was operated by a mission control element (MCE) from the 20th Attack Squadron (ATKS), Whiteman AFB, Missouri. The estimated cost of aircraft and munition damage is $5.2 million. There were no injuries or damage to other government or private property. While transiting to the operations area, the MP identified a layer of clouds directly ahead and above the MRPA’s altitude as haze and flew the MRPA into an area of rapidly changing weather undergoing the beginning stages of thunderstorm development. Lightning was present in the vicinity of the MRPA. The MQ-1B is not equipped with lightning protection, thus the effects of lightning induced high voltage throughout the wiring in the MRPA’s wings, damaging the left and right wing control modules. With these components inoperative, and still flying under the base of the developing thunderstorm, the MRPA was unable to maintain controlled flight and impacted the ground. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap was a direct or proximity lightning strike inducing electronic flight control module failure resulting in loss of aircraft control. The AAIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that a factor substantially contributing to the mishap was the Mishap Pilot’s (MP) misidentification of adverse weather. The MP misidentified a layer of clouds directly ahead and above the MRPA’s altitude as haze and continued flight toward the area of developing weather. As the MRPA flew under the cloud layer, the MP did not notice further indications of developing weather, such as increasing cloud cover, virga (precipitation that evaporates before reaching the ground) or lightning, and continued flight below the base of the developing thunderstorm, where the MRPA was subsequently affected by lightning.
MQ-9A, T/N 11-4144 CENTCOM AOR 12 DECEMBER 2014 On 12 December 2014, at approximately 1737 hours Zulu (Z), an MQ-9A remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), tail number 11-4144, forward deployed to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) from the 432d Wing, Creech AFB, Nevada, experienced a starter-generator failure while conducting an Air Tasking Order mission. Subsequent backup battery depletion en route to the emergency launch-and-recovery element (LRE) precluded any attempt to safely recover the aircraft and the mishap RPA (MRPA) was ditched into nearby mountainous terrain. At the time of the starter-generator failure, the MRPA was being controlled by a mission control element (MCE) operating from the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. There were no injuries or damage to other government or private property. Estimated cost of aircraft, onboard equipment and munitions damage is $14.1 million. The wreckage was not recovered. The MMCE had assumed control of the MRPA from the LRE, performed system checks, and a conducted a short period of weapons training, when the MRPA experienced a short loss of satellite return link. Upon reestablishing link, the mishap pilot (MP) noticed a “Battery Sourcing Current” warning, coupled with voltage readings indicating the starter-generator had failed. The mishap MCE performed appropriate emergency checklists, turned off non-essential aircraft systems to conserve battery power, and programmed a route of flight to the emergency LRE before turning off the satellite link. When the emergency LRE established uplink and gained control of the MRPA, battery voltage was too low to attempt a safe recovery to the airfield. Supervision directed the emergency LRE to ditch the MRPA in the mountains. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined, by a preponderance of evidence, the cause of the mishap was a failure of the starter-generator. As a direct result of the starter-generator failure, backup battery power depleted to the point where the emergency LRE could not safely recover the aircraft and the MRPA was ditched into nearby mountainous terrain. The exact cause of the starter-generator failure was unable to be determined without recovered wreckage. The AAIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence, two factors substantially contributed to this mishap: 1) a delay in uploading the applicable software version at the emergency LRE; and 2) not pre-configuring the landing gear for recovery prior to turning off the satellite link.
TARS, T/N 4220, Marfa, Texas 14 February 2012 The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is a program managed by Air Combat Command’s Acquisition Management and Integration Center. ITT Exelis is the contractor responsible for operating and maintaining the Marfa TARS, which is manned solely by ITT personnel. The mishap aerostat (MA) was launched on 14 Feb 12 from the Marfa TARS Site, Texas at 0421 Zulu (Z) (2321 local time), Flight #535, and remained aloft until recovery operations that culminated in the mishap. At 2115Z the Mishap Flight Director 1 (MFD 1) received an erroneous surface wind warning cancellation from the Mishap Telemetry and Control 1 (MT&C 1). This was not a cancellation, but an upgrade from a watch to a warning. The MFD 1 had knowledge of, and was briefed, on the upper level turbulence and pending high surface level winds from an electronic briefing received at 2300Z. At 2344Z, upper level winds and turbulence caused the MFD | to begin an adjustment. At 2350Z this adjustment became a recovery. The Mishap Flight Crew 1/2 (MFC 1,2) that attempted recovery was a combined team of both the outgoing “B” crew and the incoming “A” crew. The joint MFC began recovery of the MA during shift changeover. At 0016:34Z the MA was hit by 55.2 knots (kts) of wind at 5720’MSL. The surface winds at this time were SSW at 22 kts. Due to the severe winds on the MA the Mishap Winch Operator 1 (MWO 1) made the decision to rapidly outhaul the MA. During this outhaul the MA began the pitch-over which culminated with impact into the ground at 0017:13Z. The MA ruptured and completely destroyed the airframe and associated equipment. The total loss and damage was estimated at $8,819,488.00. There were no injuries or significant damage to private property. Less than | gallon of diesel fuel spilled and was immediately cleaned up and disposed of at a cost of $147.00. The AIB President found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was a delayed decision to recover the MA. Additionally, the AIB president found by a preponderance of the evidence, that the lack of training for the flight directors on weather data interpretation and their lack of training on weather equipment use, as well as the erroneous surface wind warning cancellation were significant contributing factors to the mishap.
MQ-9A, T/N 08-4051 UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 24 JUNE 2020 On 24 June 2020, at 0933 Zulu time (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-9A, tail number (T/N) 08-4051, crashed in an undisclosed location within the United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Assigned to the 162d Wing, Arizona Air National Guard, the MA was operated by the 214th Attack Squadron Mission Control Element (MCE) located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, at the time of the mishap. The location of the crashed MA was confirmed, but the wreckage was not recovered. The loss of Government Property was valued at $11,290,000. There was no reported damage to civilian property, injuries, or fatalities. At approximately 0640Z, the Mishap Ground Control Station (MGCS) started to display warnings that the fuel level in the header tank was low. The Mishap Pilot (MP) and Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO) began to accomplish procedures to clear this fault. Soon thereafter, the MP noted through fuel calculations that the measured fuel was well short of expected levels. The MP enlisted the assistance of the Mishap Mission Crew Commander (MMCC) to help diagnose the problem. As the MP and MMCC worked the problem, the MSO used the primary camera to visually sweep the MA. During that sweep, the MSO found that the MA was severely leaking fuel from the fuselage. At 0723Z, the crew started to return to base at maximum airspeed. Without knowing exactly where in the fuel system the leak was occurring, the MP concluded that if the leak was not affecting the aft tank and header tank, then a safe recovery was theoretically possible. After further analysis, the crew realized that the fuel leak was catastrophic. The MP and MMCC, coordinating with Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Liaison Officer (RPA LNO), started to plan to crash the aircraft. The CAOC directed MMCC and MP to crash the aircraft, and to do so in a way that would minimize chances of a successful recovery effort. Fuel exhausted at 0914Z. The MP then controlled the glide of the aircraft to optimize the impact point. As the aircraft lost altitude, the MP increased the airspeed of the MA through the crash, which occurred at 0933Z. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was a fuel leak from the Forward Electric Fuel Heater that caused fuel exhaustion before the aircraft could be safely returned to the Launch and Recovery Element. Further, the AAIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each of the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap; (1) Delinquent Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) to correct a known MQ-9 deficiency (2) the design of the fuel leak detection system, and (3) lack of guidance and tolerances for the MQ-9 fuel system.