MQ-1B, T/N 02-3098 Creech AFB, Nevada 04 April 2014 On 04 April 2014, at approximately 2322 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B, tail number 02-3098, assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), impacted the runway surface and was substantially damaged during a launch and recovery (LR) training flight at Creech AFB, NV. General Atomics- Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), the MQ-1B manufacturer, determined upon initial inspection that some MRPA systems are repairable. Total loss to the United States (US) Government is up to $4,500,000, pending repairs. There were no injuries or damage to other government (US or foreign) or civilian property. The mishap crew (MC) consisted of a student pilot, referred to as the mishap upgrading pilot (MUP), a student sensor operator, referred to as the mishap upgrading sensor operator (MUSO), the mishap instructor pilot (MIP), and the mishap instructor sensor operator (MISO). The MUP controlled the MRPA during the mishap. The MUP and MUSO were current and qualified MQ- 1B mission aircrew and were training for LR operations. The mishap sortie was their fourth LR training flight. During the MC’s ninth practice landing of the mishap training flight, the MRPA experienced low-level wind shear (LLWS) during a critical phase of the landing. At the same time, the MUP adjusted power to the minimum setting and raised the nose slightly, as is customary when landing. LLWS occurs when the wind speed and direction changes so quickly that the aircraft loses lift. Had the wind not shifted so rapidly, the MRPA would have most likely touched down for a normal landing. As the MUP commanded full throttle in response to the wind shear, the MRPA bounced off the runway, forcing the MRPA’s nose upward. Air Force technical order guidance for the MQ-1B in such a scenario directs the pilot to command a nose high flight path and hold that command steady. Furthermore, the pilot should push the throttle to maximum power. The MUP commanded maximum power immediately, but failed to hold a positive pitch, or nose high flight path, to arrest the pitch oscillations. Had the MUP followed this procedure correctly, it is highly likely that the aircraft would have recovered to normal flight. The MUP, instead, attempted to correct the MRPA back to level flight. The MUP overcorrected and the MRPA bounced a second time. The MUP overcorrected again, essentially “chasing” the MRPA’s oscillating pitch, or nose position up and down. This sequence continued and increased in intensity for four bounces, resulting in a pilot induced oscillation (PIO). With the landing gear sheared off by the fifth and final impact, the MRPA rotated and skidded to a stop on the runway with its nose facing back the way it had come, suffering significant damage. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President determined, by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was a combination of low-level wind shear leading to a bounced landing, and the MUP’s failure to perform the Air Force technical order critical action procedure correctly to avoid a PIO. Furthermore, the Board President determined by a preponderance of evidence that the MUP’s lack of training, enhanced by negative transfer from previous experiences, substantially contributed to the mishap.