kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
MQ-9, T/N 09-004065 Douglas County, Nevada 5 December 2012 On 5 December 2012, at approximately 03:10:30 Zulu time (Z) (19:10:30 Pacific Standard Time), MQ-9 Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft, tail number (T/N) 09-004065, crashed in an unpopulated area three miles northeast of Mount Irish, Douglas County, Nevada (NV), following a stall induced by an unrecognized reverse thrust condition that caused the aircraft to impact the ground after link to the aircraft was lost. The Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (MRPA), one inert Guided Bomb Unit (GBU-38), a Hellfire training missile, a Mission Kit, and one M299 missile rail were destroyed. The total damage to United States government property was assessed at $9,646,088. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to other property. The MRPA was an asset of the 26 Weapons Squadron (26 WPS), 57th Wing (57 WG), Nellis AFB. The Mission Control Element (MCE) Mishap Preflight Pilot (MMPP) and MCE Mishap Pilot (MMP) were temporarily assigned to the 26 WPS. The MCE Mishap Instructor Pilot (MMIP) was assigned to the United States Air Force Weapons School. The MCE Mishap Sensor Operator (MMSO) was assigned to the 26 WPS. The MCE Ground Control Station (GCS) was maintained by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The mishap sortie was part of the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment tactical scenario of the Weapons School Mission Employment phase. During the transit to the range, the MMP used a series of autopilot modes to control the aircraft. When MMP turned off the altitude hold mode of the autopilot and had the throttle positioned aft of full forward, a misconfigured throttle commanded the aircraft engine to produce reverse thrust. This specific condition went unrecognized by the MMP. Returning to base early for a perceived engine issue, the MMP allowed the aircraft to decelerate below stall speed. The MRPA stalled in flight and link was lost. Less than one minute later, the MRPA impacted the ground in an unpopulated area. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) president found by clear and convincing evidence that the causes of the mishap were 1) the Pilot/Sensor Operator station 1 (PSO1) (pilot seat) throttle quadrant settings of the controlling Ground Control Station (GCS) were improperly configured during the preflight reconfiguration from MQ-1 to MQ-9 operations prior to sortie execution, 2) this throttle anomaly went unrecognized because the MMP did not execute the Rack Configuration and Presets checklists on his control rack prior to gaining control of the MRPA, and 3) the MMP stalled the MRPA due to an unrecognized, commanded reverse thrust condition that existed whenever the pilot’s throttle was at any position except full forward. Additionally, the AAIB found by a preponderance of evidence that MMPP failed to execute his GCS preflight in accordance with technical order procedures substantially contributing to the mishap.
M-28, T/N 08-0319 VSP WALAN RABAT, AFGHANISTAN 18 DECEMBER 2011 At 0939 hours Zulu time on 18 December 2011, an M-28, Tail Number 08-0319, departed Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan on a mission to pick up four passengers at Qalat, Afghanistan, transport them to Walan Rabat short takeoff and landing zone, transport two additional personnel from Walan Rabat back to Qalat, then return to Kandahar Air Base. The mishap aircraft and crew were assigned or attached to the 318th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, and were deployed to the 318th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron at Kandahar Air Base, Afghanistan. After an uneventful stop at Qalat to onload four passengers and their bags, the mishap crew flew a 20-minute leg to Walan Rabat. Surface winds at Walan Rabat were 190 degrees at 14 knots gusting to 17 knots, 30 degrees off a direct tailwind for runway 34. Because the landing zone has a three percent upslope for runway 34, and a 1,500-foot mountain exists 1’4 miles to the north, the pilot elected to land with a tailwind on runway 34, the preferred landing direction. Walan Rabat Landing Zone is a 1,756-foot long, 31-foot wide, semi-prepared dirt strip with poorly defined boundaries. The landing zone was marked with AMP-3 markings, commonly called a “box-and-one” with colored panels. The mishap pilot consulted a wind component chart and incorrectly calculated the tailwind component, mistakenly believing it was within the allowable limit for landing the M-28. The pilot flew a shallow 2'4-3 degree approach due to the upsloping landing zone. At approximately 1,000 feet short of the landing zone, the mishap pilot visually acquired the AMP-3 markings and landed the mishap aircraft at 1032 zulu. After a firmer than normal landing, the aircraft veered to the right and departed the prepared surface. The nose gear encountered uneven terrain and collapsed, causing the mishap aircraft to flip tail- over-nose. The mishap crew and passengers then egressed the aircraft through the copilot’s window. There were no serious injuries to crew or passengers. The mishap aircraft, which was valued at approximately $12,300,000 was destroyed. There were no civilian casualties. The AIB president found no clear and convincing evidence of the primary cause of the accident. He determined by a preponderance of evidence that the Landing Zone Condition, Cross- Monitoring Performance, Task/Mission-in-Progress Re-planning, Landing with an Excessive Tailwind, and Aircraft Engine Anomalies substantially contributed to the mishap, ultimately causing the mishap aircraft to veer off the prepared surface into rough terrain, resulting in the collapse of the nose landing gear and destruction of the aircraft.
MQ-1B PREDATOR, 07-003190 AFGHANISTAN 14 FEBRUARY 2012 On 14 February 2012 at 2024Z, the Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (€MRPA) MQ-1B Predator, T/N 07-003190,operated by crews from the18th Reconnaissance Squadron and 62nd Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, experienced a dual alternator failure, just over four hours into an operational sortie and 32 nautical miles (NM) from the deployed airfield. Upon noticing indications of the dual alternator failure, the Mishap Mission Control Element (MMCE) crew turned the MRPA back toward the deployed airfield and began to execute the Dual Alternator Failure checklist. The MMCE crew started communication with the Mishap Launch and Recovery Element (MLRE), and then coordinated a descent from the operational altitude to 8,000 feet (ft) above mean sea level (MSL) with the air traffic control (ATC) agency. At 2040Z, the MLRE gained control of the MRPA about 3.5 NM from the airfield using a Line- of-Sight data link. At this time, the MLRE ground control station settings caused all previously switched-off systems to turn back on, increasing current draw on the MPRA’s batteries. At 2043Z the MLRE crew began the Dual Alternator Failure checklist. The Launch and Recovery Element Mishap Pilot (LRE MP) descended the MRPA directly over the airfield to enter the traffic pattern for landing through High Key - a position above the approach end of the runway that allows for an engine-out spiraling glide down to landing. At 2049Z, with the MRPA at 4,190 ft MSL (approximately 2,370 ft above ground level [AGL)) just short of the approach end of the runway, the MLRE lost control of the aircraft due to a complete loss of the MRPA’s electrical power. The MRPA impacted approximately 1.1 NM northeast of the approach end of Runway 31 in a farm field. No injuries or deaths resulted from the crash. Military and civilian property damages (including the MRPA, crop damage, and minor damage to a farm building) as a result of the crash totaled $3,960,209.91. The board president found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the causes of the mishap were a dual alternator failure followed by the complete loss of aircraft electrical power, and the LRE MP’s failure to adequately assess the nature of the emergency and fully execute proper procedures listed in the published flight manual. Upon gaining control of the MRPA, the LRE MP failed to fully accomplish the Dual Alternator Failure checklist and execute appropriate Forced Landing procedures. The LRE MP failed to execute appropriate electrical load-shedding measures and failed to land the MRPA as soon as possible, and instead displayed poor judgment by electing to maneuver the MRPA over the airfield with the intention of reaching High Key and executing an engine-out emergency landing. The board president also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Mishap LRE (MLRE) crew’s poor crew coordination while executing checklists and their channelized attention on a landing gear warning indication, substantially contributed to the mishap.
F-15C, T/N 86-0176 ROYAL AIR FORCE LAKENHEATH, UNITED KINGDOM 15 JUNE 2020 At 0827 zulu time (Z) (0927 local time (L)) on 15 June 2020, an F-15C, tail number (T/N) 86-0176, from the 493rd Fighter Squadron (493 FS), Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath, United Kingdom (UK), crashed in the North Sea, 124 nautical miles (NM) northeast of RAF Lakenheath during a local combat training flight. The mishap aircraft (MA) was completely destroyed. The mishap pilot (MP), assigned to the 493 FS, was fatally injured. The weather in the airspace was reported to have multiple cloud layers up to 25,000 feet (ft) and thus the mishap sortie (MS) was conducted using Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) Rules during the engagements, if IMC would be encountered. During an air-to-air training engagement, the MP was flying east at 20,300ft and was directed by his mishap element lead (MEL) to execute a hard right turn back toward the west and look for an exercise adversary aircraft (AA) at a lower altitude. The MP made a descending right turn toward the west, used his on-board radar to lock onto the AA (headed eastbound at 5,000ft less than 20 nautical miles (NM) away) and executed a simulated missile shot against the AA. The MP stabilized on approximately a westbound heading and continued his descent to 12,000ft at 507 knots true airspeed (KTAS). The MP made a radio transmission of his simulated missile kill of the AA. The MP received a “P;, miss” (Probability of Kill: Miss) radio transmission from the “Blue Air” Range Training Officer (RTO1), so the MP continued maneuvering to engage the AA which was then 5.5 NM southwest of the MP’s position. The MP entered a descending left turn through IMC toward the south, lowering the MA pitch attitude to 42° low and varying from 21° to 107° of left bank angle. The MP sustained 0.3 to 3.8 gravitational (G) forces throughout the maneuver and accelerated to 579 KTAS, with a maximum vertical velocity of 38,800ft per minute descent. The MP breached the briefed training floor of 4,000ft and at approximately 1,000ft, the MP maneuvered the MA to nearly wings-level and pulled 8.2 G-forces in an apparent attempt to recover the MA above the water. The MA impacted the water at 10° pitch low, 4° of left bank and 566 KTAS. The MP did not eject from the MA. The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MP’s fixation on his intercept of the AA and failure to execute cockpit instrument visual scans when the MP encountered IMC. Reduced visibility and lack of a discernible horizon for the MP resulted in spatial disorientation. The inability of the MP to accurately sense the pitch attitude of the MA due to spatial disorientation substantially contributed to the MA’s undesirable low pitch attitude, rapidly descending altitude, and the resulting mishap.
United States Air Force Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board Report MQ-9A, T/N 11-4129 AFGHANISTAN 18 MAY 2015 On 18 May 2015, at approximately 1159 hours zulu time (z), an MQ-9A, tail number 11-4129, assigned to the 27th Special Operations Wing at Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), and deployed to Kandahar International Airport, crashed in a remote area of Afghanistan after the aircraft was inadvertently flown into a thunderstorm. While in the thunderstorm, at 1155z the mishap aircraft (MA) stopped responding to control inputs from the mishap mission control element (MMCE). The MA then took a sharp descending left turn and continued to descend rapidly until approximately 5,000 feet mean sea level, at which time all connection between the MMCE and the MA was lost. The MA and its payload of four missiles crashed in a remote area in Afghanistan and consequently destroyed. The value of the estimated total loss was $12,911,715. There were no fatalities and no damage to private property. A launch and recovery element (LRE) at Kandahar International Airport launched the MA at 0006z. Shortly after an uneventful take-off, the LRE transferred control of the MA to the mission control element (MCE) at Hurlburt Field, FL under the 2d Special Operations Squadron. The weather at that time was mostly clear in the area where the aircraft would operate, with some scattered storms farther to the northeast. For nearly 10 hours of uninterrupted flight time, four MCE crews controlled the MA. None of the first four MCE crews noticed any anomalies with the aircraft. There were some scattered clouds, but the weather was not a significant obstacle for the first four crews. At 1000z, the MMCE crew took control of the aircraft and at 1115z directed the aircraft to a new area of operations. Enroute to the new area of operations, cumulus clouds were rapidly forming in the assigned area. Once in the assigned location, the MMCE crew navigated to avoid the developing thunderstorms. At approximately 1144z, the MA began to encounter significant turbulence, icing conditions and obstructed vision as they inadvertently entered a cloud concealing substantial inner cloud lightning energy. At approximately 1155z, the MA lost connection with the MMCE and stopped responding to control inputs by the mishap pilot (MP). The aircraft then took a sharp descending left turn and displayed numerous and significant warning messages to the MMCE until 1159z, when all connectivity from the MMCE to the MA was lost. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was a direct or near lightning strike to the MA, resulting in multiple aircraft system failures and loss of aircraft controllability.
Class A Mishap, Ramstein Air Base, Germany C-130J-30, T/N 11-5736 RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, GERMANY 23 APRIL 2020 On 23 April 2020, at approximately 17:24:22 hours local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), C-130J-30, tail number (T/N) 11-5736, assigned to the 37th Airlift Squadron, 86th Airlift Wing, Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany, conducted a routine periodic evaluation flight for Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1). The Mishap Crew (MC) flew a maximum effort (assault) landing at Ramstein AB and experienced a hard landing with a vertical acceleration load factor (g-load) exceedance value of 3.62 times the force of gravity (g) and a landing sink rate of 834 feet per minute (FPM) exceeding the mishap aircraft’s maximum allowable landing limits of 540 FPM and g-load of 2.0g. Immediately upon touchdown, the MC executed a go-around and coordinated with Air Traffic Control for a visual approach, full-stop landing. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) landed safely at 17:37:23L. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to civilian property. The MA landing g- load exceedance resulted in significant damage to the center wing, both outer wings, left and right main landing gear assemblies, and engines, to include mounting structures. The estimated damages are $20,917,089. The MC was scheduled to fly in a formation of three C-130J’s planning to conduct two training routes. The primary training objective for the local sortie was to complete the MP1’s evaluation. The MC planned to takeoff early as a single-ship, conduct a maximum effort takeoff followed by a maximum effort landing using the painted landing zone marked on the runway (requirement for MP1’s evaluation), full-stop, and then rejoin the formation in order to complete the remainder of the evaluation requirements in the formation. Preflight, engine start, taxi and the Ramstein AB visual traffic pattern procedures were executed within good flying standards and were procedurally correct. The mishap occurred during the maximum effort landing. The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of this mishap was MP 1’s early engine power reduction (power pull), beginning at 70 feet above ground level (AGL) and fully flight idle at 45 feet AGL. In addition, the board president found, by the preponderance of evidence, that MP1 and Mishap Pilot 2’s failure to identify the excessive sink rate and their failure to arrest the excessive sink rate or go-around in a timely manner were substantially contributing factors that resulted in the MA exceeding the C-130J-30 g-load and sink rate landing limits.
MQ-1B, 07-3249, Republic of Djibouti 17 May 2011 On 17 May 2011, at approximately 0217L, an MQ-1B, Tail Number (T/N) 07-3249, deployed from the 49 Wing (WG) at Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), NM impacted the terrain during approach and landing in Djibouti. The mishap crew (MC), deployed from the 432 WG, Creech AFB, NV, were recovering the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) on an early return from an operational mission in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). The MRPA returned early due to a slow oil leak. The mishap pilot (MP) attempted to maneuver the MPRA to avoid clouds on the arrival and intercepted final approach course and glidepath. However, low clouds and high humidity in the Djibouti local area obscured both infrared sensors used by the crew to visually identify the runway environment at night. Additionally, inaccuracies in the LN100G Inertial Navigation System (INS)/global positioning system (GPS) altitude resulted in a commanded glidepath approximately 420 feet below the correct glidepath. On the approach to Djibouti from the west, the terrain slopes from approximately 50 feet above mean sea level (MSL) at the touchdown zone upwards to 300 feet above MSL at four nautical mile (NM) from the end of the runway on final approach. The MP initiated a go-around at approximately 20 feet above ground level (AGL) at 2.4 NM on final approach, but was too late to avoid impact. The MRPA and one Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM)-114 Hellfire missile onboard were destroyed on impact at a cost of $2,983,766. There was no other government or private property damage or injuries to civilians on the ground. After a careful and complete investigation of this mishap, the AIB president found by clear and convincing evidence the following two causes of this mishap. First, inaccurate LN100G INS/GPS altitudes resulted in dangerously low glidepath indications; and second, the MC failed to recognize and correct the dangerous situation in time to avoid impact with the terrain. Additionally, the AIB president found from a preponderance of the evidence that low clouds and high humidity in the Djibouti local area and MP deviation from AFI 11-202, Volume 3, ACC SUP directed minimum approach altitudes significantly contributed to this accident.
F-35A, T/N 12-5052 MOUNTAIN HOME AIR FORCE BASE, IDAHO 23 SEPTEMBER 2016 On 23 September 2016, at approximately 0852 hours local time, the mishap aircraft (MA), an F- 35A, tail number 12-5052, assigned to the 61st Fighter Squadron, 56th Fighter Wing, Luke Air Force Base (AFB), AZ, but temporarily stationed at Mountain Home AFB, ID, experienced an uncontained engine fire during engine start. The MA aborted the start and the Mishap Pilot (MP) safely egressed the still burning aircraft. Maintenance crew members responded and extinguished the fire. The aft (rear) two thirds of the MA sustained significant fire damage. While total costs as a result of this mishap have yet to be determined, damages to the MA are estimated to be in excess of $17,000,000. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the tailwind present during engine start. The tailwind forced hot air into the inlet of the Integrated Power Pack, which led to a series of events resulting in insufficient torque applied to the MA engine during start, and thus the engine rotation speed slowed. At the same time, fuel continued to be supplied to the engine at an increasing rate which enabled an uncontained engine fire. The fire came out the engine exhaust and was carried along the outer surfaces of the MA by the tailwind, causing significant damage. The fire was extinguished approximately twenty seconds after the initial visual indications of a fire.
F-16C, T/N 85-1413 NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NEVADA 28 JUNE 2011 On 28 June 2011, at 1716 local time, an F-16C aircraft, tail number (T/N) 85-1413, impacted the ground approximately 95 miles north of Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), while participating in a training mission. The mishap pilot (MP) was killed. The MP was assigned to the 53rd Wing out of Eglin AFB, but was based at Nellis AFB with the 422d Test & Evaluation Squadron (TES). The mishap aircraft (MA) belonged to the 57th Wing at Nellis AFB. The MP was flying a basic fighter maneuver (BFM) training mission with a mishap wingman (MW) in a second F-16C. The MW is assigned to the United States Air Force Warfare Center, but flies missions with the 422 TES. The MA was completely destroyed upon impact, with a loss valued at $21,298,607. The MA crashed in an unpopulated Bureau of Land Management wilderness area causing incidental damage to a small area of vegetation but no damage to property. The primary purpose of this mission was to provide a final proficiency training sortie for the MP prior to his start at USAF Weapons Instructor Course (WIC), which was to begin the following week. The MP was focused on WIC preparation and needed one more sortie to complete the attendance prerequisites. The mishap occurred during F-16 simulated air-to-air combat engagements between the MP and MW. The training engagements subjected the pilots to high levels of sustained gravitational forces (G forces, or Gs) of up to 9 Gs, often at high G onset rates (greater than 6 Gs per second). Twenty-six minutes into the mission, during a planned high-speed turning maneuver likely involving 8 or more Gs, the MA stopped maneuvering and began a steep descending flight path consistent with an aircraft no longer being controlled by the pilot. The MA impacted the ground. There was no evidence of an attempt by the MP to eject or to maneuver the MA prior to impact. The AJB President found clear and convincing evidence to conclude the cause of the mishap was a G-Induced Loss of Consciousness (G-LOC) experienced by the MP during the high G maneuver. The AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the MP did not adequately perform an anti-G straining maneuver (AGSM) which led to the G-LOC. A preponderance of evidence indicates the MP had excessive motivation to succeed during his fourth engagement and had slight fatigue, which resulted in the MP not adequately performing an AGSM. Furthermore, the MA was in a clean configuration (minimal external stores) that would have enabled a higher G onset rate than what the MP was used to flying. The AIB President found no evidence the MP’s physical or mental condition, or Operations’ supervision and training contributed to the accident. Additionally, a thorough review of maintenance procedures revealed no problems or adverse trends which could have contributed to the accident.