kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
MQ-1B, T/N 04-3125 CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI 21 FEB 12 On 21 Feb 2012 at 0508 GMT, a crew assigned to the 60th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti uneventfully launched the Mishap Aircraft (MA), a MQ- 1B, tail number 04-3125. The MA was handed to the Mission Control element (MCE) from the 3rd Special Operations Squadron at Cannon AFB, NM. Beginning at approximately 0700 GMT the aircraft experienced numerous engine anomalies while on target in support of mission operations. At approximately 0855 GMT, the MP directed the MA back to the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) due to the MA inability to hold mission altitude and a decreasing oil level trend. At 1010 GMT, the MA engine failed due to low oil quantity and at 1025 GMT, the MA impacted the water 90 miles from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti and was destroyed on impact. The MA structure and components were destroyed on impact and no significant components were recovered from the ocean site. There were no injuries and there were no damages to other government or private property. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was the failure of the turbocharger bearing which resulted in the eventual engine failure and the destruction of the MA. Initially, the turbo charger wastegate was working above expected levels based on altitude and requested power settings. It performed its function of providing additional thrust increasing air pressure in the combustion chamber above 10,000 ft. However, as the aircraft crossed 10,000 ft, the wastegate increased turbocharger output erratically and remained erratic after reaching cruising altitude until it reached 100%. These events are consistent with the turbocharger bearing failure. The mission cruising altitude for this mission was 18,000 MSL. After approximately three hours of flight, the aircraft began a gradual uncommanded descent. This is consistent with the turbocharger not producing the additional boost needed to maintain level flight at altitudes greater than 10,000 ft for airspeed commanded. As the turbocharger wastegate attempted to overcome increased friction from the bearing failure, the degraded bearing damaged the turbocharger oil seal which caused oil to leak the into the intake manifold closest to #2 engine cylinder; causing poor combustion, decreased engine power and corresponding lowered Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT). Available evidence indicates the engine oil loss was caused by the turbo charger bearing failure. The MA was enroute to the LRE location when the engine failed. Upon determining the MA would not reach the LRE location, the MP and MSO sought and received guidance from the supported unit, directing a “hard-ditch” or an increased rate of descent to ensure destruction upon impact with the water. At 1025 GMT, the MA and one AGM-114P Hellfire missile were destroyed upon impact and no significant parts were recovered. The estimated government loss is valued at $4.4M. MQ-1B, T/N 04-3125, 21 Feb 12 i
MC-12W, T/N 09-0676 110 NM NORTHEAST OF KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN 27 APRIL 2013 On 27 April 2013, at approximately 1243 local time (L) in Afghanistan, an MC-12W, tail number 09-0676 impacted terrain 110 nautical miles northeast of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) while on a combat intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. The four crewmembers on board were the Mishap Mission Commander (MMC), Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO), and Mishap Tactical Systems Operator (MTSO). The four airmen were killed instantly on impact and the Mishap Aircraft (MA), valued at $19.8 million, was destroyed. The crew and MA were deployed to the 361st Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, 451st Air Expeditionary Wing, KAF, Afghanistan. The four aircrew were highly respected airmen and combat veterans with 4,845 combat flying hours and 836 combat sorties between them. The MMC, who had 1,749 flying hours, was assigned to Scott Air Force Base (AFB), Illinois as an aircraft commander in the KC-135, and was on temporary duty with the MC-12W program. The MP, who had 2,434 flying hours, was newly assigned to Beale AFB, California as a new MC-12W mission commander and had extensive combat experience in the EC-130H from his previous assignment. The MSO, who had 3,147 flying hours, was assigned to Tinker AFB, Oklahoma as an instructor air surveillance technician in the E-3, and was on temporary duty with the MC-12W program. The MTSO, who had 1,494 flying hours, was assigned to Beale AFB, California and had extensive combat experience in the MC-12W and other tactical ISR aircraft. The MA, callsign Independence 08, departed KAF at 1157L and entered orbit at 1229L. The MA encountered deteriorating weather in the orbit and was climbing from 20,000 to 23,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) at 1241L to fly above the weather when the mishap occurred. In addition, the crew had found an enemy combatant and was in the process of adjusting their orbit to enhance mission success. The board president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was a stall due to insufficient airspeed, while in a climbing left turn, which developed into a left spin followed quickly by a left spiral, from which the crew was unable to recover. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of evidence, each of the following three factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) orbit weather that impeded visibility and masked the horizon; (2) pilot inexperience in the MC-12W; and (3) known MC-12W program risks associated with sustaining required combat capability in theater. The MC-12W program accepted increased risk with mitigation measures and enabled the capture or killing of over 700 high value enemy combatants, while improving over-watch surveillance for coalition ground forces.
MQ-1B, T/N 09-3260 MEDITERRANEAN SEA 17 JANUARY 2014 On 17 January 2014, at approximately 1132 Zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), a MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 09-3260, operated by the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (18 RS), 432d Wing (432 WG), Creech Air Force Base (AFB), made a forced landing in the Mediterranean Sea. There were no reported injuries/deaths or reported non-governmental property damage. The loss to the United States is $4,591,058.55, and includes the MRPA, special mission equipment and associated internal components. During preflight checks while accomplishing a full power engine run, the launch and recovery element (LRE) crew noticed fluid draining at the rear of the aircraft. The crew chief conducted a close-up inspection and determined the liquid to be water that collected under the engine intake. The LRE and crew chief discussed the issue and determined there were no engine abnormalities precluding departure. Therefore, the LRE taxied and launched the MRPA from the forward operating location, taking off at 2358Z on 16 January 2014. The mission was uneventful for over 10 hours and three crew changes, with the mishap crew (MC) taking control of the MRPA at 0800Z on 17 January 2014. Thereafter, at 1040Z, with the MRPA at an altitude of 14,000 feet mean sea level, the MC noticed sudden abnormal engine temperatures indicative of a coolant failure, accompanied by a significant loss of thrust and an uncommanded descent. The MC began an immediate emergency divert to the closest suitable airfield approximately 400 miles away and began troubleshooting. The MC noticed the MRPA’s aircraft digital control system (ADCS) had initiated an increase in fuel flow, in accordance with the engine cold enrichment software. The ADSC incorrectly interpreted the abnormal engine temperature as a ground cold- start situation, and the enriched fuel-to-air mixture reduced thrust enough to prevent sustained flight. After running the applicable emergency checklists multiple times and consulting with the on-duty instructor pilot in the ground control station, the MC realized the MRPA could not make it to the divert airfield within the existing altitude and distant constraints, and prepared the MRPA for a forced landing in the water, which occurred at 1132Z. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was a loss of coolant due to an indeterminate failure in the coolant system. The Board President also found by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantially contributing factor was the MRPA’s ADCS incorrectly enriching the fuel-to-air mixture, negating the MC’s attempts to reduce fuel flow and improve engine performance. The Board President developed his opinion by analyzing factual data from the flight data logs, reviewing engineering analysis from the General Atomics report, MRPA maintenance records, Air Force Technical Orders, witness testimonies, consultation with maintenance and other subject matter experts, and physical examination of MQ-1B engines and aircraft systems.
F-16CM, T/N 92-3883 MISAWA AIR BASE, JAPAN 20 FEBRUARY 2018 On 20 February 2018, at 0838L, an F-16CM, tail number (T/N) 92-3883, during departure at Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan, experienced an engine fire on takeoff during a routine training sortie, necessitating an immediate landing back at Misawa AB. The mishap aircraft (MA) was based at Misawa AB, Japan, and assigned to the 13th Fighter Squadron, of the 35th Fighter Wing. The MA sustained engine damage and loss of external fuel tanks with an estimated governmental loss of $987,545.57. The mishap flight (MF) consisted of two F-16CM aircraft. The mishap flight’s pre-flight, start, and taxi were uneventful until the departure phase of flight. The mishap pilot (MP) departed runway (RWY) 28, fifteen seconds after the mishap lead pilot (MLP). Shortly after the afterburner takeoff, Misawa air traffic controllers informed the MP and the mishap lead pilot (MLP) that the MP had a large flame coming from the aft section of the MP’s aircraft. The MLP also contacted the MP regarding the fire. During the MP’s ascent, he noticed an unexpected decay in his airspeed and climb rate. The MP took a right turn back towards RWY 28, and when unable to maintain airspeed or altitude, the MP jettisoned his stores (external fuel tanks) in accordance with F-16CM critical actions procedures. Following the jettison, the MA regained some airspeed and achieved a better climb rate to get into a position to land. The MP landed on RWY 28, and accomplished the emergency engine shutdown and emergency ground egress critical action procedures. There were no injuries resulting from the mishap. The MP’s actions during the mishap sequence were focused, precise, and appropriate; his actions did not contribute to the mishap. A review of maintenance procedures revealed several past actions that were causal to the accident. The AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the accident was an obsolete part that fractured, causing the engine to overheat. In 2012, maintenance personnel ordered and installed an obsolete part, a turbine frame forward fairing, years after it was replaced by a forward fairing made of stronger material and design. The logistics system then delivered the obsolete forward fairing. Maintenance personnel installed the obsolete forward fairing on the mishap engine (ME) using the updated version of the bracket hardware. The obsolete forward fairing’s weaker material, along with wear from the mismatched hardware, ultimately caused the forward fairing to fracture during takeoff. Once fractured, a piece of the forward fairing lifted and blocked the cooling flow of air around the engine, causing the area near the blockage to overheat and catch fire. The AIB President further found by a preponderance of the evidence that maintenance practices during the 2012-2015 timeframe substantially contributed to the mishap.
MQ-1B T/N 06-3174, JALABAD, AFGHANISTAN 10 JULY 2011 On 10 July 2011, at 0053 Local time (9 July 2011 at 1953 Zulu (Z)), the mishap aircraft (MA), a MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 06-3174, was lost and presumed crashed at a forward operating location. The MA was carrying one AGM-114 Hellfire missile. It was owned by the 432d Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 432d Wing, Creech AFB, NV and flown by the 3d Special Operations Squadron, 27" Special Operations Wing, Cannon AFB, NM. At 1953Z, the MA lost its return link (RL) while flying an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. RL refers to the data transmission capability from the aircraft to the Ground Control Station (GCS) via the Predator communications systems. Attempts to re-establish the RL were unsuccessful. The MA did not return to its forward operating base and is presumed crashed with no known injuries, deaths or reported property damage. The aircraft loss is valued at approximately $4.4 million. After normal maintenance and preflight checks, the MA taxied and departed from its forward deployed location at 0057Z for a planned 22 hour mission. At 1953Z, the RL between the MA and the GCS was lost. The Mishap Crew (MC) followed the required standard procedures in an attempt to regain the link, but was unable to do so. Subsequent Air Traffic Control and Launch and Recovery Element attempts to locate the MA were also unsuccessful. Contact with the MA was not re-established and the aircraft is presumed to have crashed. No wreckage has been found. The post mishap investigation revealed no significant anomalies with regards to the MA at the time of the lost link. The only known anomaly was a LN100G navigation system failure, but the MA was operating normally on the backup navigation system at the time of the mishap. Preflight procedures and launch of the MA were all normal. There was no evidence of negative maintenance trends or issues and maintenance records showed no discrepancies. The MC had no problems with the operation of the MA immediately prior to the mishap. The AIB President could not determine the cause of this mishap by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the AIB President also could not determine any factors which contributed substantially to the mishap by a preponderance of evidence.
MQ-1B, T/N 07-3195 JALALABAD, AFGHANISTAN 27 JUNE 2013 On 27 June 2013, at approximately 0905 Zulu (Z), 1335 local time (L), an MQ-1B, tail number (T/N) 07-3195, assigned to the 432d Wing (432 WG), Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), impacted the ground at approximately 800 feet (ft.) past the departure end of the runway, Jalalabad Air Base (AB), Afghanistan. The mishap occurred after the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) aborted its initial landing attempt (also known as a go-around). The MRPA was forward deployed from the 432 WG. At the time of the mishap, the MRPA was operated by a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) from the 62d Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, Jalalabad, Afghanistan, hereinafter referred to as the Mishap Crew (MC). The MRPA and one air-to-ground Hellfire missile (AGM-114) were destroyed upon impact with the loss valued at $4,511,499.00. There were no injuries or damage to other government or civilian property. On 27 June 2013, at 0118Z, after normal preflight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed Jalalabad AB, Afghanistan. One LRE and one Mission Control Element (MCE) crew cycled through without incident prior to handing over the MRPA to the second MCE Crew (MCEC). The MCEC flew the MRPA uneventfully until 0824Z, when the MRPA experienced a turbocharger failure. The MCEC diagnosed the failure, ran the appropriate checklists and initiated a return to base (RTB). The MCEC notified the MC of the RTB. The MC briefed for the RTB and prepared to take control of the MRPA. Between 0845Z and 0901Z, the MCEC relinquished control of the MRPA to the MC. The MC returned the MRPA to the landing airfield, running all appropriate recovery checklists. At 0901Z, the MRPA was on a three-mile final approach for landing, correctly configured for approach. Between 0901Z and 0905Z, the Air Traffic Control Tower (Tower) repeatedly reported winds within technical order (TO) limits with variable headings and gusts. However, as the MRPA passed the location of the runway threshold, there was a very strong wind gust, which resulted in an unsafe landing condition. The MC immediately executed a go-around due to the unsafe landing condition. The MC attempted to maneuver the MRPA safely but was unable to sustain flight. At 0905Z, the MRPA impacted the ground approximately 800 ft. past the departure end of the runway, Jalalabad AB. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President developed his opinion by analyzing factual data from historical records, Air Force directives and guidance, engineering analysis, witness testimony, flight data and information provided by technical experts. By clear and convincing evidence, he found a combination of a turbocharger failure and a strong wind gust caused the mishap to occur. The turbocharger failed due to internal oil coking (burnt and hardened oil residue). Further, he found by the preponderance of evidence that insufficient technical guidance, an acceptance of operational weight waiver, and the MC’s decision to go- around were substantially contributing factors to the mishap.
RQ-4B, T/N 07-2029 NEAR LONE PINE, CALIFORNIA 21 JUNE 2017 On 21 June 2017, at approximately 1310 local (L) time, a RQ-4B Global Hawk, tail number (T/N) 07-2029, began breaking up mid-air near Lone Pine, California, approximately 49 minutes after takeoff, while conducting a ferry flight from Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California, to Beale AFB, California. The mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) was assigned to the 9" Reconnaissance Wing, Beale AFB. The mishap aircrew (MC) were contractors for the Northrop Grumman Corporation. The MC included a mishap mission commander (MMC), a mishap pilot (MP1) who controlled the MRPA at the time of the mishap, and a Hawkeye pilot (H2) who conducted the preflight inspection. MMC and MP1 remotely operated the MRPA from a Mission Control Element (MCE1) out of Palmdale, California. H2 conducted the pre-flight inspection at Edwards AFB. An Air Force aircrew operating from a Beale AFB MCE (MCE2) monitored the mishap flight. The mishap did not result in any injuries or damage to private property. However, the debris field included portions of the Inyo National Forest. No significant hazards or wilderness impacts to the Forest were identified. The MRPA, valued at $79 million, was destroyed. On 16 June 2017, the MRPA arrived at Edwards AFB from Beale AFB for a right-wing composite repair. Personnel from 9th Maintenance Squadron completed the repair without complications on 17 June 2017, in accordance with an engineering disposition. On 21 June 2017, maintenance and aircrew personnel conducted a pre-flight inspection at Edwards AFB. After completing the inspection, the MRPA took off at 1221L. Shortly after takeoff, the MRPA’s Kearfott KN-4074E navigators (KNA and KNB) were disabled in accordance with standard procedure. The MRPA climbed and flew to planned waypoints uneventfully. At approximately 1309L, one of the two enabled Litton LN-100G navigators (LNA and LNB)--specifically LNA--began producing erroneous navigational data. Failing to detect LNA’s erroneous data, the MRPA rolled to a nearly inverted position and entered a dive that resulted in an excessive airspeed. The MRPA subsequently exceeded its structural limitations and was unable to recover. The MRPA broke up during flight and crashed in an unpopulated and rugged area between Lone Pine, California, and Mount Whitney, California. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by a preponderance of evidence, that the causes of the mishap were that the MRPA’s LNA produced erroneous navigational data and the MRPA’s navigation system did not detect the erroneous navigational data. The AIB Board President also found, by a preponderance of evidence, that disabling KNA and KNB after takeoff substantially contributed to the mishap.
C-130H3, T/N 93-1458 EDGEMONT, SOUTH DAKOTA 1 JULY 2012 On 1 July 2012, at approximately 1738 Local time, a C-130H3, Tail Number 93-1458, assigned to the 145th Airlift Wing, North Carolina Air National Guard, Charlotte Douglas International Airport (KCLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, crashed on public land managed by the United States Forest Service (USFS), while conducting wildland firefighting operations near Edgemont, South Dakota. At the time of the mishap all members of the Mishap Crew (MC) were assigned or attached to the 156th Airlift Squadron, based at KCLT. The Mishap Crew (MC) consisted of Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1), Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2), Mishap Navigator (MN), Mishap Flight Engineer (ME), Mishap Loadmaster 1 (ML1) and Mishap Loadmaster 2 (ML2). For the mishap sortie, MP1 was the aircraft commander and pilot flying in the left seat. MP2 was in the right seat as the instructor pilot. MN occupied the navigator station on the right side of the flight deck behind MP2. ME was seated in the flight engineer seat located between MP1 and MP2, immediately aft of the center flight console. ML1 and ML2 were seated on the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) unit, near the right paratroop door. ML1 occupied the aft MAFFS control station seat and ML2 occupied the forward MAFFS observer station seat. MP1, MP2, MN and ME died in the mishap. ML1 and ML2 survived the mishap, but suffered significant injuries. The mishap aircraft (MA) and a USFS-owned MAFFS unit were destroyed. The monetary loss is valued at $43,453,295, which includes an estimated $150,000 in post aircraft removal and site environmental cleanup costs. There were no additional fatalities, injuries or damage to other government or civilian property. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) president found by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was MP1, MP2, MN and ME’s inadequate assessment of operational conditions, resulting in the MA impacting the ground after flying into a microburst. Additionally, the AIB president found by the preponderance of evidence, the failure of the White Draw Fire Lead Plane aircrew and Air Attack aircrew to communicate critical operational information; and conflicting operational guidance concerning thunderstorm avoidance, substantially contributed to the mishap.