kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
MQ-1B, T/N 99-3061, KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN 3 JANUARY 2011 On 3 J anuary 2011, at approximately 0605 zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), aM Q-1B P redator, t ail num ber 99 -3061, operated byt he 15th R econnaissance Squadron (RS) from Creech AFB, crashed west of Kandahar Air Base after completing 18 hours ofat asked surveillance mission. The crash site was remote de sert terrain. The M RPA’s structure and mechanical components were destroyed as a result of the impact with terrain. There were no injuries and there was no damage to other government or private property. After normal maintenance and pre-flight checks, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) taxied and departed from Kandahar Air Base at approximately 1204 zulu (Z) time on 2 Jan 11. At 0537Z on 3 Jan 11, the mishap crew (MC) lost satellite link with the MRPA after receiving a momentary alternator power warning. When the satellite link was re-established at 0539Z, the MC had indications that the alternators were off-line and that the MRPA was operating solely on back-up battery power. At 0603Z, approximately 30 minutes from the first alternator power warning, the MC lost satellite link permanently. The last know position of the MRPA was approximately 100 nautical miles (nm) west of Kandahar. The MRPA continued flying for some time after losing the satellite link when it exhausted back-up battery power and crashed southwest of its last known position. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was the failure of the front bearing in Alternator Number One (Alternator #1). As the front bearing failed, friction caused speed variations inside the Alternator #1 which triggered erratic bus voltage, alternator current and engine revolutions per minute (RPM). Due to voltage variations on the power bus, the Dual Alternator Regulator (DAR) performed an automatic rebalance of the alternators, switching between the two alternator output several times. With the DAR unable to tightly balance alternator output, a high voltage spike was sensed by both the DAR and PPDM, and the satellite link was severed. Because the alternator outputs are connected together and the DAR was unable to determine which alternator caused the event, it shut down both to protect the electrical system. When the link was re-established, the MC had indications that both alternators had failed and the MRPA was operating on back-up battery power. The MC realized that the MRPA would lose power before they could return to base or fly to an emergency divert, so they controlled the MRPA heading away from a known populated area. The MRPA continued flying for some time after losing the satellite link. As the battery voltage dropped, the MRPA electronics began to shutdown. The MRPA crashed and was destroyed when it impacted terrain. The estimated loss is valued at $4.4M.
Class A, Sheppard AFB T-6A, T/N 07-3890 21 MILES NE OF SHEPPARD AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 1 MAY 2019 At 1313 hours local time on | May 2019 a T-6A Texan II, tail number 07-3890, crashed 21 miles northeast of Sheppard Air Force Base (AFB), TX. The mishap crew (MC) included a mishap instructor pilot (MIP), 97th Flying Training Squadron (FTS), who supervised the mishap pilot (MP), 89 FTS. The MP was conducting a transition sortie in the Pilot Instructor Training course from the front seat. The MC ejected and sustained minor injuries. The mishap aircraft (MA) was assigned to the 80th Flying Training Wing, Sheppard AFB, TX. While setting up a training maneuver with building cloud formations, the MIP flew the MA in an unintentional nose-high trajectory with decreasing airspeed. In an attempt to regain airspeed, the MIP tried to lower the nose of the aircraft towards the horizon and penetrated the weather. Next, the MIP attempted to roll wings level while still in a nose-high attitude with insufficient airspeed and high-power setting. As a result, the MA departed controlled flight in a power-on, inverted spin. The MC attempted to recover the MA until the MIP assessed the MA unrecoverable and commanded ejection at approximately 10,800 feet mean sea level. The MA, valued at approximately $5.7 million, impacted the ground and was destroyed. There were no casualties and no loss of civilian property. The Accident Investigation Board President, by a preponderance of evidence, determined the cause of the mishap to be pilot error. Specifically, the MIP flew the MA into an aerodynamic stall due to fixation on environmental factors. Then the MIP did not follow the prescribed memorized, critical-action checklist, inhibiting recovery.
MQ-9A, T/N 11-4138 AFRICOM AOR 05 May 2015 On 5 May 2015, at approximately 0134 Local (4 May 2016 at 2234 Zulu (Z)), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-9A, tail number 11-4138, assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV) and operated by the 33rd Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron, 435th Air Ground Operations Wing, veered off the runway after landing and crashed after conducting an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission in the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility. The MA sustained extensive damage and the wreckage was recovered. The damage to U.S. government property totaled approximately $6,703,852.06. There were no fatalities, injuries or damage to civilian property. Two separate flight crews operated the MA during the launch and recovery of the mishap flight. The recovery mishap crew (MC1) consisted of mishap pilot 1 (MP1) and mishap sensor operator 1 (MSO1). The launch mishap crew (MC2) consisted of mishap pilot 2 (MP2) and mishap sensor operator 2 (MSO2). All crews were current and qualified. All MA and Ground Control Station (GCS) maintenance records and inspections were completed and reviewed. At approximately 0415Z on 4 May 2015, MC2 conducted an uneventful launch of the MA. At the end of the mission, the Mission Operations Supervisor completed a handover with MCI to take control of the MA. At 2141Z, MC] noticed they had a nosewheel steering problem while conducting normal control checks during the descent to the deployed airfield. MP1 noticed after the control check that the nosewheel was frozen left at approximately 12 degrees from center. MCI reviewed the emergency procedures section of their technical orders, noting that it did not cover a procedure for landing with the nosewheel frozen off-center. After troubleshooting, MC1 and maintenance concluded that the nosewheel servo had failed and was unfixable while airborne. MP1 landed MA at 2234Z on the main landing gear while holding the nosewheel off the runway in order to reduce airspeed before the nosewheel touched down. Approximately 3000 feet down the runway, the nosewheel touched down and the MA veered left towards the runway edge. MP1 immediately applied full right rudder and right brake to maintain runway heading, but MA continued off veer off the runway. The MA departed the runway and came to rest approximately 20 yards from the runway edge, damaging the airframe and equipment. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of evidence that the cause of this mishap was a failed nosewheel servo driver that resulted in the inability of MCI to safely maintain runway heading after landing.
B-1B, Tail Number 85-0091 BROADUS, MONTANA 19 AUGUST 2013 On 19 August 2013, at approximately 0916 hours local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), a B- 1B, Tail Number 85-0091, assigned to the 34th Bomb Squadron, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB), South Dakota, impacted grass-covered pastureland near Broadus, Montana. The four crewmembers ejected safely and sustained non-life-threatening injuries. There were no injuries to civilians. The MA was destroyed, with the government loss valued at $317,722,980.67. Damage to private property consisted of burnt pastureland. The MA departed Ellsworth AFB at approximately 0857L on 19 August 2013. Following takeoff, Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) leveled the MA off at an altitude of approximately 20,000 feet. At that time, the mishap crewmembers (MC) completed an aircraft systems check. MP2 then reduced engine thrust to idle, initiated a descent to 10,000 feet, and swept the wings from the forward to the aft position. During the sweep, the MA developed an undetectable fuel leak in the 4.5-inch main fuel line located in the left overwing fairing. The fairing is a structure that provides a smooth surface for air to flow over portions of the aircraft (e.g., wing) thereby reducing drag. Approximately 7,000 pounds of fuel leaked from the 4.5-inch main fuel line into the left overwing fairing while the MC continued their training mission. Eventually, the fuel contacted exposed portions of the hot precooler duct, ignited, and caused an explosion that separated the left overwing fairing from the MA. Ignited fuel streamed from the exposed left overwing fairing cavity, heated one of the MA’s fuel tanks, and ignited the fuel vapors inside the tank. This detonation propagated through the fuel venting system that connects the fuel tanks in the MA, resulted in a cascade of catastrophic explosions and caused a complete and permanent loss of power to the crew compartment. The efforts of the MC to extinguish the fires were unsuccessful. Mishap Pilot 1 appropriately ordered the MC to eject. Following ejection, the fuselage of the MA split in two and impacted the ground. The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence that a displaced fold down baffle in the left overwing fairing caused the mishap. The fold down baffle fills in gaps when the wings are in the forward position to form a fairing under the wing. The fold down baffle became detached for an unknown reason sometime prior to the initiation of the aft wing sweep. During the sweep, the wing pushed the detached fold down baffle into the 4.5- inch main fuel line, resulting in a v-shaped cut to the top half of the fuel line and the subsequent fuel leak. The leaking fuel ignited, caused multiple catastrophic detonations throughout the MA, and ultimately led to the breakup of the MA prior to ground impact.
F-35A, T/N 12-005053 EGLIN AFB, FLORIDA 19 MAY 2020 On the night of 19 May 2020 at 2126L, the mishap aircraft (MA), an F-35A aircraft tail number (T/N) 12-005053 crashed on runway 30 at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida (FL). The MA was operated out of Eglin AFB, FL by the 58th Fighter Squadron (FS), 33rd Operations Group (OG), assigned to the 33rd Fighter Wing. The mishap pilot (MP) ejected safely but sustained nonlife threatening injuries. The MA, valued at $175,983,949, rolled, caught fire, and was completely destroyed. The MP set and held 202 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) throughout the approach and landing. The aircraft touched down approximately 50 KCAS fast, and was approximately 8 degrees more shallow than desired for landing, at a 5.2 degree Angle of Attack. The aircraft landing lasted approximately five seconds before the MP ejected. The nose of the aircraft drove down at a high rate of speed and the nose gear contacted the runway immediately after the main landing gear. Next, the MA experienced a significant nose-high bounce. After the initial bounce, the MP made stick inputs consistent with an attempt to recover and set a landing attitude. However, the MP’s stick inputs quickly fell out of synch with the aircraft pitch oscillations and aircraft control cycles. Two seconds after touch down, the MP set and held aft stick, which would normally bring the nose of the aircraft up. Approximately one second after commanding aft stick the pilot also commanded full afterburner on his throttle. Both of those actions are consistent with an attempt to establish an attitude that would have allowed the aircraft to take off and go-around for another landing attempt. The horizontal stabilizers remained in full deflection down, which would tend to keep the nose of the aircraft down, despite the pilot holding aft stick for three seconds. After being unsuccessful in the attempt to go-around after multiple and progressively worsening bounces, the MP released the stick to eject. The AIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mishap was caused first, by the MA touching down at 202 KCAS, and second, by the MA flight control surfaces, namely the tail of the aircraft, conflicting with the MP inputs upon landing, resulting in the MP’s inability to recover from the aircraft oscillation. The AIB President also found by a preponderance of the evidence that four additional factors substantially contributed to the mishap. The substantially contributing factors are: the MP landed with Speed Hold engaged and using an alternate crosscheck method, the MP Helmet Mounted Display misalignment distracted the MP during a critical phase of flight, MP experienced cognitive degradation due to fatigue, and the MP lacked systems knowledge on flight control logic.
CV-22B, T/N 08-0037 KANDAHAR AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN 11 OCTOBER 2011 On 11 Oct 11, at 19:53:49 Zulu (Z) time, the Mishap Aircraft (MA), a CV-22B, tail number (T/N) 08-0037, departing Kandahar Air Base (KAF), Afghanistan, operated by the 8th Special Operations Squadron, sustained damage to the right proprotor hub and proprotor gearbox when the aircraft maneuvered to avoid collision with another aircraft in its formation immediately upon takeoff and impacted the ground. The aircraft was assigned to the 20th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. No deaths and one minor injury resulted from the mishap. The MA sustained $2,047,493.13 in damage. The MA was the third aircraft in a three aircraft formation supporting a nighttime mission. The formation was taxi complete at 19:52:43Z, and cleared for takeoff by tower at 19:53:23Z. As the formation commenced with takeoff, the Mishap Copilot (MCO) performing the takeoff applied takeoff power and became airborne prior to chalk 2 (Chk2), who was located 150 to 200 feet in front of the MA. The takeoff procedure was a formation 75 degree short takeoff (75 STO) which was understood to include a spacing delay of about five seconds between aircraft. Lack of clarity on the formation 75 STO procedures regarding aircraft spacing, coupled with shortening the six second power push to less than three seconds, contributed to the MCO responding to forward motion from Chk2 with an anticipatory response and taking off out of sequence prior to Chk2. The out of sequence takeoff by the MA caused the mishap pilots to assess a risk of collision between the two aircraft. The MCO tried to arrest his forward motion and avoid overtaking Chk2 by pulling back on the cyclic control stick and pulling the thrust control lever (TCL) back to idle. This reduced aircraft power and pitched the aircraft nose up. These control inputs produced a high sink rate, prompting the MCO and Mishap Pilot (MP) to rapidly apply full power. The MA had only achieved approximately 13 feet (ft) in altitude, as measured by the MA’s radar altimeter, and was unable to arrest the sink rate before impacting the ground at 525 ft per minute. The MA impacted first on the ramp, then pitched forward onto the main landing gear, and finally the nose gear before immediately becoming airborne again. The movement of the TCL from idle to full power in six-tenths of a second, in conjunction with striking the ground and the rapid application of three and one-half inches of aft cyclic, caused excessive flapping of the rotor blades resulting in damage to the proprotor hub and proprotor gearbox. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President determined, by clear and convincing evidence, the causes of the mishap were: 1) The MCO’s failure to maintain formation discipline during takeoff; and 2) The MCO’s aggressive application of control inputs, after prematurely becoming airborne, in conjunction with impacting the ground. Additionally, the AIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the non-standardized procedures for executing a formation 75 STO substantially contributed to the mishap.
HH-60G, T/N 92-6466 USCENTCOM AOR 15 MARCH 2018 On 15 March 2018, at approximately 1840 Zulu time (Z), 2140 Local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an HH-60G, Tail number (T/N) 92-6466, assigned to the 332™ Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), and operating within the USCENTCOM AOR, crashed in an uninhabited desert area. Four MA flight crew members and three members of the Guardian Angel team were fatally injured in the mishap. The MA was destroyed upon impact, there were no other injuries or fatalities, and there was no damage to private property. The mishap formation (MF) consisted of two HH-60G helicopters, with the MA operating as the lead aircraft and the mishap wingman as the trail aircraft. The assigned mission was to pre- position the MF to a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) closer to the vicinity of ground operations. The flight plan for the pre-position mission was a near direct path from the base of departure to the intended HLZ with an air refueling control point between the origin and destination points. A more extensive route of flight was loaded to the navigation system for potential follow on mission taskings, but it was not to be utilized on this mission. The loaded navigation route continued north to points beyond the intended HLZ. Night illumination for the flight was low. The MF departed the base at approximately1800Z. The flight up to air refueling was uneventful, but refueling operations concluded later than planned. While conducting normal crew duties, the MF erroneously overflew the intended HLZ and descended to low altitude. As the mishap co- pilot turned left to avoid a tower, a blade on the MA’s main rotor assembly struck the second of four 3/8 inch galvanized steel cables horizontally spanning two 341-foot towers. The cable tangled around the main rotor assembly resulting in catastrophic damage, rendering the aircraft un-flyable. The MA impacted the ground at approximately 1840Z. An extensive rescue operation was immediately conducted. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) president found by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the result of: the mishap pilot misinterpreting aircraft navigation displays, causing the MF to descend into an unplanned location and strike a 3/8 inch diameter galvanized steel cable strung horizontally between two 341 foot high towers. The AIB president also found by a preponderance of evidence that three factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) mission planning created a route of flight enabling navigation beyond the intended HLZ; (2) a breakdown in crew resource management within the MC and between the MF failed to sufficiently detect and effectively communicate the navigation error; and (3) low illumination conditions present rendered night vision goggles insufficient to detect the cables.
E-11A, T/N 11-9358 GHAZNI PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN 27 JANUARY 2020 On 27 January 2020, at approximately 1309 hours local time (L), an E-11A, tail number (T/N) 11- 9358, was destroyed after touching down in a field in Ghanzi Province, Afghanistan (AFG) following a catastrophic left engine failure. The mishap crew (MC) were deployed and assigned to the 430th Expeditionary Electronic Combat Squadron (EECS), Kandahar Airfield (KAF), AFG. The MC consisted of mishap pilot 1 (MP1) and mishap pilot 2 (MP2). The mission was both a Mission Qualification Training — 3 (MQT-3) sortie for MP2 and a combat sortie for the MC, flown in support of Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. MP1 and MP2 were fatally injured as a result of the accident, and the Mishap Aircraft (MA) was destroyed. At 1105L, the MA departed KAF. The mission proceeded uneventfully until the left engine catastrophically failed one hour and 45 minutes into the flight (1250:52L). Specifically, a fan blade broke free causing the left engine to shutdown. The MC improperly assessed that the operable right engine had failed and initiated shutdown of the right engine leading to a dual engine out emergency. Subsequently, the MC attempted to fly the MA back to KAF, approximately 230 nautical miles (NM) away. Unfortunately, the MC were unable to get either engine airstarted to provide any usable thrust. This resulted in the MA unable to glide the distance remaining to KAF. With few options remaining, the MC maneuvered the MA towards Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sharana, but did not have the altitude and airspeed to glide the remaining distance. The MC unsuccessfully attempted landing in a field approximately 21 NM short of FOB Sharana. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the MC’s error in analyzing which engine had catastrophically failed (left engine). This error resulted in the MC’s decision to shutdown the operable right engine creating a dual engine out emergency. The AIB President also found by a preponderance of the evidence that the MC’s failure to airstart the right engine and their decision to recover the MA to KAF substantially contributed to the mishap.
F-16C, T/N 00-0219 NEAR BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN 3 APRIL 2013 On 3 April 2013 at 18:40:06Z (23:10:06L) the mishap aircraft (MA), an F-16C, tail number 00-0219, deployed with the 77th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron to Bagram Airfield (BAF), Afghanistan impacted a mountainside 10 nautical miles southeast of BAF. The mishap flight was a combat mission in support of ground forces assigned in the United States Central Command’s Area of Responsibility. The crash occurred in an unpopulated area. The MA was destroyed with a loss valued at $30,945,228. The mishap pilot (MP) did not attempt to eject from his aircraft and was fatally injured. United States air and ground forces recovered the remains of the MP. The mishap caused neither civilian injuries nor damage to civilian property. Many international media sources reported on the mishap. The MA took off from BAF on 3 April 2013 at 14:36:47Z (19:06:47L) and flew the entire sortie at night. The MP was the flight lead of a two ship of F-16Cs tasked to provide close air support in eastern Afghanistan. Upon completion of the mission, the MP directed the MW to a two nautical mile trail position. The MP then contacted air traffic control and requested a visual flight rules recovery, whereby the MP assumed responsibility for traffic and terrain avoidance. BAF was reporting a broken cloud layer and light rain. While maneuvering to land, the MP descended below the minimum safe altitude into a mountainous area, which was visually obscured by weather conditions. Prior to impact, the MA provided low altitude warnings, however the MP did not take timely corrective action. The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP’s failure to perceive mountainous terrain directly in his flight path while flying below the minimum safe altitude using visual flight rules in instrument meteorological conditions (i.e., clouds) resulting in controlled flight into terrain.