kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
MQ-1B, 03-3122 KANDAHAR AB, AFGHANISTAN 30 JANUARY 2012 On 30 January, 2012, at approximately 1000 hours Zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), a MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 03-3122, operated by the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS), 432d Wing (WG), Creech Air Force Base (AFB), made a forced landing just outside the perimeter fence of Kandahar Air Base (AB). The crash site was an unpopulated area adjacent to the base. There were no injuries and there was no damage to other government or private property. The estimated loss is valued at $4.5 million and includes the MRPA and one AGM-114 Hellfire missile. After normal preflight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed from a forward operating location at 0632Z. During flight, the Mission Control Element (MCE) crew, mishap crew #1 (MC1), observed abnormal engine temperature indications. The abnormal temperature indications worsened, accompanied by a significant loss of thrust and an uncommanded descent in altitude. MC! began an emergency diversion to the closest suitable divert field, Kandahar AB. At 0922Z, MC1 lost video feed and positive flight control of the MRPA, but monitored flight data as it began a slow descending right-hand spiral through a full circle. At 0933Z, the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) crew at Kandahar AB, mishap crew #2 (MC2), regained positive flight control of the MRPA and guided it to a forced landing. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was a loss of coolant. During the mishap flight, the coolant pump supply line failed, releasing the engine’s coolant. As the coolant supply decreased, the Cylinder Head Temperature increased excessively. Heat expansion of the cylinders permitted compressed gases from the combustion chambers to “blow by” the pistons, reducing power output and preventing sustained flight. The AAIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence, that a significantly contributing factor to the loss of the MRPA was the failure to detect damage during a 60-hour engine inspection on 26 January 2012 on the coolant pump supply line and the oil cooler-to-oil pump oil line, which were routed in a manner that permitted friction chafing. Additionally, the AAIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence, that a significantly contributing factor to the loss of the MRPA was Mishap Pilot #2’s (MP2) unintentional “hostile takeover” of the MRPA at 0922Z, when MP2 failed to ensure the Line-of-Sight control link transmitter was unpowered as MP2 turned the ground antenna toward the MRPA. The 1,200 feet of altitude lost in the ensuing unintentional spiral prevented a safe recovery of the crippled aircraft.
MQ-1B, T/N 05-03143 US CENTCOM AOR 4 September 2017 On 4 September 2017, at 1701 Zulu (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-1B aircraft, tail number (T/N) 05-03143, from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), was lost in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility (US CENTCOM AOR) while forward deployed and participating in a combat support mission. At the time of the mishap, the MA was being operated by a mission control element (MCE) from the 432d Air Expeditionary Wing, Creech AFB, NV. The MCE permanently lost the ability to monitor and control the MA while flying medium altitude approximately 16 hours into the mission. The location of the aircraft is unknown. The estimated cost of the missing aircraft is $4.09 Million. There were no known injuries and there was no known damage to other Government or private property. After normal crew changeover briefs, the mishap crew lost complete video and command link (‘lost link”) within one minute of sitting in the cockpit, resulting in an inability to monitor and control the aircraft. At the moment of the lost link event, the aircraft was operating normally at an altitude of 13,000 feet. Radar controllers and one fighter aircraft in the area did not detect with certainty the MQ-1B in the area of the lost link event or in the vicinity of the emergency mission profile. Additionally, the mishap crew initiated the Emergency Checklist for aircraft that have lost link, but this did not resolve the lost link event. Weather was not a factor. The cockpit equipment and the maintenance of the cockpit was not a factor. The training and medical review of the mishap crew did not highlight any notable factors. The aircraft wreckage was not found from the time of the incident to the completion of this investigation. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was a lost link event followed by an inability to reestablish link for unknown reasons, and there was insufficient evidence of any substantially contributing factors.
MQ-9 REAPER, T/N 09-4066 LAKE ONTARIO, NEW YORK 12 NOVEMBER 2013 On 12 November 2013, at approximately 13:01 local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-9 Reaper, tail number 09-4066, assigned to the 138th Attack Squadron, 174th Attack Wing, Hancock Field Air National Guard Base, New York (NY), impacted Lake Ontario, NY, approximately 35 miles southwest of Fort Drum, NY. There were no injuries to any military members or civilians. The MA was destroyed upon impact, with loss of government property valued at $10,622,210. There was no damage to private property. The MA departed Wheeler-Sack Army Airfield, NY, at 10:42L on 12 November 2013 for the Oswego Military Operating Area to conduct a training mission. The mishap crew (MC), consisting of a Mishap Pilot (MP) and Mishap Sensor Operator, was the launch and recovery element (LRE) for the mission. The MC accomplished an uneventful takeoff. At 10:52L, the mission control element (MCE) gained control of the MA from the LRE without incident. About two hours into the mission, the MCE noticed a series of warnings on the head down displays indicating the MA’s embedded global positioning system/inertial navigation system a/k/a (EGI) unit #1 had failed. The MCE looked up the warnings in the MQ-9 flight manual and ran the Multiple Navigation Sensor Failure Checklist. The MCE made an effort to return the MA to base, but the MA went lost link and began to fly its emergency mission. Lost link occurs when there is a loss of connectivity between the aircraft and the pilot. An emergency mission is a series of waypoints arranged to bring the aircraft back to its point of origin and is automatically engaged when the aircraft goes lost link. The MA was flying on autopilot by the time it entered the emergency mission. The MCE disabled the command link because they were unable to monitor the MA. The MC entered the LRE ground control station and began to run the Gaining Handover Checklist. At 12:58:14L, the MA’s EGI unit #3 failed. Following the checklist, the MP enabled the ground data terminal (GDT) transmitter causing the MA to fly on autopilot. The autopilot commanded a right turn. Invalid autopilot attitude data was transferred to the MA which caused it to continue turning right until completely inverted, and then entered a spin. At 12:59:55L, the MP disabled the GDT transmitter in an attempt to send the MA back lost link so it would recover on its own, however, the MA did not return to a lost link profile. Approximately one minute later, the MA impacted Lake Ontario and was destroyed. The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence that the failure of the MA’s EGI units #1 and #3 in conjunction with a transfer of invalid attitude data to the MA’s autopilot system was the cause of the mishap. The MQ-9 relies on the EGI units for valid attitude reference data. Without valid data, the MA could not discern its attitude and became uncontrollable.
MQ-9A, T/N 08-4044 AFGHANISTAN 18 November 2015 On 18 November 2015, at approximately 2338 Zulu (Z) an MQ-9A, tail number 08-4044, assigned to the 27th Special Operations Wing at Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), and deployed to Kandahar International Airport, crashed in an open field near the base after declaring an in-flight emergency (IFE) shortly after take-off. The Launch and Recovery Element mishap crew (MC), consisting of one mishap pilot (MP) and one mishap sensor operator (MSO), noticed high oil pressure, rising exhaust gas temperature, and fluctuating torque immediately upon take-off. The MC reported the IFE and attempted a recovery to the runway; however, complete engine failure occurred on the crosswind leg at approximately 500 feet above ground level. The mishap aircraft (MA) glided to a crash landing as the crew attempted to circle around to land. The impact destroyed MA, four missiles, and one bomb, resulting in a loss valued at $14,391,950. There were no fatalities or damage to private property. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap to be a compressor bearing failure that led to engine loss. The Board President determined that the lack of an audible warning to indicate the high oil pressure associated with the bearing failure and the mishap crew’s task saturation significantly contributed to the mishap.
Class A, JBSA-Randolph, Texas T-6A, T/N 05-6209 JBSA-RANDOLPH, TEXAS 18 September 2018 On 18 September 2018, at 15:40:41 hours, local (L) time, a T-6A Texan II, tail number 05-6209, crashed 4.8 miles northwest of JBSA-Randolph, TX, completely destroying the aircraft. The mishap aircrew (MC) consisted of a mishap instructor pilot (MIP), occupying the front seat, who was supervising the mishap pilot (MP). The MP was conducting an instructor qualification sortie in the Pilot Instructor Training (PIT) course from the rear seat. The MC successfully ejected and sustained minor injuries. The MC and mishap aircraft (MA) were assigned to the 559th Flying Training Squadron, 12th Flying Training Wing (FTW), JBSA-Randolph, TX. During the mishap sortie (MS), the MA crashed while returning to base for local take-off and landing practice. The destroyed aircraft is valued at approximately $5.7 million with minimal damage to civilian property and no casualties. While being vectored for the approach to runway 15R at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), at approximately 15:35:00L, the MC noticed the high fuel flow reading, and subsequently decided to continue the approach to a full stop. Slightly over four minutes later, at 15:39:16L, while slowing and configuring to land, the MA’s engine failed. At the time of the engine failure, the MA was below the energy profile required to glide to a suitable landing surface. The MIP transmitted the MC’s intent to eject over the radio and they did so seconds later. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President, by a preponderance of evidence, determined the cause of the mishap to be a fuel transfer tube locking plate that was improperly installed during the contracted 4500 hour engine overhaul. This resulted in engine failure where the aircraft was not in a position to land safely.
A-29, T/N 13-2015 MOODY AFB, GA 6 MARCH 2017 On 6 March 2017, at approximately 1432 hours local time (L) the Mishap Aircraft (MA), an A- 29B, T/N 13-2015, assigned to the 81st Fighter Squadron, 14th Flying Training Wing, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, crashed during a close air attack (CAA) student flight and impacted the ground approximately 1.5 nautical miles (NM) northwest of the Homerville Airport. The Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP) and Mishap Student Pilot (MSP) ejected safely, with the MIP sustaining injury during the ejection. The MA was destroyed on impact with minor damage to approximately one acre of private property. Damage to government property is estimated at $17,772,729. The mishap occurred during a CAA syllabus sortie (flight) as part of the Afghan A-29B training course. The MA was number two of a two-ship formation with the MSP in the front seat and the MIP in the back seat. The MA experienced a Power Management System (PMS) fault early in the sortie profile, and after consultation with Top-3 leadership, the mission proceeded. Approximately one hour later, the propulsion system suddenly malfunctioned, significantly reducing propeller speed (Np), driving the propeller blades toward the feathered position, and increasing engine torque above limits. The MIP immediately initiated the Compressor Stall checklist; however, he exited that checklist after he established aircraft control and assessed the engine was not stalled. The MIP then took action to trouble shoot the propulsion system malfunction and restore normal operation; cycling the PMS system from Auto to Manual, then back to Auto, and later placing it in Manual for the remainder of the flight without any apparent effect on aircraft performance. The MIP quickly decided to divert to the nearest field at Homerville in an attempt to make a straight- in landing. The MIP continued to balance throttle inputs with engine limits seeking maximum performance from the aircraft until he commanded ejection at approximately 300 feet above ground level. The MA crashed approximately 1.5 NM from the Homerville airport, 5 minutes and 26 seconds after the propulsion system malfunction. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) found by a preponderance of the evidence the MA loss was caused by a propulsion system malfunction that dramatically reduced thrust. The MA retained some degree of thrust, but was incapable of sustaining level flight. It additionally found visibility restrictions from the rear cockpit and task oversaturation to be substantially contributing factors. The initial heading flown to allow the MIP to visually acquire Homerville and the ensuing task saturation resulted in a longer ground track than intended. Although analysis of recorded flight data and subsequent flight simulation is not conclusive, it suggests it was possible to reach the field for a very limited period of time if the aircraft flew on a straight line to Homerville.
C-130J, Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan C-130J, T/N 08-3174 JALALABAD AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN 2 OCTOBER 2015 On 2 October 2015, at approximately 0016 hours local time (L), a C-130J, Tail Number (T/N) 08- 3174, crashed after takeoff from Runway 31, Jalalabad Airfield (JAF), on the second scheduled leg of a contingency airlift mission. The mishap aircraft (MA) was assigned to the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. The mishap crew (MC) was from the 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron. The MC consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), the mishap copilot (MCP), and two mishap loadmasters. Also onboard were two fly-away security team (FAST) members and five contractors travelling as passengers. Upon impact, all eleven individuals onboard the aircraft died instantly. The aircraft struck a guard tower manned by three Afghan Special Reaction Force (ASRF) members, whom also died. The MA and cargo load were destroyed, and a perimeter wall and guard tower were damaged. The MA and cargo were valued at $58,363,044. On 1 October 2015, at approximately 2313L, the MA landed at JAF following the first scheduled leg of a contingency airlift mission. While on the ground, the MP placed a hard-shell night vision goggle (NVG) case forward of the yoke during Engine Running Onload/Offload (ERO) operations to maintain the MA elevator in an up position to accommodate loading operations of tall cargo. In the 50 minutes that followed prior to take-off at 0015L, neither the MP nor the MCP removed the case. During the takeoff roll, with the MCP at the controls, the MA rotated early and lifted off the ground approximately three knots below the anticipated takeoff speed. The MA’s pitch angle continued to increase due to the hard-shell NVG case blocking the flight controls, thus preventing the MCP from pushing the yoke forward to decrease the pitch angle. The MCP misidentified the ensuing flight control problem as a trim malfunction resulting in improper recovery techniques being applied by both mishap pilots. The rapid increase in pitch angle resulted in a stall that the mishap pilots were unable to recover. The MA impacted approximately 28 seconds after liftoff, right of the runway, within the confines of JAF. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) president found by a preponderance of the evidence that the causes of the mishap were the MP’s placement of the hard-shell NVG case in front of the yoke blocking forward movement of the flight controls, the distractions experienced by the MP and MCP during the course of the ERO, and the misidentification of the malfunction once airborne. The AIB president also found by a preponderance of the evidence that environmental conditions, inaccurate expectations, and fixation substantially contributed to the mishap.
MQ-1B, T/N 99-3057 AFGHANISTAN 25 JUNE 2014 On 25 June 2014, at 0917 hours zulu (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ- 1B aircraft, tail number 99-3057, forward deployed to Jalalabad Air Base (AB) (JBAD) from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, experienced a turbocharger failure resulting in altitude loss while conducting a mission in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and impacted high terrain in the mountains north of JBAD. At the time of the mishap, the MRPA was being operated by a mission control element (MCE) from the 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon AFB, New Mexico. The MRPA was destroyed on impact. Estimated cost of aircraft and munition damage is $4.82 million. There were no injuries or damage to other government or private property. The mishap pilot (MP) noticed indications of a turbocharger failure as he attempted to level the MRPA at 19,000 feet (ft) Mean Sea Level (MSL) after a descent from 20,500ft MSL. The Mishap MCE performed appropriate emergency checklists, pointed the MRPA toward the nearest launch and recovery element at JBAD, and began planning a recovery route through the mountains. Due to reduced engine power, the MRPA continued a slow descent to 8,650ft MSL before impacting a mountain side at 0917Z. The wreckage was not recovered. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined, by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was a turbocharger failure occurring as power was increased in an attempt to level off at 19,000ft MSL. The exact cause of the turbocharger failure was unable to be determined without recovered wreckage. The subsequent loss of engine performance forced a low altitude recovery through mountainous terrain. The AAIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence that significantly contributing factors to the loss of the MRPA were a combination of severe turbulence and a lower than anticipated maximum performance altitude. The MP defaulted to an altitude range of 10,000- 12,000ft MSL as a basis for selecting the recovery route, the top half of the full range of communal understanding of turbocharger failed performance (8,000-12,000ft MSL). The MRPA was incapable of maintaining this altitude range due to a high density altitude (DA) and downdrafts produced by severe turbulence. Had the MP known the MRPA could not maintain altitude within his range, he would have conducted a more thorough analysis of terrain clearance. Based on a lack of performance data as well as standard training and operating procedures that do not adjust for a higher DA, the MP could not be expected to know the MRPA would level off lower than his anticipated altitude range. Even if performance data did exist, and a maximum performance altitude could have been calculated, dynamic atmospheric conditions in the mountain passes would have jeopardized terrain clearance along any selected recovery route.
RQ-4B, T/N 09-2041 NEAR THE COAST OF ROTA, SPAIN 26 JUNE 2018 On 26 June 2018, at approximately 0919 local (L) time,* a RQ-4B Global Hawk, tail number (T/N) 09-2041, made impact with the ocean off the coast of Rota, Spain, approximately 13 hours and 24 minutes after takeoff from Grand Forks Air Force Base (GFAFB), North Dakota (ND), for a ferry flight to a downrange operational location. The mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) was assigned to the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale Air Force Base, California but located at one of its Geographically Separated Units, the 69th Reconnaissance Group, 348th Reconnaissance Squadron (348 RS), GFAFB, ND. The mishap crew were all assigned to 348 RS at GFAFB, and they were all active duty members of the mishap unit. The mishap did not result in any injuries or damage to private property. The MRPA along with its payload sensor system, together valued at $98.83 million, were destroyed. On 25 June 2018, between 0730L to 1840L, maintenance and aircrew personnel conducted pre- flight inspections at GFAFB and the MRPA took off at 1956L. On 26 June 2018, after approximately 11 hours and 49 minutes, at 0745L, the MRPA received initial engine fault codes indicating low oil quantity and low oil pressure. At 0811L (26 minutes after the first indication), the MRPA’s engine experienced an uncommanded inflight shutdown, based on system faults ranging from low oil quantity to oil pressure to engine vibration, consistent with an oil leak rapidly emptying the oil tank followed by oil starvation and eventual mechanical failure. At 0812L, the mishap pilot (MP) made the decision to divert the MRPA to an emergency route. In accordance with training and the approved mission plan, at 0908L, the MP made the decision to crash/ditch the MRPA in the ocean. The MRPA continued to glide for 11 minutes, where at 0919L, the MRPA crashed into the ocean off the coast of Naval Station Rota, Spain, avoiding loss of human life and infrastructure damage. I find, by a preponderance of evidence, that the cause of the mishap was an oil leak from a cracked oil line, which caused an engine uncommanded inflight shutdown. Furthermore, I find, by a preponderance of evidence, that the unit’s approved mission plan for the mishap sortie did not provide the MP with sufficient emergency divert airfields for unpowered aircraft recovery, substantially contributing to the mishap.