kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
F-16CM, T/N 91-0375 CENTCOM AOR 1 DECEMBER 2014 On 1 December 2014, at 04:58:10 hours local time (L) (02:58:10 hours Zulu time (Z)), the Mishap Aircraft (MA), an F-16CM, Tail Number (T/N) 91-0375, deployed with the 77th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron to a classified base of operation (BO) in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility, impacted the ground 9.5 nautical miles southeast of the BO. The Mishap Flight (MF) was a combat mission in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. The mishap occurred in an unpopulated area. The Mishap Pilot (MP) did not attempt to eject from his aircraft and was fatally injured on impact. The MA was destroyed with a loss valued at $30,796,852. Host nation forces recovered the MP’s remains and transported them to U.S. forces at the BO. The mishap caused neither civilian injuries nor damage to civilian property. Many domestic and international media sources reported on the mishap. The MF took off from the BO on | December 2014, at 0421L (0221Z), and flew entirely at night. Upon takeoff, the Mishap Wingman (MW) experienced a landing gear door malfunction requiring the MF to remain near the BO, burn down fuel, and land. During the subsequent recovery to base, the MP unintentionally descended from 3000’ mean sea level (MSL) to the ground (1,680’ MSL). The MP maneuvered the MA during this 32-second period, but did not attempt to stop the descent until an abrupt pull away from the ground during the last second of flight, which was insufficient to avoid impact. The MP flew 1000’ below the minimum altitude prior to starting the landing approach, reducing the time to recognize and recover from the subsequent unintentional descent. With no radar control, to expedite their combat mission, the MF executed a common practice of joining the instrument approach inside the initial approach fix, against published procedures. The MP did not attempt to eject from the MA and died upon impact. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by clear and convincing evidence the cause of this mishap was the mishap pilot’s unrecognized descent into the ground resulting in controlled flight into terrain. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the MP’s initial intentional descent below minimum safe altitude, significantly reducing the time available to recognize and respond to the unrecognized descent, was a factor that significantly contributed to the mishap.
MQ-1B Predator, T/N 04-3129 USCENTCOM AOR 2 FEBRUARY 2016 On 2 February 2016, at approximately 2322 Zulu time (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 04-3129, forward deployed from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, crashed after conducting a combat support mission. At the time of the mishap, the mishap launch and recovery element (MLRE) from the 414th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron operated the MRPA from a deployed location in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). The MRPA experienced datalink problems, departed controlled flight, and crashed approximately 10 nautical miles south of the intended base of landing. The estimated cost of aircraft and munitions is $4.1 million. No one reported any injuries or deaths, only minor damages to a cultivated field. At approximately 2314Z, the MLRE took handover of the MRPA from the mission control element. The MRPA was returning early due to a suspected engine malfunction. The handover was uneventful. Over the next six minutes, the MLRE confirmed that the engine was underperforming and began a descent for landing. In the descent, the MLRE experienced degraded video and telemetry, indicative of a degraded C-Band datalink. While troubleshooting the datalink problems, the MLRE received numerous warnings for angle of attack stalls with continually degrading telemetry and video. Evidence showed that the MLRE lost usable C-Band downlink from the MRPA. Consequently, heads up display information was exceedingly unreliable to make informed control inputs to the MRPA. The MRPA never executed the emergency mission profile and continued to respond to mishap pilot’s (MP) and mishap sensor operator’s (MSO) commands. As the MRPA descended, MP inputs transmitted to the MRPA caused a left yaw and left roll, resulting in a departure from controlled flight. The MRPA entered an unrecoverable spin and the impact destroyed the aircraft. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the failure to execute the checklist procedure for a loss of usable C-band downlink above 2000 feet above ground level, which resulted in ill-informed control inputs and a subsequent unrecoverable departure from controlled flight. The AAIB President also found by a preponderance of the evidence that the MRPA’s underperforming turbocharger was a factor that substantially contributed to the mishap by causing a major distraction to the MLRE.
MQ-1B, T/N 06-3166 US CENTCOM AOR 17 August 2017 On 17 August 2017, at approximately 18:59:32 Zulu (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), a remotely piloted MQ-1B, tail number (T/N) 06-3166, from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), was lost in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility (US CENTCOM AOR) while forward deployed participating in a combat support mission. At the time of the mishap, the MA was being operated by an aircrew from the 432d Air Expeditionary Wing, Creech AFB, NV. The MA executed an unrecoverable flight maneuver after the aircraft was transferred from the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE). The majority of the MA was destroyed from a fire at the impact site. The estimated cost of the MA and environmental clean-up cost was $5,380,813. There were no reported fatalities or injuries. After normal transfer of aircraft control from the LRE, commonly known as a Gaining Handover in the Air Force Technical Order, the mishap crew (i.e. mishap instructor pilot (MIP), mishap pilot (MP) and mishap sensor operator (MSO)) observed the MA execute a rapid, unrecoverable flight maneuver without pilot flight control inputs. This occurred 27 seconds after gaining handover. Based on testimony from the MIP and the LRE pilot, the handover was successful. The MA was flying level at 4,100 feet mean sea level (MSL) with both mishap crew and LRE aircrew receiving the video feeds from different transmitters. Although the mishap crew lost their video feed (“lost link”) immediately after the un-commanded pitch down maneuver, the LRE aircrew observed the MA pitch over then initiate a rolling dive towards the ground until impact. The LRE attempted to regain control of the MA through their transmitters, but the connection was unsuccessful. Gaining Handover checklist procedures were not a factor. Weather was not a factor. The ground control station (GCS), otherwise known as the cockpit, and the maintenance of the cockpit was not a factor. The 72-Hour/7-Day History review of the mishap crew did not highlight any notable factors. The LRE and their contract maintenance teams were found not to be a factor. The primary contractor, General Atomics — Aeronautical Systems Incorporated, completed analysis on the cockpit data log recordings and found the cause of the rapid unrecoverable maneuver was a failure of an electrical cable that resulted in a loss of power in the left tail flight control surface. This loss of power moved the left tail electrical components to the maximum trailing-edge-down deflection, resulting in a non-flyable configuration. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was an internal electrical failure that caused the un-commanded movement of the left tail surface, which resulted in the aircraft’s inability to continue flight.
F-22A, T/N 06-4109 NELLIS AIR FORCE BASE, NEVADA 30 OCTOBER 2020 On 30 October 2020, at approximately 0930 local time, the Mishap Aircraft (MA), an F-22A, tail number (T/N) 06-4109, experienced an overheat condition in the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) exhaust bay. The MA was assigned to the 422d Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), 53d Wing, headquartered at Eglin AFB, Florida. The MA was maintained by the 757th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, 57th Wing, Nellis AFB, NV. The estimated cost to replace damaged parts and repair the MA is $2,690,000. On 26 June 2020, the MA began an extensive modification to prepare for operational test missions. On 28 October 2020, to facilitate troubleshooting of the MA modification, the APU Mixing Exhaust Duct (AMED) was removed, during which time applicable Circuit Breakers (CB) were not pulled and collared, and warnings were not applied to the MA’s structure or the MA digital forms in accordance with Technical Order guidance by Maintenance Member (MXM) |. Further, these errors were not corrected by MXM2, the on-scene 7-Level supervisor who verified the work of MXM1. On 30 October 2020, the MA required defueling and reconfiguration of the aircraft doors via Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), but a decision was made to use the APU instead. On the day of the mishap, the APU Emergency-Off Switch (AES) was incorrectly set to “Normal” by an unknown person. During pre-procedural checks, MXM3 failed to recognize during his review of the MA forms and via visual inspection that AMED installation was required before APU operations. After start of the APU, smoke began emanating from the APU exhaust bay and into the left main landing gear wheel well. MXM3 delayed emergency APU shutdown in order to review the digital forms for fault reporting codes (errors). A maintenance member in the vicinity approached the MA and set the AES to “Emergency Off,” shutting down the APU manually. The Accident Investigation Board President (BP) found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was improper maintenance procedures resulting in the start of the APU while the AMED was removed. The BP also found by the preponderance of the evidence four additional factors that substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) the culture of the mishap unit, including limited use of CB collars and inconsistent use of warnings; (2) the design of test instrumentation on the MA which obscured access to applicable CBs; (3) the extensive nature of the MA’s modification; and (4) the distractions caused by several non-standard events scheduled on the day of the mishap. “
MQ-9A, T/N 06-4105 VICTORIA, REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES 13 DECEMBER 2011 On 13 December 2011, at 0620 Zulu time (Z), an MQ-9A Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), tail number (T/N) 06-4105, crashed following an uncommanded engine shutdown and attempted forced landing that occurred shortly after takeoff from Seychelles International Airport in Victoria, Republic of Seychelles. The RPA, its Multi-Spectral Targeting System, Multi-Spectral Targeting System Electronics Unit, and Beyond Line-of-Sight pod were destroyed, a loss valued at $9,643,000. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to other property. The Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (MRPA) was an asset of the 645th Aeronautical Systems Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The MRPA was forward-operated by the 409th Air Expeditionary Group Detachment 1 at Seychelles International Airport, Victoria, Republic of Seychelles. The Mishap Crew consisted of a contractor-furnished pilot and sensor operator. The accident investigation board (AIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was an electrical short in the MRPA engine control cable assembly. Additionally, the AIB president found, by a preponderance of evidence, continued operation of the MRPA without accomplishing Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO) 1Q-9A-554 and -587, and the Mishap Pilot’s improperly executed forced landing, substantially contributed to the mishap. Under 10 USC. § 2254(d), the opinion of the accident investigator as to the cause of, or the factors contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, if any, may not be considered as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may such information be considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions or statements.
MQ-1B, T/N 00-3068 Nevada Test and Training Range 27 June 2014 On 27 June 2014 at approximately 1301 hours local time (L), an MQ-1B, tail number 00-3068, crashed on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) approximately nine miles from Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, after it departed controlled flight following a missile launch from its left wing at approximately 1258L. The mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) belonged to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron (11 RS). All members of the mishap crew (MC) were assigned to the 15 Reconnaissance Squadron (15 RS). The 11 RS and 15 RS are assigned to the 432nd Wing (432 WG), Creech AFB, Nevada. The MRPA, one missile, two missile electronic control units, and two missile rails were destroyed. Damage to United States government property totaled $4,624,512. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to other property. The MRPA took off at 0633L, loaded with two live missiles, and flew for 5.5 hours prior to the MC taking control. Between takeoff and 1200L, the MRPA was used to conduct multiple training missions for crews other than the MC. The MC took control at approximately 1200L to conduct a training mission practicing missile launches at ground targets. The MC completed several simulated missile launches before attempting to actually launch one of the live missiles. At 1259:35L the MC commanded the live missile on the left wing to launch. At 1259:37L three events occurred simultaneously. First, the MC received a warning the right wing control module (RWCM) had failed. Second, the RWCM lowered and locked the right wing aileron into a full down position. Lowering an aileron on only one wing of the MRPA causes the MRPA to roll and turn in the opposite direction. Third, the MRPA began a left roll and turn, un-commanded by the MC. At 1259:38L the MRPA computer indicated the missile had fired. Shortly after that, the MRPA reached a roll angle of 60 degrees left, which angle was too steep to maintain controlled flight. At 1259:41L the MC’s data feed froze, eliminating the MCs ability to monitor the positioning and orientation of the MRPA. At 1259:46L, the MC received a warning indicating the MRPA lost satellite communication. The MRPA continued out of control until impacting the ground at approximately 1301L. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of this mishap was the failure of the RWCM. There was no action that the MC could have performed which would have prevented the MRPA from going out of control.
F-16C, T/N 86-0317 HIAWATHA NATIONAL FOREST, MICHIGAN 8 DECEMBER 2020 On the night of 8 December 2020, at approximately 19:17 local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an F-16C, tail number (T/N) 86-0317, crashed into a wooded area in the Hiawatha National Forest in Michigan. The mishap pilot (MP) was operating out of the 115th Fighter Wing, Truax Field Air National Guard Base, Wisconsin (WI) while conducting a practice Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission. Upon impact, the mishap resulted in fatal injuries to the MP and destruction of the MA. The mishap flight was planned as a 2-ship night practice ACA mission, to include an air-to-air intercept supported by the WI Civil Air Patrol (CAP) as a Track of Interest. Due to weather conditions in Green Bay, the small CAP aircraft cancelled the intercept portion of the flight and the mishap sortie launched as a 2-ship practice scramble on a back-up instrument profile. Shortly after takeoff, upon terminating the practice scramble, the MP observed a global positioning system (GPS) degradation due to the absence of satellite tracking data. The MP elected to perform an inflight alignment of the inertial navigation system (INS). While troubleshooting the GPS no track and during the inflight alignment, the mishap element performed a lead swap. Shortly after a positive change in roles, the MA entered weather conditions, and the MP lost visual contact with the mishap wingman (MW). The MP and MW established de-confliction via vertical and horizontal means. Subsequently, the MA went into a series of heading, altitude, and attitude changes. Estimated outer boundaries of the flight envelope included 90 degrees nose low attitude, 135 degrees of right bank, and 600 knots airspeed, culminating with an extreme attitude that terminated with controlled flight into terrain. There was no attempt to eject by the MP. The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MP’s failure to effectively recover from spatial disorientation. Further, the combination of night, weather conditions, the use of NVGs, low illumination, the MA’s altitude, attitude and airspeed, as well as the MP’s breakdown in visual scan of the available primary and standby instrumentation impacted the MP’s ability to recognize, confirm, and recover from the unusual attitude created by the spatially disorienting event. The Board President also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, two substantially contributing factors: fixation and a degraded GPS satellite tracking system. “
F-15E STRIKE EAGLE, T/N 90-0254 SOUTHWEST ASIA 3 MAY 2012 On 3 May 2012 at approximately 0718Z/1118L the mishap aircraft (MA), an F-15E, tail number (T/N) 90-0254, forward deployed with the 391“ Expeditionary Fighter Squadron (EFS) to the 380" Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), Southwest Asia, impacted the ground approximately 65 nautical miles south of the host nation Air Base (AB). The mishap sortie was a training mission deployed under a Theater Support Package to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). The crash occurred in an unpopulated area and the mishap aircraft was destroyed with a loss valued at $45,538,495.76. The mishap crew (MC) safely ejected from the aircraft with no injuries and was quickly recovered by host nation search and rescue forces. No known civilian injuries resulted from the mishap, and only minimal damage to a few irrigation lines occurred. There was little media interest following the initial reports of the mishap. On 3 May 2012 at 0629Z/1029L, the MA took off from the host nation AB, for a routine training sortie simulating enemy fighter tactics (Red Air) against friendly forces (Blue Air). The MC was flying as a wingman in a package of six F-15Es acting as Red Air. The MC’s objective was employment of notional ordnance on a point defended by Blue Air. At 1050L the training profile began. At 1116L the mishap pilot (MP) initiated a climb from 2400 feet (ft.) to 10,000 ft. to meet airspace requirements and advanced the throttle to the maximum afterburner setting. Soon after, the MC heard a loud bang and received indications of an overheat condition in the right engine and shut it down. Near simultaneously, the MC began to experience significant uncommanded right roll and yaw of the aircraft. At 1117L, the MP jettisoned all external aircraft stores in an attempt to improve aircraft controllability; this had no apparent effect and the MP continued to struggle with the aircraft. Quickly following, the MC received indications of a fire in the right engine and Aircraft Mounted Accessory Drive. The MP employed the fire extinguisher system into the right engine. The MA then experienced complete electrical system and communications failure. With the aircraft at the prescribed uncontrolled bailout altitude and fire continuing to burn in the right engine compartment the MP used hand signals to command bailout. The MC safely ejected from the MA. The MA crashed 10-20 seconds later. The Accident Board President found by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was catastrophic failure of the right engine. The cause of the engine failure, by clear and convincing evidence, was a rare ignition of the titantum components within the engine resulting in an extremely destructive fire. This fire led to associated failure of critical hydraulic systems, which by a preponderance of the evidence, was a substantially contributing factor to the mishap. The loss of the right engine and critical hydraulic systems made the aircraft uncontrollable and resulted in the eventual crash.
F-16CM, T/N 94-0043 Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina 30 June 2020 On 30 June 2020, the mishap pilot (MP), flying F-16CM tail number (T/N) 94-0043, assigned to the 77th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base (AFB), South Carolina, engaged in a night mission qualification training (MQT) flight near Shaw AFB. During the recovery and landing phase of the mission, at approximately 2226 local time (L), the mishap aircraft’s (MA) landing gear was damaged in an initial landing attempt at Shaw AFB. In a subsequent landing attempt, at approximately 2259L, the MA departed the runway and the MP was fatally injured during an unsuccessful ejection. The mishap flight was planned as a 4-ship night MQT suppression of enemy air defenses mission with pre-strike air-to-air refueling from a KC-135. The first three F-16s of the mishap flight, which included the mishap flight lead, mishap wingman, and mishap element lead (MEL) refueled without incident. However, the MP was unable to refuel, requiring the MEL and MP to return to Shaw AFB. During the final phase of landing on runway 22R, the MA struck the localizer antenna array short of the runway threshold, severely damaging the left main landing gear. After briefly touching down in the underrun, the MP executed a go-around and alerted the MEL and air traffic control personnel of the situation. Following more than twenty minutes of discussion between the supervisor of flying (SOF), the MEL, and MP it was decided to attempt an approach-end cable arrestment on runway 04L. During the maneuver, the MA’s tail hook did not catch the cable and the left wing fell to the runway, dragging the MA to the left. The MP ejected from the MA, but the ejection seat malfunctioned and the parachute did not deploy. The MP was fatally injured and the MA was destroyed. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP’s failure to correctly interpret the approach lighting system and identify the runway threshold during his first landing attempt, which resulted in severely damaged landing gear. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of evidence two factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the SOF chose not to consult the aircraft manufacturer, which resulted in the decision to attempt a cable arrestment in lieu of a controlled ejection and (b) a series of ejection seat malfunctions occurred, which resulted in the MP impacting the ground while still in the ejection seat. “