kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
MQ-1B, T/N 06-3178 FORWARD OPERATING BASE (FOB), AFGHANISTAN 20 AUGUST 2011 On 20 Aug 11, at approximately 15:36 Zulu (Z) time, an MQ-1B Predator remotely piloted aircraft, T/N 06-3178, impacted the ground approximately 1.7 miles southwest of a forward operating base (FOB) in Afghanistan after approximately 17.2 hours of a surveillance mission. The mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) was forward deployed from the 432d Air Expeditionary Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada. The MRPA was operated by the 3d Special Operations Squadron, Cannon AFB, New Mexico. The MRPA, one air to ground Hellfire missile and one missile rail were destroyed on impact. Two civilian residential structures were also damaged. The total damage to U.S. Government property was assessed to be $3,844,825 .00. There were no injuries or damage to other government or civilian property as a result of the mishap. On 19 Aug 11, at approximately 22:27Z, after normal pre-flight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed the FOB. Handover from the Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) to the Mission Control Element (MCE) was uneventful. On 20 Aug 11, at approximately 15:18Z, the Mission Control Element Pilot (MCEP) was hand-flying the MRPA with the altitude hold on at 18,000 feet (ft) mean sea level (MSL) when he noticed the MRPA had lost approximately 3,000 to 4,000 ft and was descending at approximately 1,200 ft per minute. The MCE crew began troubleshooting the emergency and decided to return to base. The MCE Mission Director notified the LRE crew that the MRPA was “falling out of the sky” and they needed to get prepared to take it immediately. The LRE crew immediately stepped to the Ground Control Station to prepare to recover the MRPA. At approximately 15:31Z the LRE conducted an emergency takeover and gained control of the MRPA. When the LRE took control of the MRPA, it was approximately 4,880 ft MSL and approximately five miles from the FOB. After confirming the engine was out, the Mishap Pilot (MP) made the determination that the MRPA did not have enough altitude to reach the FOB and directed the Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO) to find an alternate place to land the aircraft. The MSO located a rural, non-populated area, and the MP turned in that direction. However, due to the rapid descent rate, the MRPA was unable to reach the designated landing site and crashed in a civilian residential area. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was a broken variable pitch propeller quill shaft. The broken quill shaft forced the mishap MRPA’s propeller to an abnormal angle which generated increased drag and caused the MRPA to rapidly descend. By the time the MCEP was able to diagnose the emergency, take action, and handoff the MRPA to the LRE crew, the MRPA had lost too much altitude and was unable to reach the FOB. Furthermore, the AAIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the lack of USAF maintenance guidance defining the serviceable life of a MQ-1B VPP quill shaft substantially contributed to the mishap.
EQ-4B, T/N 04-2017, Afghanistan 20 AUGUST 2011 On 20 August 2011, at approximately 1711 Zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), EQ-4B Global Hawk, tail number (T/N) 04-2017, crashed in Afghanistan, 9.4 hours after takeoff, while conducting a tasked communications relay mission. No injuries, damage to other government property, or damage to private property occurred as a result of the mishap. The aircraft was assigned to the 9th Reconnaissance Wing at Beale Air Force Base (AFB), California, and was forward deployed to the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The pilot flying the aircraft at the time of the mishap (MP1) was from the 12th Reconnaissance Squadron, Beale AFB, CA. After normal pre-flight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at 0745Z. Handover procedures from the Launch and Recovery Element pilot to the Mission Control Element (MCE) pilot were uneventful. At 1707Z, MP1 lost satellite link with the MRPA approximately 105 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Kandahar, Afghanistan with no other abnormal indications. The remote site operating the MRPA payload simultaneously lost all links with the payload. The MP1 ran appropriate lost link procedures, but was unable to reestablish communication with the MRPA. Off-board radar tracks showed that the MRPA departed controlled flight and started a high-speed descent approximately 25 seconds after losing satellite link with the MCE. 3 minutes later, the MRPA impacted remote, deserted terrain approximately 4 nm from its last reported position and was destroyed. The estimated loss is valued at $72.8M. The Accident Investigation Board President could not find a cause supported by clear and convincing evidence; however, the Board President determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantially contributing factor was the failure of a single Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). Specifically, a partial separation of the LRU-X-1 JX connector led to interruption of electrical power to aileron and spoiler flight control actuators, rendering the aircraft uncontrollable. To keep this report unclassified and releasable, the generic term LRU or LRU- X-1 is used throughout, in lieu of naming the specific failed component. The Board President was not able to determine the exact cause of the LRU failure since the MRPA’s avionics were not recovered from the crash site. The Board President also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that LRU installation methods were a contributing factor in the mishap.
MQ-1B, T/N 08-3237 CENTCOM AOR 27 MAY 2015 On 27 May 2015, at approximately 0900 hours Zulu (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B, tail number 08-3237, assigned to and operated by the 20th Reconnaissance Squadron, located at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, 432d Wing, Creech AFB, Nevada, while on a mission in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), experienced engine failure and was ditched into nearby terrain. The wreckage was not recovered. Total loss of government property is valued at $2,806,523. There were no injuries or damage to other government property (US or foreign) or civilian property. On 27 May 2015, at 0252Z, after normal pre-flight checks, the MRPA departed for a mission in the CENTCOM AOR. The launch and transition to the mission control element was uneventful. The first indications of an engine problem occurred approximately four hours into the sortie. The Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO) received system warnings of high temperature in the engine cylinder head. The Mishap Crew (MC) began troubleshooting and saw additional system warnings on their Heads Down Display for low engine coolant temperature. The MC assessed an engine coolant leak and began to run the engine overheat checklist. Step 2 of the engine overheat checklist is to move the fan into the manual position, prior to turning the engine cooling fan on. This step was not accomplished. Without the fan working, the engine began a steady increase in temperature. The increased heat in the engine compartment and the steady decline in altitude culminated in an overheated engine that lost power. Because of the low altitude, the aircraft was in an unrecoverable state. The MP, upon authorization from higher headquarters, flew the aircraft into the ground. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) Board President (BP) found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was engine failure, due to loss of engine coolant. The AAIB BP found by a preponderance of the evidence that one factor substantially contributed to the mishap: interference while performing the engine overheat checklist.
C-130J-30, T/N 04-3144 Forward Operating Base Shank, Afghanistan 19 May 2013 On 19 May 2013, at approximately 0950 Zulu (1420 local), a C-130J, tail number (T/N) 04- 3144, assigned to the 41st Airlift Squadron, 19th Airlift Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base (AFB), Arkansas, ran off the end of a runway at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank, Northeast, Afghanistan, struck a ditch which collapsed the nose gear and eventually ripped the right main landing gear from the fuselage. The right outboard engine struck the ground, pressurized fuel and oil lines were broken, fluid was sprayed over the cracked engine casing, and the right wing caught fire. The mishap aircraft (MA) came to a full stop at approximately 544 feet (ft) off the end of the paved runway surface. The mishap crew (MC), Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) crew and two ambulatory patients safely evacuated the aircraft through the top flight-deck emergency escape hatch meeting 600 ft off the nose of the aircraft. There were no fatalities, significant injuries or damage to civilian property. The total estimated loss is $73,990,265. The MA was on an AE mission and included five active duty C-130J crewmembers from the 772nd Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (19th Airlift Wing deployed), Kandahar Air Base (AB), Afghanistan. Additionally, the MA had aboard six reserve AE crewmembers from the 65 1st Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (349th Air Mobility Wing and 433rd Airlift Wing deployed), Kandahar AB, Afghanistan. The mishap sortie happened on the third of five planned legs that day to an airfield that was at 6,809 ft Mean Sea Level (MSL) and experiencing winds varying from 200 to 250 degrees gusting from 6 to 28 knots. On the second attempted landing, the MA touched down approximately 1,500 ft down the runway but was 27 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) faster than computed touchdown landing speed leading to the aircraft going off the end of the runway at approximately 49 KIAS. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the causes of the accident were poor Crew Resource Management (CRM) and mishap pilot one’s (MP1) late power reduction causing a 27 KIAS fast touchdown at a high altitude airfield (6,809 ft MSL). Additionally, the AIB President found by the preponderance of evidence that each of the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: 1) Channelized Attention; 2) Risk Assessment; 3) Delayed Necessary Action; 4) Response Set; 5) Procedural Error.
MQ-1B, T/N 07-3197 Undisclosed Location 24 September 2015 On 24 September 2015, at approximately 0902 Zulu (Z) time, the Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 07-3197, assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV) and operated by the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS), Creech AFB, NV, entered cloud coverage and crashed while on a mission in an undisclosed location. The MRPA was destroyed upon impact and the wreckage was not recovered. Damage to the MRPA is estimated at $5,156,042. No injuries, deaths, or damage to private property were reported from the mishap. On 24 September 2015, at approximately 0200Z, after normal maintenance and pre-flight checks, the MRPA departed for a mission from an undisclosed air base. The mishap crew (MC) conducted a changeover briefing with the previous crew, took control of the MRPA, and continued its mission orbit. At approximately 0902Z, the MRPA entered clouds just as the Ground Control Station (GCS) experienced momentary interruptions (lost link) to the radio link the aircrew uses to control the MQ-1B. The lost link coincided with the MRPA entering clouds. Upon entering the clouds, the MC attempted to reverse direction of flight. The MC visually detected ice on the aircraft and the Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS) camera after rotating the MTS camera to the rearward facing position. Aircraft systems also detected the formation of ice on the MRPA. Turbulence and icing caused the MRPA’s angle of attack and roll control to become erratic. The MRPA’s airspeed dropped below stall speed, and the MRPA stalled causing the MRPA to lose link to the GCS completely. At 0904Z, the GCS received one data sample indicating the MRPA was in an extreme nose-down attitude and had lost approximately 10,000 feet of altitude. Based upon the last data sample and with the MRPA lost link and unrecoverable, the MC suspected the aircraft had crashed. At 1015Z, another aircraft operating in the area confirmed the crash via video feed. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap was inadvertent entry into clouds coinciding with a momentary loss of the MRPA’s satellite datalink with the GCS. The MRPA, its aircraft skin already cooled below freezing, flew into clouds, which caused ice to accumulate on the structure. Icing and turbulence resulted in degraded flight performance, which forced the MRPA into a stalled condition, prohibiting positive datalink with the GCS. The MC was unable to regain control over the MRPA prior to impact with the ground. The AAIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence the following substantially contributing factors: unforecasted and rapidly deteriorating localized weather, breakdown of visual scan, and complacency.
F-16C, T/N 87-0296 Dannelly Field, Alabama 28 July 2011 On 28 July 2011, at approximately 1120 hours local time (L), an F-16C, tail number 87-0296, assigned to the 100" Fighter Squadron, 187" Fighter Wing, Dannelly Field, Alabama departed the prepared runway surface of Wittman Regional Airport (KOSH) causing $5.4 million damage to the mishap aircraft (MA). The mishap pilot (MP) egressed the aircraft unharmed; there was only minor damage to Wittman Regional Airport. The MP was number two of a two-ship formation on a continuation training (CT) mission to the AirVenture 2011 air show at KOSH. After an uneventful flight from Alabama to KOSH, the flight entered the airport landing pattern. During the MP’s landing roll, the MA’s environmental control system (ECS) caused extreme fogging that completely obscured the MP’s visual cues and severely affected the correct execution of his normal landing procedures. The MP correctly applied the defog procedure without effect, resulting in the MA running off the end of the airport’s 8002 ft runway. The weather at the field was 1400 broken, 6 miles visibility, and calm winds. The weather forced the mishap flight (MF) to fly a lower than normal overhead pattern resulting in a flat final turn. The MA landed above computed touchdown speed with the speedbrakes closed. The MP attempted to aerobrake, but could not gauge the angle of attack (AOA) because of ECS fog. The MA never achieved the desired aerodynamic braking resulting in the jet exiting the prepared surface coming to rest approximately 300 ft into the grass infield. The MP egressed and emergency vehicles responded. The board president found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was extreme fogging in the MA cockpit, caused by the MA ECS, that completely obscured the MP’s vision. The board president found by a preponderance of the evidence that substantially contributing factors were an inadequate aerobrake, a fast touchdown speed, and closed speedbrakes. Aerodynamic braking provides the most effective braking in the F-16 during landing. The ECS fog denied the MP the ability to establish a proper aerobrake increasing his landing distance. The fast touchdown speed increased the landing distance, but would have been negated by a proper aerobrake. Speedbrakes would add some minor aerodynamic drag during the landing roll, but would not have prevented the MA’s runway departure. The speedbrakes’ primary purpose is to increase drag which at landing airspeeds provides for a higher power setting allowing for faster engine spool up in the event of go around. If not for the lack of visual and instrument references, the MP could have executed a proper aerobrake, come to a complete stop on the runway, and still had approximately 1000 ft of runway remaining.
MQ-1B PREDATOR, T/N 04-3133 NEAR KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN 2 MARCH 2013 On 2 March 2013, at approximately 0213 hours Zulu time (Z), an MQ-1B, tail number 04-3133 assigned to the 3d Special Operations Squadron (SOS), 27th Special Operations Wing (SOW), being flown by a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) assigned to the 62d Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS), 451st Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan, experienced a Secondary Control Module (SCM) malfunction causing abnormal flight control outputs to the aircraft's left tail board (ruddervator), entered into an unrecoverable spin, and impacted the ground approximately 7 nautical miles (nm) southwest of Kandahar Air Base. There were no injuries or fatalities nor damage to private property. The Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (MRPA) was destroyed upon impact with a loss valued at $4,688,557. On 1 March 2013 at 0422Z, the Mishap Crew (MC) composed of the Mishap Pilot (MP) and Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO) launched the MRPA from Kandahar Air Field. At 0436Z, 14 minutes after take-off, the MC handed the MRPA over to the Mission Control Element (MCE), whose crews accomplished the mission phase of the sortie over the next 21.4 hours. At 0159Z, 2 March 2013, the MCE relinquished control to the MC at Kandahar Air Field for landing. Eight minutes after the MC took control and while in a shallow descent, the MRPA displayed a loss of telemetry on the MP’s flight graphics. The MP opted to send the aircraft lost link and execute its preprogrammed emergency mission. At 0210Z, the MP regained downlink of the aircraft and was able to see the aircraft executing its preprogrammed emergency mission. The MC noticed a warning message on the Heads Down Display (HDD), "Tail Computer Left - ROM Failed". The MP took control of the MRPA and noted that the flight control outputs were not matching commanded inputs. One minute and 30 seconds after taking aircraft control, the MRPA dropped to an extremely low nose down attitude and began to spin. The MP and MSO killed the uplinks to the MRPA in order to get the MRPA to fly its preprogrammed emergency mission. When the MC tried to reestablish link a few moments later, they saw nothing but static. The Tower Controller verified that he saw a cloud of smoke on the ground at or near the MRPA’s last known position. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the failure of an Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM) chip on the circuit board within the SCM that controls the ruddervator. F. ailure of the EPROM chip led to uncommanded movements of the left ruddervator, eventually resulting in a trailing-edge down position beyond 10 degrees, departure from controlled flight, and impact with the terrain.
C-130H3, T/N 94-6706 AI TAJI ARMY AIRFIELD 8 JUNE 2020 On 8 June 2020, at approximately 2205 hours local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), a C-130H (tail number (T/N) 94-6706), was involved in a mishap during a routine mobility airlift mission from Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, into Al Taji (Camp Taji), Iraq, when it failed to come to a stop during landing, overran the runway, and impacted a concrete barrier. All 26 mishap crew (MC) members and passengers survived the mishap, with relatively minor injuries to two of the individuals. The MA was damaged beyond repair, and was valued at $35,900,000. The MA was from the 165th Airlift Wing (165 AW), Georgia Air National Guard (ANG), was manned with Wyoming ANG crew members deployed from the 153d Airlift Wing (153 AW), in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and assigned to the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing (386 AEW) at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait. The mishap occurred at the end of the first planned leg of the MC’s mission on 8 June 2020. The MC departed Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, at approximately 2053L, with an uneventful start, taxi, takeoff, and cruise to Camp Taji. During descent into Camp Taji, the MC prepared the MA for a nighttime landing, using night vision devices. During this time, the MC turned the MA earlier than their planned turn point, did not descend to lower altitudes in accordance with their planned descent, and allowed the airspeed to exceed recommended maximum speeds for the configuration the plane was in. During the landing, the MA continued to be above the planned glideslope and maintained excessive airspeed, with a nose-down attitude until touchdown. The MA proceeded to “porpoise” or oscillate down the runway from the point of touchdown until the MA was slowed sufficiently by use of reverse thrust from the engines to allow the MA to settle onto the wheels, which in turn allowed for the brakes to engage. The MA, despite slowing somewhat, had less than 1,000 feet of runway remaining by that point, and thus overran the runway and did not come to a complete stop until it impacted a 12-foot-high concrete barrier, approximately 600 feet past the runway. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the causes of the mishap were the MA’s excess airspeed above recommended landing velocity, which caused the MA to maintain lift (flight) and did not provide sufficient weight on wheels (WOW) to allow braking action to occur. Additionally, the AIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately assess risk, failure to follow proper procedures, and their poor communication were all substantially contributing factors to the mishap.
F-16CM, T/N 88-0518 USCENTCOM AOR 29 MARCH 2016 On 29 March 2016, at 2027 local time, in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility, the Mishap Aircraft (MA), an F-16CM, tail number 88-0518, assigned to the 421st Fighter Squadron, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, suffered a hardware malfunction in the Mishap Engine (ME), resulting in an uncommanded engine rollback shortly after takeoff which triggered an unrecoverable compressor stall. The Mishap Pilot (MP) immediately executed a climb, ejected safely, and only sustained minor injuries. The MA, valued at $25,335,314, was destroyed. Including other government property, the total government loss for this mishap is valued at $29,076,216. In addition, there was some damage to non-DoD crops. The mishap occurred on an alert scramble two-ship night flight. Just after takeoff, the MP simultaneously saw a giant explosion shoot out the front of the MA, heard loud grinding and two big thumps accompanied by significant vibration. At that moment, the MA was approximately 20’ above the runway traveling at 200 knots. Recognizing a state of degraded thrust, the MP immediately initiated a climb. At 880’ above the ground with a rapidly decreasing climb-rate and airspeed decreasing below 170 knots, the MP ejected. Despite being in full afterburner (maximum available thrust), the MA crashed eight seconds later, in a rural area, within a mile of the runway. After ejection, the MP landed safely suffering only minor injuries. There were no other injuries. The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap to be material failure of at least one Stage 2 Low Pressure Turbine blade, which induced an unrecoverable compressor stall shortly after takeoff. This event rendered the ME incapable of providing necessary thrust to maintain continued flight.