kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
U-28A, T/N 07-0736 5 NM SOUTHWEST OF AMBOULI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, DJIBOUTI 18 FEBRUARY 2012 On 18 February 2012, at approximately 1918 local time (L), a United States Air Force U-28A aircraft, tail number 07-0736, crashed five nautical miles (NM) southwest of Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti. This aircraft was assigned to the 34th Special Operations Squadron, Ist Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL, and deployed to the 34th Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. The aircraft was destroyed and all four aircrew members died instantly upon impact. The mishap aircraft (MA) departed Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti at 1357L, to accomplish a combat mission in support of a Combined Joint Task Force. The MA proceeded to the area of responsibility (AOR), completed its mission in the AOR and returned back to Djiboutian airspace at 1852L arriving overhead the airfield at 1910L to begin a systems check. The MA proceeded south of the airfield at 10,000 feet (ft) Mean Sea Level (MSL) for 10 NM then turned to the North towards the airfield, accomplished a systems check and requested entry into the pattern at Ambouli International Airport. This request was denied due to other traffic, and the MA was directed to proceed to the west and descend by Air Traffic Control (ATC). The MA began a left descending turn to the west and was directed by ATC to report final. The mishap crew (MC) reported they were passing through 4,000 ft MSL and would report when established on final approach. The MA, continuing to descend, initiated a right turn then reversed the turn entering a left turn while continually and smoothly increasing bank angle until reaching 55 degrees prior to impact. Additionally, the MA continued to steadily increase the descent rate until reaching 11,752 ft per minute prior to impact. The MC received aural “Sink Rate” and “Pull Up” alerts with no apparent corrective action taken. The MA impacted the ground at approximately 1918L, 5 NM southwest of Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti. The MC never lost control of the aircraft; there are no indications of mechanical malfunction; and there are no indications the crew took any actions to control or arrest the descent rate and nose down attitude. The evidence demonstrates that the MC did not recognize the position of the aircraft and, as a result, failed to take appropriate corrective actions. The only plausible reason for the MC not recognizing the situation or reacting to aural alerts is the cognitive disconnect associated with spatial disorientation. The Board President found that the clear and convincing evidence indicated the cause of the mishap was unrecognized spatial disorientation. Additionally, the Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence that failing to cross- check and ignoring the “Sink Rate” caution substantially contributed to the mishap.
PARACHUTING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SC-7 SKYVAN III-200, T/N N46LH ELOY, ARIZONA 21 FEBRUARY 2014 On 21 February 2014, at approximately 0853 local time (L), a Tactical Air Control Party Military Free-Fall (MFF) Jumpmaster died during an inadvertent parachute extraction from a contracted SC-7 Skyvan III-200, tail number (T/N) N46LH, using an MC-4 Parachute, while leading an MFF Canopy-Control Course at SkyDive Arizona in Eloy, Arizona (AZ). The mishap jumper (MJ) was a member of the 17th Special Tactics Squadron, Air Force Special Operations Command, assigned to Fort Benning, Georgia. En route to the drop zone with the mishap aircraft (MA) approaching 9,700 feet mean sea level, the MJ stood and gave the “10 minute” warning and winds call, followed by the “don equipment (rucksack)” command. The MJ opened the Plexiglas ventilation door between the aft cargo door and aircraft floor and sat down on the seat next to the door to don his own rucksack. At approximately 0853L, the MJ made a comment causing the jumper sitting across the aisle to look up and see the MJ’s reserve parachute ripcord handle partially pulled and attached to, or overlaid on, the MJ’s rucksack quick-release shackle. The MJ’s reserve parachute top closing flap had popped open above the MJ’s shoulder, but the pilot chute was still contained between the MJ and aircraft inner wall. As the MJ leaned forward, the spring-loaded pilot chute popped up and fell directly through the open ventilation door taking the reserve parachute with it. In roughly two seconds, the MJ was extracted through the ventilation door opening—tearing off his rucksack, damaging the aft cargo door, and killing him instantly. The MJ landed under a fully inflated reserve parachute at about 0905L, southeast of Eloy, AZ. Both military and civilian emergency responders were immediately on scene, but local emergency medical services declared the MJ dead at 0924L. No other individuals were injured or killed in the mishap. The aircraft suffered the only damage to private property during the mishap. The MJ was a highly trained MFF jumpmaster, acting in accordance with the best practices of the MFF jumpmaster community. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the mishap was caused by the MJ inadvertently pulling his reserve parachute ripcord while donning his rucksack in close proximity to the open ventilation door, which was of sufficient size for a parachute to pass through, but not large enough for safe passage of a person. Additionally, the AIB president found, by a preponderance of evidence, one factor that substantially contributed to the mishap. This factor consists of the opening of the ventilation door without also immediately opening the cargo door, and prior to the time when all jumpers were prepared to depart the aircraft. The opening of the ventilation door in this manner did not violate either military or civilian guidance, but substantially contributed to the mishap.
MQ-9A, T/N 10-4090 AFRICOM AOR 04 February 2015 On 4 February 2015, at approximately 1133 Zulu time (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-9A, tail number 10-4090, assigned to the 33rd Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron, 435th Air Expeditionary Wing, crashed during an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission in the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility. The MA was destroyed upon impact with the water. Loss of government property is valued at $13,203,658.00. No portion of the MA wreckage was returned to the manufacturer for analysis. No injuries, deaths or damage to private property were reported from the mishap. Two separate flight crews operated the MA during the mishap flight. The mission control element mishap crew (MC1) consisted of mishap pilot 1 (MP1) and mishap sensor operator 1 (MSO1). The launch and recovery element mishap crew (MC2) consisted of mishap pilot 2 (MP2) and mishap sensor operator 2 (MSO2). A pre-flight inspection of MA maintenance records and inspections was completed without issue. The MA took off at 0530Z on 4 February 2015 and had an uneventful sortie until approximately 0835Z, when the MA’s starter-generator failed. Approximately one minute after the starter- generator failed, MC1 reversed the flight direction of the MA and began its return flight to base. MCI ran the applicable emergency procedures checklists and restarted the starter-generator shortly thereafter. MC1 turned off several pieces of equipment that used electrical power in an attempt to maximize battery life. At approximately 0914Z, the starter-generator failed for the second time. MC! tried multiple times to restart the starter-generator but was unsuccessful. All non-essential systems were turned off and MC1 programmed the MA to return to base. At 1032Z, MC2 gained control of the MA. MP2 reported that the MA’s batteries had 24 volts (V) of power remaining when the MA was approximately thirty miles from base. Because of the MA’s reduced battery power, MC2 established a holding pattern over international waters in order to assess the situation. While the MA maintained a holding pattern over international waters, the MA’s power continued to drop at a rate of .1V every five to ten minutes. Based on the inability to guarantee complete control of the MA during approach and landing, MC2 was ordered by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander to purposefully fly the MA into international waters. At 1133Z, the MA responded to pilot commanded inputs and impacted the water. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of evidence that the cause of this mishap was a starter-generator failure that resulted in the inability of MC2 to safely land the MA.
TABLE OF CONTENTS F-15E STRIKE EAGLE, T/N 91-000304 NEAR BENGHAZI, LIBYA 21 MARCH 2011 ..,..:ccsssssesssssresnsverrenssssasnssesnennssesnenasnsareassusseensausscengqesecousuescsnsseanceeneancass i TABLE OF CONTENTS cssvoessscieusscsacsecsstucanvasinssaascondousstanshb(ise we di COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS VV SUMMARY OF BACTS ossicssscsomnsyrccictrnnnisesinnasacnnnannenies 1 1, AUTHORITY, PURPOSE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES.. I SE, Paraiba wicca cccccacesvopcesenssseciconsavcosnnsbcone 1 b. Purpose... 1 C. CircuMstances........00 1 2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY ... sod Di TEACIROUIIND + vracsessssssneesnnersorengssqnspasesavennessseganonsassosceszerenrocnsvesasacssoncones wan a. Air Force Command Structure and Organizational Responsibilities ............ 2 (1) United States Air Forces in Europe (Ramstein Air Base, Germany)...... 2 (2) 48th Fighter Wing (RAF Lakenheath, UK)...... seed (3) 492d Fighter Squadron (RAF Lakenheath, UK) ..........cssscscccsssssescesssseseeseseensesssenees 3 (4) 48th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron / 494th Aircraft Maintenance Unit (RAF Eealconnbse nth, URC) ss sciesse sie ca sii Sea aia eae acic ceo 3 b. F-15E Strike Eagle... wut c. Operation ODYSSEY DAWN... oY 4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS............... a) a. Mission... Decor 420 b. Planning.. ins Ci Preklight icsisssssssictsccossces Pa d. Summary of Accident..... ese CA |] (ol 10 f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment... eee | gg: Becmrelly mined Reta isch sss cin nsisccccinzacssiucsscovianecesh cetesstinedacotacdeatincadis i avtuccnbectéctblecsosan 12 Si MAINTENANCE 5. ssccscunssssseconssuiccasecsevecsessaccsevccesteessusnsessocmces bsebh evenbspesaveveameiscpeicecseves 12 Bs PRINS ENCE R NN oo sscossssecnessessceperssasananpositonssaisysepsaatonansdetesanamysesssdaasabantonseasscenscd 12 CH) GRETA BGR RT RIENCE iss cccccnsssctiesincasysoteascscanvesiniecientesen aabibasesbeiecddbboshedscvanapebiedeckesions 12 (2) General Documentation Reviewed ............ssscssssssssssesseecesssstenesssreeteeseee 12 (3) Documentation Specific to the Automatic Flight Control System...... oo & | 1 TAROT oss ssccersuisessartxcccocnncciarsassarrnreccasasecnpiaicccesssuipceenpeeeie nase 13 (1) Aircraft Inspections ...... 13 (2) Engine Inspections........ 14 c. Maintenance Procedures................. 14 (1) AFCS Maintenance Procedures.....cceseserssrrensnssrenes 14 (2) Discrepancies with AFCS Maintenance Procedures .......s:ssssssssensessseensesesrsnserencee 14 F-1SE, T/N 91-000304, 21 March 2011] ii
A-29, T/N PT-ZNV-221 RED RIO BOMBING RANGE, NEW MEXICO 22 JUNE 2018 On 22 June 2018, at 1133 hours local time (L), an A-29, Tail Number PT-ZNV-221, crashed after delivering a Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-12 weapon on the Red Rio Bombing Range, part of the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The mission was a continuation training sortie flown in support of the Light Attack Experiment Phase II. The mishap aircraft (MA) was owned by Embraer, operated and maintained by the Sierra Nevada Corporation, and also operated by the 586th Flight Test Squadron (FLTS), Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico. The mishap crew (MC) was temporarily assigned to the 586 FLTS for the experiment. The MC consisted of the mishap pilot (MP), a United States Naval aviator with F/A-18 experience, and the mishap weapon systems officer (MW), a United States Air Force navigator with a special operations background in the U-28A. The MW ejected with minor injuries while the MP died instantly upon impact after a delayed ejection initiation. The MA was destroyed. At 1103L, the MA departed Holloman AFB. The mission proceeded uneventfully until the first weapon delivery, a GBU-12 release from the left outboard pylon. The MP planned and attempted to execute a right 180-degree turn after the weapon delivery. The MP exacerbated the MA’s right rolling tendency, caused by the GBU-12 release, by making right aileron and rudder inputs while applying 1.47 positive g’s (gravitational force). This resulted in a rapid roll to the right followed by an uncontrolled spiral dive. The MC made four unsuccessful recovery attempts before initiating the ejection sequence below the A-29 Flight Manual recommended minimum altitude for uncontrolled flight. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was the MP’s overcontrol of the MA causing an inadvertent entry into an uncontrolled spiral dive, combined with his failure to apply adequate recovery control inputs. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence, that a specific cause of the MP’s death was delayed initiation of the ejection sequence by the MC, not in accordance with established procedures. The AJB President also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that wrong choice of action by the MC in attempting a 180-degree turn maneuver, without compensating for asymmetry of weapon release at low airspeed, substantially contributed to the mishap. In addition, fixation, critical information not communicated between the MC during the recovery, and operation of the ejection seat selector as directed in SINGLE mode substantially contributed to the fatality.
C-17A, T/N 07-7189 FOB SHANK, AFGHANISTAN 23 JANUARY 2012 On 23 January 2012, at approximately 0749 Zulu (1219 Local), a C-17A Globemaster III aircraft, tail number 07-7189, assigned to the 437th Airlift Wing, Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, landed on runway 34R at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Shank, Afghanistan. The mishap aircraft (MA) was unable to stop, departed the prepared runway surface, struck an embankment, and came to rest approximately 700 feet from the end of the runway. The MA sustained damage to the landing gear, cargo floor, undercarriage, antennas, and main structural components. There were no passengers, fatalities, significant injuries, or damage to civilian or other military property. The estimated cost to repair the MA is $69.4 million. The 816th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, operated the MA from Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. The mishap crew consisted of the Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Copilot (MCP), Mishap First Pilot, Mishap Loadmaster 1, and Mishap Loadmaster 2. Additionally, a Mishap Flying Crew Chief was assigned as mission essential personnel. The accident investigation board (AIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the MP and MCP failed to identify that the landing distance required to safely stop the aircraft exceeded the runway length. Additionally, the AIB president found by the preponderance of evidence, that failure to assess runway conditions for fixed wing operations at FOB Shank substantially contributed to the mishap.
MQ-1B, T/N 07-3210 EASTERN AFGHANISTAN 14 JULY 2014 On 14 July 2014, at 0938 Zulu time (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ- 1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 07-3210, assigned to the 432d Wing (WG), Creech AFB, Nevada, and operated by the 178th Reconnaissance Squadron (178 RS), 119th Wing (119 WG), North Dakota (ND) Air National Guard (ANG), Fargo, ND, impacted the ground approximately 190 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Kandahar Air Base (AB), Afghanistan. The MRPA’s munitions were expended prior to impact. The MRPA was destroyed upon impact with the loss valued at $4.6 million. No injuries, deaths or damage to private property resulted from the mishap. On 14 July 2014, at 0011Z, after normal preflight checks, the MRPA departed Kandahar AB, Afghanistan. The Launch and Recovery Element handed off the MRPA to the Mission Control Element (MCE) uneventfully at 0026Z. Three 178 RS MCE crews flew the MRPA’s assigned mission tasking with no abnormal indications for 8.6 hours before the mishap crew (MC) took control of the aircraft at 0900Z. At 0924Z, the MRPA’s engine, which had been operating normally, ceased producing thrust, with all engine parameters falling below even the idle range. This caused the MRPA to begin an uncommanded descent at 800 — 1,000 feet per minute. The MC analyzed the indications and ran the appropriate checklists. The MC expended their munitions in a location away from any people or buildings, as directed by the Combined Forces Air Component Commander. With insufficient thrust from the engine to remain airborne, the MC selected an uninhabited area for a controlled impact into terrain. The MRPA impacted the ground at 0938Z. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the cause of this mishap was an engine failure that rendered the aircraft incapable of producing sufficient thrust to remain airborne. A specific root cause of the engine failure could not be determined, since the MRPA was not recovered. The AAIB President developed her opinion by analyzing factual data from historical records, flight data logs, manufacturer reports, maintenance records, witness testimony, Air Force directives and guidance, and Air Force Technical Orders; by conducting flight simulations and an in-person visit to the mishap squadron facilities and ground control station; and through consultation with maintenance and other subject matter experts.
F-15C, T/N 84-0008 NEAR KADENA AIR BASE, JAPAN 11 JUNE 2018 On 11 June 2018, at approximately 0617 hours local time (L), the Mishap Aircraft (MA), an F-15C, T/N 84-0008, assigned to the 44th Fighter Squadron (44 FS), 18th Wing (18 WG), Kadena AB, Japan, crashed into the Pacific Ocean approximately 70 miles south of Kadena Air Base. The MA broke apart upon impact with a loss valued at $42,360,014.00. The Mishap Pilot (MP) ejected from the MA and sustained serious injuries. Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) rescue forces flying a UH-60J helicopter, from Naha International Airport, rescued and transported the MP to a military hospital at Camp Foster, Japan. There were no fatalities or damage to civilian property. There was media interest as reported by local, national, and international agencies. The MP was flying as lead of a two-ship formation during a dissimilar basic fighter maneuver (BFM) sortie with an F-22A, assigned to the 525th Fighter Squadron. While maneuvering defensively in relationship to the Mishap Wingman (MW), at approximately 5,400 feet mean sea level (MSL) and 180 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), the MP initiated a vertical climb to 65 degrees nose high, 20 degrees of right bank, 39 degrees Angle-of-Attack (AOA), and 1.2 Gs, which apexed near 6,300 feet MSL and 105 KIAS, before a significant nose drop occurred. The MP perceived the MA was not tracking as desired and initiated an unload of approximately one fist-width’s forward stick with full right rudder. The nose pitched down and to the right to 65 degrees nose low, 110 degrees of right bank, -26 degrees AOA and G forces decreasing from 1.2 to -0.3 Gs. With right rudder still commanded, the MA experienced a negative G departure from controlled flight with a snap roll entry to the left that transitioned to an inverted, negative G spin. The MP received no indications of hydraulic, electrical, fuel, engine, structural, or flight control system malfunctions. The MP was unable to recover the MA and ejected at approximately 1,100 feet MSL. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MP’s improper application of forward stick with full right rudder, which resulted in a negative G departure from controlled flight due to the coupling of aerodynamic forces of yaw and roll. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that spatial disorientation, lack of emergency procedure training for negative G departures from controlled flight, and limited time to analyze the situation and recover substantially contributed to the mishap.
RC-135V, T/N 64-14848 OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA 30 APRIL 2015 On 30 April 2015, at approximately 1825 local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an RC-135V, Tail Number 64-14848, assigned to the 343rd Reconnaissance Squadron, 55th Wing, Offutt Air Force Base (AFB), Nebraska (NE), experienced a fire in the rear cabin during initial takeoff. The MA and its crew were conducting a routine training mission in support of an Air Force Special Operations Command exercise. The Mishap Crewmembers (MC) consisted of cockpit crew, electronic warfare officers, intelligence operators and in-flight maintenance technicians. The Mishap Pilot aborted the takeoff, and all 27 MC safely evacuated the MA. Four crewmembers received treatment for minor smoke inhalation. Fire crews arrived at approximately 1829L and extinguished the flames. The fire burned a hole through the upper fuselage above the rear galley area of the MA, causing structural damage and damage to aircraft control and mission related systems. Repair cost to the MA is estimated at $62.4 million. There were no injuries to civilians or damage to private property. The board president found by preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was a leak in the high-pressure oxygen system due to poor assembly of the system tubing at depot maintenance. Failure by L3 Communications depot maintenance personnel to tighten a retaining nut connecting a metal oxygen tube to a junction fitting above the galley properly caused an oxygen leak. This leak created a highly flammable oxygen-rich environment that ignited. The resulting fire melted the retaining nut causing the tubing to become detached from the junction fitting, feeding more oxygen to the fire, increasing its size, and causing severe damage to the airframe, galley, and mission equipment onboard the aircraft.