kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
F-16C, T/N 87-0315 NEAR FRESNO, CALIFORNIA 27 DECEMBER 2012 On 27 December 2012, at approximately 1533 local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an F-16C Fighting Falcon, tail number (T/N) 87-0315 assigned to the 144th Fighter Wing, Fresno Air National Guard Base (ANGB), California (CA) went out of control during a training mission and impacted the ground 84 nautical miles east of Fresno, CA. The mishap pilot (MP) ejected safely with minor injuries. The MA was destroyed upon impact with total loss valued at $21,405,503.25. The aircraft impacted the ground in a desolate area on government land causing superficial landscape damage. There was no damage to private property and there were no civilian casualties. The mishap flight (MF) departed Fresno ANGB as a formation of two F-16Cs. The MF mission included air to air training opposing a separate two-ship of F16Cs. The MF then split up to accomplish one-against-one air combat training, or Basic Fighter Maneuvers (BFM). On the third and mishap BFM engagement, the MP maneuvered the MA into a nose high and low airspeed state. The MP’s actions to recover from this nose high, low airspeed state were inappropriate and not in accordance with published guidance, resulting in the MA departing controlled flight. The MP incorrectly applied out of control emergency procedure actions and was unable to recover the MA from the out of control situation. The MP safely ejected below recommended ejection altitude. The board president (BP) found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was failure of the MP to properly recover the MA from a high pitch, low airspeed state resulting in an inverted deep stall. In addition, the MP failed to properly apply Out-of-Control Recovery Critical Action Procedures, resulting in an inability to recover the MA before ejection was initiated. Furthermore, the BP found three human factors causal to the mishap: Complacency evident throughout the entire flight, Pressing beyond reasonable limits, and Procedural Error in the last few minutes of flight. Finally, by a preponderance of the evidence, the BP found six other human factors substantially contributed to the mishap: Violation-Lack of Discipline in three separate areas, Seating and Restraints, Illusion-Vestibular, Spatial Disorientation (Type 1) Unrecognized, Channelized Attention, and Error Due to Misperception.
F-22A Mishap, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV Conducted IAW Air Force Instruction 51-503 F-22A, T/N 07-4146 Naval Air Station Fallon, NV 13 April 2018 On 13 April 2018 at approximately 1745 Zulu (Z), 1045 Local (L) time, an F-22A Raptor, T/N 07-4146, assigned to the 90th Fighter Squadron, 3rd Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, took off from runway 31 Left (31L) at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon, Nevada. The mishap pilot (MP) initiated a military power (MIL) takeoff and rotated at 120 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS). As the MP recognized his visual cues for the mishap aircraft (MA) becoming airborne, he raised the landing gear handle (LGH) to retract the landing gear (LG). Immediately after main landing gear (MLG) retraction, the MA settled back on the runway with the MLG doors fully closed and the nose landing gear (NLG) doors in transit. The MA impacted the runway on its underside and slid approximately 6514 feet (ft) until it came to rest 9,419 ft from the runway threshold. Once the MA came to a complete stop, the MP safely egressed the aircraft. There were no injuries, fatalities, or damage to civilian property. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the causes of the mishap were two procedural errors by the MP. First, the MP had incorrect Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) for the conditions at NAS Fallon on the day of the mishap, and more importantly, he failed to apply any corrections to the incorrect TOLD. Second, the MP prematurely retracted the LG at an airspeed that was insufficient for the MA to maintain flight. Additionally, the AIB President found by the preponderance of the evidence that four additional factors substantially contributed to the mishap: inadequate flight brief, organizational acceptance of an incorrect technique, formal training, and organizational overconfidence in equipment.
HH-60G, TAIL NUMBER 88-26109 CLEY NEXT THE SEA, NORFOLK, UNITED KINGDOM 7JANUARY 2014 On 7 January 2014, at approximately 1805 local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an HH-60G, Tail Number 88-26109, assigned to the 56th Rescue Squadron, 48th Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath, United Kingdom (UK), experienced multiple bird strikes during a training mission and impacted privately-owned, grass-covered marshland near Cley next the Sea, UK. The four crewmembers were fatally injured in the mishap. There were no civilian injuries or fatalities. The MA was destroyed upon impact. The cost to the United States government is estimated at $40,302,061. Damage to private property consisted of minimal burning to grass at the crash site. The purpose of the training mission was to conduct a nighttime rescue scenario of a downed F-16 pilot. The training mission included two aircraft, the flight lead aircraft and the MA, collectively known as the mishap formation MF. All members of the flight lead crew and mishap crew wore night vision goggles. The MF departed RAF Lakenheath at 1733L and proceeded to an initial point to verify the status of the simulated downed pilot and conduct threat analysis. Strong winds pushed the MF toward a populated area. To avoid causing a noise disturbance, the MF reestablished its initial point to the north near the coastline. The MA departed the new initial point at 1804L, flying east at approximately 110 feet above ground level and 110 knots indicated air speed toward a landing zone near Salthouse, UK. The flight path took the MF over Cley Marshes in the Norfolk Wildlife Trust near Cley next the Sea. A flock of geese took flight from Cley Marshes, likely startled by the noise of the approaching helicopters, and struck the MA. At least three geese penetrated the windscreen, rendering the mishap pilot and mishap co-pilot unconscious, and at least one goose struck the mishap aerial gunner in the performance of special mission aviator duties, rendering the mishap areal gunner unconscious. In addition, at least one goose hit the nose of the MA, disabling the Trim and Flight Path Stabilization systems. With the mishap pilot and mishap co-pilot unconscious and the Trim and Flight Path Stabilization disabled, the MA’s cyclic stick, which controls pitch and roll of the aircraft, was free to move randomly. The MA banked left to a point where it had no vertical lift. Without vertical lift, and without pilot input to correct the left roll, the MA was not able to remain airborne or maintain controlled flight. The MA impacted the ground at 1805L— approximately three seconds after being struck by the geese. The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence that multiple bird strikes caused the mishap by rendering the mishap pilot and mishap co-pilot unconscious and disabling the Trim and Flight Path Stabilization systems.
AIRCRAFT ABBREVIATED ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION MQ-1B Predator , T/N 08-3245 USCENTCOM AOR 7 JANUARY 2016 On 7 January 2016, at approximately 1000 hours Zulu (Z), while conducting a combat support mission in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator aircraft, tail number (T/N) 08-3245, forward deployed from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, experienced a primary control module (PCM) failure resulting in loss of aircraft control. The MRPA impacted the ground and was destroyed. At the time of the mishap, the MRPA was operated by the mishap mission control element (MMCE) from the 20th Attack Squadron (20 ATKS), Whiteman AFB, Missouri. The estimated cost of aircraft and munition damage is $5,090,368. There were no injuries or reported damage to other government or private property. At about 0900Z, the MRPA received several warning messages including “Payload Power Board Lost,” “Left/Right Aileron Failure,” “Left/Right Tail Failure,” “Engine Computer Failure,” “Engine Err (communication error),” “FC Thru-put,” and “Alt MSL.” Shortly thereafter, telemetry in the return datalink was lost; however, the heads up display (HUD) video showed the aircraft flying a gradual descent, without response to pilot commands. Evidence indicated significant malfunctions. An unplanned increase in the flight computer workload indicated a breakdown of the flight computer memory had occurred. The computer memory is essential to running the computer code that controls overall aircraft function. The degraded flight code execution ultimately resulted in at least one unplanned flight computer reset. The reset was followed by a loss of return datalink telemetry and, most likely, an accompanying loss of command datalink received at the aircraft. The degraded flight code also likely corrupted the emergency mission that was automatically uploaded by the aircraft after the warnings began but before the flight computer reset. After the flight computer reset and the command datalink was lost, the aircraft began to execute a corrupted emergency mission and flew toward an unplanned, erroneous waypoint and altitude. The MRPA flew a continuous sequence of pitch angle changes resulting in a gradual descent until ground impact. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap was an anomaly within the PCM (flight computer) causing it to reset, lose command datalink, and execute a corrupt emergency mission. The corrupt emergency mission commanded the MRPA into an unplanned gradual descent until ground impact.
HH-60G, T/N 91-26354 NEAR KADENA AIR BASE, JAPAN 5 AUGUST 2013 On 5 August 2013 at approximately 1610 hours local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA), an HH-60G, tail number 91-26354, assigned to the 33rd Rescue Squadron, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base (AB), Japan, while flying in formation on a pre-deployment spin-up training mission, impacted terrain approximately 14 nautical miles northeast of Kadena AB in the Central Training Area (CTA). Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Copilot (MCP) and Mishap Aerial Gunner (MAG) exited the MA shortly after impact sustaining minor to major injuries. Mishap Flight Engineer (MFE) was fatally injured. MA was significantly damaged upon impact and subsequently destroyed by ensuing fire with a loss valued at $38,047,154.40. MA impacted on military property, damaging several trees prior to striking the ground. There was no damage to civilian property. There was media interest as reported by local, national and international outlets. MA was in a formation flight to the CTA as the wingman of the Mishap Flight Lead Aircraft (MFLA). Once in the area, MFLA, followed by MA, infiltrated their pararescuemen into a landing zone near a simulated downed helicopter with a survivor. Following the infiltration, MFLA and MA, now with MA in the formation lead position and MFLA as the trailing aircraft/wingman, proceeded to fly in a northwest-southeast oriented figure eight-like racetrack pattern at 150 feet above ground level. On the last turn prior to the mishap, MA, with MCP on the flight controls, turned to the right (east), and in a direction opposite previous turns in order to correct their pattern, which had drifted to the west. MFLA was at MA’s five o’clock position at the beginning of the turn, in an effort to maintain desired gun pattern ground track. There was no indication of discussion or that anyone on the Mishap Crew was aware as to the location of MFLA in relation to MA other than in being in trail. After approximately 90 degrees of turn, MP was surprised to see MFLA off his right side and perceived an immediate conflict with potential for mid-air collision. However, MFLA crew did not have the same perception. Based upon this perception, MP immediately took control of MA, and proceeded to increase bank and initiated a descent to avoid MFLA. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was MP, based upon his perception of a potential for a mid-air collision with the formation wingman, maneuvered MA at low altitude in a manner that resulted in excessive altitude loss and MP’s inability to stop the helicopter’s descent prior to ground impact. Furthermore, the AIB President found by a preponderance of evidence that each of the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) MCP turned in a direction opposite previous racetrack turns and into the flight path of the trailing aircraft; and (2) MP was not aware of trailing aircraft’s specific position prior to turning, which resulted in MP’s surprise upon seeing the trailing aircraft and MP’s belief that immediate maneuvering was required to avoid collision.
MQ-9A, T/N 15-4295 HANCOCK FIELD AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, NEW YORK 25 JUNE 2020 On 25 June 2020, at about 13:24 Zulu time (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an unmanned MQ-9A, tail number (T/N) 15-4295, lost engine power shortly after takeoff and impacted the ground. The MA came to rest approximately 600 feet from the departure end of runway 33 of Syracuse Hancock International Airport. The MA was assigned to the 174th Attack Wing and operated by the 108th Attack Squadron’s Launch and Recovery Element located at Hancock Field Air National Guard Base (ANGB), Syracuse, New York. The MA was significantly damaged on impact resulting in a loss of Government Property valued at $6,085,179.00. Damage to civilian property was minimal and localized to Syracuse Hancock International Airport. There were no injuries or fatalities reported. At 13:23:41Z, the Mishap Pilot (MP) applied takeoff power to the MA and began the takeoff down runway 33 Syracuse Hancock International Airport. At 13:24:14Z the MA lifted off the runway and began to climb out for departure. Approximately seven seconds after becoming airborne and about 150 feet above ground level (AGL) the MA experienced a complete loss of engine power. Loss of engine power was due to the MP misidentifying the Flap Lever. Instead of pushing the Flap Lever forward to reduce the flaps, the MP pulled the Condition Lever backwards which resulted in the fuel supply to the engine being cutoff stopping the engine. Upon realization that the engine had lost power, in accordance with emergency procedures checklist, the mishap crew (MC) consisting of the MP and mishap sensor operator (MSO), began running the Critical Action Procedures (CAPs) for an engine failure. The MP continued to misidentify the appropriate lever and pulled the Flap Lever to full aft or back. The MA impacted the ground 21 seconds after loss of engine power. Upon impact the MA struck a portion of airport runway lights, spun 180 degrees, and came to a rest approximately 600 feet off the departure end of runway 33. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the MP misidentifying the Flap Lever and pulling aft or back on the Condition Lever instead of pushing forward on the Flap Lever which cut the fuel supply to the engine, causing the engine to stop and the MA to impact the ground. Further, the AAIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence that the following factor substantially contributed to the mishap: The design of the pilot Ground Control Station (GCS) Control Console Throttle Quadrant including the proximity of the Condition Lever and the Flap Lever, lack of markings, color differentiation, or a safety guard.
MQ-1B, T/N 07-3201, JALALABAD AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN 24 JULY 2012 On 24 July 2012, at approximately 0310 zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), a MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 07-3201, operated by the 62 Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron (ERS) Detachment | (Det 1) crashed during takeoff while conducting Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) operations from Jalalabad Air Base, Afghanistan. During takeoff, the aircraft departed the runway surface and impacted a cement wall barrier and stopped against a sandbag-protected guardhouse along the left side of the runway. The MRPA’s structure and mechanical components were destroyed resulting in a loss of $4,476,000.00. There were no injuries or damage to other government or private property. After routine maintenance and aircrew preflight checks, the Mishap Crew (MC), consisting of the Mishap Pilot (MP) and the Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO), taxied the MRPA for departure. Both the MP and MSO had the Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS) selected for taxi operations and displayed on their respective Heads Up Displays (HUDs). Neither the MP nor the MSO switched to the nose camera video feed prior to takeoff, as is standard practice. Upon being cleared for takeoff, the MRPA accelerated through 40 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). At approximately 61 KIAS, the MTS ball, which is located under the nose radome of the aircraft and provides a 360 degree view for the aircrew, executed an uncommanded rotation upward of 20 degrees causing both the MP and MSO to lose forward visibility with the runway environment and horizon. Two seconds after the uncommanded rotation, at approximately 64 KIAS, the MP began to abort the takeoff by moving the throttle to idle and applying full brakes. Two seconds after commencing the abort, the MP disabled the Ground Data Terminal (GDT) uplink to send the MRPA “lost link.” Lost link logic takes two seconds to take effect because it takes two seconds to rule out temporary signal dropouts. During this delay, the MRPA slowed to approximately 54 KIAS. The MRPA executed airborne lost link logic by applying full throttle, releasing the brake input and attempting to pitch up two degrees. The MRPA was unable to achieve the lost link heading and accelerate to rotation and lift off speeds prior to departing the runway and impacting the barrier wall on the left side of the runway. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the mishap was the failure of the MP and MSO to use different video sources for takeoff. The uncommanded rotation of the MTS ball was a contributing factor to the mishap because it adversely impacted the crew’s ability to launch the MRPA. Technicians were unable to determine what caused the MTS ball to roll uncommanded. Additional contributing factors include the conflicting 62 ERS commander and 62 ERS Det 1 commander’s Operational Read File (ORF) directions for crew video source use for taxi and the lack of a specific step in the technical manual’s “Pre-Takeoff” checklist to direct the aircrew to confirm video source selection before takeoff.
MQ-1B, T/N 06-3164 CENTCOM AOR 01 March 2015 On 1 March 2015, at 0736:28 Zulu time (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number 06-3164, assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, and operated by the 196th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS), 163d Reconnaissance Wing, March Air Reserve Base, California, experienced an electrical short circuit, lost satellite return link, and was lost approximately in the CENTCOM AOR. The short caused total electrical failure, inhibiting sustained flight. The MRPA was not recovered. Estimated cost of the mishap is $3.9 million. No injuries, deaths or damages to private property were reported from the mishap. On 1| March 2015, at 0503Z, after normal preflight checks, the MRPA departed an air base in the CENTCOM AOR. The Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) handed off the MRPA to the first 196th RS mission control element (MCE) uneventfully at 0547Z. The first MCE then transferred control to the mishap crew (MC) at approximately 0700Z who confirmed that an appropriate emergency mission profile was loaded in case of a lost link event. The MRPA had been flying for two hours and thirty-three minutes when numerous electrical cautions illuminated between 0736:22Z and 0736:28Z. At 0736:28Z, the aircraft’s satellite return link ceased transmitting. The MC performed appropriate lost link emergency checklists, noted the time of 0736Z, and calculated the expected return time, should the aircraft perform its emergency return profile. Ground radars tracked the MRPA until approximately 0741Z and after numerous attempts to restore the link, it was determined that the MRPA would not recover on its own, and recovery efforts began. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President determined, by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of this mishap was a short circuit in one of the MRPA’s Printed Wiring Boards (PWB) that exceeded the electrical generation capacity of both alternators and then drained both batteries leading to total electrical failure. Without electrical power, the aircraft could not maintain satellite link or sustain flight and therefore prevented the MRPA from flying its emergency lost link profile and caused it to crash.
F-16C runway mishap, Nellis AFB, NV F-16C, T/N 85-01546 and F-16C, T/N 85-01549 NELLIS AFB, NV 15 AUGUST 2015 On 15 August 2015 at 1102 hours local time two F-16Cs collided on a runway at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Mishap Aircraft 2 (MA2) impacted the back portion of Mishap Aircraft 1 (MA1) conjoining them. Mishap Pilot 1 (MP1) suffered no injuries and Mishap Pilot 2 (MP2) suffered life-threatening injuries. MA1, tail number 85-01546 and MA2, tail number 85-01549, are assigned to the 457th Fighter Squadron, 301st Fighter Wing, Naval Air Station Fort Worth Joint Reserve Base, Texas. The estimated repair cost of MA1 is $5,412,111. MA2, valued at $64,036,628, was destroyed. Total government loss is valued at $69,501,839. The mishap occurred as part of a local area orientation sortie for Red Flag 15-4, a large force training exercise. The mission was uneventful until landing when MA2 impacted MA] slightly left of centerline with 2512 feet remaining on Runway 21 Right. MP1’s landing, aerobrake, and initial landing rollout were uneventful. However, during deceleration after rollout, he did not clear to the cold (exit) side of the runway. MP2 configured for landing without opening his speedbrakes (flight control surfaces that slow the aircraft). While MP2 landed with proper spacing, he landed too fast, touched down long, and had the engine above idle power. Additionally, MP2 did not aerobrake within prescribed limits. Combined, these actions created a substantial closing velocity between the aircraft. MP2 did not immediately perceive this closure. As MP2 recognized this closure, he saw MA1 still on the hot (landing) side of the runway. MP2 then applied heavy braking pressure and directed MP1 to “clear to the right” (runway exit/cold side). MP1 let his aircraft continue drifting left as he mentally processed this directive radio call. On hearing MP2’s second directive radio call, MP1 braked and maneuvered hard right toward the cold side. Simultaneously, MP2 applied maximum braking (minus extended speedbrakes) and abandoned normal runway deconfliction with a hard right maneuver in an attempt to pass MAI on the right. MP1’s hard right maneuver coincided with MP2’s right maneuver resulting in ground collision. The force of this collision conjoined the aircraft, pinned MP2 under MA1’s right wing, fired MP2’s ejection seat, and drove them off the runway. When the conjoined aircraft came to a stop, MP1 ground egressed. MP2 sustained life-threatening injuries and was lodged in his aircraft, which promptly caught on fire engulfing MA2 in flames. Nellis AFB first responders were on scene fighting this fire in 68 seconds, and subsequently removed MP2 from the wreckage. MP2 was transported to the Nellis AFB Hospital where medical personnel initiated critical life-saving measures. The Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of evidence the causes of the mishap were MP2’s landing, lack of comprehensive braking and flight path deconfliction, combined with MP1’s delayed transition to the cold side of the runway.