kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
BOARD F-15E STRIKE EAGLE, T/N 91-000304 NEAR BENGHAZI, LIBYA 21 MARCH 2011 On 21 March 2011, at approximately 2129 hours Zulu (Z), an F-15E Strike Eagle, tail number 91-000304, departed controlled flight and entered into an unrecoverable spin during a night combat mission in support of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. The mishap aircraft (MA), operated by the 492d Expeditionary Fighter Squadron based out of Aviano Air Base (AB), Italy (IT), was destroyed on ground impact in an unpopulated area near Benghazi, Libya. The mishap aircrew (MC), consisting of the mishap pilot (MP) and the mishap weapons system officer (MW), ejected safely with minor injuries and was recovered by friendly forces, Financial loss of the MA and associated equipment totaled $48,190,996.50. There were no known civilian injuries or damage to other property. At 1713Z, the MC performed a standard takeoff from Aviano AB, IT, for night contingency operations over Libya. The MA was number two (wingman) of two F-15Es in formation. At 2104Z, after refueling uneventfully a second time, the MC proceeded on its mission tasking. Within five minutes, the MC relayed a fuel imbalance of 2,500 pounds trapped in the right external tank, At 2111Z and again at 2112Z, the MC reported that the trapped fuel was feeding slowly. At 2127Z, with the MA advancing approximately two miles ahead in the formation, the two aircraft released munitions and attempted target egress by executing a tum away from each other. At 2128Z, the MC radioed they were in a spin, a “Mayday” call followed, and at 21292, the MC ejected from the MA. The Accident Investigation Board President found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was the MA’s sudden departure from controlled flight during a combat egress maneuver when the MP momentarily exceeded aircraft controllability performance parameters. There was sufficient evidence to determine that one or a combination of the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) ambiguous F-15E technical order guidance concerning maneuvering limitations with aircraft lateral asymmetry while configured with external stores; (2) unknown or misunderstood combat-loaded F-15E aircraft performance while operating at or above 30,000 feet mean sea level; and (3) unpublished, therefore, unfamiliar dynamic lateral directional stability as a function of external stores asymmetry caused by weapons release,
AIRCRAFT ABBREVIATED ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION MQ-1B Predator, T/N 07-3198 USCENTCOM AOR 8 MARCH 2016 On 8 March 2016, at approximately 1500 hours Zulu (Z), while conducting a combat support mission in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number 07-3198, forward deployed from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, experienced a pilot sensor operator (PSO) 1 rack lock-up while simultaneously losing datalink. The MRPA impacted the ground and was not recovered. At the time of the mishap, the MRPA was operated by the mishap mission control element (MMCE) from the 15th Attack Squadron (15 ATKS), Creech AFB, Nevada. The estimated cost of aircraft and munition damage is $4,216,800. There were no injuries or damage to other government or private property. The rack lock-up on PSO1 halted command control of the MRPA and was caused by a software anomaly that can occur following a specific sequence of operator selections on the heads-up display. Simultaneously, the MMCE lost datalink (transmission to and from the MRPA). After the MMCE executed the rack switch to another control setting (PSO2), datalink was re-established, but the return datalink was lost approximately 5 seconds later. On the PSO2 side, the throttle setting remained in the idle position with airspeed hold engaged. The MMCE believed the MRPA lost both command and return datalink and was therefore executing its emergency mission. In reality, the MRPA regained command datalink, unknowingly resulting in the MRPA to be “commanded in the blind.” With the throttle set at idle and airspeed hold on, the MRPA started a descent until it impacted the ground. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was that the MRPA lost return datalink and did not provide the MMCE with any reasonably discernable indication that command datalink was still transmitting; which, when combined with the PSO2 throttle position being in idle and the airspeed hold engaged, led to a commanded descent and eventual ground impact. The AAIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that there were two factors which substantially contributing to the mishap: (a) existing emergency checklists (lost datalink, PSO1 rack lock) did not provide sufficient or clear guidance; and (b) the unscheduled presence of the mishap instructor pilot (MIP) which increased confusion.
F-16C, T/N 87-0314, and F-16C, T/N 86-0357 WARNING AREA 386 1 AUGUST 2013 On 1 August 2013, at 22:23:56 local time (L), an F-16C, tail number (T/N) 87-0314, collided mid-air into an F-16C, T/N 86-0357, while participating in night tactical air intercept training over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Maryland. Both aircraft were assigned to the 121st Fighter Squadron, 113th Wing, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Joint Base Andrews (JBA), Maryland. The right wing of the first mishap aircraft, F-16C, T/N 87-0314 (hereinafter referred to as MA1) struck the left stabilator of the second mishap aircraft, F-16 C, T/N 86-0357 (hereinafter referred to as MA2). The MAI suffered significant structural damage to its right wing, but the mishap pilot (MP1) was able to recover the aircraft to JBA. The MA2 experienced debilitating structural damage causing the aircraft to be uncontrollable. The mishap pilot two (MP2) successfully ejected, sustained non-life threatening injuries, and was recovered by search and rescue (SAR) forces. The MAI suffered damage with a repair cost of $1,072,365.00. The MA2 was destroyed upon impact with the water, resulting in a loss valued at $21,868,432.00. Total mishap loss/cost was $22,940,797.00. There was no damage to private property, and there were no civilian casualties. The MAI and the MA2 departed JBA as part of a three-ship F-16C formation to complete a Mission Qualification Training (MQT) Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) night intercept upgrade. The MP1 was the Instructor Pilot, and the MP2 was number three in the formation as the non- maneuvering adversary training aid. During the upgrade, the MP1 elected to lead an intercept for a demonstration of intercept geometry and ACA pacing. During the intercept, the MP1 rolled out at 3900 feet behind the MA2 then proceeded to close on the MA2’s position to demonstrate an ACA inspect procedure, i.e. fly close enough to allow inspection into a target of interest cockpit. During this phase, the MP1 failed to process the accurate range, airspeed, and closing velocity cues displayed by his aircraft, and attempted to close visually (not monitoring radar cues) under low-illumination/dark night conditions. At 500 feet directly behind the MA2, and at the same altitude, the MP1’s airspeed had increased to 412 knots, with 100 knots of closing velocity. His closing velocity should have been less than 5 knots at that range, with an offset, both in horizontal and in vertical altitude, until sufficient visual references were available to close for the inspect procedure. Three seconds later, the MP! collided into the back of the MA2. The Board President (BP) found by clear and convincing evidence the cause of this mishap was failure of the MP1 to maintain flight path deconfliction between himself and the MA2 due to three human factors causal to the mishap: Misperception of Operational Conditions, Channelized Attention, and Task Misprioritization. By a preponderance of the evidence, the BP found four human factors substantially contributed to the mishap: Overconfidence, Inadequate Crew Rest, Fatigue — Physiological/Mental, and Violation — Lack of Discipline.
Class A Mishap, Near Mountain Home AFB, ID KC-10A, T/N 83-0080 NEAR MOUNTAIN HOME AFB, IDAHO 1 NOVEMBER 2016 On | November 2016, at 1546 hours Zulu time (Z), a United States Air Force KC-10A Extender, tail number 83-0080, the mishap aircraft, assigned to the 60th Air Mobility Wing, departed from its home station of Travis Air Force Base (AFB), California, on a training mission in support of two flights of F-15s and a C-17. The scheduled flight profile was a formation departure from Travis AFB, refueling for approximately one hour with the F-15s, refueling training for approximately 1 hour 15 minutes with the C-17, and approximately one half hour of approach training before landing at Travis AFB. The mishap crew (MC) is assigned to the 9th Air Refueling Squadron, Travis AFB. At 1632Z, the MC prepared for aerial refueling (AR), and the mishap boom operator (MB) lowered the Aerial Refueling Boom (boom). Immediately after lowering the boom, it began to move erratically, oscillating to the aircraft’s right and left in a U-shaped pattern, well outside of its structural limits. After oscillating for approximately two minutes, the boom hoist cable broke. Approximately two minutes later, the gimbal separated from the A-frame gimbal mounts, but remained connected to the fuselage by hydraulic and electrical lines. At 1705Z, the boom completely separated from the aircraft and fell in an open field in Idaho. There were no injuries or fatalities reported with any portion of the mishap. After the boom separated, the MC landed the aircraft at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho without incident. The total monetary value of government loss was $6,529,845.71. The AIB president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, two causes for this mishap. The first cause of this mishap was a sheared Dual Rotary Voltage Transducer (DRVT) rotary crank that resulted from DRVT rotary bearing misalignment. This provided the aircraft’s boom control unit (BCU) with continuous, inaccurate roll position indications. As a result, the BCU compensated with lateral movement commands in both directions, driving the boom beyond its operational and structural limits. The second cause, related to the first, was the MB’s failure to turn off the boom flight control switch in a timely manner. Turning off this switch would have disabled the BCU. This would have neutralized the boom flight control surfaces, and prevented the boom from departing the aircraft. Additionally, the AIB president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the failure of maintenance personnel to comply with technical orders prevented the possible detection of an erratically performing D RVT, substantially contributing to the mishap.
MQ-1B, T/N 02-3100 US CENTCOM AOR 21 August 2017 On 21 August 2017, at 0811 Zulu (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), a remotely piloted MQ-1B, tail number (T/N) 02-3100, from the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), was lost in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility (US CENTCOM AOR) while participating in a combat support mission. At the time of the mishap, the MA was being operated by the 432d Air Expeditionary Wing, Creech AFB, NV. During normal flight operations, the mishap crew permanently lost the ability to monitor and control the aircraft (“lost link”) while flying medium altitude approximately 90 minutes into the mission. The destroyed MA was recovered from the impact site and the estimated cost of the aircraft and environmental clean-up was $5,269,650. There were no reported fatalities or injuries. The MA lost link approximately 36 minutes after a crew changeover brief. At the moment of the lost link event, the aircraft was operating normally at an altitude of 13,000 feet. According to aircrew statements, the mishap crew were troubleshooting the lost link when radar control facilities notified them of the MA crash. Weather was not a factor. The cockpit equipment and the maintenance of the cockpit was not a factor. The training and 72-Hour/7-Day History review of the mishap crew did not highlight any notable factors. The launch and recovery crews and their contract maintenance teams were not a factor. The contractor, General Atomics — Aeronautical Systems Incorporated (GA-ASI), completed analysis of the MA and determined the most likely cause of the accident was the failure of the Primary Control Module (PCM), which is a critical part of the flight control systems. No evidence contradicted GA-ASI’s conclusion. Accordingly, the Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was a failure of the MA’s internal PCM, resulting in the aircraft’s inability to continue flight. There was insufficient evidence of additional substantially contributing factors.
MQ-1B, T/N 01-3074, JALALABAD, AFGHANISTAN 1 MAY 2011 On | May 2011, at approximately 1650 zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), a MQ-1B Predator, tail number 01-3074, operated by the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS) from Creech AFB, crashed 2 kilometers (KM) (direction unknown) outside a Forward Operating Base (FOB) after completing 18 hours of a tasked surveillance mission. The crash site was remote desert terrain close to the FOB, so US Army Soldiers were able to retrieve the salvageable MRPA. The MRPA was intact, but the wings were cut off by the Soldiers retrieving it in order to fit it on their vehicles and return it to their FOB. There were no injuries and there was no damage to other government or private property. After normal maintenance and pre-flight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed from Jalalabad Air Base at approximately 2250Z on 30 Apr 2011. At 1500Z on | May 11, the mishap crew (MC) was working with ground forces in Afghanistan when they encountered weather that prevented them staying on station. The MC coordinated with air traffic control to work another operating area and encountered deteriorating weather conditions and severe clear icing on the MRPA. The MC altered course to get out of the weather and icing conditions. During this transit time the MC received numerous indications of maintenance anomalies (high turbo oil temperature, oil pressure and manifold pressure) for the MRPA. The MC attempted to alleviate the high turbo oil temperature by running the appropriate emergency checklists. The MC utilized the necessary emergency checklists but the high turbo oil temperature indications continued and the MRPA started an insidious descent rate of 200 to 400 feet per minute. The MRPA never maintained level flight again and crashed in a remote area of Afghanistan at approximately 1650Z. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President determined by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was due to prop thrust bearing failure. The failure of the prop thrust bearing contaminated the oil system with metal shavings and particulate that clogged the oil filter, resulting ina lack of adequate oil to the turbocharger and engine. Due to the lack of oil flowing through the system, the MRPA turbocharger eventually failed as well. The MRPA engine was unable to produce adequate thrust with a failed turbocharger and began to descend at a rate of 200 to 400 feet per minute. The MRPA engine developed oil pressure and manifold pressure (MAP) indications that were abnormal due to the oil system contamination. Eventually the MRPA engine experienced excessive heat damage and deterioration which caused a cylinder skirt to crack and destroyed connecting rod #2 further limiting the ability of the MRPA to maintain level flight. The MC realized the MRPA could not return to base or fly to an emergency divert, so the MC controlled the MRPA away from known populated areas. The MRPA crashed when it impacted the terrain. The estimated loss is valued at $2.02M.
F-15C, S/N 79-0025 NEAR KADENA AIR BASE, JAPAN. 28 May 2013 On 28 May 13 at approximately O840L, the mishap aircratt (MA), an F-15C, 5/N 79-0025, assigned to the 44th Fighter Squadron (FS), 18th Wing (WG), Kadena Air Base (AB), Japan, crashed inte the Pacific Ocean approximately 60 miles east of Kadena AB, Japan. The mishap pilot (MP) ejected from the MA and sustained minor injuries. Japan Air Self Defense Force rescue forces recovered the MP. There was no damage to civilian property. The MA broke apart upon impact with a loss valued at $31,964,644.01. There was media interest as reported by local, national, and international outlets. The MP was on a training mission as part of a two-ship formation. The two-ship executed take off, airspace entry and two training engagements without incident. Upon termination of the second training engagement, the MP attempted to rejoin with the lead pilot (LP), at which time the MA no longer responded to MP flight control inputs. At approximately the same time, the MP noticed the hydraulic, yaw, roll, and pitch control augmentation system warning lights were illuminated. The MP was unable to recover the MA from a left descending spiral for over 20 seconds, and ejected at 4,500 feet mean sea level. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of this accident was the MA failing to respond to MP flight control] inputs due to a failure in the hydro-mechanical flight control system. Additionally, the Pitch Roil Channel Assembly provided inputs to the flight control surfaces not commanded by the MP. Furthermore, the AIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence, the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) amalfunction in the hydro-mechanical flight control system (2) limited time for malfunction analysis by the MP (3) lack of simulator emergency procedure training for the cause of this mishap (4) expectancy of the MP based on previous mishaps of a similar nature
F-16CJ Crash, El Paso County, CO BLOCK 52 F-16CJ, T/N 92-3890 EL PASO COUNTY, CO 2 JUNE 2016 On 2 June 2016 at 13:00 local time an F-16CJ was destroyed by ground impact after the Mishap Pilot (MP) ejected south of Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), CO. The MP sustained a minor injury and no other personnel were injured. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) Tail Number 92-3890 and the MP are assigned to the 57th Wing, United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron (USAFADS), Nellis AFB, NV. The MA, valued at $29,466,037.00 (total government loss), was destroyed. There was no known damage to civilian property. The mishap occurred as part of a six F-16 aircraft, USAFADS flyby and airshow combination for a United States Air Force Academy graduation ceremony, Colorado Springs, CO. The mission was uneventful until the MA entered the Peterson AFB traffic pattern in preparation for landing. When the MA was positioned on downwind (parallel to, and opposing the active landing runway), the highly experienced MP inadvertently placed the throttle to cutoff position (engine shutdown). This normally requires both (a) an actuation of the throttle cutoff release trigger switch (throttle trigger), which then permits (b) full throttle grip rotation outboard -- enabling the throttle to be retarded aft (pulled backwards), past the cutoff stop. Below the minimum altitude/airspeed required for either an engine restart or flame-out landing, the MP was forced to eject over a grass field in El Paso County, CO. The throttle trigger must be physically actuated (depressed, squeezed, pulled) to overcome the spring-force in its un-actuated position. Analysis by Air Force Research Laboratory/Materials Integrity Branch identified intermittent sticking/binding of the MA throttle trigger, causing the throttle trigger to remain in the retracted/stuck position after actuation. The throttle trigger bushing was examined and determined to be damaged and worn due to throttle trigger clevis pin misalignment, along with metallic-particle debris contamination -- both increasing the chance of throttle trigger sticking/binding. In addition, lubricant to the throttle trigger assembly was identified (inconsistent with maintenance technical orders), which exacerbated the debris contamination condition. The Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of this mishap was a throttle trigger actuation and subsequent malfunction (throttle trigger stuck in retracted position) followed by the MP’s inadvertent full-rotation of the throttle grip while retarding the throttle aft to cutoff position. Substantially contributing factors include maintenance Technical Orders that lack sufficient detail to consistently identify either a throttle trigger clevis pin misalignment or a sticking/binding throttle trigger.
United States Air Force Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board Report MQ-1B, T/N 07-3207 CENTCOM AOR 28 April 2015 On 28 April 2015, at approximately 0116 hours Local (L), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number 07-3207, assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, and operated by personnel from the 20th Reconnaissance Squadron at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, exited the runway during initial takeoff from an airbase in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility. The MRPA sustained extensive damage after it exited the runway and came to rest. Damage to the MRPA was estimated at $4.66 million. No injuries, deaths or damage to private property were reported from the mishap. On 27 April 2015, the mishap crew (MC) reported for duty, received a pre-mission brief, and was assigned two missions for their shift. The MC conducted a successful landing of a remotely piloted aircraft for their first mission. The MC stepped for their second mission at approximately 0030L (28 April 2015) to launch the MRPA. After establishing initial link communication with the MRPA on the default ‘wake-up’ frequency, the mishap pilot did not switch to the assigned operating frequency. Unbeknownst to the MC, the Ground Data Terminal (GDT) Transmitter #1 (Tx1) was operating in a significantly degraded state, although sufficient to control the MRPA throughout ground operations. At the time of the attempted takeoff, two other GDTs in relatively close physical proximity to the MC’s GDT were operating on the same or very similar frequency, creating a cluttered radio frequency environment. During takeoff roll, the mishap pilot (MP) was correcting for left drift by adding right rudder when the MPRA lost sufficient uplink signal and attempted autonomous takeoff on the high- speed lost link profile. The MC was alerted to the lost link condition of the MRPA and executed the ‘Link Failure Below 2,000 Feet AGL or on the Ground’ Critical Action Procedure (CAP). The mishap sensor operator was slow to execute the CAP. During this delay, uplink control was momentarily restored, transmitting the MP’s right rudder command. This input sent the MPRA sharply back across centerline, toward the right edge of the runway, and into a position from which a successful autonomous lost link takeoff would be highly unlikely given the limited directional control it had available. Uplink was lost again, the aircraft departed the runway onto uneven ground, and it was unable to attain takeoff speed before the landing gear and tails were sheared off. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that three substantially contributing factors contributed to the mishap. Improper frequency selection and degraded Tx1 output power combined to create the environment in which the MRPA lost uplink signal and the delayed CAP execution allowed an abrupt command input to be received by the MRPA, substantially decreasing its chances of successfully completing an autonomous lost link takeoff.