kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
Class A Mishap, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany F-16CJ, T/N 91-0340 SPANGDAHLEM AIR BASE, GERMANY 8 OCTOBER 2019 On 8 October 2019, the mishap pilot (MP), flying a F-16CJ, tail number (T/N) 91-0340, assigned to the 480th Fighter Squadron, “the Warhawks,” 52d Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, conducted a routine training sortie as part of the wing’s local readiness exercise SABER FURY. Shortly after take-off, at 15:10:42 hours local (L) time, the MP ejected from the mishap aircraft (MA) with no injuries. The MA was destroyed upon impact in a forested area at 15:11:24L 8 nautical miles (nm) south of the base. The mishap resulted in zero military or civilian casualties and the loss of a $25,551,000.00 United States government asset. The mishap flight was planned and authorized as a suppression of enemy air defenses training mission within the local training airspace. The MP was flying as number two of a scheduled 4-ship formation, but which departed as a 3-ship. The prevailing weather at the airfield, and in the surrounding area, was a ceiling at 500 feet with instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) up to 15,000 feet. Approximately 13 seconds after take-off, during the transition to IMC, the MA experienced a power disruption causing a partial electrical power loss (also known as an electrical “brownout”) which failed the MP’s primary flight and navigation instruments without corresponding fault or failure indications. This power disruption also caused the embedded global positioning and inertial navigation set (EGI) to lose power and remain off-line. The subsequent degradation and mismatch in data between the primary and standby instruments caused the pilot to become spatially disoriented at low altitude and in IMC. After two failed attempts to activate the pilot activated recovery system, following two instances of visually acquiring trees below the 500-foot ceiling, the MP successfully egressed the aircraft. The Accident Investigation Board President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of the mishap was the combination of two factors. First, the MA experienced a partial electrical power loss (brownout). The power loss caused a cascading failure of the EGI and the MP’s primary flight and navigation instruments. Due to the EGI’s loss of power, the primary attitude direction indicator continued to display unreliable data without fault or failure indications and prevented the MP from transitioning fully to the standby attitude indicator for attitude reference. Second, the weather conditions at the time of the power disruption caused the MP to rely on his primary and standby flight instruments to maintain aircraft control during a critical phase of flight. The mismatch in data provided by the primary and standby attitude indicators, due to the power disruption, caused the MP to become spatially disoriented and unable to maintain aircraft control in the weather and at low altitude. The absence of either factor may have prevented this mishap.
MQ-1B, T/N 07-3213 JALALABAD AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN 26 APRIL 2014 On 26 April 2014 at approximately 0014 Zulu (Z), the mishap aircraft (MA), an MQ-1B tail number 07-3213, owned by the 432d Wing at Creech Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, crashed near Jalalabad Airfield, Afghanistan. At the time of the mishap, the MA was being operated by a mission control element (MCE) crew, from the 214th Reconnaissance Squadron at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. There were neither injuries to civilians or military personnel nor damage to civilian property during the crash. The MA was destroyed upon impact with an estimated loss of government property valued at $4.61 million. No portion of the MA wreckage was recovered. On 25 April 2014 at 1829Z, the MA took off from Jalalabad Airfield without incident. The mishap crew (MC), which was the fourth MCE crew for the mishap flight, consisted of a Mishap Pilot (MP) and a Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO). The MC gained control of the MA from the previous MCE crew without incident. Approximately 5.3 hours after takeoff and 45 minutes after the MC assumed control of the MA, the aural warning tone alarm sounded in the ground control station. Simultaneously, the warnings for “low oil level” and “low oil pressure” appeared on the heads-down display. The engine oil level had rapidly decreased from 76 percent to 35 percent within a span of one minute and 54 seconds. MP directed MSO to turn the camera to the rear of the MA to look for oil leaks. The MC observed pieces of material and fluid emanating from the MA at a rapid pace. MP turned the MA in the direction of Jalalabad Airfield, while executing the Low Oil Pressure Checklist with the MSO. Seven minutes after the initial warning, the engine seized completely. Shortly thereafter, the MC lost satellite datalink connectivity with the MA. At the time it lost connectivity, the MA was at 14,500 feet mean sea level and descending in a glide. The satellite datalink was restored and remained intact for approximately 14 more minutes. When it was apparent that the MA would crash, the MC began to search for a non-populated area to land. Using the camera, they looked down and identified a valley. Twenty to twenty-five seconds prior to impacting the ground, the MC lost satellite connectivity with the MA and never regained it back. The MA was destroyed upon impact. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the cause of the mishap was an engine oil leak. The MA sustained a complete loss of oil. The rapid rate at which the oil leaked out of the engine indicated catastrophic oil system failure, which eventually resulted in complete engine seizure. After the engine seized, the MA was unable to maintain altitude and was too far away from Jalalabad Airfield to return to base.
MQ-9A, T/N 10-4113 NEVADA TEST AND TRAINING RANGE 7 JUNE 2016 On 7 June 2016, at approximately 22:29:47 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), the remotely piloted mishap aircraft (MA), a MQ-9A, tail number 10-4113, assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada and operated by the 26th Weapons Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV, crashed while on a proficiency flight. The MA impacted the ground on U.S. government property. The MA was destroyed at a loss of $11,063,339.00. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to civilian property. The mishap occurred approximately two minutes after aircraft handover from the 432d Wing’s Launch and Recovery Element (LRE). At approximately 22:27:11 GMT, the Mishap Crew (MC), comprised of the mishap pilot (MP) and mishap sensor operator (MSO), gained control of the MA at 8,500 feet mean sea level (MSL). Unrecognized by the MC, the programmed minimum altitude (altimeter) was preset at 9,000 feet MSL. At 22:28:19 GMT, when MC executed handover checklist items, they unknowingly engaged the preset altitude and the MA began to climb. MSO advised MP, who was completing handover checklists, of the climb. MP incorrectly believed there was an unexpected flight condition or malfunction. To halt the ascent, MP switched from autopilot to manual mode (“landing configuration”). Landing configuration disables stall protection and auto-adjustments (airspeed and altitude). MP then directed the MA to descend to 8,000 feet MSL. The MP also reduced power to the MA, to avoid acceleration. MP resumed working on the handover checklist. MP had not adjusted the MA nose/pitch, which was positioned upward. The reduced power and the nose/pitch resulted in a reduced energy state and aircraft stall. MP initially was preoccupied with the handover checklist and did not observe the Heads-Up Display gauges nor the audible and visual stall warnings. MSO advised MP that the aircraft was in a stall condition. MP did not apply the Flight Manual stall recovery procedures, but instead, increased power to the MA, which, due to the weight of the MA and its stalled condition, caused the MA to spiral towards the ground. The MA impacted the ground in the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) at 22:29:20 GMT. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap was the combination of (1) MP’s misprioritization to complete the handover checklist, and (2) MP’s failure to observe prior warnings of reduced energy state and stall, and timely implement stall recovery procedures. A substantially contributing factor to this mishap was the MC’s loss of situational awareness.
UH-IN, T/N 69-6603 KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO 27 APRIL 2011 On 27 April 2011, at approximately 1115 local time, a UH-IN, T/N 69-6603, crashed at a remote landing zone near Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico (NM). The mishap crew (MC) was performing hoist operations when the rescue device, in this case a forest penetrator, snagged on a stationary F-111 capsule. The mishap aircraft (MA) entered a descending right turn and impacted terrain. After the MA came to a rest, the MC egressed the MA unharmed. The MA is assigned to the 512th Rescue Squadron, 58th Special Operations Wing, Kirtland AFB, NM. The MC was conducting an initial instructor flight engineer checkride involving hoist operations. The MC consisted of two pilots (MP1 and MP2) and two flight engineers (MF1 and MF2). During one of the hoist operations, the hoist cable was lowered to the ground with the forest penetrator attached. MF1 initiated a hoist malfunction to test MF2’s ability to troubleshoot. During the operation, the MA’s hover drifted forward and left. When MF2 cleared the malfunction the hoist cable retracted unexpectedly. When the cable retracted, the forest penetrator raised off the ground and swung forward, snagging a stationary F-111 capsule’s window. The MA banked right and MP2 instinctively applied maximum power in an attempt to recover the MA. The MA entered a sharp descending right turn while tethered to the F-111 capsule. When the forest penetrator ripped free, the MPs leveled out the MA before impacting terrain. The MA’s main rotor struck the ground twice and the MA came to rest on its left side. The MC egressed with no major injuries. A fire ignited shortly after impact completely destroying the MA. The total cost of the mishap is $4,811,580.00. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was a combination of four actions by the mishap crew (MC), including three by the mishap flight engineers (MF1 and MF2) and one by the mishap pilot (MP2). These actions included (1) MF2’s troubleshooting sequence, (2) MF1’s checkride supervision, (3) MF2’s channelized attention, and (4) MP2’s control inputs. In addition, the AIB President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the use of an old F-111 capsule as a training target during hoist operations and miscommunication between the crew substantially contributed to the incident.
B-52H, T/N 61-0014 Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma 1 November 2012 On 1 November 2012, at approximately 1237 hours local time (L), a B-52H, tail number (T/N) 61-0014, assigned to the Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex at Tinker Air Force Base (AFB), Oklahoma, lost the inboard flap sections from each wing shortly after takeoff. No one involved in the mishap sustained any injuries. The mishap aircraft (MA) suffered extensive damage to both wings and the fuselage. There was no damage to private property, although the flaps fell in a heavily wooded area owned by Oklahoma City. The estimated repair cost of the MA is $1.08 million. The board president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was a failure by maintenance, specifically one maintainer (MX1), to install the retainer plugs in the forward ends of the flap drivescrew assemblies in the inboard flap actuators (#4 and #5) of both inboard flap sections on the MA. Additionally, the board president found, by a preponderance of evidence that the following three factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) the lack of an oversight requirement in the 552d Commodities Maintenance Squadron (CMMXS) Wheel and Gearbox Shop for an independent certification by another mechanic of the work done overhauling the flap drivescrew assemblies; (2) the lack of a procedural requirement in the 565th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron Programmed Depot Maintenance dock for personnel installing the flap drivescrews to perform a cursory inspection of the flap drivescrew assemblies to verify that they are properly assembled; and (3) the maintenance documentation practices in the 552 CMMXS Wheel and Gearbox Shop which allowed work to be signed off several days after it had been accomplished.
T-38A, T/N 64-13304 Sacramento Mather Airport, California 18 February 2021 On 18 February 2021 the mishap pilot (MP) and mishap instructor pilot (MIP), flying T-38A tail number (T/N) 64-13304, assigned to the Ist Reconnaissance Squadron, Beale Air Force Base (AFB), California, flew a day training mission that included practice landings at nearby Sacramento Mather Airport. During a touch-and-go landing attempt at Mather Airport, at approximately 1648 Zulu, or 0848 Local Time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA) impacted the runway without its landing gear fully extended. The total cost of damage to the MA was $3,001,563. The flight was planned as a single-ship training mission from Beale AFB consisting of practice maneuvers in a local military operating area (MOA), practice approaches and landings at Mather Airport and a planned return to Beale AFB. After completing practice maneuvers in the MOA, the MIP flew the MA to Mather Airport and executed an uneventful approach to a touch-and-go landing on Runway 22 Left (22L). The MP then flew a second practice approach to Runway 22L and attempted a touch-and-go landing. After the MA touched down the MP initiated the takeoff portion of the maneuver, advancing the throttles and raising the landing gear lever. When the landing gear began to retract, the MA descended toward the runway. The MP then briefly put the landing gear lever back down before placing the lever back up. The MA descended and the main landing gear (MLG) contacted the runway in a partially extended position approximately 2,320 feet from the approach end of the runway. The MLG collapsed, and the MA settled onto the runway. The force of the MA on the partially extended MLG and subsequent ground impact caused a hydraulic system failure and fire in the right MLG bay. The MA slid on its fuselage before coming to rest approximately 6,170 feet from the approach end of the runway. The MP and MIP egressed the MA with no injuries as emergency response crews extinguished the fire. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP prematurely raising the landing gear lever during the touch-and-go landing maneuver. The MP failed to execute correct touch-and-go landing procedures, which state that the landing gear lever should be raised when “DEFINITELY AIRBORNE” and “WHEN POSITIVE RATE OF CLIMB IS ESTABLISHED.” The premature landing gear retraction resulted in the MA impacting the runway without its landing gear fully extended, and with no opportunity for the MIP to intervene to prevent the mishap. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of evidence the MP’s misperception of an established positive climb rate following the touch-and-go landing attempt substantially contributed to the mishap. “
MQ-9A, T/N 05-000102 VICTORIA, REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES 4 April 2012 On 4 April 2012, at 0929 Zulu time (Z), an MQ-9A Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), tail number (T/N) 05-000102, crashed into the Indian Ocean following a commanded engine shutdown and attempted forced landing that occurred 4 minutes and 15 seconds after takeoff from Seychelles International Airport (FSIA), Victoria, Republic of Seychelles. The RPA, Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS), MTS Electronics Unit, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) pod were destroyed, a loss value exceeding $8,931,000. There were no fatalities, injuries, or damage to other property. The Mishap Remotely Piloted Aircraft (MRPA) was an asset of the 645th Aeronautical Systems Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The MRPA was forward-operated by the 409th Air Expeditionary Group, Detachment | at FSIA, Victoria, Republic of Seychelles. The mishap crew consisted of a contractor-furnished Mishap Operator (MO) and Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO). Maintenance support was provided by a contractor-furnished maintenance team that consisted of a maintenance lead, mechanics, and avionics technicians. The accident investigation board (AIB) president found by clear, convincing evidence that the causes of the mishap were 1) the MO commanded the engine off by moving the Condition Lever to a position that closed the fuel shut off valve, shutting off fuel to the engine and 2) the MO and MSO failed to complete the landing gear extension sequence to include confirming that the landing gear was extended. Additionally, the AIB president found by a preponderance of evidence that MO’s limited recent experience in launch procedures substantially contributed to the mishap.
MQ-9A, T/N 12-4177 UNDISCLOSED LOCATION 5 JULY 2016 On 5 July 2016, at 0408 Zulu (Z) time, an MQ-9A, tail number 12-4177, assigned to the 27th Special Operations Wing at Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico, and deployed to an undisclosed location, crashed in an open area. While flying with the autopilot engaged, the aircraft experienced an uncommanded loss of thrust followed by an uncommanded descent. The Mishap Crew (MC), which consisted of two mishap pilots (MP1 & MP2) and one mishap sensor operator (MSO), were unable to regain normal engine control, but were able to guide the aircraft to a controlled crash, away from any persons, animals, cultivated plants, or manmade objects. The impact destroyed the MA with modifications, resulting in a loss valued at $15,922,806. There were no fatalities or damage to private property. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the mishap to be an unrecoverable failure of the on-engine fuel control unit which resulted in insufficient thrust to maintain flight under any circumstance. Further, the board was able to rule out other malfunctions, anomalies, or defects of the command/control datalink, fuel, aircraft, or ground control station and any encounter with adverse weather, foreign object, or hostile fire.
AC-130J, T/N 09-5710 Eglin AFB, FL 21 April 2015 On 21 April 2015, at approximately 12:18:40 hours local time (L), AC-130J, tail number 09- 5710, assigned to the 413th Flight Test Squadron, 96th Test Wing, Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida, departed controlled flight over water approximately 41 nautical miles (NM) south of Eglin AFB and then was recovered and landed safely. There were no significant injuries to the crew or anyone else. Post-flight engineering analysis revealed that the mishap aircraft (MA) exceeded the Design Limit Load (DLL), thus rendering it unsafe for further flight. The damages are estimated to be $115,600,000, which includes the total loss of the MA. The mishap occurred on a medium risk flying qualities test sortie out to the edges of the flight envelope. The mishap pilot (MP) was attempting to execute a Steady Heading Sideslip (SHSS) to the RUDDER Special Alert of the Advisory Caution and Warning System (ACAWS). This is normally a prohibited maneuver, but the Director of Operations at Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC/A3) signed a waiver approving the test team to fly to this limit. The MA exceeded 14.5° Angle of Sideslip (AoS), triggering the RUDDER Special Alert and continued increasing AoS until it departed controlled flight, eventually tumbling to an inverted position. Shortly thereafter, the MA recovered from the departure and the mishap copilot (MCP) took the controls to recover from the near vertical dive. In the process of the departure and recovery, the aircraft lost approximately 5,000 feet of altitude, experienced 3.19 times the normal force acceleration (Gs), and over sped the flaps by over 100 knots. The over G exceeded the aircraft’s DLL, thereby nullifying the airworthiness of the MA, rendering it a total loss. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the cause of this mishap was the MP's excessive rudder input during the test point followed by inadequate rudder input to initiate a timely recovery from high AoS due to Overcontrolled/Undercontrolled Aircraft and Wrong Choice of Action During an Operation. Additionally, the AIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: Instrumentation and Warning System Issues, Spatial Disorientation, Confusion, and the fact the test team was Provided Inadequate Procedural Guidance or Publications.
T-38C, T/N 68-8121, & T/N 70-1586 LAUGHLIN AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS 19 NOVEMBER 2021 At 10:14:02L (10:14:02 a.m. Local Time [L]) on 19 November 2021, two T-38C Talon aircraft, Tail Numbers 68-8121 and 70-1586, collided during the landing phase to Runway (RWY) 13 Center (13C) following a formation approach at Laughlin Air Force Base (AFB), Texas (TX). Both aircraft were assigned to the 47th Flying Training Wing (FTW) at Laughlin AFB, TX. The Mishap Sortie (MS) was a local formation flight and was the Mishap Student Pilot’s (MSP) fourth formation event in the T-38C Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training program. The Mishap Formation (MF) consisted of Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP1) occupying the front cockpit (FCP) of Mishap Aircraft 1 (MA1), Mishap Instructor Pilot (MIP2) occupying the rear cockpit of Mishap Aircraft 2 (MA2), and the MSP occupying the FCP of MA2. The MF planned for MAI to lead the first half of the MS, perform a lead swap in the military operations area, then have MA2 lead the flight for the return to Laughlin AFB. The primary plan was for MA2 to lead the formation approach to RWY 13C, clear off MA1 to land, and perform a low approach to the T-38 pattern, with the caveat that a difference in fuel levels could change who landed. On final approach after MA2 “cleared off’ MA1, both aircraft attempted to land and neither performed a low approach. MAI, originally on the right side of the formation in the wingman position, ended up below MA2 on final approach in a position where neither aircraft could see the other. MAI landed first at 10:14:01L. One second later, at 10:14:02L, MA2’s nose landing gear impacted MA1’s left horizontal stabilizer. Both aircraft were rendered uncontrollable and subsequently destroyed. MIP1 egressed MA1 on the ground after the mishap with minor injuries. MIP2 and MSP experienced an interrupted ejection sequence due to the inversion of MA2, causing multiple life threatening injuries for MIP2 and fatal injuries for MSP. I find, by a preponderance of the evidence, there are two causes of the mishap: as the MF returned to base and conducted a formation approach, where one aircraft would land and the other would perform a low approach, (1) MIP2 failed to communicate and MIP1 failed to verify which aircraft would land, resulting in MA1 and MA2 simultaneously attempting to land on RWY 13C; and (2) MIP2 failed to recognize a precarious situation developing after the “cleared off” call and failed to intervene and prevent MA2 from impacting MA1 on landing. Further, I find by a preponderance of the evidence there are two factors that substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) MIP1 and MIP2 used conflicting techniques to perform the 1-up/1-down maneuver and (2) MSP’s callsign usage, affected by the “administrative lead” change and various techniques for referencing position number, was improper and confusing.