kings-crown/Aircraft_Reports huggingface dataset:
MQ-1B, T/N 03-0111 USCENTCOM AOR 18 SEPTEMBER 2012 On 18 September 2012, at approximately 0926 Zulu (Z), the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number 03-0111, operated by the 20th Reconnaissance Squadron (RS) at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, crashed and was destroyed on impact in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility. The 20th RS is assigned to the 432d Wing, Creech AFB, Nevada. At the time of the crash, the Mishap Crew (MC) was controlling the MRPA from Whiteman AFB. The MRPA was destroyed at an estimated loss of $4.4 million. There were no casualties, and there was no reported damage to any property at the crash site other than the MRPA itself. The MRPA took off from a forward operating base at 0102Z. Prior to the MC taking control of the MRPA, there was difficulty with the satellite data link that allows the MRPA to communicate with its crew. However, the issue was resolved by resetting the connection to the MRPA and the mission proceeded. At approximately 0919Z the primary navigation system began to diverge from the secondary navigation system by approximately .1 Nautical Mile (NM), to a maximum divergence of .25 NM. Normally, these systems record the same, or approximately the same, location for the MRPA. At 0921:53Z the MRPA satellite data link disconnected (known as a “Jost link”). In response, the Mishap Pilot ran the appropriate checklist, but was unsuccessful in reestablishing a satellite link. At approximately 0926Z the MRPA impacted about 3.25 NM south-southwest from the point of “lost link.” The post mishap investigation revealed no anomalies with the Ground Control Station, MC, maintenance, or operations any time prior to the “lost link” at 0921:53Z. Prior to the “lost link,” the satellite signal strength was normal and the MRPA was responsive. There was no evidence of negative maintenance trends or issues, and maintenance records showed no relevant discrepancies. The MC reported no anomalies with the operation of the MRPA immediately prior to the mishap. The MC followed all established checklist procedures and executed them in a timely manner. The only known anomaly was the navigation system divergence; there was no evidence to indicate this anomaly caused the mishap. The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President could not determine any cause of, or factor that substantially contributed to, this mishap.
Class A Mishap, Laughlin AFB, TX T-38C, T/N 68-8152 Laughlin AFB TX 13 November 2018 On the night of 13 November 2018, mishap instructor pilot 1 (MIP1) and mishap instructor pilot 2 (MIP2), flying T-38C tail number (T/N) 68-8152, assigned to 87th Flying Training Squadron, 47th Flying Training Wing, Laughlin Air Force Base (AFB), Texas (TX), conducted a routine training sortie at Laughlin AFB with MIP1 as the pilot in command. During the sortie, at approximately 1924 local time, the mishap aircraft (MA) impacted the ground and MIP1 was fatally injured during an ejection attempt. The mishap mission was planned and authorized as an instructor development sortie to regain rear cockpit night landing currency for MIP2. During the takeoff portion of MIP2’s fifth practice touch- and-go landing at Laughlin AFB, as MIP2 advanced the throttles for takeoff, the mishap crew (MC) heard a loud buzz later determined to indicate a compressor stall in the right engine. MIP1, the aircraft commander, took control of the aircraft and continued the takeoff. MIP1 did not select maximum afterburner as the MA rolled, yawed, and drifted to the right of the runway, failing to accelerate appreciably. While continuing the takeoff, MIP1 failed to recognize aural and visual aerodynamic stall warnings and lost situational awareness regarding the MA’s ground track and low height above the ground. MIP1 regained awareness when the MA was close enough to the terrain to illuminate the ground approximately one second before the MA touched down off the runway surface. MIP1 initiated a climb approximately three seconds later and commanded ejection. The MC initiated ejection at approximately 147 knots indicated airspeed, 45 degrees of right bank, with approximately 500 feet per minute descent rate. The MA impacted the ground approximately 350 feet right of the paved runway surface. MIP2 successfully completed the ejection with minor injuries. MIP1 was fatally injured when the MA impacted the ground before MIP1’s ejection seat completed the ejection sequence. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the combination of: (a) an engine compressor stall during a critical phase of flight and (b) MIP1’s failure to apply necessary throttle and flight control inputs following a loss of thrust on takeoff. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of evidence that each of the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the low illumination the night of the mishap and (b) MIP1’s misperception of the rapidly evolving emergency after taking control of the MA.
F-16CM, T/N 88-0510 NEAR CERVIA, ITALY 28 JANUARY 2013 On 28 January 2013, at approximately 1903 hours local time (L), an F-16CM, tail number 88- 0510, assigned to the 510th Fighter Squadron, 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Base (AAB), Italy, departed AAB as part of a formation of three F-16CM and one F-16DM aircraft engaged in a night training mission. The pilots were using night vision goggles (NVGs). Prior to the mishap, after airspace weather precluded them from achieving their primary mission, the mishap pilot (MP) and mishap wingman (MW) coordinated two simulated bomb attacks as a backup mission. The first attack, which did not include any simulated defensive threat reactions, was executed without event. At 1948L, approximately 45 minutes after takeoff, the MP executed a threat reaction which culminated in a “last ditch” defensive maneuver. This occurred during post-attack egress on the second attack and initially resulted in the mishap aircraft (MA) entering a 45 degree nose low, 90 degree left wing down, attitude. Approximately 12 seconds later, the MP transmitted he was spatially disoriented. At the prompting of the MW to transition to internal aircraft instruments, the MP attempted a recovery maneuver. The execution of the “last ditch” maneuver and follow on recovery maneuvers resulted in aural warnings and caution lights illuminating inside the aircraft, loss of all cultural lighting cues and discernible horizon outside the aircraft, and unusual aircraft attitudes, which together led to a high rate of descent and airspeed. The MP was spatially disoriented to the point where he believed that he could not recover the MA. At approximately 19:49:24L, the MP initiated ejection. The MP suffered fatal head and neck trauma during ejection. The MA was destroyed upon impact in the Adriatic Sea, approximately four miles from the ejection site. The loss of the MA and its associated property is valued at $28,396,157.42. There was no other damage to government or private property. The Accident Investigation Board President found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the MP’s failure to effectively recover from spatial disorientation, due to a combination of weather conditions, the MP’s use of NVGs, the MA’s attitude and high rate of speed, and the MP’s breakdown in visual scan. This led the MP to misjudge the imminent need to eject. The Board President also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that an immediate loss of the MP’s helmet upon the high-speed ejection, slack in the ejection seat harness, and a left yaw to the ejection seat as it left the MA, along with a 40 gravitational force snapback that followed the ejection seat’s drogue chute deployment, caused the MP’s injuries, which quickly resulted in his death.
F-16C, T/N 88-0496 WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, NEW MEXICO 31 JANUARY 2017 On 31 January 2017, at 19:18:31 hours local (L), an F-16C, Tail Number (T/N) 88-0496, fired 155 20mm training projectile bullets on the supporting Joint Terminal Attack Controllers’ (JTAC) position at the Red Rio bombing range (located on the White Sands Missile Range), injuring one military member and killing a civilian contractor. The mishap pilot (MP) and mishap instructor pilot (MIP) were assigned to the 311th fighter squadron, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico (NM). The MP was enrolled in the F-16 Formal Training Unit program, flying a night, close-air support (CAS) training sortie under the MIP’s supervision. After a successful bomb pass and two failed strafing attempts, the MP errantly pointed his aircraft at the observation point and fired his gun. One 20mm TP bullet fragment struck the mishap contractor (MC) in the back of the head. A UH-60 aircrew extracted the MC, provided urgent care, and transported him to Alamogordo, NM. The MC died at the hospital at 21:01 hours L. The MP was a USAF First Lieutenant, with 86 total flying hours, 60.9 in the F-16. He was flying his first night CAS sortie, wore Night Vision Goggles, and operated the mishap aircraft equipped with a LITENING Gen4 SE targeting pod, a 500-pound inert laser-guided bomb, and 210 rounds of 20mm TP. The MIP was a USAF Captain, stationed at Holloman AFB, with 887 total flying hours, 857 F-16 hours and 107 instructor pilot hours. The MIP operated an F-16D configured the same as the MP’s jet. The MC was a retired USAF Master Sergeant and former JTAC. He joined the ground element on the OP to demonstrate short-wave infrared technology. The MC was equipped with Level 3 body armor and a Kevlar helmet, but he was not wearing them. The MIP directed the MP to perform an infrared pointer aided strafe on a simulated SA-8 training target site, 900 meters away from the ground element. The MIP never verified the MP saw the intended target or the ground element’s location. For an undetermined reason, the MP disregarded his on-board sensor information, aimed at the OP and fired his gun. The Accident Investigation Board President (AIB BP) found, by the preponderance of evidence, that the cause of the mishap was pilot error. The MP misperceived that the ground element’s location was the intended target. The MP misinterpreted his instruments and failed to follow his on-board systems directing him to the proper target. The AIB BP found, by the preponderance of evidence, the MIP’s failed supervision and instruction substantially contributed to the mishap. Specifically, that his failed cross-monitoring of the MP’s performance during the MP’s fatal strafing attack, his task misprioritization (focusing on coordinating and controlling other aircraft while the MP was performing the strafing attack), and his overconfidence, complacency and overaggresiveness during the mishap sortie substantially contributed to the mishap.
F-16CM, T/N 96-0085 MONCKS CORNER, SOUTH CAROLINA TJULY 2015 On 7 July 2015, at approximately 11:00:55 hours local time (L), near Moncks Corner, South Carolina (SC), Mishap Aircraft 1 (MA1), a F-16CM, Tail Number 96-0085, assigned to the 55th Fighter Squadron, 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, SC, collided with Mishap Aircraft 2 (MA2), a Cessna 150M, registration N3601V, originating from Berkeley County Airport, SC. Neither pilot nor passenger of MA2 survived the collision. Falling debris damaged two private travel trailers near the collision site. Due to separation of the engine exhaust module during impact, MAI did not have sufficient thrust to maintain altitude, forcing MA1 Pilot (MP1) to eject. MP1 landed with minor injuries. MA1 impacted an uninhabited forest about 9 miles south of the collision. Both MAI and MA2 were destroyed. The estimated government loss was $29,161,541.52. MAI was enroute from Myrtle Beach, SC, to Charleston, SC, when MA2 departed Berkeley County Airport, near Charleston, enroute to Myrtle Beach. MAI was flying at 1600 feet as directed by the Mishap Air Traffic Controller (MC) at Charleston Air Traffic Control. The Cessna pilot, MA2 Pilot (MP2), was not in contact with MC, and was not required to be, but was visible on MC’s radar. At 11:00:16L, MC first advised MP1 of MA2 with “traffic, 12 o’clock, 2 miles, opposite direction, one thousand two hundred indicated, type unknown” (another aircraft is at your 12 o’clock position, 2 miles away, flying towards your aircraft at 1200 feet, aircraft type unknown). MP1 had no previous expectation of a potential traffic conflict. At 11:00:25L, MC instructed MP1 to turn left to 180 degrees (south) if MP1 did not see MA2 but MP1 did not hear the left turn advisory. MP1 looked, but did not see MA2 and asked MC to confirm the distance. At 11:00:33, MC told MP1 “if you don’t have that traffic in sight, turn left heading 180 immediately.” MP1 acknowledged the instruction and had completed 30 degrees of a left turn before MAI collided with MA2 at 11:00:55L. The Board President (BP) found by a preponderance of the evidence there are two causes of this mishap: (1) MC issued a radar vector directing MP1 to immediately turn left to 180 degrees (south) placing the MAI and MA2 on a collision course; and (2) MP1 and MP2 were not able to see and avoid each other in time to prevent collision. The BP found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (1) MC directed MAI to fly on a course and at an altitude that would increase potential for conflicts by passing in close proximity to the departure routes of an uncontrolled airfield; (2) MP1 and MP2 did not use available systems which may have increased situational awareness; and (3) MC did not provide MP1 with traffic information in time for MP1 to identify the conflict before MC issued the immediate left turn instruction.
BLOCK 382 F-16D, T/N 91-0466 DAYTON, OH 23 JUNE 2017 On 23 June 2017, at 12:31 local time (L), a block 52 F-16D, tail number 91-0466, assigned to the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron (USAFADS), 57th Wing, Nellis AFB, NV, departed the prepared runway surface at James M Cox Dayton International Airport (KDAY) and overturned, resulting in injuries to the mishap pilot (MP); the mishap crewmember (MC) was uninjured. There was no attempt to eject. Both personnel are assigned to the USAFADS. The mishap aircraft (MA), valued at $29,268,599, was destroyed. The mishap occurred during a familiarization sortie for the MC, with the MP demonstrating the capabilities of the F-16 and the maneuvers performed by the USAFADS. The weather at KDAY was reported as broken at 900 feet, broken at 1,500 feet, and overcast at 2,500 feet; winds 340 at 17 knots, gusting to 20 knots; 1 % miles visibility with heavy rain and mist. Prior to landing, Dayton Tower advised MP there was previously reported wind shear and heavy precipitation at KDAY. MP executed a missed approach on the first approach to KDAY due to an inability to see the runway environment because of standing water on the canopy that obscured MP’s vision. MP received holding instructions from Columbus Approach Control to wait for the weather to clear at KDAY. After holding for approximately 30 minutes, MP proceeded on vectors to the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to KDAY Runway 6 Left (6L). MP had adequate fuel to attempt one approach to KDAY then divert to Wilmington Airport if necessary. On MP’s final instrument approach to Runway 6L, MP again experienced standing water on the MA’s canopy, directly in front of the head-up display (HUD), obscuring the MP’s forward vision and blurring the HUD. MP considered the crosswinds and wind shear and planned to fly a faster approach of 160-165 knots. The Crash Survivable Flight Data Recorder (CSFDR) shows that MA maintained approximately 200 Knots Calibrated Airspeed (KCAS) on final approach. The MA crossed the runway approach end threshold at approximately 193 knots, 43 knots faster than the Technical Order calculated approach airspeed. This excess airspeed significantly increased the distance required to land the MA. The MA landed on Runway 6L, approximately 4,764 feet down the wet runway, 25 knots above computed touchdown speed, leaving 6,137 feet of prepared surface available to stop the aircraft prior to the overrun. MP was unable to stop the MA on the prepared surface. MA entered the overrun at approximately 50 knots; 4 seconds later the MA departed the overrun and overturned in the grass. The Accident Board President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the cause of the mishap was landing with excess airspeed and insufficient distance to stop the MA on the wet runway. Substantially contributing factors were environmental conditions affecting vision, misperception of changing environment, and procedures not followed correctly.
F-16C, T/N 89-2019, and F-16C, T/N 89-2034 Moline, Kansas 20 October 2014 On 20 October 2014, at 1421 hours (all times local), two F-16Cs, tail numbers (T/N) 89-2019 and 89-2034, assigned to the 125th Fighter Squadron, 138th Fighter Wing, Tulsa Air National Guard Base (ANGB), collided during a training mission near Moline, Kansas. Mishap pilot 1 (MP1), was an instructor pilot with over 2,400 hours of flight time in the F-16. Mishap pilot 2 (MP2) was a student pilot with 106 flying hours in the F-16. MP1 ejected and experienced minor injuries; MP2 was unharmed. Mishap aircraft 1 (MA1), T/N 89-2019 was destroyed. Five feet of the right wing tip was severed from mishap aircraft 2 (MA2), T/N 89-2034. The total loss to government property was $22,490,842. There was no significant damage to private property. The mishap flight (MF) departed Tulsa ANGB at 1403 for an air combat maneuvers (ACM) training mission. The MF included three F-16s; MP1 and MP2 planned to operate as a coordinated two ship, while mishap pilot 3 (MP3) would play the role of simulated adversary. The MF flew 83 nautical miles (NM) northwest to the Eureka Military Operating Area (MOA), to perform a series of ACM engagements, wherein MP1 and MP2 would patrol the Eureka MOA and MP3 would approach from an unknown direction to simulate an attack, to which MP1 and MP2 must respond. MP1 and MP2 would fill the role of either an engaged fighter (EF) whose primary responsibility is to kill the adversary, or supporting fighter (SF) whose primary responsibilities are to maintain visual and ensure flight path de-confliction with the EF. The first engagement finished without incident. For the second engagement, MP3 approached from the north, separated by 20 NM. By default, MP1 was the EF and MP2 was the SF. MP1 and MP2 were headed north with MP1 left of MP2. MP3 targeted MP2, and MP1 then directed MP2 to bracket right, but did not initiate an exchange of EF and SF roles. At 14:21:03 MP2 saw MP1 for the last time before impact, 16 seconds later. At 14:21:08 MP2 stated he had merged with MP3. MP2 then took a hard left turn in an attempt to get behind MP3. MP1 saw MP2 turn but misperceived it as a right turn, away from him, and accordingly focused on simulating a kill on MP3. At 14:21:16, MP2 made a request to exchange roles; MP1 then saw MA2’s belly on a rapid collision course. MP1 and MP2 collided at 14:21:19. The impact resulted in sheering MA\I1’s right wing flaperon and horizontal tail, causing MP1 to lose control. MP1 successfully ejected from MAI and landed near Moline, Kansas. MP2 landed MA2 safely at Tulsa ANGB. The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) president found, by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was MP2’s failure to fulfill his primary responsibilities of maintaining visual and flight path de-confliction with MP1. Additionally, the AIB president found, by a preponderance of evidence, three factors substantially contributed to the mishap: 1) MP2’s failure to call “blind” when he could not see MP1, 2) MP1’s misperception of MP2’s turn at the merge, and 3) MP1’s failure to initiate a role exchange when MP2 was most defensive.
MQ-1B T/N 07-3220, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 14 APRIL 2012 On 14 April 2012, at 03:41:13 Zulu (Z) time, the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA), an MQ-1B Predator, tail number (T/N) 07-3220, crashed in the Nangarhar Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan while attempting to return to Jalalabad Airbase. Destruction of the MRPA with one missile was assessed to be a financial loss of $3,832,053.18. No injuries, damage to other government property, or damage to private property resulted from the mishap. The aircraft belonged to the 57th Wing at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, but was deployed at the time in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The crew flying the aircraft at the time of the mishap was from the 162 Reconnaissance Squadron (RS) at Springfield Air National Guard Base (ANGB), Ohio. The 62d Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron, Detachment], provided the maintenance support. Following normal pre-flight checks, the MRPA taxied and took off from Jalalabad Airbase at 02:12Z. The Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) handed off the MRPA to the Mission Control Element (MCE) uneventfully at 02:19Z. Sixty eight minutes later, the MRPA experienced a significant loss of power. With this loss of power, the MRPA started a descent in accordance with its autopilot programming, which maintains airspeed by sacrificing altitude. The Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO) noticed the descent, and the MP attempted to return the MRPA to its assigned altitude. The engine continued to lose power and the MP analyzed this as an engine failure. The MCE crew accomplished all the critical action procedure steps (CAPS) for an engine failure as they turned the MRPA back towards Jalalabad Airbase. The MCE coordinated with the LRE for handback of the MRPA and coordinated with the 432d Wing Operations Center (WOC) Director for guidance if the MRPA could not be successfully returned to the Airbase. At approximately 03:30Z the MCE crew determined that the MRPA could not successfully be returned to the airbase and, following the guidance received from the WOC Director, purposely flew the MRPA into the ground. Impact occurred at 03:41:13Z on an unpopulated mountainside approximately 20 nautical miles (nm) short of the airbase. The MRPA was a total loss with some damaged portions recovered. The AAIB President determined by clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the mishap was engine failure. By a preponderance of the evidence, the AAIB president found that a substantially contributing factor to this single point failure was a unique data and power cable, because there was no other point on this particular MQ-1B that the two ignition circuits came together, because of redundancy upgrades to the ignition system accomplished in the past.