kfajdsl/voxpopuli huggingface dataset:
i will try to enlighten you a little bit on this. in august two thousand and seven the us passed the implementing recommendations of the nine eleven commission act and a section of this covers the modernisation of the visa waiver programme.
the terms and conditions of this law affect all eu members independent of whether they are in the visa waiver programme or not.
that is cooperation with the us on serious crime counter terrorism initiatives and information sharing in these areas.
in this way the communication seeks to ensure that the processing of data does not go beyond what is legitimate and that the processes comply with fundamental rights including our current data protection rules.
ten member states have such agreements.
the one stop cooperation aviation security is not about transfer of personal data and it does not concern information processing with respect to the pursuit of suspected criminals or terrorists so as such we will not raise it in the pnr negotiations.
the data protection instruments address it but call it prohibition of automated processing' that means that eu data protection legislation prevents any individual from being subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or her or significantly affects him or her and which is based solely
this memorandum was not intended to be in itself a legal base for any exchange of data.
this means that the final decision taken towards a person can never be taken in a fully automated manner.
secondly agreements on the exchange of screening information concerning known or suspected terrorists these concern exchange of specific information about individuals who are suspected or known terrorists namely their full name their date of birth passport and citizenship.
it is important to underline that this issue is very much distinct from pnr.
the concept of profiling is not in itself defined in any legal instrument but that does not mean that we do not have laws on it.
first agreements on enhancing cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime that concerns cooperation on matching of fingerprints and dna samples.
this should improve efficiency at eu airports without compromising security.
they confirmed a willingness of the parties to negotiate agreements on passenger information screening information on known or suspected terrorists information to combat terrorism and serious crime and information migration and border security matters.
you have also requested the commission to clarify the state of play on bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding relating to the visa waiver programme.
on the eu side this act led to a twin track approach agreed by the council in march.
under this bilateral track a number of member states initially signed a memorandum of understanding with the us.
the commission is right now evaluating whether the twin track approach agreed in two thousand and eight should be updated following the entry into force of the lisbon treaty.
it has already been decided that we will conduct negotiations in parallel with all three countries but they will not necessarily be completed at the same time.
we also had the bilateral track bilateral negotiations between the eu and between the us and member states to satisfy us conditions for access to the visa waiver programme which fall under the member states' competence as opposed to eu competence.
the pnr communication highlights these principles and lays down efficient and effective measures to safeguard the interest of data subjects.
but let me add that none of these bilateral agreements cover pnr data.
on the automated processing of data.
according to the information that the commission has just gathered from the member states eight member states have signed such a memorandum of understanding with the us.
the parliament resolution also refers to the eu us cooperation on one stop aviation security. this is the responsibility of vice president kallas who is transport commissioner.
the directive has not been adopted that is the mandate has not been adopted by the council yet but the mandates of course follow the structure of the general communication.
as you requested in your resolution from may earlier this year.
risk assessment is an issue that i know comes up very often in the discussions and that is why i have chosen to raise it immediately.
we can use that as a method for communicating with third countries but also define our own policy with that.
i would like to thank the authors of the may resolution for the excellent team work we have had and the very constructive cooperation on this file and your constructive way of finding solutions to move forward within the new institutional framework. the objective of the communication is to establish for the first time a set of criteria and principles that would guide us in our external relations concerning
the proportionality test is not a political test;
i am pleased to hear that the commission is looking into the profiling issue but i think that we need some further discussion on that.
i would of course wholeheartedly endorse that;
if somebody goes to court and the court rules that these agreements are not watertight then we look like idiots.
that is a key issue.
the european parliament cannot be asked to endorse something which is open to legal challenge.
there are some other things which need clarification.
we need to get it right now because we are not only negotiating with the us canada and australia but also setting a model and example for agreements with other countries.
i hope that the council decides to introduce that.
it is something that has to be proven in court.
some of the member states are proposing a sunset clause.
it is a legal test.
i think that this example shows that if the three main institutions can reach an agreement we can speak with a single voice on behalf of five hundred million citizens and that is a very powerful voice.
it is a key component in the battle to keep us safe not just in the air but on the ground.
it must not become a free licence for the retention of data by governments or their agencies.
how will it be protected by them and importantly how can we be assured that it remains so?
we must also be certain that all arrangements with third countries are mutual so that we too can benefit.
pnr is an important weapon in ensuring we protect ourselves against such terrorism but it is not the only weapon pragmatism and proportionality should be key to every decision we make in this house;
we have lots of tools to do so but changing and sharing of information is key to doing this.
we have pnr agreements. i already have seen strong evidence that pnr is essential to identify and to prevent terrorist attacks.
we should exchange pnr but that should not be done without rules.
we need to have clear rules on third country transfer and we need to be proportionate. all this is in the communication from the commission and i am very happy to see that although the details might vary your communication is very much in line with this.
these are the issues that will be subject to negotiations with our three partners;
the approach taken to weigh the two sometimes contradictory needs of privacy and security is essentially sound.
people have a right to keep details of their lives confidential but authorities have not only a right but a duty to safeguard the lives of their peoples.
if only terrorists and serious criminals wore black hats and displayed sinister sneers those two needs could be satisfied simultaneously.
however the union does allow its own ideological inhibitions to get in the way of achieving the right balance.
i can understand its reluctance to reveal unnecessarily information about people's origins or opinions.
where this has no connection or even correlation with terrorism that inhibition is a healthy one. however in an era in which a particular section of the population is disproportionately involved in terrorism and that section might change i see no objection against profiling of that population.
it has been killed so many times that in fact it now only exists thanks to the epp life support machine.
as much of the criticism against this agreement relates to fundamental rights exactly what the court has been asked by the commission to look into and assess we would not like to take the final vote in plenary before we have had their view on this important topic.
cohesion policy has helped vulnerable communities and regions ensuring they do not fall behind.
understanding the real impact that brexit and the loss of the structural funds will have for uk regions is crucial.
touching upon all the key policy areas cohesion policy is indeed the right tool to address these challenges.
the failure of successive uk governments to tell this story is shameful and other member states should not make the same mistake.
madam president responding to economic social environmental and democratic challenges requires a collective strategy in order to achieve social justice and develop a fair and inclusive model for the twenty first century which will put at the forefront not only economic development but more importantly the collective and individual well being of citizens.
that is why labour meps have called for brexit regional impact assessments which must take account of the loss of billions of pounds of eu regional development money funds that come directly to the poorest areas such as liverpool blackpool and rural cumbria.
structural funds have ensured increasing economic and social convergence of european regions thanks to a very concrete and effective model of solidarity.
i saw this with my own eyes on a mission to slovenia recently and i see it on a regular weekly basis in my own north west england constituency.
my message to the next parliament is be vigilant;
similarly as satu hassi has said we have a long history on asbestos and we have a very strong feeling that we need to watch out for that.
i shall treasure my ten years in this parliament and i shall watch with interest as the next parliament takes on the projects that perhaps we have been able to start.
as soon as it breaks out that is when the dangers occur and so one of the messages has to be that we need to look at the at risk areas of our european union to see where we should be highlighting the risk and monitoring it for the future.
i just want on this last occasion to say that many of us in this house have invested a lot of ourselves in the reach process guido sacconi and many colleagues have laid the foundations for a safer better chemicals
but it also of course reminded me in this context that when you have a disaster like that asbestos can be released into the atmosphere.
when i was lying on my hospital bed having my heart bypass and feeling sorry for myself i was watching on the television the earthquake in italy and that put my problems into perspective.
asbestos is very often safe while it is covered.
madam president pursuant to rule one hundred and fifty two of the rules of procedure i would like to move that we postpone the debate on zero rating practice to the november ii part session in strasbourg and replace it with council and commission statements on the outcome of the nine november competitiveness council in relation to the steel sector.
can i therefore ask colleagues to show support for the steel industry in europe and vote in favour of adding this urgent debate to our session agenda?
we cannot ignore the fact that the industry is facing unfair competition and anti competitive market behaviour.
this is dramatically destabilising the global steel market and the flow of trade risking european steel manufacturing as a whole and in my country in particular.
as many colleagues are aware the steel industry across europe has been facing unprecedented pressures in recent years.
the smart borders proposal appears more concerned with the mass collection of data than with addressing this humanitarian crisis.
this illustrates the need for increased search and rescue activities.
thousands of migrants continue to try to reach the eu in overcrowded boats risking their lives to escape poverty and violence.
the smart borders package aims to address such challenges.
also the same standards should apply to all border crossing points.
third country nationals that cross the external border should be reliably identified and their right to enter the schengen area verified.
the manual checking of travel documents is both slow and unreliable which leads to long queues and more mistakes at the borders.
the collected data should be stored in shared databases and be available to all relevant authorities.
the objective is to facilitate smooth and easy travel for the vast majority of travellers and at the same time make life more difficult for those who seek to abuse free movement inside the union.
however the absence of internal borders benefits not only bona fide travellers. it is vital for the credibility and acceptability of the schengen area that we effectively control our common external border.
schengen is now thirty years old but this approach will not be smart until european countries within the schengen area stop illegal or irregular migrants traversing europe be it to enter the united kingdom unlawfully or otherwise.
this response has been overtaken by external circumstances and events and a major rethink is required.
people traffickers illegal migrants and invalid asylum seekers are not going to be deterred by the so called smart measures. eu purpose intent and cost are all open to question here.
a rethink of the cause is paramount because an overly complex technology application which fails to address the problem areas but which penalises inconveniences and deters lawful movements is not the right approach to take.
the smart borders system will automatically record all incoming and outgoing third country nationals and will support border guards in their tasks. it will also enable the automation or semi automation of the border controls for travellers
this will allow us to face the increases in traveller flows. smart borders will also help us in making our policy against irregular migration more effective.
as regards the architecture of the system should smart borders rely on a single system rather than separate systems for entry exit recording and registered traveller management?
can we introduce a lighter' form of biometric identifiers while maintaining the effectiveness of the system?
exit could be of use to law enforcement authorities in the fight against terrorist offences and serious crime in specific cases both as an identity verification tool and as a criminal intelligence tool.
by systematically recording all incoming and outgoing third country nationals the system will automatically identify the travellers who stay longer than the authorised period.
these are of course not yet conclusive as discussions are still ongoing and the testing phase is still under
way. these issues will all be covered in depth in the updated impact assessment the commission is undertaking in order to inform its revised proposal.
the initial findings of the technical study seem to point to potential advantages of a single piece of legislation.
how can we facilitate border crossings for the very large majority of travellers who do not pose any problem or
will be a key issue to be addressed in the impact assessment for the new proposal. the commission has already acknowledged in the impact assessment for the two thousand and thirteen proposal that the data generated at entry
let me give you an idea of the questions which in my view need to be answered in the context of our impact assessment in addition to the already mentioned issue of law enforcement access and of course the financial implications and efficiency questions.
already known by the system.
there were an estimated two hundred million border crossings by third country nationals last year and a fifty increase is expected in the next decade. borders must benefit from technology.
what we need is a debate on the fundamental questions of how we got to this point and where we want to go from here. we should start by questioning the process by which the increased use of information technology in border controls has become the norm and the policy trend in europe.
we also need to discuss where the limits could and should be drawn for a fundamental rights perspective.
therefore before proceeding we have the duty to examine the fundamental rights implications of collecting storing and using biometric data for immigration asylum visa processing and border control purposes thus bridging the topics of migration and data protection.
the smart border system should not be put in place at any cost.
we need to make sure that the system is really needed and that it will be an asset without undermining the fundamental rights of eu and non eu citizens.
i am particularly concerned in this respect about access for law enforcement bodies.
the ruling of the european court of justice does not leave any room for interpretation and we cannot ignore it. where interferences with fundamental rights are at stake the extent of the eu legislators' discretion may prove to be limited. and the question that remains is how can we make sure that the principles of necessity and proportionality are respected?
do you believe that access to the system for lawenforcement purposes should be granted or not?
thank you for calling my qualification into question that is always very much appreciated. however i am not sure that you have fully appreciated the proposal because it is in no way going to make europeans more secure in no way whatsoever.
i believe it serves a legitimate purpose so my answer is yes.
however all the different countries have their own different legal systems different police forces and so on and europe is such a vast continent.
surely the only way that this would make a serious difference is if we actually knew who was in each individual country at the same time?
and proportionality and necessity will be our compass in any future discussion.
to grow we need a better and smarter border management system.
if we do nothing we will either have to face much longer queues at the borders or we shall be obliged to employ more border guards in the near future.
neither of these options seems acceptable or feasible. as you understand we are going to meet many times in the future in order first of all to discuss the results of the testing phase and the impact assessment. i want to assure you
mr president the solution to irregular migration lies in regular migration. in order to keep the european union open we need to convince our citizens that there are strong control and safeguard systems in place which besides ensuring easy access for travellers also allow for the detection of irregular situations.
but one of the objectives of this smart borders package is to facilitate smoother and swifter border crossing for the vast majority of third country nationals who cross the external borders of the european union.
creating longer queues at border crossing points hardly makes europe a more attractive destination for anyone.
it cannot be treated in the same way as energy and transport.
additionally this text properly recognises afforestation as a mitigating strategy.
i grew up like almost everyone in this house regularly watching news images of disasters caused by lack of food.
now famines are exceptional and when caused almost invariably the result of human activity of war or corruption rather than of failures of food.
and there have been advances in genetic modification that have allowed us to get extraordinary yield out of the same amount of land.
i worry though when i look at the european union that both of those things are being resisted here.
there is still an ideological preference for local production of food what's called food security' but actually the most insecure thing is to make yourselves dependent on one area and a reluctance to embrace the latest technology.
we have to ask why this country this continent which was for so long the fulcrum of innovation is now turning its back on that past.
mr president i was very pleased to support this report today because perhaps more than at any other point in my lifetime we need a strong independent and free media.
so where the media doesn't just talk and cover and comment on the need to smash glass ceilings but is able to demonstrate it has smashed its own glass ceilings for women. we must also work to secure a society both online and offline where journalists can go about their work free from the fear of abuse discrimination harassment and violence.
so it is right that we approve this report today not just for the sake of democratic debate in today's need for a strong and free media but also for the sake of women working in the media today and in the future.
and that's why this report today was so important.
the negotiations with the us australia and canada have now reached an advanced stage.
the negotiations with the us are well advanced but still ongoing.
and the us. it merely expressed the intention of the two parties to have specific agreements to govern the exchange
programme. the memorandum of understanding was intended to commit the parties the us and the specific member states to enter into negotiations on passenger information information on the screening of known or suspected terrorists information to combat terrorism and serious crime and information on migration and border security
of these three uses of pnr data only one real time use might potentially be considered to be a form of profiling in this case the checking of the pnr against pre determined risk assessment criteria. to ensure that this use will not adversely affect individuals the new eu australia pnr agreement explicitly prohibits automated processing and always requires human involvement before adverse decisions are taken on the basis of pnr data. this prohibition was not present in the pnr agreement from two thousand and seven so it is an important step
a similar provision is also included in the commission's proposal for the directive on the european
commercial purposes. to reduce their economic burden carriers generally choose to provide the required secure data with the pnr data to the us department of
the issue of profiling was also raised. that has been discussed already and there is no exact definition of it in eu law. profiling is generally understood to be an automatic data processing technique where a profile is applied to an individual in order to take a decision that affects him or her. there
or her. against this background the commission is not convinced of the need to develop any new legal definition of
them on pnr. both sides replied categorically
number of key issues. we have emphasised to the us that the support of both the council and the parliament is needed for the final outcome
for parliament. however a parliamentary resolution calling for a suspension would certainly be a very important political consideration for whether the commission would desire to launch such
exchanging data. in order to implement the memorandum of understanding the us and the relevant member states signed only two types of agreement namely agreements on enhancing cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime and agreements on the exchange of screening information concerning known or suspected
across the border. we have carefully assessed these agreements on a strictly confidential basis and we are convinced that they do not violate the pnr agreements
in other words while simple passport data may not be enough to catch criminals already on the wanted list pnr data makes it possible to identify a wider range of persons who are likely to pose a security risk. thirdly there is evidence that pnr data has already been successful in preventing and fighting serious crimes and terrorism both in member states and in third countries.
a procedure. finally the commission agrees with the european court of justice that the main purpose of pnr agreements is police and judicial cooperation and not data
terrorists. following that debate and in the context of the negotiations we again examined the issue and asked both the member states and the us whether there were any bilateral agreements between