Article 120 Exposures to rated institutions
1. Exposures to institutions with a residual maturity of more than three months for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 3 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 3 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Table 3 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 2. Exposures to an institution of up to three months residual maturity for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk-weight in accordance with Table 4 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136: Table 4 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % Table 4 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % 3. The interaction between the treatment of short term credit assessment under Article 131 and the general preferential treatment for short term exposures set out in paragraph 2 shall be as follows: (a) If there is no short-term exposure assessment, the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures as specified in paragraph 2 shall apply to all exposures to institutions of up to three months residual maturity; (b) If there is a short-term assessment and such an assessment determines the application of a more favourable or identical risk weight than the use of the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures, as specified in paragraph 2, then the short-term assessment shall be used for that specific exposure only. Other short-term exposures shall follow the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures, as specified in paragraph 2; (c) If there is a short-term assessment and such an assessment determines a less favourable risk weight than the use of the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures, as specified in paragraph 2, then the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures shall not be used and all unrated short-term claims shall be assigned the same risk weight as that applied by the specific short-term assessment.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 120 Exposures to rated institutions):
1. Exposures to institutions with a residual maturity of more than three months for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 3 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 3 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Exposures to institutions with a residual maturity of more than three months for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 3 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 3 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Table 3 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 2. Exposures to an institution of up to three months residual maturity for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk-weight in accordance with Table 4 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136: Table 4 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % Exposures to an institution of up to three months residual maturity for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk-weight in accordance with Table 4 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136: Table 4 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % Table 4 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 150 % The interaction between the treatment of short term credit assessment under Article 131 and the general preferential treatment for short term exposures set out in paragraph 2 shall be as follows: (a) If there is no short-term exposure assessment, the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures as specified in paragraph 2 shall apply to all exposures to institutions of up to three months residual maturity; (b) If there is a short-term assessment and such an assessment determines the application of a more favourable or identical risk weight than the use of the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures, as specified in paragraph 2, then the short-term assessment shall be used for that specific exposure only. Other short-term exposures shall follow the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures, as specified in paragraph 2; (c) If there is a short-term assessment and such an assessment determines a less favourable risk weight than the use of the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures, as specified in paragraph 2, then the general preferential treatment for short-term exposures shall not be used and all unrated short-term claims shall be assigned the same risk weight as that applied by the specific short-term assessment.
Article 121 Exposures to unrated institutions
1. Exposures to institutions for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with the credit quality step to which exposures to the central government of the jurisdiction in which the institution is incorporated are assigned in accordance with Table 5. Table 5 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Table 5 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Risk weight of exposure 20 % 2. For exposures to unrated institutions incorporated in countries where the central government is unrated, the risk weight shall be 100 %. 3. For exposures to unrated institutions with an original effective maturity of three months or less, the risk weight shall be 20 %. 4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, for trade finance exposures referred to in point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 162(3) to unrated institutions, the risk weight shall be 50 % and where the residual maturity of these trade finance exposures to unrated institutions is three months or less, the risk weight shall be 20 %.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 121 Exposures to unrated institutions):
1. Exposures to institutions for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with the credit quality step to which exposures to the central government of the jurisdiction in which the institution is incorporated are assigned in accordance with Table 5. Table 5 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Exposures to institutions for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with the credit quality step to which exposures to the central government of the jurisdiction in which the institution is incorporated are assigned in accordance with Table 5. Table 5 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Table 5 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Credit quality step to which central government is assigned 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step to which central government is assigned Risk weight of exposure 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Risk weight of exposure 20 % 2. For exposures to unrated institutions incorporated in countries where the central government is unrated, the risk weight shall be 100 %. 3. For exposures to unrated institutions with an original effective maturity of three months or less, the risk weight shall be 20 %. 4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, for trade finance exposures referred to in point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 162(3) to unrated institutions, the risk weight shall be 50 % and where the residual maturity of these trade finance exposures to unrated institutions is three months or less, the risk weight shall be 20 %.
Article 122 Exposures to corporates
1. Exposures for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 6 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 6 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Table 6 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 2. Exposures for which such a credit assessment is not available shall be assigned a 100 % risk weight or the risk weight of exposures to the central government of the jurisdiction in which the corporate is incorporated, whichever is the higher.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 122 Exposures to corporates):
1. Exposures for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 6 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 6 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Exposures for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 6 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 6 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Table 6 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 2. Exposures for which such a credit assessment is not available shall be assigned a 100 % risk weight or the risk weight of exposures to the central government of the jurisdiction in which the corporate is incorporated, whichever is the higher.
Article 123 Retail exposures
Exposures that comply with the following criteria shall be assigned a risk weight of 75 %: (a) the exposure shall be either to a natural person or persons, or to a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME); (b) the exposure shall be one of a significant number of exposures with similar characteristics such that the risks associated with such lending are substantially reduced; (c) the total amount owed to the institution and parent undertakings and its subsidiaries, including any exposure in default, by the obligor client or group of connected clients, but excluding exposures fully and completely secured on residential property collateral that have been assigned to the exposure class laid down in point (i) of Article 112, shall not, to the knowledge of the institution, exceed EUR 1 million. The institution shall take reasonable steps to acquire this knowledge. Securities shall not be eligible for the retail exposure class. Exposures that do not comply with the criteria referred to in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph shall not be eligible for the retail exposures class. The present value of retail minimum lease payments is eligible for the retail exposure class.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 123 Retail exposures):
Exposures that comply with the following criteria shall be assigned a risk weight of 75 %: (a) the exposure shall be either to a natural person or persons, or to a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME); (b) the exposure shall be one of a significant number of exposures with similar characteristics such that the risks associated with such lending are substantially reduced; (c) the total amount owed to the institution and parent undertakings and its subsidiaries, including any exposure in default, by the obligor client or group of connected clients, but excluding exposures fully and completely secured on residential property collateral that have been assigned to the exposure class laid down in point (i) of Article 112, shall not, to the knowledge of the institution, exceed EUR 1 million. The institution shall take reasonable steps to acquire this knowledge. Securities shall not be eligible for the retail exposure class. Exposures that do not comply with the criteria referred to in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph shall not be eligible for the retail exposures class. The present value of retail minimum lease payments is eligible for the retail exposure class. Exposures due to loans granted by a credit institution to pensioners or employees with a permanent contract against the unconditional transfer of part of the borrower's pension or salary to that credit institution shall be assigned a risk weight of 35 %, provided that all the following conditions are met: (a) in order to repay the loan, the borrower unconditionally authorises the pension fund or employer to make direct payments to the credit institution by deducting the monthly payments on the loan from the borrower's monthly pension or salary; (b) the risks of death, inability to work, unemployment or reduction of the net monthly pension or salary of the borrower are properly covered through an insurance policy underwritten by the borrower to the benefit of the credit institution; the monthly payments to be made by the borrower on all loans that meet the conditions set out in points (a) and (b) do not in aggregate exceed 20 % of the borrower's net monthly pension or salary; (d) the maximum original maturity of the loan is equal to or less than ten years.
Article 124 Exposures secured by mortgages on immovable property
1. An exposure or any part of an exposure fully secured by mortgage on immovable property shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %, where the conditions under Article 125 or 126 are not met, except for any part of the exposure which is assigned to another exposure class. The part of the exposure that exceeds the mortgage value of the immovable property shall be assigned the risk weight applicable to the unsecured exposures of the counterparty involved. The part of an exposure treated as fully secured by immovable property shall not be higher than the pledged amount of the market value or in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions, the mortgage lending value of the property in question. 2. Based on the data collected under Article 101, and any other relevant indicators, the competent authorities shall periodically, and at least annually, assess whether the risk-weight of 35 % for exposures secured by mortgages on residential property referred to in Article 125 and the risk weight of 50 % for exposures secured on commercial immovable property referred to in Article 126 located in their territory are appropriately based on: (a) the loss experience of exposures secured by immovable property; (b) forward-looking immovable property markets developments; Competent authorities may set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria than those set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2), where appropriate, on the basis of financial stability considerations. For exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 35 % through 150 %, For exposures secured on commercial immovable property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 50 % through 150 %, Within these ranges, the higher risk weight shall be set based on loss experience and taking into account forward-looking markets developments and financial stability considerations. Where the assessment demonstrates that the risk weights set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2) do not reflect the actual risks related to one or more property segments of such exposures, fully secured by mortgages on residential property or on commercial immovable property located in one or more parts of its territory, the competent authorities shall set, for those property segments of exposures, a higher risk weight corresponding to the actual risks. The competent authorities shall consult EBA on the adjustments to the risk weights and criteria applied, which will be calculated in accordance with the criteria set out in this paragraph as specified by the regulatory technical standards referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article. EBA shall publish the risk weights and criteria that the competent authorities set for exposures referred to in Articles 125, 126 and 199(1)(a). 3. When competent authorities set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria, institutions shall have a 6-month transitional period to apply the new risk weight. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (a) the rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value referred to in paragraph 1; (b) the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 that competent authorities shall take into account when determining higher risk-weights, in particular the term of ‘financial stability considerations’. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 5. The institutions of one Member State shall apply the risk-weights and criteria that have been determined by the competent authorities of another Member State to exposures secured by mortgages on commercial and residential property located in that Member State.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 124 Exposures secured by mortgages on immovable property):
1. An exposure or any part of an exposure fully secured by mortgage on immovable property shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %, where the conditions under Article 125 or 126 are not met, except for any part of the exposure which is assigned to another exposure class. The part of the exposure that exceeds the mortgage value of the immovable property shall be assigned the risk weight applicable to the unsecured exposures of the counterparty involved. The part of an exposure treated as fully secured by immovable property shall not be higher than the pledged amount of the market value or in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions, the mortgage lending value of the property in question. 2. Based on the data collected under Article 101, and any other relevant indicators, the competent authorities shall periodically, and at least annually, assess whether the risk-weight of 35 % for exposures secured by mortgages on residential property referred to in Article 125 and the risk weight of 50 % for exposures secured on commercial immovable property referred to in Article 126 located in their territory are appropriately based on: (a) the loss experience of exposures secured by immovable property; (b) forward-looking immovable property markets developments; Competent authorities may set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria than those set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2), where appropriate, on the basis of financial stability considerations. For exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 35 % through 150 %, For exposures secured on commercial immovable property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 50 % through 150 %, Within these ranges, the higher risk weight shall be set based on loss experience and taking into account forward-looking markets developments and financial stability considerations. Where the assessment demonstrates that the risk weights set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2) do not reflect the actual risks related to one or more property segments of such exposures, fully secured by mortgages on residential property or on commercial immovable property located in one or more parts of its territory, the competent authorities shall set, for those property segments of exposures, a higher risk weight corresponding to the actual risks. The competent authorities shall consult EBA on the adjustments to the risk weights and criteria applied, which will be calculated in accordance with the criteria set out in this paragraph as specified by the regulatory technical standards referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article. EBA shall publish the risk weights and criteria that the competent authorities set for exposures referred to in Articles 125, 126 and 199(1)(a). 3. When competent authorities set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria, institutions shall have a 6-month transitional period to apply the new risk weight. 4. EBA, in close cooperation with the ESRB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value referred to in paragraph 1 and the types of factors to be considered for the assessment of the appropriateness of the risk weights referred in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2019. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 5. The ESRB may, by means of recommendations in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, and in close cooperation with EBA, give guidance to authorities designated in accordance with paragraph 1a of this Article on the following: (a) factors which could ‘adversely affect current or future financial stability’ referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 2; and (b) indicative benchmarks that the authority designated in accordance with paragraph 1a is to take into account when determining higher risk weights.
Article 125 Exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property
1. Unless otherwise decided by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 124(2), exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property shall be treated as follows: (a) exposures or any part of an exposure fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property which is or shall be occupied or let by the owner, or the beneficial owner in the case of personal investment companies, shall be assigned a risk weight of 35 %; (b) exposures to a tenant under a property leasing transaction concerning residential property under which the institution is the lessor and the tenant has an option to purchase, shall be assigned a risk weight of 35 % provided that the exposure of the institution is fully and completely secured by its ownership of the property. 2. Institutions shall consider an exposure or any part of an exposure as fully and completely secured for the purposes of paragraph 1 only if the following conditions are met: (a) the value of the property shall not materially depend upon the credit quality of the borrower. Institutions may exclude situations where purely macro-economic factors affect both the value of the property and the performance of the borrower from their determination of the materiality of such dependence; (b) the risk of the borrower shall not materially depend upon the performance of the underlying property or project, but on the underlying capacity of the borrower to repay the debt from other sources, and as a consequence, the repayment of the facility shall not materially depend on any cash flow generated by the underlying property serving as collateral. For those other sources, institutions shall determine maximum loan-to-income ratios as part of their lending policy and obtain suitable evidence of the relevant income when granting the loan; (c) the requirements set out in Article 208 and the valuation rules set out in Article 229(1) are met; (d) unless otherwise determined under Article 124(2), the part of the loan to which the 35 % risk weight is assigned does not exceed 80 % of the market value of the property in question or 80 % of the mortgage lending value of the property in question in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions. 3. Institutions may derogate from point (b) of paragraph 2 for exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property which is situated within the territory of a Member State, where the competent authority of that Member State has published evidence showing that a well-developed and long-established residential property market is present in that territory with loss rates which do not exceed the following limits: (a) losses stemming from lending collateralised by residential property up to 80 % of the market value or 80 % of the mortgage lending value, unless otherwise decided under Article 124(2), do not exceed 0,3 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by residential property in any given year; (b) overall losses stemming from lending collateralised by residential property do not exceed 0,5 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by residential property in any given year. 4. Where either of the limits referred to in paragraph 3 is not satisfied in a given year, the eligibility to use paragraph 3 shall cease and the condition contained in point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply until the conditions in paragraph 3 are satisfied in a subsequent year.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 125 Exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property):
4. Where either of the limits referred to in paragraph 3 is not satisfied in a given year, the eligibility to use paragraph 3 shall cease and the condition contained in point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply until the conditions in paragraph 3 are satisfied in a subsequent year.
Article 126 Exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property
1. Unless otherwise decided by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 124(2), exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property shall be treated as follows: (a) exposures or any part of an exposure fully and completely secured by mortgages on offices or other commercial premises may be assigned a risk weight of 50 %; (b) exposures related to property leasing transactions concerning offices or other commercial premises under which the institution is the lessor and the tenant has an option to purchase may be assigned a risk weight of 50 % provided that the exposure of the institution is fully and completely secured by its ownership of the property. 2. Institutions shall consider an exposure or any part of an exposure as fully and completely secured for the purposes of paragraph 1 only if the following conditions are met: (a) the value of the property shall not materially depend upon the credit quality of the borrower. Institutions may exclude situations where purely macro-economic factors affect both the value of the property and the performance of the borrower from their determination of the materiality of such dependence; (b) the risk of the borrower shall not materially depend upon the performance of the underlying property or project, but on the underlying capacity of the borrower to repay the debt from other sources, and as a consequence, the repayment of the facility shall not materially depend on any cash flow generated by the underlying property serving as collateral; (c) the requirements set out in Article 208 and the valuation rules set out in Article 229(1) are met; (d) the 50 % risk weight unless otherwise provided under Article 124(2) shall be assigned to the part of the loan that does not exceed 50 % of the market value of the property or 60 % of the mortgage lending value unless otherwise provided under Article 124(2) of the property in question in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions. 3. Institutions may derogate from point (b) of paragraph 2 for exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property which is situated within the territory of a Member State, where the competent authority of that Member State has published evidence showing that a well-developed and long-established commercial immovable property market is present in that territory with loss rates which do not exceed the following limits: (a) losses stemming from lending collateralised by commercial immovable property up to 50 % of the market value or 60 % of the mortgage lending value, unless otherwise determined under Article 124(2), do not exceed 0,3 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by commercial immovable property; (b) overall losses stemming from lending collateralised by commercial immovable property do not exceed 0,5 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by commercial immovable property. 4. Where either of the limits referred to in paragraph 3 is not satisfied in a given year, the eligibility to use paragraph 3 shall cease and the condition contained in point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply until the conditions in paragraph 3 are satisfied in a subsequent year.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 126 Exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property):
4. Where either of the limits referred to in paragraph 3 is not satisfied in a given year, the eligibility to use paragraph 3 shall cease and the condition contained in point (b) of paragraph 2 shall apply until the conditions in paragraph 3 are satisfied in a subsequent year.
Article 127 Exposures in default
1. The unsecured part of any item where the obligor has defaulted in accordance with Article 178, or in the case of retail exposures, the unsecured part of any credit facility which has defaulted in accordance with Article 178 shall be assigned a risk weight of: (a) 150 %, where specific credit risk adjustments are less than 20 % of the unsecured part of the exposure value if these specific credit risk adjustments were not applied; (b) 100 %, where specific credit risk adjustments are no less than 20 % of the unsecured part of the exposure value if these specific credit risk adjustments were not applied. 2. For the purpose of determining the secured part of the past due item, eligible collateral and guarantees shall be those eligible for credit risk mitigation purposes under Chapter 4. 3. The exposure value remaining after specific credit risk adjustments of exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property in accordance with Article 125 shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 % if a default has occurred in accordance with Article 178. 4. The exposure value remaining after specific credit risk adjustments of exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property in accordance with Article 126 shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 % if a default has occurred in accordance with Article 178.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 127 Exposures in default):
1. The unsecured part of any item where the obligor has defaulted in accordance with Article 178, or in the case of retail exposures, the unsecured part of any credit facility which has defaulted in accordance with Article 178 shall be assigned a risk weight of: (a) 150 %, where the sum of specific credit risk adjustments and of the amounts deducted in accordance with point (m) Article 36(1) is less than 20 % of the unsecured part of the exposure value if those specific credit risk adjustments and deductions were not applied; (b) 100 %, where the sum of the specific credit risk adjustments and of the amounts deducted in accordance with point (m) Article 36(1) is no less than 20 % of the unsecured part of the exposure value if those specific credit risk adjustments and deductions were not applied. 2. For the purpose of determining the secured part of the past due item, eligible collateral and guarantees shall be those eligible for credit risk mitigation purposes under Chapter 4. 3. The exposure value remaining after specific credit risk adjustments of exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property in accordance with Article 125 shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 % if a default has occurred in accordance with Article 178. 4. The exposure value remaining after specific credit risk adjustments of exposures fully and completely secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property in accordance with Article 126 shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 % if a default has occurred in accordance with Article 178.
Article 128 Items associated with particular high risk
1. Institutions shall assign a 150 % risk weight to exposures, including exposures in the form of shares or units in a CIU that are associated with particularly high risks, where appropriate. 2. Exposures with particularly high risks shall include any of the following exposures: (a) investments in venture capital firms; (b) investments in AIFs as defined in Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 2011/61/EU except where the mandate of the fund does not allow a leverage higher than that required under Article 51(3) of Directive 2009/65/EC; (c) investments in private equity; (d) speculative immovable property financing. 3. When assessing whether an exposure other than exposures referred to in paragraph 2 is associated with particularly high risks, institutions shall take into account the following risk characteristics: (a) there is a high risk of loss as a result of a default of the obligor; (b) it is impossible to assess adequately whether the exposure falls under point (a). EBA shall issue guidelines specifying which types of exposures are associated with particularly high risk and under which circumstances. Those guidelines shall be adopted in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 128 Items associated with particular high risk):
1. Institutions shall assign a 150 % risk weight to exposures, including exposures in the form of shares or units in a CIU that are associated with particularly high risks, where appropriate. 2. Exposures with particularly high risks shall include any of the following exposures: (a) investments in venture capital firms; (c) investments in private equity; (d) speculative immovable property financing. When assessing whether an exposure other than exposures referred to in paragraph 2 is associated with particularly high risks, institutions shall take into account the following risk characteristics: (a) there is a high risk of loss as a result of a default of the obligor; (b) it is impossible to assess adequately whether the exposure falls under point (a). EBA shall issue guidelines specifying which types of exposures are associated with particularly high risk and under which circumstances. Those guidelines shall be adopted in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 129 Exposures in the form of covered bonds
1. To be eligible for the preferential treatment set out in paragraphs 4 and 5, bonds as referred to in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC (covered bonds) shall meet the requirements set out in paragraph 7 and shall be collateralised by any of the following eligible assets: (a) exposures to or guaranteed by central governments, the ESCB central banks, public sector entities, regional governments or local authorities in the Union; (b) exposures to or guaranteed by third country central governments, third-country central banks, multilateral development banks, international organisations that qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter, and exposures to or guaranteed by third-country public sector entities, third-country regional governments or third-country local authorities that are risk weighted as exposures to institutions or central governments and central banks in accordance with Article 115(1) or (2), or Article 116(1), (2) or (4) respectively and that qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter, and exposures within the meaning of this point that qualify as a minimum for the credit quality step 2 as set out in this Chapter, provided that they do not exceed 20 % of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institutions; (c) exposures to institutions that qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter. The total exposure of this kind shall not exceed 15 % of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institution. Exposures to institutions in the Union with a maturity not exceeding 100 days shall not be comprised by the step 1 requirement but those institutions shall as a minimum qualify for credit quality step 2 as set out in this Chapter; (d) loans secured by: (i) residential property up to the lesser of the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any prior liens and 80 % of the value of the pledged properties; or (ii) senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Titrisation or equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising residential property exposures. In the event of such senior units being used as collateral, the special public supervision to protect bond holders as provided for in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC shall ensure that the assets underlying such units shall, at any time while they are included in the cover pool be at least 90 % composed of residential mortgages that are combined with any prior liens up to the lesser of the principal amounts due under the units, the principal amounts of the liens, and 80 % of the value of the pledged properties, that the units qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter and that such units do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. (d) loans secured by: (i) residential property up to the lesser of the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any prior liens and 80 % of the value of the pledged properties; or (ii) senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Titrisation or equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising residential property exposures. In the event of such senior units being used as collateral, the special public supervision to protect bond holders as provided for in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC shall ensure that the assets underlying such units shall, at any time while they are included in the cover pool be at least 90 % composed of residential mortgages that are combined with any prior liens up to the lesser of the principal amounts due under the units, the principal amounts of the liens, and 80 % of the value of the pledged properties, that the units qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter and that such units do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. (e) residential loans fully guaranteed by an eligible protection provider referred to in Article 201 qualifying for the credit quality step 2 or above as set out in this Chapter, where the portion of each of the loans that is used to meet the requirement set out in this paragraph for collateralisation of the covered bond does not represent more than 80 % of the value of the corresponding residential property located in France, and where a loan-to-income ratio respects at most 33 % when the loan has been granted. There shall be no mortgage liens on the residential property when the loan is granted, and for the loans granted from 1 January 2014 the borrower shall be contractually committed not to grant such liens without the consent of the credit institution that granted the loan. The loan-to-income ratio represents the share of the gross income of the borrower that covers the reimbursement of the loan, including the interests. The protection provider shall be either a financial institution authorised and supervised by the competent authorities and subject to prudential requirements comparable to those applied to institutions in terms of robustness or an institution or an insurance undertaking. It shall establish a mutual guarantee fund or equivalent protection for insurance undertakings to absorb credit risk losses, whose calibration shall be periodically reviewed by the competent authorities. Both the credit institution and the protection provider shall carry out a creditworthiness assessment of the borrower; (f) loans secured by: (i) commercial immovable property up to the lesser of the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any prior liens and 60 % of the value of the pledged properties; or (ii) senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Titrisation or equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising commercial immovable property exposures. In the event of such senior units being used as collateral, the special public supervision to protect bond holders as provided for in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC shall ensure that the assets underlying such units shall, at any time while they are included in the cover pool be at least 90 % composed of commercial mortgages that are combined with any prior liens up to the lesser of the principal amounts due under the units, the principal amounts of the liens, and 60 % of the value of the pledged properties, that the units qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter and that such units do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. Loans secured by commercial immovable property are eligible where the loan to value ratio of 60 % is exceeded up to a maximum level of 70 % if the value of the total assets pledged as collateral for the covered bonds exceed the nominal amount outstanding on the covered bond by at least 10 %, and the bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty requirements set out in Chapter 4. The bondholders' claim shall take priority over all other claims on the collateral; (i) commercial immovable property up to the lesser of the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any prior liens and 60 % of the value of the pledged properties; or (ii) senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Titrisation or equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising commercial immovable property exposures. In the event of such senior units being used as collateral, the special public supervision to protect bond holders as provided for in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC shall ensure that the assets underlying such units shall, at any time while they are included in the cover pool be at least 90 % composed of commercial mortgages that are combined with any prior liens up to the lesser of the principal amounts due under the units, the principal amounts of the liens, and 60 % of the value of the pledged properties, that the units qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter and that such units do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. Loans secured by commercial immovable property are eligible where the loan to value ratio of 60 % is exceeded up to a maximum level of 70 % if the value of the total assets pledged as collateral for the covered bonds exceed the nominal amount outstanding on the covered bond by at least 10 %, and the bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty requirements set out in Chapter 4. The bondholders' claim shall take priority over all other claims on the collateral; (g) loans secured by maritime liens on ships up to the difference between 60 % of the value of the pledged ship and the value of any prior maritime liens. For the purposes of points (c), (d)(ii) and (f)(ii) of the first subparagraph, exposures caused by transmission and management of payments of the obligors of, or liquidation proceeds in respect of, loans secured by pledged properties of the senior units or debt securities shall not be comprised in calculating the limits referred to in those points. The competent authorities may, after consulting EBA, partly waive the application of point (c) of the first subparagraph and allow credit quality step 2 for up to 10 % of the total exposure of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institution, provided that significant potential concentration problems in the Member States concerned can be documented due to the application of the credit quality step 1 requirement referred to in that point. 2. The situations referred to in points (a) to (f) of paragraph 1 shall also include collateral that is exclusively restricted by legislation to the protection of the bond-holders against losses. 3. Institutions shall for immovable property collateralising covered bonds meet the requirements set out in Article 208 and the valuation rules set out in Article 229(1). 4. Covered bonds for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 6a which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 6a Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 10 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % Table 6a Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 10 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 10 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % Risk weight 10 % 5. Covered bonds for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available shall be assigned a risk weight on the basis of the risk weight assigned to senior unsecured exposures to the institution which issues them. The following correspondence between risk weights shall apply: (a) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 20 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 10 %; (b) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 50 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 20 %; (c) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 100 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 50 %; (d) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 150 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %. 6. Covered bonds issued before 31 December 2007 are not subject to the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 3. They are eligible for the preferential treatment under paragraphs 4 and 5 until their maturity. 7. Exposures in the form of covered bonds are eligible for preferential treatment, provided that the institution investing in the covered bonds can demonstrate to the competent authorities that: (a) it receives portfolio information at least on: (i) the value of the cover pool and outstanding covered bonds; (ii) the geographical distribution and type of cover assets, loan size, interest rate and currency risks; (iii) the maturity structure of cover assets and covered bonds; and (iv) the percentage of loans more than 90 days past due; (a) it receives portfolio information at least on: (i) the value of the cover pool and outstanding covered bonds; (ii) the geographical distribution and type of cover assets, loan size, interest rate and currency risks; (iii) the maturity structure of cover assets and covered bonds; and (iv) the percentage of loans more than 90 days past due; (b) the issuer makes the information referred to in point (a) available to the institution at least semi-annually.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 129 Exposures in the form of covered bonds):
1. To be eligible for the preferential treatment set out in paragraphs 4 and 5, bonds as referred to in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC (covered bonds) shall meet the requirements set out in paragraph 7 and shall be collateralised by any of the following eligible assets: (a) exposures to or guaranteed by central governments, the ESCB central banks, public sector entities, regional governments or local authorities in the Union; (b) exposures to or guaranteed by third country central governments, third-country central banks, multilateral development banks, international organisations that qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter, and exposures to or guaranteed by third-country public sector entities, third-country regional governments or third-country local authorities that are risk weighted as exposures to institutions or central governments and central banks in accordance with Article 115(1) or (2), or Article 116(1), (2) or (4) respectively and that qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter, and exposures within the meaning of this point that qualify as a minimum for the credit quality step 2 as set out in this Chapter, provided that they do not exceed 20 % of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institutions; (c) exposures to institutions that qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter. The total exposure of this kind shall not exceed 15 % of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institution. Exposures to institutions in the Union with a maturity not exceeding 100 days shall not be comprised by the step 1 requirement but those institutions shall as a minimum qualify for credit quality step 2 as set out in this Chapter; (d) loans secured by: (i) residential property up to the lesser of the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any prior liens and 80 % of the value of the pledged properties; or (ii) senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Titrisation or equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising residential property exposures. In the event of such senior units being used as collateral, the special public supervision to protect bond holders as provided for in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC shall ensure that the assets underlying such units shall, at any time while they are included in the cover pool be at least 90 % composed of residential mortgages that are combined with any prior liens up to the lesser of the principal amounts due under the units, the principal amounts of the liens, and 80 % of the value of the pledged properties, that the units qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter and that such units do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. (e) residential loans fully guaranteed by an eligible protection provider referred to in Article 201 qualifying for the credit quality step 2 or above as set out in this Chapter, where the portion of each of the loans that is used to meet the requirement set out in this paragraph for collateralisation of the covered bond does not represent more than 80 % of the value of the corresponding residential property located in France, and where a loan-to-income ratio respects at most 33 % when the loan has been granted. There shall be no mortgage liens on the residential property when the loan is granted, and for the loans granted from 1 January 2014 the borrower shall be contractually committed not to grant such liens without the consent of the credit institution that granted the loan. The loan-to-income ratio represents the share of the gross income of the borrower that covers the reimbursement of the loan, including the interests. The protection provider shall be either a financial institution authorised and supervised by the competent authorities and subject to prudential requirements comparable to those applied to institutions in terms of robustness or an institution or an insurance undertaking. It shall establish a mutual guarantee fund or equivalent protection for insurance undertakings to absorb credit risk losses, whose calibration shall be periodically reviewed by the competent authorities. Both the credit institution and the protection provider shall carry out a creditworthiness assessment of the borrower; (i) commercial immovable property up to the lesser of the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any prior liens and 60 % of the value of the pledged properties; or (ii) senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Titrisation or equivalent securitisation entities governed by the laws of a Member State securitising commercial immovable property exposures. In the event of such senior units being used as collateral, the special public supervision to protect bond holders as provided for in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC shall ensure that the assets underlying such units shall, at any time while they are included in the cover pool be at least 90 % composed of commercial mortgages that are combined with any prior liens up to the lesser of the principal amounts due under the units, the principal amounts of the liens, and 60 % of the value of the pledged properties, that the units qualify for the credit quality step 1 as set out in this Chapter and that such units do not exceed 10 % of the nominal amount of the outstanding issue. Loans secured by commercial immovable property are eligible where the loan to value ratio of 60 % is exceeded up to a maximum level of 70 % if the value of the total assets pledged as collateral for the covered bonds exceed the nominal amount outstanding on the covered bond by at least 10 %, and the bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty requirements set out in Chapter 4. The bondholders' claim shall take priority over all other claims on the collateral; (g) loans secured by maritime liens on ships up to the difference between 60 % of the value of the pledged ship and the value of any prior maritime liens. For the purposes of points (c), (d)(ii) and (f)(ii) of the first subparagraph, exposures caused by transmission and management of payments of the obligors of, or liquidation proceeds in respect of, loans secured by pledged properties of the senior units or debt securities shall not be comprised in calculating the limits referred to in those points. The competent authorities may, after consulting EBA, partly waive the application of point (c) of the first subparagraph and allow credit quality step 2 for up to 10 % of the total exposure of the nominal amount of outstanding covered bonds of the issuing institution, provided that significant potential concentration problems in the Member States concerned can be documented due to the application of the credit quality step 1 requirement referred to in that point. 2. The situations referred to in points (a) to (f) of paragraph 1 shall also include collateral that is exclusively restricted by legislation to the protection of the bond-holders against losses. 3. Institutions shall for immovable property collateralising covered bonds meet the requirements set out in Article 208 and the valuation rules set out in Article 229(1). 4. Covered bonds for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 6a which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 6a Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 10 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % Table 6a Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 10 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 10 % 20 % 20 % 50 % 50 % 100 % Risk weight 10 % 5. Covered bonds for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available shall be assigned a risk weight on the basis of the risk weight assigned to senior unsecured exposures to the institution which issues them. The following correspondence between risk weights shall apply: (a) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 20 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 10 %; (b) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 50 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 20 %; (c) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 100 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 50 %; (d) if the exposures to the institution are assigned a risk weight of 150 %, the covered bond shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %. 6. Covered bonds issued before 31 December 2007 are not subject to the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 3. They are eligible for the preferential treatment under paragraphs 4 and 5 until their maturity. 7. Exposures in the form of covered bonds are eligible for preferential treatment, provided that the institution investing in the covered bonds can demonstrate to the competent authorities that: (a) it receives portfolio information at least on: (i) the value of the cover pool and outstanding covered bonds; (ii) the geographical distribution and type of cover assets, loan size, interest rate and currency risks; (iii) the maturity structure of cover assets and covered bonds; and (iv) the percentage of loans more than 90 days past due; (b) the issuer makes the information referred to in point (a) available to the institution at least semi-annually.
Article 130 Items representing securitisation positions
Risk-weighted exposure amounts for securitisation positions shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 5.
Article 131 Exposures to institutions and corporates with a short-term credit assessment
Exposures to institutions and exposures to corporates for which a short-term credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 7 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 7 Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 150 % 150 % Table 7 Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 150 % 150 % Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit Quality Step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 150 % 150 % Risk weight 20 %
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 131 Exposures to institutions and corporates with a short-term credit assessment):
Exposures to institutions and exposures to corporates for which a short-term credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 7 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 7 Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 150 % 150 %
Article 132 Exposures in the form of units or shares in CIUs
1. Exposures in the form of units or shares in CIUs shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %, unless the institution applies the credit risk assessment method under paragraph 2, or the look-through approach in paragraph 4 or the average risk weight approach under paragraph 5 when the conditions in paragraph 3 are met. 2. Exposures in the form of units or shares in CIUs for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 8 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 8 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Table 8 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 3. Institutions may determine the risk weight for a CIU in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5, if the following eligibility criteria are met: (a) the CIU is managed by a company that is subject to supervision in a Member State or, in the case of third country CIU, where the following conditions are met: (i) the CIU is managed by a company which is subject to supervision that is considered equivalent to that laid down in Union law; (ii) cooperation between competent authorities is sufficiently ensured; (a) the CIU is managed by a company that is subject to supervision in a Member State or, in the case of third country CIU, where the following conditions are met: (i) the CIU is managed by a company which is subject to supervision that is considered equivalent to that laid down in Union law; (ii) cooperation between competent authorities is sufficiently ensured; (b) the CIU's prospectus or equivalent document includes the following: (i) the categories of assets in which the CIU is authorised to invest; (ii) if investment limits apply, the relative limits and the methodologies to calculate them; (b) the CIU's prospectus or equivalent document includes the following: (i) the categories of assets in which the CIU is authorised to invest; (ii) if investment limits apply, the relative limits and the methodologies to calculate them; (c) the business of the CIU is reported on at least an annual basis to enable an assessment to be made of the assets and liabilities, income and operations over the reporting period. For the purposes of point (a), the Commission may adopt, by way of implementing acts, and subject to the examination procedure referred to in Article 464(2), a decision as to whether a third country applies supervisory and regulatory arrangements at least equivalent to those applied in the Union. In the absence of such a decision, until 1 January 2015, institutions may continue to apply the treatment set out in this paragraph to exposures in the form of units or shares of CIUs from third countries where the relevant competent authorities had approved the third country as eligible for that treatment before 1 January 2014. 4. Where the institution is aware of the underlying exposures of a CIU, it may look through to those underlying exposures in order to calculate an average risk weight for its exposures in the form of units or shares in the CIUs in accordance with the methods set out in this Chapter. Where an underlying exposure of the CIU is itself an exposure in the form of shares in another CIU which fulfils the criteria of paragraph 3, the institution may look through to the underlying exposures of that other CIU. 5. Where the institution is not aware of the underlying exposures of a CIU, it may calculate an average risk weight for its exposures in the form of a unit or share in the CIU in accordance with the methods set out in this Chapter subject to the assumption that the CIU first invests, to the maximum extent allowed under its mandate, in the exposure classes attracting the highest capital requirement, and then continues making investments in descending order until the maximum total investment limit is reached. Institutions may rely on the following third parties to calculate and report, in accordance with the methods set out in paragraphs 4 and 5, a risk weight for the CIU: (a) the depository institution or the depository financial institution of the CIU provided that the CIU exclusively invests in securities and deposits all securities at that depository institution or the financial institution; (b) for CIUs not covered by point (a), the CIU management company, provided that the CIU management company meets the criteria set out in paragraph 3(a). The correctness of the calculation referred to in the first subparagraph shall be confirmed by an external auditor.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 132 Exposures in the form of units or shares in CIUs):
1. Exposures in the form of units or shares in CIUs shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %, unless the institution applies the credit risk assessment method under paragraph 2, or the look-through approach in paragraph 4 or the average risk weight approach under paragraph 5 when the conditions in paragraph 3 are met. 2. Exposures in the form of units or shares in CIUs for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is available shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 8 which corresponds to the credit assessment of the ECAI in accordance with Article 136. Table 8 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Table 8 Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Credit quality step 1 2 3 4 5 6 Credit quality step Risk weight 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 150 % 150 % Risk weight 20 % 3. Institutions may determine the risk weight for a CIU in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5, if the following eligibility criteria are met: (a) the CIU is managed by a company that is subject to supervision in a Member State or, in the case of third country CIU, where the following conditions are met: (i) the CIU is managed by a company which is subject to supervision that is considered equivalent to that laid down in Union law; (ii) cooperation between competent authorities is sufficiently ensured; (b) the CIU's prospectus or equivalent document includes the following: (i) the categories of assets in which the CIU is authorised to invest; (ii) if investment limits apply, the relative limits and the methodologies to calculate them; (c) the business of the CIU is reported on at least an annual basis to enable an assessment to be made of the assets and liabilities, income and operations over the reporting period. For the purposes of point (a), the Commission may adopt, by way of implementing acts, and subject to the examination procedure referred to in Article 464(2), a decision as to whether a third country applies supervisory and regulatory arrangements at least equivalent to those applied in the Union. In the absence of such a decision, until 1 January 2015, institutions may continue to apply the treatment set out in this paragraph to exposures in the form of units or shares of CIUs from third countries where the relevant competent authorities had approved the third country as eligible for that treatment before 1 January 2014. 4. Where the institution is aware of the underlying exposures of a CIU, it may look through to those underlying exposures in order to calculate an average risk weight for its exposures in the form of units or shares in the CIUs in accordance with the methods set out in this Chapter. Where an underlying exposure of the CIU is itself an exposure in the form of shares in another CIU which fulfils the criteria of paragraph 3, the institution may look through to the underlying exposures of that other CIU. 5. Where the institution is not aware of the underlying exposures of a CIU, it may calculate an average risk weight for its exposures in the form of a unit or share in the CIU in accordance with the methods set out in this Chapter subject to the assumption that the CIU first invests, to the maximum extent allowed under its mandate, in the exposure classes attracting the highest capital requirement, and then continues making investments in descending order until the maximum total investment limit is reached. Institutions may rely on the following third parties to calculate and report, in accordance with the methods set out in paragraphs 4 and 5, a risk weight for the CIU: (a) the depository institution or the depository financial institution of the CIU provided that the CIU exclusively invests in securities and deposits all securities at that depository institution or the financial institution; (b) for CIUs not covered by point (a), the CIU management company, provided that the CIU management company meets the criteria set out in paragraph 3(a). The correctness of the calculation referred to in the first subparagraph shall be confirmed by an external auditor.
Article 133 Equity exposures
1. The following exposures shall be considered equity exposures: (a) non-debt exposures conveying a subordinated, residual claim on the assets or income of the issuer; (b) debt exposures and other securities, partnerships, derivatives, or other vehicles, the economic substance of which is similar to the exposures specified in point (a). 2. Equity exposures shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %, unless they are required to be deducted in accordance with Part Two, assigned a 250 % risk weight in accordance with Article 48(4), assigned a 1 250 % risk weight in accordance with Article 89(3) or treated as high risk items in accordance with Article 128. 3. Investments in equity or regulatory capital instruments issued by institutions shall be classified as equity claims, unless deducted from own funds or attracting a 250 % risk weight under Article 48(4) or treated as high risk items in accordance with Article 128.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 133 Equity exposures):
2. Equity exposures shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %, unless they are required to be deducted in accordance with Part Two, assigned a 250 % risk weight in accordance with Article 48(4), assigned a 1 250 % risk weight in accordance with Article 89(3) or treated as high risk items in accordance with Article 128. 3. Investments in equity or regulatory capital instruments issued by institutions shall be classified as equity claims, unless deducted from own funds or attracting a 250 % risk weight under Article 48(4) or treated as high risk items in accordance with Article 128.
Article 134 Other items
1. Tangible assets within the meaning of item 10 under the heading 'Assets' in Article 4 of Directive 86/635/EEC shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %. 2. Prepayments and accrued income for which an institution is unable to determine the counterparty in accordance with Directive 86/635/EEC, shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %. 3. Cash items in the process of collection shall be assigned a 20 % risk weight. Cash in hand and equivalent cash items shall be assigned a 0 % risk weight. 4. Gold bullion held in own vaults or on an allocated basis to the extent backed by bullion liabilities shall be assigned a 0 % risk weight. 5. In the case of asset sale and repurchase agreements and outright forward purchases, the risk weight shall be that assigned to the assets in question and not to the counterparties to the transactions. 6. Where an institution provides credit protection for a number of exposures under terms that the nth default among the exposures shall trigger payment and that this credit event shall terminate the contract, and where the product has an external credit assessment from an ECAI, the risk weights prescribed in Chapter 5 shall be assigned. If the product is not rated by an ECAI, the risk weights of the exposures included in the basket will be aggregated, excluding n-1 exposures, up to a maximum of 1 250 % and multiplied by the nominal amount of the protection provided by the credit derivative to obtain the risk weighted asset amount. The n-1 exposures to be excluded from the aggregation shall be determined on the basis that they shall include those exposures each of which produces a lower risk-weighted exposure amount than the risk-weighted exposure amount of any of the exposures included in the aggregation. 7. The exposure value for leases shall be the discounted minimum lease payments. Minimum lease payments are the payments over the lease term that the lessee is or can be required to make and any bargain option the exercise of which is reasonably certain. A party other than the lessee may be required to make a payment related to the residual value of a leased property and that payment obligation fulfils the set of conditions in Article 201 regarding the eligibility of protection providers as well as the requirements for recognising other types of guarantees provided in Articles 213 to 215, that payment obligation may be taken into account as unfunded credit protection under Chapter 4. These exposures shall be assigned to the relevant exposure class in accordance with Article 112. When the exposure is a residual value of leased assets, the risk-weighted exposure amounts shall be calculated as follows: 1/t * 100 % * residual value, where t is the greater of 1 and the nearest number of whole years of the lease remaining.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 134 Other items):
1. Tangible assets within the meaning of item 10 under the heading 'Assets' in Article 4 of Directive 86/635/EEC shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %. 2. Prepayments and accrued income for which an institution is unable to determine the counterparty in accordance with Directive 86/635/EEC, shall be assigned a risk weight of 100 %. 3. Cash items in the process of collection shall be assigned a 20 % risk weight. Cash in hand and equivalent cash items shall be assigned a 0 % risk weight. 4. Gold bullion held in own vaults or on an allocated basis to the extent backed by bullion liabilities shall be assigned a 0 % risk weight. 5. In the case of asset sale and repurchase agreements and outright forward purchases, the risk weight shall be that assigned to the assets in question and not to the counterparties to the transactions. 6. Where an institution provides credit protection for a number of exposures subject to the condition that the nth default among the exposures shall trigger payment and that this credit event shall terminate the contract, the risk weights of the exposures included in the basket will be aggregated, excluding n-1 exposures, up to a maximum of 1 250 % and multiplied by the nominal amount of the protection provided by the credit derivative to obtain the risk-weighted exposure amount. The n-1 exposures to be excluded from the aggregation shall be determined on the basis that they shall include those exposures each of which produces a lower risk-weighted exposure amount than the risk-weighted exposure amount of any of the exposures included in the aggregation. 7. The exposure value for leases shall be the discounted minimum lease payments. Minimum lease payments are the payments over the lease term that the lessee is or can be required to make and any bargain option the exercise of which is reasonably certain. A party other than the lessee may be required to make a payment related to the residual value of a leased property and that payment obligation fulfils the set of conditions in Article 201 regarding the eligibility of protection providers as well as the requirements for recognising other types of guarantees provided in Articles 213 to 215, that payment obligation may be taken into account as unfunded credit protection under Chapter 4. These exposures shall be assigned to the relevant exposure class in accordance with Article 112. When the exposure is a residual value of leased assets, the risk-weighted exposure amounts shall be calculated as follows: 1/t * 100 % * residual value, where t is the greater of 1 and the nearest number of whole years of the lease remaining.
Article 135 Use of credit assessments by ECAIs
1. An external credit assessment may be used to determine the risk weight of an exposure under this Chapter only if it has been issued by an ECAI or has been endorsed by an ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 2. EBA shall publish the list of ECAIs in accordance with Article 2(4) and Article 18(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on its website. Sub-Section 2 Mapping of ECAI's credit assessments
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 135 Use of credit assessments by ECAIs):
1. An external credit assessment may be used to determine the risk weight of an exposure under this Chapter only if it has been issued by an ECAI or has been endorsed by an ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 2. EBA shall publish the list of ECAIs in accordance with Article 2(4) and Article 18(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on its website. 3. By 10 July 2025, ESMA shall prepare a report on whether ESG risks are appropriately reflected in ECAI credit risk rating methodologies and submit that report to the Commission. On the basis of that report, the Commission shall, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council by 10 January 2026.
Article 136 Mapping of ECAI's credit assessments
1. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall, through the Joint Committee, develop draft implementing technical standards to specify for all ECAIs, with which of the credit quality steps set out in Section 2 the relevant credit assessments of the ECAI correspond (‘mapping’). Those determinations shall be objective and consistent. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 July 2014 and shall submit revised draft implementing technical standards where necessary. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 respectively. 2. When determining the mapping of credit assessments, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall comply with the following requirements: (a) in order to differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each credit assessment, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall consider quantitative factors such as the long-term default rate associated with all items assigned the same credit assessment. For recently established ECAIs and for those that have compiled only a short record of default data, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall ask the ECAI what it believes to be the long-term default rate associated with all items assigned the same credit assessment; (b) in order to differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each credit assessment, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall consider qualitative factors such as the pool of issuers that the ECAI covers, the range of credit assessments that the ECAI assigns, each credit assessment meaning and the ECAI's definition of default; (c) EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall compare default rates experienced for each credit assessment of a particular ECAI and compare them with a benchmark built on the basis of default rates experienced by other ECAIs on a population of issuers that present an equivalent level of credit risk; (d) where the default rates experienced for the credit assessment of a particular ECAI are materially and systematically higher then the benchmark, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall assign a higher credit quality step in the credit quality assessment scale to the ECAI credit assessment; (e) where EBA, EIOPA and ESMA have increased the associated risk weight for a specific credit assessment of a particular ECAI, and where default rates experienced for that ECAI's credit assessment are no longer materially and systematically higher than the benchmark, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA may restore the original credit quality step in the credit quality assessment scale for the ECAI credit assessment. 3. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the quantitative factors referred to in point (a), the qualitative factors referred to in point (b) and the benchmark referred to in point (c) of paragraph 2. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 July 2014. Sub-Section 3 Use of credit assessments by Export Credit Agencies
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 136 Mapping of ECAI's credit assessments):
1. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall, through the Joint Committee, develop draft implementing technical standards to specify for all ECAIs, with which of the credit quality steps set out in Section 2 the relevant credit assessments of the ECAI correspond (‘mapping’). Those determinations shall be objective and consistent. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 July 2014 and shall submit revised draft implementing technical standards where necessary. When determining the mapping of credit assessments, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall comply with the following requirements: (a) in order to differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each credit assessment, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall consider quantitative factors such as the long-term default rate associated with all items assigned the same credit assessment. For recently established ECAIs and for those that have compiled only a short record of default data, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall ask the ECAI what it believes to be the long-term default rate associated with all items assigned the same credit assessment; (b) in order to differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each credit assessment, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall consider qualitative factors such as the pool of issuers that the ECAI covers, the range of credit assessments that the ECAI assigns, each credit assessment meaning and the ECAI's definition of default; (c) EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall compare default rates experienced for each credit assessment of a particular ECAI and compare them with a benchmark built on the basis of default rates experienced by other ECAIs on a population of issuers that present an equivalent level of credit risk; (d) where the default rates experienced for the credit assessment of a particular ECAI are materially and systematically higher then the benchmark, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall assign a higher credit quality step in the credit quality assessment scale to the ECAI credit assessment; (e) where EBA, EIOPA and ESMA have increased the associated risk weight for a specific credit assessment of a particular ECAI, and where default rates experienced for that ECAI's credit assessment are no longer materially and systematically higher than the benchmark, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA may restore the original credit quality step in the credit quality assessment scale for the ECAI credit assessment. 3. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the quantitative factors referred to in point (a), the qualitative factors referred to in point (b) and the benchmark referred to in point (c) of paragraph 2. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 July 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 respectively. Sub-Section 3 Use of credit assessments by Export Credit Agencies
Article 137 Use of credit assessments by export credit agencies
1. For the purpose of Article 114, institutions may use credit assessments of an Export Credit Agency that the institution has nominated, if either of the following conditions is met: (a) it is a consensus risk score from export credit agencies participating in the OECD ‘Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits’; (b) the Export Credit Agency publishes its credit assessments, and the Export Credit Agency subscribes to the OECD agreed methodology, and the credit assessment is associated with one of the eight minimum export insurance premiums that the OECD agreed methodology establishes. An institution may revoke its nomination of an Export Credit Agency. An institution shall substantiate the revocation if there are concrete indications that the intention underlying the revocation is to reduce the capital adequacy requirements. 2. Exposures for which a credit assessment by an Export Credit Agency is recognised for risk weighting purposes shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 9. Table 9 MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Table 9 MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Risk weight 0 %
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 137 Use of credit assessments by export credit agencies):
1. For the purpose of Article 114, institutions may use credit assessments of an Export Credit Agency that the institution has nominated, if either of the following conditions is met: (a) it is a consensus risk score from export credit agencies participating in the OECD ‘Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits’; (b) the Export Credit Agency publishes its credit assessments, and the Export Credit Agency subscribes to the OECD agreed methodology, and the credit assessment is associated with one of the eight minimum export insurance premiums that the OECD agreed methodology establishes. An institution may revoke its nomination of an Export Credit Agency. An institution shall substantiate the revocation if there are concrete indications that the intention underlying the revocation is to reduce the capital adequacy requirements. For the purpose of Article 114, institutions may use credit assessments of an Export Credit Agency that the institution has nominated, if either of the following conditions is met: (a) it is a consensus risk score from export credit agencies participating in the OECD ‘Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits’; (b) the Export Credit Agency publishes its credit assessments, and the Export Credit Agency subscribes to the OECD agreed methodology, and the credit assessment is associated with one of the eight minimum export insurance premiums that the OECD agreed methodology establishes. An institution may revoke its nomination of an Export Credit Agency. An institution shall substantiate the revocation if there are concrete indications that the intention underlying the revocation is to reduce the capital adequacy requirements. 2. Exposures for which a credit assessment by an Export Credit Agency is recognised for risk weighting purposes shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 9. Table 9 MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Exposures for which a credit assessment by an Export Credit Agency is recognised for risk weighting purposes shall be assigned a risk weight in accordance with Table 9. Table 9 MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Table 9 MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % MEIP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Risk weight 0 % 0 % 20 % 50 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 150 % Risk weight 0 %