Article 1 
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply: (a) ‘dual-use goods and technology’ means the items listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 ); (b) ‘competent authorities’ means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex I; (c) ‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services, including verbal forms of assistance; (g) ‘money-market instruments’ means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment; (h) ‘credit institution’ means an undertaking, the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account; (i) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace; (l) ‘investor citizenship schemes’ (or ‘golden passports’) means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to acquire its nationality in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments; (m) ‘investor residence schemes’ (or ‘golden visas’) means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to obtain a residence permit in a Member State in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments; (o) ‘financing or financial assistance’ means any action, irrespective of the particular means chosen, whereby the person, entity or body concerned, conditionally or unconditionally, disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources, including but not limited to grants, loans, guarantees, suretyships, bonds, letters of credit, supplier credits, buyer credits, import or export advances and all types of insurance and reinsurance, including export credit insurance; payment as well as terms and conditions of payment of the agreed price for a good or a service, made in line with normal business practice, do not constitute financing or financial assistance; (p) ‘partner country’ means a country applying a set of export control measures substantially equivalent to those set out in this Regulation, as identified in Annex VIII; (q) ‘consumer communication devices’ means devices used by private individuals such as personal computers and peripherals (including hard drives and printers), mobile telephones, smart televisions, memory devices (USB drives), and consumer software for all of these items; (r) ‘Russian air carrier’ means an air transport undertaking holding a valid operating licence or equivalent issued by the competent authorities of the Russian Federation; (s) ‘credit rating’ means an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating categories; (t) ‘credit rating activities’ means data and information analysis and the evaluation, approval, issuing and review of credit ratings; (v) ‘public procurement Directives’ means Directives 2014/23/EU ( 4 ), 2014/24/EU ( 5 ), 2014/25/EU ( 6 ) and 2009/81/EC ( 7 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council; (w) ‘road transport undertaking’ means any natural or legal person, entity or body engaged with a commercial purpose in the transport of freight by means of motor vehicles or combinations of vehicles; (x) ‘mining and quarrying sector’ means a sector covering the location, extraction, management and processing activities relating to non-energy producing materials; (za) ‘European critical infrastructure’ means infrastructure as defined in Article 2(b) of Directive 2008/114/EC; (zb) ‘owners or operators of critical infrastructures’ means those entities responsible for investments in, and/or day- to-day operation of, a particular asset, system or part thereof designated as critical infrastructure or European critical infrastructure; (zc) ‘partner country for importation of iron and steel’ means a country applying a set of restrictive measures on imports of iron and steel substantially equivalent to those set out in Article 3g, and a set of import control measures substantially equivalent to those set out in that Article, as identified in Annex XXXVI;
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 1 ):
For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply: (a) ‘dual-use goods and technology’ means the items listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 ); (b) ‘competent authorities’ means the competent authorities of the Member States as identified on the websites listed in Annex I; (c) ‘technical assistance’ means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service, and may take forms such as instruction, advice, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services, including verbal forms of assistance; (g) ‘money-market instruments’ means those classes of instruments which are normally dealt in on the money market, such as treasury bills, certificates of deposit and commercial papers and excluding instruments of payment; (h) ‘credit institution’ means an undertaking, the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credit for its own account; (i) ‘territory of the Union’ means the territories of the Member States to which the Treaty is applicable, under the conditions laid down in the Treaty, including their airspace; (l) ‘investor citizenship schemes’ (or ‘golden passports’) means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to acquire its nationality in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments; (m) ‘investor residence schemes’ (or ‘golden visas’) means the procedures put in place by a Member State, which allow third-country nationals to obtain a residence permit in a Member State in exchange for pre-determined payments and investments; (o) ‘financing or financial assistance’ means any action, irrespective of the particular means chosen, whereby the person, entity or body concerned, conditionally or unconditionally, disburses or commits to disburse its own funds or economic resources, including but not limited to grants, loans, guarantees, suretyships, bonds, letters of credit, supplier credits, buyer credits, import or export advances and all types of insurance and reinsurance, including export credit insurance; payment as well as terms and conditions of payment of the agreed price for a good or a service, made in line with normal business practice, do not constitute financing or financial assistance; (p) ‘partner country’ means a country applying a set of export control measures substantially equivalent to those set out in this Regulation, as identified in Annex VIII; (q) ‘consumer communication devices’ means devices used by private individuals such as personal computers and peripherals (including hard drives and printers), mobile telephones, smart televisions, memory devices (USB drives), and consumer software for all of these items; (r) ‘Russian air carrier’ means an air transport undertaking holding a valid operating licence or equivalent issued by the competent authorities of the Russian Federation; (s) ‘credit rating’ means an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating categories; (t) ‘credit rating activities’ means data and information analysis and the evaluation, approval, issuing and review of credit ratings; (v) ‘public procurement Directives’ means Directives 2014/23/EU ( 4 ), 2014/24/EU ( 5 ), 2014/25/EU ( 6 ) and 2009/81/EC ( 7 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council; (w) ‘road transport undertaking’ means any natural or legal person, entity or body engaged with a commercial purpose in the transport of freight by means of motor vehicles or combinations of vehicles; (x) ‘mining and quarrying sector’ means a sector covering the location, extraction, management and processing activities relating to non-energy producing materials; (za) ‘European critical infrastructure’ means infrastructure as defined in Article 2(b) of Directive 2008/114/EC; (zb) ‘owners or operators of critical infrastructures’ means those entities responsible for investments in, and/or day- to-day operation of, a particular asset, system or part thereof designated as critical infrastructure or European critical infrastructure; (zc) ‘partner country for importation of iron and steel’ means a country applying a set of restrictive measures on imports of iron and steel substantially equivalent to those set out in Article 3g, and a set of import control measures substantially equivalent to those set out in that Article, as identified in Annex XXXVI; (ze) ‘non-governmental organisation’ means a voluntary self-governing body or organisation established to pursue the essentially non-profit-making objectives of its founders or members;
Article 2 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, dual-use goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of the dual-use goods and technology, as referred to in paragraph 1, exported from the Union shall be prohibited. With the exception of point (g) of the first subparagraph, the exporter shall declare in the customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from the date when the first export took place. 5. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice to the authorisation requirements pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2021/821, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 26 February 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that the authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022. 6. All authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union. 8. The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.
Article 2a 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement, or the development of the defence and security sector, as listed in Annex VII, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, as listed in Annex VII, exported from the Union, shall be prohibited. With the exception of point (g) of the first subparagraph, the exporter shall declare in the customs declaration that the items are being exported under the relevant exception set out in this paragraph and shall notify the competent authority of the Member State where the exporter is resident or established of the first use of the relevant exception within 30 days from the date when the first export took place. 3a. The prohibition in paragraph 1a shall not apply to the transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or to the development of its defence and security sector, as listed in Annex VII, intended for the purposes set out in points (a) to (e) of paragraph 3. 5. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are due under contracts concluded before 26 February 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such a contract, provided that the authorisation is requested before 1 May 2022. 6. All authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union. 8. The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.
Article 2aa 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition as listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 10 ) and firearms and other arms as listed in Annex XXXV to this Regulation, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition, as referred to in paragraph 1, exported from the Union shall be prohibited.
Article 2b 
2. All authorisations required under this Article shall be granted by the competent authorities of the Member State in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which shall apply mutatis mutandis. The authorisation shall be valid throughout the Union. 3. The competent authorities may annul, suspend, modify or revoke an authorisation which they have granted pursuant to paragraph 1 if they deem that such annulment, suspension, modification or revocation is necessary for the effective implementation of this Regulation.
Article 2c 
1. The notification to the competent authority referred to in Articles 2(3) and 2a(3) shall be submitted by electronic means, whenever possible, on forms containing at least all the elements of, and in the order provided for in, the models set out in Annex IX. 2. All authorisations referred to in Articles 2, 2a and 2b shall be issued by electronic means, whenever possible, on forms containing at least all the elements of, and in the order provided for in, the models set out in Annex IX.
Article 2d 
1. The competent authorities shall exchange information on the application of Articles 2, 2a and 2b with the other Member States and the Commission, including on any authorisation granted or denied and, in the event of suspected forum shopping or other cases as appropriate, on requests for authorisation received. The competent authorities shall exchange information on the enforcement of Articles 2, 2a and 2b with the other Member States and the Commission, including on related infringements and penalties, as well as best practices of national enforcement authorities and the detection and prosecution of unauthorised exports. The exchange of information shall be carried out using the electronic system provided pursuant to Article 23(6) of Regulation (EU) 2021/821. 2. Information received as a result of the application of this Article shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested, including the exchanges mentioned in paragraph 4. Member States and the Commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information acquired in application of this Article in accordance with Union law and the respective national law. Member States and the Commission shall ensure that classified information provided or exchanged under this Article is not downgraded or declassified without the prior written consent of the originator. 3. Before a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with Articles 2, 2a and 2b for a transaction which is essentially identical to a transaction which is the subject of a still valid denial issued by another Member State or by other Member States, it shall first consult the Member State or Member States which issued the denial. If, following such consultations, the Member State concerned decides to grant an authorisation, it shall inform the other Member States and the Commission thereof, providing all relevant information to explain the decision. 3a. When a Member State grants an authorisation in accordance with Articles 2(4)(d), 2a(4)(d) and 3f(4) for the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology intended for maritime safety, it shall inform the other Member States and the Commission within two weeks of the authorisation. 4. The Commission, in consultation with the Member States shall, where appropriate and on the basis of reciprocity, exchange information with partner countries, with a view to supporting the effectiveness of export control measures under this Regulation and the consistent application of export control measures applied by partner countries.
Article 2e 
1. It shall be prohibited to provide public financing or financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Russia. 3. It shall be prohibited to invest, participate or otherwise contribute to projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund. 4. By way of derogation from paragraph 3, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, an investment participation in, or contribution to, projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund, after having determined that such an investment participation or contribution is due under contracts concluded before 2 March 2022 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts.
Article 2f 
1. It shall be prohibited for operators to broadcast or to enable, facilitate or otherwise contribute to broadcast, any content by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV, including through transmission or distribution by any means such as cable, satellite, IP-TV, internet service providers, internet video-sharing platforms or applications, whether new or pre-installed. 2. Any broadcasting licence or authorisation, transmission and distribution arrangement with the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV shall be suspended. 3. It shall be prohibited to advertise products or services in any content produced or broadcast by the legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex XV, including through transmission or distribution by any of the means referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 3 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods or technology, as listed in Annex II, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, or for use in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. 3. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of goods or technology, or to the provision of technical or financial assistance, necessary for: (a) the transport of natural gas and oil, including refined petroleum products, unless prohibited under Article 3m or 3n, from or through Russia into the Union; or (b) the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment. 4. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply until 20 June 2024 to the provision of insurance or reinsurance to any legal person, entity or body that is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State with regard to its activities outside the energy sector in Russia. 5. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the provision of insurance or reinsurance after 20 June 2024 to any legal person, entity or body that is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State with regard to its activities outside the energy sector in Russia. 6. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export and the provision of technical or financial assistance, after having determined that: (a) it is necessary for ensuring critical energy supply within the Union; or (b) it is intended for the exclusive use of entities owned, or solely or jointly controlled by a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State. 7. The Member State or Member States concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 6 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3a 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, any activity referred to in paragraph 1 after having determined that: (a) it is necessary to ensure critical energy supply within the Union, as well as the transport of natural gas and oil, including refined petroleum products, unless prohibited under Article 3m or 3n, from or through Russia into the Union; or (b) it exclusively concerns a legal person, entity or body operating in the energy sector in Russia owned by a legal person, entity or body which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State. 3a. By way of derogation from point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, any activity referred to therein after having determined that, in accordance with point (b) of Article 5aa(3), such an activity is necessary to ensure the operation of a deep-water offshore gas project in the Mediterranean Sea in which a legal person, entity or body listed in Annex XIX was a minority shareholder before 31 October 2017 and remains so, provided that the project is solely or jointly controlled or operated by a legal person incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State. 4. The Member State or Member States concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 3 within two weeks of the authorisation. 5. The prohibition in paragraph 2 shall not apply to mining and quarrying activities that yield their highest value from, or have as their primary objective, the production of any of the materials listed in Annex XXX.
Article 3b 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer, or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology suited for use in oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas, as listed in Annex X, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 3. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 27 May 2022 of contracts concluded before 26 February 2022, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology listed in Annex X or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or technology or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment. In duly justified cases of emergency, the sale, supply, transfer or export may proceed without prior authorisation, provided that the exporter notifies the competent authority within five working days after the sale, supply, transfer or export has taken place, providing detail about the relevant justification for the sale, supply, transfer or export without prior authorisation. 5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 4 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3c 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XI, and jet fuel and fuel additives as listed in Annex XX, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XI, and of jet fuel and fuel additives, as listed in Annex XX, exported from the Union, shall be prohibited. 2. It shall be prohibited to provide insurance and reinsurance, directly or indirectly, in relation to goods and technology listed in Annex XI to any person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 3. It shall be prohibited to provide any one or any combination of the following activities: overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect rectification of an aircraft or component, with the exception of pre-flight inspection, in relation to the goods and technology listed in Annex XI, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 6. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the national competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the execution of an aircraft financial lease concluded before 26 February 2022 after having determined that: (a) it is strictly necessary to ensure lease re-payments to a legal person, entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State which does not fall under any of the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation; and (b) no economic resources will be made available to the Russian counterpart, with the exception of the transfer of ownership of the aircraft after full reimbursement of the financial lease. 6a. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods listed in Part B of Annex XI, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is necessary for the production of titanium goods required in the aeronautic industry, for which no alternative supply is available. 6b. By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the provision of technical assistance, related to the use of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1, after having determined that the provision of such technical assistance is necessary for avoiding collision between satellites, or their unintended re-entry into the atmosphere. 6c. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN codes 8517 71 00 , 8517 79 00 and 9026 00 00 listed in Part B of Annex XI, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is necessary for medical or pharmaceutical purposes, or for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations. When deciding on requests for authorisations for medical, pharmaceutical or humanitarian purposes in accordance with this paragraph, the national competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the goods might have a military end-use. 6d. By way of derogation from paragraph 1a, the competent authorities may authorise the transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XI, and of jet fuels and fuel additives as listed in Annex XX, after having determined that such goods or technology are intended for the purposes set out in paragraphs 6a, 6b and 6c of this Article. 6e. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods listed in Part B of Annex XI, if the goods are intended for the exclusive use and under the full control of the authorising Member State and in order to fulfil its maintenance obligations in areas which are under a long-term lease agreement between that Member State and the Russian Federation. 7. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation. 8. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to Articles 2(4)(b) and 2a(4)(b). 9. The prohibition in paragraph 4 point (a) shall not apply to the exchange of information aimed at establishing technical standards in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization in relation to goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3c ):
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XI, and jet fuel and fuel additives as listed in Annex XX, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XI, and of jet fuel and fuel additives, as listed in Annex XX, exported from the Union, shall be prohibited. 2. It shall be prohibited to provide insurance and reinsurance, directly or indirectly, in relation to goods and technology listed in Annex XI to any person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 3. It shall be prohibited to provide any one or any combination of the following activities: overhaul, repair, inspection, replacement, modification or defect rectification of an aircraft or component, with the exception of pre-flight inspection, in relation to the goods and technology listed in Annex XI, directly or indirectly, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 6. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the national competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the execution of an aircraft financial lease concluded before 26 February 2022 after having determined that: (a) it is strictly necessary to ensure lease re-payments to a legal person, entity or body incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State which does not fall under any of the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation; and (b) no economic resources will be made available to the Russian counterpart, with the exception of the transfer of ownership of the aircraft after full reimbursement of the financial lease. 6a. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods listed in Part B of Annex XI, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is necessary for the production of titanium goods required in the aeronautic industry, for which no alternative supply is available. 6b. By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the provision of technical assistance, related to the use of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1, after having determined that the provision of such technical assistance is necessary for avoiding collision between satellites, or their unintended re-entry into the atmosphere. 6c. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN codes 8517 71 00 , 8517 79 00 and 9026 00 00 listed in Part B of Annex XI, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is necessary for medical or pharmaceutical purposes, or for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations. When deciding on requests for authorisations for medical, pharmaceutical or humanitarian purposes in accordance with this paragraph, the national competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the goods might have a military end-use. 6d. By way of derogation from paragraph 1a, the competent authorities may authorise the transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry, as listed in Annex XI, and of jet fuels and fuel additives as listed in Annex XX, after having determined that such goods or technology are intended for the purposes set out in paragraphs 6a, 6b and 6c of this Article. 6e. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods listed in Part B of Annex XI, if the goods are intended for the exclusive use and under the full control of the authorising Member State and in order to fulfil its maintenance obligations in areas which are under a long-term lease agreement between that Member State and the Russian Federation. 6f. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the export and transfer of the goods falling under CN code 9026 00 00, as listed in Part B of Annex XI, that are physically located in the Union as of 25 June 2024 for the purposes of maintenance or repairs, or the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, insurance or reinsurance, or financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is strictly necessary for the functioning of the Sakhalin-2 (Сахалин-2) Project to ensure Japan’s energy security. 7. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation. 8. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to Articles 2(4)(b) and 2a(4)(b). 9. The prohibition in paragraph 4 point (a) shall not apply to the exchange of information aimed at establishing technical standards in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization in relation to goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1.
Article 3d 
1. It shall be prohibited for any aircraft operated by Russian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier in code-sharing or blocked-space arrangements, or for any Russian registered aircraft, or for any non-Russian-registered aircraft which is owned or chartered, or otherwise controlled by any Russian natural or legal person, entity or body, to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the Union. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of an emergency landing or an emergency overflight. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise an aircraft to land in, take off from, or overfly, the territory of the Union if the competent authorities have determined that such landing, take-off or overflight is required for humanitarian purposes or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this Regulation. 4. The Member State or Member States concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 3 within two weeks of the authorisation. 5. Aircraft operators of non-scheduled flights between Russia and the Union, operated directly or via a third country, shall notify prior to their operation, and at least 48 hours in advance, all relevant information concerning the flight to the competent authorities of the Members State of departure or destination. 6. Upon refusal of a f light notified in accordance with paragraph 5, the Member State concerned shall immediately inform the other Member States, the Network Manager and the Commission.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3d ):
1. It shall be prohibited for any aircraft operated by Russian air carriers, including as a marketing carrier in code-sharing or blocked-space arrangements, or for any Russian registered aircraft, or for any non-Russian-registered aircraft which is owned or chartered, or otherwise controlled by any Russian natural or legal person, entity or body, to land in, take off from or overfly the territory of the Union. The prohibition in this paragraph shall also apply to any other aircraft which is used for a non-scheduled flight and with regard to which a Russian natural or legal person, entity or body is in a position to effectively determine the place or time of its take-off or landing. The prohibition in this paragraph shall not apply to aircraft that have a maximum seating capacity of 4 persons and a maximum take-off mass of no more than 2000 kg when used for private, non-corporate, flights carried out within Union territory and airspace for recreational purposes or for the purpose of training for private pilot licences and related ratings with Union training providers. 1a. Without prejudice to paragraph 5, aircraft operators shall provide, for non-scheduled flights, information needed for the purpose of verifying compliance with paragraph 1, including among other information: (a) credible and satisfactory information regarding the actual ultimate beneficial owner of the aircraft and, where applicable, of the natural or legal person, entity or body ultimately chartering the aircraft; and (b) a general declaration, passenger manifest and other official documents displaying the full names, birth dates, birth places and nationalities of all passengers and the crew members, where reasonable grounds to suspect circumvention of the prohibition in paragraph 1 exist, based on factors such as routing and origin of the flight, or information about the relevant operator. The information shall be provided upon request of the competent authorities of the Member State of departure, destination or overflying. The information shall be provided in advance of landing in, taking off from or overflying the territory of the Union, within a deadline set by the competent authorities of the Member State or Member States concerned. Any processing of personal data pursuant to this paragraph shall be carried out in accordance with this Regulation and with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 11 ) and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 12 ) and only in so far as necessary for the application of this Regulation. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of an emergency landing or an emergency overflight. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise an aircraft to land in, take off from, or overfly, the territory of the Union if the competent authorities have determined that such landing, take-off or overflight is required for humanitarian purposes or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this Regulation. 4. The Member State or Member States concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 3 within two weeks of the authorisation. 5. Aircraft operators of non-scheduled flights between Russia and the Union, operated directly or via a third country, shall notify prior to their operation, and at least 48 hours in advance, all relevant information concerning the flight to the competent authorities of the Members State of departure or destination. 6. Upon refusal of a f light notified in accordance with paragraph 5, the Member State concerned shall immediately inform the other Member States, the Network Manager and the Commission.
Article 3e 
1. The Network Manager for air traffic management network functions of the single European sky shall support the Commission and the Member States in ensuring the implementation of, and compliance with, Article 3d. The Network Manager shall, in particular, reject all flight plans filed by aircraft operators indicating an intent to carry out activities over the territory of the Union that constitute a violation of this Regulation, such that the pilot is not permitted to fly. 2. The Network Manager shall regularly supply to the Commission and the Member States, based on the analysis of flight plans, reports on the implementation of Article 3d.
Article 3ea 
1. It shall be prohibited to provide access, after 16 April 2022, to ports and, after 29 July 2022, to locks in the territory of the Union, to any vessel registered under the flag of Russia, with the exception of access to locks for the purpose of leaving the territory of the Union. 1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall also apply, after 8 April 2023, to any vessel certified by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022. 4. Paragraphs 1 and 1a shall not apply in the case of a vessel in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, of an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety, or for saving life at sea. 5a. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the competent authorities may authorise vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State prior to 16 April 2022, to access a port or a lock, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that: (a) a Russian flag or registration was required by contract; and (b) the access is necessary for the unloading of goods strictly necessary for the completion of renewable energy projects in the Union, provided that the import of such goods is not otherwise prohibited under this Regulation. 6. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 5, 5a and 5b within two weeks of the authorisation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3ea ):
1. It shall be prohibited to provide access, after 16 April 2022, to ports and, after 29 July 2022, to locks in the territory of the Union to any vessel registered under the flag of Russia, and for such vessels to access ports and locks, with the exception of access to locks for the purpose of leaving the territory of the Union. 1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall also apply, after 8 April 2023, to any vessel certified by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. 2. Paragraph 1 shall apply to vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State after 24 February 2022. 4. Paragraphs 1 and 1a shall not apply in the case of a vessel in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, of an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety, or for saving life at sea. 5a. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the competent authorities may authorise vessels that have changed their Russian flag or their registration, to the flag or register of any other State prior to 16 April 2022, to access a port or a lock, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that: (a) a Russian flag or registration was required by contract; and (b) the access is necessary for the unloading of goods strictly necessary for the completion of renewable energy projects in the Union, provided that the import of such goods is not otherwise prohibited under this Regulation. 6. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 5, 5a, 5b and 5c within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3eb 
1. It shall be prohibited, as of 24 July 2023, to provide access to ports and locks in the territory of the Union, by any vessel performing ship-to-ship transfers, at any point of the voyage to a Member State’s ports or locks, if the competent authority has reasonable cause to suspect that the vessel is in breach of the prohibitions set out in Article 3m(1) and (2) and Article 3n(1) and (4). 2. A competent authority shall not grant access if a vessel does not notify the competent authority at least 48 hours in advance about a ship-to-ship transfer occurring within the Exclusive Economic Zone of a Member State or within 12 nautical miles from the baseline of that Member State’s coast. 3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply in the case of a vessel in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, of an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety, or for saving life at sea. 4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise a vessel to access a port or lock in the territory of the Union, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that such access is necessary for humanitarian purposes. 5. Upon refusal of a port access call in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities concerned shall immediately inform the other competent authorities of the Member States. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission without delay. 6. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities shall use, in addition to any national system and information, the integrated maritime information available in the Union Maritime Information and Exchange System (SafeSeaNet) established in accordance with Directive 2002/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 12 ).
Article 3ec 
1. It shall be prohibited, as of 24 July 2023, to provide access to ports and locks in the territory of the Union by any vessel which the competent authority has reasonable cause to suspect of illegally interfering with, switching off or otherwise disabling its shipborne automatic identification system at any point of the voyage to a Member State’s ports or locks, in breach of SOLAS Regulation V/19, point 2.4, when transporting crude oil or petroleum products subject to the prohibitions set out in Article 3m(1) and (2) and Article 3n(1) and (4). 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply in the case of a vessel in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, of an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety, or for saving life at sea. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise a vessel to access a port or lock in the territory of the Union, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that such access is necessary for humanitarian purposes. 4. Upon refusal of a port access call in accordance with paragraph 1, the competent authorities concerned shall immediately inform the other competent authorities of the Member States. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission without delay. 5. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall use, in addition to any national system and information, the integrated maritime information available in the Union Maritime Information and Exchange System (SafeSeaNet) established in accordance with Directive 2002/59/EC.
Article 3f 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, maritime navigation goods and technology, as listed in Annex XVI, whether or not originating in the Union, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia, for use in Russia, or for the placing on board of a Russian-flagged vessel. 3. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the related provision of technical and financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for humanitarian purposes, health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment, or as a response to natural disasters. 4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, after having determined that such goods or technology or the related technical or financial assistance are intended for maritime safety. 5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 4 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3g 
6. The import volume quotas set out in paragraphs 4, 5 and 5a shall be managed by the Commission and the Member States in accordance with the management system for tariff-rate quotas provided for in Articles 49 to 54 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 ( 13 ). 7. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise the purchase, import or transfer of the goods listed in Annex XVII, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that this is necessary for the establishment, operation, maintenance, fuel supply and retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, and the continuation of design, construction and commissioning required for the completion of civil nuclear facilities, such as the Paks II project, the supply of precursor material for the production of medical radioisotopes and similar medical applications, or critical technology for environmental radiation monitoring, as well as for civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development. 8. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 7 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3g ):
6. The import volume quotas set out in paragraphs 4, 5 and 5a shall be managed by the Commission and the Member States in accordance with the management system for tariff-rate quotas provided for in Articles 49 to 54 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 ( 15 ). 7. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise the purchase, import or transfer of the goods listed in Annex XVII, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that this is necessary for the establishment, operation, maintenance, fuel supply and retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, and the continuation of design, construction and commissioning required for the completion of civil nuclear facilities, the supply of precursor material for the production of medical radioisotopes and similar medical applications, or critical technology for environmental radiation monitoring, as well as for civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development. 8. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 7 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3h 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, luxury goods, whether or not originating in the Union, as listed in Annex XVIII, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 2a. The prohibitions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply to the luxury goods listed in Annex XVIII insofar as their value exceeds EUR 300 per item, unless otherwise specified in that Annex. 3. The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to goods which are necessary for the official purposes of diplomatic or consular missions of Member States or partner countries in Russia or of international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, or to the personal effects of their staff. 3a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to goods falling under CN 7113 00 00 and CN 7114 00 00 as listed in Annex XVIII for personal use of natural persons travelling from the European Union or members of their immediate families travelling with them, owned by those individuals and not intended for sale. 4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may authorise the transfer or export to Russia of cultural goods which are on loan in the context of formal cultural cooperation with Russia. 5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under paragraphs 4 and 4a within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3i 
1. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia. 2. It shall be prohibited to: (a) provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly in relation to the prohibition in paragraph 1; (b) provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any purchase, import or transfer of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly in relation to the prohibition in paragraph 1. 3a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to purchases in Russia which are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States, including delegations, embassies and missions, or for the personal use of nationals of Member States and their immediate family members. 3aa. The competent authorities of a Member State may allow the import of goods which are intended for the strict personal use of natural persons travelling to the Union or of their immediate family members, limited to personal effects owned by those individuals and which are manifestly not intended for sale. 3ab. The competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the entry into the Union of a vehicle falling under CN code 8703 not intended for sale and owned by a citizen of a Member State or an immediate family member who is resident in Russia and is driving the vehicle into the Union for strict personal use. 3ac. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the entry into the Union of motor vehicles falling under CN code 8703 provided that they have a diplomatic vehicle registration plate and are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations, including delegations, embassies and missions, or of international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, or for the personal use of their staff and their immediate family members. 3ad. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not prevent vehicles already in the territory of the Union on 19 December 2023 from being registered in a Member State. 3ca. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 7205 , 7408 , 7604 , 7605 , 7607 and 7608 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 20 March 2024 of contracts concluded before 19 December 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3cb. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 2711 12 , 2711 13 , 2711 14 , 2711 19 and 7202 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 20 December 2024 of contracts concluded before 19 December 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3cc. With regard to the goods falling under CN code 7201 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or related technical or financial assistance of the following quantities of goods: (a) 1 140 000 metric tonnes between 19 December 2023 and 31 December 2024; (b) 700 000 metric tonnes between 1 January 2025 and 31 December 2025. 3cd. With regard to the goods falling under CN code 7203 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or related technical or financial assistance, of the following quantities of goods: (a) 1 140 836 metric tonnes between 19 December 2023 and 31 December 2024; (b) 651 906 metric tonnes between 1 January 2025 and 31 December 2025. 3c. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the purchase, import or transfer of the goods listed in Annex XXI, or the provision of related technical and financial assistance, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that this is necessary for the establishment, operation, maintenance, fuel supply and retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, and the continuation of design, construction and commissioning required for the completion of civil nuclear facilities, such as the Paks II project, the supply of precursor material for the production of medical radioisotopes and similar medical applications, or critical technology for environmental radiation monitoring, as well as for civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development. 3da. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or related technical or financial assistance, necessary for the import into the Union, until 30 June 2024, of the following quantities: (a) 752 475 metric tonnes for goods falling under CN code 2803 ; (b) 562 973 metric tonnes for goods falling under CN code 4002 . 3e. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the competent authorities may authorise the purchase, import or transfer of goods falling under CN codes 7007 , 8479 , 8481 , 8487 , 8504 , 8517 , 8525 , 8531 , 8536 , 8537 , 8538 , 8542 , 8543 , 8603 as listed in Annex XXI, or the provision of related technical and financial assistance, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that this is necessary for the operation, maintenance or repair of Budapest metro line 3 cars delivered in 2018, in execution of a guarantee provided by Metrowagonmash prior to 24 June 2023. 4. As of 10 July 2022, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or the related technical or financial assistance, necessary for the import into the Union, of: (a) 837 570 metric tonnes of potassium chloride of CN 3104 20 between 10 July of a given year and 9 July of the following year; (b) 1 577 807 metric tonnes combined of the other products listed in Annex XXI under CN 3105 20 , 3105 60 and 3105 90 between 10 July of a given year and 9 July of the following year. 5. The import volume quotas set out in paragraphs 3cc, 3cd, 3da and 4 of this Article shall be managed by the Commission and the Member States in accordance with the management system for tariff-rate quotas provided for in Articles 49 to 54 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447. 6. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 3c and 3e within two weeks of the authorisation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3i ):
1. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia. 2. It shall be prohibited to: (a) provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods and technology, directly or indirectly in relation to the prohibition in paragraph 1; (b) provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 for any purchase, import or transfer of those goods and technology, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly in relation to the prohibition in paragraph 1. 3a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to purchases in Russia which are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the Union and of the Member States, including delegations, embassies and missions, or for the personal use of nationals of Member States and their immediate family members. 3aa. The competent authorities of a Member State may allow the import of goods which are intended for the strict personal use of natural persons travelling to the Union or of their immediate family members, limited to personal effects owned by those individuals and which are manifestly not intended for sale. 3ab. The competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the entry into the Union of a vehicle falling under CN code 8703 not intended for sale and owned by a citizen of a Member State or an immediate family member who is resident in Russia and is driving the vehicle into the Union for strict personal use. 3ac. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the entry into the Union of motor vehicles falling under CN code 8703 provided that they have a diplomatic vehicle registration plate and are necessary for the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations, including delegations, embassies and missions, or of international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, or for the personal use of their staff and their immediate family members. 3ad. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not prevent vehicles already in the territory of the Union on 19 December 2023 from being registered in a Member State. 3c. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise the purchase, import or transfer of the goods listed in Annex XXI, or the provision of related technical and financial assistance, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that this is necessary for the establishment, operation, maintenance, fuel supply and retreatment and safety of civil nuclear capabilities, and the continuation of design, construction and commissioning required for the completion of civil nuclear facilities, the supply of precursor material for the production of medical radioisotopes and similar medical applications, or critical technology for environmental radiation monitoring, as well as for civil nuclear cooperation, in particular in the field of research and development. 3cb. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 2711 12 , 2711 13 , 2711 14 , 2711 19 and 7202 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 20 December 2024 of contracts concluded before 19 December 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3cc. With regard to the goods falling under CN code 7201 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or related technical or financial assistance of the following quantities of goods: (a) 1 140 000 metric tonnes between 19 December 2023 and 31 December 2024; (b) 700 000 metric tonnes between 1 January 2025 and 31 December 2025. 3cd. With regard to the goods falling under CN code 7203 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or related technical or financial assistance, of the following quantities of goods: (a) 1 140 836 metric tonnes between 19 December 2023 and 31 December 2024; (b) 651 906 metric tonnes between 1 January 2025 and 31 December 2025. 3ce. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the import or transfer of goods that were physically located in Russia before the relevant prohibition entered into force in respect of those goods, falling under CN codes 8471, 8523, 8536 and 9027, as listed in Annex XXI, or the provision of related technical and financial assistance, after having determined that those goods are components of medical devices and are brought into the Union for the purpose of maintenance, repair or returning of defective components. 3cf. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 28042910 and 284540, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 26 September 2024 of contracts concluded before 25 June 2024, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3da. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or related technical or financial assistance, necessary for the import into the Union, until 30 June 2024, of the following quantities: (a) 752 475 metric tonnes for goods falling under CN code 2803 ; (b) 562 973 metric tonnes for goods falling under CN code 4002 . 3e. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the competent authorities may authorise the purchase, import or transfer of goods falling under CN codes 7007 , 8479 , 8481 , 8487 , 8504 , 8517 , 8525 , 8531 , 8536 , 8537 , 8538 , 8542 , 8543 , 8603 as listed in Annex XXI, or the provision of related technical and financial assistance, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that this is necessary for the operation, maintenance or repair of Budapest metro line 3 cars delivered in 2018, in execution of a guarantee provided by Metrowagonmash prior to 24 June 2023. 4. As of 10 July 2022, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the import, purchase or transport, or the related technical or financial assistance, necessary for the import into the Union, of: (a) 837 570 metric tonnes of potassium chloride of CN 3104 20 between 10 July of a given year and 9 July of the following year; (b) 1 577 807 metric tonnes combined of the other products listed in Annex XXI under CN 3105 20 , 3105 60 and 3105 90 between 10 July of a given year and 9 July of the following year. 5. The import volume quotas set out in paragraphs 3cc, 3cd, 3da and 4 of this Article shall be managed by the Commission and the Member States in accordance with the management system for tariff-rate quotas provided for in Articles 49 to 54 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447. 6. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 3ab, 3c, and 3e within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3k 
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods which could contribute in particular to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities, whether or not originating in the Union, as listed in Annex XXIII, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of the goods and technology as listed in Annex XXXVII, exported from the Union, shall be prohibited. 2. 3aa. With regard to the goods falling under the CN codes listed in Annex XXIIIA, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 20 March 2024 of contracts concluded before 19 December 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3ab. With regard to the goods falling under the CN codes listed in Annex XXIIIB, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 20 June 2024 of contracts concluded before 19 December 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3ac. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 8504 10 , 8504 21 , 8504 22 , 8504 23 , 8504 31 , 8504 40 , 8504 50 and 8504 90 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 25 May 2024 of contracts concluded before 24 February 2024, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 4. The prohibitions referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 shall not apply to goods which are necessary for the official purposes of diplomatic or consular missions of Member States or partner countries in Russia or of international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, or to the personal effects of their staff. 5a. The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN code 8417 20 , or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for personal household use of natural persons. 5b. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN chapters 72, 84, 85 and 90 as listed in Annex XXIII, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is strictly necessary for the production of titanium goods required in the aeronautic industry, for which no alternative supply is available. 5c. By way of derogation from paragraph 1a, the competent authorities may authorise the transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which could contribute in particular to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities as listed in Annex XXXVII, after having determined that such goods or technology are intended for the purposes set out in paragraphs 5 and 5b of this Article. 6. When deciding on requests for authorisations referred to in paragraphs 5, 5a and 5b, the competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the goods might have a military end-use. 7. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 5, 5a, 5b and 5c within two weeks of the authorisation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3k ):
1. It shall be prohibited to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, goods which could contribute in particular to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities, whether or not originating in the Union, as listed in Annex XXIII, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia. 1a. The transit via the territory of Russia of the goods and technology as listed in Annex XXXVII, exported from the Union, shall be prohibited. 2. 3ab. With regard to the goods falling under the CN codes listed in Annex XXIIIB, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 20 June 2024 of contracts concluded before 19 December 2023, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3ac. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 8504 10 , 8504 21 , 8504 22 , 8504 23 , 8504 31 , 8504 40 , 8504 50 and 8504 90 , the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 25 May 2024 of contracts concluded before 24 February 2024, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3ad. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes listed in Annex XXIIIC, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 26 September 2024 of contracts concluded before 25 June 2024, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3ae. With regard to the goods falling under CN code 2602, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 26 July 2024 of contracts concluded before 25 June 2024, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 3af. With regard to the goods falling under CN codes 8481 80 and 8708 99, the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the execution until 26 December 2024 of contracts concluded before 25 June 2024, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 4. The prohibitions referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 shall not apply to goods which are necessary for the official purposes of diplomatic or consular missions of Member States or partner countries in Russia or of international organisations enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, or to the personal effects of their staff. 4a. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1, 1a and 2 shall not apply to the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology referred to in paragraph 1 or to the related provision of technical and financial assistance, for non-military use and for a non-military end-user, intended for health emergencies, the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment, or as a response to natural disasters. 5a. 5aa. The competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN code 3917 10, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that such goods are sold, supplied, transferred or exported strictly for the production of food items for human consumption in Russia. 5b. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods falling under CN chapters 72, 84, 85 and 90 as listed in Annex XXIII, or related technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is strictly necessary for the production of titanium goods required in the aeronautic industry, for which no alternative supply is available. 5c. By way of derogation from paragraph 1a, the competent authorities may authorise the transit via the territory of Russia of goods and technology which could contribute in particular to the enhancement of Russian industrial capacities as listed in Annex XXXVII, after having determined that such goods or technology are intended for the purposes set out in paragraphs 5 and 5b of this Article. 5d. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export of the goods and technology falling under CN codes 3917, 8421, 8471, 8523, 8536 and 8544, as listed in Annex XXIII, or the provision of related technical or financial assistance, after having determined that those goods or the provision of related technical or financial assistance are necessary for the purposes of maintenance or repair of medical devices. 5e. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the export and transfer of the goods falling under CN codes 8414 90 and 9026, as listed in Annex XXIII, that are physically located in the Union as of 25 June 2024 for the purpose of maintenance or repairs, or the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, or financing or financial assistance, after having determined that it is strictly necessary for the functioning of the Sakhalin-2 (Сахалин-2) Project to ensure Japan’s energy security. 6. When deciding on requests for the authorisations referred to in paragraphs 5, 5a, 5aa, 5b, 5c and 5d the competent authorities shall not grant an authorisation for exports to any natural or legal person, entity or body in Russia or for use in Russia, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the goods might have a military end-use. 7. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraphs 5, 5a, 5b and 5c within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3l 
1. It shall be prohibited for any road transport undertaking established in Russia to transport goods by road within the territory of the Union, including in transit. 1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall apply to the transport of goods within the territory of the Union by road transport undertakings, carried out by means of trailers or semi-trailers registered in Russia, including if those trailers or semi-trailers are hauled by trucks registered in other countries. 2. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to road transport undertakings transporting: (a) mail as a universal service; (b) goods in transit though the Union between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Russia, provided that the transport of such goods is not otherwise prohibited under this Regulation. 5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 4 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, with devastating consequences for Ukraine and its people. Two years of intense fighting, heavy artillery shelling and airstrikes have resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties and immense human suffering. Russia’s war of aggression has caused extensive damage to civilian and defence critical infrastructure, production capacities and services across Ukraine and the wholesale destruction of cities and towns in some parts of the country. The resulting humanitarian crisis has displaced millions of Ukrainians from their homes and left many in desperate need of food, shelter and medical assistance. To this day, Russian aerial strikes continue to attack targets throughout the country. It will take years, if not decades, to heal the trauma of this senseless war. The EU supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, its inherent right of self-defence, and its pursuit of a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in line with international law and the UN Charter. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine poses a fundamental threat not only to Ukraine but also to the European and global security. The EU’s contribution to Ukraine’s self-defence is a crucial investment in the EU’s own security. In this vein, the European Union and Member States will contribute, together with partners, to future security commitments to Ukraine, which will help Ukraine to defend itself, resist destabilization efforts and deter acts of aggression in the future. There is no defence without a defence industry. Ukraine is heavily dependent on military support made available by the EU and its Member States, including due to its largely destroyed defence industrial base. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has marked the dramatic return of territorial conflict and high-intensity warfare on European soil. The production capacity of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been tailored to respond primarily to limited Member States needs, mostly along national dividing lines, due to decades of public underinvestment. In such a scenario, defence companies often faced the need to reduce production rates in order to keep production lines afloat and maintain skilled personnel, while producing limited quantity of defence systems for national customers. Today, for many European defence companies the export of defence equipment to non-EU customers is a major market. The surge of demand for certain defence products in Europe caused by the radically changed security environment happened against this backdrop of an EDTIB constrained by limited “peace time” production capacity. On the long run, this situation raises the question of defence industrial readiness in Europe, i.e. the capacity of the EDTIB to respond effectively (in time and scale) to changes in European demand for defence products. This is closely linked to the broader challenge of security of supply (SoS) of defence equipment in Europe. Although this topic is not new to EU Member States, the recent ammunition plan has put it in the spotlight, by raising the question of the EDTIB’s ability to ensure Europe’s SoS of defence equipment both in peace and war times. Following the outbreak of the war and the invitation of the Versailles declaration of March 2022, in May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (“the High Representative”)/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA) adopted the Joint Communication on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN/2022/24 final). The Joint Communication highlighted that the past decades of underinvestment in defence from Member States resulted into both capability and industrial gaps within the Union. Since the presentation of the Joint Communication of May 2022, several measures have been tabled to react to the most immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: – As announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, the Commission, and the High Representative/Head of Agency established the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force (DJPTF) to work with Member States to support the coordination of their very short-term procurement needs. The Task Force focused on de-confliction and coordination to avoid a race to secure orders. The Task Force also established an aggregate estimate of needs and mapped and highlight ed the need for expansion of the EU industrial manufacturing capacities necessary to answer the needs. – Also, as announced in the Joint Communication of May 2022, in July 2022 the Commission presented the European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) , aimed at ince n tivising through financial support, Member States’ cooperation on procurement of the most urgent and critical defence equipment. EDIRPA was adopted by co-legislators on 18 October 2023 and contributes to strengthen the adaptation of Union’s defence industry to structural market changes. EDIRPA will end on 31 December 2025. – The capability gaps highlighted by the Joint Communication of May 2022 were various, but in light of the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, a specific pressing need for ground - to - ground ammunition and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles emerged. This was formally recognised by the Council, which agreed on 20 March 2023 on a three-track approach for the delivery and joint procurement of ammunition for Ukraine . In this context, in M ay 2023 the Commission tabled a new proposal for a Regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP) to face the sudden surge of demand for these products and urgently enable their timely availability, by mobilising EU budget to support investments in the ramp up of the EDTIB’s production capacities in this field. ASAP was adopted by co-legislators on 20 July 2023. It will end on 30 June 2025. The unlawful war of Russia against Ukraine not only raised urgent challenges for the EU and its Member States, but its continuation over time also keeps aggravating structural issues affecting the competitiveness of the EDTIB and questions its ability to ensure a sufficient level of SoS to Member States. Hence, the EU now needs to move from punctual emergency responses (illustrated by the above-described measures) to EU defence industrial readiness , from securing the availability of consumables in the requisite volumes during crisis times, to ensuring the timely delivery of tomorrow’s high end critical capabilities in the coming years. This is the exact purpose of the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) presented on 5 March. In order to implement the orientations set out in EDIS as well as the actions it announces, the Commission proposes a new regulation on the European defence Industry Programme (EDIP) . Announced by the Joint Communication of May 2022, and called for by the European Council, EDIP aims to reconcile the urgent with the long term , by maintaining support for the EDTIB under this Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and preparing for the EU’s defence industrial readiness for the future. In doing so, EDIP will translate in effect part of EDIS as its action is structured around 3 main pillars. - Strengthen the competitiveness and responsiveness of the EDTIB . In order to increase efforts to aggregate and harmonise European demand for defence equipment requirements from the EDTIB, EDIP proposes a ready-to-use legal framework, the Structures for European Armament Programme ( S EAP ), for cooperating and jointly managing defence equipment throughout its life cycle. In a similar logic, EDIP extends the EDIRPA logic beyond 2025, to continue to defragment and harmonise European demand. EDIP also replicate s the logic of ASAP to support the EDTIB’s productive investments, help s the EDTIB to move towards more flexible production capacities, as well as ensure s the productization phase of EDF projects. In order to enhance access to finance for the EDTIB, EDIP also entails the establishment of a fund in order to leverage, de-risk and speed-up investments needed to increase the defence manufacturing capacities of EU-based SMEs and small mid-caps, building on the Commission’s experience of the ASAP “ramp up fund” as well as the successful set - up of the EUDIS’ defence equity facility. - Enhance the ability of the EDTIB to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products . EDIP’s aims is to support Member States’ efforts in pursuing the highest possible level of SoS when it comes to defence equipment, by creating an EU wide SoS regime. The latter would also enhance M ember S tate ’s trust in cross-border supply chains, creating at the same time a key competitive advantage for the EDTIB. A comprehensive crisis management framework would enable the coordination of responses to possible future supply crises on specific defence equipment or along their supply chains. - Contribute to the recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of the Ukraine Defence Technological and Industrial Base (Ukrainian DTIB) . Ukraine’s current needs in military equipment far exceed its industrial production capacities while the EU and its M ember S tates provide military assistance from their own - largely depleted – stocks and with a defence industry tailored for peace time. In this context, both industry’s interests are to engage in a more in-depth cooperation. Failing to create a strong relationship between the respective industrial bases may result in a missed business opportunity in the short-term and in economic and strategic dependencies in the medium to long-term. In view of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU, it is necessary that EDIP enhances cooperation with Ukraine at industrial level. As part of the EU’s future security commitments to Ukraine 1 , the EU should foster greater cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB to boost its capacity to deliver for the immediate needs, as well as to work towards alignment of standards and improved interoperability. A stronger cooperation with the Ukrainian DTIB will contribute to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, and will benefit the EDTIB’s capacity to support both Member States’ and Ukraine’s needs. 
Revised version (Article 3l ):
1. It shall be prohibited for any road transport undertaking established in Russia to transport goods by road within the territory of the Union, including in transit. 1a. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall apply to the transport of goods within the territory of the Union by road transport undertakings, carried out by means of trailers or semi-trailers registered in Russia, including if those trailers or semi-trailers are hauled by trucks registered in other countries. 1b. It shall be prohibited for any legal person, entity or body established in the Union which is owned for 25 % or more by a Russian natural or legal person, entity or body to be admitted to become a road transport undertaking which transports goods by road within the territory of the Union, including in transit. 1c. It shall be prohibited, as of 26 July 2024 for any road transport undertaking established in the Union after 8 April 2022, which is owned for 25 % or more by a Russian natural or legal person, entity or body to transport goods by road within the territory of the Union, including in transit. 1d. Road transport undertakings established in the Union shall, upon request of the national competent authority of the Member State where they are established, supply information on their ownership structure to that national competent authority. 2. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to road transport undertakings transporting: (a) mail as a universal service; (b) goods in transit though the Union between the Kaliningrad Oblast and Russia, provided that the transport of such goods is not otherwise prohibited under this Regulation. 2a. Paragraphs 1b and 1c shall not apply to road transport undertakings established in the Union which are owned for 25 % or more by Russian nationals who are also nationals of a Member State or who have a temporary or permanent residence permit in a Member State. 5. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under paragraph 4 within two weeks of the authorisation.
Article 3m 
1. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import or transfer, directly or indirectly, crude oil or petroleum products, as listed in Annex XXV, if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia. 2. It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance or any other services related to the prohibition in paragraph 1. 3a. The exemption in paragraph 3, point (d), shall stop applying to Germany and Poland on 23 June 2023. 4. If the supply of crude oil by pipeline from Russia to a landlocked Member State is interrupted for reasons outside the control of that Member State, seaborne crude oil from Russia falling under CN 2709 00 may be imported into that Member State, by way of an exceptional temporary derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, until the supply is resumed or until the Council decision referred to in paragraph 3(d) applies with regard to that Member State, whichever is the earliest. 5. As of 5 December 2022, and by way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of Bulgaria may authorise the execution until 31 December 2024 of contracts concluded before 4 June 2022, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts, for the purchase, import or transfer of seaborne crude oil and of petroleum products listed in Annex XXV originating in Russia or exported from Russia. 6. As of 5 February 2023, and by way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of Croatia may authorise until 31 December 2024 the purchase, import or transfer of vacuum gas oil falling under CN code 2710 19 71 originating in Russia or exported from Russia, provided that the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) no alternative supply of vacuum gas oil is available; and (b) Croatia has notified the Commission, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation, of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, and the Commission has not objected within that period. 7. The goods imported following a derogation granted by a competent authority under paragraph 5 or 6 shall not be sold on to buyers located in another Member State or in a third country. As from 5 February 2023, it shall be prohibited to transfer or transport petroleum products falling under CN 2710 which are obtained from crude oil imported on the basis of a derogation granted by the Bulgarian competent authority under paragraph 5, to other Member States or to third countries, or to sell such petroleum products to purchasers in other Member States or in third countries. By way of derogation from the prohibition set out in the second subparagraph, the competent authorities of Bulgaria may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export to Ukraine of certain petroleum products as listed in Annex XXXI which are obtained from crude oil imported under paragraph 5, after having determined that: (a) the products are intended for exclusive use in Ukraine; (b) such sale, supply, transfer or export is not meant to circumvent the prohibitions in the second subparagraph. By way of derogation from the prohibition set out in the second subparagraph, the competent authorities of Bulgaria may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export to any third country of certain petroleum products as listed in Annex XXXII which are obtained from crude oil imported under paragraph 5, within the export volume quotas mentioned in that Annex, after having determined that: (a) the products cannot be stored in Bulgaria due to environmental and safety risks; Bulgaria shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation. 8. The transfer or transport of crude oil delivered by pipeline into Member States as referred to in paragraph 3(d) to other Member States or to third countries, or its sale to purchasers in other Member States or in third countries, shall be prohibited. All consignments and containers of such crude oil shall be clearly marked as 'REBCO: export prohibited'. As from 5 February 2023, where crude oil has been delivered by pipeline into a Member State as referred to in paragraph 3(d), it shall be prohibited to transfer or transport petroleum products falling under CN 2710 which are obtained from such crude oil to other Member States or to third countries, or to sell such petroleum products to purchasers in other Member States or in third countries. By way of temporary derogation, the prohibitions referred to in the third subparagraph shall apply as from 5 December 2024 to the import and transfer into Czechia, and to the sale to purchasers in Czechia, of petroleum products obtained from crude oil which has been delivered by pipeline into another Member State as referred to in paragraph 3(d). If alternative supplies for such petroleum products are made available to Czechia before that date, the Council shall terminate that temporary derogation. During the period until 5 December 2024, the volumes of such petroleum products imported into Czechia from other Member States shall not exceed the average volumes imported into Czechia from those other Member States over the same period during the previous five years. As of 5 February 2023, by way of derogation from the prohibitions referred to in the third subparagraph, the competent authorities of Hungary and Slovakia may authorise, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, the sale, supply, transfer or export to Ukraine of certain petroleum products as listed in Annex XXXI which are obtained from crude oil imported under paragraph 3(d), after having determined that: (b) such sale, supply, transfer or export is not meant to circumvent the prohibitions in the third subparagraph. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation. 9. The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall not apply to purchases in Russia of goods listed in Annex XXV which are required in order to meet the essential needs of the purchaser in Russia or of humanitarian projects in Russia. 10. Member States shall report to the Commission by no later than 8 June 2022 and every three months thereafter on the amounts of crude oil falling under CN 2709 00 imported by pipeline, as referred to in paragraph 3(d). Such import figures shall be broken down per pipeline. In the event that the exceptional temporary derogation referred to in paragraph 4 applies with regard to a landlocked Member State, that Member State shall report to the Commission every three months on the amounts of seaborne crude oil falling under CN 2709 00 which it imports from Russia, for as long as that derogation applies. During the period until 5 December 2023 referred to in the fourth subparagraph of paragraph 8, Member States shall report to the Commission every three months on the amounts which they export to Czechia of petroleum products falling under CN 2710 obtained from crude oil which has been delivered by pipeline as referred to in paragraph 3(d). 11. Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall inform within two weeks the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident, located, established or incorporated, of all transactions for the purchase, import or transfer into the Union of natural gas condensates of subheading CN 2709 00 10 from liquefied natural gas production plants, originating in or exported from Russia. The reporting shall include information on volumes. The Member State concerned shall provide the other Member States and the Commission with the information received under the previous subparagraph. 12. Based on the information received under paragraph 11, the Commission shall review the functioning of the measures concerning natural gas condensates of subheading CN 2709 00 10 from liquefied natural gas production plants, originating in or exported from Russia, no later than 18 June 2023.
Article 3n 
1. It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services or financing or financial assistance, related to the trading, brokering or transport, including through ship-to-ship transfers, to third countries of crude oil or petroleum products as listed in Annex XXV which originate in Russia or which have been exported from Russia. 2. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply to the execution of contracts concluded before 4 June 2022, or of ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts until: (a) 5 December 2022, for crude oil falling under CN code 2709 00 ; (b) 5 February 2023, for petroleum products falling under CN code 2710 . 3. The prohibition in paragraph 1 does not apply to the payment of insurance claims after 5 December 2022, for crude oil falling under CN code 2709 00 , or after 5 February 2023, for petroleum products falling under CN code 2710 , on the basis of insurance contracts concluded before 4 June 2022 and provided that the insurance coverage has ceased by the relevant date. 4. It shall be prohibited to trade, broker or transport, including through ship-to-ship transfers, to third countries, crude oil falling under CN code 2709 00 , as of 5 December 2022, or petroleum products falling under CN code 2710 , as of 5 February 2023, as listed in Annex XXV, which originate in Russia or which have been exported from Russia. 6a. In application of paragraphs 4 and 6, point (a), for Russian crude oil or petroleum products listed in Annex XXV, loaded as of 20 February 2024, service providers with no access to the purchase price per barrel laid down in Annex XXVIII of such products shall collect itemised price information for ancillary costs as provided by operators further up the supply chain of Russian crude oil or petroleum product trade. Such itemised price information shall be provided to counterparties and competent authorities, upon their request, for the purpose of verifying compliance with this Article. 7. In the event that, after the entry into force of a Council Decision amending Annex XI to Decision 2014/512/CFSP, a vessel has transported the Russian crude oil or petroleum products referred to in paragraph 4, and the operator responsible for the transport knew or had reasonable cause to suspect that such crude oil or petroleum products were purchased above the price laid down in Annex XXVIII to this Regulation on the date of conclusion of the contract for such purchase, it shall be prohibited to provide the services referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article relating to the transport of crude oil or petroleum products that originate in Russia or are exported from Russia as referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article by that vessel for 90 days following the date of unloading of the cargo purchased above the price cap. 9. The prohibitions in paragraph 1 and 4 shall not apply to the transport or provision of technical assistance, brokering services or financing or financial assistance, related to the transport necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant impact on human health and safety or the environment, or as a response to natural disasters, provided that the national competent authority has been notified immediately once the event has been identified. 10. Member States and the Commission shall inform each other of detected instances of a breach or circumvention of the prohibitions set out in this Article. Any information provided or received in accordance with this Article shall be used for the purposes for which it was provided or received, including ensuring the effectiveness of the measure. 11. The functioning of the price cap mechanism, including Annex XXVIII as well as the prohibitions in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article, shall be reviewed by mid-March 2023 and every 2 months thereafter. The review shall take into account the effectiveness of the measure in terms of its expected results, its implementation, international adherence to and informal alignment with the price cap mechanism, and its potential impact on the Union and its Member States. It shall respond to developments in the market, including possible turbulences. In order to achieve the objectives of the price cap, including its ability to reduce Russia’s oil revenues, the price cap shall be at least 5 % below the average market price for Russian oil and petroleum products, calculated on the basis of data provided by the International Energy Agency. 12. Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall inform within two weeks the competent authority of the Member State where they are resident, located, established or incorporated, of all transactions for the purchase or transfer into third countries of natural gas condensates of subheading CN 2709 00 10 from liquefied natural gas production plants, originating in or exported from Russia. The reporting shall include information on volumes. The Member State concerned shall provide the other Member States and the Commission with the information received under the previous subparagraph. 13. Based on the information received under paragraph 12, the Commission shall review the functioning of the measures concerning natural gas condensates of subheading CN 2709 00 10 from liquefied natural gas production plants, originating in or exported from Russia, no later than 18 June 2023.
Article 3na 
To facilitate the implementation and enforcement of Articles 3m and 3n, the Commission and Member States shall periodically share information with each other with a view to further identify vessels and entities of concern carrying out one or more deceptive practices while transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Information received in accordance with this Article shall be used only for the purpose for which it was requested.
Article 3o 
1. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, gold, as listed in Annex XXVI if it originates in Russia and it has been exported from Russia into the Union or to any third country after 22 July 2022. 2. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly the products listed in Annex XXVI when processed in a third country incorporating the products prohibited in paragraph 1. 3. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, gold, as listed in Annex XXVII if it originates in Russia and it has been exported from Russia into the Union after 22 July 2022. 4. It shall be prohibited to: (a) provide technical assistance, brokering services or other services related to the goods referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those goods, directly or indirectly in relation to the prohibition in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; (b) provide financing or financial assistance related to the goods referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 for any purchase, import or transfer of those goods, or for the provision of related technical assistance, brokering services or other services, directly or indirectly in relation to the prohibition in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. 5. The prohibitions in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not apply to gold which is necessary for the official purposes of diplomatic missions, consular posts or international organisations in Russia enjoying immunities in accordance with international law. 6. The prohibition in paragraph 3 shall not apply to goods as listed in Annex XXVII for personal use of natural persons travelling to the European Union or members of their immediate families travelling with them, owned by those individuals and not intended for sale. 7. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the competent authorities may authorise the transfer or import of cultural goods which are on loan in the context of formal cultural cooperation with Russia.