Article 401 Calculating the effect of the use of credit risk mitigation techniques
1. For calculating the value of exposures for the purposes of Article 395(1) an institution may use the ‘fully adjusted exposure value’ as calculated under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4 taking into account the credit risk mitigation, volatility adjustments, and any maturity mismatch (E*). 2. An institution permitted to use own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors for an exposure class under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3 may, subject to a permission by the competent authorities recognise the effects of financial collateral in calculating the value of exposures for the purposes of Article 395(1). Competent authorities shall grant the permission referred to in preceding subparagraph only if the institution can estimate the effects of financial collateral on their exposures separately from other LGD-relevant aspects. The estimates produced by the institution shall be sufficiently suitable for reducing the exposure value for the purposes of compliance with the provisions of Article 395. Where an institution is permitted to use its own estimates of the effects of financial collateral, it shall do so on a basis consistent with the approach adopted in the calculation of the own funds requirements in accordance with this Regulation. Institutions permitted to use own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors for an exposure class under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3, which do not calculate the value of their exposures using the method referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, may use the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method or the approach set out in Article 403(1)(b) for calculating the value of exposures. 3. An institution that makes use of the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method or is permitted to use the method described in paragraph 2 of this Article in calculating the value of exposures for the purposes of Article 395(1) shall conduct periodic stress tests of their credit-risk concentrations, including in relation to the realisable value of any collateral taken. These periodic stress tests referred to in the first subparagraph shall address risks arising from potential changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the institutions' adequacy of own funds and risks arising from the realisation of collateral in stressed situations. The stress tests carried out shall be adequate and appropriate for the assessment of such risks. In the event that the periodic stress test indicates a lower realisable value of collateral taken than would be permitted to be taken into account while making use of the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method or the method described in paragraph 2 as appropriate, the value of collateral permitted to be recognised in calculating the value of exposures for the purposes of Article 395(1) shall be reduced accordingly. Institutions referred to in the first subparagraph shall include the following in their strategies to address concentration risk: (a) policies and procedures to address risks arising from maturity mismatches between exposures and any credit protection on those exposures; (b) policies and procedures in the event that a stress test indicates a lower realisable value of collateral than taken into account while making use of the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method or the method described in paragraph 2; (c) policies and procedures relating to concentration risk arising from the application of credit risk mitigation techniques, and in particular large indirect credit exposures, for example to a single issuer of securities taken as collateral.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 401 Calculating the effect of the use of credit risk mitigation techniques):
1. For calculating the value of exposures for the purposes of Article 395(1), an institution may use the fully adjusted exposure value (E*) as calculated under Chapter 4 of Title II of Part Three, taking into account the credit risk mitigation, volatility adjustments and any maturity mismatch referred to in that Chapter. 2. With the exception of institutions using the Financial Collateral Simple Method, for the purposes of the first paragraph, institutions shall use the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method, regardless of the method used for calculating the own funds requirements for credit risk. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, institutions with permission to use the methods referred to in Section 4 of Chapter 4 of Title II of Part Three and Section 6 of Chapter 6 of Title II of Part Three, may use those methods for calculating the exposure value of securities financing transactions. 3. In calculating the value of exposures for the purposes of Article 395(1), institutions shall conduct periodic stress tests of their credit-risk concentrations, including in relation to the realisable value of any collateral taken. The periodic stress tests referred to in the first subparagraph shall address risks arising from potential changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the institutions' adequacy of own funds and risks arising from the realisation of collateral in stressed situations. The stress tests carried out shall be adequate and appropriate for the assessment of those risks. Institutions shall include the following in their strategies to address concentration risk: (a) policies and procedures to address risks arising from maturity mismatches between exposures and any credit protection on those exposures; (b) policies and procedures relating to concentration risk arising from the application of credit risk mitigation techniques, in particular from large indirect credit exposures, for example, exposures to a single issuer of securities taken as collateral. 4. Where an institution reduces an exposure to a client using an eligible credit risk mitigation technique in accordance with Article 399(1), the institution, in the manner set out in Article 403, shall treat the part of the exposure by which the exposure to the client has been reduced as having been incurred for the protection provider rather than for the client.
Article 402 Exposures arising from mortgage lending
1. For the calculation of exposure values for the purposes of Article 395, an institution may reduce the value of an exposure or any part of an exposure fully secured by immovable property in accordance with Article 125(1) by the pledged amount of the market or mortgage lending value of the immovable property concerned but not more than 50 % of the market or 60 % of the mortgage lending value in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions, if all of the following conditions are met: (a) the competent authorities of the Member States have not set a higher risk weight than 35 % for exposures or parts of exposures secured by residential property in accordance with Article 124(2); (b) the exposure or part of the exposure is fully secured by: (i) mortgages on residential property; or (ii) a residential property in a leasing transaction under which the lessor retains full ownership of the residential property and the lessee has not yet exercised his option to purchase; (b) the exposure or part of the exposure is fully secured by: (i) mortgages on residential property; or (ii) a residential property in a leasing transaction under which the lessor retains full ownership of the residential property and the lessee has not yet exercised his option to purchase; (c) the requirements in Article 208 and Article 229(1) are met. 2. For the calculation of exposure values for the purposes of Article 395, an institution may reduce the value of an exposure or any part of an exposure fully secured by immovable property in accordance with Article 126(1) by the pledged amount of the market or mortgage lending value of the immovable property concerned but not more than 50 % of the market or 60 % of the mortgage lending value in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions, if all of the following conditions are met: (a) the competent authorities of the Member States have not set a higher risk weight than 50 % for exposures or parts of exposures secured by commercial immovable property in accordance with Article 124(2); (b) the exposure is fully secured by: (i) mortgages on offices or other commercial premises; or (ii) offices or other commercial premises and the exposures related to immovable property leasing transactions; (b) the exposure is fully secured by: (i) mortgages on offices or other commercial premises; or (ii) offices or other commercial premises and the exposures related to immovable property leasing transactions; (c) the requirements in Article 126(2)(a), Article 208 and Article 229(1) are met; (d) the commercial immovable property is fully constructed. 3. An institution may treat an exposure to a counterparty that results from a reverse repurchase agreement under which the institution has purchased from the counterparty non-accessory independent mortgage liens on immovable property of third parties as a number of individual exposures to each of those third parties, provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) the counterparty is an institution; (b) the exposure is fully secured by liens on the immovable property of those third parties that have been purchased by the institution and the institution is able to exercise those liens; (c) the institution has ensured that the requirements in Article 208 and Article 229(1) are met; (d) the institution becomes beneficiary of the claims that the counterparty has against the third parties in the event of default, insolvency or liquidation of the counterparty; (e) the institution reports to the competent authorities in accordance with Article 394 the total amount of exposures to each other institution that are treated in accordance with this paragraph. For these purposes, the institution shall assume that it has an exposure to each of those third parties for the amount of the claim that the counterparty has on the third party instead of the corresponding amount of the exposure to the counterparty. The remainder of the exposure to the counter party, if any, shall continue to be treated as an exposure to the counter party.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 402 Exposures arising from mortgage lending):
1. For the calculation of exposure values for the purposes of Article 395, an institution may reduce the value of an exposure or any part of an exposure fully secured by immovable property in accordance with Article 125(1) by the pledged amount of the market or mortgage lending value of the immovable property concerned but not more than 50 % of the market or 60 % of the mortgage lending value in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions, if all of the following conditions are met: (a) the competent authorities of the Member States have not set a higher risk weight than 35 % for exposures or parts of exposures secured by residential property in accordance with Article 124(2); (b) the exposure or part of the exposure is fully secured by: (i) mortgages on residential property; or (ii) a residential property in a leasing transaction under which the lessor retains full ownership of the residential property and the lessee has not yet exercised his option to purchase; (c) the requirements in Article 208 and Article 229(1) are met. 2. For the calculation of exposure values for the purposes of Article 395, an institution may reduce the value of an exposure or any part of an exposure fully secured by immovable property in accordance with Article 126(1) by the pledged amount of the market or mortgage lending value of the immovable property concerned but not more than 50 % of the market or 60 % of the mortgage lending value in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions, if all of the following conditions are met: (a) the competent authorities of the Member States have not set a higher risk weight than 50 % for exposures or parts of exposures secured by commercial immovable property in accordance with Article 124(2); (b) the exposure is fully secured by: (i) mortgages on offices or other commercial premises; or (ii) offices or other commercial premises and the exposures related to immovable property leasing transactions; (c) the requirements in Article 126(2)(a), Article 208 and Article 229(1) are met; (d) the commercial immovable property is fully constructed. 3. An institution may treat an exposure to a counterparty that results from a reverse repurchase agreement under which the institution has purchased from the counterparty non-accessory independent mortgage liens on immovable property of third parties as a number of individual exposures to each of those third parties, provided that all of the following conditions are met: (a) the counterparty is an institution; (b) the exposure is fully secured by liens on the immovable property of those third parties that have been purchased by the institution and the institution is able to exercise those liens; (c) the institution has ensured that the requirements in Article 208 and Article 229(1) are met; (d) the institution becomes beneficiary of the claims that the counterparty has against the third parties in the event of default, insolvency or liquidation of the counterparty; (e) the institution reports to the competent authorities in accordance with Article 394 the total amount of exposures to each other institution that are treated in accordance with this paragraph. For these purposes, the institution shall assume that it has an exposure to each of those third parties for the amount of the claim that the counterparty has on the third party instead of the corresponding amount of the exposure to the counterparty. The remainder of the exposure to the counter party, if any, shall continue to be treated as an exposure to the counter party.
Article 403 Substitution approach
1. Where an exposure to a client is guaranteed by a third party, or secured by collateral issued by a third party, an institution may: (a) treat the portion of the exposure which is guaranteed as having been incurred to the guarantor rather than to the client provided that the unsecured exposure to the guarantor would be assigned an equal or lower risk weight than a risk weight of the unsecured exposure to the client under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (b) treat the portion of the exposure collateralised by the market value of recognised collateral as having been incurred to the third party rather than to the client, if the exposure is secured by collateral and provided that the collateralised portion of the exposure would be assigned an equal or lower risk weight than a risk weight of the unsecured exposure to the client under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2. The approach referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph shall not be used by an institution where there is a mismatch between the maturity of the exposure and the maturity of the protection. For the purpose of this Part, an institution may use both the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method and the treatment set out in point (b) of the first subparagraph only where it is permitted to use both the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method and the Financial Collateral Simple Method for the purposes of Article 92. 2. Where an institution applies point (a) of paragraph 1: (a) where the guarantee is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure is denominated the amount of the exposure deemed to be covered shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions on the treatment of currency mismatch for unfunded credit protection set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4; (b) a mismatch between the maturity of the exposure and the maturity of the protection shall be treated in accordance with the provisions on the treatment of maturity mismatch set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4; (c) partial coverage may be recognised in accordance with the treatment set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 403 Substitution approach):
1. Where an exposure to a client is guaranteed by a third party, or secured by collateral issued by a third party, an institution may: (a) treat the portion of the exposure which is guaranteed as having been incurred to the guarantor rather than to the client provided that the unsecured exposure to the guarantor would be assigned an equal or lower risk weight than a risk weight of the unsecured exposure to the client under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (b) treat the portion of the exposure collateralised by the market value of recognised collateral as having been incurred to the third party rather than to the client, if the exposure is secured by collateral and provided that the collateralised portion of the exposure would be assigned an equal or lower risk weight than a risk weight of the unsecured exposure to the client under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2. The approach referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph shall not be used by an institution where there is a mismatch between the maturity of the exposure and the maturity of the protection. For the purpose of this Part, an institution may use both the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method and the treatment set out in point (b) of the first subparagraph only where it is permitted to use both the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method and the Financial Collateral Simple Method for the purposes of Article 92. 2. Where an institution applies point (a) of paragraph 1: (a) where the guarantee is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure is denominated the amount of the exposure deemed to be covered shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions on the treatment of currency mismatch for unfunded credit protection set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4; (b) a mismatch between the maturity of the exposure and the maturity of the protection shall be treated in accordance with the provisions on the treatment of maturity mismatch set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4; (c) partial coverage may be recognised in accordance with the treatment set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4. 4. EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, specifying the conditions for the application of the treatment referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, including the conditions and frequency for determining, monitoring and revising the limits referred to in point (b) of that paragraph. EBA shall publish those guidelines by 31 December 2019.
Article 404 Scope of application
Titles II and III shall apply to new securitisations issued on or after 1 January 2011. Titles II and III shall, after 31 December 2014, apply to existing securitisations where new underlying exposures are added or substituted after that date.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 405 Retained interest of the issuer
1. An institution, other than when acting as an originator, a sponsor or original lender, shall be exposed to the credit risk of a securitisation position in its trading book or non-trading book only if the originator, sponsor or original lender has explicitly disclosed to the institution that it will retain, on an ongoing basis, a material net economic interest which, in any event, shall not be less than 5 %. Only any of the following qualifies as retention of a material net economic interest of not less than 5 %: (a) retention of no less than 5 % of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to the investors; (b) in the case of securitisations of revolving exposures, retention of the originator's interest of no less than 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures; (c) retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to no less than 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, where such exposures would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is no less than 100 at origination; (d) retention of the first loss tranche and, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total no less than 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures; (e) retention of a first loss exposure not less than 5 % of every securitised exposure in the securitisation. Net economic interest is measured at the origination and shall be maintained on an ongoing basis. The net economic interest, including retained positions, interest or exposures, shall not be subject to any credit risk mitigation or any short positions or any other hedge and shall not be sold. The net economic interest shall be determined by the notional value for off-balance sheet items. There shall be no multiple applications of the retention requirements for any given securitisation. 2. Where an EU parent credit institution, an EU financial holding company, an EU mixed financial holding company or one of its subsidiaries, as an originator or a sponsor, securitises exposures from several credit institutions, investment firms or other financial institutions which are included in the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis, the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 may be satisfied on the basis of the consolidated situation of the related EU parent credit institution, EU financial holding company, or EU mixed financial holding company. The first subparagraph shall apply only where credit institutions, investment firms or financial institutions which created the securitised exposures have committed themselves to adhere to the requirements set out in Article 408 and deliver, in a timely manner, to the originator or sponsor and to the EU parent credit institution, EU financial holding company or EU mixed financial holding company the information needed to satisfy the requirements referred to in Article 409. 3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the securitised exposures are exposures on or fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by the following entities: (a) central governments or central banks; (b) regional governments, local authorities and public sector entities of Member States; (c) institutions to which a 50 % risk weight or less is assigned under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (d) multilateral development banks. 4. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions based on a clear, transparent and accessible index, where the underlying reference entities are identical to those that make up an index of entities that is widely traded, or are other tradable securities other than securitisation positions.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 406 Due diligence
1. Before becoming exposed to the risks of a securitisation, and as appropriate thereafter, institutions shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authorities for each of their individual securitisation positions, that they have a comprehensive and thorough understanding of and have implemented formal policies and procedures appropriate to their trading book and non-trading book and commensurate with the risk profile of their investments in securitised positions for analysing and recording: (a) information disclosed under Article 405(1), by originators, sponsors or original lenders to specify the net economic interest that they maintain, on an ongoing basis, in the securitisation; (b) the risk characteristics of the individual securitisation position; (c) the risk characteristics of the exposures underlying the securitisation position; (d) the reputation and loss experience in earlier securitisations of the originators or sponsors in the relevant exposure classes underlying the securitisation position; (e) the statements and disclosures made by the originators or sponsors, or their agents or advisors, about their due diligence on the securitised exposures and, where applicable, on the quality of the collateral supporting the securitised exposures; (f) where applicable, the methodologies and concepts on which the valuation of collateral supporting the securitised exposures is based and the policies adopted by the originator or sponsor to ensure the independence of the valuer; (g) all the structural features of the securitisation that can materially impact the performance of the institution's securitisation position, such as the contractual waterfall and waterfall related triggers, credit enhancements, liquidity enhancements, market value triggers, and deal-specific definitions of default. Institutions shall regularly perform their own stress tests appropriate to their securitisation positions. To this end, institutions may rely on financial models developed by an ECAI provided that institutions can demonstrate, when requested, that they took due care prior to investing to validate the relevant assumptions in and structuring of the models and to understand methodology, assumptions and results. 2. Institutions, other than when acting as originators or sponsors or original lenders, shall establish formal procedures appropriate to their trading book and non-trading book and commensurate with the risk profile of their investments in securitised positions to monitor on an ongoing basis and in a timely manner performance information on the exposures underlying their securitisation positions. Where relevant, this shall include the exposure type, the percentage of loans more than 30, 60 and 90 days past due, default rates, prepayment rates, loans in foreclosure, collateral type and occupancy, and frequency distribution of credit scores or other measures of credit worthiness across underlying exposures, industry and geographical diversification, frequency distribution of loan to value ratios with band widths that facilitate adequate sensitivity analysis. Where the underlying exposures are themselves securitisation positions, institutions shall have the information set out in this subparagraph not only on the underlying securitisation tranches, such as the issuer name and credit quality, but also on the characteristics and performance of the pools underlying those securitisation tranches. Institutions shall also apply the same standards of analysis to participations or underwritings in securitisation issues purchased from third parties whether such participations or underwritings are to be held on their trading or non-trading book.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 407 Additional risk weight
Where an institution does not meet the requirements in Article 405, 406 or 409 in any material respect by reason of the negligence or omission of the institution, the competent authorities shall impose a proportionate additional risk weight of no less than 250 % of the risk weight (capped at 1250 %) which shall apply to the relevant securitisation positions in the manner specified in Article 245(6) or Article 337(3) respectively. The additional risk weight shall progressively increase with each subsequent infringement of the due diligence provisions. The competent authorities shall take into account the exemptions for certain securitisations provided in Article 405(3) by reducing the risk weight it would otherwise impose under this Article in respect of a securitisation to which Article 405(3) applies.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 270a Additional risk weight):
1. Where an institution does not meet the requirements in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 in any material respect by reason of negligence or omission by the institution, the competent authorities shall impose a proportionate additional risk weight of no less than 250 % of the risk weight, capped at 1 250 %, which shall apply to the relevant securitisation positions in the manner specified in Article 247(6) or Article 337(3) of this Regulation respectively. The additional risk weight shall progressively increase with each subsequent infringement of the due diligence and risk management provisions. The competent authorities shall take into account the exemptions for certain securitisations provided for in Article 6(5)) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 by reducing the risk weight they would otherwise impose under this Article in respect of a securitisation to which Article 6(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 applies. 2. The EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to facilitate the convergence of supervisory practices with regard to the implementation of paragraph 1, including the measures to be taken in the case of breach of the due diligence and risk management obligations. The EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 408 Criteria for credit granting
Sponsor and originator institutions shall apply the same sound and well-defined criteria for credit-granting in accordance with the requirements of Article 79 of Directive 2013/36/EU to exposures to be securitised as they apply to exposures to be held in their own non-trading book. To this end the same processes for approving and, where relevant, amending, renewing and re-financing credits shall be applied by the originator and sponsor institutions. Where the requirements referred to in the first subparagraph of this Article are not met, Article 245(1) shall not be applied by an originator institution and that originator institution shall not be allowed to exclude the securitised exposures from the calculation of its capital requirements under this Regulation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 409 Disclosure to investors
Institutions acting as an originator, a sponsor or original lender shall disclose to investors the level of their commitment under Article 405 to maintain a net economic interest in the securitisation. Sponsor and originator institutions shall ensure that prospective investors have readily available access to all materially relevant data on the credit quality and performance of the individual underlying exposures, cash flows and collateral supporting a securitisation exposure as well as such information that is necessary to conduct comprehensive and well informed stress tests on the cash flows and collateral values supporting the underlying exposures. For that purpose, materially relevant data shall be determined as at the date of the securitisation and where appropriate due to the nature of the securitisation thereafter.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 410 Uniform condition of application
1. EBA shall report to the Commission annually on measures taken by the competent authorities in order to ensure the compliance with the requirements of Titles II and III by institutions. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify in greater detail: (a) the requirements in Articles 405 and 406 applying to institutions becoming exposed to the risk of a securitisation; (b) the retention requirement, including the qualifying criteria for retaining a material net economic interest as referred to in Article 405 and the level of retention; (c) the due diligence requirements in Article 406 for institutions becoming exposed to a securitisation position; and (d) the requirements in Articles 408 and 409 applying to sponsor and originator institutions. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU)No 1093/2010. 3. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to facilitate the convergence of supervisory practices with regard to the implementation of Article 407, including the measures to be taken in the case of breach of the due diligence and risk management obligations. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 411 Definitions
For the purposes of this Part, the following definitions apply: (1) ‘financial customer’ means a customer that performs one or more of the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU as its main business, or is one of the following: (a) a credit institution; (b) an investment firm; (c) an SSPE; (d) a CIU; (e) a non-open ended investment scheme; (f) an insurance undertaking; (g) a financial holding company or mixed-financial holding company. (1) ‘financial customer’ means a customer that performs one or more of the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU as its main business, or is one of the following: (a) a credit institution; (b) an investment firm; (c) an SSPE; (d) a CIU; (e) a non-open ended investment scheme; (f) an insurance undertaking; (g) a financial holding company or mixed-financial holding company. (2) ‘retail deposit’ means a liability to a natural person or to an SME, where the natural person or the SME would qualify for the retail exposure class under the Standardised or IRB approaches for credit risk, or a liability to a company which is eligible for the treatment set out in Article 153(4) and where the aggregate deposits by all such enterprises on a group basis do not exceed EUR 1 million.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 411 Definitions):
For the purposes of this Part, the following definitions apply: (1) ‘financial customer’ means a customer that performs one or more of the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU as its main business, or is one of the following: (a) a credit institution; (b) an investment firm; (c) an SSPE; (d) a CIU; (e) a non-open ended investment scheme; (f) an insurance undertaking; (g) a financial holding company or mixed-financial holding company. (2) ‘retail deposit’ means a liability to a natural person or to an SME, where the natural person or the SME would qualify for the retail exposure class under the Standardised or IRB approaches for credit risk, or a liability to a company which is eligible for the treatment set out in Article 153(4) and where the aggregate deposits by all such enterprises on a group basis do not exceed EUR 1 million.
Article 412 Liquidity coverage requirement
1. Institutions shall hold liquid assets, the sum of the values of which covers the liquidity outflows less the liquidity inflows under stressed conditions so as to ensure that institutions maintain levels of liquidity buffers which are adequate to face any possible imbalance between liquidity inflows and outflows under gravely stressed conditions over a period of thirty days. During times of stress, institutions may use their liquid assets to cover their net liquidity outflows. 2. Institutions shall not count double liquidity inflows and liquid assets. 3. Institutions may use the liquid assets referred to in paragraph 1 to meet their obligations under stressed circumstances as specified under Article 414. 4. The provisions set out in Title II shall apply exclusively for the purposes of specifying reporting obligations set out in Article 415. 5. Member States may maintain or introduce national provisions in the area of liquidity requirements before binding minimum standards for liquidity coverage requirements are specified and fully introduced in the Union in accordance with Article 460. Member States or competent authorities may require domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of those institutions, to maintain a higher liquidity coverage requirement up to 100 % until the binding minimum standard is fully introduced at a rate of 100 % in accordance with Article 460.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 412 Liquidity coverage requirement):
1. Institutions shall hold liquid assets, the sum of the values of which covers the liquidity outflows less the liquidity inflows under stressed conditions so as to ensure that institutions maintain levels of liquidity buffers which are adequate to face any possible imbalance between liquidity inflows and outflows under gravely stressed conditions over a period of thirty days. During times of stress, institutions may use their liquid assets to cover their net liquidity outflows. 2. Institutions shall not double count liquidity outflows, liquidity inflows and liquid assets. Unless specified otherwise in the delegated act referred to in Article 460(1), where an item can be counted in more than one outflow category, it shall be counted in the outflow category that produces the greatest contractual outflow for that item. 3. Institutions may use the liquid assets referred to in paragraph 1 to meet their obligations under stressed circumstances as specified under Article 414. 4. The provisions set out in Title II shall apply exclusively for the purposes of specifying reporting obligations set out in Article 415. 4a. The delegated act referred to in Article 460(1) shall apply to institutions. 5. Member States may maintain or introduce national provisions in the area of liquidity requirements before binding minimum standards for liquidity coverage requirements are specified and fully introduced in the Union in accordance with Article 460. Member States or competent authorities may require domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of those institutions, to maintain a higher liquidity coverage requirement up to 100 % until the binding minimum standard is fully introduced at a rate of 100 % in accordance with Article 460.
Article 413 Stable Funding
1. Institutions shall ensure that long term obligations are adequately met with a diversity of stable funding instruments under both normal and stressed conditions. 2. The provisions set out in Title III shall apply exclusively for the purposes of specifying reporting obligations set out in Article 415. 3. Member States may maintain or introduce national provisions in the area of stable funding requirements before binding minimum standards for net stable funding requirements are specified and introduced in the Union in accordance with Article 510.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 414 Compliance with liquidity requirements
Where an institution does not meet, or expects not to meet the requirement set out in Article 412 or the general obligation set out in Article 413(1), including during times of stress, it shall immediately notify the competent authorities and shall submit without undue delay to the competent authorities a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with Article 412 or Article 413(1). Until compliance has been restored, the institution shall report the items referred to in Title II or Title III, as appropriate, daily by the end of each business day unless the competent authority authorises a lower reporting frequency and a longer reporting delay. Competent authorities shall only grant such authorisations based on the individual situation of an institution and taking into account the scale and complexity of the institution's activities. They shall monitor the implementation of the restoration plan and shall require a more speedy restoration if appropriate.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 414 Compliance with liquidity requirements):
An institution that does not meet, or does not expect to meet, the requirements set out in Article 412 or in Article 413(1), including during times of stress, shall immediately notify the competent authorities thereof and shall submit to the competent authorities without undue delay a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with the requirements set out in Article 412 or Article 413(1), as appropriate. Until compliance has been restored, the institution shall report the items referred to in Title III, in Title IV, in the implementing act referred to in Article 415(3) or (3a) or in the delegated act referred to in Article 460(1), as appropriate, daily by the end of each business day, unless the competent authority authorises a lower reporting frequency and a longer reporting delay. Competent authorities shall only grant such authorisations on the basis of the individual situation of the institution, taking into account the scale and complexity of the institution's activities. Competent authorities shall monitor the implementation of such restoration plan and shall require a more rapid restoration of compliance where appropriate.
Article 415 Reporting obligation and reporting format
1. Institutions shall report in a single currency, regardless of their actual denomination, to the competent authorities the items referred to in Titles II and III and their components, including the composition of their liquid assets in accordance with Article 416. Until the liquidity coverage requirement in Part Six is fully specified and implemented as a minimum standard in accordance with Article 460, institutions shall report the items set in Title II and Annex III. Institutions shall report the items in Title III. The reporting frequency shall not be less than monthly for items referred to in Title II and Annex III and not less than quarterly for items referred to in Title III. The reporting formats shall include all the necessary information and shall allow EBA to assess whether secured lending and collateral swap transactions where liquid assets referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1) have been obtained against collateral that does not qualify under points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1) have been properly unwound. 2. An institution shall report separately to the competent authorities of the home Member State the items referred to in paragraph 1 in the currency below when it has: (a) aggregate liabilities in a currency different from the reporting currency under paragraph 1 amounting to or exceeding 5 % of the institution's or the single liquidity sub-group's total liabilities; or (b) a significant branch in accordance with Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU in a host Member State using a currency different from the reporting currency under paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the following: (a) uniform formats and IT solutions with associated instructions for frequencies and reference and remittance dates. The reporting formats and frequencies shall be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the different activities of the institutions and shall comprise the reporting required in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2; (b) additional liquidity monitoring metrics required, to allow competent authorities to obtain a comprehensive view of the liquidity risk profile, proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities. EBA shall submit to the Commission those draft implementing technical standards for the items specified in point (a) by 28 July 2013 and for the items specified in point (b) by 1 January 2014. Until the full introduction of binding liquidity requirements, competent authorities may continue to collect information through monitoring tools for the purpose of monitoring compliance with existing national liquidity standards. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 4. The competent authorities of the home Member State shall upon request provide in a timely manner and by electronic means the competent authorities and the central bank of the host Member States and EBA with the individual reporting in accordance with this Article. 5. Competent authorities that exercise supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Article 111 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall upon request provide in a timely manner and by electronic means the following authorities with all reporting submitted by the institution in accordance with the uniform reporting formats referred to in paragraph 3: (a) the competent authorities and the national central bank of the host Member States in which there are significant branches in accordance with Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the parent institution or institutions controlled by the same parent financial holding company; (b) the competent authorities that have authorised subsidiaries of the parent institution or institutions controlled by the same parent financial holding company and the central bank of the same Member State; (c) EBA; (d) ECB. 6. The competent authorities that have authorised an institution that is a subsidiary of a parent institution or parent financial holding company shall upon request provide in a timely manner and by electronic means the competent authorities that exercise supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Article 111 of Directive 2013/36/EU, the central bank of the Member State where the institution is authorised and EBA all reporting submitted by the institution in accordance with the uniform reporting formats referred to in paragraph 3.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 415 Reporting obligation and reporting format):
1. Institutions shall report in a single currency, regardless of their actual denomination, to the competent authorities the items referred to in Titles II and III and their components, including the composition of their liquid assets in accordance with Article 416. Until the liquidity coverage requirement in Part Six is fully specified and implemented as a minimum standard in accordance with Article 460, institutions shall report the items set in Title II and Annex III. Institutions shall report the items in Title III. The reporting frequency shall not be less than monthly for items referred to in Title II and Annex III and not less than quarterly for items referred to in Title III. The reporting formats shall include all the necessary information and shall allow EBA to assess whether secured lending and collateral swap transactions where liquid assets referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1) have been obtained against collateral that does not qualify under points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1) have been properly unwound. 2. An institution shall report separately to the competent authorities of the home Member State the items referred to in paragraph 1 in the currency below when it has: (a) aggregate liabilities in a currency different from the reporting currency under paragraph 1 amounting to or exceeding 5 % of the institution's or the single liquidity sub-group's total liabilities; or (b) a significant branch in accordance with Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU in a host Member State using a currency different from the reporting currency under paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the following: (a) uniform formats and IT solutions with associated instructions for frequencies and reference and remittance dates. The reporting formats and frequencies shall be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the different activities of the institutions and shall comprise the reporting required in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2; (b) additional liquidity monitoring metrics required, to allow competent authorities to obtain a comprehensive view of the liquidity risk profile, proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities. EBA shall submit to the Commission those draft implementing technical standards for the items specified in point (a) by 28 July 2013 and for the items specified in point (b) by 1 January 2014. Until the full introduction of binding liquidity requirements, competent authorities may continue to collect information through monitoring tools for the purpose of monitoring compliance with existing national liquidity standards. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 3a. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify which additional liquidity monitoring metrics as referred to in paragraph 3 shall apply to small and non-complex institutions. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 28 June 2020. 4. The competent authorities of the home Member State shall upon request provide in a timely manner and by electronic means the competent authorities and the central bank of the host Member States and EBA with the individual reporting in accordance with this Article. 5. Competent authorities that exercise supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Article 111 of Directive 2013/36/EU shall upon request provide in a timely manner and by electronic means the following authorities with all reporting submitted by the institution in accordance with the uniform reporting formats referred to in paragraph 3: (a) the competent authorities and the national central bank of the host Member States in which there are significant branches in accordance with Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the parent institution or institutions controlled by the same parent financial holding company; (b) the competent authorities that have authorised subsidiaries of the parent institution or institutions controlled by the same parent financial holding company and the central bank of the same Member State; (c) EBA; (d) ECB. 6. The competent authorities that have authorised an institution that is a subsidiary of a parent institution or parent financial holding company shall upon request provide in a timely manner and by electronic means the competent authorities that exercise supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Article 111 of Directive 2013/36/EU, the central bank of the Member State where the institution is authorised and EBA all reporting submitted by the institution in accordance with the uniform reporting formats referred to in paragraph 3.
Article 416 Reporting on liquid assets
1. Institutions shall report the following as liquid assets unless excluded by paragraph 2 and only if the liquid assets fulfil the conditions in paragraph 3: (a) cash and exposures to central banks to the extent that these exposures can be withdrawn at any time in times of stress. As regards deposits held with central banks, the competent authority and the central bank shall aim at reaching a common understanding regarding the extent to which minimum reserves can be withdrawn in times of stress; (b) other transferable assets that are of extremely high liquidity and credit quality; (c) transferable assets representing claims on or guaranteed by: (i) the central government of a Member State, a region with fiscal autonomy to raise and collect taxes, or of a third country in the domestic currency of the central or regional government, if the institution incurs a liquidity risk in that Member State or third country that it covers by holding those liquid assets; (ii) central banks and non-central government public sector entities in the domestic currency of the central bank and the public sector entity; (iii) the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the Commission and multilateral development banks; (iv) the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism; (c) transferable assets representing claims on or guaranteed by: (i) the central government of a Member State, a region with fiscal autonomy to raise and collect taxes, or of a third country in the domestic currency of the central or regional government, if the institution incurs a liquidity risk in that Member State or third country that it covers by holding those liquid assets; (ii) central banks and non-central government public sector entities in the domestic currency of the central bank and the public sector entity; (iii) the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the Commission and multilateral development banks; (iv) the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism; (d) transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality; (e) standby credit facilities granted by central banks within the scope of monetary policy to the extent that these facilities are not collateralised by liquid assets and excluding emergency liquidity assistance; (f) if the credit institution belongs to a network in accordance with legal or statutory provisions, the legal or statutory minimum deposits with the central credit institution and other statutory or contractually available liquid funding from the central credit institution or institutions that are members of the network referred to in Article 113(7), or eligible for the waiver provided in Article 10, to the extent that this funding is not collateralised by liquid assets. Pending specification of a uniform definition in accordance with Article 460 of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality, institutions shall identify themselves in a given currency transferable assets that are respectively of high or extremely high liquidity and credit quality. Pending specification of a uniform definition, competent authorities may, taking into account the criteria listed in Article 509(3), (4) and (5) provide general guidance that institutions shall follow in identifying assets of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality. In the absence of such guidance, institutions shall use transparent and objective criteria to this end, including some or all of the criteria listed in Article 509(3), (4) and (5). 2. The following shall not be considered liquid assets: (a) assets that are issued by a credit institution unless they fulfil one of the following conditions: (i) they are bonds eligible for the treatment set out in Article 129(4) or (5) or asset backed instruments if demonstrated to be of the highest credit quality as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509 (3), (4) and (5); (ii) they are bonds as referred to in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC other than those referred to in point (i) of this point; (iii) the credit institution has been set up by a Member State central or regional government and that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the institution and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime; or the asset is explicitly guaranteed by that government; or at least 90 % of the loans granted by the institution are directly or indirectly guaranteed by that government and the asset is predominantly used to fund promotional loans granted on a non-competitive, not for profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives; (a) assets that are issued by a credit institution unless they fulfil one of the following conditions: (i) they are bonds eligible for the treatment set out in Article 129(4) or (5) or asset backed instruments if demonstrated to be of the highest credit quality as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509 (3), (4) and (5); (ii) they are bonds as referred to in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC other than those referred to in point (i) of this point; (iii) the credit institution has been set up by a Member State central or regional government and that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the institution and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime; or the asset is explicitly guaranteed by that government; or at least 90 % of the loans granted by the institution are directly or indirectly guaranteed by that government and the asset is predominantly used to fund promotional loans granted on a non-competitive, not for profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives; (b) assets that are provided as collateral to the institution under reverse repo and securities financing transactions and that are held by the institution only as a credit risk mitigant and that are not legally and contractually available for use by the institution; (c) assets issued by any of the following: (i) an investment firm; (ii) an insurance undertaking; (iii) a financial holding company; (iv) a mixed financial holding company; (v) any other entity that performs one or more of the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU as its main business. (c) assets issued by any of the following: (i) an investment firm; (ii) an insurance undertaking; (iii) a financial holding company; (iv) a mixed financial holding company; (v) any other entity that performs one or more of the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU as its main business. 3. In accordance with paragraph 1, institutions shall report assets that fulfil the following conditions as liquid assets: (a) they are unencumbered or stand available within collateral pools to be used for the obtaining of additional funding under committed but not yet funded credit lines available to the institution; (b) they are not issued by the institution itself or its parent or subsidiary institutions or another subsidiary of its parent institutions or parent financial holding company; (c) their price is generally agreed upon by markets participants and can easily be observed in the market, or their price can be determined by a formula that is easy to calculate based on publicly available inputs and does not depend on strong assumptions as is typically the case for structured or exotic products; (d) they are eligible collateral for standard liquidity operations of a central bank in a Member State or if the liquid assets are held to meet liquidity outflows in the currency of a third country, of the central bank of that third country; (e) they are listed on a recognised exchange or they are tradable on active outright sale or via a simple repurchase agreement on approved repurchase markets. These criteria shall be assessed separately for each market. The conditions referred to in points (c), (d) and (e) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to the assets referred to in points (a), (e) and (f) of paragraph 1. The condition referred to in point (d) of the first subparagraph shall not apply in the case of liquid assets held to meet liquidity outflows in a currency in which there is an extremely narrow definition of central bank eligibility. In the case of liquid assets denominated in currencies of third countries, this exception shall apply and only apply if the competent authorities of the third country apply the same or an equivalent exception. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, pending the specification of a binding liquidity requirement in accordance with Article 460 and in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article, institutions shall report on: (a) other non-central bank eligible but tradable assets such as equities and gold based on transparent and objective criteria, including some or all of the criteria listed in Article 509(3), (4) and (5); (b) other central bank eligible and tradable assets such as asset backed instruments of the highest credit quality as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509(3), (4) and (5); (c) other central bank eligible but non-tradable assets such as credit claims as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509(3), (4) and (5). 5. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards listing the currencies which meet the conditions referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 March 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Before the entry into force of the technical standards referred to in the third subparagraph, institutions may continue to apply the treatment set out in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, where the competent authorities have applied that treatment before 1 January 2014. 6. Shares or units in CIUs may be treated as liquid assets up to an absolute amount of EUR 500 million in the portfolio of liquid assets of each institution provided that the requirements in Article 132(3) are met and that the CIU, apart from derivatives to mitigate interest rate or credit or currency risk, only invests in liquid assets as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. The use or potential use by a CIU of derivative instruments to hedge risks of permitted investments shall not prevent that CIU from being eligible. Where the value of the shares or units of the CIU is not regularly marked to market by the third parties referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 418(4) and the competent authority is not satisfied that an institution has developed robust methodologies and processes for such valuation as referred to in the first sentence of Article 418(4), shares or units in that CIU shall not be treated as liquid assets. 7. Where a liquid asset ceases to be eligible in the stock of liquid assets, an institution may nevertheless continue to consider it a liquid asset for an additional period of 30 calendar days. Where a liquid asset in a CIU ceases to be eligible for the treatment set out in paragraph 6, the shares or units in the CIU may nevertheless be considered a liquid asset for an additional period of 30 days provided that those assets do not exceed 10 % of the CIU's overall assets.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 416 Reporting on liquid assets):
1. Institutions shall report the following as liquid assets unless excluded by paragraph 2 and only if the liquid assets fulfil the conditions in paragraph 3: (a) cash and exposures to central banks to the extent that these exposures can be withdrawn at any time in times of stress. As regards deposits held with central banks, the competent authority and the central bank shall aim at reaching a common understanding regarding the extent to which minimum reserves can be withdrawn in times of stress; (b) other transferable assets that are of extremely high liquidity and credit quality; (c) transferable assets representing claims on or guaranteed by: (i) the central government of a Member State, a region with fiscal autonomy to raise and collect taxes, or of a third country in the domestic currency of the central or regional government, if the institution incurs a liquidity risk in that Member State or third country that it covers by holding those liquid assets; (ii) central banks and non-central government public sector entities in the domestic currency of the central bank and the public sector entity; (iii) the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the Commission and multilateral development banks; (iv) the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism; (d) transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality; (e) standby credit facilities granted by central banks within the scope of monetary policy to the extent that these facilities are not collateralised by liquid assets and excluding emergency liquidity assistance; (f) if the credit institution belongs to a network in accordance with legal or statutory provisions, the legal or statutory minimum deposits with the central credit institution and other statutory or contractually available liquid funding from the central credit institution or institutions that are members of the network referred to in Article 113(7), or eligible for the waiver provided in Article 10, to the extent that this funding is not collateralised by liquid assets. Pending specification of a uniform definition in accordance with Article 460 of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality, institutions shall identify themselves in a given currency transferable assets that are respectively of high or extremely high liquidity and credit quality. Pending specification of a uniform definition, competent authorities may, taking into account the criteria listed in Article 509(3), (4) and (5) provide general guidance that institutions shall follow in identifying assets of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality. In the absence of such guidance, institutions shall use transparent and objective criteria to this end, including some or all of the criteria listed in Article 509(3), (4) and (5). 2. The following shall not be considered liquid assets: (a) assets that are issued by a credit institution unless they fulfil one of the following conditions: (i) they are bonds eligible for the treatment set out in Article 129(4) or (5) or asset backed instruments if demonstrated to be of the highest credit quality as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509 (3), (4) and (5); (ii) they are bonds as referred to in Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC other than those referred to in point (i) of this point; (iii) the credit institution has been set up by a Member State central or regional government and that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the institution and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime; or the asset is explicitly guaranteed by that government; or at least 90 % of the loans granted by the institution are directly or indirectly guaranteed by that government and the asset is predominantly used to fund promotional loans granted on a non-competitive, not for profit basis in order to promote that government's public policy objectives; (b) assets that are provided as collateral to the institution under reverse repo and securities financing transactions and that are held by the institution only as a credit risk mitigant and that are not legally and contractually available for use by the institution; (c) assets issued by any of the following: (i) an investment firm; (ii) an insurance undertaking; (iii) a financial holding company; (iv) a mixed financial holding company; (v) any other entity that performs one or more of the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU as its main business. 3. In accordance with paragraph 1, institutions shall report assets that fulfil the following conditions as liquid assets: (a) they are unencumbered or stand available within collateral pools to be used for the obtaining of additional funding under committed but not yet funded credit lines available to the institution; (b) they are not issued by the institution itself or its parent or subsidiary institutions or another subsidiary of its parent institutions or parent financial holding company; (c) their price is generally agreed upon by markets participants and can easily be observed in the market, or their price can be determined by a formula that is easy to calculate based on publicly available inputs and does not depend on strong assumptions as is typically the case for structured or exotic products; (d) they are eligible collateral for standard liquidity operations of a central bank in a Member State or if the liquid assets are held to meet liquidity outflows in the currency of a third country, of the central bank of that third country; (e) they are listed on a recognised exchange or they are tradable on active outright sale or via a simple repurchase agreement on approved repurchase markets. These criteria shall be assessed separately for each market. The conditions referred to in points (c), (d) and (e) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to the assets referred to in points (a), (e) and (f) of paragraph 1. The condition referred to in point (d) of the first subparagraph shall not apply in the case of liquid assets held to meet liquidity outflows in a currency in which there is an extremely narrow definition of central bank eligibility. In the case of liquid assets denominated in currencies of third countries, this exception shall apply and only apply if the competent authorities of the third country apply the same or an equivalent exception. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, pending the specification of a binding liquidity requirement in accordance with Article 460 and in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article, institutions shall report on: (a) other non-central bank eligible but tradable assets such as equities and gold based on transparent and objective criteria, including some or all of the criteria listed in Article 509(3), (4) and (5); (b) other central bank eligible and tradable assets such as asset backed instruments of the highest credit quality as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509(3), (4) and (5); (c) other central bank eligible but non-tradable assets such as credit claims as established by EBA pursuant to the criteria in Article 509(3), (4) and (5). 5. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards listing the currencies which meet the conditions referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 March 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Before the entry into force of the technical standards referred to in the third subparagraph, institutions may continue to apply the treatment set out in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, where the competent authorities have applied that treatment before 1 January 2014. 6. Shares or units in CIUs may be treated as liquid assets up to an absolute amount of EUR 500 million in the portfolio of liquid assets of each institution provided that the requirements in Article 132(3) are met and that the CIU, apart from derivatives to mitigate interest rate or credit or currency risk, only invests in liquid assets as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. The use or potential use by a CIU of derivative instruments to hedge risks of permitted investments shall not prevent that CIU from being eligible. Where the value of the shares or units of the CIU is not regularly marked to market by the third parties referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 418(4) and the competent authority is not satisfied that an institution has developed robust methodologies and processes for such valuation as referred to in the first sentence of Article 418(4), shares or units in that CIU shall not be treated as liquid assets. 7. Where a liquid asset ceases to be eligible in the stock of liquid assets, an institution may nevertheless continue to consider it a liquid asset for an additional period of 30 calendar days. Where a liquid asset in a CIU ceases to be eligible for the treatment set out in paragraph 6, the shares or units in the CIU may nevertheless be considered a liquid asset for an additional period of 30 days provided that those assets do not exceed 10 % of the CIU's overall assets.
Article 417 Operational requirements for holdings of liquid assets
The institution shall only report as liquid assets those holdings of liquid assets that meet the following conditions: (a) they are appropriately diversified. Diversification is not required in terms of assets corresponding to points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1); (b) they are legally and practically readily available at any time during the next 30 days to be liquidated via outright sale or via a simple repurchase agreement on approved repurchase markets in order to meet obligations coming due. Liquid assets referred to in point (c) of Article 416(1) which are held in third countries where there are transfer restrictions or which are denominated in non-convertible currencies shall be considered available only to the extent that they correspond to outflows in the third country or currency in question, unless the institution can demonstrate to the competent authorities that it has appropriately hedged the ensuing currency risk; (c) the liquid assets are controlled by a liquidity management function; (d) a portion of the liquid assets except those referred to in points (a), (c), (e) and (f) of Article 416(1) is periodically and at least annually liquidated via outright sale or via simple repurchase agreements on an approved repurchase market for the following purposes: (i) to test the access to the market for these assets; (ii) to test the effectiveness of its processes for the liquidation of assets; (iii) to test the usability of the assets; (iv) to minimise the risk of negative signalling during a period of stress; (d) a portion of the liquid assets except those referred to in points (a), (c), (e) and (f) of Article 416(1) is periodically and at least annually liquidated via outright sale or via simple repurchase agreements on an approved repurchase market for the following purposes: (i) to test the access to the market for these assets; (ii) to test the effectiveness of its processes for the liquidation of assets; (iii) to test the usability of the assets; (iv) to minimise the risk of negative signalling during a period of stress; (e) price risks associated with the assets may be hedged but the liquid assets are subject to appropriate internal arrangements that ensure that they are readily available to the treasury when needed and especially that they are not used in other ongoing operations, including: (i) hedging or other trading strategies; (ii) providing credit enhancements in structured transactions; (iii) covering operational costs. (e) price risks associated with the assets may be hedged but the liquid assets are subject to appropriate internal arrangements that ensure that they are readily available to the treasury when needed and especially that they are not used in other ongoing operations, including: (i) hedging or other trading strategies; (ii) providing credit enhancements in structured transactions; (iii) covering operational costs. (f) the denomination of the liquid assets is consistent with the distribution by currency of liquidity outflows after the deduction of inflows.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 417 Operational requirements for holdings of liquid assets):
The institution shall only report as liquid assets those holdings of liquid assets that meet the following conditions: (a) they are appropriately diversified. Diversification is not required in terms of assets corresponding to points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1); (b) they are legally and practically readily available at any time during the next 30 days to be liquidated via outright sale or via a simple repurchase agreement on approved repurchase markets in order to meet obligations coming due. Liquid assets referred to in point (c) of Article 416(1) which are held in third countries where there are transfer restrictions or which are denominated in non-convertible currencies shall be considered available only to the extent that they correspond to outflows in the third country or currency in question, unless the institution can demonstrate to the competent authorities that it has appropriately hedged the ensuing currency risk; (c) the liquid assets are controlled by a liquidity management function; (d) a portion of the liquid assets except those referred to in points (a), (c), (e) and (f) of Article 416(1) is periodically and at least annually liquidated via outright sale or via simple repurchase agreements on an approved repurchase market for the following purposes: (i) to test the access to the market for these assets; (ii) to test the effectiveness of its processes for the liquidation of assets; (iii) to test the usability of the assets; (iv) to minimise the risk of negative signalling during a period of stress; (e) price risks associated with the assets may be hedged but the liquid assets are subject to appropriate internal arrangements that ensure that they are readily available to the treasury when needed and especially that they are not used in other ongoing operations, including: (i) hedging or other trading strategies; (ii) providing credit enhancements in structured transactions; (iii) covering operational costs. (f) the denomination of the liquid assets is consistent with the distribution by currency of liquidity outflows after the deduction of inflows.
Article 418 Valuation of liquid assets
1. The value of a liquid asset to be reported shall be its market value, subject to appropriate haircuts that reflect at least the duration, the credit and liquidity risk and typical repo haircuts in periods of general market stress. The haircuts shall not be less than 15 % for the assets referred to in point (d) of Article 416(1). If the institution hedges the price risk associated with an asset, it shall take into account the cash flow resulting from the potential close-out of the hedge. 2. Shares or units in CIUs as referred to in Article 416(6) shall be subject to haircuts, looking through to the underlying assets as follows: (a) 0 % for the assets referred to in point (a) of Article 416(1); (b) 5 % for the assets referred to in points (b) and (c) of Article 416(1); (c) 20 % for the assets referred to in point (d) of Article 416(1). 3. The look-through approach referred to in paragraph 2 shall be applied as follows: (a) where the institution is aware of the underlying exposures of a CIU, it may look through to those underlying exposures in order to assign them to points (a) to (d) of Article 416(1); (b) where the institution is not aware of the underlying exposures of a CIU, it shall be assumed that the CIU invests, to the maximum extent allowed under its mandate, in descending order in the asset types referred to in points (a) to (d) of Article 416(1) until the maximum total investment limit is reached. 4. Institutions shall develop robust methodologies and processes to calculate and report the market value and haircuts for shares or units in CIUs. Only where they can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the materiality of the exposure does not justify the development of their own methodologies, institutions may rely on the following third parties to calculate and report the haircuts for shares or units in CIUs, in accordance with the methods set out in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 3: (a) the depository institution of the CIU provided that the CIU exclusively invests in securities and deposits all securities at this depository institution; (b) for other CIUs, the CIU management company, provided that the CIU management company meets the criteria set out in Article 132(3)(a). The correctness of the calculations by the depository institution or the CIU management company shall be confirmed by an external auditor.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 418 Valuation of liquid assets):
1. The value of a liquid asset to be reported shall be its market value, subject to appropriate haircuts that reflect at least the duration, the credit and liquidity risk and typical repo haircuts in periods of general market stress. The haircuts shall not be less than 15 % for the assets referred to in point (d) of Article 416(1). If the institution hedges the price risk associated with an asset, it shall take into account the cash flow resulting from the potential close-out of the hedge. 2. Shares or units in CIUs as referred to in Article 416(6) shall be subject to haircuts, looking through to the underlying assets as follows: 0 % for the assets referred to in point (a) of Article 416(1); 5 (c) 20 % for the assets referred to in point (d) of Article 416(1). The look-through approach referred to in paragraph 2 shall be applied as follows: 4. Institutions shall develop robust methodologies and processes to calculate and report the market value and haircuts for shares or units in CIUs. Only where they can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the materiality of the exposure does not justify the development of their own methodologies, institutions may rely on the following third parties to calculate and report the haircuts for shares or units in CIUs, in accordance with the methods set out in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 3: (a) the depository institution of the CIU provided that the CIU exclusively invests in securities and deposits all securities at this depository institution; (b) for other CIUs, the CIU management company, provided that the CIU management company meets the criteria set out in Article 132(3)(a). The correctness of the calculations by the depository institution or the CIU management company shall be confirmed by an external auditor.