Article 494 Transitional provisions for eligible capital
By way of derogation from points (71)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii) of Article 4(1), eligible capital may include Tier 2 capital up to the following amounts: (a) 100 % of Tier 1 capital during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014; (b) 75 % of Tier 1 capital during the period from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015; (c) 50 % of Tier 1 capital during the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 495 Treatment of equity exposures under the IRB Approach
1. Until 31 December 2017, the competent authorities may, by way of derogation from Chapter 3 of Part Three, exempt from the IRB treatment certain categories of equity exposures held by institutions and EU subsidiaries of institutions in that Member State as at 31 December 2007. The competent authority shall publish the categories of equity exposures which benefit from such treatment in accordance with Article 143 of Directive 2013/36/EU. The exempted position shall be measured as the number of shares as at 31 December 2007 and any additional share arising directly as a result of owning those holdings, provided that they do not increase the proportional share of ownership in a portfolio company. If an acquisition increases the proportional share of ownership in a specific holding the part of the holding which constitutes the excess shall not be subject to the exemption. Nor shall the exemption apply to holdings that were originally subject to the exemption, but have been sold and then bought back. Equity exposures subject to this provision shall be subject to the capital requirements calculated in accordance with the Standardised Approach under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 and the requirements set out in Title IV of Part Three, as applicable. Competent authorities shall notify the Commission and EBA of the implementation of this paragraph. 2. In the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 114(4), until 31 December 2017 the same risk weight shall be assigned in relation to exposures to the central governments or central banks of Member States denominated and funded in the domestic currency of any Member State as would be applied to such exposures denominated and funded in their domestic currency. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions according to which competent authorities shall afford the exemption referred to in paragraph 1. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 June 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 495 Treatment of equity exposures under the IRB Approach):
1. Until 31 December 2017, the competent authorities may, by way of derogation from Chapter 3 of Part Three, exempt from the IRB treatment certain categories of equity exposures held by institutions and EU subsidiaries of institutions in that Member State as at 31 December 2007. The competent authority shall publish the categories of equity exposures which benefit from such treatment in accordance with Article 143 of Directive 2013/36/EU. The exempted position shall be measured as the number of shares as at 31 December 2007 and any additional share arising directly as a result of owning those holdings, provided that they do not increase the proportional share of ownership in a portfolio company. If an acquisition increases the proportional share of ownership in a specific holding the part of the holding which constitutes the excess shall not be subject to the exemption. Nor shall the exemption apply to holdings that were originally subject to the exemption, but have been sold and then bought back. Equity exposures subject to this provision shall be subject to the capital requirements calculated in accordance with the Standardised Approach under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 and the requirements set out in Title IV of Part Three, as applicable. Competent authorities shall notify the Commission and EBA of the implementation of this paragraph. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions according to which competent authorities shall afford the exemption referred to in paragraph 1. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 June 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 496 Own funds requirements for covered bonds
1. Until 31 December 2017, competent authorities may waive in full or in part the 10 % limit for senior units issued by French Fonds Communs de Créances or by securitisation entities which are equivalent to French Fonds Communs de Créances laid down in points (d) and (f) of Article 129(1), provided that both of the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the securitised residential property or commercial immovable property exposures were originated by a member of the same consolidated group of which the issuer of the covered bonds is a member, or by an entity affiliated to the same central body to which the issuer of the covered bonds is affiliated, where that common group membership or affiliation shall be determined at the time the senior units are made collateral for covered bonds; (b) a member of the same consolidated group of which the issuer of the covered bonds is a member, or an entity affiliated to the same central body to which the issuer of the covered bonds is affiliated, retains the whole first loss tranche supporting those senior units. 2. Until 31 December 2014, for the purposes of point (c) of Article 129(1), the senior unsecured exposures of institutions which qualified for a 20 % risk weight under national law before 28 June 2013 shall be considered to qualify for credit quality step 1. 3. Until 31 December 2014, for the purposes of Article 129(5), the senior unsecured exposures of institutions which qualified for a 20 % risk weight under national law before 28 June 2013shall be considered to qualify for a 20 % risk weight.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 496 Own funds requirements for covered bonds):
(a) the securitised residential property or commercial immovable property exposures were originated by a member of the same consolidated group of which the issuer of the covered bonds is a member, or by an entity affiliated to the same central body to which the issuer of the covered bonds is affiliated, where that common group membership or affiliation shall be determined at the time the senior units are made collateral for covered bonds; (b) a member of the same consolidated group of which the issuer of the covered bonds is a member, or an entity affiliated to the same central body to which the issuer of the covered bonds is affiliated, retains the whole first loss tranche supporting those senior units. 2. Until 31 December 2014, for the purposes of point (c) of Article 129(1), the senior unsecured exposures of institutions which qualified for a 20 % risk weight under national law before 28 June 2013 shall be considered to qualify for credit quality step 1. 3. Until 31 December 2014, for the purposes of Article 129(5), the senior unsecured exposures of institutions which qualified for a 20 % risk weight under national law before 28 June 2013shall be considered to qualify for a 20 % risk weight.
Article 497 Own funds requirements for exposures to CCPs
1. Until 15 months after the date of entry into force of the latest of the regulatory technical standards referred to in Articles 16, 25, 26, 29, 34, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 and 49 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, or until a decision is made under Article 14 of that Regulation on the authorisation of the CCP, whichever is earlier, an institution may consider that CCP to be a QCCP, provided that the CCP was authorised in its Member State of establishment to provide clearing services in accordance with the national law of that Member State before all the regulatory technical standards in Articles 5, 8 to 11, 16, 18, 25, 26, 29, 34, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 56 and 81 of that Regulation have been adopted. 2. Until 15 months after the date of entry into force of the latest of the regulatory technical standards referred to in Articles 16, 26, 29, 34, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 and 49 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, or until a decision is made under Article 25 of that Regulation on the recognition of the CCP established in a third country, whichever is earlier, an institution may consider that CCP to be a QCCP, 3. The Commission may adopt an implementing act under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 extending the transitional provisions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article by a further six months, in exceptional circumstances where it is necessary and proportionate to avoid disruption to international financial markets. 4. Until the deadlines defined in paragraphs 1 and 2, and extended under paragraph 3, as applicable, where a CCP neither has a default fund nor has in place a binding arrangement with its clearing members that allows it to use all or part of the initial margin received from its clearing members as if they were pre-funded contributions, an institution shall substitute the right formula for calculating the own funds requirement (K i ) in Article 308(2) with the following one: where IM i = the initial margin posted to the CCP by clearing member i IM = the total amount of initial margin communicated to the institution by the CCP.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 497 Own funds requirements for exposures to CCPs):
1. Where a third-country CCP applies for recognition in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, institutions may consider that CCP as a QCCP from the date on which it submitted its application for recognition to ESMA and until one of the following dates: (a) where the Commission has already adopted an implementing act referred to in Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in relation to the third country in which the CCP is established and that implementing act has entered into force, two years after the date of submission of the application; (b) where the Commission has not yet adopted an implementing act referred to in Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in relation to the third country in which the CCP is established or where that implementing act has not yet entered into force, the earlier of the following dates: (i) two years after the date of entry into force of the implementing act; (ii) for CCPs that submitted the application after 27 June 2019, two years after the date of submission of the application; (iii) for those CCPs that submitted the application before 27 June 2019, 28 June 2021. 2. Until the expiration of the deadline referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, where a CCP referred to in that paragraph does not have a default fund and does not have in place a binding arrangement with its clearing members that allows it to use all or part of the initial margin received from its clearing members as if they were pre-funded contributions, the institution shall substitute the formula for calculating the own funds requirement in Article 308(2) with the following one: where: = the own funds requirement; = the own funds requirement; K CCP = the hypothetical capital of the QCCP communicated to the institution by the QCCP in accordance with Article 50c of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; K CCP the hypothetical capital of the QCCP communicated to the institution by the QCCP in accordance with Article 50c of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; DF CCP = the pre-funded financial resources of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP in accordance with Article 50c of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; DF CCP the pre-funded financial resources of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP in accordance with Article 50c of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012; i = the index denoting the clearing member; the index denoting the clearing member; IM i = the initial margin posted with the CCP by clearing member i; and IM i the initial margin posted with the CCP by clearing member i; and IM = the total amount of initial margin communicated to the institution by the CCP in accordance with Article 89(5a) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. the total amount of initial margin communicated to the institution by the CCP in accordance with Article 89(5a) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 3. In exceptional circumstances, where it is necessary and proportionate in order to avoid disruption to international financial markets, the Commission may adopt, by way of implementing acts, and subject to the examination procedure referred to in Article 464(2), a decision to extend once, by 12 months, the transitional provisions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article 498 Exemption for Commodities dealers
1. The provisions on own funds requirements as set out in this Regulation shall not apply to investment firms the main business of which consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to which Directive 93/22/EEC did not apply on 31 December 2006. This exemption shall apply until 31 December 2017 or the date of entry into force of any amendments pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, whichever is the earlier. 2. By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall, on the basis of public consultations and in the light of discussions with the competent authorities, report to the European Parliament and the Council on: (a) an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the commodity derivatives or derivatives contracts set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC; (b) the desirability of amending Directive 2004/39/EC to create a further category of investment firm whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC relating to energy supplies, including electricity, coal, gas and oil. 3. On the basis of the report referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission may submit proposals to amend this Regulation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 498 Exemption for Commodities dealers):
1. The provisions on own funds requirements as set out in this Regulation shall not apply to investment firms the main business of which consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to which Directive 93/22/EEC did not apply on 31 December 2006. This exemption shall apply until 31 December 2020 or the date of entry into force of any amendments pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3, whichever is the earlier. 2. By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall, on the basis of public consultations and in the light of discussions with the competent authorities, report to the European Parliament and the Council on: (a) an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the commodity derivatives or derivatives contracts set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC; (b) the desirability of amending Directive 2004/39/EC to create a further category of investment firm whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC relating to energy supplies, including electricity, coal, gas and oil. By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall, on the basis of public consultations and in the light of discussions with the competent authorities, report to the European Parliament and the Council on: (a) an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the commodity derivatives or derivatives contracts set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC; (b) the desirability of amending Directive 2004/39/EC to create a further category of investment firm whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC relating to energy supplies, including electricity, coal, gas and oil. 3. On the basis of the report referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission may submit proposals to amend this Regulation.
Article 499 Leverage
1. By way of derogation from Articles 429 and 430, during the period between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2021, institutions shall calculate and report the leverage ratio by using both of the following as the capital measure: (a) Tier 1 capital; (b) Tier 1 capital, subject to the derogations laid down in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Title. 2. By way of derogation from Article 451(1), institutions may choose whether to disclose the information on the leverage ratio based on either just one or both of the definitions of the capital measure specified in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article. Where institutions change their decision on which leverage ratio to disclose, the first disclosure that occurs after such change shall contain a reconciliation of the information on all leverage ratios disclosed up to the moment of the change. 3. By way of derogation from Article 429(2), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, competent authorities may permit institutions to calculate the end-of-quarter leverage ratio where they consider that institutions may not have data of sufficiently good quality to calculate a leverage ratio that is an arithmetic mean of the monthly leverage ratios over a quarter.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 499 Leverage):
1. By way of derogation from Articles 429 and 430, during the period between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2021, institutions shall calculate and report the leverage ratio by using both of the following as the capital measure: (a) Tier 1 capital; (b) Tier 1 capital, subject to the derogations laid down in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Title. By way of derogation from Articles 429 and 430, during the period between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2021, institutions shall calculate and report the leverage ratio by using both of the following as the capital measure: (a) Tier 1 capital; (b) Tier 1 capital, subject to the derogations laid down in Chapters 1 and 2 of this Title. 2. By way of derogation from Article 451(1), institutions may choose whether to disclose the information on the leverage ratio based on either just one or both of the definitions of the capital measure specified in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article. Where institutions change their decision on which leverage ratio to disclose, the first disclosure that occurs after such change shall contain a reconciliation of the information on all leverage ratios disclosed up to the moment of the change. 3. By way of derogation from Article 429(2), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, competent authorities may permit institutions to calculate the end-of-quarter leverage ratio where they consider that institutions may not have data of sufficiently good quality to calculate a leverage ratio that is an arithmetic mean of the monthly leverage ratios over a quarter.
Article 500 Transitional provisions — Basel I floor
1. Until 31 December 2017, institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3 and institutions using the Advanced Measurement Approaches as specified in Part Three, Title III, Chapter 4 for the calculation of their own funds requirements for operational risk shall meet both of the following requirements: (a) they shall hold own funds as required by Article 92; (b) they shall hold own funds which are at all times more than or equal to 80 % of the total minimum amount of own funds that the institution would be required to hold under Article 4 of Directive 93/6/EEC as that Directive and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions ( 36 ) stood prior to 1 January 2007. 2. Subject to the approval of the competent authorities, the amount referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 may be replaced by a requirement to hold own funds which are at all times more than or equal to 80 % of the own funds that the institution would be required to hold under Article 92 calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2, and Part Three, Title III, Chapter 2 or 3, as applicable, instead of in accordance with Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3, or Part Three, Title III, Chapter 4, as applicable. 3. A credit institution may apply paragraph 2 only if it started to use the IRB Approach or the Advanced Measurements Approaches for the calculation of its capital requirements on or after 1 January 2010. 4. Compliance with the requirements of point (b) of paragraph 1 shall be on the basis of amounts of own funds fully adjusted to reflect differences in the calculation of own funds under Directive 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC as those Directives stood prior to 1 January 2007 and the calculation of own funds under this Regulation deriving from the separate treatments of expected loss and unexpected loss under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3, of this Regulation. 5. The competent authorities may, after consulting EBA, waive the application of point (b) of paragraph 1 to institutions provided that all the requirements for the IRB Approach set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3, Section 6 or the qualifying criteria for the use of the Advanced Measurement Approach set out in Part Three, Title III, Chapter 4, as applicable, are met. 6. By 1 January 2017, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on whether it is appropriate to extend the application of the Basel I floor beyond 31 December 2017 to ensure that there is a backstop to internal models, taking into account international developments and internationally agreed standards. That report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal if appropriate.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 501 Capital requirements deduction for credit risk on exposures to SMEs
1. Capital requirements for credit risk on exposures to SMEs shall be multiplied by the factor 0,7619. 2. For the purpose of this Article: (a) the exposure shall be included either in the retail or in the corporates or secured by mortgages on immovable property classes. Exposures in default shall be excluded; (b) an SME is defined in accordance with Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises ( 37 ). Among the criteria listed in Article 2 of the Annex to that Recommendation only the annual turnover shall be taken into account; (c) the total amount owed to the institution and parent undertakings and its subsidiaries, including any exposure in default, by the obligor client or group of connected clients, but excluding claims or contingent claims secured on residential property collateral, shall not, to the knowledge of the institution, exceed EUR 1,5 million. The institution shall take reasonable steps to acquire such knowledge. 3. Institutions shall report to competent authorities every three months on the total amount of exposures to SMEs calculated in accordance with paragraph 2. 4. The Commission shall, by 28 June 2016, report on the impact of the own funds requirements laid down in this Regulation on lending to SMEs and natural persons and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate. 5. For the purpose of paragraph 4, EBA shall report on the following to the Commission: (a) an analysis of the evolution of the lending trends and conditions for SMEs over the period referred to in paragraph 4; (b) an analysis of effective riskiness of Union SMEs over a full economic cycle; (c) the consistency of own funds requirements laid down in this Regulation for credit risk on exposures to SMEs with the outcomes of the analysis under points (a) and (b).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Article 502 Cyclicality of capital requirements
The Commission, in cooperation with EBA, ESRB and the Member States, and taking into account the opinion of the ECB, shall periodically monitor whether this Regulation taken as a whole, together with Directive 2013/36/EU, has significant effects on the economic cycle and, in the light of that examination, shall consider whether any remedial measures are justified. By 31 December 2013, EBA shall report to the Commission on whether, and if so how, methodologies of institutions under the IRB Approach should converge with a view to more comparable capital requirements while mitigating pro-cyclicality. Based on that analysis and taking into account the opinion of the ECB, the Commission shall draw up a biennial report and submit it to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with any appropriate proposals. Contributions from credit taking and credit lending parties shall be adequately acknowledged when the report is drawn up. By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall review, and report on, the application of Article 33(1)(c) and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and the Council, together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate. With respect to the potential deletion of Article 33(1)(c) and its potential application at the Union level, the review shall in particular ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure financial stability in all Member States.
Article 503 Own funds requirements for exposures in the form of covered bonds
1. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2014, after consulting EBA, report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with any appropriate proposals, on whether the risk weights laid down in Article 129 and the own funds requirements for specific risk in Article 336(3) are adequate for all the instruments that qualify for these treatments and whether the criteria in Article 129 are appropriate. 2. The report and the proposals referred to in paragraph 1 shall take into account: (a) the extent to which the current regulatory capital requirements applicable to covered bonds adequately differentiate between variances in the credit quality of covered bonds and the collateral against which they are secured, including the extent of variations across Member States; (b) the transparency of the covered bond market and the extent to which this facilitates comprehensive internal analysis by investors in respect of the credit risk of covered bonds and the collateral against which they are secured and the asset segregation in case of the issuer's insolvency, including the mitigating effects of the underlying strict national legal framework in accordance with Article 129 of this Regulation and Article 52(4) of Directive 2009/65/EC on the overall credit quality of a covered bond and its implications on the level of transparency needed by investors; and (c) the extent to which covered bond issuance by a credit institution impacts on the credit risk to which other creditors of the issuing institution are exposed. 3. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2014, after consulting EBA, report to the European Parliament and the Council on whether loans secured by aircrafts (aircraft liens) and residential loans secured by a guarantee but not secured by a registered mortgage, should under certain conditions be considered an eligible asset in accordance with Article 129. 4. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2016, review the appropriateness of the derogation set out in Article 496 and, if relevant, the appropriateness of extending similar treatment to any other form of covered bond. In the light of that review, the Commission may, if appropriate, adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462 to make that derogation permanent, or make legislative proposals to extend it to other forms of covered bonds.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 503 Own funds requirements for exposures in the form of covered bonds):
1. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2014, after consulting EBA, report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with any appropriate proposals, on whether the risk weights laid down in Article 129 and the own funds requirements for specific risk in Article 336(3) are adequate for all the instruments that qualify for these treatments and whether the criteria in Article 129 are appropriate. 3. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2014, after consulting EBA, report to the European Parliament and the Council on whether loans secured by aircrafts (aircraft liens) and residential loans secured by a guarantee but not secured by a registered mortgage, should under certain conditions be considered an eligible asset in accordance with Article 129. 4. The Commission shall, by 31 December 2016, review the appropriateness of the derogation set out in Article 496 and, if relevant, the appropriateness of extending similar treatment to any other form of covered bond. In the light of that review, the Commission may, if appropriate, adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462 to make that derogation permanent, or make legislative proposals to extend it to other forms of covered bonds.
Article 504 Capital instruments subscribed by public authorities in emergency situations
The Commission shall, by 31 December 2016, after consulting EBA, report to the European Parliament and the Council, together with any appropriate proposals, whether the treatment set out in Article 31 needs to be amended or deleted.
Article 505 Review of long-term financing
By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with any appropriate proposals, about the appropriateness of the requirements of this Regulation in light of the need to ensure adequate levels of funding for all forms of long-term financing for the economy, including critical infrastructure projects in the Union in the field of transport, energy and communications.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 506 Credit risk — definition of default
EBA shall, by 31 December 2017, report to the Commission on how replacing 90 days by 180 days past due, as provided in point (b) of Article 178(1), impacts risk-weighted exposure amounts and the appropriateness of the continued application of that provision after 31 December 2019. On the basis of that report, the Commission may submit a legislative proposal to amend this Regulation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Article 507 Large exposures
By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall review and report on the application of Article 400(1)(j) and Article 400(2), including whether the exemptions set out in Article 400(2) is to be discretionary, and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate. With respect to the potential elimination of the national discretion under Article 400(2)(c) and its potential application at the Union level, the review shall in particular take into account the efficiency of group risk management while ensuring that sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure financial stability in all Member States in which an entity belonging to a group is incorporated.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 507 Large exposures):
1. EBA shall monitor the use of exemptions set out in point (b) of Article 390(6), points (f) to (m) of Article 400(1), point (a) and points (c) to (g), (i), (j) and (k) of Article 400(2) and by 28 June 2021 submit a report to the Commission assessing the quantitative impact that the removal of those exemptions or the setting of a limit on their use would have. That report shall assess, in particular, for each exemption provided for in those Articles: (a) the number of large exposures exempted in each Member State; (b) the number of institutions that make use of the exemption in each Member State; (c) the aggregate amount of exposures exempted in each Member State. 2. By 31 December 2023, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the application of the derogations referred to in Articles 390(4) and 401(2) concerning the methods for the calculation of exposure value of securities financing transactions, and in particular the need to take account of amendments in international standards determining the methods for such calculation.
Article 508 Level of application
1. By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall review, and report on, the application of Part One, Title II, and Article 113(6) and (7) and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and the Council, together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate. 2. By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall report on whether and how the liquidity coverage requirement laid down in Part Six should apply to investment firms and shall, after consulting EBA, submit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate. 3. By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall, after consulting EBA and ESMA and in the light of discussions with the competent authorities, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms and of firms referred to in points (2)(b) and (c) of Article 4(1). Where appropriate the report shall be followed by a legislative proposal.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 508 Level of application):
1. By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall review, and report on, the application of Part One, Title II, and Article 113(6) and (7) and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and the Council, together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate.
Article 509 Liquidity requirements
1. EBA shall monitor and evaluate the reports made in accordance with Article 415(1), across currencies and across different business models. EBA shall, after consulting the ESRB, non-financial end-users, the banking industry, competent authorities and the ESCB central banks, annually and for the first time by 31 December 2013 report to the Commission on whether a specification of the general liquidity coverage requirement in Part Six based on the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title II and Annex III, considered either individually or cumulatively, is likely to have a material detrimental impact on the business and risk profile of institutions established in the Union or on the stability and orderly functioning of financial markets or on the economy and the stability of the supply of bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes. The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall take due account of markets and international regulatory developments as well as of the interactions of the liquidity coverage requirement with other prudential requirements under this Regulation such as the risk-based capital ratios as set out in Article 92 and the leverage ratio. The European Parliament and the Council shall be given the opportunity to state their views on the report referred to in the first subparagraph. 2. EBA shall, in the report referred to in paragraph 1, assess the following, in particular: (a) the provision of mechanisms restricting the value of liquidity inflows, in particular with a view to determining an appropriate inflow cap and the conditions for its application, taking into account different business models including pass through financing, factoring, leasing, covered bonds, mortgages, issuance of covered bonds, and the extent to which that cap should be amended or removed to cater for the specificities of specialised financing; (b) the calibration of inflows and outflows referred to in Part Six, Title II, in particular under Article 422(7) and Article 425(2); (c) the provision of mechanisms restricting the coverage of liquidity requirements by certain categories of liquid assets, in particular assessing the appropriate minimum percentage for liquid assets referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1) to the total of liquid assets, testing a threshold of 60 % and taking into account international regulatory developments. Assets owed and due or callable within 30 calendar days should not count towards the limit unless the assets have been obtained against collateral that also qualifies under points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1); (d) the provision of specific lower outflow and/or higher inflow rates for intragroup flows, specifying under which conditions such specific in- or outflow rates would be justified from a prudential point of view and setting out the high level outline of a methodology using objective criteria and parameters in order to determine specific levels of inflows and outflows between the institution and the counterparty when they are not established in the same Member State; (e) the calibration of the draw-down rates applicable to the undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities that fall under Article 424(3) and (5). In particular, EBA shall test a draw-down rate of 100 %; (f) the definition of retail deposit in point (2) of Article 411, in particular the appropriateness of introducing a threshold on deposits of natural persons; (g) the need to introduce a new retail deposit category with a lower outflow in the light of the specific characteristics of such deposits that could justify a lower outflow rate and taking into account international developments; (h) derogations from requirements on the composition of the liquid assets institutions will be required to hold, where in a given currency the institutions' collective justified needs for liquid assets are exceeding the availability of those liquid assets and conditions to which such derogations should be subject; (i) the definition of Shari'ah-compliant financial products as an alternative to assets that would qualify as liquid assets for the purposes of Article 416, for the use of Shari'ah-compliant banks; (j) the definition of circumstances of stress, including principles for the use of the stock of liquid assets and the necessary supervisory reactions under which institutions would be able to use their liquid assets to meet liquidity outflows and how to address non-compliance; (k) the definition of an established operational relationship for non-financial customer as referred to in Article 422(3)(c); (l) the calibration of the outflow rate applicable to correspondent banking and prime brokerage services as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 422(4); (m) mechanisms for the grandfathering of government guaranteed bonds issued to credit institutions as part of government support measures with Union State aid approval, such as bonds issued by the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in Ireland and by the Spanish Asset Management Company in Spain, designed to remove problem assets from the balance sheets of credit institutions, as assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality until at least December 2023. 3. EBA shall, after consulting ESMA and the ECB, by 31 December 2013, report to the Commission on appropriate uniform definitions of high and of extremely high liquidity and credit quality of transferable assets for the purposes of Article 416 and appropriate haircuts for assets that would qualify as liquid assets for the purposes of Article 416, with the exception of assets referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1). The European Parliament and the Council shall be given the opportunity to state their views on that report. The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall also consider: (a) other categories of assets, in particular residential mortgage-backed securities of high liquidity and credit quality; (b) other categories of central bank eligible securities or loans, such as local government bonds and commercial paper; and (c) other non-central bank eligible but tradable assets, such as equities listed on a recognised exchange, gold, major index linked equity instruments, guaranteed bonds, covered bonds, corporate bonds and funds based on those assets. 4. The report referred to in paragraph 3 shall consider whether, and if so to what extent, standby credit facilities referred to in point (e) of Article 416(1) should be included as liquid assets in light of international development and taking into account European specificities, including the way monetary policy is performed in the Union. EBA shall in particular test the adequacy of the following criteria and the appropriate levels for such definitions: (a) minimum trade volume of the assets; (b) minimum outstanding volume of the assets; (c) transparent pricing and post-trade information; (d) credit quality steps referred to in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (e) proven record of price stability; (f) average volume traded and average trade size; (g) maximum bid/ask spread; (h) remaining time to maturity; (i) minimum turnover ratio. 5. By 31 January 2014, EBA shall also report on the following: (a) uniform definitions of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality; (b) the possible unintended consequences of the definition of liquid assets on the conduct of monetary policy operation and the extent to which: (i) a list of liquid assets that is disconnected from the list of central bank eligible assets may incentivise institutions to submit eligible assets which are not included in the definition of liquid assets in refinancing operations; (ii) regulation of liquidity may disincentivise institutions from lending or borrowing on the unsecured money market and whether this may lead to question the targeting of EONIA in monetary policy implementation; (iii) the introduction of the liquidity coverage requirement may make it more difficult for central banks to ensure price stability by using the existing monetary policy framework and instruments; (b) the possible unintended consequences of the definition of liquid assets on the conduct of monetary policy operation and the extent to which: (i) a list of liquid assets that is disconnected from the list of central bank eligible assets may incentivise institutions to submit eligible assets which are not included in the definition of liquid assets in refinancing operations; (ii) regulation of liquidity may disincentivise institutions from lending or borrowing on the unsecured money market and whether this may lead to question the targeting of EONIA in monetary policy implementation; (iii) the introduction of the liquidity coverage requirement may make it more difficult for central banks to ensure price stability by using the existing monetary policy framework and instruments; (c) the operational requirements for the holdings of liquid assets, as referred in points (b) to (f) of Article 417, in line with international regulatory developments.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 509 Liquidity requirements):
1. EBA shall monitor and evaluate the reports made in accordance with Article 415(1), across currencies and across different business models. EBA shall, after consulting the ESRB, non-financial end-users, the banking industry, competent authorities and the ESCB central banks, annually and for the first time by 31 December 2013 report to the Commission on whether a specification of the general liquidity coverage requirement in Part Six based on the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title II and Annex III, considered either individually or cumulatively, is likely to have a material detrimental impact on the business and risk profile of institutions established in the Union or on the stability and orderly functioning of financial markets or on the economy and the stability of the supply of bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes. The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall take due account of markets and international regulatory developments as well as of the interactions of the liquidity coverage requirement with other prudential requirements under this Regulation such as the risk-based capital ratios as set out in Article 92 and the leverage ratio. The European Parliament and the Council shall be given the opportunity to state their views on the report referred to in the first subparagraph. 2. EBA shall, in the report referred to in paragraph 1, assess the following, in particular: (a) the provision of mechanisms restricting the value of liquidity inflows, in particular with a view to determining an appropriate inflow cap and the conditions for its application, taking into account different business models including pass through financing, factoring, leasing, covered bonds, mortgages, issuance of covered bonds, and the extent to which that cap should be amended or removed to cater for the specificities of specialised financing; (b) the calibration of inflows and outflows referred to in Part Six, Title II, in particular under Article 422(7) and Article 425(2); (c) the provision of mechanisms restricting the coverage of liquidity requirements by certain categories of liquid assets, in particular assessing the appropriate minimum percentage for liquid assets referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1) to the total of liquid assets, testing a threshold of 60 % and taking into account international regulatory developments. Assets owed and due or callable within 30 calendar days should not count towards the limit unless the assets have been obtained against collateral that also qualifies under points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1); (d) the provision of specific lower outflow and/or higher inflow rates for intragroup flows, specifying under which conditions such specific in- or outflow rates would be justified from a prudential point of view and setting out the high level outline of a methodology using objective criteria and parameters in order to determine specific levels of inflows and outflows between the institution and the counterparty when they are not established in the same Member State; (e) the calibration of the draw-down rates applicable to the undrawn committed credit and liquidity facilities that fall under Article 424(3) and (5). In particular, EBA shall test a draw-down rate of 100 %; (f) the definition of retail deposit in point (2) of Article 411, in particular the appropriateness of introducing a threshold on deposits of natural persons; (g) the need to introduce a new retail deposit category with a lower outflow in the light of the specific characteristics of such deposits that could justify a lower outflow rate and taking into account international developments; (h) derogations from requirements on the composition of the liquid assets institutions will be required to hold, where in a given currency the institutions' collective justified needs for liquid assets are exceeding the availability of those liquid assets and conditions to which such derogations should be subject; (i) the definition of Shari'ah-compliant financial products as an alternative to assets that would qualify as liquid assets for the purposes of Article 416, for the use of Shari'ah-compliant banks; (j) the definition of circumstances of stress, including principles for the use of the stock of liquid assets and the necessary supervisory reactions under which institutions would be able to use their liquid assets to meet liquidity outflows and how to address non-compliance; (k) the definition of an established operational relationship for non-financial customer as referred to in Article 422(3)(c); (l) the calibration of the outflow rate applicable to correspondent banking and prime brokerage services as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 422(4); (m) mechanisms for the grandfathering of government guaranteed bonds issued to credit institutions as part of government support measures with Union State aid approval, such as bonds issued by the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in Ireland and by the Spanish Asset Management Company in Spain, designed to remove problem assets from the balance sheets of credit institutions, as assets of extremely high liquidity and credit quality until at least December 2023. 3. EBA shall, after consulting ESMA and the ECB, by 31 December 2013, report to the Commission on appropriate uniform definitions of high and of extremely high liquidity and credit quality of transferable assets for the purposes of Article 416 and appropriate haircuts for assets that would qualify as liquid assets for the purposes of Article 416, with the exception of assets referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 416(1). The European Parliament and the Council shall be given the opportunity to state their views on that report. The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall also consider: (a) other categories of assets, in particular residential mortgage-backed securities of high liquidity and credit quality; (b) other categories of central bank eligible securities or loans, such as local government bonds and commercial paper; and (c) other non-central bank eligible but tradable assets, such as equities listed on a recognised exchange, gold, major index linked equity instruments, guaranteed bonds, covered bonds, corporate bonds and funds based on those assets. 4. The report referred to in paragraph 3 shall consider whether, and if so to what extent, standby credit facilities referred to in point (e) of Article 416(1) should be included as liquid assets in light of international development and taking into account European specificities, including the way monetary policy is performed in the Union. EBA shall in particular test the adequacy of the following criteria and the appropriate levels for such definitions: (a) minimum trade volume of the assets; (b) minimum outstanding volume of the assets; (c) transparent pricing and post-trade information; (d) credit quality steps referred to in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (e) proven record of price stability; (f) average volume traded and average trade size; (g) maximum bid/ask spread; (h) remaining time to maturity; (i) minimum turnover ratio. 5. By 31 January 2014, EBA shall also report on the following: (a) uniform definitions of high and extremely high liquidity and credit quality; (b) the possible unintended consequences of the definition of liquid assets on the conduct of monetary policy operation and the extent to which: (i) a list of liquid assets that is disconnected from the list of central bank eligible assets may incentivise institutions to submit eligible assets which are not included in the definition of liquid assets in refinancing operations; (ii) regulation of liquidity may disincentivise institutions from lending or borrowing on the unsecured money market and whether this may lead to question the targeting of EONIA in monetary policy implementation; (iii) the introduction of the liquidity coverage requirement may make it more difficult for central banks to ensure price stability by using the existing monetary policy framework and instruments; (c) the operational requirements for the holdings of liquid assets, as referred in points (b) to (f) of Article 417, in line with international regulatory developments.
Article 510 Net Stable Funding Requirements
1. By 31 December 2015, EBA shall report to the Commission, on the basis of the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title III, on whether and how it would be appropriate to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding, including an assessment of the impact on the business and risk profile of institutions established in the Union or on financial markets or the economy and bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes and pass through financing models, including match funded mortgage lending. In particular EBA shall analyse the impact of stable sources of funding on the refinancing structures of different banking models in the Union. 2. By 31 December 2015, EBA shall also report to the Commission, on the basis of the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title III and, in accordance with the uniform reporting formats referred to in point (a) of Article 415(3) and after consulting the ESRB, on methodologies for determining the amount of stable funding available to and required by institutions and on appropriate uniform definitions for calculating such a net stable funding requirement, examining in particular the following: (a) the categories and weightings applied to sources of stable funding in Article 427(1); (b) the categories and weightings applied to determine the requirement for stable funding in Article 428(1); (c) methodologies shall provide incentives and disincentives as appropriate to encourage a more stable longer term funding of assets, business activities, investment and funding of institutions; (d) the need to develop different methodologies for different types of institutions. 3. By 31 December 2016, the Commission shall, if appropriate, taking into account the reports referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, and taking full account of the diversity of the banking sector in the Union, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council on how to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 510 Net Stable Funding Requirements):
1. By 31 December 2015, EBA shall report to the Commission, on the basis of the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title III, on whether and how it would be appropriate to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding, including an assessment of the impact on the business and risk profile of institutions established in the Union or on financial markets or the economy and bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes and pass through financing models, including match funded mortgage lending. In particular EBA shall analyse the impact of stable sources of funding on the refinancing structures of different banking models in the Union. 2. By 31 December 2015, EBA shall also report to the Commission, on the basis of the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title III and, in accordance with the uniform reporting formats referred to in point (a) of Article 415(3) and after consulting the ESRB, on methodologies for determining the amount of stable funding available to and required by institutions and on appropriate uniform definitions for calculating such a net stable funding requirement, examining in particular the following: (a) the categories and weightings applied to sources of stable funding in Article 427(1); (b) the categories and weightings applied to determine the requirement for stable funding in Article 428(1); (c) methodologies shall provide incentives and disincentives as appropriate to encourage a more stable longer term funding of assets, business activities, investment and funding of institutions; (d) the need to develop different methodologies for different types of institutions. 3. By 31 December 2016, the Commission shall, if appropriate, taking into account the reports referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, and taking full account of the diversity of the banking sector in the Union, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council on how to ensure that institutions use stable sources of funding. 4. EBA shall monitor the amount of required stable funding covering the funding risk linked to the derivative contracts listed in Annex II and credit derivatives over the one-year horizon of the net stable funding ratio, in particular the future funding risk for those derivative contracts set out in Articles 428s(2) and 428at(2), and report to the Commission on the opportunity to adopt a higher required stable funding factor or a more risk-sensitive measure by 28 June 2024. That report shall at least assess: (a) the opportunity to distinguish between margined and unmargined derivative contracts; (b) the opportunity to remove, increase or replace the requirement set out in Articles 428s(2) and 428at(2); (c) the opportunity to change more broadly the treatment of derivative contracts in the calculation of the net stable funding ratio, as set out in Article 428d, Articles 428k(4) and 428s(2), points (a) and (b) of Article 428ag, Articles 428ah(2), 428al(4) and 428at(2), points (a) and (b) of Article 428ay and Article 428az(2), to better capture the funding risk linked to those contracts over the one-year horizon of the net stable funding ratio; (d) the impact of the proposed changes on the amount of stable funding required for institutions' derivative contracts. 5. If international standards affect the treatment of derivative contracts listed in Annex II and credit derivatives for the calculation of the net stable funding ratio, the Commission shall, if appropriate and taking into account the report referred to in paragraph 4, those changes of international standards and the diversity of the banking sector in the Union, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council on how to amend the provisions regarding the treatment of derivative contracts listed in Annex II and credit derivatives for the calculation of the net stable funding ratio as set out in Title IV of Part Six to take better account of the funding risk linked to those transactions. 6. EBA shall monitor the amount of stable funding required to cover the funding risk linked to securities financing transactions, including to the assets received or given in those transactions, and to unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months with financial customers and report to the Commission on the appropriateness of that treatment by 28 June 2023. That report shall at least assess: (a) the opportunity to apply higher or lower stable funding factors to securities financing transactions with financial customers and to unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months with financial customers to take better account of their funding risk over the one-year horizon of the net stable funding ratio and of the possible contagion effects between financial customers; (b) the opportunity to apply the treatment set out in point (g) of Article 428r(1) to securities financing transactions collateralised by other types of assets; (c) the opportunity to apply stable funding factors to off-balance-sheet items used in securities financing transactions as an alternative to the treatment set out in Article 428p(5); (d) the adequacy of the asymmetric treatment between liabilities with a residual maturity of less than six months provided by financial customers that are subject to a 0 % available stable funding factor in accordance with point (c) of Article 428k(3) and assets resulting from transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months with financial customers that are subject to a 0 %, 5 % or 10 % required stable funding factor in accordance with point (g) of Article 428r(1), point (c) of Article 428s(1) and point (b) of Article 428v; (e) the impact of the introduction of higher or lower required stable funding factors for securities financing transactions, in particular with a residual maturity of less than six months with financial customers, on the market liquidity of assets received as collateral in those transactions, in particular of sovereign and corporate bonds; (f) the impact of the proposed changes on the amount of stable funding required for those institutions' transactions, in particular for securities financing transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months with financial customers where sovereign bonds are received as collateral in those transactions. 7. By 28 June 2024, the Commission shall, where appropriate and taking into account the report referred to in paragraph 6, any international standards and the diversity of the banking sector in the Union, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council on how to amend the provisions regarding the treatment of securities financing transactions, including of the assets received or given in those transactions, and the treatment of unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months with financial customers for the calculation of the net stable funding ratio as set out in Title IV of Part Six where it considers it appropriate regarding the impact of the existing treatment on institutions' net stable funding ratio and to take better account of the funding risk linked to those transactions. 8. By 28 June 2025, the required stable funding factors applied to the transactions referred to in point (g) of Article 428r(1), point (c) of Article 428s(1) and in point (b) of Article 428v, shall be raised from 0 % to 10 %, from 5 % to 15 % and from 10 % to 15 % respectively, unless otherwise specified in a legislative act adopted on the basis of a proposal by the Commission, in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article. 9. EBA shall monitor the amount of stable funding required to cover the funding risk linked to institutions' holdings of securities to hedge derivative contracts. EBA shall report on the appropriateness of the treatment by 28 June 2023. That report shall at least assess: (a) the possible impact of the treatment on investors' ability to gain exposure to assets and the impact of the treatment on credit supply in the capital markets union; (b) the opportunity to apply adjusted stable funding requirements to securities that are held to hedge derivatives which are funded by initial margin, either wholly or in part; (c) the opportunity to apply adjusted stable funding requirements to securities that are held to hedge derivatives which are not funded by initial margin. 10. By 28 June 2023 or a year after an agreement on international standards that is developed by the BCBS, whichever is the earliest, the Commission shall, where appropriate and taking into account the report referred to in paragraph 9, any international standards developed by the BCBS, the diversity of the banking sector in the Union and the aims of the capital markets union, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council on how to amend the provisions regarding the treatment of institutions' holdings of securities to hedge derivative contracts for the calculation of the net stable funding ratio as set out in Title IV of Part Six where it considers it appropriate regarding the impact of the existing treatment on institutions' net stable funding ratio and to take better account of the funding risk linked to those transactions. 11. EBA shall assess whether it would be justified to reduce the required stable funding factor for assets used for providing clearing and settlement services of precious metals such as gold, silver, platinum and palladium or assets used for providing financing transactions of precious metals such as gold, silver, platinum and palladium of a term of 180 days or less. EBA shall submit its report to the Commission by 28 June 2021.
Article 511 Leverage
1. Based on the results of the report referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall submit by 31 December 2016 a report on the impact and effectiveness of the leverage ratio to the European Parliament and the Council. 2. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal on the introduction of an appropriate number of levels of the leverage ratio that institutions following different business models would be required to meet, suggesting an adequate calibration for those levels and any appropriate adjustments to the capital measure and the total exposure measure as referred to in Article 429, together with any connected flexibility measures if necessary, including appropriate amendments to Article 458 to introduce the leverage ratio within the scope of measures included in that Article. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, EBA shall report to the Commission by 31 October 2016 on at least the following: (a) whether the leverage ratio framework provided by this Regulation and by Articles 87 and 98 of Directive 2013/36/EU is the appropriate tool to eliminate the risk of excessive leverage on the part of the institutions in a satisfactory manner and degree; (b) on identifying business models that reflect the overall risk profiles of the institutions and on introducing differentiated levels of the leverage ratio for those business models; (c) whether the requirements laid out in Articles 76 and 87 of Directive 2013/36/EU in accordance with Articles 73 and 97 of Directive 2013/36/EU for addressing the risk of excessive leverage are sufficient to ensure sound management of this risk by institutions and, if not, which further enhancements are needed in order to ensure these objectives; (d) whether and, if so, which, changes to the calculation methodology referred to in Article 429 would be necessary to ensure that the leverage ratio can be used as an appropriate indicator of an institution's risk of excessive leverage; (e) whether, in the context of the calculation of the total exposure measure of the leverage ratio, the exposure value of contracts listed in Annex II determined by using the Original Exposure Method differs in a material way from the exposure value determined by using the Mark-to-Market Method; (f) whether using either own funds or Common Equity Tier 1 capital as the capital measure of the leverage ratio could be more appropriate for the intended purpose of tracking the risk of excessive leverage and, if so, what would be the appropriate calibration of the leverage ratio; (g) whether the conversion factor referred to in point (a) of Article 429(10) for undrawn credit facilities, which may be cancelled unconditionally at any time without notice, is appropriately conservative based on the evidence collected during the observation period; (h) whether the frequency and format of the disclosure of items referred to in Article 451 are adequate; (i) the appropriate level of the leverage ratio for each of the business models identified in accordance with point (b); (j) whether a range for each level of the leverage ratio should be established; (k) whether introducing the leverage ratio as a requirement for institutions would necessitate any, and, if so, which, changes to the leverage ratio framework provided by this Regulation; (l) whether introducing the leverage ratio as a requirement for institutions would effectively constrain the risk of excessive leverage on the part of those institutions, and, if so, whether the level for the leverage ratio should be the same for all institutions or should be determined in accordance with the risk profile and business model as well as the size of institutions and, with regard to this, which additional calibrations or transitional period would be required. 4. The report referred to in paragraph 3 shall cover at least the period from 1 January 2014 until 30 June 2016 and shall take account of at least the following: (a) the impact of introducing the leverage ratio, determined in accordance with Article 429, as a requirement that institutions would have to meet on: (i) financial markets in general and markets for repurchase transactions, derivatives and covered bonds in particular; (ii) the robustness of institutions; (iii) the business models and the balance-sheet structures of institutions; in particular as regards low-risk areas of business, such as promotional credit by public development banks, municipal loans, financing of residential property and other low-risk areas regulated under national law; (iv) the migration of exposures to entities which are not subject to prudential supervision; (v) financial innovation, in particular the development of instruments with embedded leverage; (vi) institutions' risk-taking behaviour; (vii) clearing, settlement and custody activities and the operation of a central counterparty; (viii) cyclicality of the capital measure and the total exposure measure of the leverage ratio; (ix) bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs, local authorities, regional governments and public sector entities and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes; (a) the impact of introducing the leverage ratio, determined in accordance with Article 429, as a requirement that institutions would have to meet on: (i) financial markets in general and markets for repurchase transactions, derivatives and covered bonds in particular; (ii) the robustness of institutions; (iii) the business models and the balance-sheet structures of institutions; in particular as regards low-risk areas of business, such as promotional credit by public development banks, municipal loans, financing of residential property and other low-risk areas regulated under national law; (iv) the migration of exposures to entities which are not subject to prudential supervision; (v) financial innovation, in particular the development of instruments with embedded leverage; (vi) institutions' risk-taking behaviour; (vii) clearing, settlement and custody activities and the operation of a central counterparty; (viii) cyclicality of the capital measure and the total exposure measure of the leverage ratio; (ix) bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs, local authorities, regional governments and public sector entities and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes; (b) the interaction of the leverage ratio with the risk-based own funds requirements and the liquidity requirements as specified in this Regulation; (c) the impact of accounting differences between accounting standards applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, accounting standards applicable under Directive 86/635/EEC and other applicable accounting framework and other relevant accounting frameworks on the comparability of the leverage ratio.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 511 Leverage):
1. Based on the results of the report referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission shall submit by 31 December 2016 a report on the impact and effectiveness of the leverage ratio to the European Parliament and the Council. 2. Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal on the introduction of an appropriate number of levels of the leverage ratio that institutions following different business models would be required to meet, suggesting an adequate calibration for those levels and any appropriate adjustments to the capital measure and the total exposure measure as referred to in Article 429, together with any connected flexibility measures if necessary, including appropriate amendments to Article 458 to introduce the leverage ratio within the scope of measures included in that Article. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, EBA shall report to the Commission by 31 October 2016 on at least the following: (a) whether the leverage ratio framework provided by this Regulation and by Articles 87 and 98 of Directive 2013/36/EU is the appropriate tool to eliminate the risk of excessive leverage on the part of the institutions in a satisfactory manner and degree; (b) on identifying business models that reflect the overall risk profiles of the institutions and on introducing differentiated levels of the leverage ratio for those business models; (c) whether the requirements laid out in Articles 76 and 87 of Directive 2013/36/EU in accordance with Articles 73 and 97 of Directive 2013/36/EU for addressing the risk of excessive leverage are sufficient to ensure sound management of this risk by institutions and, if not, which further enhancements are needed in order to ensure these objectives; (d) whether and, if so, which, changes to the calculation methodology referred to in Article 429 would be necessary to ensure that the leverage ratio can be used as an appropriate indicator of an institution's risk of excessive leverage; (e) whether, in the context of the calculation of the total exposure measure of the leverage ratio, the exposure value of contracts listed in Annex II determined by using the Original Exposure Method differs in a material way from the exposure value determined by using the Mark-to-Market Method; (f) whether using either own funds or Common Equity Tier 1 capital as the capital measure of the leverage ratio could be more appropriate for the intended purpose of tracking the risk of excessive leverage and, if so, what would be the appropriate calibration of the leverage ratio; (g) whether the conversion factor referred to in point (a) of Article 429(10) for undrawn credit facilities, which may be cancelled unconditionally at any time without notice, is appropriately conservative based on the evidence collected during the observation period; (h) whether the frequency and format of the disclosure of items referred to in Article 451 are adequate; (i) the appropriate level of the leverage ratio for each of the business models identified in accordance with point (b); (j) whether a range for each level of the leverage ratio should be established; (k) whether introducing the leverage ratio as a requirement for institutions would necessitate any, and, if so, which, changes to the leverage ratio framework provided by this Regulation; (l) whether introducing the leverage ratio as a requirement for institutions would effectively constrain the risk of excessive leverage on the part of those institutions, and, if so, whether the level for the leverage ratio should be the same for all institutions or should be determined in accordance with the risk profile and business model as well as the size of institutions and, with regard to this, which additional calibrations or transitional period would be required. 4. The report referred to in paragraph 3 shall cover at least the period from 1 January 2014 until 30 June 2016 and shall take account of at least the following: (a) the impact of introducing the leverage ratio, determined in accordance with Article 429, as a requirement that institutions would have to meet on: (i) financial markets in general and markets for repurchase transactions, derivatives and covered bonds in particular; (ii) the robustness of institutions; (iii) the business models and the balance-sheet structures of institutions; in particular as regards low-risk areas of business, such as promotional credit by public development banks, municipal loans, financing of residential property and other low-risk areas regulated under national law; (iv) the migration of exposures to entities which are not subject to prudential supervision; (v) financial innovation, in particular the development of instruments with embedded leverage; (vi) institutions' risk-taking behaviour; (vii) clearing, settlement and custody activities and the operation of a central counterparty; (viii) cyclicality of the capital measure and the total exposure measure of the leverage ratio; (ix) bank lending, with a particular focus on lending to SMEs, local authorities, regional governments and public sector entities and on trade financing, including lending under official export credit insurance schemes; (b) the interaction of the leverage ratio with the risk-based own funds requirements and the liquidity requirements as specified in this Regulation; (c) the impact of accounting differences between accounting standards applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, accounting standards applicable under Directive 86/635/EEC and other applicable accounting framework and other relevant accounting frameworks on the comparability of the leverage ratio.
Article 512 Exposures to transferred credit risk
By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application and effectiveness of the provisions of Part Five in the light of international market developments.
Article 513 Macroprudential rules
1. By 30 June 2014, the Commission shall, after consulting the ESRB and EBA, review whether the macroprudential rules contained in this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU are sufficient to mitigate systemic risks in sectors, regions and Member States including assessing: (a) whether the current macroprudential tools in this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU are effective, efficient and transparent; (b) whether the coverage and the possible degrees of overlap between different macroprudential tools for targeting similar risks in this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU are adequate and, if appropriate, propose new macroprudential rules; (c) how internationally agreed standards for systemic institutions interacts with the provisions in this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU and, if appropriate, propose new rules taking into account those internationally agreed standards. 2. By 31 December 2014, the Commission shall, on the basis of the consultation of the ESRB and EBA, report to the European Parliament and the Council on the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 513 Macroprudential rules):
1. By 30 June 2022, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall, after consulting the ESRB and EBA, review whether the macroprudential rules contained in this Regulation and in Directive 2013/36/EU are sufficient to mitigate systemic risks in sectors, regions and Member States including assessing: (a) whether the current macroprudential tools in this Regulation and in Directive 2013/36/EU are effective, efficient and transparent; (b) whether the coverage and the possible degrees of overlap between different macroprudential tools for targeting similar risks in this Regulation and in Directive 2013/36/EU are adequate and, if appropriate, propose new macroprudential rules; (c) how internationally agreed standards for systemic institutions interact with the provisions in this Regulation and in Directive 2013/36/EU and, if appropriate, propose new rules taking into account those internationally agreed standards; (d) whether other types of instruments, such as borrower-based instruments, should be added to the macroprudential tools provided for in this Regulation and in Directive 2013/36/EU to complement capital-based instruments and to allow for the harmonised use of the instruments in the internal market; taking into account whether harmonised definitions of those instruments and the reporting of respective data at Union level are a prerequisite for the introduction of such instruments; (e) whether the leverage ratio buffer requirement as referred to in Article 92(1a) should be extended to systemically important institutions other than G-SIIs, whether its calibration should be different from the calibration for G-SIIs, and whether its calibration should depend on the level of systemic importance of the institution; (f) whether the current voluntary reciprocity of macroprudnetial measures should be turned into mandatory reciprocity and whether the current ESRB framework for voluntary reciprocity is an appropriate basis for that; (g) how relevant Union and national macroprudential authorities can be mandated with tools to address new emerging systemic risks arising from credit institutions exposures to the non-banking sector, in particular from derivatives and securities financing transactions markets, the asset management sector and the insurance sector. 2. By 31 December 2022, and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall, on the basis of the consultation with the ESRB and EBA, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council.