Article 258 Reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts
Where a securitisation position is assigned a 1 250 % risk weight, institutions may in accordance with Article 36(1)(k), as an alternative to including the position in their calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, deduct from Common Equity Tier 1 capital the exposure value of the position. For these purposes, the calculation of the exposure value may reflect eligible funded credit protection in a manner consistent with Article 257. Where an originator institution makes use of this alternative, it may subtract 12,5 times the amount deducted in accordance with Article 36(1)(k) from the amount specified in Article 252 as the risk-weighted exposure amount which would currently be calculated for the securitised exposures had they not been securitised. Sub-Section 4 Calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under the IRB approach
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 259 Hierarchy of methods
1. Institutions shall use the methods in accordance with the following hierarchy: (a) for a rated position or a position in respect of which an inferred rating may be used, the Ratings Based Method set out in Article 261 shall be used to calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount; (b) for an unrated position the institution may use the Supervisory Formula Method set out in Article 262 where it can produce estimates of PD, and where applicable exposure value and LGD as inputs into the Supervisory Formula Method in accordance with the requirements for the estimation of those parameters under the Internal Ratings Based approach in accordance with Section 3. An institution other than the originator institution may only use the Supervisory Formula Method subject to the prior permission of the competent authorities, which shall only be granted where the institution fulfils the condition provided in the first sentence of this point; (c) as an alternative to point (b) and only for unrated positions in ABCP programmes, the institution may use the Internal Assessment Approach as set out in paragraph 4 if the competent authorities have permitted it to do so; (d) in all other cases, a risk weight of 1 250 % shall be assigned to securitisation positions which are unrated; (e) notwithstanding point (d), and subject to the prior permission by the competent authorities, an institution may calculate the risk weight for an unrated position in an ABCP programme in accordance with Article 253 or 254, if the unrated position is not in commercial paper and falls within the scope of application of an Internal Assessment Approach for which permission is being sought. The aggregated exposure values treated by this exception shall not be material and in any case less than 10 % of the aggregate exposure values treated by the institution under the Internal Assessment Approach. The institution shall stop making use of this when the permission for the relevant Internal Assessment Approach has been refused. 2. For the purposes of using inferred ratings, an institution shall attribute to an unrated position an inferred credit assessment equivalent to the credit assessment of a rated reference position which is the most senior position which is in all respects subordinate to the unrated securitisation position in question and meets all of the following conditions: (a) the reference positions shall be subordinate in all respects to the unrated securitisation position; (b) the maturity of the reference positions shall be equal to or longer than that of the unrated position in question; (c) on an ongoing basis, any inferred rating shall be updated to reflect any changes in the credit assessment of the reference positions. 3. The competent authorities shall grant institutions permission to use the ‘Internal Assessment Approach’ as set out in paragraph 4 where all of the following conditions are met: (a) positions in the commercial paper issued from the ABCP programme shall be rated positions; (b) the internal assessment of the credit quality of the position shall reflect the publicly available assessment methodology of one or more ECAIs, for the rating of securities backed by the exposures of the type securitised; (c) the ECAIs, the methodology of which shall be reflected as required by point (b), shall include those ECAIs which have provided an external rating for the commercial paper issued from the ABCP programme. Quantitative elements, such as stress factors, used in assessing the position to a particular credit quality shall be at least as conservative as those used in the relevant assessment methodology of the ECAIs in question; (d) in developing its internal assessment methodology the institution shall take into consideration relevant published ratings methodologies of the ECAIs that rate the commercial paper of the ABCP programme. This consideration shall be documented by the institution and updated regularly, as outlined in point (g); (e) the institution's internal assessment methodology shall include rating grades. There shall be a correspondence between such rating grades and the credit assessments of ECAIs. This correspondence shall be explicitly documented; (f) the internal assessment methodology shall be used in the institution's internal risk management processes, including its decision making, management information and internal capital allocation processes; (g) internal or external auditors, an ECAI, or the institution's internal credit review or risk management function shall perform regular reviews of the internal assessment process and the quality of the internal assessments of the credit quality of the institution's exposures to an ABCP programme. If the institution's internal audit, credit review, or risk management functions perform the review, then these functions shall be independent of the ABCP programme business line, as well as the customer relationship; (h) the institution shall track the performance of its internal ratings over time to evaluate the performance of its internal assessment methodology and shall make adjustments, as necessary, to that methodology when the performance of the exposures routinely diverges from that indicated by the internal ratings; (i) the ABCP programme shall incorporate underwriting standards in the form of credit and investment guidelines. In deciding on an asset purchase, the ABCP programme administrator shall consider the type of asset being purchased, the type and monetary value of the exposures arising from the provision of liquidity facilities and credit enhancements, the loss distribution, and the legal and economic isolation of the transferred assets from the entity selling the assets. A credit analysis of the asset seller's risk profile shall be performed and shall include analysis of past and expected future financial performance, current market position, expected future competitiveness, leverage, cash flow, interest coverage and debt rating. In addition, a review of the seller's underwriting standards, servicing capabilities, and collection processes shall be performed; (j) the ABCP programme's underwriting standards shall establish minimum asset eligibility criteria that, in particular: (i) exclude the purchase of assets that are significantly past due or defaulted; (ii) limit excess concentration to individual obligor or geographic area; (iii) limits the tenor of the assets to be purchased; (j) the ABCP programme's underwriting standards shall establish minimum asset eligibility criteria that, in particular: (i) exclude the purchase of assets that are significantly past due or defaulted; (ii) limit excess concentration to individual obligor or geographic area; (iii) limits the tenor of the assets to be purchased; (k) the ABCP programme shall have collections policies and processes that take into account the operational capability and credit quality of the servicer. The ABCP programme shall mitigate risk relating to the performance of the seller and the servicer through various methods, such as triggers based on current credit quality that would preclude commingling of funds; (l) the aggregated estimate of loss on an asset pool that the ABCP programme is considering purchasing shall take into account all sources of potential risk, such as credit and dilution risk. If the seller-provided credit enhancement is sized based only on credit-related losses, then a separate reserve shall be established for dilution risk, if dilution risk is material for the particular exposure pool. In addition, in sizing the required enhancement level, the program shall review several years of historical information, including losses, delinquencies, dilutions, and the turnover rate of the receivables; (m) the ABCP programme shall incorporate structural features, such as wind-down triggers, into the purchase of exposures in order to mitigate potential credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. 4. Under the Internal Assessment Approach, the unrated position shall be assigned by the institution to one of the rating grades laid down in point (e) of paragraph 3. The position shall be attributed a derived rating the same as the credit assessments corresponding to that rating grade as laid down in point (e) of paragraph 3. Where this derived rating is, at the inception of the securitisation, at the level of investment grade or better, it shall be considered the same as an eligible credit assessment by an ECAI for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts. 5. Institutions which have obtained permission to use the Internal Assessment Approach shall not revert to the use of other methods unless all of the following conditions are met: (a) the institution has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the institution has good cause to do so; (b) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 259 Hierarchy of methods):
1. Institutions shall use the methods in accordance with the following hierarchy: (a) for a rated position or a position in respect of which an inferred rating may be used, the Ratings Based Method set out in Article 261 shall be used to calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount; (b) for an unrated position the institution may use the Supervisory Formula Method set out in Article 262 where it can produce estimates of PD, and where applicable exposure value and LGD as inputs into the Supervisory Formula Method in accordance with the requirements for the estimation of those parameters under the Internal Ratings Based approach in accordance with Section 3. An institution other than the originator institution may only use the Supervisory Formula Method subject to the prior permission of the competent authorities, which shall only be granted where the institution fulfils the condition provided in the first sentence of this point; (c) as an alternative to point (b) and only for unrated positions in ABCP programmes, the institution may use the Internal Assessment Approach as set out in paragraph 4 if the competent authorities have permitted it to do so; (d) in all other cases, a risk weight of 1 250 % shall be assigned to securitisation positions which are unrated; (e) notwithstanding point (d), and subject to the prior permission by the competent authorities, an institution may calculate the risk weight for an unrated position in an ABCP programme in accordance with Article 253 or 254, if the unrated position is not in commercial paper and falls within the scope of application of an Internal Assessment Approach for which permission is being sought. The aggregated exposure values treated by this exception shall not be material and in any case less than 10 % of the aggregate exposure values treated by the institution under the Internal Assessment Approach. The institution shall stop making use of this when the permission for the relevant Internal Assessment Approach has been refused. 2. For the purposes of using inferred ratings, an institution shall attribute to an unrated position an inferred credit assessment equivalent to the credit assessment of a rated reference position which is the most senior position which is in all respects subordinate to the unrated securitisation position in question and meets all of the following conditions: (a) the reference positions shall be subordinate in all respects to the unrated securitisation position; (b) the maturity of the reference positions shall be equal to or longer than that of the unrated position in question; (c) on an ongoing basis, any inferred rating shall be updated to reflect any changes in the credit assessment of the reference positions. 3. The competent authorities shall grant institutions permission to use the ‘Internal Assessment Approach’ as set out in paragraph 4 where all of the following conditions are met: (a) positions in the commercial paper issued from the ABCP programme shall be rated positions; (b) the internal assessment of the credit quality of the position shall reflect the publicly available assessment methodology of one or more ECAIs, for the rating of securities backed by the exposures of the type securitised; (c) the ECAIs, the methodology of which shall be reflected as required by point (b), shall include those ECAIs which have provided an external rating for the commercial paper issued from the ABCP programme. Quantitative elements, such as stress factors, used in assessing the position to a particular credit quality shall be at least as conservative as those used in the relevant assessment methodology of the ECAIs in question; (d) in developing its internal assessment methodology the institution shall take into consideration relevant published ratings methodologies of the ECAIs that rate the commercial paper of the ABCP programme. This consideration shall be documented by the institution and updated regularly, as outlined in point (g); (e) the institution's internal assessment methodology shall include rating grades. There shall be a correspondence between such rating grades and the credit assessments of ECAIs. This correspondence shall be explicitly documented; (f) the internal assessment methodology shall be used in the institution's internal risk management processes, including its decision making, management information and internal capital allocation processes; (g) internal or external auditors, an ECAI, or the institution's internal credit review or risk management function shall perform regular reviews of the internal assessment process and the quality of the internal assessments of the credit quality of the institution's exposures to an ABCP programme. If the institution's internal audit, credit review, or risk management functions perform the review, then these functions shall be independent of the ABCP programme business line, as well as the customer relationship; (h) the institution shall track the performance of its internal ratings over time to evaluate the performance of its internal assessment methodology and shall make adjustments, as necessary, to that methodology when the performance of the exposures routinely diverges from that indicated by the internal ratings; (i) the ABCP programme shall incorporate underwriting standards in the form of credit and investment guidelines. In deciding on an asset purchase, the ABCP programme administrator shall consider the type of asset being purchased, the type and monetary value of the exposures arising from the provision of liquidity facilities and credit enhancements, the loss distribution, and the legal and economic isolation of the transferred assets from the entity selling the assets. A credit analysis of the asset seller's risk profile shall be performed and shall include analysis of past and expected future financial performance, current market position, expected future competitiveness, leverage, cash flow, interest coverage and debt rating. In addition, a review of the seller's underwriting standards, servicing capabilities, and collection processes shall be performed; (j) the ABCP programme's underwriting standards shall establish minimum asset eligibility criteria that, in particular: (i) exclude the purchase of assets that are significantly past due or defaulted; (ii) limit excess concentration to individual obligor or geographic area; (iii) limits the tenor of the assets to be purchased; (k) the ABCP programme shall have collections policies and processes that take into account the operational capability and credit quality of the servicer. The ABCP programme shall mitigate risk relating to the performance of the seller and the servicer through various methods, such as triggers based on current credit quality that would preclude commingling of funds; (l) the aggregated estimate of loss on an asset pool that the ABCP programme is considering purchasing shall take into account all sources of potential risk, such as credit and dilution risk. If the seller-provided credit enhancement is sized based only on credit-related losses, then a separate reserve shall be established for dilution risk, if dilution risk is material for the particular exposure pool. In addition, in sizing the required enhancement level, the program shall review several years of historical information, including losses, delinquencies, dilutions, and the turnover rate of the receivables; (m) the ABCP programme shall incorporate structural features, such as wind-down triggers, into the purchase of exposures in order to mitigate potential credit deterioration of the underlying portfolio. 4. Under the Internal Assessment Approach, the unrated position shall be assigned by the institution to one of the rating grades laid down in point (e) of paragraph 3. The position shall be attributed a derived rating the same as the credit assessments corresponding to that rating grade as laid down in point (e) of paragraph 3. Where this derived rating is, at the inception of the securitisation, at the level of investment grade or better, it shall be considered the same as an eligible credit assessment by an ECAI for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts. 5. Institutions which have obtained permission to use the Internal Assessment Approach shall not revert to the use of other methods unless all of the following conditions are met: (a) the institution has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the institution has good cause to do so; (b) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority.
Article 260 Maximum risk-weighted exposure amounts
An originator institution, a sponsor institution, or other institutions which can calculate K IRB may limit the risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated in respect of its positions in a securitisation to that which would produce a own funds requirement under Article 92(3) equal to the sum of 8 % of the risk-weighted exposure amounts which would be produced if the securitised assets had not been securitised and were on the balance sheet of the institution plus the expected loss amounts of those exposures.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 261 Ratings Based Method
1. Under the Ratings Based Method, the institution shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount of a rated securitisation or re-securitisation position by applying the relevant risk weight to the exposure value and multiplying the result by 1,06. The relevant risk weight shall be the risk weight as laid down in Table 4, with which the credit assessment of the position is associated in accordance with Section 4. Table 4 Credit Quality Step Securitisation Positions Re-securitisation Positions Credit assessments other than short term Short term credit assessments A B C D E 1 1 7 % 12 % 20 % 20 % 30 % 2 8 % 15 % 25 % 25 % 40 % 3 10 % 18 % 35 % 35 % 50 % 4 2 12 % 20 % 40 % 65 % 5 20 % 35 % 60 % 100 % 6 35 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 7 3 60 % 75 % 150 % 225 % 8 100 % 200 % 350 % 9 250 % 300 % 500 % 10 425 % 500 % 650 % 11 650 % 750 % 850 % all other and unrated 1 250 % Table 4 Credit Quality Step Securitisation Positions Re-securitisation Positions Credit assessments other than short term Short term credit assessments A B C D E 1 1 7 % 12 % 20 % 20 % 30 % 2 8 % 15 % 25 % 25 % 40 % 3 10 % 18 % 35 % 35 % 50 % 4 2 12 % 20 % 40 % 65 % 5 20 % 35 % 60 % 100 % 6 35 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 7 3 60 % 75 % 150 % 225 % 8 100 % 200 % 350 % 9 250 % 300 % 500 % 10 425 % 500 % 650 % 11 650 % 750 % 850 % all other and unrated 1 250 % Credit Quality Step Securitisation Positions Re-securitisation Positions Credit Quality Step Securitisation Positions Re-securitisation Positions Credit assessments other than short term Short term credit assessments A B C D E Credit assessments other than short term Short term credit assessments 1 1 7 % 12 % 20 % 20 % 30 % 7 % 2 8 % 15 % 25 % 25 % 40 % 3 10 % 18 % 35 % 35 % 50 % 4 2 12 % 20 % 40 % 65 % 5 20 % 35 % 60 % 100 % 6 35 % 50 % 100 % 150 % 7 3 60 % 75 % 150 % 225 % 8 100 % 200 % 350 % 9 250 % 300 % 500 % 10 425 % 500 % 650 % 11 650 % 750 % 850 % all other and unrated 1 250 % all other and unrated 1 250 % The weightings in column C of Table 4 shall be applied where the securitisation position is not a re-securitisation position and where the effective number of exposures securitised is less than six. For the remainder of the securitisation positions that are not re-securitisation positions, the weightings in column B shall be applied unless the position is in the most senior tranche of a securitisation, in which case the weightings in column A shall be applied. For re-securitisation positions the weightings in column E shall be applied unless the re-securitisation position is in the most senior tranche of the re-securitisation and none of the underlying exposures are themselves re-securitisation exposures, in which case column D shall be applied. When determining whether a tranche is the most senior, it is not required to take into consideration amounts due under interest rate or currency derivative contracts, fees due, or other similar payments. In calculating the effective number of exposures securitised multiple exposures to one obligor shall be treated as one exposure. The effective number of exposures is calculated as: where EAD i represents the sum of the exposure values of all exposures to the i th obligor. If the portfolio share associated with the largest exposure, C 1 , is available, the institution may compute N as 1/C 1 . 2. Credit risk mitigation on securitisation positions may be recognised in accordance with Article 264(1) and (4), subject to the conditions in Article 247.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 262 Supervisory Formula Method
1. Under the Supervisory Formula Method, the risk weight for a securitisation position shall be calculated as follows subject to a floor of 20 % for re-securitisation positions and 7 % for all other securitisation positions: where: S[x] = x, when x ≤ K IRBR , when x > K IRBR S[x] = x, when x ≤ K IRBR S[x] = x, when x ≤ K IRBR , when x > K IRBR τ = 1000; ω = 20; Beta [x; a, b] = the cumulative beta distribution with parameters a and b evaluated at x; T = the thickness of the tranche in which the position is held, measured as the ratio of (a) the nominal amount of the tranche to (b) the sum of the nominal amounts of the exposures that have been securitised. For derivative instruments listed in Annex II, the sum of the current replacement cost and the potential future credit exposure calculated in accordance with Chapter 6 shall be used in place of the nominal amount; K IRBR = the ratio of (a) K IRB to (b) the sum of the exposure values of the exposures that have been securitised, and is expressed in decimal form; L = the credit enhancement level, measured as the ratio of the nominal amount of all tranches subordinate to the tranche in which the position is held to the sum of the nominal amounts of the exposures that have been securitised. Capitalised future income shall not be included in the measured L. Amounts due by counterparties to derivative instruments listed in Annex II that represent tranches more junior than the tranche in question may be measured at their current replacement cost, without the potential future credit exposures, in calculating the enhancement level; N = the effective number of exposures calculated in accordance with Article 261. In the case of re-securitisations, the institution shall look at the number of securitisation exposures in the pool and not the number of underlying exposures in the original pools from which the underlying securitisation exposures stem; ELGD = the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default, calculated as follows: LGD i = the average LGD associated with all exposures to the ith obligor, where LGD is determined in accordance with Chapter 3. In the case of re-securitisation, an LGD of 100 % shall be applied to the securitised positions. When default and dilution risk for purchased receivables are treated in an aggregate manner within a securitisation, the LGD i input shall be constructed as a weighted average of the LGD for credit risk and the 75 % LGD for dilution risk. The weights shall be the stand-alone own funds charges for credit risk and dilution risk respectively. LGD i = the average LGD associated with all exposures to the ith obligor, where LGD is determined in accordance with Chapter 3. In the case of re-securitisation, an LGD of 100 % shall be applied to the securitised positions. When default and dilution risk for purchased receivables are treated in an aggregate manner within a securitisation, the LGD i input shall be constructed as a weighted average of the LGD for credit risk and the 75 % LGD for dilution risk. The weights shall be the stand-alone own funds charges for credit risk and dilution risk respectively. 2. Where the nominal amount of the largest securitised exposure, C 1 , is no more than 3 % of the sum of the nominal amount of the securitised exposures, then, for the purposes of the Supervisory Formula Method, the institution may set LGD= 50 % in the case of securitisations, which are not re-securitisations, and N equal to either of the following: C m = the ratio of the sum of the nominal amounts of the largest ‘m’ exposures to the sum of the nominal amounts of the exposures securitised. The level of ‘m’ may be set by the institution. C m the ratio of the sum of the nominal amounts of the largest ‘m’ exposures to the sum of the nominal amounts of the exposures securitised. The level of ‘m’ may be set by the institution. For securitisations in which materially all securitised exposures are retail exposures, institutions may, subject to permission by the competent authority, use the Supervisory Formula Method using the simplifications h=0 and v=0, provided that the effective number of exposures is not low and that the exposures are not highly concentrated. 3. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the use institutions make of paragraph 2. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines. 4. Credit risk mitigation on securitisation positions may be recognised in accordance with Article 264(2) to (4), subject to the conditions in Article 247.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 263 Liquidity Facilities
1. For the purposes of determining the exposure value of an unrated securitisation position in the form of cash advance facilities, a conversion factor of 0 % may be applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity facility that meets the conditions set out in Article 255(2). 2. When it is not possible for the institution to calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts for the securitised exposures as if they had not been securitised, an institution may, on an exceptional basis and subject to the permission of the competent authorities, temporarily apply the method set out in paragraph 3 for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts for an unrated securitisation position in the form of liquidity facility that meets the conditions in Article 255(1). Institutions shall notify the use they make of the first sentence to the competent authorities, together with its reasons and the intended time period of use. The calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts shall, in general, be deemed not to be possible if an inferred rating, the Internal Assessment Approach and the Supervisory Formula Approach are not at the institution's disposal. 3. The highest risk weight that would be applied under Chapter 2 to any of the securitised exposures, had they not been securitised, may be applied to the securitisation position represented by a liquidity facility that meets the conditions in Article 255(1). To determine the exposure value of the position a conversion factor of 100 % shall be applied.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 264 Credit risk mitigation for securitisation positions subject to the IRB Approach
1. Where risk-weighted exposure amounts are calculated using the Ratings Based Method, the exposure value or the risk-weight for a securitisation position in respect of which credit protection has been obtained may be amended in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4 as they apply for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under Chapter 2. 2. In the case of full credit protection, where risk-weighted exposure amounts are calculated using the Supervisory Formula Method, the following requirements shall apply: (a) the institution shall determine the ‘effective risk weight’ of the position. It shall do this by dividing the risk-weighted exposure amount of the position by the exposure value of the position and multiplying the result by 100; (b) in the case of funded credit protection, the risk-weighted exposure amount of the securitisation position shall be calculated by multiplying the funded protection-adjusted exposure amount of the position (E*), as calculated under Chapter 4 for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under Chapter 2 taking the amount of the securitisation position to be E, by the effective risk weight; (c) in the case of unfunded credit protection, the risk-weighted exposure amount of the securitisation position shall be calculated by multiplying the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch and maturity mismatch (GA) in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4 by the risk weight of the protection provider; and adding this to the amount arrived at by multiplying the amount of the securitisation position minus GA by the effective risk weight. 3. In the case of partial protection, where risk-weighted exposure amounts are calculated using the Supervisory Formula Method, the following requirements shall apply: (a) if the credit risk mitigation covers the first loss or losses on a proportional basis on the securitisation position, the institution may apply paragraph 2; (b) in other cases, the institution shall treat the securitisation position as two or more positions with the uncovered portion being considered the position with the lower credit quality. For the purposes of calculating the risk-weighted exposure amount for this position, the provisions in Article 262 shall apply subject to the adjustment of T to e* in the case of funded credit protection and to T-g in the case of unfunded credit protection, where e* denotes the ratio of E* to the total notional amount of the underlying pool, where E* is the adjusted exposure amount of the securitisation position calculated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4 as they apply for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under Chapter 2 taking the amount of the securitisation position to be E; and g is the ratio of the nominal amount of credit protection, adjusted for any currency or maturity mismatch in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4, to the sum of the exposure amounts of the securitised exposures. In the case of unfunded credit protection the risk weight of the protection provider shall be applied to that portion of the position not falling within the adjusted value of T. 4. Where, in the case of unfunded credit protection, competent authorities have granted the institution permission to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts for comparable direct exposures to the protection provider in accordance with Chapter 3, the risk weight g of exposures to the protection provider in accordance with Article 235 shall be determined as specified in Chapter 3.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 265 Additional own funds requirements for securitisations of revolving exposures with early amortisation provisions
1. In addition to the risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated in respect of its securitisation positions, an originator institution shall calculate a risk-weighted exposure amount in accordance with the methodology set out in Article 256 when it sells revolving exposures into a securitisation that contains an early amortisation provision. 2. By way of derogation from Article 256, the exposure value of the originators interest shall be the sum of the following items: (a) the exposure value of that notional part of a pool of drawn amounts sold into a securitisation, the proportion of which in relation to the amount of the total pool sold into the structure determines the proportion of the cash flows generated by principal and interest collections and other associated amounts which are not available to make payments to those having securitisation positions in the securitisation; (b) the exposure value of that part of the pool of undrawn amounts of the credit lines, the drawn amounts of which have been sold into the securitisation, the proportion of which to the total amount of such undrawn amounts is the same as the proportion of the exposure value described in point (a) to the exposure value of the pool of drawn amounts sold into the securitisation. The originator's interest shall not be subordinate to the investors' interest. The exposure value of the Investors' interest shall be the exposure value of the notional part of the pool of drawn amounts not falling within point (a) plus the exposure value of that part of the pool of undrawn amounts of credit lines, the drawn amounts of which have been sold into the securitisation, not falling within point (b). 3. The risk-weighted exposure amount in respect of the exposure value of the originator's interest in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 2 shall be calculated as that for a pro-rata exposure to the securitised drawn amounts exposures as if they had not been securitised and a pro rata exposure to the undrawn amounts of the credit lines, the drawn amounts of which have been sold into the securitisation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 266 Reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts
1. The risk-weighted exposure amount of a securitisation position to which a 1 250 % risk weight is assigned may be reduced by 12,5 times the amount of any specific credit risk adjustments treated in accordance with Article 110 made by the institution in respect of the securitised exposures. To the extent that specific credit adjustments are taken account of for this purpose they shall not be taken account of for the purposes of the calculation laid down in Article 159. 2. The risk-weighted exposure amount of a securitisation position may be reduced by 12,5 times the amount of any specific credit risk adjustments treated in accordance with Article 110 made by the institution in respect of the position. 3. As provided in Article 36(1)(k) in respect of a securitisation position in respect of which a 1 250 % risk weight applies, institutions may, as an alternative to including the position in their calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, deduct from own funds the exposure value of the position subject to the following: (a) the exposure value of the position may be derived from the risk-weighted exposure amounts taking into account any reductions made in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2; (b) the calculation of the exposure value may reflect eligible funded protection in a manner consistent with the methodology prescribed in Articles 247 and 264; (c) where the Supervisory Formula Method is used to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and L < K IRBR and [L+T] > K IRBR the position may be treated as two positions with L equal to K IRBR for the more senior of the positions. 4. Where an institution makes use of the option in paragraph 3 it may subtract 12,5 times the amount deducted in accordance with that paragraph from the amount specified in Article 260 as the amount to which the risk-weighted exposure amount in respect of its positions in a securitisation may be limited.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 253 Reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts):
1. Where a securitisation position is assigned a 1 250 % risk weight under this Section, institutions may deduct the exposure value of such position from Common Equity Tier 1 capital in accordance with point (k) of Article 36(1) as an alternative to including the position in their calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts. For that purpose, the calculation of the exposure value may reflect eligible funded credit protection in accordance with Article 249. 2. Where an institution makes use of the alternative set out in paragraph 1, it may subtract the amount deducted in accordance with point (k) of Article 36(1) from the amount specified in Article 268 as maximum capital requirement that would be calculated in respect of the underlying exposures as if they had not been securitised. Subsection 2 Hierarchy of methods and common parameters
Article 267 Use of Credit Assessments by ECAIs
Institutions may use credit assessments to determine the risk weight of a securitisation position only where the credit assessment has been issued or has been endorsed by an ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 270b Use of credit assessments by ECAIs):
Institutions may use only credit assessments to determine the risk weight of a securitisation position in accordance with this Chapter where the credit assessment has been issued or has been endorsed by an ECAI in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.
Article 268 Requirements to be met by the credit assessments of ECAIs
For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Section 3, institutions shall only use a credit assessment of an ECAI if the following conditions are met: (a) there shall be no mismatch between the types of payments reflected in the credit assessment and the types of payment to which the institution is entitled under the contract giving rise to the securitisation position in question; (b) loss and cash-flow analysis as well as sensitivity of ratings to changes in the underlying ratings assumptions, including the performance of pool assets, shall be published by the ECAI as well as the credit assessments, procedures, methodologies, assumptions, and the key elements underpinning the assessments in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. Information that is made available only to a limited number of entities shall not be considered to have been published. The credit assessments shall be included in the ECAI's transition matrix; (c) the credit assessment shall not be based or partly based on unfunded support provided by the institution itself. In such case, the institution shall consider the relevant position for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for this position in accordance with Section 3 as if it were not rated. The ECAI shall be committed to publish explanations how the performance of pool assets affects this credit assessment. (c) the credit assessment shall not be based or partly based on unfunded support provided by the institution itself. In such case, the institution shall consider the relevant position for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for this position in accordance with Section 3 as if it were not rated. The ECAI shall be committed to publish explanations how the performance of pool assets affects this credit assessment.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 268 Requirements to be met by the credit assessments of ECAIs):
For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Section 3, institutions shall only use a credit assessment of an ECAI if the following conditions are met: (a) there shall be no mismatch between the types of payments reflected in the credit assessment and the types of payment to which the institution is entitled under the contract giving rise to the securitisation position in question; (b) loss and cash-flow analysis as well as sensitivity of ratings to changes in the underlying ratings assumptions, including the performance of pool assets, shall be published by the ECAI as well as the credit assessments, procedures, methodologies, assumptions, and the key elements underpinning the assessments in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. Information that is made available only to a limited number of entities shall not be considered to have been published. The credit assessments shall be included in the ECAI's transition matrix; (c) the credit assessment shall not be based or partly based on unfunded support provided by the institution itself. In such case, the institution shall consider the relevant position for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for this position in accordance with Section 3 as if it were not rated. The ECAI shall be committed to publish explanations how the performance of pool assets affects this credit assessment.
Article 269 Use of credit assessments
1. An institution may nominate one or more ECAIs the credit assessments of which shall be used in the calculation of its risk-weighted exposure amounts under this Chapter (a ‘nominated ECAI’). 2. An institution shall use credit assessments consistently and not selectively in respect of its securitisation positions, in accordance with the following principles: (a) an institution may not use an ECAI's credit assessments for its positions in some tranches and another ECAI's credit assessments for its positions in other tranches within the same securitisation that may or may not be rated by the first ECAI; (b) where a position has two credit assessments by nominated ECAIs, the institution shall use the less favourable credit assessment; (c) where a position has more than two credit assessments by nominated ECAIs, the two most favourable credit assessments shall be used. If the two most favourable assessments are different, the less favourable of the two shall be used; (d) an institution shall not actively solicit the withdrawal of less favourable ratings. 3. Where credit protection eligible under Chapter 4 is provided directly to the SSPE, and that protection is reflected in the credit assessment of a position by a nominated ECAI, the risk weight associated with that credit assessment may be used. Where the protection is not eligible under Chapter 4, the credit assessment shall not be recognised. Where the credit protection is not provided to the SSPE but directly to a securitisation position, the credit assessment shall not be recognised.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 270d Use of credit assessments):
1. An institution may decide to nominate one or more ECAIs the credit assessments of which shall be used in the calculation of its risk-weighted exposure amounts under this Chapter (a ‘nominated ECAI’). 2. An institution shall use the credit assessments of its securitisation positions in a consistent and non-selective manner and, for these purposes, shall comply with the following requirements: (a) an institution shall not use an ECAI’s credit assessments for its positions in some tranches and another ECAI’s credit assessments for its positions in other tranches within the same securitisation that may or may not be rated by the first ECAI; (b) where a position has two credit assessments by nominated ECAIs, the institution shall use the less favourable credit assessment; (c) where a position has three or more credit assessments by nominated ECAIs, the two most favourable credit assessments shall be used. Where the two most favourable assessments are different, the less favourable of the two shall be used; (d) an institution shall not actively solicit the withdrawal of less favourable ratings. 3. Where the exposures underlying a securitisation benefit from full or partial eligible credit protection in accordance with Chapter 4, and the effect of such protection has been reflected in the credit assessment of a securitisation position by a nominated ECAI, the institution shall use the risk weight associated with that credit assessment. Where the credit protection referred to in this paragraph is not eligible under Chapter 4, the credit assessment shall not be recognised and the securitisation position shall be treated as unrated. 4. Where a securitisation position benefits from eligible credit protection in accordance with Chapter 4 and the effect of such protection has been reflected in its credit assessment by a nominated ECAI, the institution shall treat the securitisation position as if it were unrated and calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Chapter 4.
Article 270 Mapping
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine, for all ECAIs, which of the credit quality steps set out in this Chapter are associated with the relevant credit assessments of an ECAI. Those determinations shall be objective and consistent, and carried out in accordance with the following principles: (a) EBA shall differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each assessment; (b) EBA shall consider quantitative factors, such as default and/or loss rates and the historical performance of credit assessments of each ECAI across different asset classes; (c) EBA shall consider qualitative factors such as the range of transactions assessed by the ECAI, its methodology and the meaning of its credit assessments, in particular whether based on expected loss or first euro loss, and to timely payment of interest or to ultimate payment of interest; (d) EBA shall seek to ensure that securitisation positions to which the same risk weight is applied on the basis of the credit assessments of ECAIs are subject to equivalent degrees of credit risk. EBA shall consider amending its determination as to the credit quality step with which a particular credit assessment shall be associated, as appropriate. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 July 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 270e Securitisation mapping):
The EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to map in an objective and consistent manner the credit quality steps set out in this Chapter relative to the relevant credit assessments of all ECAIs. For the purposes of this Article, the EBA shall in particular: (a) differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed by each assessment; (b) consider quantitative factors, such as default or loss rates and the historical performance of credit assessments of each ECAI across different asset classes; (c) consider qualitative factors such as the range of transactions assessed by the ECAI, its methodology and the meaning of its credit assessments in particular whether such assessments take into account expected loss or first Euro loss, and timely payment of interests or ultimate payment of interests; (d) seek to ensure that securitisation positions to which the same risk weight is applied on the basis of the credit assessments of ECAIs are subject to equivalent degrees of credit risk. The EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 July 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 271 Determination of the exposure value
1. An institution shall determine the exposure value of derivative instruments listed in Annex II in accordance with this Chapter. 2. An institution may determine the exposure value of repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, long settlement transactions and margin lending transactions in accordance with this Chapter instead of making use of Chapter 4.
Article 272 Definitions
For the purposes of this Chapter and of Title VI of this Part, the following definitions shall apply: General terms (1) ‘counterparty credit risk’ or ‘CCR’ means the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows; General terms (1) ‘counterparty credit risk’ or ‘CCR’ means the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows; Transaction types (2) ‘long settlement transactions’ means transactions where a counterparty undertakes to deliver a security, a commodity, or a foreign exchange amount against cash, other financial instruments, or commodities, or vice versa, at a settlement or delivery date specified by contract that is later than the market standard for this particular type of transaction or five business days after the date on which the institution enters into the transaction, whichever is earlier; (3) ‘margin lending transactions’ means transactions in which an institution extends credit in connection with the purchase, sale, carrying or trading of securities. Margin lending transactions do not include other loans that are secured by collateral in the form of securities; Transaction types (2) ‘long settlement transactions’ means transactions where a counterparty undertakes to deliver a security, a commodity, or a foreign exchange amount against cash, other financial instruments, or commodities, or vice versa, at a settlement or delivery date specified by contract that is later than the market standard for this particular type of transaction or five business days after the date on which the institution enters into the transaction, whichever is earlier; (3) ‘margin lending transactions’ means transactions in which an institution extends credit in connection with the purchase, sale, carrying or trading of securities. Margin lending transactions do not include other loans that are secured by collateral in the form of securities; Netting set, hedging sets, and related terms (4) ‘netting set’ means a group of transactions between an institution and a single counterparty that is subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement that is recognised under Section 7 and Chapter 4. Each transaction that is not subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement which is recognised under Section 7 shall be treated as its own netting set for the purposes of this Chapter. Under the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6, all netting sets with a single counterparty may be treated as a single netting set if negative simulated market values of the individual netting sets are set to 0 in the estimation of expected exposure (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’); (5) ‘risk position’ means a risk number that is assigned to a transaction under the Standardised Method set out in Section5 following a predetermined algorithm; (6) ‘hedging set’ means a group of risk positions arising from the transactions within a single netting set, where only the balance of those risk positions is used for determining the exposure value under the Standardised Method set out in Section 5; (7) ‘margin agreement’ means an agreement or provisions of an agreement under which one counterparty must supply collateral to a second counterparty when an exposure of that second counterparty to the first counterparty exceeds a specified level; (8) ‘margin threshold’ means the largest amount of an exposure that remains outstanding before one party has the right to call for collateral; (9) ‘margin period of risk’ means the time period from the most recent exchange of collateral covering a netting set of transactions with a defaulting counterparty until the transactions are closed out and the resulting market risk is re-hedged; (10) ‘effective maturity’ under the Internal Model Method for a netting set with maturity greater than one year means the ratio of the sum of expected exposure over the life of the transactions in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate of return, divided by the sum of expected exposure over one year in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate. This effective maturity may be adjusted to reflect rollover risk by replacing expected exposure with effective expected exposure for forecasting horizons under one year; (11) ‘cross-product netting’ means the inclusion of transactions of different product categories within the same netting set pursuant to the cross-product netting rules set out in this Chapter; (12) ‘Current Market Value’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘CMV’) for the purposes of Section 5 refers to the net market value of the portfolio of transactions within a netting set, where both positive and negative market values are used in computing the CMV; Netting set, hedging sets, and related terms (4) ‘netting set’ means a group of transactions between an institution and a single counterparty that is subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement that is recognised under Section 7 and Chapter 4. Each transaction that is not subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement which is recognised under Section 7 shall be treated as its own netting set for the purposes of this Chapter. Under the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6, all netting sets with a single counterparty may be treated as a single netting set if negative simulated market values of the individual netting sets are set to 0 in the estimation of expected exposure (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’); (4) ‘netting set’ means a group of transactions between an institution and a single counterparty that is subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement that is recognised under Section 7 and Chapter 4. Each transaction that is not subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement which is recognised under Section 7 shall be treated as its own netting set for the purposes of this Chapter. Under the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6, all netting sets with a single counterparty may be treated as a single netting set if negative simulated market values of the individual netting sets are set to 0 in the estimation of expected exposure (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’); (5) ‘risk position’ means a risk number that is assigned to a transaction under the Standardised Method set out in Section5 following a predetermined algorithm; (6) ‘hedging set’ means a group of risk positions arising from the transactions within a single netting set, where only the balance of those risk positions is used for determining the exposure value under the Standardised Method set out in Section 5; (7) ‘margin agreement’ means an agreement or provisions of an agreement under which one counterparty must supply collateral to a second counterparty when an exposure of that second counterparty to the first counterparty exceeds a specified level; (8) ‘margin threshold’ means the largest amount of an exposure that remains outstanding before one party has the right to call for collateral; (9) ‘margin period of risk’ means the time period from the most recent exchange of collateral covering a netting set of transactions with a defaulting counterparty until the transactions are closed out and the resulting market risk is re-hedged; (10) ‘effective maturity’ under the Internal Model Method for a netting set with maturity greater than one year means the ratio of the sum of expected exposure over the life of the transactions in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate of return, divided by the sum of expected exposure over one year in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate. This effective maturity may be adjusted to reflect rollover risk by replacing expected exposure with effective expected exposure for forecasting horizons under one year; (10) ‘effective maturity’ under the Internal Model Method for a netting set with maturity greater than one year means the ratio of the sum of expected exposure over the life of the transactions in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate of return, divided by the sum of expected exposure over one year in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate. This effective maturity may be adjusted to reflect rollover risk by replacing expected exposure with effective expected exposure for forecasting horizons under one year; (11) ‘cross-product netting’ means the inclusion of transactions of different product categories within the same netting set pursuant to the cross-product netting rules set out in this Chapter; (12) ‘Current Market Value’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘CMV’) for the purposes of Section 5 refers to the net market value of the portfolio of transactions within a netting set, where both positive and negative market values are used in computing the CMV; Distributions (13) ‘distribution of market values’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of net market values of transactions within a netting set for a future date (the forecasting horizon), given the realised market value of those transactions at the date of the forecast; (14) ‘distribution of exposures’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of market values that is generated by setting forecast instances of negative net market values equal to zero; (15) ‘risk-neutral distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures over a future time period where the distribution is calculated using market implied values such as implied volatilities; (16) ‘actual distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures at a future time period where the distribution is calculated using historic or realised values such as volatilities calculated using past price or rate changes; Distributions (13) ‘distribution of market values’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of net market values of transactions within a netting set for a future date (the forecasting horizon), given the realised market value of those transactions at the date of the forecast; (14) ‘distribution of exposures’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of market values that is generated by setting forecast instances of negative net market values equal to zero; (15) ‘risk-neutral distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures over a future time period where the distribution is calculated using market implied values such as implied volatilities; (16) ‘actual distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures at a future time period where the distribution is calculated using historic or realised values such as volatilities calculated using past price or rate changes; Exposure measures and adjustments (17) ‘current exposure’ means the larger of zero and the market value of a transaction or portfolio of transactions within a netting set with a counterparty that would be lost upon the default of the counterparty, assuming no recovery on the value of those transactions in insolvency or liquidation; (18) ‘peak exposure’ means a high percentile of the distribution of exposures at particular future date before the maturity date of the longest transaction in the netting set; (19) ‘expected exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’) means the average of the distribution of exposures at a particular future date before the longest maturity transaction in the netting set matures; (20) ‘effective expected exposure at a specific date’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EE’) means the maximum expected exposure that occurs at that date or any prior date. Alternatively, it may be defined for a specific date as the greater of the expected exposure at that date or the effective expected exposure at any prior date; (21) ‘expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EPE’) means the weighted average over time of expected exposures, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents. When calculating the own funds requirement, institutions shall take the average over the first year or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period until the contract with the longest maturity in the netting set has matured; (22) ‘effective expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EPE’) means the weighted average of effective expected exposure over the first year of a netting set or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period of the longest maturity contract in the netting set, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents; Exposure measures and adjustments (17) ‘current exposure’ means the larger of zero and the market value of a transaction or portfolio of transactions within a netting set with a counterparty that would be lost upon the default of the counterparty, assuming no recovery on the value of those transactions in insolvency or liquidation; (18) ‘peak exposure’ means a high percentile of the distribution of exposures at particular future date before the maturity date of the longest transaction in the netting set; (19) ‘expected exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’) means the average of the distribution of exposures at a particular future date before the longest maturity transaction in the netting set matures; (20) ‘effective expected exposure at a specific date’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EE’) means the maximum expected exposure that occurs at that date or any prior date. Alternatively, it may be defined for a specific date as the greater of the expected exposure at that date or the effective expected exposure at any prior date; (21) ‘expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EPE’) means the weighted average over time of expected exposures, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents. When calculating the own funds requirement, institutions shall take the average over the first year or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period until the contract with the longest maturity in the netting set has matured; (21) ‘expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EPE’) means the weighted average over time of expected exposures, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents. When calculating the own funds requirement, institutions shall take the average over the first year or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period until the contract with the longest maturity in the netting set has matured; (22) ‘effective expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EPE’) means the weighted average of effective expected exposure over the first year of a netting set or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period of the longest maturity contract in the netting set, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents; CCR related risks (23) ‘rollover risk’ means the amount by which EPE is understated when future transactions with a counterparty are expected to be conducted on an ongoing basis. The additional exposure generated by those future transactions is not included in calculation of EPE; (24) ‘counterparty’ for the purposes of Section 7 means any legal or natural person that enters into a netting agreement, and has the contractual capacity to do so; (25) ‘contractual cross product netting agreement’ means a bilateral contractual agreement between an institution and a counterparty which creates a single legal obligation (based on netting of covered transactions) covering all bilateral master agreements and transactions belonging to different product categories that are included within the agreement; For the purposes of this definition, ‘different product categories’ means: (a) repurchase transactions, securities and commodities lending and borrowing transactions; (b) margin lending transactions; (c) the contracts listed in Annex II; (26) ‘payment leg’ means the payment agreed in an OTC derivative transaction with a linear risk profile which stipulates the exchange of a financial instrument for a payment. In the case of transactions that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, those two payment legs shall consist of the contractually agreed gross payments, including the notional amount of the transaction. CCR related risks (23) ‘rollover risk’ means the amount by which EPE is understated when future transactions with a counterparty are expected to be conducted on an ongoing basis. The additional exposure generated by those future transactions is not included in calculation of EPE; (23) ‘rollover risk’ means the amount by which EPE is understated when future transactions with a counterparty are expected to be conducted on an ongoing basis. The additional exposure generated by those future transactions is not included in calculation of EPE; (24) ‘counterparty’ for the purposes of Section 7 means any legal or natural person that enters into a netting agreement, and has the contractual capacity to do so; (25) ‘contractual cross product netting agreement’ means a bilateral contractual agreement between an institution and a counterparty which creates a single legal obligation (based on netting of covered transactions) covering all bilateral master agreements and transactions belonging to different product categories that are included within the agreement; For the purposes of this definition, ‘different product categories’ means: (a) repurchase transactions, securities and commodities lending and borrowing transactions; (b) margin lending transactions; (c) the contracts listed in Annex II; (25) ‘contractual cross product netting agreement’ means a bilateral contractual agreement between an institution and a counterparty which creates a single legal obligation (based on netting of covered transactions) covering all bilateral master agreements and transactions belonging to different product categories that are included within the agreement; For the purposes of this definition, ‘different product categories’ means: (a) repurchase transactions, securities and commodities lending and borrowing transactions; (b) margin lending transactions; (c) the contracts listed in Annex II; (26) ‘payment leg’ means the payment agreed in an OTC derivative transaction with a linear risk profile which stipulates the exchange of a financial instrument for a payment. In the case of transactions that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, those two payment legs shall consist of the contractually agreed gross payments, including the notional amount of the transaction. (26) ‘payment leg’ means the payment agreed in an OTC derivative transaction with a linear risk profile which stipulates the exchange of a financial instrument for a payment. In the case of transactions that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, those two payment legs shall consist of the contractually agreed gross payments, including the notional amount of the transaction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 272 Definitions):
For the purposes of this Chapter and of Title VI of this Part, the following definitions shall apply: General terms (1) ‘counterparty credit risk’ or ‘CCR’ means the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows; General terms (1) ‘counterparty credit risk’ or ‘CCR’ means the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows; Transaction types (2) ‘long settlement transactions’ means transactions where a counterparty undertakes to deliver a security, a commodity, or a foreign exchange amount against cash, other financial instruments, or commodities, or vice versa, at a settlement or delivery date specified by contract that is later than the market standard for this particular type of transaction or five business days after the date on which the institution enters into the transaction, whichever is earlier; (3) ‘margin lending transactions’ means transactions in which an institution extends credit in connection with the purchase, sale, carrying or trading of securities. Margin lending transactions do not include other loans that are secured by collateral in the form of securities; Transaction types (2) ‘long settlement transactions’ means transactions where a counterparty undertakes to deliver a security, a commodity, or a foreign exchange amount against cash, other financial instruments, or commodities, or vice versa, at a settlement or delivery date specified by contract that is later than the market standard for this particular type of transaction or five business days after the date on which the institution enters into the transaction, whichever is earlier; (3) ‘margin lending transactions’ means transactions in which an institution extends credit in connection with the purchase, sale, carrying or trading of securities. Margin lending transactions do not include other loans that are secured by collateral in the form of securities; Netting set, hedging sets, and related terms (4) ‘netting set’ means a group of transactions between an institution and a single counterparty that is subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement that is recognised under Section 7 and Chapter 4. Each transaction that is not subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement which is recognised under Section 7 shall be treated as its own netting set for the purposes of this Chapter. Under the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6, all netting sets with a single counterparty may be treated as a single netting set if negative simulated market values of the individual netting sets are set to 0 in the estimation of expected exposure (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’); (5) ‘risk position’ means a risk number that is assigned to a transaction under the Standardised Method set out in Section5 following a predetermined algorithm; (6) ‘hedging set’ means a group of risk positions arising from the transactions within a single netting set, where only the balance of those risk positions is used for determining the exposure value under the Standardised Method set out in Section 5; (7) ‘margin agreement’ means an agreement or provisions of an agreement under which one counterparty must supply collateral to a second counterparty when an exposure of that second counterparty to the first counterparty exceeds a specified level; (8) ‘margin threshold’ means the largest amount of an exposure that remains outstanding before one party has the right to call for collateral; (9) ‘margin period of risk’ means the time period from the most recent exchange of collateral covering a netting set of transactions with a defaulting counterparty until the transactions are closed out and the resulting market risk is re-hedged; (10) ‘effective maturity’ under the Internal Model Method for a netting set with maturity greater than one year means the ratio of the sum of expected exposure over the life of the transactions in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate of return, divided by the sum of expected exposure over one year in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate. This effective maturity may be adjusted to reflect rollover risk by replacing expected exposure with effective expected exposure for forecasting horizons under one year; (11) ‘cross-product netting’ means the inclusion of transactions of different product categories within the same netting set pursuant to the cross-product netting rules set out in this Chapter; (12) ‘Current Market Value’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘CMV’) for the purposes of Section 5 refers to the net market value of the portfolio of transactions within a netting set, where both positive and negative market values are used in computing the CMV; Netting set, hedging sets, and related terms (4) ‘netting set’ means a group of transactions between an institution and a single counterparty that is subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement that is recognised under Section 7 and Chapter 4. Each transaction that is not subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement which is recognised under Section 7 shall be treated as its own netting set for the purposes of this Chapter. Under the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6, all netting sets with a single counterparty may be treated as a single netting set if negative simulated market values of the individual netting sets are set to 0 in the estimation of expected exposure (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’); (5) ‘risk position’ means a risk number that is assigned to a transaction under the Standardised Method set out in Section5 following a predetermined algorithm; (6) ‘hedging set’ means a group of risk positions arising from the transactions within a single netting set, where only the balance of those risk positions is used for determining the exposure value under the Standardised Method set out in Section 5; (7) ‘margin agreement’ means an agreement or provisions of an agreement under which one counterparty must supply collateral to a second counterparty when an exposure of that second counterparty to the first counterparty exceeds a specified level; (8) ‘margin threshold’ means the largest amount of an exposure that remains outstanding before one party has the right to call for collateral; (9) ‘margin period of risk’ means the time period from the most recent exchange of collateral covering a netting set of transactions with a defaulting counterparty until the transactions are closed out and the resulting market risk is re-hedged; (10) ‘effective maturity’ under the Internal Model Method for a netting set with maturity greater than one year means the ratio of the sum of expected exposure over the life of the transactions in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate of return, divided by the sum of expected exposure over one year in the netting set discounted at the risk-free rate. This effective maturity may be adjusted to reflect rollover risk by replacing expected exposure with effective expected exposure for forecasting horizons under one year; (11) ‘cross-product netting’ means the inclusion of transactions of different product categories within the same netting set pursuant to the cross-product netting rules set out in this Chapter; (12) ‘Current Market Value’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘CMV’) for the purposes of Section 5 refers to the net market value of the portfolio of transactions within a netting set, where both positive and negative market values are used in computing the CMV; Distributions (13) ‘distribution of market values’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of net market values of transactions within a netting set for a future date (the forecasting horizon), given the realised market value of those transactions at the date of the forecast; (14) ‘distribution of exposures’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of market values that is generated by setting forecast instances of negative net market values equal to zero; (15) ‘risk-neutral distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures over a future time period where the distribution is calculated using market implied values such as implied volatilities; (16) ‘actual distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures at a future time period where the distribution is calculated using historic or realised values such as volatilities calculated using past price or rate changes; Distributions (13) ‘distribution of market values’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of net market values of transactions within a netting set for a future date (the forecasting horizon), given the realised market value of those transactions at the date of the forecast; (14) ‘distribution of exposures’ means the forecast of the probability distribution of market values that is generated by setting forecast instances of negative net market values equal to zero; (15) ‘risk-neutral distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures over a future time period where the distribution is calculated using market implied values such as implied volatilities; (16) ‘actual distribution’ means a distribution of market values or exposures at a future time period where the distribution is calculated using historic or realised values such as volatilities calculated using past price or rate changes; Exposure measures and adjustments (17) ‘current exposure’ means the larger of zero and the market value of a transaction or portfolio of transactions within a netting set with a counterparty that would be lost upon the default of the counterparty, assuming no recovery on the value of those transactions in insolvency or liquidation; (18) ‘peak exposure’ means a high percentile of the distribution of exposures at particular future date before the maturity date of the longest transaction in the netting set; (19) ‘expected exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’) means the average of the distribution of exposures at a particular future date before the longest maturity transaction in the netting set matures; (20) ‘effective expected exposure at a specific date’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EE’) means the maximum expected exposure that occurs at that date or any prior date. Alternatively, it may be defined for a specific date as the greater of the expected exposure at that date or the effective expected exposure at any prior date; (21) ‘expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EPE’) means the weighted average over time of expected exposures, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents. When calculating the own funds requirement, institutions shall take the average over the first year or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period until the contract with the longest maturity in the netting set has matured; (22) ‘effective expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EPE’) means the weighted average of effective expected exposure over the first year of a netting set or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period of the longest maturity contract in the netting set, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents; Exposure measures and adjustments (17) ‘current exposure’ means the larger of zero and the market value of a transaction or portfolio of transactions within a netting set with a counterparty that would be lost upon the default of the counterparty, assuming no recovery on the value of those transactions in insolvency or liquidation; (18) ‘peak exposure’ means a high percentile of the distribution of exposures at particular future date before the maturity date of the longest transaction in the netting set; (19) ‘expected exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EE’) means the average of the distribution of exposures at a particular future date before the longest maturity transaction in the netting set matures; (20) ‘effective expected exposure at a specific date’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EE’) means the maximum expected exposure that occurs at that date or any prior date. Alternatively, it may be defined for a specific date as the greater of the expected exposure at that date or the effective expected exposure at any prior date; (21) ‘expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘EPE’) means the weighted average over time of expected exposures, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents. When calculating the own funds requirement, institutions shall take the average over the first year or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period until the contract with the longest maturity in the netting set has matured; (22) ‘effective expected positive exposure’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Effective EPE’) means the weighted average of effective expected exposure over the first year of a netting set or, if all the contracts within the netting set mature within less than one year, over the time period of the longest maturity contract in the netting set, where the weights are the proportion of the entire time period that an individual expected exposure represents; CCR related risks (23) ‘rollover risk’ means the amount by which EPE is understated when future transactions with a counterparty are expected to be conducted on an ongoing basis. The additional exposure generated by those future transactions is not included in calculation of EPE; (24) ‘counterparty’ for the purposes of Section 7 means any legal or natural person that enters into a netting agreement, and has the contractual capacity to do so; (25) ‘contractual cross product netting agreement’ means a bilateral contractual agreement between an institution and a counterparty which creates a single legal obligation (based on netting of covered transactions) covering all bilateral master agreements and transactions belonging to different product categories that are included within the agreement; For the purposes of this definition, ‘different product categories’ means: (a) repurchase transactions, securities and commodities lending and borrowing transactions; (b) margin lending transactions; (c) the contracts listed in Annex II; (26) ‘payment leg’ means the payment agreed in an OTC derivative transaction with a linear risk profile which stipulates the exchange of a financial instrument for a payment. In the case of transactions that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, those two payment legs shall consist of the contractually agreed gross payments, including the notional amount of the transaction. CCR related risks (23) ‘rollover risk’ means the amount by which EPE is understated when future transactions with a counterparty are expected to be conducted on an ongoing basis. The additional exposure generated by those future transactions is not included in calculation of EPE; (24) ‘counterparty’ for the purposes of Section 7 means any legal or natural person that enters into a netting agreement, and has the contractual capacity to do so; (25) ‘contractual cross product netting agreement’ means a bilateral contractual agreement between an institution and a counterparty which creates a single legal obligation (based on netting of covered transactions) covering all bilateral master agreements and transactions belonging to different product categories that are included within the agreement; For the purposes of this definition, ‘different product categories’ means: (a) repurchase transactions, securities and commodities lending and borrowing transactions; (b) margin lending transactions; (c) the contracts listed in Annex II; (26) ‘payment leg’ means the payment agreed in an OTC derivative transaction with a linear risk profile which stipulates the exchange of a financial instrument for a payment. In the case of transactions that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, those two payment legs shall consist of the contractually agreed gross payments, including the notional amount of the transaction.
Article 273 Methods for calculating the exposure value
1. Institutions shall determine the exposure value for the contracts listed in Annex II on the basis of one of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 in accordance with this Article. An institution which is not eligible for the treatment set out in Article 94 shall not use the method set out in Section 4. To determine the exposure value for the contracts listed in point 3 of Annex II an institution shall not use the method set out in Section 4. Institutions may use in combination the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 on a permanent basis within a group. A single institution shall not use in combination the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 on a permanent basis but shall be permitted to use in combination methods set out in Sections 3 and 5 when one of the methods is used for the cases set out in Article 282(6). 2. Where permitted by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 283(1) and (2), an institution may determine the exposure value for the following items using the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6: (a) the contracts listed in Annex II; (b) repurchase transactions; (c) securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions; (d) margin lending transactions; (e) long settlement transactions. 3. When an institution purchases protection through a credit derivative against a non-trading book exposure or against a counterparty risk exposure, it may calculate its own funds requirement for the hedged exposure in accordance with either of the following: (a) Articles 233 to 236; (b) in accordance with Article 153(3), or Article 183, where permission has been granted in accordance with Article 143. The exposure value for CCR for those credit derivatives shall be zero, unless an institution applies the approach in point (h)(ii) of Article 299(2). 4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, an institution may choose consistently to include for the purposes of calculating own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk all credit derivatives not included in the trading book and purchased as protection against a non-trading book exposure or against a counterparty credit risk exposure where the credit protection is recognised under this Regulation. 5. Where credit default swaps sold by an institution are treated by an institution as credit protection provided by that institution and are subject to own funds requirement for credit risk of the underlying for the full notional amount, their exposure value for the purposes of CCR in the non-trading book shall be zero. 6. Under all methods set out in Sections 3 to 6, the exposure value for a given counterparty shall be equal to the sum of the exposure values calculated for each netting set with that counterparty. For a given counterparty, the exposure value for a given netting set of OTC derivative instruments listed in Annex II calculated in accordance with this Chapter shall be the greater of zero and the difference between the sum of exposure values across all netting sets with the counterparty and the sum of CVA for that counterparty being recognised by the institution as an incurred write-down. The credit valuation adjustments shall be calculated without taking into account any offsetting debit value adjustment attributed to the own credit risk of the firm that has been already excluded from own funds under Article 33(1)(c). 7. Institutions shall determine the exposure value for exposures arising from long settlement transactions by any of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6, regardless of which method the institution has chosen for treating OTC derivatives and repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, and margin lending transactions. In calculating the own funds requirements for long settlement transactions, an institution that uses the approach set out in Chapter 3 may assign the risk weights under the approach set out in Chapter 2 on a permanent basis and irrespective of the materiality of such positions. 8. For the methods set out in Sections 3 and 4, the institution shall adopt a consistent methodology for determining the notional amount for different product types, and shall ensure that the notional amount to be taken into account provides an appropriate measure of the risk inherent in the contract. Where the contract provides for a multiplication of cash flows, the notional amount shall be adjusted by an institution to take into account the effects of the multiplication on the risk structure of that contract. For the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6, institutions shall treat transactions where specific wrong way risk has been identified in accordance with Article 291(2), (4), (5) and (6) as appropriate.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 273 Methods for calculating the exposure value):
1. Institutions shall calculate the exposure value for the contracts listed in Annex II on the basis of one of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 in accordance with this Article. An institution which does not meet the conditions set out in Article 273a(1) shall not use the method set out in Section 4. An institution which does not meet the conditions set out in Article 273a(2) shall not use the method set out in Section 5. Institutions may use in combination the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 on a permanent basis within a group. A single institution shall not use in combination the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 on a permanent basis. 2. Where permitted by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 283(1) and (2), an institution may determine the exposure value for the following items using the Internal Model Method set out in Section 6: (a) the contracts listed in Annex II; (b) repurchase transactions; (c) securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions; (d) margin lending transactions; (e) long settlement transactions. When an institution purchases protection through a credit derivative against a non-trading book exposure or against a counterparty risk exposure, it may calculate its own funds requirement for the hedged exposure in accordance with either of the following: (a) Articles 233 to 236; (b) in accordance with Article 153(3), or Article 183, where permission has been granted in accordance with Article 143. 4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, an institution may choose consistently to include for the purposes of calculating own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk all credit derivatives not included in the trading book and purchased as protection against a non-trading book exposure or against a counterparty credit risk exposure where the credit protection is recognised under this Regulation. 5. Where credit default swaps sold by an institution are treated by an institution as credit protection provided by that institution and are subject to own funds requirement for credit risk of the underlying for the full notional amount, their exposure value for the purposes of CCR in the non-trading book shall be zero. 6. Under the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6, the exposure value for a given counterparty shall be equal to the sum of the exposure values calculated for each netting set with that counterparty. By way of derogation from the first subparagraph, where one margin agreement applies to multiple netting sets with that counterparty and the institution is using one of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 to calculate the exposure value of those netting sets, the exposure value shall be calculated in accordance with the relevant Section. For a given counterparty, the exposure value for a given netting set of OTC derivative instruments listed in Annex II calculated in accordance with this Chapter shall be the greater of zero and the difference between the sum of exposure values across all netting sets with the counterparty and the sum of credit valuation adjustments for that counterparty being recognised by the institution as an incurred write-down. The credit valuation adjustments shall be calculated without taking into account any offsetting debit value adjustment attributed to the own credit risk of the firm that has been already excluded from own funds in accordance with point (c) of Article 33(1). 7. In calculating the exposure value in accordance with the methods set out in Sections 3, 4 and 5, institutions may treat two OTC derivative contracts included in the same netting agreement that are perfectly matching as if they were a single contract with a notional principal equal to zero. For the purposes of the first subparagraph, two OTC derivative contracts are perfectly matching when they meet all the following conditions: (a) their risk positions are opposite; (b) their features, with the exception of the trade date, are identical; (c) their cash flows fully offset each other. 8. Institutions shall determine the exposure value for exposures arising from long settlement transactions by any of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of this Chapter, regardless of which method the institution has chosen for treating OTC derivatives and repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, and margin lending transactions. In calculating the own funds requirements for long settlement transactions, an institution that uses the approach set out in Chapter 3 may assign the risk weights under the approach set out in Chapter 2 on a permanent basis and irrespective of the materiality of those positions. 9. For the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of this Chapter, institutions shall treat transactions where Specific Wrong-Way risk has been identified in accordance with Article 291(2), (4), (5), and (6).
Article 274 Mark-to-Market Method
1. In order to determine the current replacement cost of all contracts with positive values, institutions shall attach the current market values to the contracts. 2. In order to determine the potential future credit exposure, institutions shall multiply the notional amounts or underlying values, as applicable, by the percentages in Table 1 and in accordance with the following principles: (a) contracts which do not fall within one of the five categories indicated in Table 1 shall be treated as contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals; (b) for contracts with multiple exchanges of principal, the percentages shall be multiplied by the number of remaining payments still to be made in accordance with the contract; (c) for contracts that are structured to settle outstanding exposure following specified payment dates and where the terms are reset so that the market value of the contract is zero on those specified dates, the residual maturity shall be equal to the time until the next reset date. In the case of interest-rate contracts that meet those criteria and have a remaining maturity of over one year, the percentage shall be no lower than 0,5 %. Table 1 Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals One year or less 0 % 1 % 6 % 7 % 10 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 12 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 10 % 8 % 15 % Table 1 Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals One year or less 0 % 1 % 6 % 7 % 10 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 12 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 10 % 8 % 15 % Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals One year or less 0 % 1 % 6 % 7 % 10 % One year or less 0 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 12 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 10 % 8 % 15 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 3. For contracts relating to commodities other than gold, which are referred to in point 3 of Annex II, an institution may, as an alternative to applying the percentages in Table 1, apply the percentages in Table 2 provided that that institution follows the extended maturity ladder approach set out in Article 361 for those contracts. Table 2 Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % Table 2 Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % 2,5 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % 4. The sum of current replacement cost and potential future credit exposure is the exposure value.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 274 Mark-to-Market Method):
1. In order to determine the current replacement cost of all contracts with positive values, institutions shall attach the current market values to the contracts. In order to determine the potential future credit exposure, institutions shall multiply the notional amounts or underlying values, as applicable, by the percentages in Table 1 and in accordance with the following principles: (a) contracts which do not fall within one of the five categories indicated in Table 1 shall be treated as contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals; (b) for contracts with multiple exchanges of principal, the percentages shall be multiplied by the number of remaining payments still to be made in accordance with the contract; (c) for contracts that are structured to settle outstanding exposure following specified payment dates and where the terms are reset so that the market value of the contract is zero on those specified dates, the residual maturity shall be equal to the time until the next reset date. In the case of interest-rate contracts that meet those criteria and have a remaining maturity of over one year, the percentage shall be no lower than 0,5 %. Table 1 Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals One year or less 0 % 1 % 6 % 7 % 10 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 12 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 10 % 8 % 15 % Table 1 Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals One year or less 0 % 1 % 6 % 7 % 10 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 12 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 10 % 8 % 15 % Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals Residual maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Contracts concerning equities Contracts concerning precious metals except gold Contracts concerning commodities other than precious metals One year or less 0 % 1 % 6 % 7 % 10 % One year or less 0 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % 5 % 8 % 7 % 12 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 0,5 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 10 % 8 % 15 % Over five years 1,5 % 7,5 % 3. For contracts relating to commodities other than gold, which are referred to in point 3 of Annex II, an institution may, as an alternative to applying the percentages in Table 1, apply the percentages in Table 2 provided that that institution follows the extended maturity ladder approach set out in Article 361 for those contracts. Table 2 Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % For contracts relating to commodities other than gold, which are referred to in point 3 of Annex II, an institution may, as an alternative to applying the percentages in Table 1, apply the percentages in Table 2 provided that that institution follows the extended maturity ladder approach set out in Article 361 for those contracts. Table 2 Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % Table 2 Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % Residual maturity Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products Precious metals (except gold) Base metals Agricultural products (softs) Other, including energy products One year or less 2 % 2,5 % 3 % 4 % 2,5 % Over one year, not exceeding five years 5 % 4 % 5 % 6 % Over five years 7,5 % 8 % 9 % 10 % 4. The sum of current replacement cost and potential future credit exposure is the exposure value.