Article 240 First-to-default credit derivatives
Where an institution obtains credit protection for a number of exposures under terms that the first default among the exposures shall trigger payment and that this credit event shall terminate the contract, the institution may amend the calculation of the risk-weighted exposure amount and, as relevant, the expected loss amount of the exposure which would, in the absence of the credit protection, produce the lowest risk-weighted exposure amount in accordance with this Chapter: (a) for institutions using the Standardised Approach, the risk-weighted exposure amount shall be that calculated under the Standardised Approach; (b) for institutions using the IRB Approach, the risk-weighted exposure amount shall be the sum of the risk-weighted exposure amount calculated under the IRB Approach and 12,5 times the expected loss amount. The treatment set out in this Article applies only where the exposure value is less than or equal to the value of the credit protection.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 241 Nth-to-default credit derivatives
Where the nth default among the exposures triggers payment under the credit protection, the institution purchasing the protection may only recognise the protection for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and, as applicable, expected loss amounts where protection has also been obtained for defaults 1 to n-1 or when n-1 defaults have already occurred. In such cases, the institution may amend the calculation of the risk-weighted exposure amount and, as applicable, the expected loss amount of the exposure which would, in the absence of the credit protection, produce the n-th lowest risk-weighted exposure amount in accordance with this Chapter. Institutions shall calculate the nth lowest amount as specified in points (a) and (b) of Article 240. The treatment set out in this Article applies only where the exposure value is less than or equal to the value of the credit protection. All exposures in the basket shall meet the requirements laid down in Article 204(2) and Article 216(1)(d).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 242 Definitions
For the purposes of this Chapter, the following definitions shall apply: (1) ‘excess spread’ means finance charge collections and other fee income received in respect of the securitised exposures net of costs and expenses; (2) ‘clean-up call option’ means a contractual option for the originator to repurchase or extinguish the securitisation positions before all of the underlying exposures have been repaid, when the amount of outstanding exposures falls below a specified level; (3) ‘liquidity facility’ means the securitisation position arising from a contractual agreement to provide funding to ensure timeliness of cash flows to investors; (4) ‘K IRB ’ means 8 % of the risk-weighted exposure amounts that would be calculated under Chapter 3 in respect of the securitised exposures, had they not been securitised, plus the amount of expected losses associated with those exposures calculated under that Chapter; (5) ‘ratings based method’ means the method of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for securitisation positions in accordance with Article 261; (6) ‘supervisory formula method’ means the method of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for securitisation positions in accordance with Article 262; (7) ‘unrated position’ means a securitisation position which does not have an eligible credit assessment by an ECAI as referred to in Section 4; (8) ‘rated position’ means a securitisation position which has an eligible credit assessment by an ECAI as referred to in Section 4; (9) ‘asset-backed commercial paper programme’ or ‘ABCP programme’ means a programme of securitisations the securities issued by which predominantly take the form of commercial paper with an original maturity of one year or less; (10) ‘traditional securitisation’ means a securitisation involving the economic transfer of the exposures being securitised. This shall be accomplished by the transfer of ownership of the securitised exposures from the originator institution to an SSPE or through sub-participation by an SSPE. The securities issued do not represent payment obligations of the originator institution; (11) ‘synthetic securitisation’ means a securitisation where the transfer of risk is achieved by the use of credit derivatives or guarantees, and the exposures being securitised remain exposures of the originator institution; (12) ‘revolving exposure’ means an exposure whereby customers' outstanding balances are permitted to fluctuate based on their decisions to borrow and repay, up to an agreed limit; (13) ‘revolving securitisation’ means a securitisation where the securitisation structure itself revolves by exposures being added to or removed from the pool of exposures irrespective of whether the exposures revolve or not; (14) ‘early amortisation provision’ means a contractual clause in a securitisation of revolving exposures or a revolving securitisation which requires, on the occurrence of defined events, investors' positions to be redeemed before the originally stated maturity of the securities issued; (15) ‘first loss tranche’ means the most subordinated tranche in a securitisation that is the first tranche to bear losses incurred on the securitised exposures and thereby provides protection to the second loss and, where relevant, higher ranking tranches.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 242 Definitions):
For the purposes of this Chapter, the following definitions apply: (1) ‘clean-up call option’ means a contractual option that entitles the originator to call the securitisation positions before all of the securitised exposures have been repaid, either by repurchasing the underlying exposures remaining in the pool in the case of traditional securitisations or by terminating the credit protection in the case of synthetic securitisations, in both cases when the amount of outstanding underlying exposures falls to or below certain pre-specified level; (2) ‘credit-enhancing interest-only strip’ means an on-balance sheet asset that represents a valuation of cash flows related to future margin income and is a subordinated tranche in the securitisation; (3) ‘liquidity facility’ means a liquidity facility as defined in point (14) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (4) ‘unrated position’ means a securitisation position which does not have an eligible credit assessment in accordance with Section 4; (5) ‘rated position’ means a securitisation position which has an eligible credit assessment in accordance with Section 4; (6) ‘senior securitisation position’ means a position backed or secured by a first claim on the whole of the underlying exposures, disregarding for these purposes amounts due under interest rate or currency derivative contracts, fees or other similar payments, and irrespective of any difference in maturity with one or more other senior tranches with which that position shares losses on a pro-rata basis; (7) ‘IRB pool’ means a pool of underlying exposures of a type in relation to which the institution has permission to use the IRB Approach and is able to calculate risk- weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Chapter 3 for all of these exposures; (8) ‘mixed pool’ means a pool of underlying exposures of a type in relation to which the institution has permission to use the IRB Approach and is able to calculate risk- weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Chapter 3 for some, but not all, of the exposures; (9) ‘overcollateralisation’ means any form of credit enhancement by virtue of which underlying exposures are posted in value which is higher than the value of the securitisation positions; (10) ‘simple, transparent and standardised securitisation’ or ‘STS securitisation’ means a securitisation that meets the requirements set out in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (11) ‘asset-backed commercial paper programme’ or ‘ABCP programme’ means an asset backed commercial paper programme or ABCP programme as defined in point (7) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (12) ‘asset-backed commercial paper transaction’ or ‘ABCP transaction’ means an asset-backed commercial paper transaction or ABCP transaction as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (13) ‘traditional securitisation’ means a traditional securitisation as defined in point (9) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (14) ‘synthetic securitisation’ means a synthetic securitisation as defined in point (10) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (15) ‘revolving exposure’ means a revolving exposure as defined in point (15) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (16) ‘early amortisation provision’ means an early amortisation provision as defined in point (17) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (17) ‘first loss tranche’ means a first loss tranche as defined in point (18) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402; (18) ‘mezzanine securitisation position’ means a position in the securitisation which is subordinated to the senior securitisation position and more senior than the first loss tranche, and which is subject to a risk weight lower than 1 250 % and higher than 25 % in accordance with Subsections 2 and 3 of Section 3; (19) ‘promotional entity’ means any undertaking or entity established by a Member State’s central, regional or local government, which grants promotional loans or grants promotional guarantees, whose primary goal is not to make profit or maximise market share but to promote that government’s public policy objectives, provided that, subject to State aid rules, that government has an obligation to protect the economic basis of the undertaking or entity and maintain its viability throughout its lifetime, or that at least 90 % of its original capital or funding or the promotional loan it grants is directly or indirectly guaranteed by the Member State’s central, regional or local government.
Article 243 Traditional securitisation
1. The originator institution of a traditional securitisation may exclude securitised exposures from the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts if either of the following conditions is fulfilled: (a) significant credit risk associated with the securitised exposures is considered to have been transferred to third parties; (b) the originator institution applies a 1 250 % risk weight to all securitisation positions it holds in this securitisation or deducts these securitisation positions from Common Equity Tier 1 items in accordance with Article 36(1)(k). 2. Significant credit risk shall be considered to have been transferred in the following cases: (a) the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the mezzanine securitisation positions held by the originator institution in this securitisation do not exceed 50 % of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of all mezzanine securitisation positions existing in this securitisation; (b) where there are no mezzanine securitisation positions in a given securitisation and the originator can demonstrate that the exposure value of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight exceeds a reasoned estimate of the expected loss on the securitised exposures by a substantial margin, the originator institution does not hold more than 20 % of the exposure values of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight. Where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts, which the originator institution would achieve by this securitisation is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, competent authorities may decide on a case-by-case basis that significant credit risk shall not be considered to have been transferred to third parties. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, mezzanine securitisation positions mean securitisation positions to which a risk weight lower than 1 250 % applies and that are more junior than the most senior position in this securitisation and more junior than any securitisation position in this securitisation to which either of the following is assigned in accordance with Section 4: (a) in the case of a securitisation position subject to Section 3, Sub-section 3 a credit quality step 1; (b) in the case of a securitisation position subject to points Section 3, Sub-section 4 a credit quality step 1 or 2. 4. As an alternative to paragraphs 2 and 3, competent authorities shall grant permission to originator institutions to consider significant credit risk as having been transferred where the originator institution is able to demonstrate, in every case of a securitisation, that the reduction of own funds requirements which the originator achieves by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties. Permission shall be granted only where the institution meets all of the following conditions: (a) the institution has appropriately risk-sensitive policies and methodologies in place to assess the transfer of risk; (b) the institution has also recognised the transfer of credit risk to third parties in each case for purposes of the institution's internal risk management and its internal capital allocation. 5. In addition to the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4, as applicable, all the following conditions shall be met: (a) the securitisation documentation reflects the economic substance of the transaction; (b) the securitised exposures are put beyond the reach of the originator institution and its creditors, including in bankruptcy and receivership. This shall be supported by the opinion of qualified legal counsel; (c) the securities issued do not represent payment obligations of the originator institution; (d) the originator institution does not maintain effective or indirect control over the transferred exposures. An originator shall be considered to have maintained effective control over the transferred exposures if it has the right to repurchase from the transferee the previously transferred exposures in order to realise their benefits or if it is obligated to re-assume transferred risk. The originator institution's retention of servicing rights or obligations in respect of the exposures shall not of itself constitute indirect control of the exposures; (e) the securitisation documentation meets all the following conditions: (i) it does not contain clauses that other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator institution including but not limited to altering the underlying credit exposures or increasing the yield payable to investors in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the securitised exposures; (ii) it does not contain clauses that increase the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool; (iii) it makes it clear, where applicable, that any purchase or repurchase of securitisation positions by the originator or sponsor beyond its contractual obligations is exceptional and may only be made at arm's length; (e) the securitisation documentation meets all the following conditions: (i) it does not contain clauses that other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator institution including but not limited to altering the underlying credit exposures or increasing the yield payable to investors in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the securitised exposures; (ii) it does not contain clauses that increase the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool; (iii) it makes it clear, where applicable, that any purchase or repurchase of securitisation positions by the originator or sponsor beyond its contractual obligations is exceptional and may only be made at arm's length; (f) where there is a clean-up call option, that option shall also meet the following conditions: (i) it is exercisable at the discretion of the originator institution; (ii) it may only be exercised when 10 % or less of the original value of the exposures securitised remains unamortised; (iii) it is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement. (f) where there is a clean-up call option, that option shall also meet the following conditions: (i) it is exercisable at the discretion of the originator institution; (ii) it may only be exercised when 10 % or less of the original value of the exposures securitised remains unamortised; (iii) it is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement. 6. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the specific cases, referred to in paragraph 2, where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, and the use institutions make of paragraph 4. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines. EBA shall review Member States' implementation of those guidelines and provide advice to the Commission by 31 December 2017 on whether a binding technical standard is required.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 243 Traditional securitisation):
1. The originator institution of a traditional securitisation may exclude securitised exposures from the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts if either of the following conditions is fulfilled: (a) significant credit risk associated with the securitised exposures is considered to have been transferred to third parties; (b) the originator institution applies a 1 250 % risk weight to all securitisation positions it holds in this securitisation or deducts these securitisation positions from Common Equity Tier 1 items in accordance with Article 36(1)(k). 2. Significant credit risk shall be considered to have been transferred in the following cases: (a) the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the mezzanine securitisation positions held by the originator institution in this securitisation do not exceed 50 % of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of all mezzanine securitisation positions existing in this securitisation; (b) where there are no mezzanine securitisation positions in a given securitisation and the originator can demonstrate that the exposure value of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight exceeds a reasoned estimate of the expected loss on the securitised exposures by a substantial margin, the originator institution does not hold more than 20 % of the exposure values of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight. Where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts, which the originator institution would achieve by this securitisation is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, competent authorities may decide on a case-by-case basis that significant credit risk shall not be considered to have been transferred to third parties. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, mezzanine securitisation positions mean securitisation positions to which a risk weight lower than 1 250 % applies and that are more junior than the most senior position in this securitisation and more junior than any securitisation position in this securitisation to which either of the following is assigned in accordance with Section 4: (a) in the case of a securitisation position subject to Section 3, Sub-section 3 a credit quality step 1; (b) in the case of a securitisation position subject to points Section 3, Sub-section 4 a credit quality step 1 or 2. 4. As an alternative to paragraphs 2 and 3, competent authorities shall grant permission to originator institutions to consider significant credit risk as having been transferred where the originator institution is able to demonstrate, in every case of a securitisation, that the reduction of own funds requirements which the originator achieves by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties. Permission shall be granted only where the institution meets all of the following conditions: (a) the institution has appropriately risk-sensitive policies and methodologies in place to assess the transfer of risk; (b) the institution has also recognised the transfer of credit risk to third parties in each case for purposes of the institution's internal risk management and its internal capital allocation. 5. In addition to the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4, as applicable, all the following conditions shall be met: (a) the securitisation documentation reflects the economic substance of the transaction; (b) the securitised exposures are put beyond the reach of the originator institution and its creditors, including in bankruptcy and receivership. This shall be supported by the opinion of qualified legal counsel; (c) the securities issued do not represent payment obligations of the originator institution; (d) the originator institution does not maintain effective or indirect control over the transferred exposures. An originator shall be considered to have maintained effective control over the transferred exposures if it has the right to repurchase from the transferee the previously transferred exposures in order to realise their benefits or if it is obligated to re-assume transferred risk. The originator institution's retention of servicing rights or obligations in respect of the exposures shall not of itself constitute indirect control of the exposures; (e) the securitisation documentation meets all the following conditions: (i) it does not contain clauses that other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator institution including but not limited to altering the underlying credit exposures or increasing the yield payable to investors in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the securitised exposures; (ii) it does not contain clauses that increase the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool; (iii) it makes it clear, where applicable, that any purchase or repurchase of securitisation positions by the originator or sponsor beyond its contractual obligations is exceptional and may only be made at arm's length; (f) where there is a clean-up call option, that option shall also meet the following conditions: (i) it is exercisable at the discretion of the originator institution; (ii) it may only be exercised when 10 % or less of the original value of the exposures securitised remains unamortised; (iii) it is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement. 6. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the specific cases, referred to in paragraph 2, where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, and the use institutions make of paragraph 4. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines. EBA shall review Member States' implementation of those guidelines and provide advice to the Commission by 31 December 2017 on whether a binding technical standard is required.
Article 244 Synthetic securitisation
1. An originator institution of a synthetic securitisation may calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, for the securitised exposures in accordance with Article 249, if either of the following is met: (a) significant credit risk is considered to have been transferred to third parties either through funded or unfunded credit protection; (b) the originator institution applies a 1 250 % risk weight to all securitisation positions it holds in this securitisation or deducts these securitisation positions from Common Equity Tier 1 items in accordance with Article 36(1)(k). 2. Significant credit risk shall be considered to have been transferred if either of the following conditions is met: (a) the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the mezzanine securitisation positions which are held by the originator institution in this securitisation do not exceed 50 % of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of all mezzanine securitisation positions existing in this securitisation; (b) where there are no mezzanine securitisation positions in a given securitisation and the originator can demonstrate that the exposure value of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight exceeds a reasoned estimate of the expected loss on the securitised exposures by a substantial margin, the originator institution does not hold more than 20 % of the exposure values of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight. Where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts, which the originator institution would achieve by this securitisation, is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, competent authority may decide on a case- by-case basis that significant credit risk shall not be considered to have been transferred to third parties. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, mezzanine securitisation positions means securitisation positions to which a risk weight lower than 1 250 % applies and that are more junior than the most senior position in this securitisation and more junior than any securitisation positions in this securitisation to which either of the following is assigned in accordance with Section 4: (a) in the case of a securitisation position subject to Section 3, Sub-section 3 a credit quality step 1; (b) in the case of a securitisation position subject to Section 3, Sub-section 4 a credit quality step 1 or 2. 4. As an alternative to paragraphs 2 and 3, competent authorities shall grant permission to originator institutions to consider significant credit risk as having been transferred where the originator institution is able to demonstrate, in every case of a securitisation, that the reduction of own funds requirements which the originator achieves by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties. Permission shall be granted only where the institution meets all of the following conditions: (a) the institution has appropriately risk-sensitive policies and methodologies in place to assess the transfer of risk; (b) the institution has also recognised the transfer of credit risk to third parties in each case for the purposes of the institution's internal risk management and its internal capital allocation. 5. In addition to the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4, as applicable, the transfer shall comply with the following conditions: (a) the securitisation documentation reflects the economic substance of the transaction; (b) the credit protection by which the credit risk is transferred complies with Article 247(2); (c) the instruments used to transfer credit risk do not contain terms or conditions that: (i) impose significant materiality thresholds below which credit protection is deemed not to be triggered if a credit event occurs; (ii) allow for the termination of the protection due to deterioration of the credit quality of the underlying exposures; (iii) other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator institution; (iv) increase the institution's cost of credit protection or the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool; (c) the instruments used to transfer credit risk do not contain terms or conditions that: (i) impose significant materiality thresholds below which credit protection is deemed not to be triggered if a credit event occurs; (ii) allow for the termination of the protection due to deterioration of the credit quality of the underlying exposures; (iii) other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator institution; (iv) increase the institution's cost of credit protection or the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool; (d) an opinion is obtained from qualified legal counsel confirming the enforceability of the credit protection in all relevant jurisdictions; (e) the securitisation documentation shall make clear, where applicable, that any purchase or repurchase of securitisation positions by the originator or sponsor beyond its contractual obligations may only be made at arm's length; (f) where there is a clean-up call option, that option meets all the following conditions: (i) it is exercisable at the discretion of the originator institution; (ii) it may only be exercised when 10 % or less of the original value of the exposures securitised remains unamortised; (iii) it is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement. (f) where there is a clean-up call option, that option meets all the following conditions: (i) it is exercisable at the discretion of the originator institution; (ii) it may only be exercised when 10 % or less of the original value of the exposures securitised remains unamortised; (iii) it is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement. 6. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the specific cases, referred to in paragraph 2, where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, and the use institutions make of paragraph 4. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines. EBA shall review Member States' implementation of those guidelines and provide advice to the Commission by 31 December 2017 on whether a binding technical standard is required.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 244 Synthetic securitisation):
1. An originator institution of a synthetic securitisation may calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, for the securitised exposures in accordance with Article 249, if either of the following is met: (a) significant credit risk is considered to have been transferred to third parties either through funded or unfunded credit protection; (b) the originator institution applies a 1 250 % risk weight to all securitisation positions it holds in this securitisation or deducts these securitisation positions from Common Equity Tier 1 items in accordance with Article 36(1)(k). 2. Significant credit risk shall be considered to have been transferred if either of the following conditions is met: (a) the risk-weighted exposure amounts of the mezzanine securitisation positions which are held by the originator institution in this securitisation do not exceed 50 % of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of all mezzanine securitisation positions existing in this securitisation; (b) where there are no mezzanine securitisation positions in a given securitisation and the originator can demonstrate that the exposure value of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight exceeds a reasoned estimate of the expected loss on the securitised exposures by a substantial margin, the originator institution does not hold more than 20 % of the exposure values of the securitisation positions that would be subject to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 or a 1 250 % risk weight. Where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts, which the originator institution would achieve by this securitisation, is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, competent authority may decide on a case- by-case basis that significant credit risk shall not be considered to have been transferred to third parties. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, mezzanine securitisation positions means securitisation positions to which a risk weight lower than 1 250 % applies and that are more junior than the most senior position in this securitisation and more junior than any securitisation positions in this securitisation to which either of the following is assigned in accordance with Section 4: (a) in the case of a securitisation position subject to Section 3, Sub-section 3 a credit quality step 1; (b) in the case of a securitisation position subject to Section 3, Sub-section 4 a credit quality step 1 or 2. 4. As an alternative to paragraphs 2 and 3, competent authorities shall grant permission to originator institutions to consider significant credit risk as having been transferred where the originator institution is able to demonstrate, in every case of a securitisation, that the reduction of own funds requirements which the originator achieves by the securitisation is justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties. Permission shall be granted only where the institution meets all of the following conditions: (a) the institution has appropriately risk-sensitive policies and methodologies in place to assess the transfer of risk; (b) the institution has also recognised the transfer of credit risk to third parties in each case for the purposes of the institution's internal risk management and its internal capital allocation. 5. In addition to the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4, as applicable, the transfer shall comply with the following conditions: (a) the securitisation documentation reflects the economic substance of the transaction; (b) the credit protection by which the credit risk is transferred complies with Article 247(2); (c) the instruments used to transfer credit risk do not contain terms or conditions that: (i) impose significant materiality thresholds below which credit protection is deemed not to be triggered if a credit event occurs; (ii) allow for the termination of the protection due to deterioration of the credit quality of the underlying exposures; (iii) other than in the case of early amortisation provisions, require positions in the securitisation to be improved by the originator institution; (iv) increase the institution's cost of credit protection or the yield payable to holders of positions in the securitisation in response to a deterioration in the credit quality of the underlying pool; (d) an opinion is obtained from qualified legal counsel confirming the enforceability of the credit protection in all relevant jurisdictions; (e) the securitisation documentation shall make clear, where applicable, that any purchase or repurchase of securitisation positions by the originator or sponsor beyond its contractual obligations may only be made at arm's length; (f) where there is a clean-up call option, that option meets all the following conditions: (i) it is exercisable at the discretion of the originator institution; (ii) it may only be exercised when 10 % or less of the original value of the exposures securitised remains unamortised; (iii) it is not structured to avoid allocating losses to credit enhancement positions or other positions held by investors and is not otherwise structured to provide credit enhancement. 6. The competent authorities shall keep EBA informed about the specific cases, referred to in paragraph 2, where the possible reduction in risk-weighted exposure amounts is not justified by a commensurate transfer of credit risk to third parties, and the use institutions make of paragraph 4. EBA shall monitor the range of practices in this area and shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines. EBA shall review Member States' implementation of those guidelines and provide advice to the Commission by 31 December 2017 on whether a binding technical standard is required.
Article 245 Calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts
1. Where an originator institution has transferred significant credit risk associated with securitised exposures in accordance with Section 2, that institution may: (a) in the case of a traditional securitisation, exclude from its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, the exposures which it has securitised; (b) in the case of a synthetic securitisation, calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts, in respect of the securitised exposures in accordance with Articles 249 and 250. 2. Where the originator institution has decided to apply paragraph 1, it shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts prescribed in this Chapter for the positions that it may hold in the securitisation. Where the originator institution has not transferred significant credit risk or has decided not to apply paragraph 1, it need not calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts for any positions it may have in the securitisation in question but shall continue including the securitised exposures in its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts as if they had not been securitised. 3. Where there is an exposure to different tranches in a securitisation, the exposure to each tranche shall be considered a separate securitisation position. The providers of credit protection to securitisation positions shall be considered to hold positions in the securitisation. Securitisation positions shall include exposures to a securitisation arising from interest rate or currency derivative contracts. 4. Unless a securitisation position is deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 items pursuant to Article 36(1)(k), the risk-weighted exposure amount shall be included in the institution's total of risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3). 5. The risk-weighted exposure amount of a securitisation position shall be calculated by applying to the exposure value of the position, calculated as set out in Article 246, the relevant total risk weight. 6. The total risk weight shall be determined as the sum of the risk weight set out in this Chapter and any additional risk weight in accordance with Article 407.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 247 Calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts):
1. Where an originator institution has transferred significant credit risk associated with the underlying exposures of the securitisation in accordance with Section 2, that institution may: (a) in the case of a traditional securitisation, exclude the underlying exposures from its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, as relevant, expected loss amounts; (b) in the case of a synthetic securitisation, calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts, and, where relevant, expected loss amounts, with respect to the underlying exposures in accordance with Articles 251 and 252. 2. Where the originator institution has decided to apply paragraph 1, it shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts as set out in this Chapter for the positions that it may hold in the securitisation. Where the originator institution has not transferred significant credit risk or has decided not to apply paragraph 1, it shall not be required to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts for any position it may have in the securitisation but shall continue including the underlying exposures in its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and, where relevant, expected loss amounts as if they had not been securitised. 3. Where there is an exposure to positions in different tranches in a securitisation, the exposure to each tranche shall be considered a separate securitisation position. The providers of credit protection to securitisation positions shall be considered as holding positions in the securitisation. Securitisation positions shall include exposures to a securitisation arising from interest rate or currency derivative contracts that the institution has entered into with the transaction. 4. Unless a securitisation position is deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 items pursuant to point (k) of Article 36(1), the risk-weighted exposure amount shall be included in the institution’s total of risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3). 5. The risk-weighted exposure amount of a securitisation position shall be calculated by multiplying the exposure value of the position, calculated as set out in Article 248, by the relevant total risk weight. 6. The total risk weight shall be determined as the sum of the risk weight set out in this Chapter and any additional risk weight in accordance with Article 270a.
Article 246 Exposure value
1. The exposure value shall be calculated as follows: (a) where an institution calculates risk-weighted exposure amounts under Sub-section 3, the exposure value of an on-balance sheet securitisation position shall be its accounting value remaining after specific credit risk adjustments treated in accordance with Article 110 have been applied; (b) where an institution calculates risk-weighted exposure amounts under Sub-section 4, the exposure value of an on-balance sheet securitisation position shall be the accounting value measured without taking into account any credit risk adjustments treated in accordance with Article 110 made; (c) where an institution calculates risk-weighted exposure amounts under Sub-section 3, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet securitisation position shall be its nominal value, less any specific credit risk adjustment of that securitisation position, multiplied by a conversion factor as prescribed in this Chapter. The conversion factor shall be 100 % unless otherwise specified; (d) where an institution calculates risk-weighted exposure amounts under Sub-section 4, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet securitisation position shall be its nominal value multiplied by a conversion factor as prescribed in this Chapter. The conversion factor shall be 100 % unless otherwise specified; (e) The exposure value for the counterparty credit risk of a derivative instrument listed in Annex II, shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 6. 2. Where an institution has two or more overlapping positions in a securitisation, it shall, to the extent that they overlap include in its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts only the position or portion of a position producing the higher risk-weighted exposure amounts. The institution may also recognise such overlap between specific risk own funds requirements for positions in the trading book and own funds requirements for securitisation positions in the non-trading book, provided that the institution is able to calculate and compare the own funds requirements for the relevant positions. For the purpose of this paragraph, overlapping occurs when the positions, wholly or partially, represent an exposure to the same risk such that, to the extent of the overlap, there is a single exposure. 3. Where Article 268(c) applies to positions in the ABCP, the institution may, use the risk-weight assigned to a liquidity facility in order to calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount for the ABCP provided that 100 % of the ABCP issued by the programme is covered by this or other liquidity facilities and all of those liquidity facilities rank pari passu with the ABCP so that they form overlapping positions. The institution shall notify to the competent authorities the use it makes of that treatment.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 248 Exposure value):
1. The exposure value of a securitisation position shall be calculated as follows: (a) the exposure value of an on-balance sheet securitisation position shall be its accounting value remaining after any relevant specific credit risk adjustments on the securitisation position have been applied in accordance with Article 110; (b) the exposure value of an off-balance sheet securitisation position shall be its nominal value less any relevant specific credit risk adjustments on the securitisation position in accordance with Article 110, multiplied by the relevant conversion factor as set out in this point. The conversion factor shall be 100 %, except in the case of cash advance facilities. To determine the exposure value of the undrawn portion of the cash advance facilities, a conversion factor of 0 % may be applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity facility that is unconditionally cancellable provided that repayment of draws on the facility are senior to any other claims on the cash flows arising from the underlying exposures and the institution has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that it is applying an appropriately conservative method for measuring the amount of the undrawn portion; (c) the exposure value for the counterparty credit risk of a securitisation position that results from a derivative instrument listed in Annex II, shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 6; (d) an originator institution may deduct from the exposure value of a securitisation position which is assigned 1 250 % risk weight in accordance with Subsection 3 or deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 in accordance with point (k) of Article 36(1), the amount of the specific credit risk adjustments on the underlying exposures in accordance with Article 110, and any non-refundable purchase price discounts connected with such underlying exposures to the extent that such discounts have caused the reduction of own funds. The EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify what constitutes an appropriately conservative method for measuring the amount of the undrawn portion referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph. The EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 18 January 2019. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the third subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 2. Where an institution has two or more overlapping positions in a securitisation, it shall include only one of the positions in its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts. Where the positions partially overlap, the institution may split the position into two parts and recognise the overlap in relation to one part only in accordance with the first subparagraph. Alternatively, the institution may treat the positions as if they were fully overlapping by expanding for capital calculation purposes the position that produces the higher risk-weighted exposure amounts. The institution may also recognise an overlap between the specific risk own funds requirements for positions in the trading book and the own funds requirements for securitisation positions in the non-trading book, provided that the institution is able to calculate and compare the own funds requirements for the relevant positions. For the purposes of this paragraph, two positions shall be deemed to be overlapping where they are mutually offsetting in such a manner that the institution is able to preclude the losses arising from one position by performing the obligations required under the other position. 3. Where point (d) of Article 270c applies to positions in an ABCP, the institution may use the risk weight assigned to a liquidity facility in order to calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount for the ABCP, provided that the liquidity facility covers 100 % of the ABCP issued by the ABCP programme and the liquidity facility ranks pari passu with the ABCP in a manner that they form an overlapping position. The institution shall notify the competent authorities where it has applied the provisions laid down in this paragraph. For the purposes of determining the 100 % coverage set out in this paragraph, the institution may take into account other liquidity facilities in the ABCP programme, provided that they form an overlapping position with the ABCP.
Article 247 Recognition of credit risk mitigation for securitisation positions
1. An institution may recognise funded or unfunded credit protection obtained in respect of a securitisation position in accordance with Chapter 4 and subject to the requirements laid down in this Chapter and in Chapter 4. Eligible funded credit protection is limited to financial collateral which is eligible for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under Chapter 2 as laid down under Chapter 4 and recognition is subject to compliance with the relevant requirements as laid down under Chapter 4. 2. Eligible unfunded credit protection and unfunded credit protection providers are limited to those which are eligible under Chapter 4 and recognition is subject to compliance with the relevant requirements laid down under Chapter 4. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the eligible providers of unfunded credit protection listed in points (a) to (h) of Article 201(1) except for qualifying central counterparties shall have a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI which has been determined to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under Article 136 and shall have been associated with credit quality step 2 or above at the time the credit protection was first recognised. Institutions that have a permission to apply the IRB Approach to a direct exposure to the protection provider may assess eligibility in accordance with the first sentence based on the equivalence of the PD for the protection provider to the PD associated with the credit quality steps referred to in Article 136. 4. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, SSPEs are eligible protection providers where they own assets that qualify as eligible financial collateral and to which there are no rights or contingent rights preceding or ranking pari passu to the contingent rights of the institution receiving unfunded credit protection and all requirements for the recognition of financial collateral in Chapter 4 are fulfilled. In those cases, GA (the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch and maturity mismatch in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4) shall be limited to the volatility adjusted market value of those assets and g (the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under the Standardised Approach) shall be determined as the weighted-average risk weight that would apply to those assets as financial collateral under the Standardised Approach.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 249 Recognition of credit risk mitigation for securitisation positions):
1. An institution may recognise funded or unfunded credit protection with respect to a securitisation position where the requirements for credit risk mitigation laid down in this Chapter and in Chapter 4 are met. 2. Eligible funded credit protection shall be limited to financial collateral which is eligible for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under Chapter 2 as laid down under Chapter 4 and recognition of credit risk mitigation shall be subject to compliance with the relevant requirements as laid down under Chapter 4. Eligible unfunded credit protection and unfunded credit protection providers shall be limited to those which are eligible in accordance with Chapter 4 and recognition of credit risk mitigation shall be subject to compliance with the relevant requirements as laid down under Chapter 4. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the eligible providers of unfunded credit protection listed in points (a) to (h) of Article 201(1) shall have been assigned a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI which is credit quality step 2 or above at the time the credit protection was first recognised and credit quality step 3 or above thereafter. The requirement set out in this subparagraph shall not apply to qualifying central counterparties. Institutions which are allowed to apply the IRB Approach to a direct exposure to the protection provider may assess eligibility in accordance with the first subparagraph based on the equivalence of the PD for the protection provider to the PD associated with the credit quality steps referred to in Article 136. 4. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, SSPEs shall be eligible protection providers where all of the following conditions are met: (a) the SSPE owns assets that qualify as eligible financial collateral in accordance with Chapter 4; (b) the assets referred to in point (a) are not subject to claims or contingent claims ranking ahead or pari passu with the claim or contingent claim of the institution receiving unfunded credit protection; and (c) all the requirements for the recognition of financial collateral set out in Chapter 4 are met. 5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency and maturity mismatches (Ga) in accordance with Chapter 4 shall be limited to the volatility adjusted market value of those assets and the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under the Standardised Approach (g) shall be determined as the weighted-average risk weight that would apply to those assets as financial collateral under the Standardised Approach. 6. Where a securitisation position benefits from full credit protection or a partial credit protection on a pro-rata basis, the following requirements shall apply: (a) the institution providing credit protection shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts for the portion of the securitisation position benefiting from credit protection in accordance with Subsection 3 as if it held that portion of the position directly; (b) the institution buying credit protection shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Chapter 4 for the protected portion. 7. In all cases not covered by paragraph 6, the following requirements shall apply: (a) the institution providing credit protection shall treat the portion of the position benefiting from credit protection as a securitisation position and shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts as if it held that position directly in accordance with Subsection 3, subject to paragraphs 8, 9 and 10; (b) the institution buying credit protection shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts for the protected portion of the position referred to in point (a) in accordance with Chapter 4. The institution shall treat the portion of the securitisation position not benefiting from credit protection as a separate securitisation position and shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Subsection 3, subject to paragraphs 8, 9 and 10. 8. Institutions using the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) or the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA) under Subsection 3 shall determine the attachment point (A) and detachment point (D) separately for each of the positions derived in accordance with paragraph 7 as if these had been issued as separate securitisation positions at the time of origination of the transaction. The value of K IRB or K SA , respectively, shall be calculated taking into account the original pool of exposures underlying the securitisation. 9. Institutions using the Securitisation External Ratings Based Approach (SEC-ERBA) under Subsection 3 for the original securitisation position shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts for the positions derived in accordance with paragraph 7 as follows: (a) where the derived position has the higher seniority, it shall be assigned the risk weight of the original securitisation position; (b) where the derived position has the lower seniority, it may be assigned an inferred rating in accordance with Article 263(7). In that case, thickness input T shall only be computed on the basis of the derived position. Where a rating may not be inferred, the institution shall apply the higher of the risk weight resulting from either: (i) applying the SEC-SA in accordance with paragraph 8 and Subsection 3; or (ii) the risk weight of the original securitisation position under the SEC-ERBA. 10. The derived position with the lower seniority shall be treated as a non-senior securitisation position even if the original securitisation position prior to protection qualifies as senior.
Article 248 Implicit support
1. A sponsor institution, or an originator institution which in respect of a securitisation has made use of Article 245(1) and (2) in the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts or has sold instruments from its trading book to the effect that it is no longer required to hold own funds for the risks of those instruments shall not, with a view to reducing potential or actual losses to investors, provide support to the securitisation beyond its contractual obligations. A transaction shall not be considered to provide support if it is executed at arm's length and taken into account in the assessment of significant risk transfer. Any such transaction shall be, regardless of whether it provides support, notified to the competent authorities and subject to the institution's credit review and approval process. The institution shall, when assessing whether the transaction is not structured to provide support, adequately consider at least all the following: (a) the price of the repurchase; (b) the institution's capital and liquidity position before and after repurchase; (c) the performance of the securitised exposures; (d) the performance of the securitisation positions; (e) the impact of support on the losses expected to be incurred by the originator relative to investors. 2. EBA shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines on what constitutes at arm's length and when a transaction is not structured to provide support. 3. If an originator institution or a sponsor institution fails to comply with paragraph 1 in respect of a securitisation this institution shall at a minimum hold own funds against all of the securitised exposures as if they had not been securitised. Sub-Section 2 Originator institutions' calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts securitised in a synthetic securitisation
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 250 Implicit support):
1. A sponsor institution, or an originator institution which in respect of a securitisation has made use of Article 247(1) and (2) in the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts or has sold instruments from its trading book to the effect that it is no longer required to hold own funds for the risks of those instruments shall not provide support, directly or indirectly, to the securitisation beyond its contractual obligations with a view to reducing potential or actual losses to investors. 2. A transaction shall not be considered as support for the purposes of paragraph 1 where the transaction has been duly taken into account in the assessment of significant credit risk transfer and both parties have executed the transaction acting in their own interest as free and independent parties (arm’s length). For these purposes, the institution shall undertake a full credit review of the transaction and, at a minimum, take into account all of the following items: (a) the repurchase price; (b) the institution’s capital and liquidity position before and after repurchase; (c) the performance of the underlying exposures; (d) the performance of the securitisation positions; (e) the impact of support on the losses expected to be incurred by the originator relative to investors. 3. The originator institution and the sponsor institution shall notify the competent authority of any transaction entered into in relation to the securitisation in accordance with paragraph 2. 4. The EBA shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, issue guidelines on what constitutes ‘arm’s length’ for the purposes of this Article and the circumstances under which a transaction is not structured to provide support. 5. If an originator institution or a sponsor institution fails to comply with paragraph 1 in respect of a securitisation, the institution shall include all of the underlying exposures of that securitisation in its calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts as if they had not been securitised and disclose: (a) that it has provided support to the securitisation in breach of paragraph 1; and (b) the impact of the support provided in terms of own funds requirements.
Article 249 General treatment
In calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for the securitised exposures, where the conditions in Article 244 are met, the originator institution of a synthetic securitisation shall, subject to Article 250, use the relevant calculation methodologies set out in this Section and not those set out in Chapter 2. For institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under Chapter 3, the expected loss amount in respect of such exposures shall be zero. The requirements set out in the first subparagraph apply to the entire pool of exposures included in the securitisation. Subject to Article 250, the originator institution shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts in respect of all tranches in the securitisation in accordance with the provisions of this Section including those for which the institution recognises credit risk mitigation in accordance with Article 247, in which case the risk-weight to be applied to that position may be amended in accordance with Chapter 4, subject to the requirements laid down in this Chapter.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 251 Originator institutions’ calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts securitised in a synthetic securitisation):
1. For the purpose of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for the underlying exposures, the originator institution of a synthetic securitisation shall use the calculation methodologies set out in this Section where applicable instead of those set out in Chapter 2. For institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and, where relevant, expected loss amounts with respect to the underlying exposures under Chapter 3, the expected loss amount in respect of such exposures shall be zero. 2. The requirements set out in paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply to the entire pool of exposures backing the securitisation. Subject to Article 252, the originator institution shall calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts with respect to all tranches in the securitisation in accordance with this Section, including the positions in relation to which the institution is able to recognise credit risk mitigation in accordance with Article 249. The risk weight to be applied to positions which benefit from credit risk mitigation may be amended in accordance with Chapter 4.
Article 250 Treatment of maturity mismatches in synthetic securitisations
For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Article 249, any maturity mismatch between the credit protection which constitutes a tranche and by which the transfer of risk is achieved and the securitised exposures shall be taken into consideration as follows: (a) the maturity of the securitised exposures shall be taken to be the longest maturity of any of those exposures subject to a maximum of five years. The maturity of the credit protection shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 4; (b) an originator institution shall ignore any maturity mismatch in calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for tranches appearing pursuant to this Section with a risk weighting of 1 250 %. For all other tranches, the maturity mismatch treatment set out in Chapter 4 shall be applied in accordance with the following formula: where: RW* = risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3)(a); RW Ass = risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures if they had not been securitised, calculated on a pro-rata basis; RW SP = risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated under Article 249 if there was no maturity mismatch; T = maturity of the underlying exposures expressed in years; t = maturity of credit protection. expressed in years; t* = 0,25. (b) an originator institution shall ignore any maturity mismatch in calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for tranches appearing pursuant to this Section with a risk weighting of 1 250 %. For all other tranches, the maturity mismatch treatment set out in Chapter 4 shall be applied in accordance with the following formula: where: RW* = risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3)(a); RW* = risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3)(a); RW Ass = risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures if they had not been securitised, calculated on a pro-rata basis; RW Ass risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures if they had not been securitised, calculated on a pro-rata basis; RW SP = risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated under Article 249 if there was no maturity mismatch; RW SP risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated under Article 249 if there was no maturity mismatch; T = maturity of the underlying exposures expressed in years; maturity of the underlying exposures expressed in years; t = maturity of credit protection. expressed in years; maturity of credit protection. expressed in years; t* = 0,25. t* 0,25. Sub-Section 3 Calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 250 Treatment of maturity mismatches in synthetic securitisations):
For the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Article 249, any maturity mismatch between the credit protection which constitutes a tranche and by which the transfer of risk is achieved and the securitised exposures shall be taken into consideration as follows: (a) the maturity of the securitised exposures shall be taken to be the longest maturity of any of those exposures subject to a maximum of five years. The maturity of the credit protection shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 4; (b) an originator institution shall ignore any maturity mismatch in calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts for tranches appearing pursuant to this Section with a risk weighting of 1 250 %. For all other tranches, the maturity mismatch treatment set out in Chapter 4 shall be applied in accordance with the following formula: where: RW* = risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3)(a); RW* = risk-weighted exposure amounts for the purposes of Article 92(3)(a); RW Ass = risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures if they had not been securitised, calculated on a pro-rata basis; RW Ass risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures if they had not been securitised, calculated on a pro-rata basis; RW SP = risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated under Article 249 if there was no maturity mismatch; RW SP risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated under Article 249 if there was no maturity mismatch; T = maturity of the underlying exposures expressed in years; maturity of the underlying exposures expressed in years; t = maturity of credit protection. expressed in years; maturity of credit protection. expressed in years; t* = 0,25. t* 0,25. Sub-Section 3 Calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach
Article 251 Risk-weights
Subject to Article 252, the institution shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount of a rated securitisation or re-securitisation position by applying the relevant risk weight to the exposure value. The relevant risk weight shall be the risk weight as laid down in Table 1, with which the credit assessment of the position is associated in accordance with Section 4. Table 1 Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 (only for credit assessments other than short-term credit assessments) all other credit quality steps Securitisation positions 20 % 50 % 100 % 350 % 1 250 % Re-securitisation positions 40 % 100 % 225 % 650 % 1 250 % Table 1 Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 (only for credit assessments other than short-term credit assessments) all other credit quality steps Securitisation positions 20 % 50 % 100 % 350 % 1 250 % Re-securitisation positions 40 % 100 % 225 % 650 % 1 250 % Credit Quality Step 1 2 3 4 (only for credit assessments other than short-term credit assessments) all other credit quality steps Credit Quality Step 4 (only for credit assessments other than short-term credit assessments) all other credit quality steps Securitisation positions 20 % 50 % 100 % 350 % 1 250 % Securitisation positions 20 % 1 250 % Re-securitisation positions 40 % 100 % 225 % 650 % 1 250 % Re-securitisation positions Subject to Articles 252 to 255, the risk-weighted exposure amount of an unrated securitisation position shall be calculated by applying a risk weight of 1 250 %.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 252 Originator and sponsor institutions
For an originator institution or sponsor institution, the risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated in respect of its securitisation positions in any one securitisation may be limited to the risk-weighted exposure amounts which would currently be calculated for the securitised exposures had they not been securitised subject to the presumed application of a 150 % risk weight to the following: (a) all items currently in default; (b) all items associated with particularly high risk in accordance with Article 128 amongst the securitised exposures.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 253 Treatment of unrated positions
1. For the purpose of calculating the risk-weighted exposure amount of an unrated securitisation position an institution may apply the weighted-average risk weight that would be applied to the securitised exposures under Chapter 2 by an institution holding the exposures, multiplied by the concentration ratio referred to in paragraph 2. For this purpose, the institution shall know the composition of the pool of securitised exposures securitised at all times. 2. The concentration ratio shall be equal to the sum of the nominal amounts of all the tranches divided by the sum of the nominal amounts of the tranches junior to or pari passu with the tranche in which the position is held including that tranche itself. The resulting risk weight shall not be higher than 1 250 % or lower than any risk weight applicable to a rated more senior tranche. Where the institution is unable to determine the risk weights that would be applied to the securitised exposures under Chapter 2, it shall apply a risk weight of 1 250 % to the position.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 254 Treatment of securitisation positions in a second loss tranche or better in an ABCP programme
Subject to the availability of a more favourable treatment for unrated liquidity facilities under Article 255 an institution may apply to securitisation positions meeting the following conditions a risk weight that is the greater of 100 % or the highest of the risk weights that would be applied to any of the securitised exposures under Chapter 2 by an institution holding the exposures: (a) the securitisation position shall be in a tranche which is economically in a second loss position or better in the securitisation and the first loss tranche shall provide meaningful credit enhancement to the second loss tranche; (b) the quality of the securitisation position shall be equivalent to credit quality step 3 under the Standardised Approach or better; (c) the securitisation position shall be held by an institution which does not hold a position in the first loss tranche.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 255 Treatment of unrated liquidity facilities
1. Institutions may apply a conversion factor of 50 % to the nominal amount of an unrated liquidity facility in order to determine its exposure value when the following conditions are met: (a) the liquidity facility documentation shall clearly identify and limit the circumstances under which the facility may be drawn; (b) it shall not be possible for the facility to be drawn so as to provide credit support by covering losses already incurred at the time of draw and in particular not so as to provide liquidity in respect of exposures in default at the time of draw or so as to acquire assets at more than fair value; (c) the facility shall not be used to provide permanent or regular funding for the securitisation; (d) repayment of draws on the facility shall not be subordinated to the claims of investors other than to claims arising in respect of interest rate or currency derivative contracts, fees or other such payments, nor be subject to waiver or deferral; (e) it shall not be possible for the facility to be drawn after all applicable credit enhancements from which the liquidity facility would benefit are exhausted; (f) the facility shall include a provision that results in an automatic reduction in the amount that can be drawn by the amount of exposures that are in default, where ‘default’ has the meaning given to it under Chapter 3, or where the pool of securitised exposures consists of rated instruments, that terminates the facility if the average quality of the pool falls below investment grade. The risk weight to be applied shall be the highest risk weight that would be applied to any of the securitised exposures under Chapter 2 by an institution holding the exposures. 2. To determine the exposure value of cash advance facilities, a conversion factor of 0 % may be applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity facility that is unconditionally cancellable provided that the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are satisfied and that repayment of draws on the facility are senior to any other claims on the cash flows arising from the securitised exposures.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 256 Additional own funds requirements for securitisations of revolving exposures with early amortisation provisions
1. Where there is a securitisation of revolving exposures subject to an early amortisation provision, the originator institution shall calculate an additional risk-weighted exposure amount in respect of the risk that the levels of credit risk to which it is exposed may increase following the operation of the early amortisation provision, in accordance with this Article. 2. The institution shall calculate a risk-weighted exposure amount in respect of the sum of the exposure values of the originator's interest and the investors' interest. For securitisation structures where the securitised exposures comprise revolving and non-revolving exposures, an originator institution shall apply the treatment set out in paragraphs 3 to 6 to that portion of the underlying pool containing revolving exposures. The exposure value of the originator's interest shall be the exposure value of that notional part of a pool of drawn amounts sold into a securitisation, the proportion of which in relation to the amount of the total pool sold into the structure determines the proportion of the cash flows generated by principal and interest collections and other associated amounts which are not available to make payments to those having securitisation positions in the securitisation. The originator's interest shall not be subordinate to the investors' interest. The exposure value of the investors' interest shall be the exposure value of the remaining notional part of the pool of drawn amounts. The risk-weighted exposure amount in respect of the exposure value of the originator's interest shall be calculated as that for a pro rata exposure to the securitised exposures as if they had not been securitised. 3. Originators of the following types of securitisation are exempt from the calculation of an additional risk-weighted exposure amount in paragraph 1: (a) securitisations of revolving exposures whereby investors remain fully exposed to all future draws by borrowers so that the risk on the underlying facilities does not return to the originator institution even after an early amortisation event has occurred; (b) securitisations where any early amortisation provision is solely triggered by events not related to the performance of the securitised assets or the originator institution, such as material changes in tax laws or regulations. 4. For an originator institution subject to the calculation of an additional risk-weighted exposure amount in accordance with paragraph 1 the total of the risk-weighted exposure amounts in respect of its positions in the investors' interest and the risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated under paragraph 1 shall be no greater than the greater of: (a) the risk-weighted exposure amounts calculated in respect of its positions in the investors' interest; (b) the risk-weighted exposure amounts that would be calculated in respect of the securitised exposures by an institution holding the exposures as if they had not been securitised in an amount equal to the investors' interest. Deduction of net gains, if any, arising from the capitalisation of future income required under Article 32(1), shall be treated outside the maximum amount indicated in the preceding subparagraph. 5. The risk-weighted exposure amount to be calculated in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be determined by multiplying the exposure value of the investors' interest by the product of the appropriate conversion factor as indicated in paragraphs 6 to 9 and the weighted average risk weight that would apply to the securitised exposures if the exposures had not been securitised. An early amortisation provision shall be considered to be controlled where all of the following conditions are met: (a) the originator institution has an appropriate own funds/liquidity plan in place to ensure that it has sufficient own funds and liquidity available in the event of an early amortisation; (b) throughout the duration of the transaction there is pro-rata sharing between the originator's interest and the investor's interest of payments of interest and principal, expenses, losses and recoveries based on the balance of receivables outstanding at one or more reference points during each month; (c) the amortisation period is considered sufficient for 90 % of the total debt (originator's and investors' interest) outstanding at the beginning of the early amortisation period to have been repaid or recognised as in default; (d) the speed of repayment is no more rapid than would be achieved by straight-line amortisation over the period set out in point (c). 6. In the case of securitisations subject to an early amortisation provision of retail exposures which are uncommitted and unconditionally cancellable without prior notice, where the early amortisation is triggered by the excess spread level falling to a specified level, institutions shall compare the three-month average excess spread level with the excess spread levels at which excess spread is required to be trapped. Where the securitisation does not require excess spread to be trapped, the trapping point is deemed to be 4,5 percentage points greater than the excess spread level at which an early amortisation is triggered. The conversion factor to be applied shall be determined by the level of the actual three month average excess spread in accordance with Table 2. Table 2 Securitisations subject to a controlled early amortisation provision Securitisations subject to a non-controlled early amortisation provision Three months average excess spread Conversion factor Conversion factor Above level A 0 % 0 % Level A 1 % 5 % Level B 2 % 15 % Level C 10 % 50 % Level D 20 % 100 % Level E 40 % 100 % Table 2 Securitisations subject to a controlled early amortisation provision Securitisations subject to a non-controlled early amortisation provision Three months average excess spread Conversion factor Conversion factor Above level A 0 % 0 % Level A 1 % 5 % Level B 2 % 15 % Level C 10 % 50 % Level D 20 % 100 % Level E 40 % 100 % Securitisations subject to a controlled early amortisation provision Securitisations subject to a non-controlled early amortisation provision Securitisations subject to a controlled early amortisation provision Securitisations subject to a non-controlled early amortisation provision Three months average excess spread Conversion factor Conversion factor Three months average excess spread Conversion factor Above level A 0 % 0 % Above level A 0 % Level A 1 % 5 % Level A Level B 2 % 15 % Level B Level C 10 % 50 % Level C Level D 20 % 100 % Level D Level E 40 % 100 % Level E Where: (a) ‘Level A’ refers to levels of excess spread less than 133,33 % of the trapping level of excess spread but not less than 100 % of that trapping level; (b) ‘Level B’ refers to levels of excess spread less than 100 % of the trapping level of excess spread but not less than 75 % of that trapping level; (c) ‘Level C’ refers to levels of excess spread less than 75 % of the trapping level of excess spread but not less than 50 % of that trapping level; (d) ‘Level D’ refers to levels of excess spread less than 50 % of the trapping level of excess spread but not less than 25 % of that trapping level; (e) ‘Level E’ refers to levels of excess spread less than 25 % of the trapping level of excess spread. 7. In the case of securitisations subject to an early amortization provision of retail exposures which are uncommitted and unconditionally cancellable without prior notice and where the early amortization is triggered by a quantitative value in respect of something other than the three months average excess spread, subject to permission by the competent authorities, institutions may apply a treatment which approximates closely to that prescribed in paragraph 6 for determining the conversion factor indicated. The competent authority shall grant permission, if the following conditions are met: (a) that treatment is more appropriate because the institution can establish a quantitative measure equivalent, in relation to the quantitative value triggering early amortisation, to the trapping level of excess spread; (b) that treatment leads to a measure of the risk that the credit risk to which the institution is exposed may increase following the operation of the early amortisation provision that is as prudent as that calculated in accordance with paragraph 6. 8. All other securitisations subject to a controlled early amortisation provision of revolving exposures shall be subject to a conversion factor of 90 %. 9. All other securitisations subject to a non-controlled early amortisation provision of revolving exposures shall be subject to a conversion factor of 100 %.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Article 257 Credit risk mitigation for securitisation positions subject to the Standardised Approach
Where credit protection is obtained on a securitisation position, the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts may be amended in accordance with Chapter 4.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.