Article 275 Original Exposure Method
1. The exposure value is the notional amount of each instrument multiplied by the percentages set out in Table 3. Table 3 Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % Table 3 Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Over one year, not exceeding two years Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % Additional allowance for each additional year 2. For calculating the exposure value of interest-rate contracts, an institution may choose to use either the original or residual maturity.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 275 Original Exposure Method):
1. The exposure value is the notional amount of each instrument multiplied by the percentages set out in Table 3. Table 3 Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % The exposure value is the notional amount of each instrument multiplied by the percentages set out in Table 3. Table 3 Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % Table 3 Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold Original maturity Interest-rate contracts Contracts concerning foreign-exchange rates and gold One year or less 0,5 % 2 % One year or less 0,5 % 2 % Over one year, not exceeding two years 1 % 5 % Over one year, not exceeding two years Additional allowance for each additional year 1 % 3 % Additional allowance for each additional year 2. For calculating the exposure value of interest-rate contracts, an institution may choose to use either the original or residual maturity.
Article 276 Standardised Method
1. Institutions may use the Standardised Method (hereinafter referred to as ‘SM’) only for calculating the exposure value for OTC derivatives and long settlement transactions. 2. When applying the SM, institutions shall calculate the exposure value separately for each netting set, net of collateral, as follows: where: CMV = current market value of the portfolio of transactions within the netting set with a counterparty gross of collateral, where: where: CMV i = the current market value of transaction i ; = current market value of the portfolio of transactions within the netting set with a counterparty gross of collateral, where: CMV i = the current market value of transaction i ; CMV i the current market value of transaction i ; CMC = the current market value of the collateral assigned to the netting set, where: where: CMC l = the current market value of collateral l; the current market value of the collateral assigned to the netting set, where: CMC l = the current market value of collateral l; CMC l the current market value of collateral l; i = index designating transaction; index designating transaction; l = index designating collateral; index designating collateral; j = index designating hedging set category; index designating hedging set category; The hedging sets for this purpose correspond to risk factors for which risk positions of opposite sign can be offset to yield a net risk position on which the exposure measure is then based. RPT ij = risk position from transaction i with respect to hedging set j; RPT ij risk position from transaction i with respect to hedging set j; RPC lj = risk position from collateral l with respect to hedging set j; RPC lj risk position from collateral l with respect to hedging set j; CCRM j = CCR Multiplier set out in Table 5 with respect to hedging set j; CCRM j CCR Multiplier set out in Table 5 with respect to hedging set j; β = 1,4. β 1,4. 3. For the purposes of the calculation under paragraph 2: (a) eligible collateral received from a counterparty shall have a positive sign and collateral posted to a counterparty shall have a negative sign; (b) only collateral that is eligible under Article 197, Article 198 and Article 299(2)(d) shall be used for the SM; (c) an institution may disregard the interest rate risk from payment legs with a remaining maturity of less than one year; (d) an institution may treat transactions that consist of two payment legs that are denominated in the same currency as a single aggregate transaction. The treatment for payment legs applies to the aggregate transaction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 276 Standardised Method):
1. Institutions may use the Standardised Method (hereinafter referred to as ‘SM’) only for calculating the exposure value for OTC derivatives and long settlement transactions. 2. When applying the SM, institutions shall calculate the exposure value separately for each netting set, net of collateral, as follows: where: CMV = current market value of the portfolio of transactions within the netting set with a counterparty gross of collateral, where: where: CMV i = the current market value of transaction i ; CMC = the current market value of the collateral assigned to the netting set, where: where: CMC l = the current market value of collateral l; i = index designating transaction; l = index designating collateral; j = index designating hedging set category; When applying the SM, institutions shall calculate the exposure value separately for each netting set, net of collateral, as follows: where: CMV = current market value of the portfolio of transactions within the netting set with a counterparty gross of collateral, where: where: CMV i = the current market value of transaction i ; = current market value of the portfolio of transactions within the netting set with a counterparty gross of collateral, where: CMV i = the current market value of transaction i ; CMV i the current market value of transaction i ; CMC = the current market value of the collateral assigned to the netting set, where: where: CMC l = the current market value of collateral l; the current market value of the collateral assigned to the netting set, where: CMC l = the current market value of collateral l; CMC l the current market value of collateral l; i = index designating transaction; index designating transaction; l = index designating collateral; index designating collateral; j = index designating hedging set category; index designating hedging set category; The hedging sets for this purpose correspond to risk factors for which risk positions of opposite sign can be offset to yield a net risk position on which the exposure measure is then based. RPT ij = risk position from transaction i with respect to hedging set j; RPT ij risk position from transaction i with respect to hedging set j; RPC lj = risk position from collateral l with respect to hedging set j; RPC lj risk position from collateral l with respect to hedging set j; CCRM j = CCR Multiplier set out in Table 5 with respect to hedging set j; CCRM j CCR Multiplier set out in Table 5 with respect to hedging set j; β = 1,4. β 1,4. For the purposes of the calculation under paragraph 2: (a) eligible collateral received from a counterparty shall have a positive sign and collateral posted to a counterparty shall have a negative sign; only collateral that is eligible under Article 197, Article 198 and Article 299(2)(d) shall be used for the SM; (c) an institution may disregard the interest rate risk from payment legs with a remaining maturity of less than one year; (d) an institution may treat transactions that consist of two payment legs that are denominated in the same currency as a single aggregate transaction. The treatment for payment legs applies to the aggregate transaction.
Article 277 Transactions with a linear risk profile
1. Institutions shall map transactions with a linear risk profile to risk positions in accordance with the following provisions: (a) transactions with a linear risk profile with equities (including equity indices), gold, other precious metals or other commodities as the underlying shall be mapped to a risk position in the respective equity (or equity index) or commodity and an interest rate risk position for the payment leg; (b) transactions with a linear risk profile with a debt instrument as the underlying instrument shall be mapped to an interest rate risk position for the debt instrument and another interest rate risk position for the payment leg; (c) transactions with a linear risk profile that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, including foreign exchange forwards, shall be mapped to an interest rate risk position for each of the payment legs. Where, under a transaction mentioned in point (a), (b) or (c), a payment leg or the underlying debt instrument is denominated in foreign currency, that payment leg or underlying instrument shall also be mapped to a risk position in that currency. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the size of a risk position from a transaction with linear risk profile shall be the effective notional value (market price multiplied by quantity) of the underlying financial instruments or commodities converted to the institution's domestic currency by multiplication with the relevant exchange rate, except for debt instruments. 3. For debt instruments and for payment legs, the size of the risk position shall be the effective notional value of the outstanding gross payments (including the notional amount) converted to the currency of the home Member State, multiplied by the modified duration of the debt instrument or payment leg, as the case may be. 4. The size of a risk position from a credit default swap shall be the notional value of the reference debt instrument multiplied by the remaining maturity of the credit default swap.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 277 Transactions with a linear risk profile):
1. Institutions shall map transactions with a linear risk profile to risk positions in accordance with the following provisions: (a) transactions with a linear risk profile with equities (including equity indices), gold, other precious metals or other commodities as the underlying shall be mapped to a risk position in the respective equity (or equity index) or commodity and an interest rate risk position for the payment leg; (b) transactions with a linear risk profile with a debt instrument as the underlying instrument shall be mapped to an interest rate risk position for the debt instrument and another interest rate risk position for the payment leg; (c) transactions with a linear risk profile that stipulate the exchange of payment against payment, including foreign exchange forwards, shall be mapped to an interest rate risk position for each of the payment legs. Where, under a transaction mentioned in point (a), (b) or (c), a payment leg or the underlying debt instrument is denominated in foreign currency, that payment leg or underlying instrument shall also be mapped to a risk position in that currency. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the size of a risk position from a transaction with linear risk profile shall be the effective notional value (market price multiplied by quantity) of the underlying financial instruments or commodities converted to the institution's domestic currency by multiplication with the relevant exchange rate, except for debt instruments. 3. For debt instruments and for payment legs, the size of the risk position shall be the effective notional value of the outstanding gross payments (including the notional amount) converted to the currency of the home Member State, multiplied by the modified duration of the debt instrument or payment leg, as the case may be. 4. The size of a risk position from a credit default swap shall be the notional value of the reference debt instrument multiplied by the remaining maturity of the credit default swap. 5. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (a) the method for identifying transactions with only one material risk driver; (b) the method for identifying transactions with more than one material risk driver and for identifying the most material of those risk drivers for the purposes of paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 December 2019. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 278 Transactions with a non-linear risk profile
1. Institutions shall determine the size of the risk positions for transactions with a non-linear risk profile in accordance with the following paragraphs. 2. The size of a risk position from an OTC derivative with a non-linear risk profile, including options and swaptions, of which the underlying is not a debt instrument or a payment leg shall be equal to the delta equivalent effective notional value of the financial instrument that underlies the transaction in accordance with Article 280(1). 3. The size of a risk position from an OTC derivative with a non-linear risk profile, including options and swaptions, of which the underlying is a debt instrument or a payment leg, shall be equal to the delta equivalent effective notional value of the financial instrument or payment leg multiplied by the modified duration of the debt instrument or payment leg, as the case may be.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 279 Treatment of collateral
For the determination of risk positions, institutions shall treat collateral as follows: (a) collateral received from a counterparty shall be treated as an obligation to the counterparty under a derivative contract (short position) that is due on the day the determination is made; (b) collateral posted with the counterparty shall be treated as a claim on the counterparty (long position) that is due on the day the determination is made.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 280 Calculation of risk positions
1. An institution shall determine the size and sign of a risk position as follows: (a) for all instruments other than debt instruments: (i) as the effective notional value in the case of a transaction with a linear risk profile; (ii) as the delta equivalent notional value, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, where: P ref = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the reference currency; V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option, the value is the option price); p = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the same currency as V; (a) for all instruments other than debt instruments: (i) as the effective notional value in the case of a transaction with a linear risk profile; (ii) as the delta equivalent notional value, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, where: P ref = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the reference currency; V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option, the value is the option price); p = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the same currency as V; (ii) as the delta equivalent notional value, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, where: P ref = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the reference currency; P ref = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the reference currency; V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option, the value is the option price); value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option, the value is the option price); p = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the same currency as V; price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the same currency as V; (b) for debt instruments and the payment legs of all transactions: (i) as the effective notional value multiplied by the modified duration in the case of a transaction with a linear risk profile; (ii) as the delta equivalent in notional value multiplied by the modified duration, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, where: V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option this is the option price); r = interest rate level. (b) for debt instruments and the payment legs of all transactions: (i) as the effective notional value multiplied by the modified duration in the case of a transaction with a linear risk profile; (ii) as the delta equivalent in notional value multiplied by the modified duration, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, where: V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option this is the option price); r = interest rate level. (ii) as the delta equivalent in notional value multiplied by the modified duration, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option this is the option price); value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option this is the option price); r = interest rate level. interest rate level. If V is denominated in a currency other than the reference currency, the derivative shall be converted into the reference currency by multiplication with the relevant exchange rate. 2. Institutions shall group the risk positions into hedging sets. The absolute value amount of the sum of the resulting risk positions shall be calculated for each hedging set. The net risk position shall be the result of that calculation and shall be calculated for the purposes of Article 276(2) as follows:
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 280 Calculation of risk positions):
1. An institution shall determine the size and sign of a risk position as follows: (a) for all instruments other than debt instruments: (i) as the effective notional value in the case of a transaction with a linear risk profile; (ii) as the delta equivalent notional value, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, where: P ref = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the reference currency; P ref = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the reference currency; V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option, the value is the option price); value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option, the value is the option price); p = price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the same currency as V; price of the underlying instrument, expressed in the same currency as V; (b) for debt instruments and the payment legs of all transactions: (i) as the effective notional value multiplied by the modified duration in the case of a transaction with a linear risk profile; (ii) as the delta equivalent in notional value multiplied by the modified duration, , in the case of a transaction with a non-linear risk profile, V = value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option this is the option price); value of the financial instrument (in the case of an option this is the option price); r = interest rate level. interest rate level. If V is denominated in a currency other than the reference currency, the derivative shall be converted into the reference currency by multiplication with the relevant exchange rate. 2. Institutions shall group the risk positions into hedging sets. The absolute value amount of the sum of the resulting risk positions shall be calculated for each hedging set. The net risk position shall be the result of that calculation and shall be calculated for the purposes of Article 276(2) as follows:
Article 281 Interest rate risk positions
1. In order to calculate interest rate risk position, institutions shall apply the following provisions. 2. For interest rate risk positions from the following: (a) money deposits received from the counterparty as collateral; (b) a payment legs; (c) underlying debt instruments, to which in each case a capital charge of 1,60 % or less applies in accordance with Table 1 of Article 336, institutions shall assign those positions to one of the six hedging sets for each currency set out in Table 4. Table 4 Government referenced interest rates Non-government referenced interest rates Maturity < 1 year < 1 year >1 ≤ 5 years > 5 years >1 ≤ 5 years > 5 years Table 4 Government referenced interest rates Non-government referenced interest rates Maturity < 1 year < 1 year >1 ≤ 5 years > 5 years >1 ≤ 5 years > 5 years Government referenced interest rates Non-government referenced interest rates Government referenced interest rates Non-government referenced interest rates Maturity < 1 year < 1 year Maturity < 1 year >1 ≤ 5 years > 5 years >1 ≤ 5 years > 5 years 3. For interest rate risk positions from underlying debt instruments or payment legs for which the interest rate is linked to a reference interest rate that represents a general market interest level, the remaining maturity shall be the length of the time interval up to the next re-adjustment of the interest rate. In all other cases, it shall be the remaining life of the underlying debt instrument or, in the case of a payment leg, the remaining life of the transaction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 282 Hedging sets
1. Institutions shall establish hedging sets in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 5. 2. There shall be one hedging set for each issuer of a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap. N-th to default basket credit default swaps shall be treated as follows: (a) the size of a risk position in a reference debt instrument in a basket underlying an n-th to default credit default swap shall be the effective notional value of the reference debt instrument, multiplied by the modified duration of the n-th to default derivative with respect to a change in the credit spread of the reference debt instrument; (b) there shall be one hedging set for each reference debt instrument in a basket underlying a given ‘nth to default’ credit default swap. Risk positions from different n-th to default credit default swaps shall not be included in the same hedging set; (c) the CCR multiplier applicable to each hedging set created for one of the reference debt instruments of an n-th to default derivative shall be as follows: (i) 0,3 % for reference debt instruments that have a credit assessment from a recognised ECAI equivalent to credit quality step 1 to 3; (ii) 0,6 % for other debt instruments. (c) the CCR multiplier applicable to each hedging set created for one of the reference debt instruments of an n-th to default derivative shall be as follows: (i) 0,3 % for reference debt instruments that have a credit assessment from a recognised ECAI equivalent to credit quality step 1 to 3; (ii) 0,6 % for other debt instruments. 3. For interest rate risk positions from: (a) money deposits that are posted with a counterparty as collateral when that counterparty does not have debt obligations of low specific risk outstanding; (b) underlying debt instruments, to which according to Table 1 of Article 336 a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies. There shall be one hedging set for each issuer. When a payment leg emulates such a debt instrument, there shall also be one hedging set for each issuer of the reference debt instrument. An institution may assign risk positions that arise from debt instruments of a particular issuer, or from reference debt instruments of the same issuer that are emulated by payment legs, or that underlie a credit default swap, to the same hedging set. 4. Underlying financial instruments other than debt instruments shall be assigned to the same hedging sets only if they are identical or similar instruments. In all other cases they shall be assigned to separate hedging sets. For the purposes of this paragraph institutions shall determine whether underlying instruments are similar in accordance with the following principles: (a) for equities, the underlying is similar if it is issued by the same issuer. An equity index shall be treated as a separate issuer; (b) for precious metals, the underlying is similar if it is the same metal. A precious metal index shall be treated as a separate precious metal; (c) for electric power, the underlying is similar if the delivery rights and obligations refer to the same peak or off-peak load time interval within any 24-hour interval; (d) for commodities, the underlying is similar if it is the same commodity. A commodity index shall be treated as a separate commodity. 5. The CCR multipliers (hereinafter referred to as ‘CCRM’) for the different hedging set categories are set out in the following table: Table 5 Hedging set categories CCRM 1. Interest Rates 0,2 % 2. Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % 3. Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % 4. Exchange Rates 2,5 % 5. Electric Power 4 % 6. Gold 5 % 7. Equity 7 % 8. Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % 9. Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10 % 10. Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories 10 % Table 5 Hedging set categories CCRM 1. Interest Rates 0,2 % 2. Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % 3. Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % 4. Exchange Rates 2,5 % 5. Electric Power 4 % 6. Gold 5 % 7. Equity 7 % 8. Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % 9. Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10 % 10. Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories 10 % Hedging set categories CCRM Hedging set categories 1. Interest Rates 0,2 % Interest Rates 0,2 % 2. Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % 3. Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % 4. Exchange Rates 2,5 % Exchange Rates 2,5 % 5. Electric Power 4 % Electric Power 4 % 6. Gold 5 % 7. Equity 7 % Equity 8. Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % 9. Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10 % Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10. Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories 10 % Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives, as referred to in point 10 of Table 5, shall be assigned to separate individual hedging sets for each category of underlying instrument. 6. For transactions with a non-linear risk profile or for payment legs and transactions with debt instruments as underlying for which the institution cannot determine the delta or the modified duration, as the case may be, with an instrument model that the competent authority has approved for the purposes of determining the own funds requirements for market risk, the competent authority shall either determine the size of the risk positions and the applicable CCRMjs conservatively, or require the institution to use the method set out in Section 3. Netting shall not be recognised (that is, the exposure value shall be determined as if there were a netting set that comprises just an individual transaction). 7. An institution shall have internal procedures to verify that, prior to including a transaction in a hedging set, the transaction is covered by a legally enforceable netting contract that meets the requirements set out in Section 7. 8. An institution that makes use of collateral to mitigate its CCR shall have internal procedures to verify that, prior to recognising the effect of collateral in its calculations, the collateral meets the legal certainty standards set out in Chapter 4.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 282 Hedging sets):
1. Institutions shall establish hedging sets in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 5. 2. There shall be one hedging set for each issuer of a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap. N-th to default basket credit default swaps shall be treated as follows: (a) the size of a risk position in a reference debt instrument in a basket underlying an n-th to default credit default swap shall be the effective notional value of the reference debt instrument, multiplied by the modified duration of the n-th to default derivative with respect to a change in the credit spread of the reference debt instrument; (b) there shall be one hedging set for each reference debt instrument in a basket underlying a given ‘nth to default’ credit default swap. Risk positions from different n-th to default credit default swaps shall not be included in the same hedging set; (c) the CCR multiplier applicable to each hedging set created for one of the reference debt instruments of an n-th to default derivative shall be as follows: (i) 0,3 % for reference debt instruments that have a credit assessment from a recognised ECAI equivalent to credit quality step 1 to 3; (ii) 0,6 % for other debt instruments. 3. For interest rate risk positions from: (a) money deposits that are posted with a counterparty as collateral when that counterparty does not have debt obligations of low specific risk outstanding; (b) underlying debt instruments, to which according to Table 1 of Article 336 a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies. There shall be one hedging set for each issuer. When a payment leg emulates such a debt instrument, there shall also be one hedging set for each issuer of the reference debt instrument. An institution may assign risk positions that arise from debt instruments of a particular issuer, or from reference debt instruments of the same issuer that are emulated by payment legs, or that underlie a credit default swap, to the same hedging set. 4. Underlying financial instruments other than debt instruments shall be assigned to the same hedging sets only if they are identical or similar instruments. In all other cases they shall be assigned to separate hedging sets. For the purposes of this paragraph institutions shall determine whether underlying instruments are similar in accordance with the following principles: (a) for equities, the underlying is similar if it is issued by the same issuer. An equity index shall be treated as a separate issuer; (b) for precious metals, the underlying is similar if it is the same metal. A precious metal index shall be treated as a separate precious metal; (c) for electric power, the underlying is similar if the delivery rights and obligations refer to the same peak or off-peak load time interval within any 24-hour interval; (d) for commodities, the underlying is similar if it is the same commodity. A commodity index shall be treated as a separate commodity. 5. The CCR multipliers (hereinafter referred to as ‘CCRM’) for the different hedging set categories are set out in the following table: Table 5 Hedging set categories CCRM 1. Interest Rates 0,2 % 2. Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % 3. Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % 4. Exchange Rates 2,5 % 5. Electric Power 4 % 6. Gold 5 % 7. Equity 7 % 8. Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % 9. Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10 % 10. Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories 10 % Table 5 Hedging set categories CCRM 1. Interest Rates 0,2 % 2. Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % 3. Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % 4. Exchange Rates 2,5 % 5. Electric Power 4 % 6. Gold 5 % 7. Equity 7 % 8. Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % 9. Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10 % 10. Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories 10 % Hedging set categories CCRM Hedging set categories 1. Interest Rates 0,2 % Interest Rates 0,2 % 2. Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % Interest Rates for risk positions from a reference debt instrument that underlies a credit default swap and to which a capital charge of 1,60 %, or less, applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,3 % 3. Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % Interest Rates for risk positions from a debt instrument or reference debt instrument to which a capital charge of more than 1,60 % applies under Table 1 of Chapter 2 of Title IV. 0,6 % 4. Exchange Rates 2,5 % Exchange Rates 2,5 % 5. Electric Power 4 % Electric Power 4 % 6. Gold 5 % 7. Equity 7 % Equity 8. Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % Precious Metals (other than gold) 8,5 % 9. Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10 % Other Commodities (excluding precious metals and electricity power) 10. Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories 10 % Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives that are not in any of the above categories Underlying instruments of OTC derivatives, as referred to in point 10 of Table 5, shall be assigned to separate individual hedging sets for each category of underlying instrument. 6. For transactions with a non-linear risk profile or for payment legs and transactions with debt instruments as underlying for which the institution cannot determine the delta or the modified duration, as the case may be, with an instrument model that the competent authority has approved for the purposes of determining the own funds requirements for market risk, the competent authority shall either determine the size of the risk positions and the applicable CCRMjs conservatively, or require the institution to use the method set out in Section 3. Netting shall not be recognised (that is, the exposure value shall be determined as if there were a netting set that comprises just an individual transaction). 7. An institution shall have internal procedures to verify that, prior to including a transaction in a hedging set, the transaction is covered by a legally enforceable netting contract that meets the requirements set out in Section 7. 8. An institution that makes use of collateral to mitigate its CCR shall have internal procedures to verify that, prior to recognising the effect of collateral in its calculations, the collateral meets the legal certainty standards set out in Chapter 4.
Article 283 Permission to use the Internal Model Method
1. Provided that the competent authorities are satisfied that the requirement in paragraph 2 have been met by an institution, they shall permit that institution to use the Internal Model Method (IMM) to calculate the exposure value for any of the following transactions: (a) transactions in Article 273(2)(a); (b) transactions in Article 273(2)(b), (c) and (d); (c) transactions in Article 273(2)(a) to (d), Where an institution is permitted to use the IMM to calculate exposure value for any of the transactions mentioned in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph, it may also use the IMM for the transactions in Article 273(2)(e). Notwithstanding the third subparagraph of Article 273(1), an institution may choose not to apply this method to exposures that are immaterial in size and risk. In such case, an institution shall apply one of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 5 to these exposures where the relevant requirements for each approach are met. 2. Competent authorities shall permit institutions to use IMM for the calculations referred to in paragraph 1 only if the institution has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements set out in this Section, and the competent authorities verified that the systems for the management of CCR maintained by the institution are sound and properly implemented. 3. The competent authorities may permit institutions for a limited period to implement the IMM sequentially across different transaction types. During this period of sequential implementation institutions may use the methods set out in Section 3 or Section 5 for transaction type for which they do not use the IMM. 4. For all OTC derivative transactions and for long settlement transactions for which an institution has not received permission under paragraph 1 to use the IMM, the institution shall use the methods set out in Section 3 or Section 5. Those methods may be used in combination on a permanent basis within a group. Within an institution those methods may be used in combination only where one of the methods is used for the cases set out in Article 282(6) 5. An institution which is permitted in accordance with paragraph 1 to use the IMM shall not revert to the use of the methods set out in Section 3 or Section 5 unless it is permitted by the competent authority to do so. Competent authorities shall give such permission if the institution demonstrates good cause. 6. If an institution ceases to comply with the requirements laid down in this Section, it shall notify the competent authority and do one of the following: (a) present to the competent authority a plan for a timely return to compliance; (b) demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 283 Permission to use the Internal Model Method):
1. Provided that the competent authorities are satisfied that the requirement in paragraph 2 have been met by an institution, they shall permit that institution to use the Internal Model Method (IMM) to calculate the exposure value for any of the following transactions: (a) transactions in Article 273(2)(a); transactions in Article 273(2)(b), (c) and (d); (c) transactions in Article 273(2)(a) to (d), Notwithstanding the third subparagraph of Article 273(1), an institution may choose not to apply this method to exposures that are immaterial in size and risk. In such case, an institution shall apply one of the methods set out in Sections 3 to 5 to these exposures where the relevant requirements for each approach are met. 2. Competent authorities shall permit institutions to use IMM for the calculations referred to in paragraph 1 only if the institution has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements set out in this Section, and the competent authorities verified that the systems for the management of CCR maintained by the institution are sound and properly implemented. 3. The competent authorities may permit institutions for a limited period to implement the IMM sequentially across different transaction types. During this period of sequential implementation institutions may use the methods set out in Section 3 or Section 5 for transaction type for which they do not use the IMM. 4. For all OTC derivative transactions and for long settlement transactions for which an institution has not received permission under paragraph 1 to use the IMM, the institution shall use the methods set out in Section 3 or Section 5. Those methods may be used in combination on a permanent basis within a group. Within an institution those methods may be used in combination only where one of the methods is used for the cases set out in Article 282(6) 5. An institution which is permitted in accordance with paragraph 1 to use the IMM shall not revert to the use of the methods set out in Section 3 or Section 5 unless it is permitted by the competent authority to do so. Competent authorities shall give such permission if the institution demonstrates good cause. 6. If an institution ceases to comply with the requirements laid down in this Section, it shall notify the competent authority and do one of the following: (a) present to the competent authority a plan for a timely return to compliance; (b) demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial. If an institution ceases to comply with the requirements laid down in this Section, it shall notify the competent authority and do one of the following: (a) present to the competent authority a plan for a timely return to compliance; (b) demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial.
Article 284 Exposure value
1. Where an institution is permitted, in accordance with Article 283(1), to use the IMM to calculate the exposure value of some or all transactions mentioned in that paragraph, it shall measure the exposure value of those transactions at the level of the netting set. The model used by the institution for that purpose shall: (a) specify the forecasting distribution for changes in the market value of the netting set attributable to joint changes in relevant market variables, such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates; (b) calculate the exposure value for the netting set at each of the future dates on the basis of the joint changes in the market variables. 2. In order for the model to capture the effects of margining, the model of the collateral value shall meet the quantitative, qualitative and data requirements for the IMM in accordance with this Section and the institution may include in its forecasting distributions for changes in the market value of the netting set only eligible financial collateral as referred to in Articles 197 and 198 and points (c) and (d) of Article 299(2). 3. The own funds requirement for counterparty credit risk with respect to the CCR exposures to which an institution applies the IMM, shall be the higher of the following: (a) the own funds requirement for those exposures calculated on the basis of Effective EPE using current market data; (b) the own funds requirement for those exposures calculated on the basis of Effective EPE using a single consistent stress calibration for all CCR exposures to which they apply the IMM. 4. Except for counterparties identified as having Specific Wrong-Way risk that fall within the scope of Article 291(4) and (5), institutions shall calculate the exposure value as the product of alpha (α) times Effective EPE, as follows: Exposure value = α · Effective EPE where: α = 1.4, unless competent authorities require a higher α or permit institutions to use their own estimates in accordance with paragraph 9; α = 1.4, unless competent authorities require a higher α or permit institutions to use their own estimates in accordance with paragraph 9; Effective EPE shall be calculated by estimating expected exposure (EEt) as the average exposure at future date t, where the average is taken across possible future values of relevant market risk factors. The model shall estimate EE at a series of future dates t1, t2, t3, etc. 5. Effective EE shall be calculated recursively as: the current date is denoted as t 0 ; Effective EE t0 equals current exposure. 6. Effective EPE is the average Effective EE during the first year of future exposure. If all contracts in the netting set mature within less than one year, EPE shall be the average of EE until all contracts in the netting set mature. Effective EPE shall be calculated as a weighted average of Effective EE: where the weights allow for the case when future exposure is calculated at dates that are not equally spaced over time. 7. Institutions shall calculate EE or peak exposure measures on the basis of a distribution of exposures that accounts for the possible non-normality of the distribution of exposures. 8. An institution may use a measure of the distribution calculated by the IMM that is more conservative than α multiplied by Effective EPE as calculated in accordance with the equation in paragraph 4 for every counterparty. 9. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, competent authorities may permit institutions to use their own estimates of alpha, where: (a) alpha shall equal the ratio of internal capital from a full simulation of CCR exposure across counterparties (numerator) and internal capital based on EPE (denominator); (b) in the denominator, EPE shall be used as if it were a fixed outstanding amount. When estimated in accordance with this paragraph, alpha shall be no lower than 1,2. 10. For the purposes of an estimate of alpha under paragraph 9, an institution shall ensure that the numerator and denominator are calculated in a manner consistent with the modelling methodology, parameter specifications and portfolio composition. The approach used to estimate α shall be based on the institution's internal capital approach, be well documented and be subject to independent validation. In addition, an institution shall review its estimates of alpha on at least a quarterly basis, and more frequently when the composition of the portfolio varies over time. An institution shall also assess the model risk. 11. An institution shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that its internal estimates of alpha capture in the numerator material sources of dependency of distribution of market values of transactions or of portfolios of transactions across counterparties. Internal estimates of alpha shall take account of the granularity of portfolios. 12. In supervising the use of estimates under paragraph 9, competent authorities shall have regard to the significant variation in estimates of alpha that arises from the potential for mis-specification in the models used for the numerator, especially where convexity is present. 13. Where appropriate, volatilities and correlations of market risk factors used in the joint modelling of market and credit risk shall be conditioned on the credit risk factor to reflect potential increases in volatility or correlation in an economic downturn.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 284 Exposure value):
1. Where an institution is permitted, in accordance with Article 283(1), to use the IMM to calculate the exposure value of some or all transactions mentioned in that paragraph, it shall measure the exposure value of those transactions at the level of the netting set. The model used by the institution for that purpose shall: (a) specify the forecasting distribution for changes in the market value of the netting set attributable to joint changes in relevant market variables, such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates; (b) calculate the exposure value for the netting set at each of the future dates on the basis of the joint changes in the market variables. 3. The own funds requirement for counterparty credit risk with respect to the CCR exposures to which an institution applies the IMM, shall be the higher of the following: (a) the own funds requirement for those exposures calculated on the basis of Effective EPE using current market data; (b) the own funds requirement for those exposures calculated on the basis of Effective EPE using a single consistent stress calibration for all CCR exposures to which they apply the IMM. The own funds requirement for counterparty credit risk with respect to the CCR exposures to which an institution applies the IMM, shall be the higher of the following: (a) the own funds requirement for those exposures calculated on the basis of Effective EPE using current market data; (b) the own funds requirement for those exposures calculated on the basis of Effective EPE using a single consistent stress calibration for all CCR exposures to which they apply the IMM. 4. Except for counterparties identified as having Specific Wrong-Way risk that fall within the scope of Article 291(4) and (5), institutions shall calculate the exposure value as the product of alpha (α) times Effective EPE, as follows: Exposure value = α · Effective EPE where: α = 1.4, unless competent authorities require a higher α or permit institutions to use their own estimates in accordance with paragraph 9; Except for counterparties identified as having Specific Wrong-Way risk that fall within the scope of Article 291(4) and (5), institutions shall calculate the exposure value as the product of alpha (α) times Effective EPE, as follows: Exposure value = α · Effective EPE where: α = 1.4, unless competent authorities require a higher α or permit institutions to use their own estimates in accordance with paragraph 9; α = 1.4, unless competent authorities require a higher α or permit institutions to use their own estimates in accordance with paragraph 9; Effective EPE shall be calculated by estimating expected exposure (EEt) as the average exposure at future date t, where the average is taken across possible future values of relevant market risk factors. The model shall estimate EE at a series of future dates t1, t2, t3, etc. 5. Effective EE shall be calculated recursively as: where: the current date is denoted as t 0 ; Effective EE t0 equals current exposure. Effective EE shall be calculated recursively as: the current date is denoted as t 0 ; Effective EE t0 equals current exposure. 6. Effective EPE is the average Effective EE during the first year of future exposure. If all contracts in the netting set mature within less than one year, EPE shall be the average of EE until all contracts in the netting set mature. Effective EPE shall be calculated as a weighted average of Effective EE: where the weights allow for the case when future exposure is calculated at dates that are not equally spaced over time. Effective EPE is the average Effective EE during the first year of future exposure. If all contracts in the netting set mature within less than one year, EPE shall be the average of EE until all contracts in the netting set mature. Effective EPE shall be calculated as a weighted average of Effective EE: 7. Institutions shall calculate EE or peak exposure measures on the basis of a distribution of exposures that accounts for the possible non-normality of the distribution of exposures. 8. An institution may use a measure of the distribution calculated by the IMM that is more conservative than α multiplied by Effective EPE as calculated in accordance with the equation in paragraph 4 for every counterparty. 9. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, competent authorities may permit institutions to use their own estimates of alpha, where: (a) alpha shall equal the ratio of internal capital from a full simulation of CCR exposure across counterparties (numerator) and internal capital based on EPE (denominator); (b) in the denominator, EPE shall be used as if it were a fixed outstanding amount. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, competent authorities may permit institutions to use their own estimates of alpha, where: (a) alpha shall equal the ratio of internal capital from a full simulation of CCR exposure across counterparties (numerator) and internal capital based on EPE (denominator); (b) in the denominator, EPE shall be used as if it were a fixed outstanding amount. When estimated in accordance with this paragraph, alpha shall be no lower than 1,2. 10. For the purposes of an estimate of alpha under paragraph 9, an institution shall ensure that the numerator and denominator are calculated in a manner consistent with the modelling methodology, parameter specifications and portfolio composition. The approach used to estimate α shall be based on the institution's internal capital approach, be well documented and be subject to independent validation. In addition, an institution shall review its estimates of alpha on at least a quarterly basis, and more frequently when the composition of the portfolio varies over time. An institution shall also assess the model risk. 11. An institution shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that its internal estimates of alpha capture in the numerator material sources of dependency of distribution of market values of transactions or of portfolios of transactions across counterparties. Internal estimates of alpha shall take account of the granularity of portfolios. 12. In supervising the use of estimates under paragraph 9, competent authorities shall have regard to the significant variation in estimates of alpha that arises from the potential for mis-specification in the models used for the numerator, especially where convexity is present. 13. Where appropriate, volatilities and correlations of market risk factors used in the joint modelling of market and credit risk shall be conditioned on the credit risk factor to reflect potential increases in volatility or correlation in an economic downturn.
Article 285 Exposure value for netting sets subject to a margin agreement
1. If the netting set is subject to a margin agreement and daily mark-to-market valuation, the institution shall calculate Effective EPE as set out in this paragraph. If the model captures the effects of margining when estimating EE, the institution may, subject to the permission of the competent authority, use the model's EE measure directly in the equation in Article 284(5). Competent authorities shall grant such permission only if they verify that the model properly captures the effects of margining when estimating EE. An institution that has not received such permission shall use one of the following Effective EPE measures: (a) Effective EPE, calculated without taking into account any collateral held or posted by way of margin plus any collateral that has been posted to the counterparty independent of the daily valuation and margining process or current exposure; (b) Effective EPE, calculated as the potential increase in exposure over the margin period of risk, plus the larger of: (i) the current exposure including all collateral currently held or posted, other than collateral called or in dispute; (ii) the largest net exposure, including collateral under the margin agreement, that would not trigger a collateral call. This amount shall reflect all applicable thresholds, minimum transfer amounts, independent amounts and initial margins under the margin agreement. (b) Effective EPE, calculated as the potential increase in exposure over the margin period of risk, plus the larger of: (i) the current exposure including all collateral currently held or posted, other than collateral called or in dispute; (ii) the largest net exposure, including collateral under the margin agreement, that would not trigger a collateral call. This amount shall reflect all applicable thresholds, minimum transfer amounts, independent amounts and initial margins under the margin agreement. For the purposes of point (b), institutions shall calculate the add-on as the expected positive change of the mark-to-market value of the transactions during the margin period of risk. Changes in the value of collateral shall be reflected using the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach in accordance with Section 4 of Chapter 4 or the own estimates of volatility adjustments of the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method, but no collateral payments shall be assumed during the margin period of risk. The margin period of risk is subject to the minimum periods set out in paragraphs 2 to 5. 2. For transactions subject to daily re-margining and mark-to-market valuation, the margin period of risk used for the purpose of modelling the exposure value with margin agreements shall not be less than: (a) 5 business days for netting sets consisting only of repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions and margin lending transactions; (b) 10 business days for all other netting sets. 3. Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 shall be subject to the following exceptions: (a) for all netting sets where the number of trades exceeds 5 000 at any point during a quarter, the margin period of risk for the following quarter shall not be less than 20 business days. This exception shall not apply to institutions' trade exposures; (b) for netting sets containing one or more trades involving either illiquid collateral, or an OTC derivative that cannot be easily replaced, the margin period of risk shall not be less than 20 business days. An institution shall determine whether collateral is illiquid or whether OTC derivatives cannot be easily replaced in the context of stressed market conditions, characterised by the absence of continuously active markets where a counterparty would, within two days or fewer, obtain multiple price quotations that would not move the market or represent a price reflecting a market discount (in the case of collateral) or premium (in the case of an OTC derivative). An institution shall consider whether trades or securities it holds as collateral are concentrated in a particular counterparty and if that counterparty exited the market precipitously whether the institution would be able to replace those trades or securities. 4. If an institution has been involved in more than two margin call disputes on a particular netting set over the immediately preceding two quarters that have lasted longer than the applicable margin period of risk under paragraphs 2 and 3, the institution shall use a margin period of risk that is at least double the period specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 for that netting set for the subsequent two quarters. 5. For re-margining with a periodicity of N days, the margin period of risk shall be at least equal to the period specified in paragraphs 2 and 3, F, plus N days minus one day. That is: Margin Period of Risk = F + N – 1 6. If the internal model includes the effect of margining on changes in the market value of the netting set, an institution shall model collateral, other than cash of the same currency as the exposure itself, jointly with the exposure in its exposure value calculations for OTC derivatives and securities-financing transactions. 7. If an institution is not able to model collateral jointly with the exposure, it shall not recognise in its exposure value calculations for OTC derivatives and securities-financing transactions the effect of collateral other than cash of the same currency as the exposure itself, unless it uses either volatility adjustments that meet the standards of the financial collateral comprehensive Method with own volatility adjustments estimates or the standard Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach in accordance with Chapter 4. 8. An institution using the IMM shall ignore in its models the effect of a reduction of the exposure value due to any clause in a collateral agreement that requires receipt of collateral when counterparty credit quality deteriorates.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 285 Exposure value for netting sets subject to a margin agreement):
1. If the netting set is subject to a margin agreement and daily mark-to-market valuation, the institution shall calculate Effective EPE as set out in this paragraph. If the model captures the effects of margining when estimating EE, the institution may, subject to the permission of the competent authority, use the model's EE measure directly in the equation in Article 284(5). Competent authorities shall grant such permission only if they verify that the model properly captures the effects of margining when estimating EE. An institution that has not received such permission shall use one of the following Effective EPE measures: (a) Effective EPE, calculated without taking into account any collateral held or posted by way of margin plus any collateral that has been posted to the counterparty independent of the daily valuation and margining process or current exposure; (b) Effective EPE, calculated as the potential increase in exposure over the margin period of risk, plus the larger of: (i) the current exposure including all collateral currently held or posted, other than collateral called or in dispute; (ii) the largest net exposure, including collateral under the margin agreement, that would not trigger a collateral call. This amount shall reflect all applicable thresholds, minimum transfer amounts, independent amounts and initial margins under the margin agreement. For the purposes of point (b), institutions shall calculate the add-on as the expected positive change of the mark-to-market value of the transactions during the margin period of risk. Changes in the value of collateral shall be reflected using the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach in accordance with Section 4 of Chapter 4 or the own estimates of volatility adjustments of the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method, but no collateral payments shall be assumed during the margin period of risk. The margin period of risk is subject to the minimum periods set out in paragraphs 2 to 5. 2. For transactions subject to daily re-margining and mark-to-market valuation, the margin period of risk used for the purpose of modelling the exposure value with margin agreements shall not be less than: (a) 5 business days for netting sets consisting only of repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions and margin lending transactions; (b) 10 business days for all other netting sets. 3. Points (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 shall be subject to the following exceptions: (a) for all netting sets where the number of trades exceeds 5 000 at any point during a quarter, the margin period of risk for the following quarter shall not be less than 20 business days. This exception shall not apply to institutions' trade exposures; (b) for netting sets containing one or more trades involving either illiquid collateral, or an OTC derivative that cannot be easily replaced, the margin period of risk shall not be less than 20 business days. An institution shall determine whether collateral is illiquid or whether OTC derivatives cannot be easily replaced in the context of stressed market conditions, characterised by the absence of continuously active markets where a counterparty would, within two days or fewer, obtain multiple price quotations that would not move the market or represent a price reflecting a market discount (in the case of collateral) or premium (in the case of an OTC derivative). An institution shall consider whether trades or securities it holds as collateral are concentrated in a particular counterparty and if that counterparty exited the market precipitously whether the institution would be able to replace those trades or securities. 4. If an institution has been involved in more than two margin call disputes on a particular netting set over the immediately preceding two quarters that have lasted longer than the applicable margin period of risk under paragraphs 2 and 3, the institution shall use a margin period of risk that is at least double the period specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 for that netting set for the subsequent two quarters. 5. For re-margining with a periodicity of N days, the margin period of risk shall be at least equal to the period specified in paragraphs 2 and 3, F, plus N days minus one day. That is: Margin Period of Risk = F + N – 1 6. If the internal model includes the effect of margining on changes in the market value of the netting set, an institution shall model collateral, other than cash of the same currency as the exposure itself, jointly with the exposure in its exposure value calculations for OTC derivatives and securities-financing transactions. 7. If an institution is not able to model collateral jointly with the exposure, it shall not recognise in its exposure value calculations for OTC derivatives and securities-financing transactions the effect of collateral other than cash of the same currency as the exposure itself, unless it uses either volatility adjustments that meet the standards of the financial collateral comprehensive Method with own volatility adjustments estimates or the standard Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach in accordance with Chapter 4. 8. An institution using the IMM shall ignore in its models the effect of a reduction of the exposure value due to any clause in a collateral agreement that requires receipt of collateral when counterparty credit quality deteriorates.
Article 286 Management of CCR — Policies, processes and systems
1. An institution shall establish and maintain a CCR management framework, consisting of: (a) policies, processes and systems to ensure the identification, measurement, management, approval and internal reporting of CCR; (b) procedures for ensuring that those policies, processes and systems are complied with. Those policies, processes and systems shall be conceptually sound, implemented with integrity and documented. The documentation shall include an explanation of the empirical techniques used to measure CCR. 2. The CCR management framework required by paragraph 1 shall take account of market, liquidity, and legal and operational risks that are associated with CCR. In particular, the framework shall ensure that the institution complies with the following principles: (a) it does not undertake business with a counterparty without assessing its creditworthiness; (b) it takes due account of settlement and pre-settlement credit risk; (c) it manages such risks as comprehensively as practicable at the counterparty level by aggregating CCR exposures with other credit exposures and at the firm-wide level. 3. An institution using the IMM shall ensure that its CCR management framework accounts to the satisfaction of the competent authority for the liquidity risks of all of the following: (a) potential incoming margin calls in the context of exchanges of variation margin or other margin types, such as initial or independent margin, under adverse market shocks; (b) potential incoming calls for the return of excess collateral posted by counterparties; (c) calls resulting from a potential downgrade of its own external credit quality assessment. An institution shall ensure that the nature and horizon of collateral re-use is consistent with its liquidity needs and does not jeopardise its ability to post or return collateral in a timely manner. 4. An institution's management body and senior management shall be actively involved in, and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to, the management of CCR. Senior management shall be aware of the limitations and assumptions of the model used and the impact those limitations and assumptions can have on the reliability of the output through a formal process. Senior management shall be also aware of the uncertainties of the market environment and operational issues and of how these are reflected in the model. 5. The daily reports prepared on an institution's exposures to CCR in accordance with Article 287(2)(b) shall be reviewed by a level of management with sufficient seniority and authority to enforce both reductions of positions taken by individual credit managers or traders and reductions in the institution's overall CCR exposure. 6. An institution's CCR management framework established in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be used in conjunction with internal credit and trading limits. Credit and trading limits shall be related to the institution's risk measurement model in a manner that is consistent over time and that is well understood by credit managers, traders and senior management. An institution shall have a formal process to report breaches of risk limits to the appropriate level of management. 7. An institution's measurement of CCR shall include measuring daily and intra-day use of credit lines. The institution shall measure current exposure gross and net of collateral. At portfolio and counterparty level, the institution shall calculate and monitor peak exposure or potential future exposure at the confidence interval chosen by the institution. The institution shall take account of large or concentrated positions, including by groups of related counterparties, by industry and by market. 8. An institution shall establish and maintain a routine and rigorous program of stress testing. The results of that stress testing shall be reviewed regularly and at least quarterly by senior management and shall be reflected in the CCR policies and limits set by the management body or senior management. Where stress tests reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, the institution shall take prompt steps to manage those risks.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 286 Management of CCR — Policies, processes and systems):
1. An institution shall establish and maintain a CCR management framework, consisting of: (a) policies, processes and systems to ensure the identification, measurement, management, approval and internal reporting of CCR; (b) procedures for ensuring that those policies, processes and systems are complied with. An institution shall establish and maintain a CCR management framework, consisting of: (a) policies, processes and systems to ensure the identification, measurement, management, approval and internal reporting of CCR; (b) procedures for ensuring that those policies, processes and systems are complied with. Those policies, processes and systems shall be conceptually sound, implemented with integrity and documented. The documentation shall include an explanation of the empirical techniques used to measure CCR. The CCR management framework required by paragraph 1 shall take account of market, liquidity, and legal and operational risks that are associated with CCR. In particular, the framework shall ensure that the institution complies with the following principles: (a) it does not undertake business with a counterparty without assessing its creditworthiness; (b) it takes due account of settlement and pre-settlement credit risk; (c) it manages such risks as comprehensively as practicable at the counterparty level by aggregating CCR exposures with other credit exposures and at the firm-wide level. An institution using the IMM shall ensure that its CCR management framework accounts to the satisfaction of the competent authority for the liquidity risks of all of the following: (a) potential incoming margin calls in the context of exchanges of variation margin or other margin types, such as initial or independent margin, under adverse market shocks; (b) potential incoming calls for the return of excess collateral posted by counterparties; (c) calls resulting from a potential downgrade of its own external credit quality assessment. An institution shall ensure that the nature and horizon of collateral re-use is consistent with its liquidity needs and does not jeopardise its ability to post or return collateral in a timely manner. 4. An institution's management body and senior management shall be actively involved in, and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to, the management of CCR. Senior management shall be aware of the limitations and assumptions of the model used and the impact those limitations and assumptions can have on the reliability of the output through a formal process. Senior management shall be also aware of the uncertainties of the market environment and operational issues and of how these are reflected in the model. 5. The daily reports prepared on an institution's exposures to CCR in accordance with Article 287(2)(b) shall be reviewed by a level of management with sufficient seniority and authority to enforce both reductions of positions taken by individual credit managers or traders and reductions in the institution's overall CCR exposure. 6. An institution's CCR management framework established in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be used in conjunction with internal credit and trading limits. Credit and trading limits shall be related to the institution's risk measurement model in a manner that is consistent over time and that is well understood by credit managers, traders and senior management. An institution shall have a formal process to report breaches of risk limits to the appropriate level of management. 7. An institution's measurement of CCR shall include measuring daily and intra-day use of credit lines. The institution shall measure current exposure gross and net of collateral. At portfolio and counterparty level, the institution shall calculate and monitor peak exposure or potential future exposure at the confidence interval chosen by the institution. The institution shall take account of large or concentrated positions, including by groups of related counterparties, by industry and by market. 8. An institution shall establish and maintain a routine and rigorous program of stress testing. The results of that stress testing shall be reviewed regularly and at least quarterly by senior management and shall be reflected in the CCR policies and limits set by the management body or senior management. Where stress tests reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of circumstances, the institution shall take prompt steps to manage those risks.
Article 287 Organisation structures for CCR management
1. An institution using the IMM shall establish and maintain: (a) a risk control unit that complies with paragraph 2; (b) a collateral management unit that complies with paragraph 3. 2. The risk control unit shall be responsible for the design and implementation of its CCR management, including the initial and on-going validation of the model, and shall carry out the following functions and meet the following requirements: (a) it shall be responsible for the design and implementation of the CCR management system of the institution; (b) it shall produce daily reports on and analyse the output of the institution's risk measurement model. That analysis shall include an evaluation of the relationship between measures of CCR exposure values and trading limits; (c) it shall control input data integrity and produce and analyse reports on the output of the institution's risk measurement model, including an evaluation of the relationship between measures of risk exposure and credit and trading limits; (d) it shall be independent from units responsible for originating, renewing or trading exposures and free from undue influence; (e) it shall be adequately staffed; (f) it shall report directly to the senior management of the institution; (g) its work shall be closely integrated into the day-to-day credit risk management process of the institution; (h) its output shall be an integral part of the process of planning, monitoring and controlling the institution's credit and overall risk profile. 3. The collateral management unit shall carry out the following tasks and functions: (a) calculating and making margin calls, managing margin call disputes and reporting levels of independent amounts, initial margins and variation margins accurately on a daily basis; (b) controlling the integrity of the data used to make margin calls, and ensuring that it is consistent and reconciled regularly with all relevant sources of data within the institution; (c) tracking the extent of re-use of collateral and any amendment of the rights of the institution to or in connection with the collateral that it posts; (d) reporting to the appropriate level of management the types of collateral assets that are reused, and the terms of such reuse including instrument, credit quality and maturity; (e) tracking concentration to individual types of collateral assets accepted by the institution; (f) reporting collateral management information on a regular basis, but at least quarterly, to senior management, including information on the type of collateral received and posted, the size, aging and cause for margin call disputes. That internal reporting shall also reflect trends in these figures. 4. Senior management shall allocate sufficient resources to the collateral management unit required under paragraph 1(b) to ensure that its systems achieve an appropriate level of operational performance, as measured by the timeliness and accuracy of margin calls by the institution and the timeliness of the response of the institution to margin calls by its counterparties. Senior management shall ensure that the unit is adequately staffed to process calls and disputes in a timely manner even under severe market crisis, and to enable the institution to limit its number of large disputes caused by trade volumes.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 287 Organisation structures for CCR management):
1. An institution using the IMM shall establish and maintain: (a) a risk control unit that complies with paragraph 2; (b) a collateral management unit that complies with paragraph 3. An institution using the IMM shall establish and maintain: (a) a risk control unit that complies with paragraph 2; (b) a collateral management unit that complies with paragraph 3. The risk control unit shall be responsible for the design and implementation of its CCR management, including the initial and on-going validation of the model, and shall carry out the following functions and meet the following requirements: (a) it shall be responsible for the design and implementation of the CCR management system of the institution; (b) it shall produce daily reports on and analyse the output of the institution's risk measurement model. That analysis shall include an evaluation of the relationship between measures of CCR exposure values and trading limits; (c) it shall control input data integrity and produce and analyse reports on the output of the institution's risk measurement model, including an evaluation of the relationship between measures of risk exposure and credit and trading limits; (d) it shall be independent from units responsible for originating, renewing or trading exposures and free from undue influence; (e) it shall be adequately staffed; (f) it shall report directly to the senior management of the institution; (g) its work shall be closely integrated into the day-to-day credit risk management process of the institution; (h) its output shall be an integral part of the process of planning, monitoring and controlling the institution's credit and overall risk profile. The collateral management unit shall carry out the following tasks and functions: (a) calculating and making margin calls, managing margin call disputes and reporting levels of independent amounts, initial margins and variation margins accurately on a daily basis; (b) controlling the integrity of the data used to make margin calls, and ensuring that it is consistent and reconciled regularly with all relevant sources of data within the institution; (c) tracking the extent of re-use of collateral and any amendment of the rights of the institution to or in connection with the collateral that it posts; (d) reporting to the appropriate level of management the types of collateral assets that are reused, and the terms of such reuse including instrument, credit quality and maturity; (e) tracking concentration to individual types of collateral assets accepted by the institution; (f) reporting collateral management information on a regular basis, but at least quarterly, to senior management, including information on the type of collateral received and posted, the size, aging and cause for margin call disputes. That internal reporting shall also reflect trends in these figures. 4. Senior management shall allocate sufficient resources to the collateral management unit required under paragraph 1(b) to ensure that its systems achieve an appropriate level of operational performance, as measured by the timeliness and accuracy of margin calls by the institution and the timeliness of the response of the institution to margin calls by its counterparties. Senior management shall ensure that the unit is adequately staffed to process calls and disputes in a timely manner even under severe market crisis, and to enable the institution to limit its number of large disputes caused by trade volumes.
Article 288 Review of CCR management system
An institution shall regularly conduct an independent review of its CCR management system through its internal auditing process. That review shall include both the activities of the control and collateral management units required by Article 287 and shall specifically address, as a minimum: (a) the adequacy of the documentation of the CCR management system and process required by Article 286; (b) the organisation of the CCR control unit required by Article 287(1)(a); (c) the organisation of the collateral management unit required by Article 287(1)(b); (d) the integration of CCR measures into daily risk management; (e) the approval process for risk pricing models and valuation systems used by front and back-office personnel; (f) the validation of any significant change in the CCR measurement process; (g) the scope of CCR captured by the risk measurement model; (h) the integrity of the management information system; (i) the accuracy and completeness of CCR data; (j) the accurate reflection of legal terms in collateral and netting agreements into exposure value measurements; (k) the verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run models, including the independence of such data sources; (l) the accuracy and appropriateness of volatility and correlation assumptions; (m) the accuracy of valuation and risk transformation calculations; (n) the verification of the model's accuracy through frequent back-testing as set out in points (b) to (e) of Article 293(1); (o) the compliance of the CCR control unit and collateral management unit with the relevant regulatory requirements.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 288 Review of CCR management system):
An institution shall regularly conduct an independent review of its CCR management system through its internal auditing process. That review shall include both the activities of the control and collateral management units required by Article 287 and shall specifically address, as a minimum: (a) the adequacy of the documentation of the CCR management system and process required by Article 286; the organisation of the CCR control unit required by Article 287(1)(a); the organisation of the collateral management unit required by Article 287(1)(b); (d) the integration of CCR measures into daily risk management; (e) the approval process for risk pricing models and valuation systems used by front and back-office personnel; (f) the validation of any significant change in the CCR measurement process; (g) the scope of CCR captured by the risk measurement model; (h) the integrity of the management information system; (i) the accuracy and completeness of CCR data; (j) the accurate reflection of legal terms in collateral and netting agreements into exposure value measurements; (k) the verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run models, including the independence of such data sources; (l) the accuracy and appropriateness of volatility and correlation assumptions; (m) the accuracy of valuation and risk transformation calculations; (o) the compliance of the CCR control unit and collateral management unit with the relevant regulatory requirements.
Article 289 Use test
1. Institutions shall ensure that the distribution of exposures generated by the model used to calculate Effective EPE is closely integrated into the day-to-day CCR management process of the institution, and that the output of the model is taken into account in the process of credit approval, CCR management, internal capital allocation and corporate governance. 2. The institution shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that it has been using a model to calculate the distribution of exposures upon which the EPE calculation is based that meets, broadly, the requirements set out in this Section for at least one year prior to permission to use the IMM by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 283. 3. The model used to generate a distribution of exposures to CCR shall be part of the CCR management framework required by Article 286. This framework shall include the measurement of usage of credit lines, aggregating CCR exposures with other credit exposures and internal capital allocation. 4. In addition to EPE, an institution shall measure and manage current exposures. Where appropriate, the institution shall measure current exposure gross and net of collateral. The use test is satisfied if an institution uses other CCR measures, such as peak exposure, based on the distribution of exposures generated by the same model to compute EPE. 5. An institution shall have the systems capability to estimate EE daily if necessary, unless it demonstrates to the satisfaction of its competent authorities that its exposures to CCR warrant less frequent calculation. The institution shall estimate EE along a time profile of forecasting horizons that adequately reflects the time structure of future cash flows and maturity of the contracts and in a manner that is consistent with the materiality and composition of the exposures. 6. Exposure shall be measured, monitored and controlled over the life of all contracts in the netting set and not only to the one-year horizon. The institution shall have procedures in place to identify and control the risks for counterparties where the exposure rises beyond the one-year horizon. The forecast increase in exposure shall be an input into the institution's internal capital model.
Article 290 Stress testing
1. An institution shall have a comprehensive stress testing programme for CCR, including for use in assessment of own funds requirements for CCR, which complies with the requirements laid down in paragraphs 2 to 10. 2. It shall identify possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on an institution's credit exposures and assess the institution's ability to withstand such changes. 3. The stress measures under the programme shall be compared against risk limits and considered by the institution as part of the process set out in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU. 4. The programme shall comprehensively capture trades and aggregate exposures across all forms of counterparty credit risk at the level of specific counterparties in a sufficient time frame to conduct regular stress testing. 5. It shall provide for at least monthly exposure stress testing of principal market risk factors such as interest rates, FX, equities, credit spreads, and commodity prices for all counterparties of the institution, in order to identify, and enable the institution when necessary to reduce outsized concentrations in specific directional risks. Exposure stress testing -including single factor, multifactor and material non-directional risks- and joint stressing of exposure and creditworthiness shall be performed at the counterparty-specific, counterparty group and aggregate institution-wide CCR levels. 6. It shall apply at least quarterly multifactor stress testing scenarios and assess material non-directional risks including yield curve exposure and basis risks. Multiple-factor stress tests shall, at a minimum, address the following scenarios in which the following occurs: (a) severe economic or market events have occurred; (b) broad market liquidity has decreased significantly; (c) a large financial intermediary is liquidating positions. 7. The severity of the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be consistent with the purpose of the stress test. When evaluating solvency under stress, the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be sufficiently severe to capture historical extreme market environments and extreme but plausible stressed market conditions. The stress tests shall evaluate the impact of such shocks on own funds, own funds requirements and earnings. For the purpose of day-to-day portfolio monitoring, hedging, and management of concentrations the testing programme shall also consider scenarios of lesser severity and higher probability. 8. The programme shall include provision, where appropriate, for reverse stress tests to identify extreme, but plausible, scenarios that could result in significant adverse outcomes. Reverse stress testing shall account for the impact of material non-linearity in the portfolio. 9. The results of the stress testing under the programme shall be reported regularly, at least on a quarterly basis, to senior management. The reports and analysis of the results shall cover the largest counterparty-level impacts across the portfolio, material concentrations within segments of the portfolio (within the same industry or region), and relevant portfolio and counterparty specific trends. 10. Senior management shall take a lead role in the integration of stress testing into the risk management framework and risk culture of the institution and ensure that the results are meaningful and used to manage CCR. The results of stress testing for significant exposures shall be assessed against guidelines that indicate the institution's risk appetite, and referred to senior management for discussion and action when excessive or concentrated risks are identified.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 290 Stress testing):
1. An institution shall have a comprehensive stress testing programme for CCR, including for use in assessment of own funds requirements for CCR, which complies with the requirements laid down in paragraphs 2 to 10. 2. It shall identify possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on an institution's credit exposures and assess the institution's ability to withstand such changes. 3. The stress measures under the programme shall be compared against risk limits and considered by the institution as part of the process set out in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU. 4. The programme shall comprehensively capture trades and aggregate exposures across all forms of counterparty credit risk at the level of specific counterparties in a sufficient time frame to conduct regular stress testing. 5. It shall provide for at least monthly exposure stress testing of principal market risk factors such as interest rates, FX, equities, credit spreads, and commodity prices for all counterparties of the institution, in order to identify, and enable the institution when necessary to reduce outsized concentrations in specific directional risks. Exposure stress testing -including single factor, multifactor and material non-directional risks- and joint stressing of exposure and creditworthiness shall be performed at the counterparty-specific, counterparty group and aggregate institution-wide CCR levels. 7. The severity of the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be consistent with the purpose of the stress test. When evaluating solvency under stress, the shocks of the underlying risk factors shall be sufficiently severe to capture historical extreme market environments and extreme but plausible stressed market conditions. The stress tests shall evaluate the impact of such shocks on own funds, own funds requirements and earnings. For the purpose of day-to-day portfolio monitoring, hedging, and management of concentrations the testing programme shall also consider scenarios of lesser severity and higher probability. 8. The programme shall include provision, where appropriate, for reverse stress tests to identify extreme, but plausible, scenarios that could result in significant adverse outcomes. Reverse stress testing shall account for the impact of material non-linearity in the portfolio. 9. The results of the stress testing under the programme shall be reported regularly, at least on a quarterly basis, to senior management. The reports and analysis of the results shall cover the largest counterparty-level impacts across the portfolio, material concentrations within segments of the portfolio (within the same industry or region), and relevant portfolio and counterparty specific trends. 10. Senior management shall take a lead role in the integration of stress testing into the risk management framework and risk culture of the institution and ensure that the results are meaningful and used to manage CCR. The results of stress testing for significant exposures shall be assessed against guidelines that indicate the institution's risk appetite, and referred to senior management for discussion and action when excessive or concentrated risks are identified.