Article 384 Standardised method
1. An institution which does not calculate the own funds requirements for CVA risk for its counterparties in accordance with Article 383 shall calculate a portfolio own funds requirements for CVA risk for each counterparty in accordance with the following formula, taking into account CVA hedges that are eligible in accordance with Article 386: where: h = the one-year risk horizon (in units of a year); h = 1; = the one-year risk horizon (in units of a year); h = 1; w i = the weight applicable to counterparty ‘i’. Counterparty ‘i’ shall be mapped to one of the six weights wi based on an external credit assessment by a nominated ECAI, as set out in Table 1. For a counterparty for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available: (a) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 3 shall map the internal rating of the counterparty to one of the external credit assessment; (b) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 2 shall assign wi=1,0 % to this counterparty. However, if an institution uses Article 128 to risk weight counterparty credit risk exposures to this counterparty, wi=3,0 % shall be assigned; w i the weight applicable to counterparty ‘i’. Counterparty ‘i’ shall be mapped to one of the six weights wi based on an external credit assessment by a nominated ECAI, as set out in Table 1. For a counterparty for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available: (a) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 3 shall map the internal rating of the counterparty to one of the external credit assessment; (b) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 2 shall assign wi=1,0 % to this counterparty. However, if an institution uses Article 128 to risk weight counterparty credit risk exposures to this counterparty, wi=3,0 % shall be assigned; = the total counterparty credit risk exposure value of counterparty ‘i’ (summed across its netting sets) including the effect of collateral in accordance with the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of Title II, Chapter 6 as applicable to the calculation of the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk for that counterparty. An institution using one of the methods set out in Sections 3 and 4 of Title II, Chapter 6, may use as the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, the exposure shall be discounted by applying the following factor: the total counterparty credit risk exposure value of counterparty ‘i’ (summed across its netting sets) including the effect of collateral in accordance with the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of Title II, Chapter 6 as applicable to the calculation of the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk for that counterparty. An institution using one of the methods set out in Sections 3 and 4 of Title II, Chapter 6, may use as the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, the exposure shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B i = the notional of purchased single name credit default swap hedges (summed if more than one position) referencing counterparty ‘i’ and used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B i the notional of purchased single name credit default swap hedges (summed if more than one position) referencing counterparty ‘i’ and used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B ind = is the full notional of one or more index credit default swap of purchased protection used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B ind is the full notional of one or more index credit default swap of purchased protection used to hedge CVA risk. w ind = is the weight applicable to index hedges. An institution shall determine w ind by calculating a weighted average of wi that are applicable to the individual constituents of the index; w ind is the weight applicable to index hedges. An institution shall determine w ind by calculating a weighted average of wi that are applicable to the individual constituents of the index; M i = the effective maturity of the transactions with counterparty i. For an institution using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i shall be calculated in accordance with Article 162(2)(g). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i is the average notional weighted maturity as referred to in point (b) of Article 162(2). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. M i the effective maturity of the transactions with counterparty i. For an institution using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i shall be calculated in accordance with Article 162(2)(g). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i is the average notional weighted maturity as referred to in point (b) of Article 162(2). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. = the maturity of the hedge instrument with notional B i (the quantities B i are to be summed if these are several positions); the maturity of the hedge instrument with notional B i (the quantities B i are to be summed if these are several positions); M ind = the maturity of the index hedge. In the case of more than one index hedge position, M ind is the notional-weighted maturity. M ind the maturity of the index hedge. In the case of more than one index hedge position, M ind is the notional-weighted maturity. 2. Where a counterparty is included in an index on which a credit default swap used for hedging counterparty credit risk is based, the institution may subtract the notional amount attributable to that counterparty in accordance with its reference entity weight from the index CDS notional amount and treat it as a single name hedge (B i ) of the individual counterparty with maturity based on the maturity of the index. Table 1 Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 % Table 1 Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 % Credit quality step Weight w i Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 %
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 384 Standardised method):
1. An institution which does not calculate the own funds requirements for CVA risk for its counterparties in accordance with Article 383 shall calculate a portfolio own funds requirements for CVA risk for each counterparty in accordance with the following formula, taking into account CVA hedges that are eligible in accordance with Article 386: where: h = the one-year risk horizon (in units of a year); h = 1; w i = the weight applicable to counterparty ‘i’. Counterparty ‘i’ shall be mapped to one of the six weights wi based on an external credit assessment by a nominated ECAI, as set out in Table 1. For a counterparty for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available: (a) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 3 shall map the internal rating of the counterparty to one of the external credit assessment; (b) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 2 shall assign wi=1,0 % to this counterparty. However, if an institution uses Article 128 to risk weight counterparty credit risk exposures to this counterparty, wi=3,0 % shall be assigned; = the total counterparty credit risk exposure value of counterparty ‘i’ (summed across its netting sets) including the effect of collateral in accordance with the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of Title II, Chapter 6 as applicable to the calculation of the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk for that counterparty. An institution using one of the methods set out in Sections 3 and 4 of Title II, Chapter 6, may use as the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, the exposure shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B i = the notional of purchased single name credit default swap hedges (summed if more than one position) referencing counterparty ‘i’ and used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B ind = is the full notional of one or more index credit default swap of purchased protection used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: w ind = is the weight applicable to index hedges. An institution shall determine w ind by calculating a weighted average of wi that are applicable to the individual constituents of the index; M i = the effective maturity of the transactions with counterparty i. For an institution using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i shall be calculated in accordance with Article 162(2)(g). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i is the average notional weighted maturity as referred to in point (b) of Article 162(2). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. = the maturity of the hedge instrument with notional B i (the quantities B i are to be summed if these are several positions); M ind = the maturity of the index hedge. In the case of more than one index hedge position, M ind is the notional-weighted maturity. An institution which does not calculate the own funds requirements for CVA risk for its counterparties in accordance with Article 383 shall calculate a portfolio own funds requirements for CVA risk for each counterparty in accordance with the following formula, taking into account CVA hedges that are eligible in accordance with Article 386: where: h = the one-year risk horizon (in units of a year); h = 1; = the one-year risk horizon (in units of a year); h = 1; w i = the weight applicable to counterparty ‘i’. Counterparty ‘i’ shall be mapped to one of the six weights wi based on an external credit assessment by a nominated ECAI, as set out in Table 1. For a counterparty for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available: (a) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 3 shall map the internal rating of the counterparty to one of the external credit assessment; (b) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 2 shall assign wi=1,0 % to this counterparty. However, if an institution uses Article 128 to risk weight counterparty credit risk exposures to this counterparty, wi=3,0 % shall be assigned; w i the weight applicable to counterparty ‘i’. Counterparty ‘i’ shall be mapped to one of the six weights wi based on an external credit assessment by a nominated ECAI, as set out in Table 1. For a counterparty for which a credit assessment by a nominated ECAI is not available: (a) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 3 shall map the internal rating of the counterparty to one of the external credit assessment; (b) an institution using the approach in Title II, Chapter 2 shall assign wi=1,0 % to this counterparty. However, if an institution uses Article 128 to risk weight counterparty credit risk exposures to this counterparty, wi=3,0 % shall be assigned; = the total counterparty credit risk exposure value of counterparty ‘i’ (summed across its netting sets) including the effect of collateral in accordance with the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of Title II, Chapter 6 as applicable to the calculation of the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk for that counterparty. An institution using one of the methods set out in Sections 3 and 4 of Title II, Chapter 6, may use as the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, the exposure shall be discounted by applying the following factor: the total counterparty credit risk exposure value of counterparty ‘i’ (summed across its netting sets) including the effect of collateral in accordance with the methods set out in Sections 3 to 6 of Title II, Chapter 6 as applicable to the calculation of the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risk for that counterparty. An institution using one of the methods set out in Sections 3 and 4 of Title II, Chapter 6, may use as the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, the exposure shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B i = the notional of purchased single name credit default swap hedges (summed if more than one position) referencing counterparty ‘i’ and used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B i the notional of purchased single name credit default swap hedges (summed if more than one position) referencing counterparty ‘i’ and used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B ind = is the full notional of one or more index credit default swap of purchased protection used to hedge CVA risk. That notional amount shall be discounted by applying the following factor: B ind is the full notional of one or more index credit default swap of purchased protection used to hedge CVA risk. w ind = is the weight applicable to index hedges. An institution shall determine w ind by calculating a weighted average of wi that are applicable to the individual constituents of the index; w ind is the weight applicable to index hedges. An institution shall determine w ind by calculating a weighted average of wi that are applicable to the individual constituents of the index; M i = the effective maturity of the transactions with counterparty i. For an institution using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i shall be calculated in accordance with Article 162(2)(g). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i is the average notional weighted maturity as referred to in point (b) of Article 162(2). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. M i the effective maturity of the transactions with counterparty i. For an institution using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i shall be calculated in accordance with Article 162(2)(g). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. For an institution not using the method set out in Section 6 of Title II, Chapter 6, M i is the average notional weighted maturity as referred to in point (b) of Article 162(2). However, for that purpose, M i shall not be capped at five years but at the longest contractual remaining maturity in the netting set. = the maturity of the hedge instrument with notional B i (the quantities B i are to be summed if these are several positions); the maturity of the hedge instrument with notional B i (the quantities B i are to be summed if these are several positions); M ind = the maturity of the index hedge. In the case of more than one index hedge position, M ind is the notional-weighted maturity. M ind the maturity of the index hedge. In the case of more than one index hedge position, M ind is the notional-weighted maturity. 2. Where a counterparty is included in an index on which a credit default swap used for hedging counterparty credit risk is based, the institution may subtract the notional amount attributable to that counterparty in accordance with its reference entity weight from the index CDS notional amount and treat it as a single name hedge (B i ) of the individual counterparty with maturity based on the maturity of the index. Table 1 Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 % Where a counterparty is included in an index on which a credit default swap used for hedging counterparty credit risk is based, the institution may subtract the notional amount attributable to that counterparty in accordance with its reference entity weight from the index CDS notional amount and treat it as a single name hedge (B i ) of the individual counterparty with maturity based on the maturity of the index. Table 1 Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 % Table 1 Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 % Credit quality step Weight w i Credit quality step Weight w i 1 0,7 % 2 0,8 % 3 1,0 % 4 2,0 % 5 3,0 % 6 10,0 %
Article 385 Alternative to using CVA methods to calculating own funds requirements
As an alternative to Article 384, for instruments referred to in Article 382 and subject to the prior consent of the competent authority, institutions using the Original Exposure Method as laid down in Article 275, may apply a multiplication factor of 10 to the resulting risk-weighted exposure amounts for counterparty credit risk for those exposures instead of calculating own funds requirements for CVA risk.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 386 Eligible hedges
1. Hedges shall be ‘eligible hedges’ for the purposes of the calculation of own funds requirements for CVA risk in accordance with Articles 383 and 384 only where they are used for the purpose of mitigating CVA risk and managed as such, and are one of the following: (a) single-name credit default swaps or other equivalent hedging instruments referencing the counterparty directly; (b) index credit default swaps, provided that the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is reflected, to the satisfaction of the competent authority, in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk. The requirement in point (b) that the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is reflected in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk shall also apply to cases where a proxy is used for the spread of a counterparty. For all counterparties for which a proxy is used, an institution shall use reasonable basis time series out of a representative group of similar names for which a spread is available. If the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is not reflected to the satisfaction of the competent authority, then an institution shall reflect only 50 % of the notional amount of index hedges in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk. Over-hedging of the exposures with single name credit default swaps under the method laid out in Article 383 is not allowed. 2. An institution shall not reflect other types of counterparty risk hedges in the calculation of the own funds requirements for CVA risk. In particular, tranched or nth-to-default credit default swaps and credit linked notes are not eligible hedges for the purposes the calculation of the own funds requirements for CVA risk. 3. Eligible hedges that are included in the calculation of the own funds requirements for CVA risk shall not be included in the calculation of the own funds requirements for specific risk as set out in Title IV or treated as credit risk mitigation other than for the counterparty credit risk of the same portfolio of transaction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 386 Eligible hedges):
1. Hedges shall be ‘eligible hedges’ for the purposes of the calculation of own funds requirements for CVA risk in accordance with Articles 383 and 384 only where they are used for the purpose of mitigating CVA risk and managed as such, and are one of the following: (a) single-name credit default swaps or other equivalent hedging instruments referencing the counterparty directly; (b) index credit default swaps, provided that the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is reflected, to the satisfaction of the competent authority, in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk. Hedges shall be ‘eligible hedges’ for the purposes of the calculation of own funds requirements for CVA risk in accordance with Articles 383 and 384 only where they are used for the purpose of mitigating CVA risk and managed as such, and are one of the following: (a) single-name credit default swaps or other equivalent hedging instruments referencing the counterparty directly; (b) index credit default swaps, provided that the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is reflected, to the satisfaction of the competent authority, in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk. The requirement in point (b) that the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is reflected in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk shall also apply to cases where a proxy is used for the spread of a counterparty. For all counterparties for which a proxy is used, an institution shall use reasonable basis time series out of a representative group of similar names for which a spread is available. If the basis between any individual counterparty spread and the spreads of index credit default swap hedges is not reflected to the satisfaction of the competent authority, then an institution shall reflect only 50 % of the notional amount of index hedges in the value-at-risk and the stressed value-at-risk. Over-hedging of the exposures with single name credit default swaps under the method laid out in Article 383 is not allowed. 2. An institution shall not reflect other types of counterparty risk hedges in the calculation of the own funds requirements for CVA risk. In particular, tranched or nth-to-default credit default swaps and credit linked notes are not eligible hedges for the purposes the calculation of the own funds requirements for CVA risk. 3. Eligible hedges that are included in the calculation of the own funds requirements for CVA risk shall not be included in the calculation of the own funds requirements for specific risk as set out in Title IV or treated as credit risk mitigation other than for the counterparty credit risk of the same portfolio of transaction.
Article 387 Subject matter
Institutions shall monitor and control their large exposures in accordance with this Part.
Article 388 Negative Scope
This Part shall not apply to investment firms that fulfil the criteria set out in Article 95(1) or Article 96(1). This Part shall not apply to a group on the basis of its consolidated situation, if that group only includes investment firms referred to in Article 95(1) or Article 96(1) and ancillary companies and where that group does not include credit institutions.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 389 Definition
For the purposes of this Part, ‘exposures’, means any asset or off-balance sheet item referred to in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2, without applying the risk weights or degrees of risk.
Article 390 Calculation of the exposure value
1. Exposures arising from the items referred to in Annex II shall be calculated in accordance with one of the methods set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6. 2. Institutions with a permission to use the Internal Model Method in accordance with Article 283 may use the Internal Model Method for calculating the exposure value for repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, margin lending transactions and long settlement transactions. 3. The institutions that calculate the own funds requirements for their trading-book business in accordance with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2, Article 299 and Part Three, Title V and, as appropriate, with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5, shall calculate the exposures to individual clients which arise on the trading book by adding together the following items: (a) the positive excess of an institution's long positions over its short positions in all the financial instruments issued by the client in question, the net position in each of the different instruments being calculated in accordance with the methods laid down in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2; (b) the net exposure, in the case of the underwriting of a debt or an equity instrument; (c) the exposures due to the transactions, agreements and contracts referred to in Articles 299 and 378 to 380 with the client in question, such exposures being calculated in the manner laid down in those Articles, for the calculation of exposure values. For the purposes of point (b), the net exposure is calculated by deducting those underwriting positions which are subscribed or sub-underwritten by third parties on the basis of a formal agreement reduced by the factors set out in Article 345. For the purposes of point (b), institutions shall set up systems to monitor and control their underwriting exposures between the time of the initial commitment and the next business day in the light of the nature of the risks incurred in the markets in question. For the purposes of point (c), Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3 shall be excluded from the reference in Article 299. 4. The overall exposures to individual clients or groups of connected clients shall be calculated by adding together the exposures of the trading book and those of the non-trading book. 5. The exposures to groups of connected clients shall be calculated by adding together the exposures to individual clients in a group. 6. Exposures shall not include any of the following: (a) in the case of foreign exchange transactions, exposures incurred in the ordinary course of settlement during the two working days following payment; (b) in the case of transactions for the purchase or sale of securities, exposures incurred in the ordinary course of settlement during five working days following payment or delivery of the securities, whichever the earlier; (c) in the case of the provision of money transmission including the execution of payment services, clearing and settlement in any currency and correspondent banking or financial instruments clearing, settlement and custody services to clients, delayed receipts in funding and other exposures arising from client activity which do not last longer than the following business day; (d) in the case of the provision of money transmission including the execution of payment services, clearing and settlement in any currency and correspondent banking, intra-day exposures to institutions providing those services; (e) exposures deducted from own funds in accordance with Articles 36, 56 and 66. 7. In order to determine the overall exposure to a client or a group of connected clients, in respect of clients to which the institution has exposures through transactions referred to in points (m) and (o) of Article 112 or through other transactions where there is an exposure to underlying assets, an institution shall assess its underlying exposures taking into account the economic substance of the structure of the transaction and the risks inherent in the structure of the transaction itself, in order to determine whether it constitutes an additional exposure. 8. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the conditions and methodologies used to determine the overall exposure to a client or a group of connected clients in respect of the types of exposures referred to in paragraph 7; (b) the conditions under which the structure of the transaction referred to in paragraph 7 does not constitute an additional exposure. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 390 Calculation of the exposure value):
1. Exposures arising from the items referred to in Annex II shall be calculated in accordance with one of the methods set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 6. 2. Institutions with a permission to use the Internal Model Method in accordance with Article 283 may use the Internal Model Method for calculating the exposure value for repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, margin lending transactions and long settlement transactions. 3. The institutions that calculate the own funds requirements for their trading-book business in accordance with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2, Article 299 and Part Three, Title V and, as appropriate, with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5, shall calculate the exposures to individual clients which arise on the trading book by adding together the following items: (a) the positive excess of an institution's long positions over its short positions in all the financial instruments issued by the client in question, the net position in each of the different instruments being calculated in accordance with the methods laid down in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2; (b) the net exposure, in the case of the underwriting of a debt or an equity instrument; (c) the exposures due to the transactions, agreements and contracts referred to in Articles 299 and 378 to 380 with the client in question, such exposures being calculated in the manner laid down in those Articles, for the calculation of exposure values. For the purposes of point (b), the net exposure is calculated by deducting those underwriting positions which are subscribed or sub-underwritten by third parties on the basis of a formal agreement reduced by the factors set out in Article 345. For the purposes of point (b), institutions shall set up systems to monitor and control their underwriting exposures between the time of the initial commitment and the next business day in the light of the nature of the risks incurred in the markets in question. For the purposes of point (c), Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3 shall be excluded from the reference in Article 299. 4. The overall exposures to individual clients or groups of connected clients shall be calculated by adding together the exposures of the trading book and those of the non-trading book. 5. The exposures to groups of connected clients shall be calculated by adding together the exposures to individual clients in a group. 6. Exposures shall not include any of the following: (a) in the case of foreign exchange transactions, exposures incurred in the ordinary course of settlement during the two working days following payment; (b) in the case of transactions for the purchase or sale of securities, exposures incurred in the ordinary course of settlement during five working days following payment or delivery of the securities, whichever the earlier; (c) in the case of the provision of money transmission including the execution of payment services, clearing and settlement in any currency and correspondent banking or financial instruments clearing, settlement and custody services to clients, delayed receipts in funding and other exposures arising from client activity which do not last longer than the following business day; (d) in the case of the provision of money transmission including the execution of payment services, clearing and settlement in any currency and correspondent banking, intra-day exposures to institutions providing those services; (e) exposures deducted from own funds in accordance with Articles 36, 56 and 66. 7. In order to determine the overall exposure to a client or a group of connected clients, in respect of clients to which the institution has exposures through transactions referred to in points (m) and (o) of Article 112 or through other transactions where there is an exposure to underlying assets, an institution shall assess its underlying exposures taking into account the economic substance of the structure of the transaction and the risks inherent in the structure of the transaction itself, in order to determine whether it constitutes an additional exposure. 8. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the conditions and methodologies used to determine the overall exposure to a client or a group of connected clients in respect of the types of exposures referred to in paragraph 7; (b) the conditions under which the structure of the transaction referred to in paragraph 7 does not constitute an additional exposure. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 9. For the purposes of paragraph 5, EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify how to determine the exposures arising from derivative contracts listed in Annex II and credit derivative contracts, where the contract was not directly entered into with a client but the underlying debt or equity instrument was issued by that client for their inclusion into the exposures to the client. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 March 2020. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 391 Definition of an institution for large exposures purposes
For the purposes of calculating the value of exposures in accordance with this Part the term ‘institution’ shall include a private or public undertaking, including its branches, which, were it established in the Union, would fulfil the definition of the term ‘institution’ and has been authorised in a third country that applies prudential supervisory and regulatory requirements at least equivalent to those applied in the Union.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 391 Definition of an institution for large exposures purposes):
For the purposes of calculating the value of exposures in accordance with this Part the term ‘institution’ shall include a private or public undertaking, including its branches, which, were it established in the Union, would fulfil the definition of the term ‘institution’ and has been authorised in a third country that applies prudential supervisory and regulatory requirements at least equivalent to those applied in the Union. For the purposes of the first paragraph, the Commission may adopt, by means of implementing acts, and subject to the examination procedure referred to in Article 464(2), decisions as to whether a third country applies prudential supervisory and regulatory requirements at least equivalent to those applied in the Union.
Article 392 Definition of a large exposure
An institution's exposure to a client or group of connected clients shall be considered a large exposure where its value is equal to or exceeds 10 % of its eligible capital.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 392 Definition of a large exposure):
An institution's exposure to a client or a group of connected clients shall be considered a large exposure where the value of the exposure is equal to or exceeds 10 % of its Tier 1 capital.
Article 393 Capacity to identify and manage large exposures
An institution shall have sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms for the purposes of identifying, managing, monitoring, reporting and recording all large exposures and subsequent changes to them, in accordance with this Regulation.
Article 394 Reporting requirements
1. An institution shall report the following information about every large exposure to the competent authorities, including large exposures exempted from the application of Article 395(1): (a) the identification of the client or the group of connected clients to which an institution has a large exposure; (b) the exposure value before taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation, when applicable; (c) where used, the type of funded or unfunded credit protection; (d) the exposure value after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation calculated for the purpose of Article 395(1). Where an institution is subject to Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3 its 20 largest exposures on a consolidated basis, excluding those exempted from the application of Article 395(1) shall be made available to the competent authorities. 2. An institution shall report the following information to the competent authorities, in addition to reporting the information referred to in paragraph 1, in relation to its 10 largest exposures on a consolidated basis to institutions as well as its 10 largest exposures on a consolidated basis to unregulated financial sector entities, including large exposures exempted from the application of Article 395(1): (e) the expected run-off of the exposure expressed as the amount maturing within monthly maturity buckets up to one year, quarterly maturity buckets up to three years and annually thereafter. 3. Reporting shall be carried out at least twice a year. 4. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the following: (a) the uniform formats for the reporting referred to in paragraph 3 which shall be proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of institutions' activities and the instructions for using those formats; (b) the frequencies and dates of the reporting referred to in paragraph 3; (c) the IT solutions to be applied for the reporting referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 394 Reporting requirements):
1. An institution shall report the following information about every large exposure to the competent authorities, including large exposures exempted from the application of Article 395(1): (a) the identification of the client or the group of connected clients to which an institution has a large exposure; (b) the exposure value before taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation, when applicable; (c) where used, the type of funded or unfunded credit protection; (d) the exposure value after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation calculated for the purpose of Article 395(1). Where an institution is subject to Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3 its 20 largest exposures on a consolidated basis, excluding those exempted from the application of Article 395(1) shall be made available to the competent authorities. 2. An institution shall report the following information to the competent authorities, in addition to reporting the information referred to in paragraph 1, in relation to its 10 largest exposures on a consolidated basis to institutions as well as its 10 largest exposures on a consolidated basis to unregulated financial sector entities, including large exposures exempted from the application of Article 395(1): (e) the expected run-off of the exposure expressed as the amount maturing within monthly maturity buckets up to one year, quarterly maturity buckets up to three years and annually thereafter. 3. Reporting shall be carried out at least twice a year. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the criteria for the identification of shadow banking entities referred to in paragraph 2. In developing those draft regulatory technical standards, EBA shall take into account international developments and internationally agreed standards on shadow banking and shall consider whether: (a) the relation with an individual entity or a group of entities may carry risks to the institution's solvency or liquidity position; (b) entities that are subject to solvency or liquidity requirements similar to those imposed by this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU should be entirely or partially excluded from the obligation to be reported referred to in paragraph 2 on shadow banking entities. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 June 2020. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 395 Limits to large exposures
1. An institution shall not incur an exposure, after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403, to a client or group of connected clients the value of which exceeds 25 % of its eligible capital. Where that client is an institution or where a group of connected clients includes one or more institutions, that value shall not exceed 25 % of the institution's eligible capital or EUR 150 million, whichever the higher, provided that the sum of exposure values, after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403, to all connected clients that are not institutions does not exceed 25 % of the institution's eligible capital. Where the amount of EUR 150 million is higher than 25 % of the institution's eligible capital the value of the exposure, after taking into account the effect of credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 shall not exceed a reasonable limit in terms of the institution's eligible capital. That limit shall be determined by the institution in accordance with the policies and procedures referred to in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU, to address and control concentration risk. This limit shall not exceed 100 % of the institution's eligible capital. Competent authorities may set a lower limit than EUR 150 million and shall inform EBA and the Commission thereof. 2. EBA shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 as well as the outcomes of developments in the area of shadow banking and large exposures at the Union and international levels, issue guidelines by 31 December 2014 to set appropriate aggregate limits to such exposures or tighter individual limits on exposures to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework. In developing those guidelines, EBA shall consider whether the introduction of additional limits would have a material detrimental impact on the risk profile of institutions established in the Union, on the provision of credit to the real economy or on the stability and orderly functioning of financial markets. By 31 December 2015 the Commission shall assess the appropriateness and the impact of imposing limits on exposures to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework, taking into account Union and international developments in the area of shadow banking and large exposures as well as credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403. The Commission shall submit the report to the European Parliament and the Council, together, if appropriate, with a legislative proposal on exposure limits to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework. 3. Subject to Article 396, an institution shall at all times comply with the relevant limit laid down in paragraph 1. 4. Assets constituting claims and other exposures onto recognised third-country investment firms may be subject to the same treatment as set out in paragraph 1. 5. The limits laid down in this Article may be exceeded for the exposures on the institution's trading book if the following conditions are met: (a) the exposure on the non-trading book to the client or group of connected clients in question does not exceed the limit laid down in paragraph 1, this limit being calculated with reference to eligible capital, so that the excess arises entirely on the trading book; (b) the institution meets an additional own funds requirement on the excess in respect of the limit laid down in paragraph 1 which is calculated in accordance with Articles 397 and 398; (c) where 10 days or less have elapsed since the excess occurred, the trading-book exposure to the client or group of connected clients in question shall not exceed 500 % of the institution's eligible capital; (d) any excesses that have persisted for more than 10 days do not, in aggregate, exceed 600 % of the institution's eligible capital. In each case in which the limit has been exceeded, the institution shall report the amount of the excess and the name of the client concerned and, where applicable, the name of the group of connected clients concerned, without delay to the competent authorities. 6. For the purpose of this paragraph, structural measures mean measures adopted by a Member State and implemented by the relevant competent authorities of that Member State before the entry into force of a legal act explicitly harmonising such measures, that require credit institutions authorised in that Member State to reduce their exposures to different legal entities depending on their activities, irrespective of where those activities are located, with a view to protecting depositors and preserving financial stability. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 400(1)(f), where Member States adopt national laws requiring structural measures to be taken within a banking group, competent authorities may require the institutions of the banking group which hold deposits that are covered by a Deposit Guarantee Scheme in accordance with Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes ( 30 ) or an equivalent deposit guarantee scheme in a third country to apply a large exposure limit below 25 % but not lower than 15 % between 28 June 2013 and 30 June 2015, and than 10 % from 1 July 2015 on a sub-consolidated basis in accordance with Article 11(5) to intragroup exposures where these exposures consist of exposures to an entity that does not belong to the same subgroup as regards the structural measures. For the purpose of this paragraph, the following conditions shall be met: (a) all entities belonging to a same subgroup as regards the structural measures are considered as one client or group of connected clients; (b) the competent authorities apply a uniform limit to the exposures referred to in the first subparagraph. Applying this approach shall be without prejudice to effective supervision on a consolidated basis and shall not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole or form or create an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. 7. Before adopting the specific structural measures as referred to in paragraph 6 relating to large exposures, the competent authorities shall notify the Council, the Commission, the competent authorities concerned and EBA at least two months prior to the publication of the decision to adopt the structural measures, and submit relevant quantitative or qualitative evidence of all of the following: (a) the scope of the activities that are subject to the structural measures; (b) an explanation as to why such draft measures are deemed to be suitable, effective and proportionate to protect depositors; (c) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the measures on the internal market based on information which is available to the Member State. 8. The power to adopt an implementing act to accept or reject the proposed national measures referred to in paragraph 7 is conferred on the Commission acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 464(2). Within one month of receiving the notification referred to in paragraph 7, EBA shall provide its opinion on the points mentioned in that paragraph to the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned. Competent authorities concerned may also provide their opinions on the points mentioned in that paragraph to the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned. Taking utmost account of the opinions referred to in the second subparagraph and if there is robust and strong evidence that the measures have a negative impact on the internal market that outweighs the financial stability benefits, the Commission shall, within two months of receiving the notification, reject the proposed national measures. Otherwise, the Commission shall accept the proposed national measures for an initial period of 2 years and where appropriate the measures may be subject to amendment. The Commission shall only reject the proposed national measures if it considers the proposed national measures entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole, thus forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market or to the free movement of capital in accordance with the provisions of the TFEU. The assessment of the Commission shall take account of the opinion of EBA and shall take into account the evidence presented in accordance with paragraph 7. Before the expiry of the measures, the competent authorities may propose new measures for the extension of the period of application for an additional period of 2 years each time. In this case, they shall notify the Commission, the Council, the competent authorities concerned and EBA. Approval of the new measures shall be subject to the process set out in this Article. This Article shall be without prejudice to Article 458.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 395 Limits to large exposures):
1. An institution shall not incur an exposure, after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403, to a client or group of connected clients the value of which exceeds 25 % of its eligible capital. Where that client is an institution or where a group of connected clients includes one or more institutions, that value shall not exceed 25 % of the institution's eligible capital or EUR 150 million, whichever the higher, provided that the sum of exposure values, after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403, to all connected clients that are not institutions does not exceed 25 % of the institution's eligible capital. Where the amount of EUR 150 million is higher than 25 % of the institution's eligible capital the value of the exposure, after taking into account the effect of credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 shall not exceed a reasonable limit in terms of the institution's eligible capital. That limit shall be determined by the institution in accordance with the policies and procedures referred to in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU, to address and control concentration risk. This limit shall not exceed 100 % of the institution's eligible capital. Competent authorities may set a lower limit than EUR 150 million and shall inform EBA and the Commission thereof. 2. EBA shall, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 as well as the outcomes of developments in the area of shadow banking and large exposures at the Union and international levels, issue guidelines by 31 December 2014 to set appropriate aggregate limits to such exposures or tighter individual limits on exposures to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework. In developing those guidelines, EBA shall consider whether the introduction of additional limits would have a material detrimental impact on the risk profile of institutions established in the Union, on the provision of credit to the real economy or on the stability and orderly functioning of financial markets. By 31 December 2015 the Commission shall assess the appropriateness and the impact of imposing limits on exposures to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework, taking into account Union and international developments in the area of shadow banking and large exposures as well as credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 399 to 403. The Commission shall submit the report to the European Parliament and the Council, together, if appropriate, with a legislative proposal on exposure limits to shadow banking entities which carry out banking activities outside a regulated framework. 3. Subject to Article 396, an institution shall at all times comply with the relevant limit laid down in paragraph 1. 4. Assets constituting claims and other exposures onto recognised third-country investment firms may be subject to the same treatment as set out in paragraph 1. The limits laid down in this Article may be exceeded for the exposures on the institution's trading book if the following conditions are met: (a) the exposure on the non-trading book to the client or group of connected clients in question does not exceed the limit laid down in paragraph 1, this limit being calculated with reference to eligible capital, so that the excess arises entirely on the trading book; (b) the institution meets an additional own funds requirement on the excess in respect of the limit laid down in paragraph 1 which is calculated in accordance with Articles 397 and 398; (c) where 10 days or less have elapsed since the excess occurred, the trading-book exposure to the client or group of connected clients in question shall not exceed 500 % of the institution's eligible capital; (d) any excesses that have persisted for more than 10 days do not, in aggregate, exceed 600 % of the institution's eligible capital. In each case in which the limit has been exceeded, the institution shall report the amount of the excess and the name of the client concerned and, where applicable, the name of the group of connected clients concerned, without delay to the competent authorities. 6. For the purpose of this paragraph, structural measures mean measures adopted by a Member State and implemented by the relevant competent authorities of that Member State before the entry into force of a legal act explicitly harmonising such measures, that require credit institutions authorised in that Member State to reduce their exposures to different legal entities depending on their activities, irrespective of where those activities are located, with a view to protecting depositors and preserving financial stability. For the purpose of this paragraph, the following conditions shall be met: (a) all entities belonging to a same subgroup as regards the structural measures are considered as one client or group of connected clients; (b) the competent authorities apply a uniform limit to the exposures referred to in the first subparagraph. Applying this approach shall be without prejudice to effective supervision on a consolidated basis and shall not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole or form or create an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. 7. Before adopting the specific structural measures as referred to in paragraph 6 relating to large exposures, the competent authorities shall notify the Council, the Commission, the competent authorities concerned and EBA at least two months prior to the publication of the decision to adopt the structural measures, and submit relevant quantitative or qualitative evidence of all of the following: (a) the scope of the activities that are subject to the structural measures; (b) an explanation as to why such draft measures are deemed to be suitable, effective and proportionate to protect depositors; (c) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the measures on the internal market based on information which is available to the Member State. 8. The power to adopt an implementing act to accept or reject the proposed national measures referred to in paragraph 7 is conferred on the Commission acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 464(2). Within one month of receiving the notification referred to in paragraph 7, EBA shall provide its opinion on the points mentioned in that paragraph to the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned. Competent authorities concerned may also provide their opinions on the points mentioned in that paragraph to the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned. Taking utmost account of the opinions referred to in the second subparagraph and if there is robust and strong evidence that the measures have a negative impact on the internal market that outweighs the financial stability benefits, the Commission shall, within two months of receiving the notification, reject the proposed national measures. Otherwise, the Commission shall accept the proposed national measures for an initial period of 2 years and where appropriate the measures may be subject to amendment. The Commission shall only reject the proposed national measures if it considers the proposed national measures entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole, thus forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market or to the free movement of capital in accordance with the provisions of the TFEU. The assessment of the Commission shall take account of the opinion of EBA and shall take into account the evidence presented in accordance with paragraph 7. Before the expiry of the measures, the competent authorities may propose new measures for the extension of the period of application for an additional period of 2 years each time. In this case, they shall notify the Commission, the Council, the competent authorities concerned and EBA. Approval of the new measures shall be subject to the process set out in this Article. This Article shall be without prejudice to Article 458.
Article 396 Compliance with large exposures requirements
1. If, in an exceptional case, exposures exceed the limit set out in Article 395(1), the institution shall report the value of the exposure without delay to the competent authorities which may, where the circumstances warrant it, allow the institution a limited period of time in which to comply with the limit. Where the amount of EUR 150 million referred to in Article 395(1) is applicable, the competent authorities may allow on a case-by-case basis the 100 % limit in terms of the institution's eligible capital to be exceeded. 2. Where compliance by an institution on an individual or sub-consolidated basis with the obligations imposed in this Part is waived under Article 7(1), or the provisions of Article 9 are applied in the case of parent institutions in a Member State, measures shall be taken to ensure the satisfactory allocation of risks within the group.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 396 Compliance with large exposures requirements):
1. If, in an exceptional case, exposures exceed the limit set out in Article 395(1), the institution shall report the value of the exposure without delay to the competent authorities which may, where the circumstances warrant it, allow the institution a limited period of time in which to comply with the limit. Where the amount of EUR 150 million referred to in Article 395(1) is applicable, the competent authorities may allow on a case-by-case basis the 100 % limit in terms of the institution's eligible capital to be exceeded. 2. Where compliance by an institution on an individual or sub-consolidated basis with the obligations imposed in this Part is waived under Article 7(1), or the provisions of Article 9 are applied in the case of parent institutions in a Member State, measures shall be taken to ensure the satisfactory allocation of risks within the group. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, EBA shall issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to specify how the competent authorities may determine: (a) the exceptional cases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article; (b) the time considered appropriate for returning to compliance; (c) the measures to be taken to ensure the timely return to compliance of the institution.
Article 397 Calculating additional own funds requirements for large exposures in the trading book
1. The excess referred to in Article 395(5)(b) shall be calculated by selecting those components of the total trading exposure to the client or group of connected clients in question which attract the highest specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or requirements in Article 299 and Part Three, Title V, the sum of which equals the amount of the excess referred to in point (a) of Article 395(5). 2. Where the excess has not persisted for more than 10 days, the additional capital requirement shall be 200 % of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1, on these components. 3. As from 10 days after the excess has occurred, the components of the excess, selected in accordance with paragraph 1, shall be allocated to the appropriate line in Column 1 of Table 1 in ascending order of specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or requirements in Article 299 and Part Three, Title V. The additional own funds requirement shall be equal to the sum of the specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or the Article 299 and Part Three, Title V requirements on these components, multiplied by the corresponding factor in Column 2 of Table 1. Table 1 Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % Over 250 % 900 % Table 1 Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % Over 250 % 900 % Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 40 % to 60 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 60 % to 80 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 80 % to 100 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % From 100 % to 250 % Over 250 % 900 % Over 250 %
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 397 Calculating additional own funds requirements for large exposures in the trading book):
1. The excess referred to in Article 395(5)(b) shall be calculated by selecting those components of the total trading exposure to the client or group of connected clients in question which attract the highest specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or requirements in Article 299 and Part Three, Title V, the sum of which equals the amount of the excess referred to in point (a) of Article 395(5). 2. Where the excess has not persisted for more than 10 days, the additional capital requirement shall be 200 % of the requirements referred to in paragraph 1, on these components. 3. As from 10 days after the excess has occurred, the components of the excess, selected in accordance with paragraph 1, shall be allocated to the appropriate line in Column 1 of Table 1 in ascending order of specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or requirements in Article 299 and Part Three, Title V. The additional own funds requirement shall be equal to the sum of the specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or the Article 299 and Part Three, Title V requirements on these components, multiplied by the corresponding factor in Column 2 of Table 1. Table 1 Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % Over 250 % 900 % As from 10 days after the excess has occurred, the components of the excess, selected in accordance with paragraph 1, shall be allocated to the appropriate line in Column 1 of Table 1 in ascending order of specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or requirements in Article 299 and Part Three, Title V. The additional own funds requirement shall be equal to the sum of the specific-risk requirements in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 and/or the Article 299 and Part Three, Title V requirements on these components, multiplied by the corresponding factor in Column 2 of Table 1. Table 1 Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % Over 250 % 900 % Table 1 Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % Over 250 % 900 % Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Column 1: Excess over the limits (on the basis of a percentage of eligible capital) Column 2: Factors Up to 40 % 200 % Up to 40 % 200 % From 40 % to 60 % 300 % From 40 % to 60 % From 60 % to 80 % 400 % From 60 % to 80 % From 80 % to 100 % 500 % From 80 % to 100 % From 100 % to 250 % 600 % From 100 % to 250 % Over 250 % 900 % Over 250 %
Article 398 Procedures to prevent institutions from avoiding the additional own funds requirement
Institutions shall not deliberately avoid the additional own funds requirements set out in Article 397 that they would otherwise incur, on exposures exceeding the limit laid down in Article 395(1) once those exposures have been maintained for more than 10 days, by means of temporarily transferring the exposures in question to another company, whether within the same group or not, and/or by undertaking artificial transactions to close out the exposure during the 10-day period and create a new exposure. Institutions shall maintain systems which ensure that any transfer which has the effect referred to in the first subparagraph is immediately reported to the competent authorities.
Article 399 Eligible credit mitigation techniques
1. For the purposes of Articles 400 to 403 the term ‘guarantee’ shall include credit derivatives recognised under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4 other than credit linked notes. 2. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, where, under Articles 400 to 403 the recognition of funded or unfunded credit protection is permitted, this shall be subject to compliance with the eligibility requirements and other requirements set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4. 3. Where an institution relies upon Article 401(2), the recognition of funded credit protection shall be subject to the relevant requirements under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3. For the purposes of this Part, an institution shall not take into account the collateral referred to in Article 199(5) to (7), unless permitted under Article 402. 4. Institutions shall analyse, to the extent possible, their exposures to collateral issuers, providers of unfunded credit protection and underlying assets pursuant to Article 390(7) for possible concentrations and where appropriate take action and report any significant findings to their competent authority.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 399 Eligible credit mitigation techniques):
1. An institution shall use a credit risk mitigation technique in the calculation of an exposure where it has used that technique to calculate capital requirements for credit risk in accordance with Title II of Part Three, provided that the credit risk mitigation technique meets the conditions set out in this Article. For the purposes of Articles 400 to 403, the term ‘guarantee’ shall include credit derivatives recognised under Chapter 4 of Title II of Part Three other than credit linked notes. 2. Subject to paragraph 3 of this Article, where, under Articles 400 to 403 the recognition of funded or unfunded credit protection is permitted, this shall be subject to compliance with the eligibility requirements and other requirements set out in Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4. 3. Credit risk mitigation techniques which are available only to institutions using one of the IRB approaches shall not be used to reduce exposure values for large exposure purposes, except for exposures secured by immovable properties in accordance with Article 402. 4. Institutions shall analyse, to the extent possible, their exposures to collateral issuers, providers of unfunded credit protection and underlying assets pursuant to Article 390(7) for possible concentrations and where appropriate take action and report any significant findings to their competent authority.
Article 400 Exemptions
1. The following exposures shall be exempted from the application of Article 395(1): (a) asset items constituting claims on central governments, central banks or public sector entities which, unsecured, would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (b) asset items constituting claims on international organisations or multilateral development banks which, unsecured, would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (c) asset items constituting claims carrying the explicit guarantees of central governments, central banks, international organisations, multilateral development banks or public sector entities, where unsecured claims on the entity providing the guarantee would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (d) other exposures attributable to, or guaranteed by, central governments, central banks, international organisations, multilateral development banks or public sector entities, where unsecured claims on the entity to which the exposure is attributable or by which it is guaranteed would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (e) asset items constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities of Member States where those claims would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 and other exposures to or guaranteed by those regional governments or local authorities, claims on which would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (f) exposures to counterparties referred to in Article 113(6) or (7) if they would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2. Exposures that do not meet those criteria, whether or not exempted from Article 395(1) shall be treated as exposures to a third party; (g) asset items and other exposures secured by collateral in the form of cash deposits placed with the lending institution or with an institution which is the parent undertaking or a subsidiary of the lending institution; (h) asset items and other exposures secured by collateral in the form of certificates of deposit issued by the lending institution or by an institution which is the parent undertaking or a subsidiary of the lending institution and lodged with either of them; (i) exposures arising from undrawn credit facilities that are classified as low-risk off-balance sheet items in Annex I and provided that an agreement has been concluded with the client or group of connected clients under which the facility may be drawn only if it has been ascertained that it will not cause the limit applicable under Article 395(1) to be exceeded; (j) trade exposures to central counterparties and default fund contributions to central counterparties; (k) exposures to deposit guarantee schemes under Directive 94/19/EC arising from the funding of those schemes, if the member institutions of the scheme have a legal or contractual obligation to fund the scheme. Cash received under a credit linked note issued by the institution and loans and deposits of a counterparty to or with the institution which are subject to an on-balance sheet netting agreement recognised under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4 shall be deemed to fall under point (g). 2. Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt the following exposures: (a) covered bonds falling within the terms of Article 129(1), (3) and (6); (b) asset items constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities of Member States where those claims would be assigned a 20 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 and other exposures to or guaranteed by those regional governments or local authorities, claims on which would be assigned a 20 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (c) exposures, including participations or other kinds of holdings, incurred by an institution to its parent undertaking, to other subsidiaries of that parent undertaking or to its own subsidiaries, in so far as those undertakings are covered by the supervision on a consolidated basis to which the institution itself is subject, in accordance with this Regulation, Directive 2002/87/EC or with equivalent standards in force in a third country; exposures that do not meet these criteria, whether or not exempted from Article 395(1), shall be treated as exposures to a third party; (d) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures, including participations or other kinds of holdings, to regional or central credit institutions with which the credit institution is associated in a network in accordance with legal or statutory provisions and which are responsible, under those provisions, for cash-clearing operations within the network; (e) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to credit institutions incurred by credit institutions, one of which operates on a non-competitive basis and provides or guarantees loans under legislative programmes or its statutes, to promote specified sectors of the economy under some form of government oversight and restrictions on the use of the loans, provided that the respective exposures arise from such loans that are passed on to the beneficiaries via credit institutions or from the guarantees of these loans; (f) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to institutions, provided that those exposures do not constitute such institutions' own funds, do not last longer than the following business day and are not denominated in a major trading currency; (g) asset items constituting claims on central banks in the form of required minimum reserves held at those central banks which are denominated in their national currencies; (h) asset items constituting claims on central governments in the form of statutory liquidity requirements held in government securities which are denominated and funded in their national currencies provided that, at the discretion of the competent authority, the credit assessment of those central governments assigned by a nominated ECAI is investment grade; (i) 50 % of medium/low risk off-balance sheet documentary credits and of medium/low risk off-balance sheet undrawn credit facilities referred to in Annex I and subject to the competent authorities' agreement, 80 % of guarantees other than loan guarantees which have a legal or regulatory basis and are given for their members by mutual guarantee schemes possessing the status of credit institutions; (j) legally required guarantees used when a mortgage loan financed by issuing mortgage bonds is paid to the mortgage borrower before the final registration of the mortgage in the land register, provided that the guarantee is not used as reducing the risk in calculating the risk -weighted exposure amounts; (k) assets items constituting claims on and other exposures to recognised exchanges. 3. Competent authorities may only make use of the exemption provided for in paragraph 2 where the following conditions are met: (a) the specific nature of the exposure, the counterparty or the relationship between the institution and the counterparty eliminate or reduce the risk of the exposure; and (b) any remaining concentration risk can be addressed by other equally effective means such as the arrangements, processes and mechanisms provided for in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Competent authorities shall inform EBA whether or not they intend to use any of the exemptions provided for in paragraph 2 in accordance with points (a) and (b) of this paragraph and shall consult EBA on this choice.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 400 Exemptions):
The following exposures shall be exempted from the application of Article 395(1): (a) asset items constituting claims on central governments, central banks or public sector entities which, unsecured, would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (b) asset items constituting claims on international organisations or multilateral development banks which, unsecured, would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (c) asset items constituting claims carrying the explicit guarantees of central governments, central banks, international organisations, multilateral development banks or public sector entities, where unsecured claims on the entity providing the guarantee would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (d) other exposures attributable to, or guaranteed by, central governments, central banks, international organisations, multilateral development banks or public sector entities, where unsecured claims on the entity to which the exposure is attributable or by which it is guaranteed would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (e) asset items constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities of Member States where those claims would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 and other exposures to or guaranteed by those regional governments or local authorities, claims on which would be assigned a 0 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (g) asset items and other exposures secured by collateral in the form of cash deposits placed with the lending institution or with an institution which is the parent undertaking or a subsidiary of the lending institution; (h) asset items and other exposures secured by collateral in the form of certificates of deposit issued by the lending institution or by an institution which is the parent undertaking or a subsidiary of the lending institution and lodged with either of them; (i) exposures arising from undrawn credit facilities that are classified as low-risk off-balance sheet items in Annex I and provided that an agreement has been concluded with the client or group of connected clients under which the facility may be drawn only if it has been ascertained that it will not cause the limit applicable under Article 395(1) to be exceeded; (j) trade exposures to central counterparties and default fund contributions to central counterparties; (k) exposures to deposit guarantee schemes under Directive 94/19/EC arising from the funding of those schemes, if the member institutions of the scheme have a legal or contractual obligation to fund the scheme. Cash received under a credit linked note issued by the institution and loans and deposits of a counterparty to or with the institution which are subject to an on-balance sheet netting agreement recognised under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 4 shall be deemed to fall under point (g). 2. Competent authorities may fully or partially exempt the following exposures: (b) asset items constituting claims on regional governments or local authorities of Member States where those claims would be assigned a 20 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2 and other exposures to or guaranteed by those regional governments or local authorities, claims on which would be assigned a 20 % risk weight under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 2; (c) exposures, including participations or other kinds of holdings, incurred by an institution to its parent undertaking, to other subsidiaries of that parent undertaking or to its own subsidiaries, in so far as those undertakings are covered by the supervision on a consolidated basis to which the institution itself is subject, in accordance with this Regulation, Directive 2002/87/EC or with equivalent standards in force in a third country; exposures that do not meet these criteria, whether or not exempted from Article 395(1), shall be treated as exposures to a third party; (d) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures, including participations or other kinds of holdings, to regional or central credit institutions with which the credit institution is associated in a network in accordance with legal or statutory provisions and which are responsible, under those provisions, for cash-clearing operations within the network; (e) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to credit institutions incurred by credit institutions, one of which operates on a non-competitive basis and provides or guarantees loans under legislative programmes or its statutes, to promote specified sectors of the economy under some form of government oversight and restrictions on the use of the loans, provided that the respective exposures arise from such loans that are passed on to the beneficiaries via credit institutions or from the guarantees of these loans; (f) asset items constituting claims on and other exposures to institutions, provided that those exposures do not constitute such institutions' own funds, do not last longer than the following business day and are not denominated in a major trading currency; (g) asset items constituting claims on central banks in the form of required minimum reserves held at those central banks which are denominated in their national currencies; (h) asset items constituting claims on central governments in the form of statutory liquidity requirements held in government securities which are denominated and funded in their national currencies provided that, at the discretion of the competent authority, the credit assessment of those central governments assigned by a nominated ECAI is investment grade; (i) 50 % of medium/low risk off-balance sheet documentary credits and of medium/low risk off-balance sheet undrawn credit facilities referred to in Annex I and subject to the competent authorities' agreement, 80 % of guarantees other than loan guarantees which have a legal or regulatory basis and are given for their members by mutual guarantee schemes possessing the status of credit institutions; 50 % of medium/low risk off-balance sheet documentary credits and of medium/low risk off-balance sheet undrawn credit facilities referred to in Annex I and subject to the competent authorities' agreement, 80 % of guarantees other than loan guarantees which have a legal or regulatory basis and are given for their members by mutual guarantee schemes possessing the status of credit institutions; (j) legally required guarantees used when a mortgage loan financed by issuing mortgage bonds is paid to the mortgage borrower before the final registration of the mortgage in the land register, provided that the guarantee is not used as reducing the risk in calculating the risk -weighted exposure amounts; (k) assets items constituting claims on and other exposures to recognised exchanges. 3. Competent authorities may only make use of the exemption provided for in paragraph 2 where the following conditions are met: (a) the specific nature of the exposure, the counterparty or the relationship between the institution and the counterparty eliminate or reduce the risk of the exposure; and (b) any remaining concentration risk can be addressed by other equally effective means such as the arrangements, processes and mechanisms provided for in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Competent authorities may only make use of the exemption provided for in paragraph 2 where the following conditions are met: (a) the specific nature of the exposure, the counterparty or the relationship between the institution and the counterparty eliminate or reduce the risk of the exposure; and (b) any remaining concentration risk can be addressed by other equally effective means such as the arrangements, processes and mechanisms provided for in Article 81 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Competent authorities shall inform EBA whether or not they intend to use any of the exemptions provided for in paragraph 2 in accordance with points (a) and (b) of this paragraph and shall consult EBA on this choice.