Article 186 Own funds requirement and risk quantification
For the purpose of calculating own funds requirements institutions shall meet the following standards: (a) the estimate of potential loss shall be robust to adverse market movements relevant to the long-term risk profile of the institution's specific holdings. The data used to represent return distributions shall reflect the longest sample period for which data is available and meaningful in representing the risk profile of the institution's specific equity exposures. The data used shall be sufficient to provide conservative, statistically reliable and robust loss estimates that are not based purely on subjective or judgmental considerations. The shock employed shall provide a conservative estimate of potential losses over a relevant long-term market or business cycle. The institution shall combine empirical analysis of available data with adjustments based on a variety of factors in order to attain model outputs that achieve appropriate realism and conservatism. In constructing value at risk (VaR) models estimating potential quarterly losses, institutions may use quarterly data or convert shorter horizon period data to a quarterly equivalent using an analytically appropriate method supported by empirical evidence and through a well-developed and documented thought process and analysis. Such an approach shall be applied conservatively and consistently over time. Where only limited relevant data is available the institution shall add appropriate margins of conservatism; (b) the models used shall capture adequately all of the material risks embodied in equity returns including both the general market risk and specific risk exposure of the institution's equity portfolio. The internal models shall adequately explain historical price variation, capture both the magnitude and changes in the composition of potential concentrations, and be robust to adverse market environments. The population of risk exposures represented in the data used for estimation shall be closely matched to or at least comparable with those of the institution's equity exposures; (c) the internal model shall be appropriate for the risk profile and complexity of an institution's equity portfolio. Where an institution has material holdings with values that are highly non-linear in nature the internal models shall be designed to capture appropriately the risks associated with such instruments; (d) mapping of individual positions to proxies, market indices, and risk factors shall be plausible, intuitive, and conceptually sound; (e) institutions shall demonstrate through empirical analyses the appropriateness of risk factors, including their ability to cover both general and specific risk; (f) the estimates of the return volatility of equity exposures shall incorporate relevant and available data, information, and methods. Independently reviewed internal data or data from external sources including pooled data shall be used; (g) a rigorous and comprehensive stress-testing programme shall be in place.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 187 Risk management process and controls
With regard to the development and use of internal models for own funds requirement purposes, institutions shall establish policies, procedures, and controls to ensure the integrity of the model and modelling process. These policies, procedures, and controls shall include the following: (a) full integration of the internal model into the overall management information systems of the institution and in the management of the non-trading book equity portfolio. Internal models shall be fully integrated into the institution's risk management infrastructure if they are particularly used in measuring and assessing equity portfolio performance including the risk-adjusted performance, allocating economic capital to equity exposures and evaluating overall capital adequacy and the investment management process; (b) established management systems, procedures, and control functions for ensuring the periodic and independent review of all elements of the internal modelling process, including approval of model revisions, vetting of model inputs, and review of model results, such as direct verification of risk computations. These reviews shall assess the accuracy, completeness, and appropriateness of model inputs and results and focus on both finding and limiting potential errors associated with known weaknesses and identifying unknown model weaknesses. Such reviews may be conducted by an internal independent unit, or by an independent external third party; (c) adequate systems and procedures for monitoring investment limits and the risk exposures of equity exposures; (d) the units responsible for the design and application of the model shall be functionally independent from the units responsible for managing individual investments; (e) parties responsible for any aspect of the modelling process shall be adequately qualified. Management shall allocate sufficient skilled and competent resources to the modelling function.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 188 Validation and documentation
Institutions shall have robust systems in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of their internal models and modelling processes. All material elements of the internal models and the modelling process and validation shall be documented. The validation and documentation of institutions' internal models and modelling processes shall be subject to the following requirements: (a) institutions shall use the internal validation process to assess the performance of its internal models and processes in a consistent and meaningful way; (b) the methods and data used for quantitative validation shall be consistent over time. Changes in estimation and validation methods and changes to data sources and periods covered, shall be documented; (c) institutions shall regularly compare actual equity returns computed using realised and unrealised gains and losses with modelled estimates. Such comparisons shall make use of historical data that cover as long a period as possible. The institution shall document the methods and data used in such comparisons. This analysis and documentation shall be updated at least annually; (d) institutions shall make use of other quantitative validation tools and comparisons with external data sources. The analysis shall be based on data that are appropriate to the portfolio, are updated regularly, and cover a relevant observation period. Institutions' internal assessments of the performance of their models shall be based on as long a period as possible; (e) institutions shall have sound internal standards for addressing situations where comparison of actual equity returns with the models estimates calls the validity of the estimates or of the models as such into question. These standards shall take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in equity returns. All adjustments made to internal models in response to model reviews shall be documented and consistent with the institution's model review standards; (f) the internal model and the modelling process shall be documented, including the responsibilities of parties involved in the modelling, and the model approval and model review processes. Sub-Section 5 Internal governance and oversight
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 188 Validation and documentation):
Institutions shall have robust systems in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of their internal models and modelling processes. All material elements of the internal models and the modelling process and validation shall be documented. The validation and documentation of institutions' internal models and modelling processes shall be subject to the following requirements: (a) institutions shall use the internal validation process to assess the performance of its internal models and processes in a consistent and meaningful way; (b) the methods and data used for quantitative validation shall be consistent over time. Changes in estimation and validation methods and changes to data sources and periods covered, shall be documented; (c) institutions shall regularly compare actual equity returns computed using realised and unrealised gains and losses with modelled estimates. Such comparisons shall make use of historical data that cover as long a period as possible. The institution shall document the methods and data used in such comparisons. This analysis and documentation shall be updated at least annually; (d) institutions shall make use of other quantitative validation tools and comparisons with external data sources. The analysis shall be based on data that are appropriate to the portfolio, are updated regularly, and cover a relevant observation period. Institutions' internal assessments of the performance of their models shall be based on as long a period as possible; (e) institutions shall have sound internal standards for addressing situations where comparison of actual equity returns with the models estimates calls the validity of the estimates or of the models as such into question. These standards shall take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in equity returns. All adjustments made to internal models in response to model reviews shall be documented and consistent with the institution's model review standards; (f) the internal model and the modelling process shall be documented, including the responsibilities of parties involved in the modelling, and the model approval and model review processes.
Article 189 Corporate Governance
1. All material aspects of the rating and estimation processes shall be approved by the institution's management body or a designated committee thereof and senior management. These parties shall possess a general understanding of the rating systems of the institution and detailed comprehension of its associated management reports. 2. Senior management shall be subject to the following requirements: (a) they shall provide notice to the management body or a designated committee thereof of material changes or exceptions from established policies that will materially impact the operations of the institution's rating systems; (b) they shall have a good understanding of the rating systems designs and operations; (c) they shall ensure, on an ongoing basis that the rating systems are operating properly. Senior management shall be regularly informed by the credit risk control units about the performance of the rating process, areas needing improvement, and the status of efforts to improve previously identified deficiencies. 3. Internal ratings-based analysis of the institution's credit risk profile shall be an essential part of the management reporting to these parties. Reporting shall include at least risk profile by grade, migration across grades, estimation of the relevant parameters per grade, and comparison of realised default rates, and to the extent that own estimates are used of realised LGDs and realised conversion factors against expectations and stress-test results. Reporting frequencies shall depend on the significance and type of information and the level of the recipient.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 189 Corporate Governance):
1. All material aspects of the rating and estimation processes shall be approved by the institution's management body or a designated committee thereof and senior management. These parties shall possess a general understanding of the rating systems of the institution and detailed comprehension of its associated management reports. 2. Senior management shall be regularly informed by the credit risk control units about the performance of the rating process, areas needing improvement, and the status of efforts to improve previously identified deficiencies. 3. Internal ratings-based analysis of the institution's credit risk profile shall be an essential part of the management reporting to these parties. Reporting shall include at least risk profile by grade, migration across grades, estimation of the relevant parameters per grade, and comparison of realised default rates, and to the extent that own estimates are used of realised LGDs and realised conversion factors against expectations and stress-test results. Reporting frequencies shall depend on the significance and type of information and the level of the recipient.
Article 190 Credit risk control
1. The credit risk control unit shall be independent from the personnel and management functions responsible for originating or renewing exposures and report directly to senior management. The unit shall be responsible for the design or selection, implementation, oversight and performance of the rating systems. It shall regularly produce and analyse reports on the output of the rating systems. 2. The areas of responsibility for the credit risk control unit or units shall include: (a) testing and monitoring grades and pools; (b) production and analysis of summary reports of the institution's rating systems; (c) implementing procedures to verify that grade and pool definitions are consistently applied across departments and geographic areas; (d) reviewing and documenting any changes to the rating process, including the reasons for the changes; (e) reviewing the rating criteria to evaluate if they remain predictive of risk. Changes to the rating process, criteria or individual rating parameters shall be documented and retained; (f) active participation in the design or selection, implementation and validation of models used in the rating process; (g) oversight and supervision of models used in the rating process; (h) ongoing review and alterations to models used in the rating process. 3. Institutions using pooled data in accordance with Article 179(2) may outsource the following tasks: (a) production of information relevant to testing and monitoring grades and pools; (b) production of summary reports of the institution's rating systems; (c) production of information relevant to a review of the rating criteria to evaluate if they remain predictive of risk; (d) documentation of changes to the rating process, criteria or individual rating parameters; (e) production of information relevant to ongoing review and alterations to models used in the rating process. 4. Institutions making use of paragraph 3 shall ensure that the competent authorities have access to all relevant information from the third party that is necessary for examining compliance with the requirements and that the competent authorities may perform on-site examinations to the same extent as within the institution.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 190 Credit risk control):
1. The credit risk control unit shall be independent from the personnel and management functions responsible for originating or renewing exposures and report directly to senior management. The unit shall be responsible for the design or selection, implementation, oversight and performance of the rating systems. It shall regularly produce and analyse reports on the output of the rating systems. 4. Institutions making use of paragraph 3 shall ensure that the competent authorities have access to all relevant information from the third party that is necessary for examining compliance with the requirements and that the competent authorities may perform on-site examinations to the same extent as within the institution.
Article 191 Internal Audit
Internal audit or another comparable independent auditing unit shall review at least annually the institution's rating systems and its operations, including the operations of the credit function and the estimation of PDs, LGDs, ELs and conversion factors. Areas of review shall include adherence to all applicable requirements.
Article 192 Definitions
For the purposes of this Chapter, the following definitions shall apply: (1) ‘lending institution’ means the institution which has the exposure in question; (2) ‘secured lending transaction’ means any transaction giving rise to an exposure secured by collateral which does not include a provision conferring upon the institution the right to receive margin at least daily; (3) ‘capital market-driven transaction’ means any transaction giving rise to an exposure secured by collateral which includes a provision conferring upon the institution the right to receive margin at least daily; (4) ‘underlying CIU’ means a CIU in the shares or units of which another CIU has invested.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Revised version (Article 192 Definitions):
For the purposes of this Chapter, the following definitions shall apply: (1) ‘lending institution’ means the institution which has the exposure in question; (2) ‘secured lending transaction’ means any transaction giving rise to an exposure secured by collateral which does not include a provision conferring upon the institution the right to receive margin at least daily; (3) ‘capital market-driven transaction’ means any transaction giving rise to an exposure secured by collateral which includes a provision conferring upon the institution the right to receive margin at least daily; (4) ‘underlying CIU’ means a CIU in the shares or units of which another CIU has invested; (5) ‘substitution of risk parameters approach under A-IRB’ means the substitution, in accordance with Article 236a, of both the PD and LGD risk parameters of the underlying exposure with the corresponding PD and LGD that would be assigned under the IRB approach using own estimates of LGD to a comparable direct exposure to the protection provider.
Article 193 Principles for recognising the effect of credit risk mitigation techniques
1. No exposure in respect of which an institution obtains credit risk mitigation shall produce a higher risk-weighted exposure amount or expected loss amount than an otherwise identical exposure in respect of which an institution has no credit risk mitigation. 2. Where the risk-weighted exposure amount already takes account of credit protection under Chapter 2 or Chapter 3, as applicable, institutions shall not take into account that credit protection in the calculations under this Chapter. 3. Where the provisions in Sections 2 and 3 are met, institutions may amend the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach and the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6. 4. Institutions shall treat cash, securities or commodities purchased, borrowed or received under a repurchase transaction or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transaction as collateral. 5. Where an institution calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach has more than one form of credit risk mitigation covering a single exposure it shall do both of the following: (a) subdivide the exposure into parts covered by each type of credit risk mitigation tool; (b) calculate the risk-weighted exposure amount for each part obtained in point (a) separately in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 2 and this Chapter. 6. When an institution calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach covers a single exposure with credit protection provided by a single protection provider and that protection has differing maturities, it shall do both of the following: (a) subdivide the exposure into parts covered by each credit risk mitigation tool;
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 193 Principles for recognising the effect of credit risk mitigation techniques):
1. No exposure in respect of which an institution obtains credit risk mitigation shall produce a higher risk-weighted exposure amount or expected loss amount than an otherwise identical exposure in respect of which an institution has no credit risk mitigation. 2. Where the risk-weighted exposure amount already takes account of credit protection under Chapter 2 or Chapter 3, as applicable, institutions shall not take into account that credit protection in the calculations under this Chapter. 3. Where the provisions in Sections 2 and 3 are met, institutions may amend the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach and the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach in accordance with the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6. 4. Institutions shall treat cash, securities or commodities purchased, borrowed or received under a repurchase transaction or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transaction as collateral.
Article 194 Principles governing the eligibility of credit risk mitigation techniques
1. The technique used to provide the credit protection together with the actions and steps taken and procedures and policies implemented by the lending institution shall be such as to result in credit protection arrangements which are legally effective and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. The lending institution shall provide, upon request of the competent authority, the most recent version of the independent, written and reasoned legal opinion or opinions that it used to establish whether its credit protection arrangement or arrangements meet the condition laid down in the first subparagraph. 2. The lending institution shall take all appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of the credit protection arrangement and to address the risks related to that arrangement. 3. Institutions may recognise funded credit protection in the calculation of the effect of credit risk mitigation only where the assets relied upon for protection meet both of the following conditions: (a) they are included in the list of eligible assets set out in Articles 197 to 200, as applicable; (b) they are sufficiently liquid and their value over time sufficiently stable to provide appropriate certainty as to the credit protection achieved having regard to the approach used to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and to the degree of recognition allowed. 4. Institutions may recognise funded credit protection in the calculation of the effect of credit risk mitigation only where the lending institution has the right to liquidate or retain, in a timely manner, the assets from which the protection derives in the event of the default, insolvency or bankruptcy — or other credit event set out in the transaction documentation — of the obligor and, where applicable, of the custodian holding the collateral. The degree of correlation between the value of the assets relied upon for protection and the credit quality of the obligor shall not be too high. 5. In the case of unfunded credit protection, a protection provider shall qualify as an eligible protection provider only where the protection provider is included in the list of eligible protection providers set out in Article 201 or 202, as applicable. 6. In the case of unfunded credit protection, a protection agreement shall qualify as an eligible protection agreement only where it meets both the following conditions: (a) it is included in the list of eligible protection agreements set out in Articles 203 and 204(1); (b) it is legally effective and enforceable in the relevant jurisdictions, to provide appropriate certainty as to the credit protection achieved having regard to the approach used to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and to the degree of recognition allowed; (c) the protection provider meets the criteria laid down in paragraph 5. 7. Credit protection shall comply with the requirements set out in Section 3, as applicable. 8. An institution shall be able to demonstrate to competent authorities that it has adequate risk management processes to control those risks to which it may be exposed as a result of carrying out credit risk mitigation practices. 9. Notwithstanding the fact that credit risk mitigation has been taken into account for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and, where applicable, expected loss amounts, institutions shall continue to undertake a full credit risk assessment of the underlying exposure and be in a position to demonstrate the fulfilment of this requirement to the competent authorities. In the case of repurchase transactions and securities lending or commodities lending or borrowing transactions the underlying exposure shall, for the purposes of this paragraph only, be deemed to be the net amount of the exposure. 10. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify what constitutes sufficiently liquid assets and when asset values can be considered as sufficiently stable for the purpose of paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 194 Principles governing the eligibility of credit risk mitigation techniques):
1. The technique used to provide the credit protection together with the actions and steps taken and procedures and policies implemented by the lending institution shall be such as to result in credit protection arrangements which are legally effective and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. The lending institution shall provide, upon request of the competent authority, the most recent version of the independent, written and reasoned legal opinion or opinions that it used to establish whether its credit protection arrangement or arrangements meet the condition laid down in the first subparagraph. 2. The lending institution shall take all appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of the credit protection arrangement and to address the risks related to that arrangement. 3. Institutions may recognise funded credit protection in the calculation of the effect of credit risk mitigation only where the assets relied upon for protection meet both of the following conditions: (a) they are included in the list of eligible assets set out in Articles 197 to 200, as applicable; (b) they are sufficiently liquid and their value over time sufficiently stable to provide appropriate certainty as to the credit protection achieved having regard to the approach used to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and to the degree of recognition allowed. Institutions may recognise funded credit protection in the calculation of the effect of credit risk mitigation only where the assets relied upon for protection meet both of the following conditions: (a) they are included in the list of eligible assets set out in Articles 197 to 200, as applicable; (b) they are sufficiently liquid and their value over time sufficiently stable to provide appropriate certainty as to the credit protection achieved having regard to the approach used to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and to the degree of recognition allowed. 4. Institutions may recognise funded credit protection in the calculation of the effect of credit risk mitigation only where the lending institution has the right to liquidate or retain, in a timely manner, the assets from which the protection derives in the event of the default, insolvency or bankruptcy — or other credit event set out in the transaction documentation — of the obligor and, where applicable, of the custodian holding the collateral. The degree of correlation between the value of the assets relied upon for protection and the credit quality of the obligor shall not be too high. 5. In the case of unfunded credit protection, a protection provider shall qualify as an eligible protection provider only where the protection provider is included in the list of eligible protection providers set out in Article 201 or 202, as applicable. In the case of unfunded credit protection, a protection agreement shall qualify as an eligible protection agreement only where it meets both the following conditions: (a) it is included in the list of eligible protection agreements set out in Articles 203 and 204(1); (b) it is legally effective and enforceable in the relevant jurisdictions, to provide appropriate certainty as to the credit protection achieved having regard to the approach used to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and to the degree of recognition allowed; (c) the protection provider meets the criteria laid down in paragraph 5. 7. Credit protection shall comply with the requirements set out in Section 3, as applicable. 8. An institution shall be able to demonstrate to competent authorities that it has adequate risk management processes to control those risks to which it may be exposed as a result of carrying out credit risk mitigation practices. 9. Notwithstanding the fact that credit risk mitigation has been taken into account for the purposes of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and, where applicable, expected loss amounts, institutions shall continue to undertake a full credit risk assessment of the underlying exposure and be in a position to demonstrate the fulfilment of this requirement to the competent authorities. In the case of repurchase transactions and securities lending or commodities lending or borrowing transactions the underlying exposure shall, for the purposes of this paragraph only, be deemed to be the net amount of the exposure. 10. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify what constitutes sufficiently liquid assets and when asset values can be considered as sufficiently stable for the purpose of paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 195 On-balance sheet netting
An institution may use on-balance sheet netting of mutual claims between itself and its counterparty as an eligible form of credit risk mitigation. Without prejudice to Article 196, eligibility is limited to reciprocal cash balances between the institution and the counterparty. Institutions may amend risk-weighted exposure amounts and, as relevant, expected loss amounts only for loans and deposits that they have received themselves and that are subject to an on-balance sheet netting agreement.
Article 196 Master netting agreements covering repurchase transactions or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions or other capital market-driven transactions
Institutions adopting the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method set out in Article 223 may take into account the effects of bilateral netting contracts covering repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, or other capital market-driven transactions with a counterparty. Without prejudice to Article 299, the collateral taken and securities or commodities borrowed within such agreements or transactions shall comply with the eligibility requirements for collateral set out in Articles 197 and 198.
Article 197 Eligibility of collateral under all approaches and methods
1. Institutions may use the following items as eligible collateral under all approaches and methods: (a) cash on deposit with, or cash assimilated instruments held by, the lending institution; (b) debt securities issued by central governments or central banks, which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI or export credit agency recognised as eligible for the purposes of Chapter 2 which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 4 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to central governments and central banks under Chapter 2; (c) debt securities issued by institutions, which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to institutions under Chapter 2; (d) debt securities issued by other entities which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to corporates under Chapter 2; (e) debt securities with a short-term credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of short term exposures under Chapter 2; (f) equities or convertible bonds that are included in a main index; (g) gold; (h) securitisation positions that are not re-securitisation positions, which have an external credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of securitisation exposures under the approach specified in Chapter 5, Section 3, Sub-section 3. 2. For the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1, ‘debt securities issued by central governments or central banks’ shall include all the following: (a) debt securities issued by regional governments or local authorities, exposures to which are treated as exposures to the central government in whose jurisdiction they are established under Article 115(2); (b) debt securities issued by public sector entities which are treated as exposures to central governments in accordance with Article 116(4); (c) debt securities issued by multilateral development banks to which a 0 % risk weight is assigned under Article 117(2); (d) debt securities issued by international organisations which are assigned a 0 % risk weight under Article 118. 3. For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1, ‘debt securities issued by institutions’ shall include all the following: (a) debt securities issued by regional governments or local authorities other than those debt securities referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2; (b) debt securities issued by public sector entities, exposures to which are treated in accordance with Article 116(1) and (2); (c) debt securities issued by multilateral development banks other than those to which a 0 % risk weight is assigned under Article 117(2). 4. An institution may use debt securities that are issued by other institutions and that do not have a credit assessment by an ECAI as eligible collateral where those debt securities fulfil all the following criteria: (a) they are listed on a recognised exchange; (b) they qualify as senior debt; (c) all other rated issues by the issuing institution of the same seniority have a credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to institutions or short term exposures under Chapter 2; (d) the lending institution has no information to suggest that the issue would justify a credit assessment below that indicated in point (c); (e) the market liquidity of the instrument is sufficient for these purposes. 5. Institutions may use units or shares in CIUs as eligible collateral where all the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the units or shares have a daily public price quote; (b) the CIUs are limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under paragraphs 1 and 4; (c) the CIUs meet the conditions laid down in Article 132(3). Where a CIU invests in shares or units of another CIU, conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph shall apply equally to any such underlying CIU. The use by a CIU of derivative instruments to hedge permitted investments shall not prevent units or shares in that undertaking from being eligible as collateral. 6. For the purposes of paragraph 5, where a CIU (‘the original CIU’) or any of its underlying CIUs are not limited to investing in instruments that are eligible under paragraphs 1 and 4, institutions may use units or shares in that CIU as collateral to an amount equal to the value of the eligible assets held by that CIU under the assumption that that CIU or any of its underlying CIUs have invested in non-eligible assets to the maximum extent allowed under their respective mandates. Where any underlying CIU has underlying CIUs of its own, institutions may use units or shares in the original CIU as eligible collateral provided that they apply the methodology laid down in the first subparagraph. Where non-eligible assets can have a negative value due to liabilities or contingent liabilities resulting from ownership, institutions shall do both of the following: (a) calculate the total value of the non-eligible assets; (b) where the amount obtained under point (a) is negative, subtract the absolute value of that amount from the total value of the eligible assets. 7. With regard to points (b) to (e) of paragraph 1, where a security has two credit assessments by ECAIs, institutions shall apply the less favourable assessment. Where a security has more than two credit assessments by ECAIs, institutions shall apply the two most favourable assessments. Where the two most favourable credit assessments are different, institutions shall apply the less favourable of the two. 8. ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the following: (a) the main indices referred to in point (f) of paragraph 1 of this Article, in point (a) of Article 198(1), in Article 224(1) and (4), and in point (e) of Article 299(2); (b) the recognised exchanges referred to in point (a) of paragraph 4 of this Article, in point (a) of Article 198(1), in Article 224(1) and (4), in point (e) of Article 299(2), in point (k) of Article 400(2), in point (e) of Article 416(3), in point (c) of Article 428(1), and in point 12 of Annex III in accordance with the conditions laid down in point (72) of Article 4(1). ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 197 Eligibility of collateral under all approaches and methods):
1. Institutions may use the following items as eligible collateral under all approaches and methods: (a) cash on deposit with, or cash assimilated instruments held by, the lending institution; (b) debt securities issued by central governments or central banks, which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI or export credit agency recognised as eligible for the purposes of Chapter 2 which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 4 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to central governments and central banks under Chapter 2; (c) debt securities issued by institutions, which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to institutions under Chapter 2; (d) debt securities issued by other entities which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to corporates under Chapter 2; (e) debt securities with a short-term credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of short term exposures under Chapter 2; (f) equities or convertible bonds that are included in a main index; (g) gold; (h) securitisation positions that are not resecuritisation positions and which are subject to a 100 % risk weight or lower in accordance with Article 261 to Article 264. 2. For the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1, ‘debt securities issued by central governments or central banks’ shall include all the following: (a) debt securities issued by regional governments or local authorities, exposures to which are treated as exposures to the central government in whose jurisdiction they are established under Article 115(2); (b) debt securities issued by public sector entities which are treated as exposures to central governments in accordance with Article 116(4); (c) debt securities issued by multilateral development banks to which a 0 % risk weight is assigned under Article 117(2); (d) debt securities issued by international organisations which are assigned a 0 % risk weight under Article 118. 3. For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1, ‘debt securities issued by institutions’ shall include all the following: (a) debt securities issued by regional governments or local authorities other than those debt securities referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2; (b) debt securities issued by public sector entities, exposures to which are treated in accordance with Article 116(1) and (2); (c) debt securities issued by multilateral development banks other than those to which a 0 % risk weight is assigned under Article 117(2). 4. An institution may use debt securities that are issued by other institutions and that do not have a credit assessment by an ECAI as eligible collateral where those debt securities fulfil all the following criteria: (a) they are listed on a recognised exchange; (b) they qualify as senior debt; (c) all other rated issues by the issuing institution of the same seniority have a credit assessment by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to institutions or short term exposures under Chapter 2; (d) the lending institution has no information to suggest that the issue would justify a credit assessment below that indicated in point (c); (e) the market liquidity of the instrument is sufficient for these purposes. 5. Institutions may use units or shares in CIUs as eligible collateral where all the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the units or shares have a daily public price quote; (b) the CIUs are limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under paragraphs 1 and 4; (c) the CIUs meet the conditions laid down in Article 132(3). Where a CIU invests in shares or units of another CIU, conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph shall apply equally to any such underlying CIU. The use by a CIU of derivative instruments to hedge permitted investments shall not prevent units or shares in that undertaking from being eligible as collateral. 6. For the purposes of paragraph 5, where a CIU (‘the original CIU’) or any of its underlying CIUs are not limited to investing in instruments that are eligible under paragraphs 1 and 4, institutions may use units or shares in that CIU as collateral to an amount equal to the value of the eligible assets held by that CIU under the assumption that that CIU or any of its underlying CIUs have invested in non-eligible assets to the maximum extent allowed under their respective mandates. Where any underlying CIU has underlying CIUs of its own, institutions may use units or shares in the original CIU as eligible collateral provided that they apply the methodology laid down in the first subparagraph. Where non-eligible assets can have a negative value due to liabilities or contingent liabilities resulting from ownership, institutions shall do both of the following: (a) calculate the total value of the non-eligible assets; (b) where the amount obtained under point (a) is negative, subtract the absolute value of that amount from the total value of the eligible assets. 7. With regard to points (b) to (e) of paragraph 1, where a security has two credit assessments by ECAIs, institutions shall apply the less favourable assessment. Where a security has more than two credit assessments by ECAIs, institutions shall apply the two most favourable assessments. Where the two most favourable credit assessments are different, institutions shall apply the less favourable of the two. 8. ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the following: (a) the main indices referred to in point (f) of paragraph 1 of this Article, in point (a) of Article 198(1), in Article 224(1) and (4), and in point (e) of Article 299(2); (b) the recognised exchanges referred to in point (a) of paragraph 4 of this Article, in point (a) of Article 198(1), in Article 224(1) and (4), in point (e) of Article 299(2), in point (k) of Article 400(2), in point (e) of Article 416(3), in point (c) of Article 428(1), and in point 12 of Annex III in accordance with the conditions laid down in point (72) of Article 4(1). ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 198 Additional eligibility of collateral under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method
1. In addition to the collateral established in Article 197, where an institution uses the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method set out in Article 223, that institution may use the following items as eligible collateral: (a) equities or convertible bonds not included in a main index but traded on a recognised exchange; (b) units or shares in CIUs where both the following conditions are met: (i) the units or shares have a daily public price quote; (ii) the CIU is limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under Article 197(1) and (4) and the items mentioned in point (a) of this subparagraph. (b) units or shares in CIUs where both the following conditions are met: (i) the units or shares have a daily public price quote; (ii) the CIU is limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under Article 197(1) and (4) and the items mentioned in point (a) of this subparagraph. In the case a CIU invests in units or shares of another CIU, conditions (a) and (b) of this paragraph equally apply to any such underlying CIU. The use by a CIU of derivative instruments to hedge permitted investments shall not prevent units or shares in that undertaking from being eligible as collateral. 2. Where the CIU or any underlying CIU are not limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under Article 197(1) and (4) and the items mentioned in point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, institutions may use units or shares in that CIU as collateral to an amount equal to the value of the eligible assets held by that CIU under the assumption that that CIU or any of its underlying CIUs have invested in non-eligible assets to the maximum extent allowed under their respective mandates. Where non-eligible assets can have a negative value due to liabilities or contingent liabilities resulting from ownership, institutions shall do both of the following: (a) calculate the total value of the non-eligible assets; (b) where the amount obtained under point (a) is negative, subtract the absolute value of that amount from the total value of the eligible assets.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 198 Additional eligibility of collateral under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method):
1. In addition to the collateral established in Article 197, where an institution uses the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method set out in Article 223, that institution may use the following items as eligible collateral: (a) equities or convertible bonds not included in a main index but traded on a recognised exchange; (b) units or shares in CIUs where both the following conditions are met: (i) the units or shares have a daily public price quote; (ii) the CIU is limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under Article 197(1) and (4) and the items mentioned in point (a) of this subparagraph. In the case a CIU invests in units or shares of another CIU, conditions (a) and (b) of this paragraph equally apply to any such underlying CIU. The use by a CIU of derivative instruments to hedge permitted investments shall not prevent units or shares in that undertaking from being eligible as collateral. 2. Where the CIU or any underlying CIU are not limited to investing in instruments that are eligible for recognition under Article 197(1) and (4) and the items mentioned in point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, institutions may use units or shares in that CIU as collateral to an amount equal to the value of the eligible assets held by that CIU under the assumption that that CIU or any of its underlying CIUs have invested in non-eligible assets to the maximum extent allowed under their respective mandates. Where non-eligible assets can have a negative value due to liabilities or contingent liabilities resulting from ownership, institutions shall do both of the following: (a) calculate the total value of the non-eligible assets; (b) where the amount obtained under point (a) is negative, subtract the absolute value of that amount from the total value of the eligible assets.
Article 199 Additional eligibility for collateral under the IRB Approach
1. In addition to the collateral referred to in Articles 197 and 198, institutions that calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach may also use the following forms of collateral: (a) immovable property collateral in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; (b) receivables in accordance with paragraph 5; (c) other physical collateral in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 8; (d) leasing in accordance with paragraph 7. 2. Unless otherwise specified under Article 124(2), institutions may use as eligible collateral residential property which is or will be occupied or let by the owner, or the beneficial owner in the case of personal investment companies, and commercial immovable property, including offices and other commercial premises, where both the following conditions are met: (a) the value of the property does not materially depend upon the credit quality of the obligor. Institutions may exclude situations where purely macro-economic factors affect both the value of the property and the performance of the borrower from their determination of the materiality of such dependence; (b) the risk of the borrower does not materially depend upon the performance of the underlying property or project, but on the underlying capacity of the borrower to repay the debt from other sources, and as a consequence the repayment of the facility does not materially depend on any cash flow generated by the underlying property serving as collateral. 3. Institutions may derogate from point (b) of paragraph 2 for exposures secured by residential property situated within the territory of a Member State, where the competent authority of that Member State has published evidence showing that a well-developed and long-established residential property market is present in that territory with loss rates that do not exceed any of the following limits: (a) losses stemming from loans collateralised by residential property up to 80 % of the market value or 80 % of the mortgage-lending-value, unless otherwise provided under Article 124(2), do not exceed 0,3 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by residential property in any given year; (b) overall losses stemming from loans collateralised by residential property do not exceed 0,5 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by residential property in any given year. Where either of the conditions in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph is not met in a given year, institutions shall not use the treatment set out in that subparagraph until both conditions are satisfied in a subsequent year. 4. Institutions may derogate from point (b) of paragraph 2 for commercial immovable property situated within the territory of a Member State, where the competent authority of that Member State has published evidence showing that a well-developed and long-established commercial immovable property market is present in that territory with loss rates that do not exceed any of the following limits: (a) losses stemming from loans collateralised by commercial immovable property up to 50 % of the market value or 60 % of the mortgage-lending-value do not exceed 0,3 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by commercial immovable property in any given year; (b) overall losses stemming from loans collateralised by commercial immovable property do not exceed 0,5 % of the outstanding loans collateralised by commercial immovable property in any given year. 5. Institutions may use as eligible collateral amounts receivable linked to a commercial transaction or transactions with an original maturity of less than or equal to one year. Eligible receivables do not include those associated with securitisations, sub-participations or credit derivatives or amounts owed by affiliated parties. 6. Competent authorities shall permit an institution to use as eligible collateral physical collateral of a type other than those indicated in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 where all the following conditions are met: (a) there are liquid markets, evidenced by frequent transactions taking into account the asset type, for the disposal of the collateral in an expeditious and economically efficient manner. Institutions shall carry out the assessment of this condition periodically and where information indicates material changes in the market; (b) there are well-established, publicly available market prices for the collateral. Institutions may consider market prices as well-established where they come from reliable sources of information such as public indices and reflect the price of the transactions under normal conditions. Institutions may consider market prices as publicly available, where these prices are disclosed, easily accessible, and obtainable regularly and without any undue administrative or financial burden; (c) the institution analyses the market prices, time and costs required to realise the collateral and the realised proceeds from the collateral; (d) the institution demonstrates that the realised proceeds from the collateral are not below 70 % of the collateral value in more than 10 % of all liquidations for a given type of collateral. Where there is material volatility in the market prices, the institution demonstrates to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that its valuation of the collateral is sufficiently conservative. Institutions shall document the fulfilment of the conditions specified in points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph and those specified in Article 210. 7. Subject to the provisions of Article 230(2), where the requirements set out in Article 211 are met, exposures arising from transactions whereby an institution leases property to a third party may be treated in the same manner as loans collateralised by the type of property leased. 8. EBA shall disclose a list of types of physical collateral for which institutions can assume that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 6 are met.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 199 Additional eligibility for collateral under the IRB Approach):
3. Where either of the conditions in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph is not met in a given year, institutions shall not use the treatment set out in that subparagraph until both conditions are satisfied in a subsequent year. 5. Institutions may use as eligible collateral amounts receivable linked to a commercial transaction or transactions with an original maturity of less than or equal to one year. Eligible receivables do not include those associated with securitisations, sub-participations or credit derivatives or amounts owed by affiliated parties. 6. Institutions shall document the fulfilment of the conditions specified in points (a) to (d) of the first subparagraph and those specified in Article 210. 7. Subject to the provisions of Article 230(2), where the requirements set out in Article 211 are met, exposures arising from transactions whereby an institution leases property to a third party may be treated in the same manner as loans collateralised by the type of property leased. 8. EBA shall disclose a list of types of physical collateral for which institutions can assume that the conditions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 6 are met.
Article 200 Other funded credit protection
Institutions may use the following other funded credit protection as eligible collateral: (a) cash on deposit with, or cash assimilated instruments held by, a third party institution in a non-custodial arrangement and pledged to the lending institution; (b) life insurance policies pledged to the lending institution; (c) instruments issued by third party institutions which will be repurchased by that institution on request. Sub-Section 2 Unfunded credit protection
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 200 Other funded credit protection):
Institutions may use the following other funded credit protection as eligible collateral: (a) cash on deposit with, or cash assimilated instruments held by, a third party institution in a non-custodial arrangement and pledged to the lending institution; (b) life insurance policies pledged to the lending institution; (c) instruments issued by a third‐party institution or by an investment firm which are to be repurchased by that institution or by that investment firm on request. Sub-Section 2 Unfunded credit protection
Article 201 Eligibility of protection providers under all approaches
1. Institutions may use the following parties as eligible providers of unfunded credit protection: (a) central governments and central banks; (b) regional governments or local authorities; (c) multilateral development banks; (d) international organisations exposures to which a 0 % risk weight under Article 117 is assigned; (e) public sector entities, claims on which are treated in accordance with Article 116; (f) institutions, and financial institutions for which exposures to the financial institution are treated as exposures to institutions in accordance with Article 119(5); (g) other corporate entities, including parent undertakings, subsidiaries and affiliated corporate entities of the institution, where either of the following conditions is met: (i) those other corporate entities have a credit assessment by an ECAI; (ii) in the case of institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach, those other corporate entities do not have a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI and are internally rated by the institution; (g) other corporate entities, including parent undertakings, subsidiaries and affiliated corporate entities of the institution, where either of the following conditions is met: (i) those other corporate entities have a credit assessment by an ECAI; (ii) in the case of institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach, those other corporate entities do not have a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI and are internally rated by the institution; (h) central counterparties. 2. Where institutions calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach, to be eligible as a provider of unfunded credit protection a guarantor shall be internally rated by the institution in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of Chapter 3. Competent authorities shall publish and maintain the list of those financial institutions that are eligible providers of unfunded credit protection under point (f) of paragraph 1, or the guiding criteria for identifying such eligible providers of unfunded credit protection, together with a description of the applicable prudential requirements, and share their list with other competent authorities in accordance with Article 117 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 201 Eligibility of protection providers under all approaches):
1. Institutions may use the following parties as eligible providers of unfunded credit protection: (a) central governments and central banks; (b) regional governments or local authorities; (c) multilateral development banks; (d) international organisations exposures to which a 0 % risk weight under Article 117 is assigned; (e) public sector entities, claims on which are treated in accordance with Article 116; (f) institutions, and financial institutions for which exposures to the financial institution are treated as exposures to institutions in accordance with Article 119(5); (g) other corporate entities, including parent undertakings, subsidiaries and affiliated corporate entities of the institution, where either of the following conditions is met: (i) those other corporate entities have a credit assessment by an ECAI; (ii) in the case of institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach, those other corporate entities do not have a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI and are internally rated by the institution; (h) central counterparties. 2. Where institutions calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach, to be eligible as a provider of unfunded credit protection a guarantor shall be internally rated by the institution in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of Chapter 3. Competent authorities shall publish and maintain the list of those financial institutions that are eligible providers of unfunded credit protection under point (f) of paragraph 1, or the guiding criteria for identifying such eligible providers of unfunded credit protection, together with a description of the applicable prudential requirements, and share their list with other competent authorities in accordance with Article 117 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Article 202 Eligibility of protection providers under the IRB Approach which qualify for the treatment set out in Article 153(3)
An institution may use institutions, insurance and reinsurance undertakings and export credit agencies as eligible providers of unfunded credit protection which qualify for the treatment set out in Article 153(3) where they meet all the following conditions: (a) they have sufficient expertise in providing unfunded credit protection; (b) they are regulated in a manner equivalent to the rules laid down in this Regulation, or had, at the time the credit protection was provided, a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI which had been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above in accordance with the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to corporates set out in Chapter 2; (c) they had, at the time the credit protection was provided, or for any period of time thereafter, an internal rating with a PD equivalent to or lower than that associated with credit quality step 2 or above in accordance with the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to corporates set out in Chapter 2; (d) they have an internal rating with a PD equivalent to or lower than that associated with credit quality step 3 or above in accordance with the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to corporates set out in Chapter 2. For the purpose of this Article, credit protection provided by export credit agencies shall not benefit from any explicit central government counter-guarantee.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 203 Eligibility of guarantees as unfunded credit protection
Institutions may use guarantees as eligible unfunded credit protection. Sub-Section 3 Types of derivatives
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 203 Eligibility of guarantees as unfunded credit protection):
Institutions may use guarantees as eligible unfunded credit protection.
Article 204 Eligible types of credit derivatives
1. Institutions may use the following types of credit derivatives, and instruments that may be composed of such credit derivatives or that are economically effectively similar, as eligible credit protection: (a) credit default swaps; (b) total return swaps; (c) credit linked notes to the extent of their cash funding. Where an institution buys credit protection through a total return swap and records the net payments received on the swap as net income, but does not record the offsetting deterioration in the value of the asset that is protected either through reductions in fair value or by an addition to reserves, that credit protection does not qualify as eligible credit protection. 2. Where an institution conducts an internal hedge using a credit derivative, in order for the credit protection to qualify as eligible credit protection for the purposes of this Chapter, the credit risk transferred to the trading book shall be transferred out to a third party or parties. Where an internal hedge has been conducted in accordance with the first subparagraph and the requirements in this Chapter have been met, institutions shall apply the rules set out in Sections 4 to 6 for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts where they acquire unfunded credit protection.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 204 Eligible types of credit derivatives):
1. Where an institution buys credit protection through a total return swap and records the net payments received on the swap as net income, but does not record the offsetting deterioration in the value of the asset that is protected either through reductions in fair value or by an addition to reserves, that credit protection does not qualify as eligible credit protection. 2. Where an institution conducts an internal hedge using a credit derivative, in order for the credit protection to qualify as eligible credit protection for the purposes of this Chapter, the credit risk transferred to the trading book shall be transferred out to a third party or parties. Where an internal hedge has been conducted in accordance with the first subparagraph and the requirements in this Chapter have been met, institutions shall apply the rules set out in Sections 4 to 6 for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts where they acquire unfunded credit protection.
Article 205 Requirements for on-balance sheet netting agreements other than master netting agreements referred to in Article 206
On-balance sheet netting agreements other than master netting agreements referred to in Article 206 shall qualify as an eligible form of credit risk mitigation where all the following conditions are met: (a) those agreements are legally effective and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions, including in the event of the insolvency or bankruptcy of a counterparty; (b) institutions are able to determine at any time the assets and liabilities that are subject to those agreements; (c) institutions monitor and control the risks associated with the termination of the credit protection on an ongoing basis; (d) institutions monitor and control the relevant exposures on a net basis and do so on an ongoing basis.
Article 206 Requirements for master netting agreements covering repurchase transactions or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions or other capital market driven transactions
Master netting agreements covering repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions or other capital market driven transactions shall qualify as an eligible form of credit risk mitigation where the collateral provided under those agreements meets all the requirements laid down in Article 207(2) to (4) and where all the following conditions are met: (a) they are legally effective and enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions, including in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the counterparty; (b) they give the non-defaulting party the right to terminate and close-out in a timely manner all transactions under the agreement upon the event of default, including in the event of the bankruptcy or insolvency of the counterparty; (c) they provide for the netting of gains and losses on transactions closed out under an agreement so that a single net amount is owed by one party to the other.