Article 8 Participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing
1. Participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing shall be open and transparent to all natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas established in the Union regardless of the volume requested. Natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas shall be precluded from participating as suppliers, producers and purchasers in demand aggregation and joint purchasing, if they are: (a) targeted by Union restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 215 TFEU, in particular Union restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, or in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; (b) directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf or at the direction of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies targeted by such Union restrictive measures; or (c) directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf or at the direction of the Russian Federation or its Government or by any Russian natural or legal person or entity or body established in Russia. 2. Contractual obligations shall be put in place to ensure that no funds or economic resources resulting from participation in the process of joint purchasing organised by the service provider are made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, which are: (a) targeted by Union restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 215 TFEU, in particular Union restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, or in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine; (b) directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf or at the direction of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies targeted by such Union restrictive measures; or (c) directly or indirectly owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf or at the direction of the Russian Federation or its Government or by any Russian natural or legal person or entity or body established in Russia. 3. Member States, or other stakeholders may provide liquidity support, including guarantees, to participants in the process of joint purchasing organised by the service provider, in accordance with State aid rules, where applicable. This may include guarantees to cover collateral needs or to cover the risk of additional costs following the insolvency of other buyers under the same joint purchasing contract. 4. Natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas established in the Energy Community Contracting Parties may participate in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing provided that the necessary measures or arrangements are in place to allow their participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing pursuant to this Section.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1 Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Since Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine, supplies of gas to the EU by Russia have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political weapon. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia had been less than 10% of the EU’s gas imports in the first half of 2023. Twelve Member States activated the first or second crisis level pursuant to the common EU classification, as foreseen by the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. This supply shock has had significant impacts on the price level and volatility of gas and electricity, on inflation, on the overall EU financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. The wholesale price in 2022 was on average more than five times higher than the pre-crisis level and even spiked above 300 €/MWh at the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. They remain to this date at markedly higher levels than in the pre-crisis period, with strong volatility. Companies, in particular energy-intensive industries, experienced loss of competitiveness, while citizens face reduced purchasing power. In this context, the Council adopted on 19 December 2022 the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 to enhance solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides a temporary legal basis in respect of: · better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II) ; · measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III), and ; · measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV). Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 aims at mitigating the impact on the price for gas by addressing demand and supply, ensuring security of supply across the entire European Union, and enhancing solidarity. It contains different elements designed to work, in a coherent manner, towards avoiding very high prices and reinforcing solidarity and security of supply. This proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 in view of the persisting risks for energy supplies in the Union. The Union’s response under REPowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to mitigating the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the supplies of gas, and its subsequent impacts on price levels, inflation, financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. However, global gas markets continue to be very tight and market balances are expected to remain precarious in the immediate future. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022, remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include a rebound in Asian LNG demand reducing the availability of gas on the global gas market; a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm; extreme weather potentially affecting the hydropower storage and nuclear production due to low water levels, and the subsequent increase in demand for gas fired power generation; further disruptions of critical infrastructures; and a deterioration of the geopolitical environment and threat landscape in supplying regions, for example with the crisis in the Middle East. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. 1.1.1. The m ain elements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (1) Demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and implemented, with the support of a service provider, the “AggregateEU” mechanism, which allows for aggregation of demand, organisation of tendering rounds vis à vis international gas suppliers and matching the demand with suppliers’ bids. The mechanism is open to participation, as buyers, of undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties. The Regulation provides for mandatory demand aggregation by laying down on Member States an obligation to require domestic undertakings to use the service provider to aggregate demand with sufficiently high volumes of gas. Volumes equivalent to at least 15 % of storage filling targets (around 13,5 billion cubic metres for the Union as a whole), are to be included by Member States’ undertakings in the demand aggregation process. To prevent that the objective of diversification from the gas supplied from the Russian Federation is put at risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides that participation of undertakings or other bodies controlled by Russian natural or legal persons or undertakings established in the Russian Federation is excluded. In addition, natural gas originating in the Russian Federation is excluded from the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through a list of entry points. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions aimed at ensuring a better coordination of gas purchases in the Union and energy solidarity among Member States. To achieve this, the Regulation seeks to provide the Commission with an overview of upcoming tenders or contracts related to the sale and purchase of gas. Accordingly, natural gas undertakings or undertakings consuming gas are required to send notifications to the Commission of any upcoming tenders or contracts of a volume above 5 TWh/year. The Commission then may issue recommendations to such undertakings in cases where such tenders or contracts may negatively impact the joint purchasing mechanism, market functioning, security of supply or solidarity. (2) Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 also enhances the efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals. Diversification of supply sources away from Russian gas has been changing the gas flow patterns in the EU. Therefore, the routes from LNG terminals to consumption centres have become more relevant than the formerly predominant East-West flows. However, such changes in gas flows have led to particularly high levels of congestion at interconnection points, notably in north-western Europe. To enhance the gas system’s responsiveness to congestion and improve the system’s flexibility, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions obliging TSOs to offer underutilised contracted firm capacity for all interconnectors, not only congested ones, either through (i) the implementation of a new monthly “use-it-or-lose-it” (UIOLI) procedure, or (ii) the extension of existing procedures with the same objective. Moreover, it has become of utmost importance to optimise the LNG absorption capacity of the EU LNG terminals and the usage of storage facilities. For this purpose, increased transparency was deemed necessary by market participants, similar to the level of transparency existing for the transport of gas via pipelines. Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) operates two main platforms covering all EU Member States as well as the United Kingdom and Ukraine: the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) for gas storage and the Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI) for LNG. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (Articles 12 and 13), new components were added to these platforms, including information on services offered and the conditions that apply to those services, contracted and available storage and LNG facility capacities, tariffs, etc. The platforms currently cover almost all EU large-scale LNG terminals and 98% of EU storage facilities. In addition to the EU-wide platforms, the individual storage and LNG operators were obliged to create more transparency around the possibilities to book secondary capacity. To this end, they were required to set up individual booking platforms. Greater transparency makes for a better and more comprehensive overview of the LNG and storage markets in the EU. It also results in more efficient use of these infrastructures and increases the potential to attract additional suppliers. (3) Action on the level of gas prices Development of a new complementary benchmark for LNG The EU’s LNG market is still consolidating. Hub indexed pricing remains influenced by pipeline supplies and by existing infrastructure bottlenecks, and therefore it does not always accurately reflect the price at which LNG is actually imported into the Union. Also, as Russian gas still represents a non-negligible – though decreasing – part of EU imports, increasingly concentrated in some areas, gas markets remain vulnerable to Russian gas supplies manipulation. There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are indispensable to replace the supply shortfalls caused by the likely halt of Russian gas imports. Regulation 2022/2576 has tasked the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (‘ACER’) to create within a short time frame an objective price assessment tool, and over time a benchmark, of the EU’s LNG imports by collecting real-time information on all daily transactions. ACER has developed such a benchmark, which provides more comprehensive information to buyers and increases price transparency. Regulation 2022/2576 granted ACER the necessary powers to collect the transaction data needed for the establishment of the LNG benchmark, building on and reinforcing the tasks and powers ACER already had under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (hereinafter together referred to as ‘REMIT’). (4) Action to reduce price volatility Intra-day price volatility management mechanism: Financial legislation (MiFID II) already requires a set of mechanisms to be set up by trading venues to contain significant volatility in financial markets, and ESMA has been working on ways to improve the functioning of circuit breakers across all asset classes, which will have a more permanent positive impact on trading of all asset classes, including energy derivatives. The just concluded MiFIR Review has also added the notion of emergency situation and given additional powers to ESMA on circuit breakers. Those changes are due to be transposed in national legislations by the second half of 2025. The intra-day volatility management mechanism set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 has been introduced so that trading venues set up mechanisms to prevent excessive movements of prices within a trading day, either through the adaptation of existing circuit breakers or through the creation of an additional mechanism. Large volatility spikes on gas and electricity markets make it difficult for energy firms to continue participating in those markets and meet their hedging needs while ensuring security of energy supply for the end-consumers. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 lays down a requirement for trading venues to establish a temporary intra-day volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in energy-related derivatives contracts within the same trading day. Trading venues can implement the intra-day volatility management mechanism either by integrating it into their existing circuit breakers already established in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU or as an additional mechanism. (5) Security of supply Extension of solidarity protection obligation to critical gas fired power plants Under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, a Member State where critical gas-fired power plants may play a key role for security of electricity supply, would have to curtail these power plants, to the possible detriment of the security of electricity supply of other Member States, before this Member State is allowed to request solidarity measures under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. To prevent such negative spill-over effects into electricity generation, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 allows Member States to trigger a solidarity request, under certain limits, if gas-fired power plants, that are needed to ensure the electricity system’s adequacy, are at risk of not being supplied with critical gas volumes. For the same reason, Member States providing solidarity will be entitled to ensure that the operation of their critical gas-fired power plants is not endangered when providing solidarity to another Member State. Default rules for bilateral solidarity Specific measures in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 introduced a default mechanism between the Member States to ensure they help each other to supply the “solidarity protected customers” (households and under certain conditions district heating and essential social services) and critical gas-fired power plants, in an emergency leading to very severe shortage of gas. The security of supply rules resulting from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 introduced the principle of such solidarity but its actual use in a crisis requires detailed legal, technical and financial arrangements which were supposed to be agreed bilaterally between Member States. However, only eight out of 40 required arrangements have been agreed so far. Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, therefore, spell out the rules and procedures that will automatically apply between Member States which have not agreed on bilateral solidarity arrangements. Solidarity has to be provided based on fair compensation pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. However, possible indirect costs resulting from judicial or arbitration proceedings after the curtailment of industry will remain to be limited to 100% of the price of gas. The reason is that the cost of compensation to industry resulting from curtailment is partially covered by the price of gas and, should a part remain from litigation, this part is highly uncertain and can largely exceed the costs of the gas. The uncertainty about indirect compensation costs therefore has proved to be a major obstacle for Member States to conclude bilateral solidarity agreements. However, Member States will still be able to agree on different compensation conditions. The current solidarity obligation, stemming from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, applies between the Member States that are directly connected or via a third country. This proposed prolongation will maintain the extension of this obligation to Member States with LNG facilities, which, even if not directly connected, could provide solidarity to a Member State in an emergency if endowed with the infrastructure necessary to receive this LNG. 1.1.2. The c urrent situation : severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply persist The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 , helped mitigate the consequences of the crisis and prepared the EU to a degraded security of gas supplies situation. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, in view of the general situation of gas supply to the Union 1 , the Commission concluded that the Regulation’s provisions have played an important role in stabilising the situation of the gas market and ensuring adequate gas supply to the Union, and that the Regulation is an important element of the EU gas security of supply tool kit . If not prolonged, the Regulation will cease to apply on 30 December 2023. However, as of the date of adoption of this proposal, severe difficulties in gas supplies to the Union persist. Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis. With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, and these unreliable imports may be further reduced or stopped. This figure would be approximately 110 bcm less than in 2021. Global gas markets remain very tight and are expected to remain as such for some time as only very limited new LNG liquefaction capacity globally is planned to be operational before 2026. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022 (when prices spiked above 300 EUR/MWh), remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. Over the previous decade, prices had moved within a band of EUR 5 MWh to EUR 35 MWh and averaged around EUR 20/MWh. In early autumn 2023 prices ranged between EUR 40 MWh and EUR 50 MWh. This level of prices still has inevitable repercussions on the EU citizens’ purchasing power and the competitiveness of European businesses. Market volatility is also a consequence of the market tightness and represents an additional risk for the EU economy. Summer and autumn 2023 saw a number of episodes of significant volatility when prices increased by more than 50% in few weeks. This shows that gas markets are still fragile and may have large reactions to any unexpected and sudden shock to supply and demand, as was the case following the strike in Australian LNG facilities, the Middle East crisis and the disruption of the Balticconnector. Under these conditions, the fear of scarcity may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include: a rebound in Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand that further reduces the availability of gas on the global gas market, a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm, extreme weather conditions potentially affecting hydropower storage or nuclear production which would require higher recourse to gas-fired power generation and/or trigger increased demand for gas, and further possible gas supply disruptions, including a complete halt of gas imports from Russia or a disruption of existing critical gas infrastructure. Furthermore, since the adoption of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the threat landscape has deteriorated. Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, in addition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Azerbaijan, Middle East). Recent examples illustrate the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to the disruption of critical gas infrastructure. In September 2022, the NordStream 1 pipeline was damaged by acts of sabotage to such a degree that it currently cannot transport any gas and will not be able to do so in the foreseeable future. In October 2023, the Balticconnector, an important pipeline connecting Finland to Estonia, was disrupted. The investigation is examining whether the damage was external and made by a vessel’s anchor. As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, Finland is now no longer able to meet the N-1 criterion as part of the infrastructure standard defined in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The N-1 criterion ensures that Member States take measures so that in case of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, they still have the technical capacity to satisfy their total demand during a peak day, As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, on 27 October 2023 Finland raised its crisis level pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 from “early warning” to “alert”, which is the last crisis level before an emergency. This new infrastructure incident illustrates the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to new disruptions of critical gas infrastructure. It should be also noted that the significant reduction in demand for natural gas (-18% between August 2022 and September 2023) is contributing to preserve the gas balance in the EU. This reduction is a result of economic factors (e.g. high prices) and administrative measures adopted by Member States pursuant to Regulation 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction and Regulation (EU) 2023/706 that prolonged it. A possible increase in demand, due to a rebound in the gas use in the residential, commercial and industrial sectors or in case the administrative measures aimed at reducing demand were not prolonged further, represents an additional risk that, given the current situation of tight global gas markets, could undermine EU’s security of gas supply. In three subsequent reports of December 2022 , February and July 2023 , the I nternational E nergy A gency (IEA) has consistently been highlighting the risks for the EU security of gas supply and warning against complacency in the light of the improvement of the situation compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. According to the report of February 2023 , “ g lobal gas supply is set to remain tight in 2023 and the global balance is subject to an unusually wide range of uncertainties and exogenous risk factors. This includes the possibility of complete cessation of Russian piped gas deliveries to the European Union, as well as a recovery of China’s LNG imports in line with the country’s long-term LNG contracts and a potential lower availability of LNG supply ” The IEA warned that “ the improved outlook should not be a distraction from the measures necessary (…) to mitigate the European Union’s exposure to the exogenous risks ” 2 . It developed stress scenario s w ith a halt to Russian gas supplies , LNG supplies remain ing tight and weather-related demand increases , which could result in a potential supply-demand gap of 40 bcm i n the EU . In its report of July 2023, the IEA highlighted that “ risks and uncertainties remain ahead of the 2023/24 Northern Hemisphere winter ” and “ full storage sites are no guarantee against winter volatility and the risk of renewed market tensions ” 3 . In addition, the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG) published its yearly Winter Supply Outlook with a summer overview, i n line with Art icle 8 of Regulation (EC) 715/2009. ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, additional measures may be needed in case of a full Russian supply disruption. In addition, careful management of the storages throughout the winter of 2023-2024 is needed, as a 46% filling level is likely needed at the beginning of the injection season to achieve the 90% storage target set out by Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 4 . In conclusion, in the light of the persisting severe difficulties and risks, the situation related to gas supplies, while improved compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022, remains fragile. The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to improve the situation. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. In the light of these persisting severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, and not to alter the current fragile balance, it is necessary and urgent to prolong Regulation (EU) 2022/2576. Hence, this Proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of Regulation 2022/2576 enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. The prolongation by one year is necessary and proportionate due to the persistent nature of the severe difficulties and the additional risks, and the uncertainty of the current situation which is expected to continue during the whole of 2024. 1.1.3. Reasons for prolonging the Regulation’s provisions in the current situation The different provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, which the current proposal seeks to prolong, are necessary to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, for the following reasons. Better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II – Section 1 and 2) In general, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases help to ensure more equal access for undertakings across Member States, especially those in landlocked countries or without direct access to international markets, to new or additional gas sources in urgent situations where solidarity is required. It can, in the spirit of solidarity, reduce the detrimental effect of outbidding, which is driving prices up and help in particular smaller undertakings to benefit from more advantageous purchasing conditions resulting from aggregated demand. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and launched, with the assistance of a service provider, the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under the name of “AggregateEU”. Member States and natural gas undertakings as well as undertakings consuming gas have effectively participated in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (“AggregateEU”) and contributed to achieve, by October 2023, a total aggregation of 44.04 bcm of demand for gas, which is equivalent to more than three times the mandatory amounts for demand aggregation. The matched volumes in the same period amounted to 34.77 bcm, corresponding to around 10% of EU consumption in 2022. This shows that "AggregateEU” attracted significant interest by market participants. The Commission also implemented supporting measures as mandated by the Regulation, including those on transparency and information exchange, governance of the EU Energy Platform and mandatory use of “AggregateEU”. Under the transparency and information exchange provisions of the Regulation, the Commission issued two recommendations by July 2023. In these instances, the Commission considered that further coordination with regards to tenders for the purchase of gas was needed, as it could improve the functioning of joint purchasing or prevent a negative impact on the internal market, on security of supply or on energy solidarity. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission concluded that the “AggregateEU” mechanism, based on the demand aggregation provisions of the Regulation, provided additional opportunities for European buyers (undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties) to procure gas from reliable suppliers at competitive conditions as well as market transparency on demand and supply, thereby contributing to decreasing volatility of markets. In view of the above, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply. The relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines (Chapter II – Section 3) The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 increasing the transparency around available capacities and services offered at LNG terminals and gas storage sites facilitated the increased influx of LNG into the Union and facilitated the accommodation of the altered gas flows. The situation has not changed since the adoption of the Regulation as the EU still needs to import large volumes of LNG to compensate for the Russian pipeline supply and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This is why enhanced transparency around LNG terminals and storage sites remains necessary. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 requires having use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms in place at all interconnection points in Europe, whereas this was only a requirement for certain interconnection points in the past. Such mechanisms enable the system to react to possible congestion resulting from changed gas flows in a swift and flexible manner. The measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III) Due to the difficulties to assess the accuracy of LNG prices prevailing in the marketplace, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 tasks the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to collect all the data on transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment and a daily LNG benchmark, determined as the spread between the LNG daily price assessment and the settlement price for the TTF futures front-month. On trading, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 includes a measure to manage excess volatility in gas and electricity derivatives markets, while preserving the price formation processes. The intra-day price spike collar aims at avoiding excessive price volatility and prevent extreme price spikes in prices on energy derivative market over a trading day. As concluded in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, since gas markets still feature episodes of significant volatility, the provisions in Chapter III –of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 may play a role in preventing excessive price spikes and in stabilising the market. The episodes of pronounced volatility observed in summer and autumn 2023 reinforce the conclusion that gas markets are still fragile and vulnerable to extreme price spikes. The intra-day volatility mechanism could remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV) Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 temporarily complemented the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, notably by making the solidarity mechanism applicable by default in absence of bilateral agreements, as well as by extending the solidarity mechanism to liquified natural gas (LNG) and critical gas volumes (CGV) for electricity. In addition, a provision was added to facilitate demand reduction by protected customers, as well as a provision to safeguard cross-border flows. In December 2022, the Commission carried out a joint solidarity ‘dry run’ exercise with EU Member States and ENTSOG, which tested the emergency rules and procedures, as well as the solidarity mechanism. In addition, the Commission circulated a questionnaire to the Gas Coordination Group to gather feedback on e.g. the provisions set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/1576. The outcomes of the ‘dry run’ exercise and the questionnaire are further detailed in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation 2022/2576. Based on the findings of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 and the new threat landscape, the Commission concludes that the concepts set out in Chapter IV remain essential to mitigate possible gas crises and reduce the collective costs of such a crisis, and for facilitating ongoing or future demand reduction efforts. In particular, the absence of bilateral agreements is a structural vulnerability that persists, meaning that a prolongation of default rules is necessary. Critical gas volumes for electricity generation too remain crucial to prevent that a potential gas crisis does not spread to the electricity system. The values for critical gas volumes in Annex I remain valid for the period of a prolonged application of the Regulation until the end of 2024. In addition, the supply landscape of the EU has changed significantly, with LNG being the main supply source in 2023. Solidarity should therefore still be extended to include Member States with LNG facilities, to reflect this changed reality. Lastly, the concepts of non-essential consumption of protected customers and the additional safeguards for cross-border flows in an emergency were assessed to be beneficial concepts for preventing and mitigating crises and therefore useful provisions to prolong. 
Revised version (Article 8 Participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing):
3. Member States, or other stakeholders may provide liquidity support, including guarantees, to participants in the process of joint purchasing organised by the service provider, in accordance with State aid rules, where applicable. This may include guarantees to cover collateral needs or to cover the risk of additional costs following the insolvency of other buyers under the same joint purchasing contract. 4. Natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas established in the Energy Community Contracting Parties may participate in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing provided that the necessary measures or arrangements are in place to allow their participation in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing pursuant to this Section.
Article 9 Natural gas supplies excluded from joint purchasing
Natural gas supplies originating in the Russian Federation shall not be subject to joint purchasing, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through the following entry points: (a) Greifswald (b) Lubmin II (c) Imatra (d) Narva (e) Värska (f) Luhamaa (g) Sakiai (h) Kotlovka (i) Kondratki (j) Wysokoje (k) Tieterowka (l) Mozyr (m) Kobryn (n) Sudzha (RU)/Ukraine (o) Belgorod (RU)/Ukraine (p) Valuyki (RU)/Ukraine (q) Serebryanka (RU)/Ukraine (r) Pisarevka (RU)/Ukraine (s) Sokhranovka (RU)/Ukraine (t) Prokhorovka (RU)/Ukraine (u) Platovo (RU)/Ukraine (v) Strandzha 2 (BG)/Malkoclar (TR).
Article 10 Mandatory use of the service provider
1. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas under their jurisdiction participate in the process of demand aggregation organised by the service provider as one of the possible means to meet the filling targets referred to in Article 6a and 20 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. 2. Member States with underground gas storage facilities shall require natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas under their jurisdiction to participate in the process of demand aggregation organised by the service provider with volumes at least equal to 15 % of the total volume necessary to meet the filling targets referred to in Articles 6a and 20 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. 3. Member States without underground gas storage facilities shall require natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas under their jurisdiction to participate in the process of demand aggregation organised by the service provider with volumes at least equal to 15 % of the volumes corresponding to the cross-border filling targets referred to in Article 6c and 20 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. 4. The natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas participating in demand aggregation under a mandatory obligation may decide not to purchase the gas after the aggregation process. The gas purchased may be used for other purposes than storage filling.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1 Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Since Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine, supplies of gas to the EU by Russia have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political weapon. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia had been less than 10% of the EU’s gas imports in the first half of 2023. Twelve Member States activated the first or second crisis level pursuant to the common EU classification, as foreseen by the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. This supply shock has had significant impacts on the price level and volatility of gas and electricity, on inflation, on the overall EU financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. The wholesale price in 2022 was on average more than five times higher than the pre-crisis level and even spiked above 300 €/MWh at the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. They remain to this date at markedly higher levels than in the pre-crisis period, with strong volatility. Companies, in particular energy-intensive industries, experienced loss of competitiveness, while citizens face reduced purchasing power. In this context, the Council adopted on 19 December 2022 the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 to enhance solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides a temporary legal basis in respect of: · better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II) ; · measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III), and ; · measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV). Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 aims at mitigating the impact on the price for gas by addressing demand and supply, ensuring security of supply across the entire European Union, and enhancing solidarity. It contains different elements designed to work, in a coherent manner, towards avoiding very high prices and reinforcing solidarity and security of supply. This proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 in view of the persisting risks for energy supplies in the Union. The Union’s response under REPowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to mitigating the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the supplies of gas, and its subsequent impacts on price levels, inflation, financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. However, global gas markets continue to be very tight and market balances are expected to remain precarious in the immediate future. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022, remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include a rebound in Asian LNG demand reducing the availability of gas on the global gas market; a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm; extreme weather potentially affecting the hydropower storage and nuclear production due to low water levels, and the subsequent increase in demand for gas fired power generation; further disruptions of critical infrastructures; and a deterioration of the geopolitical environment and threat landscape in supplying regions, for example with the crisis in the Middle East. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. 1.1.1. The m ain elements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (1) Demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and implemented, with the support of a service provider, the “AggregateEU” mechanism, which allows for aggregation of demand, organisation of tendering rounds vis à vis international gas suppliers and matching the demand with suppliers’ bids. The mechanism is open to participation, as buyers, of undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties. The Regulation provides for mandatory demand aggregation by laying down on Member States an obligation to require domestic undertakings to use the service provider to aggregate demand with sufficiently high volumes of gas. Volumes equivalent to at least 15 % of storage filling targets (around 13,5 billion cubic metres for the Union as a whole), are to be included by Member States’ undertakings in the demand aggregation process. To prevent that the objective of diversification from the gas supplied from the Russian Federation is put at risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides that participation of undertakings or other bodies controlled by Russian natural or legal persons or undertakings established in the Russian Federation is excluded. In addition, natural gas originating in the Russian Federation is excluded from the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through a list of entry points. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions aimed at ensuring a better coordination of gas purchases in the Union and energy solidarity among Member States. To achieve this, the Regulation seeks to provide the Commission with an overview of upcoming tenders or contracts related to the sale and purchase of gas. Accordingly, natural gas undertakings or undertakings consuming gas are required to send notifications to the Commission of any upcoming tenders or contracts of a volume above 5 TWh/year. The Commission then may issue recommendations to such undertakings in cases where such tenders or contracts may negatively impact the joint purchasing mechanism, market functioning, security of supply or solidarity. (2) Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 also enhances the efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals. Diversification of supply sources away from Russian gas has been changing the gas flow patterns in the EU. Therefore, the routes from LNG terminals to consumption centres have become more relevant than the formerly predominant East-West flows. However, such changes in gas flows have led to particularly high levels of congestion at interconnection points, notably in north-western Europe. To enhance the gas system’s responsiveness to congestion and improve the system’s flexibility, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions obliging TSOs to offer underutilised contracted firm capacity for all interconnectors, not only congested ones, either through (i) the implementation of a new monthly “use-it-or-lose-it” (UIOLI) procedure, or (ii) the extension of existing procedures with the same objective. Moreover, it has become of utmost importance to optimise the LNG absorption capacity of the EU LNG terminals and the usage of storage facilities. For this purpose, increased transparency was deemed necessary by market participants, similar to the level of transparency existing for the transport of gas via pipelines. Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) operates two main platforms covering all EU Member States as well as the United Kingdom and Ukraine: the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) for gas storage and the Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI) for LNG. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (Articles 12 and 13), new components were added to these platforms, including information on services offered and the conditions that apply to those services, contracted and available storage and LNG facility capacities, tariffs, etc. The platforms currently cover almost all EU large-scale LNG terminals and 98% of EU storage facilities. In addition to the EU-wide platforms, the individual storage and LNG operators were obliged to create more transparency around the possibilities to book secondary capacity. To this end, they were required to set up individual booking platforms. Greater transparency makes for a better and more comprehensive overview of the LNG and storage markets in the EU. It also results in more efficient use of these infrastructures and increases the potential to attract additional suppliers. (3) Action on the level of gas prices Development of a new complementary benchmark for LNG The EU’s LNG market is still consolidating. Hub indexed pricing remains influenced by pipeline supplies and by existing infrastructure bottlenecks, and therefore it does not always accurately reflect the price at which LNG is actually imported into the Union. Also, as Russian gas still represents a non-negligible – though decreasing – part of EU imports, increasingly concentrated in some areas, gas markets remain vulnerable to Russian gas supplies manipulation. There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are indispensable to replace the supply shortfalls caused by the likely halt of Russian gas imports. Regulation 2022/2576 has tasked the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (‘ACER’) to create within a short time frame an objective price assessment tool, and over time a benchmark, of the EU’s LNG imports by collecting real-time information on all daily transactions. ACER has developed such a benchmark, which provides more comprehensive information to buyers and increases price transparency. Regulation 2022/2576 granted ACER the necessary powers to collect the transaction data needed for the establishment of the LNG benchmark, building on and reinforcing the tasks and powers ACER already had under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (hereinafter together referred to as ‘REMIT’). (4) Action to reduce price volatility Intra-day price volatility management mechanism: Financial legislation (MiFID II) already requires a set of mechanisms to be set up by trading venues to contain significant volatility in financial markets, and ESMA has been working on ways to improve the functioning of circuit breakers across all asset classes, which will have a more permanent positive impact on trading of all asset classes, including energy derivatives. The just concluded MiFIR Review has also added the notion of emergency situation and given additional powers to ESMA on circuit breakers. Those changes are due to be transposed in national legislations by the second half of 2025. The intra-day volatility management mechanism set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 has been introduced so that trading venues set up mechanisms to prevent excessive movements of prices within a trading day, either through the adaptation of existing circuit breakers or through the creation of an additional mechanism. Large volatility spikes on gas and electricity markets make it difficult for energy firms to continue participating in those markets and meet their hedging needs while ensuring security of energy supply for the end-consumers. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 lays down a requirement for trading venues to establish a temporary intra-day volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in energy-related derivatives contracts within the same trading day. Trading venues can implement the intra-day volatility management mechanism either by integrating it into their existing circuit breakers already established in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU or as an additional mechanism. (5) Security of supply Extension of solidarity protection obligation to critical gas fired power plants Under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, a Member State where critical gas-fired power plants may play a key role for security of electricity supply, would have to curtail these power plants, to the possible detriment of the security of electricity supply of other Member States, before this Member State is allowed to request solidarity measures under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. To prevent such negative spill-over effects into electricity generation, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 allows Member States to trigger a solidarity request, under certain limits, if gas-fired power plants, that are needed to ensure the electricity system’s adequacy, are at risk of not being supplied with critical gas volumes. For the same reason, Member States providing solidarity will be entitled to ensure that the operation of their critical gas-fired power plants is not endangered when providing solidarity to another Member State. Default rules for bilateral solidarity Specific measures in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 introduced a default mechanism between the Member States to ensure they help each other to supply the “solidarity protected customers” (households and under certain conditions district heating and essential social services) and critical gas-fired power plants, in an emergency leading to very severe shortage of gas. The security of supply rules resulting from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 introduced the principle of such solidarity but its actual use in a crisis requires detailed legal, technical and financial arrangements which were supposed to be agreed bilaterally between Member States. However, only eight out of 40 required arrangements have been agreed so far. Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, therefore, spell out the rules and procedures that will automatically apply between Member States which have not agreed on bilateral solidarity arrangements. Solidarity has to be provided based on fair compensation pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. However, possible indirect costs resulting from judicial or arbitration proceedings after the curtailment of industry will remain to be limited to 100% of the price of gas. The reason is that the cost of compensation to industry resulting from curtailment is partially covered by the price of gas and, should a part remain from litigation, this part is highly uncertain and can largely exceed the costs of the gas. The uncertainty about indirect compensation costs therefore has proved to be a major obstacle for Member States to conclude bilateral solidarity agreements. However, Member States will still be able to agree on different compensation conditions. The current solidarity obligation, stemming from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, applies between the Member States that are directly connected or via a third country. This proposed prolongation will maintain the extension of this obligation to Member States with LNG facilities, which, even if not directly connected, could provide solidarity to a Member State in an emergency if endowed with the infrastructure necessary to receive this LNG. 1.1.2. The c urrent situation : severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply persist The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 , helped mitigate the consequences of the crisis and prepared the EU to a degraded security of gas supplies situation. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, in view of the general situation of gas supply to the Union 1 , the Commission concluded that the Regulation’s provisions have played an important role in stabilising the situation of the gas market and ensuring adequate gas supply to the Union, and that the Regulation is an important element of the EU gas security of supply tool kit . If not prolonged, the Regulation will cease to apply on 30 December 2023. However, as of the date of adoption of this proposal, severe difficulties in gas supplies to the Union persist. Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis. With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, and these unreliable imports may be further reduced or stopped. This figure would be approximately 110 bcm less than in 2021. Global gas markets remain very tight and are expected to remain as such for some time as only very limited new LNG liquefaction capacity globally is planned to be operational before 2026. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022 (when prices spiked above 300 EUR/MWh), remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. Over the previous decade, prices had moved within a band of EUR 5 MWh to EUR 35 MWh and averaged around EUR 20/MWh. In early autumn 2023 prices ranged between EUR 40 MWh and EUR 50 MWh. This level of prices still has inevitable repercussions on the EU citizens’ purchasing power and the competitiveness of European businesses. Market volatility is also a consequence of the market tightness and represents an additional risk for the EU economy. Summer and autumn 2023 saw a number of episodes of significant volatility when prices increased by more than 50% in few weeks. This shows that gas markets are still fragile and may have large reactions to any unexpected and sudden shock to supply and demand, as was the case following the strike in Australian LNG facilities, the Middle East crisis and the disruption of the Balticconnector. Under these conditions, the fear of scarcity may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include: a rebound in Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand that further reduces the availability of gas on the global gas market, a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm, extreme weather conditions potentially affecting hydropower storage or nuclear production which would require higher recourse to gas-fired power generation and/or trigger increased demand for gas, and further possible gas supply disruptions, including a complete halt of gas imports from Russia or a disruption of existing critical gas infrastructure. Furthermore, since the adoption of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the threat landscape has deteriorated. Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, in addition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Azerbaijan, Middle East). Recent examples illustrate the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to the disruption of critical gas infrastructure. In September 2022, the NordStream 1 pipeline was damaged by acts of sabotage to such a degree that it currently cannot transport any gas and will not be able to do so in the foreseeable future. In October 2023, the Balticconnector, an important pipeline connecting Finland to Estonia, was disrupted. The investigation is examining whether the damage was external and made by a vessel’s anchor. As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, Finland is now no longer able to meet the N-1 criterion as part of the infrastructure standard defined in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The N-1 criterion ensures that Member States take measures so that in case of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, they still have the technical capacity to satisfy their total demand during a peak day, As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, on 27 October 2023 Finland raised its crisis level pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 from “early warning” to “alert”, which is the last crisis level before an emergency. This new infrastructure incident illustrates the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to new disruptions of critical gas infrastructure. It should be also noted that the significant reduction in demand for natural gas (-18% between August 2022 and September 2023) is contributing to preserve the gas balance in the EU. This reduction is a result of economic factors (e.g. high prices) and administrative measures adopted by Member States pursuant to Regulation 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction and Regulation (EU) 2023/706 that prolonged it. A possible increase in demand, due to a rebound in the gas use in the residential, commercial and industrial sectors or in case the administrative measures aimed at reducing demand were not prolonged further, represents an additional risk that, given the current situation of tight global gas markets, could undermine EU’s security of gas supply. In three subsequent reports of December 2022 , February and July 2023 , the I nternational E nergy A gency (IEA) has consistently been highlighting the risks for the EU security of gas supply and warning against complacency in the light of the improvement of the situation compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. According to the report of February 2023 , “ g lobal gas supply is set to remain tight in 2023 and the global balance is subject to an unusually wide range of uncertainties and exogenous risk factors. This includes the possibility of complete cessation of Russian piped gas deliveries to the European Union, as well as a recovery of China’s LNG imports in line with the country’s long-term LNG contracts and a potential lower availability of LNG supply ” The IEA warned that “ the improved outlook should not be a distraction from the measures necessary (…) to mitigate the European Union’s exposure to the exogenous risks ” 2 . It developed stress scenario s w ith a halt to Russian gas supplies , LNG supplies remain ing tight and weather-related demand increases , which could result in a potential supply-demand gap of 40 bcm i n the EU . In its report of July 2023, the IEA highlighted that “ risks and uncertainties remain ahead of the 2023/24 Northern Hemisphere winter ” and “ full storage sites are no guarantee against winter volatility and the risk of renewed market tensions ” 3 . In addition, the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG) published its yearly Winter Supply Outlook with a summer overview, i n line with Art icle 8 of Regulation (EC) 715/2009. ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, additional measures may be needed in case of a full Russian supply disruption. In addition, careful management of the storages throughout the winter of 2023-2024 is needed, as a 46% filling level is likely needed at the beginning of the injection season to achieve the 90% storage target set out by Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 4 . In conclusion, in the light of the persisting severe difficulties and risks, the situation related to gas supplies, while improved compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022, remains fragile. The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to improve the situation. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. In the light of these persisting severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, and not to alter the current fragile balance, it is necessary and urgent to prolong Regulation (EU) 2022/2576. Hence, this Proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of Regulation 2022/2576 enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. The prolongation by one year is necessary and proportionate due to the persistent nature of the severe difficulties and the additional risks, and the uncertainty of the current situation which is expected to continue during the whole of 2024. 1.1.3. Reasons for prolonging the Regulation’s provisions in the current situation The different provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, which the current proposal seeks to prolong, are necessary to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, for the following reasons. Better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II – Section 1 and 2) In general, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases help to ensure more equal access for undertakings across Member States, especially those in landlocked countries or without direct access to international markets, to new or additional gas sources in urgent situations where solidarity is required. It can, in the spirit of solidarity, reduce the detrimental effect of outbidding, which is driving prices up and help in particular smaller undertakings to benefit from more advantageous purchasing conditions resulting from aggregated demand. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and launched, with the assistance of a service provider, the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under the name of “AggregateEU”. Member States and natural gas undertakings as well as undertakings consuming gas have effectively participated in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (“AggregateEU”) and contributed to achieve, by October 2023, a total aggregation of 44.04 bcm of demand for gas, which is equivalent to more than three times the mandatory amounts for demand aggregation. The matched volumes in the same period amounted to 34.77 bcm, corresponding to around 10% of EU consumption in 2022. This shows that "AggregateEU” attracted significant interest by market participants. The Commission also implemented supporting measures as mandated by the Regulation, including those on transparency and information exchange, governance of the EU Energy Platform and mandatory use of “AggregateEU”. Under the transparency and information exchange provisions of the Regulation, the Commission issued two recommendations by July 2023. In these instances, the Commission considered that further coordination with regards to tenders for the purchase of gas was needed, as it could improve the functioning of joint purchasing or prevent a negative impact on the internal market, on security of supply or on energy solidarity. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission concluded that the “AggregateEU” mechanism, based on the demand aggregation provisions of the Regulation, provided additional opportunities for European buyers (undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties) to procure gas from reliable suppliers at competitive conditions as well as market transparency on demand and supply, thereby contributing to decreasing volatility of markets. In view of the above, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply. The relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines (Chapter II – Section 3) The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 increasing the transparency around available capacities and services offered at LNG terminals and gas storage sites facilitated the increased influx of LNG into the Union and facilitated the accommodation of the altered gas flows. The situation has not changed since the adoption of the Regulation as the EU still needs to import large volumes of LNG to compensate for the Russian pipeline supply and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This is why enhanced transparency around LNG terminals and storage sites remains necessary. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 requires having use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms in place at all interconnection points in Europe, whereas this was only a requirement for certain interconnection points in the past. Such mechanisms enable the system to react to possible congestion resulting from changed gas flows in a swift and flexible manner. The measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III) Due to the difficulties to assess the accuracy of LNG prices prevailing in the marketplace, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 tasks the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to collect all the data on transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment and a daily LNG benchmark, determined as the spread between the LNG daily price assessment and the settlement price for the TTF futures front-month. On trading, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 includes a measure to manage excess volatility in gas and electricity derivatives markets, while preserving the price formation processes. The intra-day price spike collar aims at avoiding excessive price volatility and prevent extreme price spikes in prices on energy derivative market over a trading day. As concluded in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, since gas markets still feature episodes of significant volatility, the provisions in Chapter III –of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 may play a role in preventing excessive price spikes and in stabilising the market. The episodes of pronounced volatility observed in summer and autumn 2023 reinforce the conclusion that gas markets are still fragile and vulnerable to extreme price spikes. The intra-day volatility mechanism could remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV) Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 temporarily complemented the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, notably by making the solidarity mechanism applicable by default in absence of bilateral agreements, as well as by extending the solidarity mechanism to liquified natural gas (LNG) and critical gas volumes (CGV) for electricity. In addition, a provision was added to facilitate demand reduction by protected customers, as well as a provision to safeguard cross-border flows. In December 2022, the Commission carried out a joint solidarity ‘dry run’ exercise with EU Member States and ENTSOG, which tested the emergency rules and procedures, as well as the solidarity mechanism. In addition, the Commission circulated a questionnaire to the Gas Coordination Group to gather feedback on e.g. the provisions set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/1576. The outcomes of the ‘dry run’ exercise and the questionnaire are further detailed in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation 2022/2576. Based on the findings of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 and the new threat landscape, the Commission concludes that the concepts set out in Chapter IV remain essential to mitigate possible gas crises and reduce the collective costs of such a crisis, and for facilitating ongoing or future demand reduction efforts. In particular, the absence of bilateral agreements is a structural vulnerability that persists, meaning that a prolongation of default rules is necessary. Critical gas volumes for electricity generation too remain crucial to prevent that a potential gas crisis does not spread to the electricity system. The values for critical gas volumes in Annex I remain valid for the period of a prolonged application of the Regulation until the end of 2024. In addition, the supply landscape of the EU has changed significantly, with LNG being the main supply source in 2023. Solidarity should therefore still be extended to include Member States with LNG facilities, to reflect this changed reality. Lastly, the concepts of non-essential consumption of protected customers and the additional safeguards for cross-border flows in an emergency were assessed to be beneficial concepts for preventing and mitigating crises and therefore useful provisions to prolong.
Article 11 Gas purchasing consortium
Natural gas undertakings and undertakings consuming gas participating in demand aggregation organised by the service provider may, on a transparent basis, coordinate elements of the conditions of the purchase contract or use joint purchase contracts in order to achieve better conditions with their suppliers, provided they comply with Union law, including Union competition law, in particular Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as may be specified by the Commission in a decision pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, as well as with the transparency requirement pursuant to Article 3 of this Regulation.
Article 12 Secondary capacity booking platform for LNG facility users and gas storage facility users
LNG facility users and gas storage facility users, who wish to re-sell their contracted capacity on the secondary market, as defined in in Article 2, point (6), of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 19 ) , shall be entitled to do so. By 28 February 2023, LNG facility operators and gas storage facility operators, individually or regionally, shall set up or make use of an existing transparent and non-discriminatory booking platform for LNG facility users and gas storage facility users to re-sell their contracted capacity on the secondary market.
Article 13 Transparency platforms for LNG facilities and gas storage facilities
1. By 28 February 2023, LNG facility operators and gas storage facility operators shall publish all the information required by Article 19 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on a European LNG Transparency Platform and a European Storage Transparency platform, respectively, in a transparent and user-friendly manner. Regulatory authorities may request those operators to make public any additional information relevant for system users. 2. LNG facilities that have been granted an exemption from third party access rules pursuant to Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC, and gas storage facility operators under the negotiated third party access regime referred to in Article 33(3) of that Directive, shall make public final tariffs for infrastructure by 31 January 2023.
Article 14 More effective use of transmission capacities
1. Transmission system operators shall offer underutilised contracted firm capacity at interconnection points and virtual interconnection points as a monthly capacity product and as daily and within-day capacity products for the month in the event of an underutilisation pursuant to paragraph 2. 2. Contracted firm capacity shall be considered underutilised if a network user used or offered less than on average 80 % of the booked firm capacity at an interconnection point or virtual interconnection point in the preceding calendar month. The transmission system operator shall monitor the unused capacity and shall inform the network user on the amount of capacity to be withdrawn at the relevant interconnection point or virtual interconnection point at the latest before notifying the amount of capacity to be offered for the upcoming rolling monthly capacity auction in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/459. 3. The amount of capacity to be offered shall equal the difference between the average utilisation for the preceding calendar month and 80 % of the firm capacity which was contracted for a duration longer than a month. 4. Available capacity offered in an auction in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/459 shall have priority over underutilised capacity included in an auction pursuant to paragraph 2 when allocating capacity. 5. If the underutilised capacity offered by the transmission system operator is sold, it shall be withdrawn from the original holder of the contracted capacity. The original holder may use the withdrawn firm capacity on an interruptible basis. 6. The network user shall retain its rights and obligations under the capacity contract until the capacity is reallocated by the transmission system operator and to the extent that the capacity is not reallocated by the transmission system operator. 7. Before offering underutilised firm capacity in accordance with this Article, the transmission system operator shall analyse the potential effects at every interconnection point it operates and shall inform the competent national regulatory authority. By derogation from paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article, and regardless of whether those interconnection points are congested or not, national regulatory authorities may decide to introduce one of the following mechanisms at all interconnection points: (a) a firm day ahead use-it-or lose-it mechanism in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/459 and taking into consideration point 2.2.3 of Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009; (b) an oversubscription and buy-back scheme in accordance with point 2.2.2 of Annex I of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 offering at least 5 % additional capacity in relation to the technical capacity at the relevant interconnection point; or (c) at least offer initially not nominated capacity on a day-ahead and within-day basis, to be allocated as interruptible capacity. Paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article shall automatically apply if one of the alternative mechanisms pursuant to the first subparagraph is not applied by 31 March 2023. 8. Before taking the decision referred to in paragraph 7, the national regulatory authority shall consult with the national regulatory authority of the adjacent Member State and take account of that authority’s opinions. In the case that the entry-exit system is covering more than one Member State where more than one transmission system operator is active, national regulatory authorities of the concerned Member States shall decide jointly on the application of paragraph 7.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1 Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Since Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine, supplies of gas to the EU by Russia have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political weapon. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia had been less than 10% of the EU’s gas imports in the first half of 2023. Twelve Member States activated the first or second crisis level pursuant to the common EU classification, as foreseen by the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. This supply shock has had significant impacts on the price level and volatility of gas and electricity, on inflation, on the overall EU financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. The wholesale price in 2022 was on average more than five times higher than the pre-crisis level and even spiked above 300 €/MWh at the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. They remain to this date at markedly higher levels than in the pre-crisis period, with strong volatility. Companies, in particular energy-intensive industries, experienced loss of competitiveness, while citizens face reduced purchasing power. In this context, the Council adopted on 19 December 2022 the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 to enhance solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides a temporary legal basis in respect of: · better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II) ; · measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III), and ; · measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV). Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 aims at mitigating the impact on the price for gas by addressing demand and supply, ensuring security of supply across the entire European Union, and enhancing solidarity. It contains different elements designed to work, in a coherent manner, towards avoiding very high prices and reinforcing solidarity and security of supply. This proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 in view of the persisting risks for energy supplies in the Union. The Union’s response under REPowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to mitigating the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the supplies of gas, and its subsequent impacts on price levels, inflation, financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. However, global gas markets continue to be very tight and market balances are expected to remain precarious in the immediate future. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022, remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include a rebound in Asian LNG demand reducing the availability of gas on the global gas market; a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm; extreme weather potentially affecting the hydropower storage and nuclear production due to low water levels, and the subsequent increase in demand for gas fired power generation; further disruptions of critical infrastructures; and a deterioration of the geopolitical environment and threat landscape in supplying regions, for example with the crisis in the Middle East. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. 1.1.1. The m ain elements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (1) Demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and implemented, with the support of a service provider, the “AggregateEU” mechanism, which allows for aggregation of demand, organisation of tendering rounds vis à vis international gas suppliers and matching the demand with suppliers’ bids. The mechanism is open to participation, as buyers, of undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties. The Regulation provides for mandatory demand aggregation by laying down on Member States an obligation to require domestic undertakings to use the service provider to aggregate demand with sufficiently high volumes of gas. Volumes equivalent to at least 15 % of storage filling targets (around 13,5 billion cubic metres for the Union as a whole), are to be included by Member States’ undertakings in the demand aggregation process. To prevent that the objective of diversification from the gas supplied from the Russian Federation is put at risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides that participation of undertakings or other bodies controlled by Russian natural or legal persons or undertakings established in the Russian Federation is excluded. In addition, natural gas originating in the Russian Federation is excluded from the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through a list of entry points. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions aimed at ensuring a better coordination of gas purchases in the Union and energy solidarity among Member States. To achieve this, the Regulation seeks to provide the Commission with an overview of upcoming tenders or contracts related to the sale and purchase of gas. Accordingly, natural gas undertakings or undertakings consuming gas are required to send notifications to the Commission of any upcoming tenders or contracts of a volume above 5 TWh/year. The Commission then may issue recommendations to such undertakings in cases where such tenders or contracts may negatively impact the joint purchasing mechanism, market functioning, security of supply or solidarity. (2) Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 also enhances the efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals. Diversification of supply sources away from Russian gas has been changing the gas flow patterns in the EU. Therefore, the routes from LNG terminals to consumption centres have become more relevant than the formerly predominant East-West flows. However, such changes in gas flows have led to particularly high levels of congestion at interconnection points, notably in north-western Europe. To enhance the gas system’s responsiveness to congestion and improve the system’s flexibility, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions obliging TSOs to offer underutilised contracted firm capacity for all interconnectors, not only congested ones, either through (i) the implementation of a new monthly “use-it-or-lose-it” (UIOLI) procedure, or (ii) the extension of existing procedures with the same objective. Moreover, it has become of utmost importance to optimise the LNG absorption capacity of the EU LNG terminals and the usage of storage facilities. For this purpose, increased transparency was deemed necessary by market participants, similar to the level of transparency existing for the transport of gas via pipelines. Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) operates two main platforms covering all EU Member States as well as the United Kingdom and Ukraine: the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) for gas storage and the Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI) for LNG. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (Articles 12 and 13), new components were added to these platforms, including information on services offered and the conditions that apply to those services, contracted and available storage and LNG facility capacities, tariffs, etc. The platforms currently cover almost all EU large-scale LNG terminals and 98% of EU storage facilities. In addition to the EU-wide platforms, the individual storage and LNG operators were obliged to create more transparency around the possibilities to book secondary capacity. To this end, they were required to set up individual booking platforms. Greater transparency makes for a better and more comprehensive overview of the LNG and storage markets in the EU. It also results in more efficient use of these infrastructures and increases the potential to attract additional suppliers. (3) Action on the level of gas prices Development of a new complementary benchmark for LNG The EU’s LNG market is still consolidating. Hub indexed pricing remains influenced by pipeline supplies and by existing infrastructure bottlenecks, and therefore it does not always accurately reflect the price at which LNG is actually imported into the Union. Also, as Russian gas still represents a non-negligible – though decreasing – part of EU imports, increasingly concentrated in some areas, gas markets remain vulnerable to Russian gas supplies manipulation. There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are indispensable to replace the supply shortfalls caused by the likely halt of Russian gas imports. Regulation 2022/2576 has tasked the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (‘ACER’) to create within a short time frame an objective price assessment tool, and over time a benchmark, of the EU’s LNG imports by collecting real-time information on all daily transactions. ACER has developed such a benchmark, which provides more comprehensive information to buyers and increases price transparency. Regulation 2022/2576 granted ACER the necessary powers to collect the transaction data needed for the establishment of the LNG benchmark, building on and reinforcing the tasks and powers ACER already had under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (hereinafter together referred to as ‘REMIT’). (4) Action to reduce price volatility Intra-day price volatility management mechanism: Financial legislation (MiFID II) already requires a set of mechanisms to be set up by trading venues to contain significant volatility in financial markets, and ESMA has been working on ways to improve the functioning of circuit breakers across all asset classes, which will have a more permanent positive impact on trading of all asset classes, including energy derivatives. The just concluded MiFIR Review has also added the notion of emergency situation and given additional powers to ESMA on circuit breakers. Those changes are due to be transposed in national legislations by the second half of 2025. The intra-day volatility management mechanism set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 has been introduced so that trading venues set up mechanisms to prevent excessive movements of prices within a trading day, either through the adaptation of existing circuit breakers or through the creation of an additional mechanism. Large volatility spikes on gas and electricity markets make it difficult for energy firms to continue participating in those markets and meet their hedging needs while ensuring security of energy supply for the end-consumers. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 lays down a requirement for trading venues to establish a temporary intra-day volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in energy-related derivatives contracts within the same trading day. Trading venues can implement the intra-day volatility management mechanism either by integrating it into their existing circuit breakers already established in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU or as an additional mechanism. (5) Security of supply Extension of solidarity protection obligation to critical gas fired power plants Under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, a Member State where critical gas-fired power plants may play a key role for security of electricity supply, would have to curtail these power plants, to the possible detriment of the security of electricity supply of other Member States, before this Member State is allowed to request solidarity measures under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. To prevent such negative spill-over effects into electricity generation, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 allows Member States to trigger a solidarity request, under certain limits, if gas-fired power plants, that are needed to ensure the electricity system’s adequacy, are at risk of not being supplied with critical gas volumes. For the same reason, Member States providing solidarity will be entitled to ensure that the operation of their critical gas-fired power plants is not endangered when providing solidarity to another Member State. Default rules for bilateral solidarity Specific measures in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 introduced a default mechanism between the Member States to ensure they help each other to supply the “solidarity protected customers” (households and under certain conditions district heating and essential social services) and critical gas-fired power plants, in an emergency leading to very severe shortage of gas. The security of supply rules resulting from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 introduced the principle of such solidarity but its actual use in a crisis requires detailed legal, technical and financial arrangements which were supposed to be agreed bilaterally between Member States. However, only eight out of 40 required arrangements have been agreed so far. Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, therefore, spell out the rules and procedures that will automatically apply between Member States which have not agreed on bilateral solidarity arrangements. Solidarity has to be provided based on fair compensation pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. However, possible indirect costs resulting from judicial or arbitration proceedings after the curtailment of industry will remain to be limited to 100% of the price of gas. The reason is that the cost of compensation to industry resulting from curtailment is partially covered by the price of gas and, should a part remain from litigation, this part is highly uncertain and can largely exceed the costs of the gas. The uncertainty about indirect compensation costs therefore has proved to be a major obstacle for Member States to conclude bilateral solidarity agreements. However, Member States will still be able to agree on different compensation conditions. The current solidarity obligation, stemming from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, applies between the Member States that are directly connected or via a third country. This proposed prolongation will maintain the extension of this obligation to Member States with LNG facilities, which, even if not directly connected, could provide solidarity to a Member State in an emergency if endowed with the infrastructure necessary to receive this LNG. 1.1.2. The c urrent situation : severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply persist The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 , helped mitigate the consequences of the crisis and prepared the EU to a degraded security of gas supplies situation. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, in view of the general situation of gas supply to the Union 1 , the Commission concluded that the Regulation’s provisions have played an important role in stabilising the situation of the gas market and ensuring adequate gas supply to the Union, and that the Regulation is an important element of the EU gas security of supply tool kit . If not prolonged, the Regulation will cease to apply on 30 December 2023. However, as of the date of adoption of this proposal, severe difficulties in gas supplies to the Union persist. Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis. With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, and these unreliable imports may be further reduced or stopped. This figure would be approximately 110 bcm less than in 2021. Global gas markets remain very tight and are expected to remain as such for some time as only very limited new LNG liquefaction capacity globally is planned to be operational before 2026. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022 (when prices spiked above 300 EUR/MWh), remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. Over the previous decade, prices had moved within a band of EUR 5 MWh to EUR 35 MWh and averaged around EUR 20/MWh. In early autumn 2023 prices ranged between EUR 40 MWh and EUR 50 MWh. This level of prices still has inevitable repercussions on the EU citizens’ purchasing power and the competitiveness of European businesses. Market volatility is also a consequence of the market tightness and represents an additional risk for the EU economy. Summer and autumn 2023 saw a number of episodes of significant volatility when prices increased by more than 50% in few weeks. This shows that gas markets are still fragile and may have large reactions to any unexpected and sudden shock to supply and demand, as was the case following the strike in Australian LNG facilities, the Middle East crisis and the disruption of the Balticconnector. Under these conditions, the fear of scarcity may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include: a rebound in Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand that further reduces the availability of gas on the global gas market, a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm, extreme weather conditions potentially affecting hydropower storage or nuclear production which would require higher recourse to gas-fired power generation and/or trigger increased demand for gas, and further possible gas supply disruptions, including a complete halt of gas imports from Russia or a disruption of existing critical gas infrastructure. Furthermore, since the adoption of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the threat landscape has deteriorated. Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, in addition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Azerbaijan, Middle East). Recent examples illustrate the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to the disruption of critical gas infrastructure. In September 2022, the NordStream 1 pipeline was damaged by acts of sabotage to such a degree that it currently cannot transport any gas and will not be able to do so in the foreseeable future. In October 2023, the Balticconnector, an important pipeline connecting Finland to Estonia, was disrupted. The investigation is examining whether the damage was external and made by a vessel’s anchor. As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, Finland is now no longer able to meet the N-1 criterion as part of the infrastructure standard defined in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The N-1 criterion ensures that Member States take measures so that in case of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, they still have the technical capacity to satisfy their total demand during a peak day, As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, on 27 October 2023 Finland raised its crisis level pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 from “early warning” to “alert”, which is the last crisis level before an emergency. This new infrastructure incident illustrates the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to new disruptions of critical gas infrastructure. It should be also noted that the significant reduction in demand for natural gas (-18% between August 2022 and September 2023) is contributing to preserve the gas balance in the EU. This reduction is a result of economic factors (e.g. high prices) and administrative measures adopted by Member States pursuant to Regulation 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction and Regulation (EU) 2023/706 that prolonged it. A possible increase in demand, due to a rebound in the gas use in the residential, commercial and industrial sectors or in case the administrative measures aimed at reducing demand were not prolonged further, represents an additional risk that, given the current situation of tight global gas markets, could undermine EU’s security of gas supply. In three subsequent reports of December 2022 , February and July 2023 , the I nternational E nergy A gency (IEA) has consistently been highlighting the risks for the EU security of gas supply and warning against complacency in the light of the improvement of the situation compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. According to the report of February 2023 , “ g lobal gas supply is set to remain tight in 2023 and the global balance is subject to an unusually wide range of uncertainties and exogenous risk factors. This includes the possibility of complete cessation of Russian piped gas deliveries to the European Union, as well as a recovery of China’s LNG imports in line with the country’s long-term LNG contracts and a potential lower availability of LNG supply ” The IEA warned that “ the improved outlook should not be a distraction from the measures necessary (…) to mitigate the European Union’s exposure to the exogenous risks ” 2 . It developed stress scenario s w ith a halt to Russian gas supplies , LNG supplies remain ing tight and weather-related demand increases , which could result in a potential supply-demand gap of 40 bcm i n the EU . In its report of July 2023, the IEA highlighted that “ risks and uncertainties remain ahead of the 2023/24 Northern Hemisphere winter ” and “ full storage sites are no guarantee against winter volatility and the risk of renewed market tensions ” 3 . In addition, the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG) published its yearly Winter Supply Outlook with a summer overview, i n line with Art icle 8 of Regulation (EC) 715/2009. ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, additional measures may be needed in case of a full Russian supply disruption. In addition, careful management of the storages throughout the winter of 2023-2024 is needed, as a 46% filling level is likely needed at the beginning of the injection season to achieve the 90% storage target set out by Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 4 . In conclusion, in the light of the persisting severe difficulties and risks, the situation related to gas supplies, while improved compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022, remains fragile. The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to improve the situation. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. In the light of these persisting severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, and not to alter the current fragile balance, it is necessary and urgent to prolong Regulation (EU) 2022/2576. Hence, this Proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of Regulation 2022/2576 enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. The prolongation by one year is necessary and proportionate due to the persistent nature of the severe difficulties and the additional risks, and the uncertainty of the current situation which is expected to continue during the whole of 2024. 1.1.3. Reasons for prolonging the Regulation’s provisions in the current situation The different provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, which the current proposal seeks to prolong, are necessary to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, for the following reasons. Better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II – Section 1 and 2) In general, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases help to ensure more equal access for undertakings across Member States, especially those in landlocked countries or without direct access to international markets, to new or additional gas sources in urgent situations where solidarity is required. It can, in the spirit of solidarity, reduce the detrimental effect of outbidding, which is driving prices up and help in particular smaller undertakings to benefit from more advantageous purchasing conditions resulting from aggregated demand. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and launched, with the assistance of a service provider, the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under the name of “AggregateEU”. Member States and natural gas undertakings as well as undertakings consuming gas have effectively participated in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (“AggregateEU”) and contributed to achieve, by October 2023, a total aggregation of 44.04 bcm of demand for gas, which is equivalent to more than three times the mandatory amounts for demand aggregation. The matched volumes in the same period amounted to 34.77 bcm, corresponding to around 10% of EU consumption in 2022. This shows that "AggregateEU” attracted significant interest by market participants. The Commission also implemented supporting measures as mandated by the Regulation, including those on transparency and information exchange, governance of the EU Energy Platform and mandatory use of “AggregateEU”. Under the transparency and information exchange provisions of the Regulation, the Commission issued two recommendations by July 2023. In these instances, the Commission considered that further coordination with regards to tenders for the purchase of gas was needed, as it could improve the functioning of joint purchasing or prevent a negative impact on the internal market, on security of supply or on energy solidarity. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission concluded that the “AggregateEU” mechanism, based on the demand aggregation provisions of the Regulation, provided additional opportunities for European buyers (undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties) to procure gas from reliable suppliers at competitive conditions as well as market transparency on demand and supply, thereby contributing to decreasing volatility of markets. In view of the above, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply. The relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines (Chapter II – Section 3) The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 increasing the transparency around available capacities and services offered at LNG terminals and gas storage sites facilitated the increased influx of LNG into the Union and facilitated the accommodation of the altered gas flows. The situation has not changed since the adoption of the Regulation as the EU still needs to import large volumes of LNG to compensate for the Russian pipeline supply and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This is why enhanced transparency around LNG terminals and storage sites remains necessary. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 requires having use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms in place at all interconnection points in Europe, whereas this was only a requirement for certain interconnection points in the past. Such mechanisms enable the system to react to possible congestion resulting from changed gas flows in a swift and flexible manner. The measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III) Due to the difficulties to assess the accuracy of LNG prices prevailing in the marketplace, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 tasks the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to collect all the data on transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment and a daily LNG benchmark, determined as the spread between the LNG daily price assessment and the settlement price for the TTF futures front-month. On trading, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 includes a measure to manage excess volatility in gas and electricity derivatives markets, while preserving the price formation processes. The intra-day price spike collar aims at avoiding excessive price volatility and prevent extreme price spikes in prices on energy derivative market over a trading day. As concluded in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, since gas markets still feature episodes of significant volatility, the provisions in Chapter III –of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 may play a role in preventing excessive price spikes and in stabilising the market. The episodes of pronounced volatility observed in summer and autumn 2023 reinforce the conclusion that gas markets are still fragile and vulnerable to extreme price spikes. The intra-day volatility mechanism could remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV) Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 temporarily complemented the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, notably by making the solidarity mechanism applicable by default in absence of bilateral agreements, as well as by extending the solidarity mechanism to liquified natural gas (LNG) and critical gas volumes (CGV) for electricity. In addition, a provision was added to facilitate demand reduction by protected customers, as well as a provision to safeguard cross-border flows. In December 2022, the Commission carried out a joint solidarity ‘dry run’ exercise with EU Member States and ENTSOG, which tested the emergency rules and procedures, as well as the solidarity mechanism. In addition, the Commission circulated a questionnaire to the Gas Coordination Group to gather feedback on e.g. the provisions set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/1576. The outcomes of the ‘dry run’ exercise and the questionnaire are further detailed in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation 2022/2576. Based on the findings of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 and the new threat landscape, the Commission concludes that the concepts set out in Chapter IV remain essential to mitigate possible gas crises and reduce the collective costs of such a crisis, and for facilitating ongoing or future demand reduction efforts. In particular, the absence of bilateral agreements is a structural vulnerability that persists, meaning that a prolongation of default rules is necessary. Critical gas volumes for electricity generation too remain crucial to prevent that a potential gas crisis does not spread to the electricity system. The values for critical gas volumes in Annex I remain valid for the period of a prolonged application of the Regulation until the end of 2024. In addition, the supply landscape of the EU has changed significantly, with LNG being the main supply source in 2023. Solidarity should therefore still be extended to include Member States with LNG facilities, to reflect this changed reality. Lastly, the concepts of non-essential consumption of protected customers and the additional safeguards for cross-border flows in an emergency were assessed to be beneficial concepts for preventing and mitigating crises and therefore useful provisions to prolong. 
Revised version (Article 14 More effective use of transmission capacities):
1. Transmission system operators shall offer underutilised contracted firm capacity at interconnection points and virtual interconnection points as a monthly capacity product and as daily and within-day capacity products for the month in the event of an underutilisation pursuant to paragraph 2. 2. Contracted firm capacity shall be considered underutilised if a network user used or offered less than on average 80 % of the booked firm capacity at an interconnection point or virtual interconnection point in the preceding calendar month. The transmission system operator shall monitor the unused capacity and shall inform the network user on the amount of capacity to be withdrawn at the relevant interconnection point or virtual interconnection point at the latest before notifying the amount of capacity to be offered for the upcoming rolling monthly capacity auction in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/459. 3. The amount of capacity to be offered shall equal the difference between the average utilisation for the preceding calendar month and 80 % of the firm capacity which was contracted for a duration longer than a month. 4. Available capacity offered in an auction in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/459 shall have priority over underutilised capacity included in an auction pursuant to paragraph 2 when allocating capacity. 5. If the underutilised capacity offered by the transmission system operator is sold, it shall be withdrawn from the original holder of the contracted capacity. The original holder may use the withdrawn firm capacity on an interruptible basis. 6. The network user shall retain its rights and obligations under the capacity contract until the capacity is reallocated by the transmission system operator and to the extent that the capacity is not reallocated by the transmission system operator. 7. Paragraphs 1 to 6 of this Article shall automatically apply if one of the alternative mechanisms pursuant to the first subparagraph is not applied by 31 March 2023. 8. Before taking the decision referred to in paragraph 7, the national regulatory authority shall consult with the national regulatory authority of the adjacent Member State and take account of that authority’s opinions. In the case that the entry-exit system is covering more than one Member State where more than one transmission system operator is active, national regulatory authorities of the concerned Member States shall decide jointly on the application of paragraph 7.
Article 15 Intra-day volatility management mechanism
1. As soon as possible, but by no later than 31 January 2023, each trading venue on which energy-related commodity derivatives are traded shall set up, for each energy-related commodity derivative traded on it, an intra-day volatility management mechanism based on an upper and lower price boundary (‘price boundaries’) that defines the prices above and below which orders may not be executed (‘intra-day volatility management mechanism’). Trading venues shall ensure that the intra-day price volatility management mechanism prevents excessive movements of prices within a trading day for energy-related commodity derivatives. When setting up the intra-day volatility management mechanism, trading venues shall also ensure that the implementation of those measures does not prevent the formation of reliable end-of-day closing prices. 2. For each energy-related commodity derivative traded on them, trading venues shall establish the applicable calculation method to determine the price boundaries relative to a reference price. The first reference price of the day shall be equal to the price determined upon the opening of the relevant trading session. The subsequent reference prices shall be the last market price observed at regular intervals. In the event of an interruption in trading during the trading day, the first reference price after the interruption shall be the opening price of the resumed trading. 3. The price boundaries shall be expressed either in absolute value, or in relative terms in the form of a percentage variation relative to the reference price. Trading venues shall adjust that calculation method to the specificities of each energy-related commodity derivative, the liquidity profile of the market for such derivative and its volatility profile. The trading venue shall inform the competent authority of the method without undue delay. 4. Trading venues shall renew the price boundaries at regular intervals during trading hours, based on the reference price. 5. Trading venues shall without undue delay make public the features of the intra-day volatility management mechanism they have put in place or whenever they have applied a modification. 6. Trading venues shall implement the intra-day volatility management mechanism either by integrating it into their existing circuit breakers already established in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU or as an additional mechanism. 7. Where a trading venue intends to modify the calculation method for the price boundaries applicable to a given energy-related commodity derivative, it shall inform the competent authority of the intended modifications without undue delay. 8. Where the information collected by the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) in accordance with Article 16(3) show that further consistency of implementation of the mechanism is needed to ensure more efficient management of excessive price volatility across the Union, the Commission may adopt implementing acts specifying the uniform principles for the implementation of the intra-day volatility management mechanism, taking into account the specificities of each energy-related commodity derivative, the liquidity profile of the market for such derivative and its volatility profile. In particular, in order to ensure the smooth operation of trading venues that offer trading in energy-related commodity derivatives, the Commission may specify the intervals at which the price boundaries will be renewed or the measures to be taken if trading moves outside those price boundaries including provisions to ensure the formation of reliable closing prices. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29.
Article 16 Role of competent authorities
1. Competent authorities shall supervise the implementation of the intra-day volatility management mechanisms. Competent authorities shall ensure that divergences in the implementation of the intra-day volatility management mechanisms by trading venues established in their Member States are duly justified by the specificities of the trading venues or energy-related commodity derivative concerned. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that trading venues implement appropriate preliminary mechanisms ensuring that excessive volatility in energy-related commodity derivatives markets is mitigated until the set-up of the intra-day volatility management mechanism as referred to in Article 15(1). 3. Competent authorities shall report to ESMA on the implementation of the intra-day volatility management mechanism by trading venues they supervise within three weeks from the date referred to in Article 15(1) and at least on a quarterly basis.
Article 17 Coordination role of ESMA
1. ESMA shall coordinate and monitor the implementation of the intra-day volatility management mechanisms on the basis of reports submitted to it by the competent authorities in accordance with Article 16(3). 2. ESMA shall document any divergences in the implementation of the intra-day volatility management mechanisms across jurisdictions in the Union based on the reports from competent authorities. By 30 June 2023, ESMA shall submit a report to the Commission evaluating the efficiency of the intra-day volatility management mechanisms. On the basis of that report, the Commission shall consider whether to submit a proposal for the amendment of this Regulation to the Council.
Article 18 Tasks and powers of ACER to carry out price assessments and benchmarks
1. As a matter of urgency, ACER shall produce and publish a daily LNG price assessment starting no later than 13 January 2023. For the purpose of the LNG price assessment, ACER shall systematically collect and process LNG market data on transactions. The price assessment shall where appropriate take into account regional differences and market conditions. 2. No later than 31 March 2023, ACER shall produce and publish a daily LNG benchmark determined by the spread between the daily LNG price assessment and the settlement price for the TTF Gas Futures front-month contract established by ICE Endex Markets B.V. on a daily basis. For the purposes of the LNG benchmark, ACER shall systematically collect and process all LNG market data. 3. By way of derogation from Article 3(4), point (b), of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, the market participant obligations and prohibitions of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 shall apply to LNG market participants. The powers conferred on ACER under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 shall also apply in relation to LNG market participants including the provisions on confidentiality.
Article 19 Publication of LNG price assessments and benchmark
1. The LNG price assessment shall be published daily, and by no later than 18.00 CET for the outright transaction price assessment. By 31 March 2023, in addition to the publication of the LNG price assessment, ACER shall also, on a daily basis, publish the LNG benchmark by no later than 19:00 CET or as soon as technically possible. 2. For the purposes of this Article, ACER may make use of the services of a third party.
Article 20 Provision of LNG market data to ACER
1. LNG market participants shall submit daily to ACER the LNG market data in accordance with the specifications set out in Article 21, in a standardised format, through a high-quality transmission protocol, and as close to real-time as technologically possible before the publication of the daily LNG price assessment (18:00 CET). 2. The Commission may adopt implementing acts specifying the point in time by which LNG market data is to be submitted before the daily publication of the LNG price assessment as referred to in paragraph 1. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29. 3. Where appropriate, ACER shall, after consulting the Commission, issue guidance on: (a) the details of the information to be reported, in addition to the current details of reportable transactions and fundamental data under Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014, including bids and offers; and (b) the procedure, standard and electronic format and the technical and organisational requirements for submitting data to be used for the provision of the required LNG market data. 4. LNG market participants shall submit the required LNG market data to ACER free of charge and through the reporting channels established by ACER, where possible using already existing and available procedures.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1 Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Since Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine, supplies of gas to the EU by Russia have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political weapon. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia had been less than 10% of the EU’s gas imports in the first half of 2023. Twelve Member States activated the first or second crisis level pursuant to the common EU classification, as foreseen by the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. This supply shock has had significant impacts on the price level and volatility of gas and electricity, on inflation, on the overall EU financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. The wholesale price in 2022 was on average more than five times higher than the pre-crisis level and even spiked above 300 €/MWh at the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. They remain to this date at markedly higher levels than in the pre-crisis period, with strong volatility. Companies, in particular energy-intensive industries, experienced loss of competitiveness, while citizens face reduced purchasing power. In this context, the Council adopted on 19 December 2022 the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 to enhance solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides a temporary legal basis in respect of: · better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II) ; · measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III), and ; · measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV). Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 aims at mitigating the impact on the price for gas by addressing demand and supply, ensuring security of supply across the entire European Union, and enhancing solidarity. It contains different elements designed to work, in a coherent manner, towards avoiding very high prices and reinforcing solidarity and security of supply. This proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 in view of the persisting risks for energy supplies in the Union. The Union’s response under REPowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to mitigating the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the supplies of gas, and its subsequent impacts on price levels, inflation, financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. However, global gas markets continue to be very tight and market balances are expected to remain precarious in the immediate future. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022, remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include a rebound in Asian LNG demand reducing the availability of gas on the global gas market; a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm; extreme weather potentially affecting the hydropower storage and nuclear production due to low water levels, and the subsequent increase in demand for gas fired power generation; further disruptions of critical infrastructures; and a deterioration of the geopolitical environment and threat landscape in supplying regions, for example with the crisis in the Middle East. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. 1.1.1. The m ain elements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (1) Demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and implemented, with the support of a service provider, the “AggregateEU” mechanism, which allows for aggregation of demand, organisation of tendering rounds vis à vis international gas suppliers and matching the demand with suppliers’ bids. The mechanism is open to participation, as buyers, of undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties. The Regulation provides for mandatory demand aggregation by laying down on Member States an obligation to require domestic undertakings to use the service provider to aggregate demand with sufficiently high volumes of gas. Volumes equivalent to at least 15 % of storage filling targets (around 13,5 billion cubic metres for the Union as a whole), are to be included by Member States’ undertakings in the demand aggregation process. To prevent that the objective of diversification from the gas supplied from the Russian Federation is put at risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides that participation of undertakings or other bodies controlled by Russian natural or legal persons or undertakings established in the Russian Federation is excluded. In addition, natural gas originating in the Russian Federation is excluded from the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through a list of entry points. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions aimed at ensuring a better coordination of gas purchases in the Union and energy solidarity among Member States. To achieve this, the Regulation seeks to provide the Commission with an overview of upcoming tenders or contracts related to the sale and purchase of gas. Accordingly, natural gas undertakings or undertakings consuming gas are required to send notifications to the Commission of any upcoming tenders or contracts of a volume above 5 TWh/year. The Commission then may issue recommendations to such undertakings in cases where such tenders or contracts may negatively impact the joint purchasing mechanism, market functioning, security of supply or solidarity. (2) Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 also enhances the efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals. Diversification of supply sources away from Russian gas has been changing the gas flow patterns in the EU. Therefore, the routes from LNG terminals to consumption centres have become more relevant than the formerly predominant East-West flows. However, such changes in gas flows have led to particularly high levels of congestion at interconnection points, notably in north-western Europe. To enhance the gas system’s responsiveness to congestion and improve the system’s flexibility, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions obliging TSOs to offer underutilised contracted firm capacity for all interconnectors, not only congested ones, either through (i) the implementation of a new monthly “use-it-or-lose-it” (UIOLI) procedure, or (ii) the extension of existing procedures with the same objective. Moreover, it has become of utmost importance to optimise the LNG absorption capacity of the EU LNG terminals and the usage of storage facilities. For this purpose, increased transparency was deemed necessary by market participants, similar to the level of transparency existing for the transport of gas via pipelines. Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) operates two main platforms covering all EU Member States as well as the United Kingdom and Ukraine: the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) for gas storage and the Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI) for LNG. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (Articles 12 and 13), new components were added to these platforms, including information on services offered and the conditions that apply to those services, contracted and available storage and LNG facility capacities, tariffs, etc. The platforms currently cover almost all EU large-scale LNG terminals and 98% of EU storage facilities. In addition to the EU-wide platforms, the individual storage and LNG operators were obliged to create more transparency around the possibilities to book secondary capacity. To this end, they were required to set up individual booking platforms. Greater transparency makes for a better and more comprehensive overview of the LNG and storage markets in the EU. It also results in more efficient use of these infrastructures and increases the potential to attract additional suppliers. (3) Action on the level of gas prices Development of a new complementary benchmark for LNG The EU’s LNG market is still consolidating. Hub indexed pricing remains influenced by pipeline supplies and by existing infrastructure bottlenecks, and therefore it does not always accurately reflect the price at which LNG is actually imported into the Union. Also, as Russian gas still represents a non-negligible – though decreasing – part of EU imports, increasingly concentrated in some areas, gas markets remain vulnerable to Russian gas supplies manipulation. There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are indispensable to replace the supply shortfalls caused by the likely halt of Russian gas imports. Regulation 2022/2576 has tasked the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (‘ACER’) to create within a short time frame an objective price assessment tool, and over time a benchmark, of the EU’s LNG imports by collecting real-time information on all daily transactions. ACER has developed such a benchmark, which provides more comprehensive information to buyers and increases price transparency. Regulation 2022/2576 granted ACER the necessary powers to collect the transaction data needed for the establishment of the LNG benchmark, building on and reinforcing the tasks and powers ACER already had under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (hereinafter together referred to as ‘REMIT’). (4) Action to reduce price volatility Intra-day price volatility management mechanism: Financial legislation (MiFID II) already requires a set of mechanisms to be set up by trading venues to contain significant volatility in financial markets, and ESMA has been working on ways to improve the functioning of circuit breakers across all asset classes, which will have a more permanent positive impact on trading of all asset classes, including energy derivatives. The just concluded MiFIR Review has also added the notion of emergency situation and given additional powers to ESMA on circuit breakers. Those changes are due to be transposed in national legislations by the second half of 2025. The intra-day volatility management mechanism set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 has been introduced so that trading venues set up mechanisms to prevent excessive movements of prices within a trading day, either through the adaptation of existing circuit breakers or through the creation of an additional mechanism. Large volatility spikes on gas and electricity markets make it difficult for energy firms to continue participating in those markets and meet their hedging needs while ensuring security of energy supply for the end-consumers. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 lays down a requirement for trading venues to establish a temporary intra-day volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in energy-related derivatives contracts within the same trading day. Trading venues can implement the intra-day volatility management mechanism either by integrating it into their existing circuit breakers already established in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU or as an additional mechanism. (5) Security of supply Extension of solidarity protection obligation to critical gas fired power plants Under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, a Member State where critical gas-fired power plants may play a key role for security of electricity supply, would have to curtail these power plants, to the possible detriment of the security of electricity supply of other Member States, before this Member State is allowed to request solidarity measures under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. To prevent such negative spill-over effects into electricity generation, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 allows Member States to trigger a solidarity request, under certain limits, if gas-fired power plants, that are needed to ensure the electricity system’s adequacy, are at risk of not being supplied with critical gas volumes. For the same reason, Member States providing solidarity will be entitled to ensure that the operation of their critical gas-fired power plants is not endangered when providing solidarity to another Member State. Default rules for bilateral solidarity Specific measures in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 introduced a default mechanism between the Member States to ensure they help each other to supply the “solidarity protected customers” (households and under certain conditions district heating and essential social services) and critical gas-fired power plants, in an emergency leading to very severe shortage of gas. The security of supply rules resulting from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 introduced the principle of such solidarity but its actual use in a crisis requires detailed legal, technical and financial arrangements which were supposed to be agreed bilaterally between Member States. However, only eight out of 40 required arrangements have been agreed so far. Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, therefore, spell out the rules and procedures that will automatically apply between Member States which have not agreed on bilateral solidarity arrangements. Solidarity has to be provided based on fair compensation pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. However, possible indirect costs resulting from judicial or arbitration proceedings after the curtailment of industry will remain to be limited to 100% of the price of gas. The reason is that the cost of compensation to industry resulting from curtailment is partially covered by the price of gas and, should a part remain from litigation, this part is highly uncertain and can largely exceed the costs of the gas. The uncertainty about indirect compensation costs therefore has proved to be a major obstacle for Member States to conclude bilateral solidarity agreements. However, Member States will still be able to agree on different compensation conditions. The current solidarity obligation, stemming from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, applies between the Member States that are directly connected or via a third country. This proposed prolongation will maintain the extension of this obligation to Member States with LNG facilities, which, even if not directly connected, could provide solidarity to a Member State in an emergency if endowed with the infrastructure necessary to receive this LNG. 1.1.2. The c urrent situation : severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply persist The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 , helped mitigate the consequences of the crisis and prepared the EU to a degraded security of gas supplies situation. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, in view of the general situation of gas supply to the Union 1 , the Commission concluded that the Regulation’s provisions have played an important role in stabilising the situation of the gas market and ensuring adequate gas supply to the Union, and that the Regulation is an important element of the EU gas security of supply tool kit . If not prolonged, the Regulation will cease to apply on 30 December 2023. However, as of the date of adoption of this proposal, severe difficulties in gas supplies to the Union persist. Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis. With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, and these unreliable imports may be further reduced or stopped. This figure would be approximately 110 bcm less than in 2021. Global gas markets remain very tight and are expected to remain as such for some time as only very limited new LNG liquefaction capacity globally is planned to be operational before 2026. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022 (when prices spiked above 300 EUR/MWh), remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. Over the previous decade, prices had moved within a band of EUR 5 MWh to EUR 35 MWh and averaged around EUR 20/MWh. In early autumn 2023 prices ranged between EUR 40 MWh and EUR 50 MWh. This level of prices still has inevitable repercussions on the EU citizens’ purchasing power and the competitiveness of European businesses. Market volatility is also a consequence of the market tightness and represents an additional risk for the EU economy. Summer and autumn 2023 saw a number of episodes of significant volatility when prices increased by more than 50% in few weeks. This shows that gas markets are still fragile and may have large reactions to any unexpected and sudden shock to supply and demand, as was the case following the strike in Australian LNG facilities, the Middle East crisis and the disruption of the Balticconnector. Under these conditions, the fear of scarcity may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include: a rebound in Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand that further reduces the availability of gas on the global gas market, a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm, extreme weather conditions potentially affecting hydropower storage or nuclear production which would require higher recourse to gas-fired power generation and/or trigger increased demand for gas, and further possible gas supply disruptions, including a complete halt of gas imports from Russia or a disruption of existing critical gas infrastructure. Furthermore, since the adoption of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the threat landscape has deteriorated. Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, in addition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Azerbaijan, Middle East). Recent examples illustrate the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to the disruption of critical gas infrastructure. In September 2022, the NordStream 1 pipeline was damaged by acts of sabotage to such a degree that it currently cannot transport any gas and will not be able to do so in the foreseeable future. In October 2023, the Balticconnector, an important pipeline connecting Finland to Estonia, was disrupted. The investigation is examining whether the damage was external and made by a vessel’s anchor. As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, Finland is now no longer able to meet the N-1 criterion as part of the infrastructure standard defined in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The N-1 criterion ensures that Member States take measures so that in case of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, they still have the technical capacity to satisfy their total demand during a peak day, As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, on 27 October 2023 Finland raised its crisis level pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 from “early warning” to “alert”, which is the last crisis level before an emergency. This new infrastructure incident illustrates the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to new disruptions of critical gas infrastructure. It should be also noted that the significant reduction in demand for natural gas (-18% between August 2022 and September 2023) is contributing to preserve the gas balance in the EU. This reduction is a result of economic factors (e.g. high prices) and administrative measures adopted by Member States pursuant to Regulation 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction and Regulation (EU) 2023/706 that prolonged it. A possible increase in demand, due to a rebound in the gas use in the residential, commercial and industrial sectors or in case the administrative measures aimed at reducing demand were not prolonged further, represents an additional risk that, given the current situation of tight global gas markets, could undermine EU’s security of gas supply. In three subsequent reports of December 2022 , February and July 2023 , the I nternational E nergy A gency (IEA) has consistently been highlighting the risks for the EU security of gas supply and warning against complacency in the light of the improvement of the situation compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. According to the report of February 2023 , “ g lobal gas supply is set to remain tight in 2023 and the global balance is subject to an unusually wide range of uncertainties and exogenous risk factors. This includes the possibility of complete cessation of Russian piped gas deliveries to the European Union, as well as a recovery of China’s LNG imports in line with the country’s long-term LNG contracts and a potential lower availability of LNG supply ” The IEA warned that “ the improved outlook should not be a distraction from the measures necessary (…) to mitigate the European Union’s exposure to the exogenous risks ” 2 . It developed stress scenario s w ith a halt to Russian gas supplies , LNG supplies remain ing tight and weather-related demand increases , which could result in a potential supply-demand gap of 40 bcm i n the EU . In its report of July 2023, the IEA highlighted that “ risks and uncertainties remain ahead of the 2023/24 Northern Hemisphere winter ” and “ full storage sites are no guarantee against winter volatility and the risk of renewed market tensions ” 3 . In addition, the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG) published its yearly Winter Supply Outlook with a summer overview, i n line with Art icle 8 of Regulation (EC) 715/2009. ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, additional measures may be needed in case of a full Russian supply disruption. In addition, careful management of the storages throughout the winter of 2023-2024 is needed, as a 46% filling level is likely needed at the beginning of the injection season to achieve the 90% storage target set out by Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 4 . In conclusion, in the light of the persisting severe difficulties and risks, the situation related to gas supplies, while improved compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022, remains fragile. The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to improve the situation. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. In the light of these persisting severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, and not to alter the current fragile balance, it is necessary and urgent to prolong Regulation (EU) 2022/2576. Hence, this Proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of Regulation 2022/2576 enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. The prolongation by one year is necessary and proportionate due to the persistent nature of the severe difficulties and the additional risks, and the uncertainty of the current situation which is expected to continue during the whole of 2024. 1.1.3. Reasons for prolonging the Regulation’s provisions in the current situation The different provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, which the current proposal seeks to prolong, are necessary to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, for the following reasons. Better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II – Section 1 and 2) In general, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases help to ensure more equal access for undertakings across Member States, especially those in landlocked countries or without direct access to international markets, to new or additional gas sources in urgent situations where solidarity is required. It can, in the spirit of solidarity, reduce the detrimental effect of outbidding, which is driving prices up and help in particular smaller undertakings to benefit from more advantageous purchasing conditions resulting from aggregated demand. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and launched, with the assistance of a service provider, the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under the name of “AggregateEU”. Member States and natural gas undertakings as well as undertakings consuming gas have effectively participated in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (“AggregateEU”) and contributed to achieve, by October 2023, a total aggregation of 44.04 bcm of demand for gas, which is equivalent to more than three times the mandatory amounts for demand aggregation. The matched volumes in the same period amounted to 34.77 bcm, corresponding to around 10% of EU consumption in 2022. This shows that "AggregateEU” attracted significant interest by market participants. The Commission also implemented supporting measures as mandated by the Regulation, including those on transparency and information exchange, governance of the EU Energy Platform and mandatory use of “AggregateEU”. Under the transparency and information exchange provisions of the Regulation, the Commission issued two recommendations by July 2023. In these instances, the Commission considered that further coordination with regards to tenders for the purchase of gas was needed, as it could improve the functioning of joint purchasing or prevent a negative impact on the internal market, on security of supply or on energy solidarity. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission concluded that the “AggregateEU” mechanism, based on the demand aggregation provisions of the Regulation, provided additional opportunities for European buyers (undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties) to procure gas from reliable suppliers at competitive conditions as well as market transparency on demand and supply, thereby contributing to decreasing volatility of markets. In view of the above, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply. The relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines (Chapter II – Section 3) The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 increasing the transparency around available capacities and services offered at LNG terminals and gas storage sites facilitated the increased influx of LNG into the Union and facilitated the accommodation of the altered gas flows. The situation has not changed since the adoption of the Regulation as the EU still needs to import large volumes of LNG to compensate for the Russian pipeline supply and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This is why enhanced transparency around LNG terminals and storage sites remains necessary. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 requires having use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms in place at all interconnection points in Europe, whereas this was only a requirement for certain interconnection points in the past. Such mechanisms enable the system to react to possible congestion resulting from changed gas flows in a swift and flexible manner. The measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III) Due to the difficulties to assess the accuracy of LNG prices prevailing in the marketplace, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 tasks the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to collect all the data on transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment and a daily LNG benchmark, determined as the spread between the LNG daily price assessment and the settlement price for the TTF futures front-month. On trading, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 includes a measure to manage excess volatility in gas and electricity derivatives markets, while preserving the price formation processes. The intra-day price spike collar aims at avoiding excessive price volatility and prevent extreme price spikes in prices on energy derivative market over a trading day. As concluded in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, since gas markets still feature episodes of significant volatility, the provisions in Chapter III –of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 may play a role in preventing excessive price spikes and in stabilising the market. The episodes of pronounced volatility observed in summer and autumn 2023 reinforce the conclusion that gas markets are still fragile and vulnerable to extreme price spikes. The intra-day volatility mechanism could remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV) Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 temporarily complemented the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, notably by making the solidarity mechanism applicable by default in absence of bilateral agreements, as well as by extending the solidarity mechanism to liquified natural gas (LNG) and critical gas volumes (CGV) for electricity. In addition, a provision was added to facilitate demand reduction by protected customers, as well as a provision to safeguard cross-border flows. In December 2022, the Commission carried out a joint solidarity ‘dry run’ exercise with EU Member States and ENTSOG, which tested the emergency rules and procedures, as well as the solidarity mechanism. In addition, the Commission circulated a questionnaire to the Gas Coordination Group to gather feedback on e.g. the provisions set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/1576. The outcomes of the ‘dry run’ exercise and the questionnaire are further detailed in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation 2022/2576. Based on the findings of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 and the new threat landscape, the Commission concludes that the concepts set out in Chapter IV remain essential to mitigate possible gas crises and reduce the collective costs of such a crisis, and for facilitating ongoing or future demand reduction efforts. In particular, the absence of bilateral agreements is a structural vulnerability that persists, meaning that a prolongation of default rules is necessary. Critical gas volumes for electricity generation too remain crucial to prevent that a potential gas crisis does not spread to the electricity system. The values for critical gas volumes in Annex I remain valid for the period of a prolonged application of the Regulation until the end of 2024. In addition, the supply landscape of the EU has changed significantly, with LNG being the main supply source in 2023. Solidarity should therefore still be extended to include Member States with LNG facilities, to reflect this changed reality. Lastly, the concepts of non-essential consumption of protected customers and the additional safeguards for cross-border flows in an emergency were assessed to be beneficial concepts for preventing and mitigating crises and therefore useful provisions to prolong. 
Revised version (Article 20 Provision of LNG market data to ACER):
1. LNG market participants shall submit daily to ACER the LNG market data in accordance with the specifications set out in Article 21, in a standardised format, through a high-quality transmission protocol, and as close to real-time as technologically possible before the publication of the daily LNG price assessment (18:00 CET). 2. The Commission may adopt implementing acts specifying the point in time by which LNG market data is to be submitted before the daily publication of the LNG price assessment as referred to in paragraph 1. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 29. 4. LNG market participants shall submit the required LNG market data to ACER free of charge and through the reporting channels established by ACER, where possible using already existing and available procedures.
Article 21 LNG market data quality
1. LNG market data shall include: (a) the parties to the contract, including buy/sell indicator; (b) the reporting party; (c) the transaction price; (d) the contract quantities; (e) the value of the contract; (f) the arrival window for the LNG cargo; (g) the terms of delivery; (h) the delivery points; (i) the timestamp information on all of the following: (i) the date and time of placing the bid or offer; (ii) the transaction date and time; (iii) the date and time of reporting of the bid, offer or transaction; (iv) the receipt of LNG market data by ACER. 2. LNG market participants shall provide ACER with LNG market data in the following units and currencies: (a) transaction, bid and offer unit prices shall be reported in the currency specified in the contract and in EUR/MWh and shall include applied conversion and exchange rates if applicable; (b) contract quantities shall be reported in the units specified in the contracts and in MWh; (c) arrival windows shall be reported in terms of delivery dates expressed in UTC format; (d) delivery point shall indicate a valid identifier listed by ACER such as referred to in the list of LNG facilities subject to reporting pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014; the timestamp information shall be reported in UTC format; (e) if relevant, the price formula in the long-term contract from which the price is derived shall be reported in its integrity. 3. ACER shall issue guidance regarding the criteria under which a single submitter accounts for a significant portion of LNG market data submitted within a certain reference period and how this situation shall be addressed in its daily LNG price assessment and LNG benchmarks.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1 Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Since Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine, supplies of gas to the EU by Russia have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political weapon. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia had been less than 10% of the EU’s gas imports in the first half of 2023. Twelve Member States activated the first or second crisis level pursuant to the common EU classification, as foreseen by the Gas Security of Supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. This supply shock has had significant impacts on the price level and volatility of gas and electricity, on inflation, on the overall EU financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. The wholesale price in 2022 was on average more than five times higher than the pre-crisis level and even spiked above 300 €/MWh at the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. They remain to this date at markedly higher levels than in the pre-crisis period, with strong volatility. Companies, in particular energy-intensive industries, experienced loss of competitiveness, while citizens face reduced purchasing power. In this context, the Council adopted on 19 December 2022 the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 to enhance solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides a temporary legal basis in respect of: · better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II) ; · measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III), and ; · measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV). Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 aims at mitigating the impact on the price for gas by addressing demand and supply, ensuring security of supply across the entire European Union, and enhancing solidarity. It contains different elements designed to work, in a coherent manner, towards avoiding very high prices and reinforcing solidarity and security of supply. This proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 in view of the persisting risks for energy supplies in the Union. The Union’s response under REPowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to mitigating the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the supplies of gas, and its subsequent impacts on price levels, inflation, financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens. However, global gas markets continue to be very tight and market balances are expected to remain precarious in the immediate future. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022, remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include a rebound in Asian LNG demand reducing the availability of gas on the global gas market; a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm; extreme weather potentially affecting the hydropower storage and nuclear production due to low water levels, and the subsequent increase in demand for gas fired power generation; further disruptions of critical infrastructures; and a deterioration of the geopolitical environment and threat landscape in supplying regions, for example with the crisis in the Middle East. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. 1.1.1. The m ain elements of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (1) Demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and implemented, with the support of a service provider, the “AggregateEU” mechanism, which allows for aggregation of demand, organisation of tendering rounds vis à vis international gas suppliers and matching the demand with suppliers’ bids. The mechanism is open to participation, as buyers, of undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties. The Regulation provides for mandatory demand aggregation by laying down on Member States an obligation to require domestic undertakings to use the service provider to aggregate demand with sufficiently high volumes of gas. Volumes equivalent to at least 15 % of storage filling targets (around 13,5 billion cubic metres for the Union as a whole), are to be included by Member States’ undertakings in the demand aggregation process. To prevent that the objective of diversification from the gas supplied from the Russian Federation is put at risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides that participation of undertakings or other bodies controlled by Russian natural or legal persons or undertakings established in the Russian Federation is excluded. In addition, natural gas originating in the Russian Federation is excluded from the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through a list of entry points. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions aimed at ensuring a better coordination of gas purchases in the Union and energy solidarity among Member States. To achieve this, the Regulation seeks to provide the Commission with an overview of upcoming tenders or contracts related to the sale and purchase of gas. Accordingly, natural gas undertakings or undertakings consuming gas are required to send notifications to the Commission of any upcoming tenders or contracts of a volume above 5 TWh/year. The Commission then may issue recommendations to such undertakings in cases where such tenders or contracts may negatively impact the joint purchasing mechanism, market functioning, security of supply or solidarity. (2) Efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 also enhances the efficient operation of pipelines and LNG terminals. Diversification of supply sources away from Russian gas has been changing the gas flow patterns in the EU. Therefore, the routes from LNG terminals to consumption centres have become more relevant than the formerly predominant East-West flows. However, such changes in gas flows have led to particularly high levels of congestion at interconnection points, notably in north-western Europe. To enhance the gas system’s responsiveness to congestion and improve the system’s flexibility, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 contains provisions obliging TSOs to offer underutilised contracted firm capacity for all interconnectors, not only congested ones, either through (i) the implementation of a new monthly “use-it-or-lose-it” (UIOLI) procedure, or (ii) the extension of existing procedures with the same objective. Moreover, it has become of utmost importance to optimise the LNG absorption capacity of the EU LNG terminals and the usage of storage facilities. For this purpose, increased transparency was deemed necessary by market participants, similar to the level of transparency existing for the transport of gas via pipelines. Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) operates two main platforms covering all EU Member States as well as the United Kingdom and Ukraine: the Aggregated Gas Storage Inventory (AGSI) for gas storage and the Aggregated LNG Storage Inventory (ALSI) for LNG. Following the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (Articles 12 and 13), new components were added to these platforms, including information on services offered and the conditions that apply to those services, contracted and available storage and LNG facility capacities, tariffs, etc. The platforms currently cover almost all EU large-scale LNG terminals and 98% of EU storage facilities. In addition to the EU-wide platforms, the individual storage and LNG operators were obliged to create more transparency around the possibilities to book secondary capacity. To this end, they were required to set up individual booking platforms. Greater transparency makes for a better and more comprehensive overview of the LNG and storage markets in the EU. It also results in more efficient use of these infrastructures and increases the potential to attract additional suppliers. (3) Action on the level of gas prices Development of a new complementary benchmark for LNG The EU’s LNG market is still consolidating. Hub indexed pricing remains influenced by pipeline supplies and by existing infrastructure bottlenecks, and therefore it does not always accurately reflect the price at which LNG is actually imported into the Union. Also, as Russian gas still represents a non-negligible – though decreasing – part of EU imports, increasingly concentrated in some areas, gas markets remain vulnerable to Russian gas supplies manipulation. There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are indispensable to replace the supply shortfalls caused by the likely halt of Russian gas imports. Regulation 2022/2576 has tasked the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (‘ACER’) to create within a short time frame an objective price assessment tool, and over time a benchmark, of the EU’s LNG imports by collecting real-time information on all daily transactions. ACER has developed such a benchmark, which provides more comprehensive information to buyers and increases price transparency. Regulation 2022/2576 granted ACER the necessary powers to collect the transaction data needed for the establishment of the LNG benchmark, building on and reinforcing the tasks and powers ACER already had under Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (hereinafter together referred to as ‘REMIT’). (4) Action to reduce price volatility Intra-day price volatility management mechanism: Financial legislation (MiFID II) already requires a set of mechanisms to be set up by trading venues to contain significant volatility in financial markets, and ESMA has been working on ways to improve the functioning of circuit breakers across all asset classes, which will have a more permanent positive impact on trading of all asset classes, including energy derivatives. The just concluded MiFIR Review has also added the notion of emergency situation and given additional powers to ESMA on circuit breakers. Those changes are due to be transposed in national legislations by the second half of 2025. The intra-day volatility management mechanism set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 has been introduced so that trading venues set up mechanisms to prevent excessive movements of prices within a trading day, either through the adaptation of existing circuit breakers or through the creation of an additional mechanism. Large volatility spikes on gas and electricity markets make it difficult for energy firms to continue participating in those markets and meet their hedging needs while ensuring security of energy supply for the end-consumers. Therefore, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 lays down a requirement for trading venues to establish a temporary intra-day volatility management mechanism aimed at limiting large price movements in energy-related derivatives contracts within the same trading day. Trading venues can implement the intra-day volatility management mechanism either by integrating it into their existing circuit breakers already established in accordance with Directive 2014/65/EU or as an additional mechanism. (5) Security of supply Extension of solidarity protection obligation to critical gas fired power plants Under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, a Member State where critical gas-fired power plants may play a key role for security of electricity supply, would have to curtail these power plants, to the possible detriment of the security of electricity supply of other Member States, before this Member State is allowed to request solidarity measures under Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. To prevent such negative spill-over effects into electricity generation, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 allows Member States to trigger a solidarity request, under certain limits, if gas-fired power plants, that are needed to ensure the electricity system’s adequacy, are at risk of not being supplied with critical gas volumes. For the same reason, Member States providing solidarity will be entitled to ensure that the operation of their critical gas-fired power plants is not endangered when providing solidarity to another Member State. Default rules for bilateral solidarity Specific measures in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 introduced a default mechanism between the Member States to ensure they help each other to supply the “solidarity protected customers” (households and under certain conditions district heating and essential social services) and critical gas-fired power plants, in an emergency leading to very severe shortage of gas. The security of supply rules resulting from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 introduced the principle of such solidarity but its actual use in a crisis requires detailed legal, technical and financial arrangements which were supposed to be agreed bilaterally between Member States. However, only eight out of 40 required arrangements have been agreed so far. Articles 27 and 28 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, therefore, spell out the rules and procedures that will automatically apply between Member States which have not agreed on bilateral solidarity arrangements. Solidarity has to be provided based on fair compensation pursuant to Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. However, possible indirect costs resulting from judicial or arbitration proceedings after the curtailment of industry will remain to be limited to 100% of the price of gas. The reason is that the cost of compensation to industry resulting from curtailment is partially covered by the price of gas and, should a part remain from litigation, this part is highly uncertain and can largely exceed the costs of the gas. The uncertainty about indirect compensation costs therefore has proved to be a major obstacle for Member States to conclude bilateral solidarity agreements. However, Member States will still be able to agree on different compensation conditions. The current solidarity obligation, stemming from Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, applies between the Member States that are directly connected or via a third country. This proposed prolongation will maintain the extension of this obligation to Member States with LNG facilities, which, even if not directly connected, could provide solidarity to a Member State in an emergency if endowed with the infrastructure necessary to receive this LNG. 1.1.2. The c urrent situation : severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply persist The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 , helped mitigate the consequences of the crisis and prepared the EU to a degraded security of gas supplies situation. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, in view of the general situation of gas supply to the Union 1 , the Commission concluded that the Regulation’s provisions have played an important role in stabilising the situation of the gas market and ensuring adequate gas supply to the Union, and that the Regulation is an important element of the EU gas security of supply tool kit . If not prolonged, the Regulation will cease to apply on 30 December 2023. However, as of the date of adoption of this proposal, severe difficulties in gas supplies to the Union persist. Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis. With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, and these unreliable imports may be further reduced or stopped. This figure would be approximately 110 bcm less than in 2021. Global gas markets remain very tight and are expected to remain as such for some time as only very limited new LNG liquefaction capacity globally is planned to be operational before 2026. This situation has negative consequences on gas prices which, despite being lower than the peak experienced in summer 2022 (when prices spiked above 300 EUR/MWh), remain more than twice as high than pre-crisis levels. Over the previous decade, prices had moved within a band of EUR 5 MWh to EUR 35 MWh and averaged around EUR 20/MWh. In early autumn 2023 prices ranged between EUR 40 MWh and EUR 50 MWh. This level of prices still has inevitable repercussions on the EU citizens’ purchasing power and the competitiveness of European businesses. Market volatility is also a consequence of the market tightness and represents an additional risk for the EU economy. Summer and autumn 2023 saw a number of episodes of significant volatility when prices increased by more than 50% in few weeks. This shows that gas markets are still fragile and may have large reactions to any unexpected and sudden shock to supply and demand, as was the case following the strike in Australian LNG facilities, the Middle East crisis and the disruption of the Balticconnector. Under these conditions, the fear of scarcity may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. A number of risks can, if they materialise, fuel the fear of scarcity which, given the fragility of the market due to its tightness, may trigger large reactions with serious repercussions on prices. These risks include: a rebound in Asian liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand that further reduces the availability of gas on the global gas market, a cold winter which could lead to an increase of gas demand of up to 30 bcm, extreme weather conditions potentially affecting hydropower storage or nuclear production which would require higher recourse to gas-fired power generation and/or trigger increased demand for gas, and further possible gas supply disruptions, including a complete halt of gas imports from Russia or a disruption of existing critical gas infrastructure. Furthermore, since the adoption of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the threat landscape has deteriorated. Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, in addition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine (Azerbaijan, Middle East). Recent examples illustrate the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to the disruption of critical gas infrastructure. In September 2022, the NordStream 1 pipeline was damaged by acts of sabotage to such a degree that it currently cannot transport any gas and will not be able to do so in the foreseeable future. In October 2023, the Balticconnector, an important pipeline connecting Finland to Estonia, was disrupted. The investigation is examining whether the damage was external and made by a vessel’s anchor. As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, Finland is now no longer able to meet the N-1 criterion as part of the infrastructure standard defined in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The N-1 criterion ensures that Member States take measures so that in case of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, they still have the technical capacity to satisfy their total demand during a peak day, As a result of the Balticconnector disruption, on 27 October 2023 Finland raised its crisis level pursuant to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 from “early warning” to “alert”, which is the last crisis level before an emergency. This new infrastructure incident illustrates the likelihood and relevance of the risks related to new disruptions of critical gas infrastructure. It should be also noted that the significant reduction in demand for natural gas (-18% between August 2022 and September 2023) is contributing to preserve the gas balance in the EU. This reduction is a result of economic factors (e.g. high prices) and administrative measures adopted by Member States pursuant to Regulation 2022/1369 on coordinated gas demand reduction and Regulation (EU) 2023/706 that prolonged it. A possible increase in demand, due to a rebound in the gas use in the residential, commercial and industrial sectors or in case the administrative measures aimed at reducing demand were not prolonged further, represents an additional risk that, given the current situation of tight global gas markets, could undermine EU’s security of gas supply. In three subsequent reports of December 2022 , February and July 2023 , the I nternational E nergy A gency (IEA) has consistently been highlighting the risks for the EU security of gas supply and warning against complacency in the light of the improvement of the situation compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022. According to the report of February 2023 , “ g lobal gas supply is set to remain tight in 2023 and the global balance is subject to an unusually wide range of uncertainties and exogenous risk factors. This includes the possibility of complete cessation of Russian piped gas deliveries to the European Union, as well as a recovery of China’s LNG imports in line with the country’s long-term LNG contracts and a potential lower availability of LNG supply ” The IEA warned that “ the improved outlook should not be a distraction from the measures necessary (…) to mitigate the European Union’s exposure to the exogenous risks ” 2 . It developed stress scenario s w ith a halt to Russian gas supplies , LNG supplies remain ing tight and weather-related demand increases , which could result in a potential supply-demand gap of 40 bcm i n the EU . In its report of July 2023, the IEA highlighted that “ risks and uncertainties remain ahead of the 2023/24 Northern Hemisphere winter ” and “ full storage sites are no guarantee against winter volatility and the risk of renewed market tensions ” 3 . In addition, the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOG) published its yearly Winter Supply Outlook with a summer overview, i n line with Art icle 8 of Regulation (EC) 715/2009. ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, additional measures may be needed in case of a full Russian supply disruption. In addition, careful management of the storages throughout the winter of 2023-2024 is needed, as a 46% filling level is likely needed at the beginning of the injection season to achieve the 90% storage target set out by Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 4 . In conclusion, in the light of the persisting severe difficulties and risks, the situation related to gas supplies, while improved compared to the peak of the crisis in summer 2022, remains fragile. The Union’s response under RepowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, contributed to improve the situation. Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports. In the light of these persisting severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, and not to alter the current fragile balance, it is necessary and urgent to prolong Regulation (EU) 2022/2576. Hence, this Proposal seeks to prolong by one year the period of application of Regulation 2022/2576 enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, reliable price benchmarks and exchanges of gas across borders. The prolongation by one year is necessary and proportionate due to the persistent nature of the severe difficulties and the additional risks, and the uncertainty of the current situation which is expected to continue during the whole of 2024. 1.1.3. Reasons for prolonging the Regulation’s provisions in the current situation The different provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, which the current proposal seeks to prolong, are necessary to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply, for the following reasons. Better coordination of gas purchases (Chapter II – Section 1 and 2) In general, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases help to ensure more equal access for undertakings across Member States, especially those in landlocked countries or without direct access to international markets, to new or additional gas sources in urgent situations where solidarity is required. It can, in the spirit of solidarity, reduce the detrimental effect of outbidding, which is driving prices up and help in particular smaller undertakings to benefit from more advantageous purchasing conditions resulting from aggregated demand. Pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission designed and launched, with the assistance of a service provider, the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under the name of “AggregateEU”. Member States and natural gas undertakings as well as undertakings consuming gas have effectively participated in the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 (“AggregateEU”) and contributed to achieve, by October 2023, a total aggregation of 44.04 bcm of demand for gas, which is equivalent to more than three times the mandatory amounts for demand aggregation. The matched volumes in the same period amounted to 34.77 bcm, corresponding to around 10% of EU consumption in 2022. This shows that "AggregateEU” attracted significant interest by market participants. The Commission also implemented supporting measures as mandated by the Regulation, including those on transparency and information exchange, governance of the EU Energy Platform and mandatory use of “AggregateEU”. Under the transparency and information exchange provisions of the Regulation, the Commission issued two recommendations by July 2023. In these instances, the Commission considered that further coordination with regards to tenders for the purchase of gas was needed, as it could improve the functioning of joint purchasing or prevent a negative impact on the internal market, on security of supply or on energy solidarity. In the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the Commission concluded that the “AggregateEU” mechanism, based on the demand aggregation provisions of the Regulation, provided additional opportunities for European buyers (undertakings established in the EU and in the Energy Community Contracting Parties) to procure gas from reliable suppliers at competitive conditions as well as market transparency on demand and supply, thereby contributing to decreasing volatility of markets. In view of the above, demand aggregation and better coordination of gas purchases remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply. The relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines (Chapter II – Section 3) The provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 increasing the transparency around available capacities and services offered at LNG terminals and gas storage sites facilitated the increased influx of LNG into the Union and facilitated the accommodation of the altered gas flows. The situation has not changed since the adoption of the Regulation as the EU still needs to import large volumes of LNG to compensate for the Russian pipeline supply and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This is why enhanced transparency around LNG terminals and storage sites remains necessary. Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 requires having use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms in place at all interconnection points in Europe, whereas this was only a requirement for certain interconnection points in the past. Such mechanisms enable the system to react to possible congestion resulting from changed gas flows in a swift and flexible manner. The measures to enhance the use of LNG facilities, gas storage facilities and pipelines remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures to prevent excessive gas prices and excessive intra-day volatility in energy derivatives markets (Chapter III) Due to the difficulties to assess the accuracy of LNG prices prevailing in the marketplace, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 tasks the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to collect all the data on transactions pertaining to LNG deliveries to the Union necessary to establish a daily LNG price assessment and a daily LNG benchmark, determined as the spread between the LNG daily price assessment and the settlement price for the TTF futures front-month. On trading, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 includes a measure to manage excess volatility in gas and electricity derivatives markets, while preserving the price formation processes. The intra-day price spike collar aims at avoiding excessive price volatility and prevent extreme price spikes in prices on energy derivative market over a trading day. As concluded in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, since gas markets still feature episodes of significant volatility, the provisions in Chapter III –of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 may play a role in preventing excessive price spikes and in stabilising the market. The episodes of pronounced volatility observed in summer and autumn 2023 reinforce the conclusion that gas markets are still fragile and vulnerable to extreme price spikes. The intra-day volatility mechanism could remain a valuable tool to address the above-mentioned severe difficulties and risks for the EU’s security of gas supply and the relevant provisions should therefore be prolonged by one year. Measures for the case of a gas emergency (Chapter IV) Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 temporarily complemented the Gas Security of Supply Regulation, notably by making the solidarity mechanism applicable by default in absence of bilateral agreements, as well as by extending the solidarity mechanism to liquified natural gas (LNG) and critical gas volumes (CGV) for electricity. In addition, a provision was added to facilitate demand reduction by protected customers, as well as a provision to safeguard cross-border flows. In December 2022, the Commission carried out a joint solidarity ‘dry run’ exercise with EU Member States and ENTSOG, which tested the emergency rules and procedures, as well as the solidarity mechanism. In addition, the Commission circulated a questionnaire to the Gas Coordination Group to gather feedback on e.g. the provisions set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/1576. The outcomes of the ‘dry run’ exercise and the questionnaire are further detailed in the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation 2022/2576. Based on the findings of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 and the new threat landscape, the Commission concludes that the concepts set out in Chapter IV remain essential to mitigate possible gas crises and reduce the collective costs of such a crisis, and for facilitating ongoing or future demand reduction efforts. In particular, the absence of bilateral agreements is a structural vulnerability that persists, meaning that a prolongation of default rules is necessary. Critical gas volumes for electricity generation too remain crucial to prevent that a potential gas crisis does not spread to the electricity system. The values for critical gas volumes in Annex I remain valid for the period of a prolonged application of the Regulation until the end of 2024. In addition, the supply landscape of the EU has changed significantly, with LNG being the main supply source in 2023. Solidarity should therefore still be extended to include Member States with LNG facilities, to reflect this changed reality. Lastly, the concepts of non-essential consumption of protected customers and the additional safeguards for cross-border flows in an emergency were assessed to be beneficial concepts for preventing and mitigating crises and therefore useful provisions to prolong. 
Revised version (Article 21 LNG market data quality):
3. ACER shall issue guidance regarding the criteria under which a single submitter accounts for a significant portion of LNG market data submitted within a certain reference period and how this situation shall be addressed in its daily LNG price assessment and LNG benchmarks.
Article 22 Business continuity
ACER shall regularly review, update and publish its LNG reference price assessment and LNG benchmark methodology as well as the methodology used for LNG market data reporting and the publication of its LNG price assessments and LNG benchmarks, taking into account the views of LNG market data contributors.