Article 81 
1. Member States shall allow investment companies and, for each of the common funds they manage, management companies, to provide key investor information in a durable medium or by means of a website. A paper copy shall be delivered to the investor on request and free of charge. In addition, an up-to-date version of the key investor information shall be made available on the website of the investment company or management company. 2. The Commission may adopt, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112(2), (3) and (4), and subject to the conditions of Articles 112a and 112b, measures which define the specific conditions which need to be met when providing key investor information in a durable medium other than on paper or by means of a website which does not constitute a durable medium.
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).
Revised version (Article 81 ):
1. Member States shall allow investment companies and, for each of the common funds they manage, management companies, to provide key investor information in a durable medium or by means of a website. A paper copy shall be delivered to the investor on request and free of charge. In addition, an up-to-date version of the key investor information shall be made available on the website of the investment company or management company. 2. The Commission may adopt, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112a , measures which define the specific conditions which need to be met when providing key investor information in a durable medium other than on paper or by means of a website which does not constitute a durable medium.
Article 82 
1. UCITS shall send their key investor information and any amendments thereto, to the competent authorities of their home Member State. 2. The essential elements of key investor information shall be kept up to date.
Article 83 
1. The following shall not borrow: (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund. A UCITS may, however, acquire foreign currency by means of a ‘back-to-back’ loan. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a Member State may authorise a UCITS to borrow provided that such borrowing is: (a) on a temporary basis and represents: — in the case of an investment company, no more than 10 % of its assets, or — in the case of a common fund, no more than 10 % of the value of the fund; or (a) on a temporary basis and represents: — in the case of an investment company, no more than 10 % of its assets, or — in the case of a common fund, no more than 10 % of the value of the fund; or (b) to enable the acquisition of immovable property essential for the direct pursuit of its business and represents, in the case of an investment company, no more than 10 % of its assets. Where a UCITS is authorised to borrow under points (a) and (b), such borrowing shall not exceed 15 % of its assets in total. 3. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Article, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the requirements of this Article relating to borrowing. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 83 ):
1. The following shall not borrow: (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund. A UCITS may, however, acquire foreign currency by means of a ‘back-to-back’ loan. The following shall not borrow: (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund. A UCITS may, however, acquire foreign currency by means of a ‘back-to-back’ loan. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a Member State may authorise a UCITS to borrow provided that such borrowing is: (a) on a temporary basis and represents: — in the case of an investment company, no more than 10 % of its assets, or — in the case of a common fund, no more than 10 % of the value of the fund; or on a temporary basis and represents: — in the case of an investment company, no more than 10 % of its assets, or — in the case of a common fund, no more than 10 % of the value of the fund; or (b) to enable the acquisition of immovable property essential for the direct pursuit of its business and represents, in the case of an investment company, no more than 10 % of its assets. Where a UCITS is authorised to borrow under points (a) and (b), such borrowing shall not exceed 15 % of its assets in total. 3. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Article, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the requirements of this Article relating to borrowing. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Article, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the requirements of this Article relating to borrowing. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 84 
1. A UCITS shall repurchase or redeem its units at the request of any unit-holder. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1: (a) a UCITS may, in accordance with the applicable national law, the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation of the investment company, temporarily suspend the repurchase or redemption of its units; (b) a UCITS home Member State may allow its competent authorities to require the suspension of the repurchase or redemption of units in the interest of the unit-holders or of the public. The temporary suspension referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph shall be provided for only in exceptional cases where circumstances so require and where suspension is justified having regard to the interests of the unit-holders. 3. In the event of a temporary suspension under paragraph 2(a), a UCITS shall, without delay, communicate its decision to its home Member State competent authorities and to the competent authorities of all Member States in which it markets its units. 4. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Article, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions which need to be met by the UCITS after the adoption of the temporary suspension of the re-purchase or redemption of the units of the UCITS as referred to in paragraph 2(a), once the suspension has been decided. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 84 ):
1. A UCITS shall repurchase or redeem its units at the request of any unit-holder. By way of derogation from paragraph 1: (a) a UCITS may, in accordance with the applicable national law, the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation of the investment company, temporarily suspend the repurchase or redemption of its units; (b) a UCITS home Member State may allow its competent authorities to require the suspension of the repurchase or redemption of units in the interest of the unit-holders or of the public. The temporary suspension referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph shall be provided for only in exceptional cases where circumstances so require and where suspension is justified having regard to the interests of the unit-holders. 3. In the event of a temporary suspension under paragraph 2(a), a UCITS shall, without delay, communicate its decision to its home Member State competent authorities and to the competent authorities of all Member States in which it markets its units. 4. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Article, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions which need to be met by the UCITS after the adoption of the temporary suspension of the re-purchase or redemption of the units of the UCITS as referred to in paragraph 2(a), once the suspension has been decided. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Article, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions which need to be met by the UCITS after the adoption of the temporary suspension of the re-purchase or redemption of the units of the UCITS as referred to in paragraph 2(a), once the suspension has been decided. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 85 
The rules for the valuation of assets and the rules for calculating the sale or issue price and the repurchase or redemption price of the units of a UCITS shall be laid down in the applicable national law, in the fund rules or in the instruments of incorporation of the investment company.
Article 86 
The distribution or reinvestment of the income of a UCITS shall be effected in accordance with the law and with the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation of the investment company.
Article 87 
A UCITS unit shall not be issued unless the equivalent of the net issue price is paid into the assets of the UCITS within the usual time limits. This shall not preclude the distribution of bonus units.
Article 88 
1. Without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51, the following shall not grant loans or act as a guarantor on behalf of third parties: (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the undertakings referred to therein from acquiring transferable securities, money market instruments or other financial instruments referred to in points (e), (g) and (h) of Article 50(1) which are not fully paid.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 88 ):
1. Without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51, the following shall not grant loans or act as a guarantor on behalf of third parties: (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund. Without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51, the following shall not grant loans or act as a guarantor on behalf of third parties: (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the undertakings referred to therein from acquiring transferable securities, money market instruments or other financial instruments referred to in points (e), (g) and (h) of Article 50(1) which are not fully paid.
Article 89 
The following shall not carry out uncovered sales of transferable securities, money market instruments or other financial instruments referred to in points (e), (g) and (h) of Article 50(1): (a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’) together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal and a proposal f or a regulation on facilitating the cross-border distribution of collective investment funds, which also amends Regulations (No) 345/2013 1 and 346/2013 2 , as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal for an enabling frame work on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP)for businesses , a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. This proposal amends certain provisions in Directive 2009/65/EC 3 and Directive 2011/61/EU 4 with the purpose of reducing regulatory barriers to the cross-border distribution of investment funds in the EU. These new measures are expected to reduce the cost for fund managers of going cross-border and should support more cross-border marketing of investment funds. Increased competition in the EU will help to give investors more choice and better value. This proposal was scheduled in the Commission Work Program me 2018 5 and should be seen in the broader context of the CMU action plan 6 and the CMU Mid-Term Review 7 , to establish a genuine internal capital market by addressing fragmentation in the capital markets, removing regulatory barriers to the financing of the economy and increasing the supply of capital to businesses. Regulatory barriers, namely Member States’ marketing requirements, regulatory fees and administrative and notification requirements represent a significant disincentive to the cross-border distri bution of funds. These barriers were identified in response to the Green Paper on Capital Markets Union 8 , the Call for Evidence on the EU regulatory framework for financial services 9 and the public consultation on barriers to the cross-border distribution of investment funds 10 . Investment funds are investment products created with the sole purpose of pooling investors’ capital and investing that capital collectively through a portfolio of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds and other securities. In the EU, investment funds can be categorised as undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and alternative investment funds (AIFs) managed by alternative investment fund managers. UCITS are covered by Directive 2009/65/EC and AIFs are covered by Directive 2011/61/EU. Directive 2011/61/EU is complemented by four fund frameworks: · Regulation (No) 345/2013 on European venture capital funds, · Regulation (No) 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds, · Regulation 2015/460 11 on European long-term investment funds and · Regulation 2017/1131 12 on money market funds. The shared purpose of these rules is notably to make cross-border distribution easier while ensuring a high level of investor protection. Rules for EU investment fun ds allow fund managers to distribute and, with some exceptions, also to manage their funds across the EU . While EU investment funds have seen rapid growth, with a total of EUR 14 310 billion in assets under management in June 2017 13 , the EU investment fund market is still predominantly organised as a national market : 70 % of all assets under management are held by investment funds registered for sale only in their domestic market 14 . Only 37 % of UCITS and about 3 % of AIFs are registered for sale in more than three Member States. Compared to the United States, the EU market is smaller in terms of assets under management. However, there are considerably more funds in the EU (58 125 in the EU compared to 15 415 in the US) 15 . This means EU funds are on average sig nificantly smaller . This has a negative impact on economies of scale, the fees paid by investors and the way in which the internal market operates for investment funds. This proposal also recognizes that there are other factors outside the scope of this proposal which hold back the cross-border distribution of investment funds in the EU. These factors include national tax regimes applicable to investment funds and investors, vertical distribution channels and cultural preferences for domestic investment products. 
Revised version (Article 89 ):
(a) an investment company; (b) a management company or depositary acting on behalf of a common fund.
Article 90 
The law of the UCITS home Member State or the fund rules shall prescribe the remuneration and the expenditure which a management company is empowered to charge to a common fund and the method of calculation of such remuneration. The law or the instruments of incorporation of an investment company shall prescribe the nature of the cost to be borne by the company.
Article 91 
1. UCITS host Member States shall ensure that UCITS are able to market their units within their territories upon notification in accordance with Article 93. 2. UCITS host Member States shall not impose any additional requirements or administrative procedures on UCITS as referred to in paragraph 1 in respect of the field governed by this Directive. 3. Member States shall ensure that complete information on the laws, regulations and administrative provisions which do not fall within the field governed by this Directive and which are specifically relevant to the arrangements made for the marketing of units of UCITS, established in another Member State within their territories, is easily accessible from a distance and by electronic means. Member States shall ensure that that information is available in a language customary in the sphere of international finance, is provided in a clear and unambiguous manner and is kept up to date. 4. For the purposes of this Chapter, a UCITS shall include investment compartments thereof.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL · Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal is part of a package of measures to further enable and support the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition while mitigating the risks. It is in line with the Commission priorities to make Europe fit for the digital age and to build a future-ready economy that works for the people. The digital finance package includes a new Strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector 1 with the aim to ensure that the EU embraces the digital revolution and drives it with innovative European firms in the lead, making the benefits of digital finance available to European consumers and businesses. In addition to this proposal, the package also includes a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets 2 , a proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) 3 and a proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector 4 . The reasons for, and objectives of, the two sets of legislative measures have been set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for distributed ledger technology market infrastructures, proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets and proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience, respectively, and apply here as well. The particular reasons for this proposal for a directive is that, in order to provide legal certainty as regards crypto assets and achieve the objectives of strengthening digital operational resilience, it is necessary to establish a temporary exemption for multilateral trading facilities and amend or clarify certain provisions in existing EU financial services directives. · Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area This proposal, similar to the proposals for regulation it accompanies, is part of a broader ongoing work at European and international level aimed at (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial services and address broader operational risks, and (ii) providing a clear, proportionate and enabling EU legal framework for crypto-asset service providers. · Consistency with other Union policies As stated by President von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, 5 and set-out in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’, 6 it is crucial for Europe to reap all the benefits of the digital age and to strengthen its industry and innovation capacity, within safe and ethical boundaries. As regards crypto assets, this proposal is closely linked with wider Commission policies on blockchain technology, as crypto-assets, as the main application of blockchain technologies, are inextricably linked to the promotion of blockchain technology throughout Europe. As regards operational resilience, the European strategy for data 7 sets out four pillars - data protection, fundamental rights, safety and cyber-security - as essential pre-requisites for a society empowered by the use of data. A legislative framework strengthening the digital operational resilience of the Union’s financial entities is consistent with these policy objectives. The proposal would also support policies aimed at recovering from the coronavirus, as it would ensure that increased reliance on digital finance goes hand in hand with operational resilience. Both proposals also respond to calls from the CMU High-Level Forum to establish clear rules for the use of crypto asset (recommendation 7) and to put in place new rules on cyber resilience.
Revised version (Article 91 ):
1. UCITS host Member States shall ensure that UCITS are able to market their units within their territories upon notification in accordance with Article 93. 2. UCITS host Member States shall not impose any additional requirements or administrative procedures on UCITS as referred to in paragraph 1 in respect of the field governed by this Directive. 4. For the purposes of this Chapter, a UCITS shall include investment compartments thereof.
Article 92 
UCITS shall, in accordance with the laws, regulations and administrative provisions in force in the Member State where their units are marketed, take the measures necessary to ensure that facilities are available in that Member State for making payments to unit-holders, repurchasing or redeeming units and making available the information which UCITS are required to provide.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL · Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal is part of a package of measures to further enable and support the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition while mitigating the risks. It is in line with the Commission priorities to make Europe fit for the digital age and to build a future-ready economy that works for the people. The digital finance package includes a new Strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector 1 with the aim to ensure that the EU embraces the digital revolution and drives it with innovative European firms in the lead, making the benefits of digital finance available to European consumers and businesses. In addition to this proposal, the package also includes a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets 2 , a proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) 3 and a proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector 4 . The reasons for, and objectives of, the two sets of legislative measures have been set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for distributed ledger technology market infrastructures, proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets and proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience, respectively, and apply here as well. The particular reasons for this proposal for a directive is that, in order to provide legal certainty as regards crypto assets and achieve the objectives of strengthening digital operational resilience, it is necessary to establish a temporary exemption for multilateral trading facilities and amend or clarify certain provisions in existing EU financial services directives. · Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area This proposal, similar to the proposals for regulation it accompanies, is part of a broader ongoing work at European and international level aimed at (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial services and address broader operational risks, and (ii) providing a clear, proportionate and enabling EU legal framework for crypto-asset service providers. · Consistency with other Union policies As stated by President von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, 5 and set-out in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’, 6 it is crucial for Europe to reap all the benefits of the digital age and to strengthen its industry and innovation capacity, within safe and ethical boundaries. As regards crypto assets, this proposal is closely linked with wider Commission policies on blockchain technology, as crypto-assets, as the main application of blockchain technologies, are inextricably linked to the promotion of blockchain technology throughout Europe. As regards operational resilience, the European strategy for data 7 sets out four pillars - data protection, fundamental rights, safety and cyber-security - as essential pre-requisites for a society empowered by the use of data. A legislative framework strengthening the digital operational resilience of the Union’s financial entities is consistent with these policy objectives. The proposal would also support policies aimed at recovering from the coronavirus, as it would ensure that increased reliance on digital finance goes hand in hand with operational resilience. Both proposals also respond to calls from the CMU High-Level Forum to establish clear rules for the use of crypto asset (recommendation 7) and to put in place new rules on cyber resilience.
Article 93 
1. If a UCITS proposes to market its units in a Member State other than its home Member State, it shall first submit a notification letter to the competent authorities of its home Member State. The notification letter shall include information on arrangements made for marketing units of the UCITS in the host Member State, including, where relevant, in respect of share classes. In the context of Article 16(1), it shall include an indication that the UCITS is marketed by the management company that manages the UCITS. 2. A UCITS shall enclose with the notification letter, as referred to in paragraph 1, the latest version of the following: (a) its fund rules or its instruments of incorporation, its prospectus and, where appropriate, its latest annual report and any subsequent half-yearly report translated in accordance with the provisions of Article 94(1)(c) and (d); and (b) its key investor information referred to in Article 78, translated in accordance with Article 94(1)(b) and (d). 3. The competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall verify whether the documentation submitted by the UCITS in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 is complete. The competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall transmit the complete documentation referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 to the competent authorities of the Member State in which the UCITS proposes to market its units, no later than 10 working days of the date of receipt of the notification letter accompanied by the complete documentation provided for in paragraph 2. They shall enclose with the documentation an attestation that the UCITS fulfils the conditions imposed by this Directive. Upon the transmission of the documentation, the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall immediately notify the UCITS about the transmission. The UCITS may access the market of the UCITS host Member State as from the date of that notification. 4. Member States shall ensure that the notification letter referred to in paragraph 1 and the attestation referred to in paragraph 3 are provided in a language customary in the sphere of international finance, unless the UCITS home and host Member States agree to that notification letter and that attestation being provided in an official language of both Member States. 5. Member States shall ensure that the electronic transmission and filing of the documents referred to in paragraph 3 is accepted by their competent authorities. 6. For the purpose of the notification procedure set out in this Article, the competent authorities of the Member State in which a UCITS proposes to market its units shall not request any additional documents, certificates or information other than those provided for in this Article. 7. The UCITS home Member State shall ensure that the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State have access, by electronic means, to the documents referred to in paragraph 2 and, if applicable, to any translations thereof. It shall ensure that the UCITS keeps those documents and translations up to date. The UCITS shall notify any amendments to the documents referred to in paragraph 2 to the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State and shall indicate where those documents can be obtained electronically. 8. In the event of a change in the information regarding the arrangements made for marketing communicated in the notification letter in accordance with paragraph 1, or a change regarding share classes to be marketed, the UCITS shall give written notice thereof to the competent authorities of the host Member State before implementing the change.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’) together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal and a proposal f or a regulation on facilitating the cross-border distribution of collective investment funds, which also amends Regulations (No) 345/2013 1 and 346/2013 2 , as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal for an enabling frame work on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP)for businesses , a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. This proposal amends certain provisions in Directive 2009/65/EC 3 and Directive 2011/61/EU 4 with the purpose of reducing regulatory barriers to the cross-border distribution of investment funds in the EU. These new measures are expected to reduce the cost for fund managers of going cross-border and should support more cross-border marketing of investment funds. Increased competition in the EU will help to give investors more choice and better value. This proposal was scheduled in the Commission Work Program me 2018 5 and should be seen in the broader context of the CMU action plan 6 and the CMU Mid-Term Review 7 , to establish a genuine internal capital market by addressing fragmentation in the capital markets, removing regulatory barriers to the financing of the economy and increasing the supply of capital to businesses. Regulatory barriers, namely Member States’ marketing requirements, regulatory fees and administrative and notification requirements represent a significant disincentive to the cross-border distri bution of funds. These barriers were identified in response to the Green Paper on Capital Markets Union 8 , the Call for Evidence on the EU regulatory framework for financial services 9 and the public consultation on barriers to the cross-border distribution of investment funds 10 . Investment funds are investment products created with the sole purpose of pooling investors’ capital and investing that capital collectively through a portfolio of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds and other securities. In the EU, investment funds can be categorised as undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and alternative investment funds (AIFs) managed by alternative investment fund managers. UCITS are covered by Directive 2009/65/EC and AIFs are covered by Directive 2011/61/EU. Directive 2011/61/EU is complemented by four fund frameworks: · Regulation (No) 345/2013 on European venture capital funds, · Regulation (No) 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds, · Regulation 2015/460 11 on European long-term investment funds and · Regulation 2017/1131 12 on money market funds. The shared purpose of these rules is notably to make cross-border distribution easier while ensuring a high level of investor protection. Rules for EU investment fun ds allow fund managers to distribute and, with some exceptions, also to manage their funds across the EU . While EU investment funds have seen rapid growth, with a total of EUR 14 310 billion in assets under management in June 2017 13 , the EU investment fund market is still predominantly organised as a national market : 70 % of all assets under management are held by investment funds registered for sale only in their domestic market 14 . Only 37 % of UCITS and about 3 % of AIFs are registered for sale in more than three Member States. Compared to the United States, the EU market is smaller in terms of assets under management. However, there are considerably more funds in the EU (58 125 in the EU compared to 15 415 in the US) 15 . This means EU funds are on average sig nificantly smaller . This has a negative impact on economies of scale, the fees paid by investors and the way in which the internal market operates for investment funds. This proposal also recognizes that there are other factors outside the scope of this proposal which hold back the cross-border distribution of investment funds in the EU. These factors include national tax regimes applicable to investment funds and investors, vertical distribution channels and cultural preferences for domestic investment products. 
Revised version (Article 93 ):
1. If a UCITS proposes to market its units in a Member State other than its home Member State, it shall first submit a notification letter to the competent authorities of its home Member State. The notification letter shall include information on arrangements made for marketing units of the UCITS in the host Member State, including, where relevant, in respect of share classes. In the context of Article 16(1), it shall include an indication that the UCITS is marketed by the management company that manages the UCITS. 2. A UCITS shall enclose with the notification letter, as referred to in paragraph 1, the latest version of the following: (b) its key investor information referred to in Article 78, translated in accordance with Article 94(1)(b) and (d). 3. The competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall verify whether the documentation submitted by the UCITS in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 is complete. The competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall transmit the complete documentation referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 to the competent authorities of the Member State in which the UCITS proposes to market its units, no later than 10 working days of the date of receipt of the notification letter accompanied by the complete documentation provided for in paragraph 2. They shall enclose with the documentation an attestation that the UCITS fulfils the conditions imposed by this Directive. Upon the transmission of the documentation, the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall immediately notify the UCITS about the transmission. The UCITS may access the market of the UCITS host Member State as from the date of that notification. 4. Member States shall ensure that the notification letter referred to in paragraph 1 and the attestation referred to in paragraph 3 are provided in a language customary in the sphere of international finance, unless the UCITS home and host Member States agree to that notification letter and that attestation being provided in an official language of both Member States. 5. Member States shall ensure that the electronic transmission and filing of the documents referred to in paragraph 3 is accepted by their competent authorities. 6. For the purpose of the notification procedure set out in this Article, the competent authorities of the Member State in which a UCITS proposes to market its units shall not request any additional documents, certificates or information other than those provided for in this Article. 7. The UCITS home Member State shall ensure that the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State have access, by electronic means, to the documents referred to in paragraph 2 and, if applicable, to any translations thereof. It shall ensure that the UCITS keeps those documents and translations up to date. The UCITS shall notify any amendments to the documents referred to in paragraph 2 to the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State and shall indicate where those documents can be obtained electronically. 8. In the event of a change in the information regarding the arrangements made for marketing communicated in the notification letter in accordance with paragraph 1, or a change regarding share classes to be marketed, the UCITS shall give written notice thereof to the competent authorities of the host Member State before implementing the change.
Article 94 
1. Where a UCITS markets its units in a UCITS host Member State, it shall provide to investors within the territory of such Member State all information and documents which it is required pursuant to Chapter IX to provide to investors in its home Member State. Such information and documents shall be provided to investors in compliance with the following provisions: (a) without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter IX, such information or documents shall be provided to investors in the way prescribed by the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the UCITS host Member State; (b) key investor information referred to in Article 78 shall be translated into the official language, or one of the official languages, of the UCITS host Member State or into a language approved by the competent authorities of that Member State; (c) information or documents other than key investor information referred to in Article 78 shall be translated, at the choice of the UCITS, into the official language, or one of the official languages, of the UCITS host Member State, into a language approved by the competent authorities of that Member State or into a language customary in the sphere of international finance; and (d) translations of information or documents under points (b) and (c) shall be produced under the responsibility of the UCITS and shall faithfully reflect the content of the original information. 2. The requirements set out in paragraph 1 shall also be applicable to any changes to the information and documents referred therein. 3. The frequency of the publication of the issue, sale, repurchase or redemption price of units of UCITS according to Article 76 shall be subject to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the UCITS home Member State.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL · Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal is part of a package of measures to further enable and support the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition while mitigating the risks. It is in line with the Commission priorities to make Europe fit for the digital age and to build a future-ready economy that works for the people. The digital finance package includes a new Strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector 1 with the aim to ensure that the EU embraces the digital revolution and drives it with innovative European firms in the lead, making the benefits of digital finance available to European consumers and businesses. In addition to this proposal, the package also includes a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets 2 , a proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) 3 and a proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector 4 . The reasons for, and objectives of, the two sets of legislative measures have been set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for distributed ledger technology market infrastructures, proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets and proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience, respectively, and apply here as well. The particular reasons for this proposal for a directive is that, in order to provide legal certainty as regards crypto assets and achieve the objectives of strengthening digital operational resilience, it is necessary to establish a temporary exemption for multilateral trading facilities and amend or clarify certain provisions in existing EU financial services directives. · Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area This proposal, similar to the proposals for regulation it accompanies, is part of a broader ongoing work at European and international level aimed at (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial services and address broader operational risks, and (ii) providing a clear, proportionate and enabling EU legal framework for crypto-asset service providers. · Consistency with other Union policies As stated by President von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, 5 and set-out in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’, 6 it is crucial for Europe to reap all the benefits of the digital age and to strengthen its industry and innovation capacity, within safe and ethical boundaries. As regards crypto assets, this proposal is closely linked with wider Commission policies on blockchain technology, as crypto-assets, as the main application of blockchain technologies, are inextricably linked to the promotion of blockchain technology throughout Europe. As regards operational resilience, the European strategy for data 7 sets out four pillars - data protection, fundamental rights, safety and cyber-security - as essential pre-requisites for a society empowered by the use of data. A legislative framework strengthening the digital operational resilience of the Union’s financial entities is consistent with these policy objectives. The proposal would also support policies aimed at recovering from the coronavirus, as it would ensure that increased reliance on digital finance goes hand in hand with operational resilience. Both proposals also respond to calls from the CMU High-Level Forum to establish clear rules for the use of crypto asset (recommendation 7) and to put in place new rules on cyber resilience.
Article 95 
1. The Commission may adopt, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112(2), (3) and (4), and subject to the conditions of Articles 112a and 112b, measures specifying: (a) the scope of the information referred to in Article 91(3); (b) the facilitation of access for the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member States to the information or documents referred to in Article 93(1), (2) and (3) in accordance with Article 93(7). 2. In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of Article 93, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine: (a) the form and contents of a standard model notification letter to be used by a UCITS for the purpose of notification referred to in Article 93(1), including an indication as to which documents the translations refer to; (b) the form and contents of a standard model attestation to be used by competent authorities of Member States referred to in Article 93(3); (c) the procedure for the exchange of information and the use of electronic communication between competent authorities for the purpose of notification under Article 93. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).
Revised version (Article 95 ):
1. The Commission may adopt, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112a , measures specifying: (a) the scope of the information referred to in Article 91(3); (b) the facilitation of access for the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member States to the information or documents referred to in Article 93(1), (2) and (3) in accordance with Article 93(7). 2. In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of Article 93, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine: (a) the form and contents of a standard model notification letter to be used by a UCITS for the purpose of notification referred to in Article 93(1), including an indication as to which documents the translations refer to; (b) the form and contents of a standard model attestation to be used by competent authorities of Member States referred to in Article 93(3); (c) the procedure for the exchange of information and the use of electronic communication between competent authorities for the purpose of notification under Article 93. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 96 
For the purpose of pursuing its activities, a UCITS may use the same reference to its legal form (such as investment company or common fund) in its designation in a UCITS host Member State as it uses in its home Member State.
Article 97 
1. Member States shall designate the competent authorities which are to carry out the duties provided for in this Directive. They shall inform ESMA and the Commission thereof, indicating any division of duties. 2. The competent authorities shall be public authorities or bodies appointed by public authorities. 3. The authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall be competent to supervise that UCITS including, where relevant, pursuant to Article 19. However, the authorities of the UCITS host Member State shall be competent to supervise compliance with the provisions falling outside the field governed by this Directive and requirements set out in Articles 92 and 94.
Article 98 
1. The competent authorities shall be given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions. Such powers shall be exercised: (a) directly; (b) in collaboration with other authorities; (c) under the responsibility of the competent authorities, by delegation to entities to which tasks have been delegated; or (d) by application to the competent judicial authorities. 2. Under paragraph 1, competent authorities shall have the power, at least, to: (a) access any document in any form and receive a copy thereof; (b) require any person to provide information and, if necessary, to summon and question a person with a view to obtaining information; (c) carry out on-site inspections; (d) require existing telephone and existing data traffic records; (e) require the cessation of any practice that is contrary to the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive; (f) request the freezing or the sequestration of assets; (g) request the temporary prohibition of professional activity; (h) require authorised investment companies, management companies or depositaries to provide information; (i) adopt any type of measure to ensure that investment companies, management companies or depositaries continue to comply with the requirements of this Directive; (j) require the suspension of the issue, repurchase or redemption of units in the interest of the unit-holders or of the public; (k) withdraw the authorisation granted to a UCITS, a management company or a depositary; (l) refer matters for criminal prosecution; and (m) allow auditors or experts to carry out verifications or investigations.
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).
Revised version (Article 98 ):
1. The competent authorities shall be given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions. Such powers shall be exercised: (a) directly; (b) in collaboration with other authorities; (c) under the responsibility of the competent authorities, by delegation to entities to which tasks have been delegated; or (d) by application to the competent judicial authorities. 2. Under paragraph 1, competent authorities shall have the power, at least, to: (a) access any document in any form and receive a copy thereof; (b) require any person to provide information and, if necessary, to summon and question a person with a view to obtaining information; (c) carry out on-site inspections; (d) require: (i) in so far as permitted by national law, existing data traffic records held by a telecommunications operator, where there is a reasonable suspicion of an infringement and where such records may be relevant to an investigation into infringements of this Directive; (ii) existing recordings of telephone conversations or electronic communications or other data traffic records held by UCITS, management companies, investment companies, depositaries or any other entities regulated by this Directive; (d) require: (i) in so far as permitted by national law, existing data traffic records held by a telecommunications operator, where there is a reasonable suspicion of an infringement and where such records may be relevant to an investigation into infringements of this Directive; (ii) existing recordings of telephone conversations or electronic communications or other data traffic records held by UCITS, management companies, investment companies, depositaries or any other entities regulated by this Directive; (e) require the cessation of any practice that is contrary to the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive; (f) request the freezing or the sequestration of assets; (g) request the temporary prohibition of professional activity; (h) require authorised investment companies, management companies or depositaries to provide information; (i) adopt any type of measure to ensure that investment companies, management companies or depositaries continue to comply with the requirements of this Directive; (j) require the suspension of the issue, repurchase or redemption of units in the interest of the unit-holders or of the public; (k) withdraw the authorisation granted to a UCITS, a management company or a depositary; (l) refer matters for criminal prosecution; and (m) allow auditors or experts to carry out verifications or investigations.
Article 99 
1. Member States shall lay down the rules on measures and penalties applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that those rules are enforced. Without prejudice to the procedures for the withdrawal of authorisation or to the right of Member States to impose criminal penalties, Member States shall, in particular, ensure, in conformity with their national law, that the appropriate administrative measures can be taken or administrative penalties be imposed against the persons responsible where the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive have not been complied with. The measures and penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 2. Without precluding rules on measures and penalties applicable to infringements of the other national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive, Member States shall, in particular, lay down effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures and penalties concerning the duty to present key investor information in a way that is likely to be understood by retail investors according to Article 78(5). 3. Member States shall allow competent authorities to disclose to the public any measure or penalty that will be imposed for infringement of the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive, unless such disclosure would seriously jeopardise the financial markets, be detrimental to the interests of investors or cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved.
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).
Article 100 
1. Member States shall ensure that efficient and effective complaints and redress procedures are in place for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes concerning the activity of UCITS using existing bodies where appropriate. 2. Member States shall ensure that the bodies referred to in paragraph 1 are not prevented by legal or regulatory provisions from cooperating effectively in the resolution of cross-border disputes.
Article 101 
1. The competent authorities of the Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties under this Directive or of exercising their powers under this Directive or under national law. Member States shall take the necessary administrative and organisational measures to facilitate the cooperation provided for in this paragraph. Competent authorities shall use their powers for the purpose of cooperation, even in cases where the conduct under investigation does not constitute an infringement of any regulation in force in their Member State. 2. The competent authorities of the Member States shall immediately provide each other with the information required for the purposes of carrying out their duties under this Directive. 2a. The competent authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this Directive, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The competent authorities shall without delay provide ESMA with all information necessary to carry out its duties, in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 3. Where a competent authority of one Member State has good reason to suspect that acts contrary to the provisions of this Directive, are being or have been carried out by entities not subject to that competent authority’s supervision on the territory of another Member State, it shall notify the competent authorities of the other Member State thereof in as specific a manner as possible. The recipient authorities shall take appropriate action, shall inform the notifying competent authority of the outcome of that action and, to the extent possible, of significant interim developments. This paragraph shall be without prejudice to the competences of the notifying competent authority. 4. The competent authorities of one Member State may request the cooperation of the competent authorities of another Member State in a supervisory activity or for an on-the-spot verification or in an investigation on the territory of the latter within the framework of their powers pursuant to this Directive. Where a competent authority receives a request with respect to an on-the-spot verification or investigation, it shall: (a) carry out the verification or investigation itself; (b) allow the requesting authority to carry out the verification or investigation; or (c) allow auditors or experts to carry out the verification or investigation. 5. If the verification or investigation is carried out on the territory of one Member State by a competent authority of the same Member State, the competent authority of the Member State which has requested cooperation may request that its own officials accompany the officials carrying out the verification or investigation. The verification or investigation shall, however, be subject to the overall control of the Member State on whose territory it is conducted. If the verification or investigation is carried out on the territory of one Member State by a competent authority of another Member State, the competent authority of the Member State on whose territory the verification or investigation is carried out may request that its own officials accompany the officials carrying out the verification or investigation. 6. The competent authorities of the Member State where the verification or investigation is carried out may refuse to exchange information as provided for in paragraph 2 or to act on a request for cooperation in carrying out an investigation or on-the-spot verification as provided for in paragraph 4, only where: (a) such an investigation, on-the-spot verification or exchange of information might adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy of that Member State; (b) judicial proceedings have already been initiated in respect of the same persons and the same actions before the authorities of that Member State; (c) final judgment in respect of the same persons and the same actions has already been delivered in that Member State. 7. The competent authorities shall notify the requesting competent authorities of any decision taken under paragraph 6. That notification shall contain information about the motives of their decision. 8. The competent authorities may refer to ESMA situations where a request: (a) to exchange information as provided for in Article 109 has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time; (b) to carry out an investigation or on-the-spot verification as provided for in Article 110 has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time; or (c) for authorisation for its officials to accompany those of the competent authority of the other Member State has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time. Without prejudice to Article 258 of the Treaty of on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ESMA may, in situations referred to in the first subparagraph, act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, without prejudice to the possibilities for refusing to act on a request for information or for an investigation provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article and to the ability of ESMA to act in accordance with Article 17 of that Regulation in those cases. (c) for authorisation for its officials to accompany those of the competent authority of the other Member State has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time. Without prejudice to Article 258 of the Treaty of on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ESMA may, in situations referred to in the first subparagraph, act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, without prejudice to the possibilities for refusing to act on a request for information or for an investigation provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article and to the ability of ESMA to act in accordance with Article 17 of that Regulation in those cases. 9. In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of this Article, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to establish common procedures for competent authorities to cooperate in on-the-spot verifications and investigations as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union (‘CMU’) together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal and a proposal f or a regulation on facilitating the cross-border distribution of collective investment funds, which also amends Regulations (No) 345/2013 1 and 346/2013 2 , as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal for an enabling frame work on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP)for businesses , a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims, and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. This proposal amends certain provisions in Directive 2009/65/EC 3 and Directive 2011/61/EU 4 with the purpose of reducing regulatory barriers to the cross-border distribution of investment funds in the EU. These new measures are expected to reduce the cost for fund managers of going cross-border and should support more cross-border marketing of investment funds. Increased competition in the EU will help to give investors more choice and better value. This proposal was scheduled in the Commission Work Program me 2018 5 and should be seen in the broader context of the CMU action plan 6 and the CMU Mid-Term Review 7 , to establish a genuine internal capital market by addressing fragmentation in the capital markets, removing regulatory barriers to the financing of the economy and increasing the supply of capital to businesses. Regulatory barriers, namely Member States’ marketing requirements, regulatory fees and administrative and notification requirements represent a significant disincentive to the cross-border distri bution of funds. These barriers were identified in response to the Green Paper on Capital Markets Union 8 , the Call for Evidence on the EU regulatory framework for financial services 9 and the public consultation on barriers to the cross-border distribution of investment funds 10 . Investment funds are investment products created with the sole purpose of pooling investors’ capital and investing that capital collectively through a portfolio of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds and other securities. In the EU, investment funds can be categorised as undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and alternative investment funds (AIFs) managed by alternative investment fund managers. UCITS are covered by Directive 2009/65/EC and AIFs are covered by Directive 2011/61/EU. Directive 2011/61/EU is complemented by four fund frameworks: · Regulation (No) 345/2013 on European venture capital funds, · Regulation (No) 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds, · Regulation 2015/460 11 on European long-term investment funds and · Regulation 2017/1131 12 on money market funds. The shared purpose of these rules is notably to make cross-border distribution easier while ensuring a high level of investor protection. Rules for EU investment fun ds allow fund managers to distribute and, with some exceptions, also to manage their funds across the EU . While EU investment funds have seen rapid growth, with a total of EUR 14 310 billion in assets under management in June 2017 13 , the EU investment fund market is still predominantly organised as a national market : 70 % of all assets under management are held by investment funds registered for sale only in their domestic market 14 . Only 37 % of UCITS and about 3 % of AIFs are registered for sale in more than three Member States. Compared to the United States, the EU market is smaller in terms of assets under management. However, there are considerably more funds in the EU (58 125 in the EU compared to 15 415 in the US) 15 . This means EU funds are on average sig nificantly smaller . This has a negative impact on economies of scale, the fees paid by investors and the way in which the internal market operates for investment funds. This proposal also recognizes that there are other factors outside the scope of this proposal which hold back the cross-border distribution of investment funds in the EU. These factors include national tax regimes applicable to investment funds and investors, vertical distribution channels and cultural preferences for domestic investment products. 
Revised version (Article 101 ):
1. The competent authorities of the Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the purpose of carrying out their duties under this Directive or of exercising their powers under this Directive or under national law. Member States shall take the necessary administrative and organisational measures to facilitate the cooperation provided for in this paragraph. Competent authorities shall use their powers for the purpose of cooperation, even in cases where the conduct under investigation does not constitute an infringement of any regulation in force in their Member State. 2. The competent authorities of the Member States shall immediately provide each other with the information required for the purposes of carrying out their duties under this Directive. 2a. The competent authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this Directive, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The competent authorities shall without delay provide ESMA with all information necessary to carry out its duties, in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 3. Where a competent authority of one Member State has good reason to suspect that acts contrary to the provisions of this Directive, are being or have been carried out by entities not subject to that competent authority’s supervision on the territory of another Member State, it shall notify the competent authorities of the other Member State thereof in as specific a manner as possible. The recipient authorities shall take appropriate action, shall inform the notifying competent authority of the outcome of that action and, to the extent possible, of significant interim developments. This paragraph shall be without prejudice to the competences of the notifying competent authority. 4. The competent authorities of one Member State may request the cooperation of the competent authorities of another Member State in a supervisory activity or for an on-the-spot verification or in an investigation on the territory of the latter within the framework of their powers pursuant to this Directive. Where a competent authority receives a request with respect to an on-the-spot verification or investigation, it shall: (a) carry out the verification or investigation itself; (b) allow the requesting authority to carry out the verification or investigation; or (c) allow auditors or experts to carry out the verification or investigation. 5. If the verification or investigation is carried out on the territory of one Member State by a competent authority of the same Member State, the competent authority of the Member State which has requested cooperation may request that its own officials accompany the officials carrying out the verification or investigation. The verification or investigation shall, however, be subject to the overall control of the Member State on whose territory it is conducted. If the verification or investigation is carried out on the territory of one Member State by a competent authority of another Member State, the competent authority of the Member State on whose territory the verification or investigation is carried out may request that its own officials accompany the officials carrying out the verification or investigation. 6. The competent authorities of the Member State where the verification or investigation is carried out may refuse to exchange information as provided for in paragraph 2 or to act on a request for cooperation in carrying out an investigation or on-the-spot verification as provided for in paragraph 4, only where: (a) such an investigation, on-the-spot verification or exchange of information might adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy of that Member State; (b) judicial proceedings have already been initiated in respect of the same persons and the same actions before the authorities of that Member State; (c) final judgment in respect of the same persons and the same actions has already been delivered in that Member State. 7. The competent authorities shall notify the requesting competent authorities of any decision taken under paragraph 6. That notification shall contain information about the motives of their decision. 8. The competent authorities may refer to ESMA situations where a request: (a) to exchange information as provided for in Article 109 has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time; (b) to carry out an investigation or on-the-spot verification as provided for in Article 110 has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time; or (c) for authorisation for its officials to accompany those of the competent authority of the other Member State has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time. Without prejudice to Article 258 of the Treaty of on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ESMA may, in situations referred to in the first subparagraph, act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, without prejudice to the possibilities for refusing to act on a request for information or for an investigation provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article and to the ability of ESMA to act in accordance with Article 17 of that Regulation in those cases. for authorisation for its officials to accompany those of the competent authority of the other Member State has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time. Without prejudice to Article 258 of the Treaty of on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ESMA may, in situations referred to in the first subparagraph, act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, without prejudice to the possibilities for refusing to act on a request for information or for an investigation provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article and to the ability of ESMA to act in accordance with Article 17 of that Regulation in those cases. 9. In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of this Article, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to establish common procedures for competent authorities to cooperate in on-the-spot verifications and investigations as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 102 
1. Member States shall provide that all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authorities, as well as auditors and experts instructed by the competent authorities, be bound by the obligation of professional secrecy. Such obligation implies that no confidential information which those persons receive in the course of their duties shall be divulged to any person or authority whatsoever, save in summary or aggregate form such that UCITS, management companies and depositaries (undertakings contributing towards UCITS’ business activity) cannot be individually identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law. However, when a UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity has been declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up, confidential information which does not concern third parties involved in rescue attempts may be divulged in the course of civil or commercial proceedings. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities of the Member States from exchanging information in accordance with this Directive or other Union legislation applicable to UCITS or to undertakings contributing towards their business activity or from transmitting it to ESMA in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 or the ESRB. That information shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in paragraph 1. The competent authorities exchanging information with other competent authorities under this Directive may indicate at the time of communication that such information must not be disclosed without their express consent, in which case such information may be exchanged solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. 3. Member States may conclude cooperation agreements providing for exchange of information with the competent authorities of third countries, or with authorities or bodies of third countries, as determined in paragraph 5 of this Article and Article 103(1) only if the information disclosed is subject to guarantees of professional secrecy at least equivalent to those referred to in this Article. Such exchange of information shall be intended for the performance of the supervisory task of those authorities or bodies. Where the information originates in another Member State, it shall not be disclosed without the express consent of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. 4. The competent authorities receiving confidential information under paragraphs 1 or 2 may use the information only in the course of their duties for the purposes of: (a) checking that the conditions governing the taking-up of business of UCITS or of undertakings contributing towards their business activity are met and facilitating the monitoring of the conduct of that business, administrative and accounting procedures and internal-control mechanisms; (b) imposing penalties; (c) conducting administrative appeals against decisions by the competent authorities; and (d) pursuing court proceedings initiated under Article 107(2). 5. Paragraphs 1 and 4 shall not preclude the exchange of information within a Member State or between Member States, where that exchange is to take place between a competent authority and: (a) authorities with public responsibility for the supervision of credit institutions, investment undertakings, insurance undertakings or other financial organisations, or authorities responsible for the supervision of financial markets; (b) bodies involved in the liquidation or bankruptcy of UCITS or undertakings contributing towards their business activity, or bodies involved in similar procedures; or (c) persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings or other financial institutions; (d) ESMA, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 17 ), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 18 ) and the ESRB. In particular, paragraphs 1 and 4 shall not preclude the performance by the competent authorities listed above of their supervisory functions, or the disclosure to bodies which administer compensation schemes of information necessary for the performance of their functions. Information exchanged pursuant to the first subparagraph shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in paragraph 1.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 102 ):
1. Member States shall provide that all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authorities, as well as auditors and experts instructed by the competent authorities, be bound by the obligation of professional secrecy. Such obligation implies that no confidential information which those persons receive in the course of their duties shall be divulged to any person or authority whatsoever, save in summary or aggregate form such that UCITS, management companies and depositaries (undertakings contributing towards UCITS’ business activity) cannot be individually identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law. However, when a UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity has been declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up, confidential information which does not concern third parties involved in rescue attempts may be divulged in the course of civil or commercial proceedings. Member States shall provide that all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authorities, as well as auditors and experts instructed by the competent authorities, be bound by the obligation of professional secrecy. Such obligation implies that no confidential information which those persons receive in the course of their duties shall be divulged to any person or authority whatsoever, save in summary or aggregate form such that UCITS, management companies and depositaries (undertakings contributing towards UCITS’ business activity) cannot be individually identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law. However, when a UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity has been declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up, confidential information which does not concern third parties involved in rescue attempts may be divulged in the course of civil or commercial proceedings. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities of the Member States from exchanging information in accordance with this Directive or other Union legislation applicable to UCITS or to undertakings contributing towards their business activity or from transmitting it to ESMA in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 or the ESRB. That information shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in paragraph 1. The competent authorities exchanging information with other competent authorities under this Directive may indicate at the time of communication that such information must not be disclosed without their express consent, in which case such information may be exchanged solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities of the Member States from exchanging information in accordance with this Directive or other Union legislation applicable to UCITS or to undertakings contributing towards their business activity or from transmitting it to ESMA in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 or the ESRB. That information shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in paragraph 1. The competent authorities exchanging information with other competent authorities under this Directive may indicate at the time of communication that such information must not be disclosed without their express consent, in which case such information may be exchanged solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. 3. Member States may conclude cooperation agreements providing for exchange of information with the competent authorities of third countries, or with authorities or bodies of third countries, as determined in paragraph 5 of this Article and Article 103(1) only if the information disclosed is subject to guarantees of professional secrecy at least equivalent to those referred to in this Article. Such exchange of information shall be intended for the performance of the supervisory task of those authorities or bodies. Where the information originates in another Member State, it shall not be disclosed without the express consent of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. Member States may conclude cooperation agreements providing for exchange of information with the competent authorities of third countries, or with authorities or bodies of third countries, as determined in paragraph 5 of this Article and Article 103(1) only if the information disclosed is subject to guarantees of professional secrecy at least equivalent to those referred to in this Article. Such exchange of information shall be intended for the performance of the supervisory task of those authorities or bodies. Where the information originates in another Member State, it shall not be disclosed without the express consent of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. The competent authorities receiving confidential information under paragraphs 1 or 2 may use the information only in the course of their duties for the purposes of: (a) checking that the conditions governing the taking-up of business of UCITS or of undertakings contributing towards their business activity are met and facilitating the monitoring of the conduct of that business, administrative and accounting procedures and internal-control mechanisms; (b) imposing penalties; (c) conducting administrative appeals against decisions by the competent authorities; and (d) pursuing court proceedings initiated under Article 107(2). 5. Paragraphs 1 and 4 shall not preclude the exchange of information within a Member State or between Member States, where that exchange is to take place between a competent authority and: (a) authorities with public responsibility for the supervision of credit institutions, investment undertakings, insurance undertakings or other financial organisations, or authorities responsible for the supervision of financial markets; (b) bodies involved in the liquidation or bankruptcy of UCITS or undertakings contributing towards their business activity, or bodies involved in similar procedures; or (c) persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings or other financial institutions; (d) ESMA, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 22 ), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 23 ) and the ESRB. In particular, paragraphs 1 and 4 shall not preclude the performance by the competent authorities listed above of their supervisory functions, or the disclosure to bodies which administer compensation schemes of information necessary for the performance of their functions. Information exchanged pursuant to the first subparagraph shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in paragraph 1.
Article 103 
1. Notwithstanding Article 102(1) to (4), Member States may authorise exchanges of information between a competent authority and: (a) authorities responsible for overseeing bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of UCITS or undertakings contributing towards their business activity, or bodies involved in similar procedures; (b) authorities responsible for overseeing persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment firms or other financial institutions. 2. Member States which have recourse to the derogation provided for in paragraph 1 shall require that at least the following conditions are met: (a) the information is used for the purpose of performing the task of overseeing referred to in paragraph 1; (b) the information received is subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in Article 102(1); and (c) where the information originates in another Member State, it is not disclosed without the express consent of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their consent. 3. Member States shall communicate to ESMA, to the Commission and to the other Member States the names of the authorities which may receive information pursuant to paragraph 1. 4. Notwithstanding Article 102(1) to (4), Member States may, with the aim of strengthening the stability, including the integrity, of the financial system, authorise the exchange of information between the competent authorities and the authorities or bodies responsible under the law for the detection and investigation of breaches of company law. 5. Member States which have recourse to the derogation provided for in paragraph 4 shall require that at least the following conditions are met: (a) the information is used for the purpose of performing the task referred to in paragraph 4; (b) the information received is subject to the conditions of professional secrecy provided for in Article 102(1); and For the purposes of point (c), the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph 4 shall communicate to the competent authorities which have disclosed the information the names and precise responsibilities of the persons to whom it is to be sent. 6. Where, in a Member State, the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph 4 perform their task of detection or investigation with the aid, in view of their specific competence, of persons appointed for that purpose and not employed in the public sector the possibility of exchanging information provided for in that paragraph may be extended to such persons under the conditions stipulated in paragraph 5. 7. Member States shall communicate to ESMA, to the Commission and to the other Member States the names of the authorities or bodies which may receive information pursuant to paragraph 4.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL · Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal is part of a package of measures to further enable and support the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition while mitigating the risks. It is in line with the Commission priorities to make Europe fit for the digital age and to build a future-ready economy that works for the people. The digital finance package includes a new Strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector 1 with the aim to ensure that the EU embraces the digital revolution and drives it with innovative European firms in the lead, making the benefits of digital finance available to European consumers and businesses. In addition to this proposal, the package also includes a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets 2 , a proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) 3 and a proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector 4 . The reasons for, and objectives of, the two sets of legislative measures have been set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for distributed ledger technology market infrastructures, proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets and proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience, respectively, and apply here as well. The particular reasons for this proposal for a directive is that, in order to provide legal certainty as regards crypto assets and achieve the objectives of strengthening digital operational resilience, it is necessary to establish a temporary exemption for multilateral trading facilities and amend or clarify certain provisions in existing EU financial services directives. · Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area This proposal, similar to the proposals for regulation it accompanies, is part of a broader ongoing work at European and international level aimed at (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial services and address broader operational risks, and (ii) providing a clear, proportionate and enabling EU legal framework for crypto-asset service providers. · Consistency with other Union policies As stated by President von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, 5 and set-out in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’, 6 it is crucial for Europe to reap all the benefits of the digital age and to strengthen its industry and innovation capacity, within safe and ethical boundaries. As regards crypto assets, this proposal is closely linked with wider Commission policies on blockchain technology, as crypto-assets, as the main application of blockchain technologies, are inextricably linked to the promotion of blockchain technology throughout Europe. As regards operational resilience, the European strategy for data 7 sets out four pillars - data protection, fundamental rights, safety and cyber-security - as essential pre-requisites for a society empowered by the use of data. A legislative framework strengthening the digital operational resilience of the Union’s financial entities is consistent with these policy objectives. The proposal would also support policies aimed at recovering from the coronavirus, as it would ensure that increased reliance on digital finance goes hand in hand with operational resilience. Both proposals also respond to calls from the CMU High-Level Forum to establish clear rules for the use of crypto asset (recommendation 7) and to put in place new rules on cyber resilience.
Revised version (Article 103 ):
3. Member States shall communicate to ESMA, to the Commission and to the other Member States the names of the authorities which may receive information pursuant to paragraph 1. 4. Notwithstanding Article 102(1) to (4), Member States may, with the aim of strengthening the stability, including the integrity, of the financial system, authorise the exchange of information between the competent authorities and the authorities or bodies responsible under the law for the detection and investigation of breaches of company law. 6. Where, in a Member State, the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph 4 perform their task of detection or investigation with the aid, in view of their specific competence, of persons appointed for that purpose and not employed in the public sector the possibility of exchanging information provided for in that paragraph may be extended to such persons under the conditions stipulated in paragraph 5. 7. Member States shall communicate to ESMA, to the Commission and to the other Member States the names of the authorities or bodies which may receive information pursuant to paragraph 4.
Article 104 
1. Articles 102 and 103 shall not prevent a competent authority from transmitting to central banks and other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as monetary authorities information intended for the performance of their tasks, nor shall those articles prevent such authorities or bodies from communicating to the competent authorities such information as they may need for the purposes of Article 102(4). Information received in this context shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in Article 102(1). 2. Articles 102 and 103 shall not prevent the competent authorities from communicating the information referred to in Article 102(1) to (4) to a clearing house or other similar body recognised under national law for the provision of clearing or settlement services for one of their Member State’s markets if they consider that it is necessary to communicate the information in order to ensure the proper functioning of those bodies in relation to defaults or potential defaults by market participants. The information received in this context shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in Article 102(1). Member States shall, however, ensure that information received under Article 102(2) is not disclosed in the circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph without the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed it. 3. Notwithstanding Article 102(1) and (4), Member States may, by virtue of provisions laid down by law, authorise the disclosure of certain information to other departments of their central government administrations responsible for legislation on the supervision of UCITS and of undertakings contributing towards their business activity, credit institutions, financial institutions, investment undertakings and insurance undertakings and to inspectors instructed by those departments. Such disclosures may, however, be made only where necessary for reasons of prudential control. Member States shall, however, provide that information received under Article 102(2) and (5) is never disclosed in the circumstances referred to in this paragraph except with the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed the information.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 104 ):
1. Articles 102 and 103 shall not prevent a competent authority from transmitting to central banks and other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as monetary authorities information intended for the performance of their tasks, nor shall those articles prevent such authorities or bodies from communicating to the competent authorities such information as they may need for the purposes of Article 102(4). Information received in this context shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in Article 102(1). 2. Articles 102 and 103 shall not prevent the competent authorities from communicating the information referred to in Article 102(1) to (4) to a clearing house or other similar body recognised under national law for the provision of clearing or settlement services for one of their Member State’s markets if they consider that it is necessary to communicate the information in order to ensure the proper functioning of those bodies in relation to defaults or potential defaults by market participants. The information received in this context shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in Article 102(1). Member States shall, however, ensure that information received under Article 102(2) is not disclosed in the circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph without the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed it. Articles 102 and 103 shall not prevent the competent authorities from communicating the information referred to in Article 102(1) to (4) to a clearing house or other similar body recognised under national law for the provision of clearing or settlement services for one of their Member State’s markets if they consider that it is necessary to communicate the information in order to ensure the proper functioning of those bodies in relation to defaults or potential defaults by market participants. The information received in this context shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy imposed in Article 102(1). Member States shall, however, ensure that information received under Article 102(2) is not disclosed in the circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph without the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed it. 3. Notwithstanding Article 102(1) and (4), Member States may, by virtue of provisions laid down by law, authorise the disclosure of certain information to other departments of their central government administrations responsible for legislation on the supervision of UCITS and of undertakings contributing towards their business activity, credit institutions, financial institutions, investment undertakings and insurance undertakings and to inspectors instructed by those departments. Such disclosures may, however, be made only where necessary for reasons of prudential control. Member States shall, however, provide that information received under Article 102(2) and (5) is never disclosed in the circumstances referred to in this paragraph except with the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed the information. Notwithstanding Article 102(1) and (4), Member States may, by virtue of provisions laid down by law, authorise the disclosure of certain information to other departments of their central government administrations responsible for legislation on the supervision of UCITS and of undertakings contributing towards their business activity, credit institutions, financial institutions, investment undertakings and insurance undertakings and to inspectors instructed by those departments. Such disclosures may, however, be made only where necessary for reasons of prudential control. Member States shall, however, provide that information received under Article 102(2) and (5) is never disclosed in the circumstances referred to in this paragraph except with the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed the information.
Article 105 
In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of the provisions in this Directive concerning the exchange of information, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the conditions of application with regard to the procedures for exchange of information between competent authorities and between the competent authorities and ESMA. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 106 
1. Member States shall provide at least that any person approved in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC, performing in a UCITS, or in an undertaking contributing towards its business activity, the statutory audit referred to in Article 51 of Directive 78/660/EEC, Article 37 of Directive 83/349/EEC or Article 73 of this Directive or any other statutory task, shall have a duty to report promptly to the competent authorities any fact or decision concerning that undertaking of which he has become aware while carrying out that task and which is liable to bring about any of the following: (a) a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of UCITS or undertakings contributing towards their business activity; (b) the impairment of the continuous functioning of the UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity; or (c) a refusal to certify the accounts or the expression of reservations. That person shall have a duty to report any facts and decisions of which he becomes aware in the course of carrying out a task as described in point (a) in an undertaking having close links resulting from a control relationship with the UCITS or an undertaking contributing towards its business activity, within which he is carrying out that task. 2. The disclosure in good faith to the competent authorities, by persons approved in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC of any fact or decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision and shall not subject such persons to liability of any kind.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL · Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal is part of a package of measures to further enable and support the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition while mitigating the risks. It is in line with the Commission priorities to make Europe fit for the digital age and to build a future-ready economy that works for the people. The digital finance package includes a new Strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector 1 with the aim to ensure that the EU embraces the digital revolution and drives it with innovative European firms in the lead, making the benefits of digital finance available to European consumers and businesses. In addition to this proposal, the package also includes a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets 2 , a proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) 3 and a proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector 4 . The reasons for, and objectives of, the two sets of legislative measures have been set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for distributed ledger technology market infrastructures, proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets and proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience, respectively, and apply here as well. The particular reasons for this proposal for a directive is that, in order to provide legal certainty as regards crypto assets and achieve the objectives of strengthening digital operational resilience, it is necessary to establish a temporary exemption for multilateral trading facilities and amend or clarify certain provisions in existing EU financial services directives. · Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area This proposal, similar to the proposals for regulation it accompanies, is part of a broader ongoing work at European and international level aimed at (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial services and address broader operational risks, and (ii) providing a clear, proportionate and enabling EU legal framework for crypto-asset service providers. · Consistency with other Union policies As stated by President von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, 5 and set-out in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’, 6 it is crucial for Europe to reap all the benefits of the digital age and to strengthen its industry and innovation capacity, within safe and ethical boundaries. As regards crypto assets, this proposal is closely linked with wider Commission policies on blockchain technology, as crypto-assets, as the main application of blockchain technologies, are inextricably linked to the promotion of blockchain technology throughout Europe. As regards operational resilience, the European strategy for data 7 sets out four pillars - data protection, fundamental rights, safety and cyber-security - as essential pre-requisites for a society empowered by the use of data. A legislative framework strengthening the digital operational resilience of the Union’s financial entities is consistent with these policy objectives. The proposal would also support policies aimed at recovering from the coronavirus, as it would ensure that increased reliance on digital finance goes hand in hand with operational resilience. Both proposals also respond to calls from the CMU High-Level Forum to establish clear rules for the use of crypto asset (recommendation 7) and to put in place new rules on cyber resilience.
Revised version (Article 106 ):
2. The disclosure in good faith to the competent authorities, by persons approved in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC of any fact or decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision and shall not subject such persons to liability of any kind.
Article 107 
1. The competent authorities shall give written reasons for any decision to refuse authorisation, or any negative decision taken in the implementation of the general measures adopted in application of this Directive, and communicate them to applicants. 2. Member States shall provide that any decision taken under the laws, regulations or administrative provisions adopted in accordance with this Directive is properly reasoned and subject to a right of appeal in the courts, including where no decision is taken within six months of submission of an application for authorisation which provides all the information required. 3. Member States shall provide that one or more of the following bodies, as determined by national law, may, in the interests of consumers and in accordance with national law, take action before the courts or competent administrative bodies to ensure that the national provisions for the implementation of this Directive are applied: (a) public bodies or their representatives; (b) consumer organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers; or (c) professional organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting their members.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL · Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal is part of a package of measures to further enable and support the potential of digital finance in terms of innovation and competition while mitigating the risks. It is in line with the Commission priorities to make Europe fit for the digital age and to build a future-ready economy that works for the people. The digital finance package includes a new Strategy on digital finance for the EU financial sector 1 with the aim to ensure that the EU embraces the digital revolution and drives it with innovative European firms in the lead, making the benefits of digital finance available to European consumers and businesses. In addition to this proposal, the package also includes a proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets 2 , a proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology (DLT) 3 and a proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector 4 . The reasons for, and objectives of, the two sets of legislative measures have been set out in the explanatory memoranda of the proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for distributed ledger technology market infrastructures, proposal for a regulation on markets in crypto assets and proposal for a regulation on digital operational resilience, respectively, and apply here as well. The particular reasons for this proposal for a directive is that, in order to provide legal certainty as regards crypto assets and achieve the objectives of strengthening digital operational resilience, it is necessary to establish a temporary exemption for multilateral trading facilities and amend or clarify certain provisions in existing EU financial services directives. · Consistency with existing provisions in the policy area This proposal, similar to the proposals for regulation it accompanies, is part of a broader ongoing work at European and international level aimed at (i) strengthening the cybersecurity in financial services and address broader operational risks, and (ii) providing a clear, proportionate and enabling EU legal framework for crypto-asset service providers. · Consistency with other Union policies As stated by President von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, 5 and set-out in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’, 6 it is crucial for Europe to reap all the benefits of the digital age and to strengthen its industry and innovation capacity, within safe and ethical boundaries. As regards crypto assets, this proposal is closely linked with wider Commission policies on blockchain technology, as crypto-assets, as the main application of blockchain technologies, are inextricably linked to the promotion of blockchain technology throughout Europe. As regards operational resilience, the European strategy for data 7 sets out four pillars - data protection, fundamental rights, safety and cyber-security - as essential pre-requisites for a society empowered by the use of data. A legislative framework strengthening the digital operational resilience of the Union’s financial entities is consistent with these policy objectives. The proposal would also support policies aimed at recovering from the coronavirus, as it would ensure that increased reliance on digital finance goes hand in hand with operational resilience. Both proposals also respond to calls from the CMU High-Level Forum to establish clear rules for the use of crypto asset (recommendation 7) and to put in place new rules on cyber resilience.
Revised version (Article 107 ):
1. The competent authorities shall give written reasons for any decision to refuse authorisation, or any negative decision taken in the implementation of the general measures adopted in application of this Directive, and communicate them to applicants. 2. Member States shall provide that any decision taken under the laws, regulations or administrative provisions adopted in accordance with this Directive is properly reasoned and subject to a right of appeal in the courts, including where no decision is taken within six months of submission of an application for authorisation which provides all the information required.
Article 108 
1. Only the authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall have the power to take action against that UCITS if it infringes any law, regulation or administrative provision or any regulation laid down in the fund rules or in the instruments of incorporation of the investment company. However, the authorities of the UCITS host Member State may take action against that UCITS if it infringes the laws, regulations and administrative provisions in force in that Member State that fall outside the scope of this Directive or the requirements set out in Articles 92 and 94. 2. Any decision to withdraw authorisation, or any other serious measure taken against a UCITS, or any suspension of the issue, repurchase or redemption of its units imposed upon it, shall be communicated without delay by the authorities of the UCITS home Member State to the authorities of the UCITS host Member States and, if the management company of a UCITS is established in another Member State, to the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State. 3. The competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State or those of the UCITS home Member State may take action against the management company if it infringes rules under their respective responsibility. 4. In the event that the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State have clear and demonstrable grounds for believing that a UCITS, the units of which are marketed within the territory of that Member State is in breach of the obligations arising from the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive which do not confer powers on the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State, they shall refer those findings to the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State, which shall take the appropriate measures. 5. If, despite the measures taken by the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State or because such measures prove to be inadequate, or because the UCITS home Member State fails to act within a reasonable timeframe, the UCITS persists in acting in a manner that is clearly prejudicial to the interests of the UCITS host Member State’s investors, the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State, may, as a consequence, take either of the following actions: (a) after informing the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State, take all the appropriate measures needed in order to protect investors, including the possibility of preventing the UCITS concerned from carrying out any further marketing of its units within the territory of the UCITS host Member State; or (b) if necessary, refer the matter to ESMA, which may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The Commission and ESMA shall be informed without delay of any measure taken pursuant to point (a) of the first subparagraph. 6. Member States shall ensure that within their territories it is legally possible to serve the legal documents necessary for the measures which may be taken by the UCITS host Member State in regard to UCITS pursuant to paragraphs 2 to 5.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 108 ):
1. Only the authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall have the power to take action against that UCITS if it infringes any law, regulation or administrative provision or any regulation laid down in the fund rules or in the instruments of incorporation of the investment company. However, the authorities of the UCITS host Member State may take action against that UCITS if it infringes the laws, regulations and administrative provisions in force in that Member State that fall outside the scope of this Directive or the requirements set out in Articles 92 and 94. Only the authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall have the power to take action against that UCITS if it infringes any law, regulation or administrative provision or any regulation laid down in the fund rules or in the instruments of incorporation of the investment company. However, the authorities of the UCITS host Member State may take action against that UCITS if it infringes the laws, regulations and administrative provisions in force in that Member State that fall outside the scope of this Directive or the requirements set out in Articles 92 and 94. 2. Any decision to withdraw authorisation, or any other serious measure taken against a UCITS, or any suspension of the issue, repurchase or redemption of its units imposed upon it, shall be communicated without delay by the authorities of the UCITS home Member State to the authorities of the UCITS host Member States and, if the management company of a UCITS is established in another Member State, to the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State. 3. The competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State or those of the UCITS home Member State may take action against the management company if it infringes rules under their respective responsibility. 4. In the event that the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State have clear and demonstrable grounds for believing that a UCITS, the units of which are marketed within the territory of that Member State is in breach of the obligations arising from the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive which do not confer powers on the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State, they shall refer those findings to the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State, which shall take the appropriate measures. 5. If, despite the measures taken by the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State or because such measures prove to be inadequate, or because the UCITS home Member State fails to act within a reasonable timeframe, the UCITS persists in acting in a manner that is clearly prejudicial to the interests of the UCITS host Member State’s investors, the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State, may, as a consequence, take either of the following actions: (a) after informing the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State, take all the appropriate measures needed in order to protect investors, including the possibility of preventing the UCITS concerned from carrying out any further marketing of its units within the territory of the UCITS host Member State; or (b) if necessary, refer the matter to ESMA, which may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The Commission and ESMA shall be informed without delay of any measure taken pursuant to point (a) of the first subparagraph. 6. Member States shall ensure that within their territories it is legally possible to serve the legal documents necessary for the measures which may be taken by the UCITS host Member State in regard to UCITS pursuant to paragraphs 2 to 5.
Article 109 
1. Where, through the provision of services or by the establishment of branches, a management company operates in one or more management company’s host Member States, the competent authorities of all the Member States concerned shall collaborate closely. They shall supply one another on request with all the information concerning the management and ownership of such management companies that is likely to facilitate their supervision and all information likely to facilitate the monitoring of such companies. In particular, the authorities of the management company’s home Member State shall cooperate to ensure that the authorities of the management company’s host Member State collect the particulars referred to in Article 21(2). 2. In so far as it is necessary for the purpose of exercising the powers of supervision of the home Member State, the competent authorities of the management company’s host Member State shall inform the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State of any measures taken by the management company’s host Member State pursuant to Article 21(5) which involve measures or penalties imposed on a management company or restrictions on a management company’s activities. 3. The competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State shall, without delay, notify the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State of any problem identified at the level of the management company which may materially affect the ability of the management company to perform its duties properly with respect to the UCITS or of any breach of the requirements under Chapter III. 4. The competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall, without delay, notify the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State of any problem identified at the level of the UCITS which may materially affect the ability of the management company to perform its duties properly or to comply with the requirements of this Directive which fall under the responsibility of the UCITS home Member State.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Each undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) must provide ‘k ey investor information’ in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC 1 . The information on objectives and investment policy, risk and reward profile, charges, past performance and other practical details helps investors to understand the essential characteristics of the UCITS and to make informed investment decisions. Articles 78 to 82, and 94 of the Directive specify the main principles of the k ey investor information . Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 2 lays down further rules on its content and format . UCITS qualify as packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 3 , which requires that all PRIIPs be accompanied by a ‘key information document’. The document contains i nformation on the PRIIP’s risk and reward profile, including the possible maximum loss of invested capital and appropriate performance scenarios, the costs retail investors have to bear when investing in it, and other details. Again, this information helps retail investors to understand the essential characteristics of the product and to make informed investment decisions. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 4 lays down detailed rules on the presentation, content, review, revision and provision of the document. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 5 lays down rules on product intervention. Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 provides for a transitional arrangement whereby management companies, investment companies and persons advising on, or selling, units of UCITS and non-UCITS are temporarily exempted from the requirement to provide retail investors with a key information document. The arrangement currently applies until 31 December 2021. This Directive is accompanied by two further measures. First, the Commission is proposing that the transitional arrangement in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 be extended to 30 June 2022. This will allow the time necessary to prepare for the end of the transitional arrangement and to implement the other measure (which involves amendments to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653) from 1 July 2022. The three measures are therefore synchronised in terms of application dates. As things stand, as of 1 July 2022 retail investors in UCITS would receive both a key information document in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 and key investor information in accordance with Directive 2009/65/EC. It is desirable to avoid a situation where retail investors receive two different pre-contractual disclosure documents in respect of the same UCITS. This Directive ensures that a key information document drawn up, provided, revised and translated for a given UCITS in accordance with the Regulation is considered as satisfying the key investor information requirements of Directive 2009/65/EC. This initiative is not part of the regulatory fitness programme (REFIT). 
Revised version (Article 109 ):
1. Where, through the provision of services or by the establishment of branches, a management company operates in one or more management company’s host Member States, the competent authorities of all the Member States concerned shall collaborate closely. They shall supply one another on request with all the information concerning the management and ownership of such management companies that is likely to facilitate their supervision and all information likely to facilitate the monitoring of such companies. In particular, the authorities of the management company’s home Member State shall cooperate to ensure that the authorities of the management company’s host Member State collect the particulars referred to in Article 21(2). Where, through the provision of services or by the establishment of branches, a management company operates in one or more management company’s host Member States, the competent authorities of all the Member States concerned shall collaborate closely. They shall supply one another on request with all the information concerning the management and ownership of such management companies that is likely to facilitate their supervision and all information likely to facilitate the monitoring of such companies. In particular, the authorities of the management company’s home Member State shall cooperate to ensure that the authorities of the management company’s host Member State collect the particulars referred to in Article 21(2). 2. In so far as it is necessary for the purpose of exercising the powers of supervision of the home Member State, the competent authorities of the management company’s host Member State shall inform the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State of any measures taken by the management company’s host Member State pursuant to Article 21(5) which involve measures or penalties imposed on a management company or restrictions on a management company’s activities. 3. The competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State shall, without delay, notify the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State of any problem identified at the level of the management company which may materially affect the ability of the management company to perform its duties properly with respect to the UCITS or of any breach of the requirements under Chapter III. 4. The competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State shall, without delay, notify the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State of any problem identified at the level of the UCITS which may materially affect the ability of the management company to perform its duties properly or to comply with the requirements of this Directive which fall under the responsibility of the UCITS home Member State.
Article 110 
1. Each management company’s host Member State shall ensure that where a management company authorised in another Member State pursues business within its territory through a branch the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State may, after informing the competent authorities of the management company’s host Member State, themselves or through the intermediary they instruct for the purpose, carry out on-the-spot verification of the information referred to in Article 109. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not affect the right of the competent authorities of the management company’s host Member State, in discharging their responsibilities under this Directive, to carry out on-the-spot verifications of branches established within the territory of that Member State.
Article 111 
The Commission may adopt technical amendments to this Directive in the following areas: (a) clarification of the definitions in order to ensure consistent harmonisation and uniform application of this Directive throughout the Union; or (b) alignment of terminology and the framing of definitions in accordance with subsequent acts on UCITS and related matters. The measures referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112(2), (3) and (4), and subject to the conditions of Articles 112a and 112b.
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).
Revised version (Article 111 ):
The Commission may adopt technical amendments to this Directive in the following areas: (a) clarification of the definitions in order to ensure consistent harmonisation and uniform application of this Directive throughout the Union; or (b) alignment of terminology and the framing of definitions in accordance with subsequent acts on UCITS and related matters. The measures referred to in the first subparagraph shall be adopted by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112a .
Article 112 
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the European Securities Committee established by Commission Decision 2001/528/EC. 2. The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Articles 12, 14, 23, 33, 43, 51, 60, 61, 62, 64, 75, 78, 81, 95 and 111 shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of 4 years from 4 January 2011. The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 50a shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of 4 years from 21 July 2011. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of delegated powers at the latest 6 months before the end of the 4-year period. The delegation of power shall be automatically extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council revokes them in accordance with Article 112a. 3. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify the European Parliament and the Council thereof simultaneously. 4. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in Articles 112a and 112b.
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).
Article 112a Revocation of the delegation
1. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 12, 14, 23, 33, 43, 50a, 51, 60, 61, 62, 64, 75, 78, 81, 95 and 111 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. 2. The institution which has commenced an internal procedure for deciding whether to revoke a delegation of power shall endeavour to inform the other institution and the Commission within a reasonable time before the final decision is taken, indicating the delegated power which could be subject to revocation. 3. The decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect immediately or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of the delegated acts already in force. It shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union .
Amendment rationale: Context of the proposal 1.1. General Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different jurisdictions. The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be delegated. The Madoff case also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated? Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary, the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one and the same third party. Finally, the Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework, especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements, so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. In addition, the financial crisis also revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and created incentives for taking excessive risk. Finally, the analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector"[2] the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework is a natural additional step in this process. This proposal forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key information documents for investment products).