Article 1 Establishment of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
1. A European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) is hereby established with a view to supporting cooperation among law enforcement authorities in the Union. 2. Europol as established by this Regulation shall replace and succeed Europol as established by Decision 2009/371/JHA.
Article 2 Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation: (a) ‘the competent authorities of the Member States’ means all police authorities and other law enforcement services existing in the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal offences. The competent authorities shall also comprise other public authorities existing in the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal offences in respect of which Europol is competent; (b) ‘strategic analysis’ means all methods and techniques by which information is collected, stored, processed and assessed with the aim of supporting and developing a criminal policy that contributes to the efficient and effective prevention of, and the fight against, crime; (c) ‘operational analysis’ means all methods and techniques by which information is collected, stored, processed and assessed with the aim of supporting criminal investigations; (d) ‘Union bodies’ means institutions, bodies, missions, offices and agencies set up by, or on the basis of, the TEU and the TFEU; (e) ‘international organisation’ means an organisation and its subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other body which is set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or more countries; (f) ‘private parties’ means entities and bodies established under the law of a Member State or third country, in particular companies and firms, business associations, non-profit organisations and other legal persons that are not covered by point (e); (g) ‘private persons’ means all natural persons; (h) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to a data subject; (i) ‘data subject’ means an identified or identifiable natural person, an identifiable person being a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person; (j) ‘genetic data’ means all personal data relating to the genetic characteristics of an individual that have been inherited or acquired, which give unique information about the physiology or the health of that individual, resulting in particular from an analysis of a biological sample from the individual in question; (k) ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data or sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction; (l) ‘recipient’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body to which data are disclosed, whether a third party or not; (m) ‘transfer of personal data’ means the communication of personal data, actively made available, between a limited number of identified parties, with the knowledge or intention of the sender to give the recipient access to the personal data; (n) ‘personal data breach’ means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed; (o) ‘the data subject's consent’ means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data relating to him or her being processed; (p) ‘administrative personal data’ means all personal data processed by Europol apart from those that are processed to meet the objectives laid down in Article 3.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 2 Definitions):
For the purposes of this Regulation: (a) ‘the competent authorities of the Member States’ means all police authorities and other law enforcement services existing in the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal offences. The competent authorities shall also comprise other public authorities existing in the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal offences in respect of which Europol is competent; (b) ‘strategic analysis’ means all methods and techniques by which information is collected, stored, processed and assessed with the aim of supporting and developing a criminal policy that contributes to the efficient and effective prevention of, and the fight against, crime; (c) ‘operational analysis’ means all methods and techniques by which information is collected, stored, processed and assessed with the aim of supporting criminal investigations; (d) ‘Union bodies’ means institutions, bodies, missions, offices and agencies set up by, or on the basis of, the TEU and the TFEU; (e) ‘international organisation’ means an organisation and its subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other body which is set up by, or on the basis of, an agreement between two or more countries; (f) ‘private parties’ means entities and bodies established under the law of a Member State or third country, in particular companies and firms, business associations, non-profit organisations and other legal persons that are not covered by point (e); (g) ‘private persons’ means all natural persons; (l) ‘recipient’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body to which data are disclosed, whether a third party or not; (p) ‘administrative personal data’ means personal data processed by Europol other than operational personal data; (q) ‘investigative data’ means data that a Member State, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) established by Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 ( 1 ), Eurojust or a third country is authorised to process in an ongoing criminal investigation related to one or more Member States, in accordance with procedural requirements and safeguards applicable under Union or national law, that a Member State, the EPPO, Eurojust or a third country submitted to Europol in support of such an ongoing criminal investigation and that contain personal data that do not relate to the categories of data subjects listed in Annex II; (t) ‘online crisis situation’ means the dissemination of online content stemming from an ongoing or recent real world event which depicts harm to life or to physical integrity, or calls for imminent harm to life or to physical integrity, and aims to or has the effect of seriously intimidating a population, provided that there is a link, or a reasonable suspicion of a link, to terrorism or violent extremism and that the potential exponential multiplication and virality of that content across multiple online services are anticipated; (u) ‘category of transfers of personal data’ means a group of transfers of personal data where the data relate to the same specific situation, and where the transfers consist of the same categories of personal data and the same categories of data subjects; (v) ‘research and innovation projects’ means projects regarding matters covered by this Regulation for the development, training, testing and validation of algorithms for the development of specific tools, and other specific research and innovation projects relevant for the achievement of Europol’s objectives.
Article 3 Objectives
1. Europol shall support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy, as listed in Annex I. 2. In addition to paragraph 1, Europol's objectives shall also cover related criminal offences. The following shall be considered to be related criminal offences: (a) criminal offences committed in order to procure the means of perpetrating acts in respect of which Europol is competent; (b) criminal offences committed in order to facilitate or perpetrate acts in respect of which Europol is competent; (c) criminal offences committed in order to ensure the impunity of those committing acts in respect of which Europol is competent.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 3 Objectives):
1. Europol shall support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy, as listed in Annex I.
Article 4 Tasks
1. Europol shall perform the following tasks in order to achieve the objectives set out in Article 3: (a) collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information, including criminal intelligence; (b) notify the Member States, via the national units established or designated pursuant to Article 7(2), without delay of any information and connections between criminal offences concerning them; (c) coordinate, organise and implement investigative and operational actions to support and strengthen actions by the competent authorities of the Member States, that are carried out: (i) jointly with the competent authorities of the Member States; or (ii) in the context of joint investigation teams in accordance with Article 5 and, where appropriate, in liaison with Eurojust; (d) participate in joint investigation teams, as well as propose that they be set up in accordance with Article 5; (e) provide information and analytical support to Member States in connection with major international events; (f) prepare threat assessments, strategic and operational analyses and general situation reports; (g) develop, share and promote specialist knowledge of crime prevention methods, investigative procedures and technical and forensic methods, and provide advice to Member States; (h) support Member States' cross-border information exchange activities, operations and investigations, as well as joint investigation teams, including by providing operational, technical and financial support; (i) provide specialised training and assist Member States in organising training, including with the provision of financial support, within the scope of its objectives and in accordance with the staffing and budgetary resources at its disposal in coordination with the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL); (j) cooperate with the Union bodies established on the basis of Title V of the TFEU and with OLAF, in particular through exchanges of information and by providing them with analytical support in the areas that fall within their competence; (k) provide information and support to EU crisis management structures and missions established on the basis of the TEU, within the scope of Europol's objectives as set out in Article 3; (l) develop Union centres of specialised expertise for combating certain types of crime falling within the scope of Europol's objectives, in particular the European Cybercrime Centre; (m) support Member States' actions in preventing and combating forms of crime listed in Annex I which are facilitated, promoted or committed using the internet, including, in cooperation with Member States, the making of referrals of internet content, by which such forms of crime are facilitated, promoted or committed, to the online service providers concerned for their voluntary consideration of the compatibility of the referred internet content with their own terms and conditions. 2. Europol shall provide strategic analyses and threat assessments to assist the Council and the Commission in laying down strategic and operational priorities of the Union for fighting crime. Europol shall also assist in the operational implementation of those priorities. 3. Europol shall provide strategic analyses and threat assessments to assist the efficient and effective use of the resources available at national and Union level for operational activities and the support of those activities. 4. Europol shall act as the Central Office for combating euro counterfeiting in accordance with Council Decision 2005/511/JHA ( 20 ) . Europol shall also encourage the coordination of measures carried out to fight euro counterfeiting by the competent authorities of the Member States or in the context of joint investigation teams, where appropriate in liaison with Union bodies and the authorities of third countries. 5. Europol shall not apply coercive measures in carrying out its tasks.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 4 Tasks):
In order for a Member State to inform, within a period of 12 months after Europol has proposed the possible entry of an information alert referred to in the first subparagraph, point (t), other Member States and Europol on the outcome of the verification and analysis of the data and on whether an alert has been entered in SIS, a periodic reporting mechanism shall be put in place. Member States shall inform Europol of any information alerts entered in SIS and of any hit on such information alerts, and may inform, through Europol, the third country or international organisation that provided the data leading to the entry of the information alert on hits on such information alert, in accordance with the procedure set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1862. 2. Europol shall provide strategic analyses and threat assessments to assist the Council and the Commission in laying down strategic and operational priorities of the Union for fighting crime. Europol shall also assist in the operational implementation of those priorities, in particular in the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), including by facilitating and providing administrative, logistical, financial and operational support to operational and strategic activities led by Member States. 3. Europol shall provide strategic analyses and threat assessments to assist the efficient and effective use of the resources available at national and Union level for operational activities and the support of those activities. Europol shall also provide threat assessment analyses based on the information it holds on criminal phenomena and trends to support the Commission and the Member States in carrying out risk assessments. 4. Europol shall act as the Central Office for combating euro counterfeiting in accordance with Council Decision 2005/511/JHA ( 9 ). Europol shall also encourage the coordination of measures carried out to fight euro counterfeiting by the competent authorities of the Member States or in the context of joint investigation teams, where appropriate in liaison with Union bodies and the authorities of third countries. 4a. Europol shall assist the Member States and the Commission in identifying key research themes. Europol shall assist the Commission in drawing up and implementing the Union framework programmes for research and innovation activities that are relevant to achieve Europol’s objectives. Where appropriate, Europol may disseminate the results of its research and innovation activities as part of its contribution to creating synergies between the research and innovation activities of relevant Union bodies in accordance with paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point (w). Europol shall take all necessary measures to avoid conflicts of interest. Europol shall not receive funding from a given Union framework programme where it assists the Commission in identifying key research themes and in drawing up and implementing that programme. When designing and conceptualising research and innovation activities regarding matters covered by this Regulation, Europol may, where appropriate, consult the Joint Research Centre of the Commission. 4b. Europol shall support the Member States in the screening, as regards the expected implications for security, of specific cases of foreign direct investments into the Union under Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 10 ) that concern undertakings that provide technologies, including software, used by Europol for the prevention and investigation of crimes that fall within Europol’s objectives. 5. Europol shall not apply coercive measures in carrying out its tasks. Europol staff may provide operational support to the competent authorities of the Member States during the execution of investigative measures, at their request and in accordance with their national law, in particular by facilitating cross-border information exchange, by providing forensic and technical support and by being present during the execution of those measures. Europol staff shall not, themselves, have the power to execute investigative measures. 5a. Europol shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), in the performance of its tasks.
Article 5 Participation in joint investigation teams
1. Europol staff may participate in the activities of joint investigation teams dealing with crime falling within Europol's objectives. The agreement setting up a joint investigation team shall determine the conditions relating to the participation of the Europol staff in the team, and shall include information on the rules on liability. 2. Europol staff may, within the limits of the laws of the Member States in which a joint investigation team is operating, assist in all activities and exchanges of information with all members of the joint investigation team. 3. Europol staff participating in a joint investigation team may, in accordance with this Regulation, provide all members of the team with necessary information processed by Europol for the purposes set out in Article 18(2). Europol shall at the same time inform the national units of the Member States represented in the team, as well as those of the Member States which provided the information. 4. Information obtained by Europol staff while part of the joint investigation team may, with the consent and under the responsibility of the Member State which provided the information, be processed by Europol for the purposes set out in Article 18(2), under the conditions laid down in this Regulation. 5. Where Europol has reason to believe that setting up a joint investigation team would add value to an investigation, it may propose this to the Member States concerned and take measures to assist them in setting up the joint investigation team.
Article 6 Request by Europol for the initiation of a criminal investigation
1. In specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated into a crime falling within the scope of its objectives, it shall request the competent authorities of the Member States concerned via the national units to initiate, conduct or coordinate such a criminal investigation. 2. The national units shall inform Europol without delay of the decision of the competent authorities of the Member States concerning any request made pursuant to paragraph 1. 3. If the competent authorities of a Member State decide not to accede to a request made by Europol pursuant to paragraph 1, they shall inform Europol of the reasons for their decision without undue delay, preferably within one month of receipt of the request. However, the reasons may be withheld if providing them would: (a) be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the Member State concerned; or (b) jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation or the safety of an individual. 4. Europol shall immediately inform Eurojust of any request made pursuant to paragraph 1 and of any decision of a competent authority of a Member State pursuant to paragraph 2.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 6 Request by Europol for the initiation of a criminal investigation):
1. In specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated into a crime falling within the scope of its objectives, it shall request the competent authorities of the Member States concerned via the national units to initiate, conduct or coordinate such a criminal investigation. 1a. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, where the Executive Director considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated into a specific crime which concerns only one Member State but affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, he or she may propose to the competent authorities of the Member State concerned, via its national unit, to initiate, conduct or coordinate such a criminal investigation. 2. The national units shall inform Europol, with regard to any request made pursuant to paragraph 1, or the Executive Director, with regard to any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 1a, of the decision of the competent authorities of the Member States, without undue delay. 3. If the competent authorities of a Member State decide not to accede to a request made by Europol pursuant to paragraph 1, they shall inform Europol of the reasons for their decision without undue delay, preferably within one month of receipt of the request. However, the reasons may be withheld if providing them would: (a) be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the Member State concerned; or (b) jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation or the safety of an individual. 4. Europol shall immediately inform Eurojust and, where relevant, the EPPO, of any request made pursuant to paragraph 1, of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 1a and of any decision of a competent authority of a Member State pursuant to paragraph 2.
Article 7 Europol national units
1. The Member States and Europol shall cooperate with each other in the fulfilment of their respective tasks set out in this Regulation. 2. Each Member State shall establish or designate a national unit, which shall be the liaison body between Europol and the competent authorities of that Member State. Each Member State shall appoint an official as the head of its national unit. 3. Each Member State shall ensure that its national unit is competent under national law to fulfil the tasks assigned to national units in this Regulation, and in particular that it has access to national law enforcement data and other relevant data necessary for cooperation with Europol. 4. Each Member State shall determine the organisation and the staff of its national unit in accordance with its national law. 5. In accordance with paragraph 2, the national unit shall be the liaison body between Europol and the competent authorities of the Member States. However, subject to conditions determined by the Member States, including prior involvement of the national unit, the Member States may allow direct contacts between their competent authorities and Europol. The national unit shall at the same time receive from Europol any information exchanged in the course of direct contacts between Europol and the competent authorities, unless the national unit indicates that it does not need to receive such information. 6. Each Member State shall, via its national unit or, subject to paragraph 5, a competent authority, in particular: (a) supply Europol with the information necessary for it to fulfil its objectives, including information relating to forms of crime the prevention or combating of which is considered a priority by the Union; (b) ensure effective communication and cooperation of all relevant competent authorities with Europol; (c) raise awareness of Europol's activities; (d) in accordance with point (a) of Article 38(5), ensure compliance with national law when supplying information to Europol. 7. Without prejudice to the discharge by Member States of their responsibilities with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, Member States shall not in any particular case be obliged to supply information in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 6 that would: (a) be contrary to the essential interests of the security of the Member State concerned; (b) jeopardise the success of an ongoing investigation or the safety of an individual; or (c) disclose information relating to organisations or specific intelligence activities in the field of national security. However, Member States shall supply information as soon as it ceases to fall within the scope of points (a), (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph. 8. Member States shall ensure that their financial intelligence units established pursuant to Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 21 ) are allowed to cooperate with Europol via their national unit regarding analyses, within the limits of their mandate and competence. 9. The heads of the national units shall meet on a regular basis, in particular to discuss and resolve problems that occur in the context of their operational cooperation with Europol. 10. The costs incurred by national units in communications with Europol shall be borne by the Member States and, with the exception of the costs of connection, shall not be charged to Europol. 11. Europol shall draw up an annual report on the information provided by each Member State pursuant to point (a) of paragraph 6 on the basis of the quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria defined by the Management Board. The annual report shall be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and national parliaments.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 7 Europol national units):
1. The Member States and Europol shall cooperate with each other in the fulfilment of their respective tasks set out in this Regulation. 2. Each Member State shall establish or designate a national unit, which shall be the liaison body between Europol and the competent authorities of that Member State. Each Member State shall appoint an official as the head of its national unit. 3. Each Member State shall ensure that its national unit is competent under national law to fulfil the tasks assigned to national units in this Regulation, and in particular that it has access to national law enforcement data and other relevant data necessary for cooperation with Europol. 4. Each Member State shall determine the organisation and the staff of its national unit in accordance with its national law. 5. In accordance with paragraph 2, the national unit shall be the liaison body between Europol and the competent authorities of the Member States. However, subject to conditions determined by the Member States, including prior involvement of the national unit, the Member States may allow direct contacts between their competent authorities and Europol. The national unit shall at the same time receive from Europol any information exchanged in the course of direct contacts between Europol and the competent authorities, unless the national unit indicates that it does not need to receive such information. 7. However, Member States shall supply information as soon as it ceases to fall within the scope of points (a), (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph. 8. Each Member State shall ensure that its FIU, within the limits of its mandate and competence and subject to national procedural safeguards, is entitled to reply to duly justified requests that are made by Europol in accordance with Article 12 of Directive (EU) 2019/1153 regarding financial information and financial analyses, either via its national unit or, if allowed by that Member State, by direct contact between the FIU and Europol. 9. The heads of the national units shall meet on a regular basis, in particular to discuss and resolve problems that occur in the context of their operational cooperation with Europol. 10. The costs incurred by national units in communications with Europol shall be borne by the Member States and, with the exception of the costs of connection, shall not be charged to Europol. 11. Europol shall draw up an annual report on the information provided by each Member State pursuant to point (a) of paragraph 6 on the basis of the quantitative and qualitative evaluation criteria defined by the Management Board. The annual report shall be sent to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and national parliaments.
Article 8 Liaison officers
1. Each national unit shall designate at least one liaison officer to be attached to Europol. Except as otherwise laid down in this Regulation, the liaison officers shall be subject to the national law of the designating Member State. 2. Liaison officers shall constitute the national liaison bureaux at Europol and shall be instructed by their national units to represent the interests of the latter within Europol in accordance with the national law of the designating Member State and the provisions applicable to the administration of Europol. 3. Liaison officers shall assist in the exchange of information between Europol and their Member States. 4. Liaison officers shall, in accordance with their national law, assist in the exchange of information between their Member States and the liaison officers of other Member States, third countries and international organisations. Europol's infrastructure may be used, in accordance with national law, for such bilateral exchanges also to cover crimes falling outside the scope of the objectives of Europol. All such exchanges of information shall be in accordance with applicable Union and national law. 5. The Management Board shall determine the rights and obligations of liaison officers in relation to Europol. Liaison officers shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary for the performance of their tasks in accordance with Article 63(2). 6. Europol shall ensure that liaison officers are fully informed of and associated with all of its activities, in so far as necessary for the performance of their tasks. 7. Europol shall cover the costs of providing Member States with the necessary premises within the Europol building and adequate support for liaison officers to perform their duties. All other costs that arise in connection with the designation of liaison officers shall be borne by the designating Member State, including the costs of equipment for liaison officers, unless the European Parliament and the Council decide otherwise on the recommendation of the Management Board.
Article 9 Administrative and management structure of Europol
The administrative and management structure of Europol shall comprise: (a) a Management Board; (b) an Executive Director; (c) where appropriate, other advisory bodies established by the Management Board in accordance with point (s) of Article 11(1).
Article 10 Composition of the Management Board
1. The Management Board shall be composed of one representative from each Member State and one representative of the Commission. Each representative shall have a voting right. 2. The members of the Management Board shall be appointed taking into account their knowledge of law enforcement cooperation. 3. Each member of the Management Board shall have an alternate member who shall be appointed taking into account the criterion set out in paragraph 2. The alternate member shall represent the member in his or her absence. The principle of a balanced gender representation on the Management Board shall also be taken into account. 4. Without prejudice to the right of the Member States and of the Commission to terminate the mandate of their respective member and alternate member, the membership of the Management Board shall be for a period of four years. That term shall be extendable.
Article 11 Functions of the Management Board
1. The Management Board shall: (a) adopt each year, by a majority of two-thirds of its members and in accordance with Article 12, a document containing Europol's multiannual programming and its annual work programme for the following year; (b) adopt, by a majority of two-thirds of its members, the annual budget of Europol and exercise other functions in respect of Europol's budget pursuant to Chapter X; (c) adopt a consolidated annual activity report on Europol's activities and, by 1 July of the following year, send it to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the national parliaments. The consolidated annual activity report shall be made public; (d) adopt the financial rules applicable to Europol in accordance with Article 61; (e) adopt an internal anti-fraud strategy, proportionate to fraud risks, taking into account the costs and benefits of the measures to be implemented; (f) adopt rules for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in respect of its members, including in relation to their declaration of interests; (g) in accordance with paragraph 2, exercise, with respect to the staff of Europol, the powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the appointing authority and by the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants on the authority empowered to conclude a contract of employment of other servants (‘the appointing authority powers’); (h) adopt appropriate implementing rules giving effect to the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations; (i) adopt internal rules regarding the procedure for the selection of the Executive Director, including rules on the composition of the selection committee which ensure its independence and impartiality; (j) propose to the Council a shortlist of candidates for the posts of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Directors and, where relevant, propose to the Council that their terms of office be extended or that they be removed from office in accordance with Articles 54 and 55; (k) establish performance indicators and oversee the Executive Director's performance, including the implementation of Management Board decisions; (l) appoint a Data Protection Officer, who shall be functionally independent in the performance of his or her duties; (m) appoint an accounting officer, who shall be subject to the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants and functionally independent in the performance of his or her duties; (n) establish, where appropriate, an internal audit capability; (o) ensure adequate follow-up to findings and recommendations stemming from the internal or external audit reports and evaluations, as well as from investigations of OLAF and the EDPS; (p) define the evaluation criteria for the annual report in accordance with Article 7(11); (q) adopt guidelines further specifying the procedures for the processing of information by Europol in accordance with Article 18, after consulting the EDPS; (r) decide upon the conclusion of working and administrative arrangements in accordance with Article 23(4) and Article 25(1), respectively; (s) decide, taking into consideration both business and financial requirements, upon the establishment of Europol's internal structures, including Union centres of specialised expertise as referred to in point (l) of Article 4(1), upon a proposal of the Executive Director; (t) adopt its rules of procedure, including provisions concerning the tasks and the functioning of its secretariat; (u) adopt, where appropriate, other internal rules. 2. If the Management Board considers it necessary for the performance of Europol's tasks, it may suggest to the Council that it draw the attention of the Commission to the need for an adequacy decision as referred to in point (a) of Article 25(1) or for a recommendation for a decision authorising the opening of negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an international agreement as referred to in point (b) of Article 25(1). 3. The Management Board shall, in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, adopt a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and on Article 6 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants delegating the relevant appointing authority powers to the Executive Director and establishing the conditions under which such delegation of powers may be suspended. The Executive Director shall be authorised to subdelegate those powers. Where exceptional circumstances so require, the Management Board may, by way of a decision, temporarily suspend the delegation of the appointing authority powers to the Executive Director and any subdelegation of such powers and exercise them itself or delegate those powers to one of its members or to a staff member other than the Executive Director.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 11 Functions of the Management Board):
2. If the Management Board considers it necessary for the performance of Europol's tasks, it may suggest to the Council that it draw the attention of the Commission to the need for an adequacy decision as referred to in point (a) of Article 25(1) or for a recommendation for a decision authorising the opening of negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an international agreement as referred to in point (b) of Article 25(1). 3. The Management Board shall, in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations, adopt a decision based on Article 2(1) of the Staff Regulations and on Article 6 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants delegating the relevant appointing authority powers to the Executive Director and establishing the conditions under which such delegation of powers may be suspended. The Executive Director shall be authorised to subdelegate those powers. Where exceptional circumstances so require, the Management Board may, by way of a decision, temporarily suspend the delegation of the appointing authority powers to the Executive Director and any subdelegation of such powers and exercise them itself or delegate those powers to one of its members or to a staff member other than the Executive Director.
Article 12 Multiannual programming and annual work programmes
1. The Management Board shall, by 30 November each year, adopt a document containing Europol's multiannual programming and annual work programme, based on a draft put forward by the Executive Director, taking into account the opinion of the Commission and, as regards the multiannual programming, after having consulted the JPSG. The Management Board shall forward that document to the Council, the Commission and the JPSG. 2. The multiannual programming shall set out the overall strategic programming, including the objectives, expected results and performance indicators. It shall also set out the resource planning, including the multiannual budget and staff. It shall include the strategy for relations with third countries and international organisations. The multiannual programming shall be implemented by means of annual work programmes and shall, where appropriate, be updated following the outcome of external and internal evaluations. The conclusion of those evaluations shall also be reflected, where appropriate, in the annual work programme for the following year. 3. The annual work programme shall comprise detailed objectives, expected results and performance indicators. It shall also contain a description of the actions to be financed and an indication of the financial and human resources allocated to each action, in accordance with the principles of activity-based budgeting and management. The annual work programme shall be consistent with the multiannual programming. It shall clearly indicate tasks that have been added, changed or deleted compared to the previous financial year. 4. Where, after adoption of an annual work programme, a new task is assigned to Europol, the Management Board shall amend the annual work programme. 5. Any substantial amendment to the annual work programme shall be adopted by the same procedure as that applicable to the adoption of the initial annual work programme. The Management Board may delegate to the Executive Director the power to make non-substantial amendments to the annual work programme.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 12 Multiannual programming and annual work programmes):
1. The Management Board shall, by 30 November of each year, adopt a single programming document containing Europol’s multiannual programming and annual work programme, based on a draft put forward by the Executive Director, taking into account the opinion of the Commission and, as regards the multiannual programming, after having consulted the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG). Where the Management Board decides not to take into account the opinion of the Commission referred to in the first subparagraph, in whole or in part, Europol shall provide a thorough justification. Where the Management Board decides not to take into account any of the matters raised by the JPSG in accordance with Article 51(2), point (c), Europol shall provide a thorough justification. Once the single programming document has been adopted, the Management Board shall forward it to the Council, the Commission and the JPSG. 2. The multiannual programming shall set out the overall strategic programming, including the objectives, expected results and performance indicators. It shall also set out the resource planning, including the multiannual budget and establishment plan. It shall include the strategy for relations with third countries and international organisations and Europol’s planned research and innovation activities. The multiannual programming shall be implemented by means of annual work programmes and shall, where appropriate, be updated following the outcome of external and internal evaluations. The conclusion of those evaluations shall also be reflected, where appropriate, in the annual work programme for the following year. 3. The annual work programme shall comprise detailed objectives, expected results and performance indicators. It shall also contain a description of the actions to be financed and an indication of the financial and human resources allocated to each action, in accordance with the principles of activity-based budgeting and management. The annual work programme shall be consistent with the multiannual programming. It shall clearly indicate tasks that have been added, changed or deleted compared to the previous financial year. 4. Where, after adoption of an annual work programme, a new task is assigned to Europol, the Management Board shall amend the annual work programme. 5. Any substantial amendment to the annual work programme shall be adopted by the same procedure as that applicable to the adoption of the initial annual work programme. The Management Board may delegate to the Executive Director the power to make non-substantial amendments to the annual work programme.
Article 13 Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the Management Board
1. The Management Board shall elect a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson from within the group of three Member States that have jointly prepared the Council's 18-month programme. They shall serve for the 18-month period corresponding to that Council programme. If, however, the Chairperson's or the Deputy Chairperson's membership of the Management Board ends at any time during their term of office as Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson, their term of office shall automatically expire at the same time. 2. The Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson shall be elected by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Management Board. 3. Where the Chairperson is unable to carry out his or her duties, he or she shall automatically be replaced by the Deputy Chairperson.
Article 14 Meetings of the Management Board
1. The Chairperson shall convene the meetings of the Management Board. 2. The Executive Director shall take part in the deliberations of the Management Board. 3. The Management Board shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of its Chairperson, or at the request of the Commission or of at least one-third of its members. 4. The Management Board may invite any person whose opinion may be relevant for the discussion, including, where appropriate, a representative of the JPSG, to attend its meeting as a non-voting observer. 5. The members and the alternate members of the Management Board may, subject to its rules of procedure, be assisted at the meetings by advisers or experts. 6. Europol shall provide the secretariat for the Management Board.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 14 Meetings of the Management Board):
1. The Chairperson shall convene the meetings of the Management Board. 2. The Executive Director shall take part in the deliberations of the Management Board. 3. The Management Board shall hold at least two ordinary meetings a year. In addition, it shall meet on the initiative of its Chairperson, or at the request of the Commission or of at least one-third of its members. 4. The Management Board may invite any person whose opinion may be relevant for the discussion to attend its meeting as a non-voting observer. Two representatives of the JPSG shall be invited to attend two ordinary meetings of the Management Board per year as non-voting observers to discuss the following matters of political interest: (b) the single programming document referred to in Article 12 for the following year and the annual budget; (c) JPSG written questions and answers; (d) external relations and partnership matters. The Management Board, together with the representatives of the JPSG, may determine other matters of political interest to be discussed at the meetings referred to in the first subparagraph. 5. The members and the alternate members of the Management Board may, subject to its rules of procedure, be assisted at the meetings by advisers or experts. 6. Europol shall provide the secretariat for the Management Board.
Article 15 Voting rules of the Management Board
1. Without prejudice to points (a) and (b) of Article 11(1), Article 13(2), Article 50(2), Article 54(8) and Article 64, the Management Board shall take decisions by a majority of its members. 2. Each member shall have one vote. In the absence of a voting member, his or her alternate shall be entitled to exercise his or her right to vote. 3. The Executive Director shall not take part in the vote. 4. The Management Board's rules of procedure shall establish more detailed voting arrangements, in particular the circumstances in which a member may act on behalf of another member, and any quorum requirements, where necessary.
Article 16 Responsibilities of the Executive Director
1. The Executive Director shall manage Europol. He or she shall be accountable to the Management Board. 2. Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission or the Management Board, the Executive Director shall be independent in the performance of his or her duties and shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or any other body. 3. The Council may invite the Executive Director to report on the performance of his or her duties. 4. The Executive Director shall be the legal representative of Europol. 5. The Executive Director shall be responsible for the implementation of the tasks assigned to Europol by this Regulation, in particular: (a) the day-to-day administration of Europol; (b) making proposals to the Management Board as regards the establishment of Europol's internal structures; (c) implementing decisions adopted by the Management Board; (d) preparing the draft multiannual programming and annual work programmes and submitting them to the Management Board, after having consulted the Commission; (e) implementing the multiannual programming and the annual work programmes and reporting to the Management Board on their implementation; (f) preparing appropriate draft implementing rules to give effect to the Staff Regulations and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations; (g) preparing the draft consolidated annual report on Europol's activities and presenting it to the Management Board for adoption; (h) preparing an action plan following up conclusions of internal or external audit reports and evaluations, as well as investigation reports and recommendations from investigations by OLAF and the EDPS, and reporting on progress twice a year to the Commission and regularly to the Management Board; (i) protecting the financial interests of the Union by applying measures to prevent fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity and, without prejudice to the investigative competence of OLAF, by effective checks and, if irregularities are detected, by recovering amounts wrongly paid and, where appropriate, by effective, proportionate and dissuasive administrative and financial penalties; (j) preparing a draft internal anti-fraud strategy for Europol and presenting it to the Management Board for adoption; (k) preparing draft internal rules for the prevention and management of conflicts of interest in respect of the members of the Management Board and presenting those draft rules to the Management Board for adoption; (l) preparing draft financial rules applicable to Europol; (m) preparing Europol's draft statement of estimates of revenue and expenditure and implementing its budget; (n) supporting the Chairperson of the Management Board in preparing Management Board meetings; (o) informing the Management Board on a regular basis regarding the implementation of Union strategic and operational priorities for fighting crime; (p) performing other tasks pursuant to this Regulation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 16 Responsibilities of the Executive Director):
1. The Executive Director shall manage Europol. He or she shall be accountable to the Management Board. 2. Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission or the Management Board, the Executive Director shall be independent in the performance of his or her duties and shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or any other body. 3. The Council or the JPSG may invite the Executive Director to report on the performance of his or her duties. 4. The Executive Director shall be the legal representative of Europol.
Article 17 Sources of information
1. Europol shall only process information that has been provided to it: (a) by Member States in accordance with their national law and Article 7; (b) by Union bodies, third countries and international organisations in accordance with Chapter V; (c) by private parties and private persons in accordance with Chapter V. 2. Europol may directly retrieve and process information, including personal data, from publicly available sources, including the internet and public data. 3. In so far as Europol is entitled under Union, international or national legal instruments to gain computerised access to data from Union, international or national information systems, it may retrieve and process information, including personal data, by such means if that is necessary for the performance of its tasks. The applicable provisions of such Union, international or national legal instruments shall govern access to, and the use of, that information by Europol, in so far as they provide for stricter rules on access and use than those laid down by this Regulation. Access to such information systems shall be granted only to duly authorised staff of Europol and only in so far as this is necessary and proportionate for the performance of their tasks.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 17 Sources of information):
2. Europol may directly retrieve and process information, including personal data, from publicly available sources, including the internet and public data. 3. In so far as Europol is entitled under Union, international or national legal instruments to gain computerised access to data from Union, international or national information systems, it may retrieve and process information, including personal data, by such means if that is necessary for the performance of its tasks. The applicable provisions of such Union, international or national legal instruments shall govern access to, and the use of, that information by Europol, in so far as they provide for stricter rules on access and use than those laid down by this Regulation. Access to such information systems shall be granted only to duly authorised staff of Europol and only in so far as this is necessary and proportionate for the performance of their tasks.
Article 18 Purposes of information processing activities
1. In so far as is necessary for the achievement of its objectives as laid down in Article 3, Europol may process information, including personal data. 2. Personal data may be processed only for the purposes of: (a) cross-checking aimed at identifying connections or other relevant links between information related to: (i) persons who are suspected of having committed or taken part in a criminal offence in respect of which Europol is competent, or who have been convicted of such an offence; (ii) persons regarding whom there are factual indications or reasonable grounds to believe that they will commit criminal offences in respect of which Europol is competent; (b) analyses of a strategic or thematic nature; (c) operational analyses; (d) facilitating the exchange of information between Member States, Europol, other Union bodies, third countries and international organisations. 3. Processing for the purpose of operational analyses as referred to in point (c) of paragraph 2 shall be performed by means of operational analysis projects, in respect of which the following specific safeguards shall apply: (a) for every operational analysis project, the Executive Director shall define the specific purpose, categories of personal data and categories of data subjects, participants, duration of storage and conditions for access, transfer and use of the data concerned, and shall inform the Management Board and the EDPS thereof; (b) personal data may only be collected and processed for the purpose of the specified operational analysis project. Where it becomes apparent that personal data may be relevant for another operational analysis project, further processing of that personal data shall only be permitted insofar as such further processing is necessary and proportionate and the personal data are compatible with the provisions set out in point (a) that apply to the other analysis project; (c) only authorised staff may access and process the data of the relevant project. 4. The processing referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be carried out in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in this Regulation. Europol shall duly document those processing operations. The documentation shall be made available, upon request, to the Data Protection Officer and to the EDPS for the purpose of verifying the lawfulness of the processing operations. 5. Categories of personal data and categories of data subjects whose data may be collected and processed for each purpose referred to in paragraph 2 are listed in Annex II. 6. Europol may temporarily process data for the purpose of determining whether such data are relevant to its tasks and, if so, for which of the purposes referred to in paragraph 2. The Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Executive Director and after consulting the EDPS, shall further specify the conditions relating to the processing of such data, in particular with respect to access to and use of the data, as well as time limits for the storage and deletion of the data, which may not exceed six months, having due regard to the principles referred to in Article 28. 7. The Management Board, after consulting the EDPS, shall, as appropriate, adopt guidelines further specifying procedures for the processing of information for the purposes listed in paragraph 2 in accordance with point (q) of Article 11(1).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 18 Purposes of information processing activities):
1. In so far as is necessary for the achievement of its objectives as laid down in Article 3, Europol may process information, including personal data. 3a. If necessary to achieve the objectives of Europol’s research and innovation projects, the processing of personal data for that purpose shall be carried out only in the context of Europol’s research and innovation projects with clearly defined purposes and objectives, and shall be in accordance with Article 33a. 4. The processing referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be carried out in compliance with the data protection safeguards provided for in this Regulation. Europol shall duly document those processing operations. The documentation shall be made available, upon request, to the Data Protection Officer and to the EDPS for the purpose of verifying the lawfulness of the processing operations. 5. Without prejudice to Article 8(4), Article 18(2), point (e), Article 18a, and data processing pursuant to Article 26(6c), where Europol’s infrastructure is used for bilateral exchanges of personal data and Europol has no access to the content of the data, categories of personal data and categories of data subjects whose data may be collected and processed for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article are listed in Annex II. 5a. In accordance with Article 73 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 12 ), Europol shall, where applicable and as far as possible, make a clear distinction between the personal data that relate to the different categories of data subjects listed in Annex II. 6. Europol may temporarily process data for the purpose of determining whether such data are relevant to its tasks and, if so, for which of the purposes referred to in paragraph 2. The time limit for the processing of such data shall not exceed six months from the receipt of those data. 6a. Prior to the processing of data pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, where strictly necessary for the sole purpose of determining whether personal data are in compliance with paragraph 5 of this Article, Europol may temporarily process personal data that have been provided to it pursuant to Article 17(1) and (2), including by checking those data against all data that Europol already processes in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Article. Europol shall process personal data pursuant to the first subparagraph for a period of up to 18 months from the moment Europol ascertains that those data fall within its objectives or, in justified cases, for a longer period where necessary for the purpose of this Article. Europol shall inform the EDPS of any extension of the processing period. The maximum period of data processing pursuant to the first subparagraph shall be three years. Such personal data shall be kept functionally separate from other data. Where Europol concludes that personal data referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph are not in compliance with paragraph 5, Europol shall delete those data and inform, where relevant, the provider of those deleted data accordingly. 6b. The Management Board, acting on a proposal from the Executive Director, after consulting the EDPS and having due regard to the principles referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, shall specify the conditions relating to the processing of the data referred to in paragraphs 6 and 6a of this Article, in particular with respect to the provision of, access to and the use of those data, as well as the time limits for the storage and deletion of such data, which shall not exceed those set out in paragraphs 6 and 6a of this Article. 7. The Management Board, after consulting the EDPS, shall, as appropriate, adopt guidelines further specifying procedures for the processing of information for the purposes listed in paragraph 2 in accordance with point (q) of Article 11(1).
Article 19 Determination of the purpose of, and restrictions on, the processing of information by Europol
1. A Member State, a Union body, a third country or an international organisation providing information to Europol shall determine the purpose or purposes for which it is to be processed, as referred to in Article 18. If it has not done so, Europol, in agreement with the provider of the information concerned, shall process the information in order to determine the relevance of such information as well as the purpose or purposes for which it is to be further processed. Europol may process information for a purpose different from that for which information has been provided only if authorised so to do by the provider of the information. 2. Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations may indicate, at the moment of providing information to Europol, any restriction on access thereto or the use to be made thereof, in general or specific terms, including as regards its transfer, erasure or destruction. Where the need for such restrictions becomes apparent after the information has been provided, they shall inform Europol accordingly. Europol shall comply with such restrictions. 3. In duly justified cases Europol may assign restrictions to access or use by Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations of information retrieved from publicly available sources.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 19 Determination of the purpose of, and restrictions on, the processing of information by Europol):
1. A Member State, a Union body, a third country or an international organisation that provides information to Europol shall determine the purpose or purposes for which that information is to be processed, in accordance with Article 18. Where a provider of information referred to in the first subparagraph has not complied with that subparagraph, Europol, in agreement with the provider of the information concerned, shall process the information in order to determine the relevance of such information as well as the purpose or purposes for which it is to be further processed. Europol shall process information for a purpose different from that for which information has been provided only if authorised to do so by the provider of the information. Information provided for the purposes referred to in Article 18(2), points (a) to (d), may also be processed by Europol for the purpose of Article 18(2), point (e), in accordance with Article 33a. 2. Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations may indicate, at the moment of providing information to Europol, any restriction on access thereto or the use to be made thereof, in general or specific terms, including as regards its transfer, transmission, erasure or destruction. Where the need for such restrictions becomes apparent after the information has been provided, they shall inform Europol accordingly. Europol shall comply with such restrictions. 3. In duly justified cases Europol may assign restrictions to access or use by Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations of information retrieved from publicly available sources.
Article 20 Access by Member States and Europol's staff to information stored by Europol
1. Member States shall, in accordance with their national law and Article 7(5), have access to, and be able to search, all information which has been provided for the purposes of points (a) and (b) of Article 18(2). This shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations to indicate any restrictions in accordance with Article 19(2). 2. Member States shall, in accordance with their national law and Article 7(5), have indirect access on the basis of a hit/no hit system to information provided for the purposes of point (c) of Article 18(2). This shall be without prejudice to any restrictions indicated by the Member States, Union bodies and third countries or international organisations providing the information, in accordance with Article 19(2). In the case of a hit, Europol shall initiate the procedure by which the information that generated the hit may be shared, in accordance with the decision of the provider of the information to Europol. 3. In accordance with national law, the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be accessed and further processed by Member States only for the purpose of preventing and combating: (a) forms of crime in respect of which Europol is competent; and (b) other forms of serious crime, as set out in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA ( 22 ) . 4. Europol staff duly empowered by the Executive Director shall have access to information processed by Europol to the extent required for the performance of their duties and without prejudice to Article 67.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 20 Access by Member States and Europol's staff to information stored by Europol):
In the case of a hit, Europol shall initiate the procedure by which the information that generated the hit may be shared, in accordance with the decision of the provider of the information to Europol. 3. In accordance with national law, the information referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 2a shall be accessed and further processed by Member States only for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting: (a) forms of crime in respect of which Europol is competent; and (b) other forms of serious crime, as set out in Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA ( 13 ). 4. Europol staff duly empowered by the Executive Director shall have access to information processed by Europol to the extent required for the performance of their duties and without prejudice to Article 67.
Article 21 Access by Eurojust and OLAF to information stored by Europol
1. Europol shall take all appropriate measures to enable Eurojust and OLAF, within their respective mandates, to have indirect access on the basis of a hit/no hit system to information provided for the purposes of points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 18(2), without prejudice to any restrictions indicated by the Member State, Union body, third country or international organisation providing the information in question, in accordance with Article 19(2). In the case of a hit, Europol shall initiate the procedure by which the information that generated the hit may be shared, in accordance with the decision of the provider of the information to Europol, and only to the extent that the data generating the hit are necessary for the performance of Eurojust's or OLAF's tasks. 2. Europol and Eurojust may conclude a working arrangement ensuring, in a reciprocal manner and within their respective mandates, access to, and the possibility of searching, all information that has been provided for the purpose specified in point (a) of Article 18(2). This shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations to indicate restrictions on access to, and the use of, such data, and shall be in accordance with the data protection guarantees provided for in this Regulation. 3. Searches of information in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be carried out only for the purpose of identifying whether information available at Eurojust or OLAF matches with information processed at Europol. 4. Europol shall allow searches in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 only after obtaining from Eurojust information on which National Members, Deputies and Assistants, as well as Eurojust staff members, and from OLAF information on which OLAF staff members, have been designated as authorised to perform such searches. 5. If, during Europol's information-processing activities in respect of an individual investigation, Europol or a Member State identifies the need for coordination, cooperation or support in accordance with the mandate of Eurojust or OLAF, Europol shall notify them to that effect and shall initiate the procedure for sharing the information, in accordance with the decision of the Member State providing the information. In such a case, Eurojust or OLAF shall consult with Europol. 6. Eurojust, including the College, the National Members, Deputies and Assistants, as well as Eurojust staff members, and OLAF, shall respect any restriction on access or use, in general or specific terms, indicated by Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations in accordance with Article 19(2). 7. Europol, Eurojust and OLAF shall inform each other if, after consulting each other's data in accordance with paragraph 2 or as a result of a hit in accordance with paragraph 1, there are indications that data may be incorrect or may conflict with other data.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 21 Access by Eurojust and OLAF to information stored by Europol):
1. Europol shall take all appropriate measures to enable Eurojust and OLAF, within their respective mandates, to have indirect access on the basis of a hit/no hit system to information provided for the purposes of points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 18(2), without prejudice to any restrictions indicated by the Member State, Union body, third country or international organisation providing the information in question, in accordance with Article 19(2). In the case of a hit, Europol shall initiate the procedure by which the information that generated the hit may be shared, in accordance with the decision of the provider of the information to Europol, and only to the extent that the data generating the hit are necessary for the performance of Eurojust's or OLAF's tasks. 2. Europol and Eurojust may conclude a working arrangement ensuring, in a reciprocal manner and within their respective mandates, access to, and the possibility of searching, all information that has been provided for the purpose specified in point (a) of Article 18(2). This shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations to indicate restrictions on access to, and the use of, such data, and shall be in accordance with the data protection guarantees provided for in this Regulation. 3. Searches of information in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be carried out only for the purpose of identifying whether information available at Eurojust or OLAF matches with information processed at Europol. 4. Europol shall allow searches in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 only after obtaining from Eurojust information on which National Members, Deputies and Assistants, as well as Eurojust staff members, and from OLAF information on which OLAF staff members, have been designated as authorised to perform such searches. 5. If, during Europol's information-processing activities in respect of an individual investigation, Europol or a Member State identifies the need for coordination, cooperation or support in accordance with the mandate of Eurojust or OLAF, Europol shall notify them to that effect and shall initiate the procedure for sharing the information, in accordance with the decision of the Member State providing the information. In such a case, Eurojust or OLAF shall consult with Europol. 6. Eurojust, including the College, the National Members, Deputies and Assistants, as well as Eurojust staff members, and OLAF, shall respect any restriction on access or use, in general or specific terms, indicated by Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations in accordance with Article 19(2). 7. Europol, Eurojust and OLAF shall inform each other if, after consulting each other's data in accordance with paragraph 2 or as a result of a hit in accordance with paragraph 1, there are indications that data may be incorrect or may conflict with other data. 8. If, while processing information in respect of a specific criminal investigation or a specific project, Europol identifies information relevant to possible illegal activity affecting the financial interest of the Union, Europol shall provide OLAF without delay with that information without prejudice to any restrictions indicated pursuant to Article 19(2) by the Member State that provided the information. Where Europol provides OLAF with information under the first subparagraph, it shall notify the Member States concerned without delay.
Article 22 Duty to notify Member States
1. Europol shall, in accordance with point (b) of Article 4(1), notify a Member State without delay of any information concerning it. If such information is subject to access restrictions pursuant to Article 19(2) that would prohibit its being shared, Europol shall consult with the provider of the information stipulating the access restriction and seek its authorisation for sharing. In such a case, the information shall not be shared without an explicit authorisation by the provider. 2. Irrespective of any access restrictions, Europol shall notify a Member State of any information concerning it if this is absolutely necessary in the interest of preventing an imminent threat to life. In such a case, Europol shall at the same time notify the provider of the information about the sharing of the information and justify its analysis of the situation.
Article 23 Common provisions
1. In so far as necessary for the performance of its tasks, Europol may establish and maintain cooperative relations with Union bodies in accordance with the objectives of those bodies, the authorities of third countries, international organisations and private parties. 2. Subject to any restriction pursuant to Article 19(2) and without prejudice to Article 67, Europol may directly exchange all information, with the exception of personal data, with entities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, in so far as such an exchange is relevant for the performance of Europol's tasks. 3. The Executive Director shall inform the Management Board about any regular cooperative relations which Europol intends to establish and maintain in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, and about the development of such relations once established. 4. For the purposes set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, Europol may conclude working arrangements with entities referred to in paragraph 1. Such working arrangements shall not allow the exchange of personal data and shall not bind the Union or its Member States. 5. Europol may receive and process personal data from entities referred to in paragraph 1 insofar as necessary and proportionate for the legitimate performance of its tasks and subject to the provisions of this Chapter. 6. Without prejudice to Article 30(5), personal data shall only be transferred by Europol to Union bodies, third countries and international organisations if necessary for preventing and combating crime falling within the scope of Europol's objectives and in accordance with this Regulation, and if the recipient gives an undertaking that the data will be processed only for the purpose for which they were transferred. If the data to be transferred have been provided by a Member State, Europol shall seek that Member State's consent, unless the Member State has granted its prior authorisation to such onward transfer, either in general terms or subject to specific conditions. Such consent may be withdrawn at any time. 7. Onward transfers of personal data held by Europol by Member States, Union bodies, third countries and international organisations shall be prohibited, unless Europol has given its prior explicit authorisation. 8. Europol shall ensure that detailed records of all transfers of personal data and of the grounds for such transfers are recorded in accordance with this Regulation. 9. Any information which has clearly been obtained in obvious violation of human rights shall not be processed.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism. 
Revised version (Article 23 Common provisions):
1. In so far as necessary for the performance of its tasks, Europol may establish and maintain cooperative relations with Union bodies in accordance with the objectives of those bodies, the authorities of third countries, international organisations and private parties. 2. Subject to any restriction pursuant to Article 19(2) and without prejudice to Article 67, Europol may directly exchange all information, with the exception of personal data, with entities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, in so far as such an exchange is relevant for the performance of Europol's tasks. 3. The Executive Director shall inform the Management Board about any regular cooperative relations which Europol intends to establish and maintain in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, and about the development of such relations once established. 4. For the purposes set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, Europol may conclude working arrangements with entities referred to in paragraph 1. Such working arrangements shall not allow the exchange of personal data and shall not bind the Union or its Member States. 5. Europol may receive and process personal data from entities referred to in paragraph 1 insofar as necessary and proportionate for the legitimate performance of its tasks and subject to the provisions of this Chapter. 6. Without prejudice to Article 30(5), personal data shall only be transferred by Europol to Union bodies, third countries and international organisations if necessary for preventing and combating crime falling within the scope of Europol's objectives and in accordance with this Regulation, and if the recipient gives an undertaking that the data will be processed only for the purpose for which they were transferred. If the data to be transferred have been provided by a Member State, Europol shall seek that Member State's consent, unless the Member State has granted its prior authorisation to such onward transfer, either in general terms or subject to specific conditions. Such consent may be withdrawn at any time. 7. Onward transfers of personal data held by Europol by Member States, Union bodies, third countries, international organisations or private parties shall be prohibited, unless Europol has given its prior explicit authorisation. 8. Europol shall ensure that detailed records of all transfers of personal data and of the grounds for such transfers are recorded in accordance with this Regulation. 9. Any information which has clearly been obtained in obvious violation of human rights shall not be processed.
Article 24 Transfer of personal data to Union bodies
Subject to any possible restrictions pursuant to Article 19(2) or (3) and without prejudice to Article 67, Europol may directly transfer personal data to a Union body, insofar as such transfer is necessary for the performance of its tasks or those of the recipient Union body.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Europe faces a security landscape in flux, with evolving and increasingly complex security threats. Criminals exploit the advantages that the digital transformation, new technologies 1 , globalisation and mobility bring about, including the inter-connectivity and blurring of the boundaries between the physical and digital world. 2 Recent events 3 have once again shown that terrorism remains a significant threat to the freedom and way of life of the European Union and its citizens. The COVID-19 crisis adds to this, as criminals have quickly seized opportunities to exploit the crisis by adapting their modes of operation or developing new criminal activities . 4 Although the full impact of the COVID-19 crisis on security is not yet apparent, it is expected to shape the landscape of serious and organised crime in the EU in mid- and long-term. 5 These evolving security threats call for effective EU level support to the work of national law enforcement authorities. These threats spread across borders, cut across a variety of crimes that they facilitate, and manifest themselves in poly-criminal organised crime groups 6 that engage in a wide range of criminal activities. As action at national level alone does not suffice to address these transnational security challenges , Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of the support and expertise that Europol, the EU agency for law enforcement cooperation, offers to counter serious crime and terrorism. Europol is the centrepiece for EU-level support to Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism. The agency offers support and expertise to national law enforcement authorities in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. Since the entry into application of the 2016 Europol Regulation 7 , the operational importance of the agency’s tasks has changed substantially. For example, the operational support provided by Europol’s European Counter-Terrorism Centre has increased fivefold over recent years (from 127 operational cases supported in 2016 to 632 cases in 2019). The Centre is now part of almost every major counter-terrorism investigation in the EU. The threat from terrorism in Europe remains high. 8 In a joint statement by the EU Home Affairs Ministers of 13 November 2020 on the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Ministers “ invite the Commission to submit a proposal revising the Europol mandate with a strong legal basis for the handling of large datasets. Europol and especially its European Counter Terrorism Centre are of fundamental importance for effectively supporting the Member States in their prevention and prosecution of terrorist crimes, and need to be bolstered. ” 9 The threat environment also changes type of the support Member States need and expect from Europol to keep citizens safe, in a way that was not foreseeable when the co-legislators negotiated the current Europol mandate. The December 2019 Council Conclusions acknowledge “ the urgent operational need for Europol to request and receive data directly from private parties ”, calling on the Commission to consider adapting the schedule for the review of the Europol Regulation “ in view of the need for European law enforcement to address ongoing technological developments ”. 10 There is a pressing social need to counter serious crimes prepared or committed with the use of cross-border services offered by private parties 11 , notably cybercrimes. Whereas this challenge is partially addressed by the e-evidence package 12 , there are situations where Europol’s support is necessary to counter the threats posed by cybercrime and cyber-enabled crimes effectively, notably when private parties seek to report such crimes. A July 2020 European Parliament Resolution also calls for reinforcing Europol, stating that “ strengthening Europol’s capacity to request the initiation of cross-border investigations, particularly in cases of serious attacks against whistleblowers and investigative journalists who play an essential role in exposing corruption, fraud, mismanagement and other wrongdoing in the public and private sectors, should be a priority.” 13 Given the changing security landscape, Europol needs to have the capabilities and tools to support Member States effectively in countering serious crime and terrorism. In response to pressing operational needs, and calls by the co-legislators for stronger support from Europol, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 announced a legislative initiative to “ strengthen the Europol mandate in order to reinforce operational police cooperation ”. This is also a key action of the July 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. 14 In line with the call by the Political Guidelines 15 to “ leave no stone unturned when it comes to protecting our citizens ”, this legislative initiative addresses those areas where stakeholders ask for reinforced support from Europol to help Member States keeping citizens safe. To that end, this proposal seeks to strengthen the mandate of Europol within the mission and tasks of the agency as laid down in the Treaty 16 , notably by: · enabling Europol to cooperate effectively with private parties, addressing lack of effective cooperation between private parties and law enforcement authorities to counter the use of cross-border services, such as communication, banking, or transport services, by criminals; · enabling Europol to effectively support Member States and their investigations with the analysis of large and complex datasets, addressing the big data challenge for law enforcement authorities; · strengthening Europol’s role on research and innovation, addressing gaps relevant for law enforcement; · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with third countries in specific situations and on a case-by-case basis for preventing and countering crimes falling within the scope of Europol’s objectives; · clarifying that Europol may request, in specific cases where Europol considers that a criminal investigation should be initiated, the competent authorities of a Member State to initiate, conduct or coordinate an investigation of a crime which affects a common interest covered by a Union policy, without the requirement of a cross-border dimension of the crime concerned; 17 · strengthening Europol’s cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO); · further strengthening the data protection framework applicable to Europol; · further strengthening parliamentary oversight and accountability of Europol. This legislative initiative is linked to a legislative proposal amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to enable Europol to enter data into the SIS. Subject to consultation of the Member States, this would enable Europol to enter data into the SIS on the suspected involvement of a third country national in an offence in respect of which Europol is competent. This legislative initiative is part of a package of measures presented by the Commission on 9 December 2020 to reinforce the Union’s response to the threat posed by terrorism.