Article 171 Assignment to grades or pools
1. An institution shall have specific definitions, processes and criteria for assigning exposures to grades or pools within a rating system that comply with the following requirements: (a) the grade or pool definitions and criteria shall be sufficiently detailed to allow those charged with assigning ratings to consistently assign obligors or facilities posing similar risk to the same grade or pool. This consistency shall exist across lines of business, departments and geographic locations; (b) the documentation of the rating process shall allow third parties to understand the assignments of exposures to grades or pools, to replicate grade and pool assignments and to evaluate the appropriateness of the assignments to a grade or a pool; (c) the criteria shall also be consistent with the institution's internal lending standards and its policies for handling troubled obligors and facilities. 2. An institution shall take all relevant information into account in assigning obligors and facilities to grades or pools. Information shall be current and shall enable the institution to forecast the future performance of the exposure. The less information an institution has, the more conservative shall be its assignments of exposures to obligor and facility grades or pools. If an institution uses an external rating as a primary factor determining an internal rating assignment, the institution shall ensure that it considers other relevant information.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 171 Assignment to grades or pools):
2. An institution shall take all relevant information into account in assigning obligors and facilities to grades or pools. Information shall be current and shall enable the institution to forecast the future performance of the exposure. The less information an institution has, the more conservative shall be its assignments of exposures to obligor and facility grades or pools. If an institution uses an external rating as a primary factor determining an internal rating assignment, the institution shall ensure that it considers other relevant information.
Article 172 Assignment of exposures
1. For exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, and for equity exposures where an institution uses the PD/LGD approach set out in Article 155(3), assignment of exposures shall be carried out in accordance with the following criteria: (a) each obligor shall be assigned to an obligor grade as part of the credit approval process; (b) for those exposures for which an institution has received the permission of the competent authority to use own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors pursuant to Article 143, each exposure shall also be assigned to a facility grade as part of the credit approval process; (c) institutions using the methods set out in Article 153(5) for assigning risk weights for specialised lending exposures shall assign each of these exposures to a grade in accordance with Article 170(2); (d) each separate legal entity to which the institution is exposed shall be separately rated. An institution shall have appropriate policies regarding the treatment of individual obligor clients and groups of connected clients; (e) separate exposures to the same obligor shall be assigned to the same obligor grade, irrespective of any differences in the nature of each specific transaction. However, where separate exposures are allowed to result in multiple grades for the same obligor, the following shall apply: (i) country transfer risk, this being dependent on whether the exposures are denominated in local or foreign currency; (ii) the treatment of associated guarantees to an exposure may be reflected in an adjusted assignment to an obligor grade; (iii) consumer protection, bank secrecy or other legislation prohibit the exchange of client data. (e) separate exposures to the same obligor shall be assigned to the same obligor grade, irrespective of any differences in the nature of each specific transaction. However, where separate exposures are allowed to result in multiple grades for the same obligor, the following shall apply: (i) country transfer risk, this being dependent on whether the exposures are denominated in local or foreign currency; (ii) the treatment of associated guarantees to an exposure may be reflected in an adjusted assignment to an obligor grade; (iii) consumer protection, bank secrecy or other legislation prohibit the exchange of client data. 2. For retail exposures, each exposure shall be assigned to a grade or a pool as part of the credit approval process. 3. For grade and pool assignments institutions shall document the situations in which human judgement may override the inputs or outputs of the assignment process and the personnel responsible for approving these overrides. Institutions shall document these overrides and note down the personnel responsible. Institutions shall analyse the performance of the exposures whose assignments have been overridden. This analysis shall include an assessment of the performance of exposures whose rating has been overridden by a particular person, accounting for all the responsible personnel.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 172 Assignment of exposures):
1. For exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, and for equity exposures where an institution uses the PD/LGD approach set out in Article 155(3), assignment of exposures shall be carried out in accordance with the following criteria: (a) each obligor shall be assigned to an obligor grade as part of the credit approval process; (b) for those exposures for which an institution has received the permission of the competent authority to use own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors pursuant to Article 143, each exposure shall also be assigned to a facility grade as part of the credit approval process; (c) institutions using the methods set out in Article 153(5) for assigning risk weights for specialised lending exposures shall assign each of these exposures to a grade in accordance with Article 170(2); (d) each separate legal entity to which the institution is exposed shall be separately rated. An institution shall have appropriate policies regarding the treatment of individual obligor clients and groups of connected clients; (e) separate exposures to the same obligor shall be assigned to the same obligor grade, irrespective of any differences in the nature of each specific transaction. However, where separate exposures are allowed to result in multiple grades for the same obligor, the following shall apply: (i) country transfer risk, this being dependent on whether the exposures are denominated in local or foreign currency; (ii) the treatment of associated guarantees to an exposure may be reflected in an adjusted assignment to an obligor grade; (iii) consumer protection, bank secrecy or other legislation prohibit the exchange of client data. 2. For retail exposures, each exposure shall be assigned to a grade or a pool as part of the credit approval process. 3. For grade and pool assignments institutions shall document the situations in which human judgement may override the inputs or outputs of the assignment process and the personnel responsible for approving these overrides. Institutions shall document these overrides and note down the personnel responsible. Institutions shall analyse the performance of the exposures whose assignments have been overridden. This analysis shall include an assessment of the performance of exposures whose rating has been overridden by a particular person, accounting for all the responsible personnel.
Article 173 Integrity of assignment process
1. For exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, and for equity exposures where an institution uses the PD/LGD approach set out in Article 155(3), the assignment process shall meet the following requirements of integrity: (a) Assignments and periodic reviews of assignments shall be completed or approved by an independent party that does not directly benefit from decisions to extend the credit; (b) Institutions shall review assignments at least annually and adjust the assignment where the result of the review does not justify carrying forward the current assignment. High risk obligors and problem exposures shall be subject to more frequent review. Institutions shall undertake a new assignment if material information on the obligor or exposure becomes available; (c) An institution shall have an effective process to obtain and update relevant information on obligor characteristics that affect PDs, and on transaction characteristics that affect LGDs or conversion factors. 2. For retail exposures, an institution shall at least annually review obligor and facility assignments and adjust the assignment where the result of the review does not justify carrying forward the current assignment, or review the loss characteristics and delinquency status of each identified risk pool, whichever applicable. An institution shall also at least annually review in a representative sample the status of individual exposures within each pool as a means of ensuring that exposures continue to be assigned to the correct pool, and adjust the assignment where the result of the review does not justify carrying forward the current assignment. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards for the methodologies of the competent authorities to assess the integrity of the assignment process and the regular and independent assessment of risks. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 173 Integrity of assignment process):
2. For retail exposures, an institution shall at least annually review obligor and facility assignments and adjust the assignment where the result of the review does not justify carrying forward the current assignment, or review the loss characteristics and delinquency status of each identified risk pool, whichever applicable. An institution shall also at least annually review in a representative sample the status of individual exposures within each pool as a means of ensuring that exposures continue to be assigned to the correct pool, and adjust the assignment where the result of the review does not justify carrying forward the current assignment. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards setting out the methodologies of the competent authorities to assess the integrity of the assignment process and the regular and independent assessment of risks. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 10 July 2026. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 174 Use of models
If an institution uses statistical models and other mechanical methods to assign exposures to obligors or facilities grades or pools, the following requirements shall be met: (a) the model shall have good predictive power and capital requirements shall not be distorted as a result of its use. The input variables shall form a reasonable and effective basis for the resulting predictions. The model shall not have material biases; (b) the institution shall have in place a process for vetting data inputs into the model, which includes an assessment of the accuracy, completeness and appropriateness of the data; (c) the data used to build the model shall be representative of the population of the institution's actual obligors or exposures; (d) the institution shall have a regular cycle of model validation that includes monitoring of model performance and stability; review of model specification; and testing of model outputs against outcomes; (e) the institution shall complement the statistical model by human judgement and human oversight to review model-based assignments and to ensure that the models are used appropriately. Review procedures shall aim at finding and limiting errors associated with model weaknesses. Human judgements shall take into account all relevant information not considered by the model. The institution shall document how human judgement and model results are to be combined.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Revised version (Article 174 Use of models):
Institutions shall use statistical or other mathematical methods (‘models’) to assign exposures to obligor or facility grades or pools. The following requirements shall be met: (a) the model shall have good predictive power and own funds requirements shall not be distorted as a result of its use; (b) the institution shall have in place a process for vetting data inputs into the model, which includes an assessment of the accuracy, completeness and appropriateness of the data; (c) the data used to build the model shall be representative of the population of the institution's actual obligors or exposures; (d) the institution shall have a regular cycle of model validation that includes monitoring of model performance and stability; review of model specification; and testing of model outputs against outcomes; (e) the institution shall complement the statistical model by human judgement and human oversight to review model-based assignments and to ensure that the models are used appropriately. Review procedures shall aim at finding and limiting errors associated with model weaknesses. Human judgements shall take into account all relevant information not considered by the model. The institution shall document how human judgement and model results are to be combined. For the purposes of the first paragraph, point (a), the input variables shall form a reasonable and effective basis for the resulting predictions. The model shall not have material biases. There shall be a functional link between the inputs and the outputs of the model, which may be determined through expert judgement, where appropriate.
Article 175 Documentation of rating systems
1. The institutions shall document the design and operational details of its rating systems. The documentation shall provide evidence of compliance with the requirements in this Section, and address topics including portfolio differentiation, rating criteria, responsibilities of parties that rate obligors and exposures, frequency of assignment reviews, and management oversight of the rating process. 2. The institution shall document the rationale for and analysis supporting its choice of rating criteria. An institution shall document all major changes in the risk rating process, and such documentation shall support identification of changes made to the risk rating process subsequent to the last review by the competent authorities. The organisation of rating assignment including the rating assignment process and the internal control structure shall also be documented. 3. The institutions shall document the specific definitions of default and loss used internally and ensure consistency with the definitions set out in this Regulation. 4. Where the institution employs statistical models in the rating process, the institution shall document their methodologies. This material shall: (a) provide a detailed outline of the theory, assumptions and mathematical and empirical basis of the assignment of estimates to grades, individual obligors, exposures, or pools, and the data source(s) used to estimate the model; (b) establish a rigorous statistical process including out-of-time and out-of-sample performance tests for validating the model; (c) indicate any circumstances under which the model does not work effectively. 5. An institution shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the requirements of this Article are met, where an institution has obtained a rating system, or model used within a rating system, from a third-party vendor and that vendor refuses or restricts the access of the institution to information pertaining to the methodology of that rating system or model, or underlying data used to develop that methodology or model, on the basis that such information is proprietary.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 175 Documentation of rating systems):
1. The institutions shall document the design and operational details of its rating systems. The documentation shall provide evidence of compliance with the requirements in this Section, and address topics including portfolio differentiation, rating criteria, responsibilities of parties that rate obligors and exposures, frequency of assignment reviews, and management oversight of the rating process. 2. The institution shall document the rationale for and analysis supporting its choice of rating criteria. An institution shall document all major changes in the risk rating process, and such documentation shall support identification of changes made to the risk rating process subsequent to the last review by the competent authorities. The organisation of rating assignment including the rating assignment process and the internal control structure shall also be documented. 3. The institutions shall document the specific definitions of default and loss used internally and ensure consistency with the definitions set out in this Regulation. 5. An institution shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the requirements of this Article are met, where an institution has obtained a rating system, or model used within a rating system, from a third-party vendor and that vendor refuses or restricts the access of the institution to information pertaining to the methodology of that rating system or model, or underlying data used to develop that methodology or model, on the basis that such information is proprietary.
Article 176 Data maintenance
1. Institutions shall collect and store data on aspects of their internal ratings as required under Part Eight. 2. For exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, and for equity exposures where an institution uses the PD/LGD approach set out in Article 155(3), institutions shall collect and store: (a) complete rating histories on obligors and recognised guarantors; (b) the dates the ratings were assigned; (c) the key data and methodology used to derive the rating; (d) the person responsible for the rating assignment; (e) the identity of obligors and exposures that defaulted; (f) the date and circumstances of such defaults; (g) data on the PDs and realised default rates associated with rating grades and ratings migration. 3. Institutions not using own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors shall collect and store data on comparisons of realised LGDs to the values as set out in Article 161(1) and realised conversion factors to the values as set out in Article 166(8). 4. Institutions using own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors shall collect and store: (a) complete histories of data on the facility ratings and LGD and conversion factor estimates associated with each rating scale; (b) the dates on which the ratings were assigned and the estimates were made; (c) the key data and methodology used to derive the facility ratings and LGD and conversion factor estimates; (d) the person who assigned the facility rating and the person who provided LGD and conversion factor estimates; (e) data on the estimated and realised LGDs and conversion factors associated with each defaulted exposure; (f) data on the LGD of the exposure before and after evaluation of the effects of a guarantee/or credit derivative, for those institutions that reflect the credit risk mitigating effects of guarantees or credit derivatives through LGD; (g) data on the components of loss for each defaulted exposure. 5. For retail exposures, institutions shall collect and store: (a) data used in the process of allocating exposures to grades or pools; (b) data on the estimated PDs, LGDs and conversion factors associated with grades or pools of exposures; (d) for defaulted exposures, data on the grades or pools to which the exposure was assigned over the year prior to default and the realised outcomes on LGD and conversion factor; (e) data on loss rates for qualifying revolving retail exposures.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 176 Data maintenance):
1. Institutions shall collect and store data on aspects of their internal ratings as required under Part Eight. 3. Institutions not using own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors shall collect and store data on comparisons of realised LGDs to the values as set out in Article 161(1) and realised conversion factors to the values as set out in Article 166(8).
Article 177 Stress tests used in assessment of capital adequacy
1. An institution shall have in place sound stress testing processes for use in the assessment of its capital adequacy. Stress testing shall involve identifying possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on an institution's credit exposures and assessment of the institution's ability to withstand such changes. 2. An institution shall regularly perform a credit risk stress test to assess the effect of certain specific conditions on its total capital requirements for credit risk. The test shall be one chosen by the institution, subject to supervisory review. The test to be employed shall be meaningful and consider the effects of severe, but plausible, recession scenarios. An institution shall assess migration in its ratings under the stress test scenarios. Stressed portfolios shall contain the vast majority of an institution's total exposure. 3. Institutions using the treatment set out in Article 153(3) shall consider as part of their stress testing framework the impact of a deterioration in the credit quality of protection providers, in particular the impact of protection providers falling outside the eligibility criteria. Sub-Section 2 Risk quantification
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 177 Stress tests used in assessment of capital adequacy):
1. An institution shall have in place sound stress testing processes for use in the assessment of its capital adequacy. Stress testing shall involve identifying possible events or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on an institution's credit exposures and assessment of the institution's ability to withstand such changes. 2. An institution shall regularly perform a credit risk stress test to assess the effect of certain specific conditions on its total capital requirements for credit risk. The test shall be one chosen by the institution, subject to supervisory review. The test to be employed shall be meaningful and consider the effects of severe, but plausible, recession scenarios. An institution shall assess migration in its ratings under the stress test scenarios. Stressed portfolios shall contain the vast majority of an institution's total exposure. 3. Institutions using the treatment set out in Article 153(3) shall consider as part of their stress testing framework the impact of a deterioration in the credit quality of protection providers, in particular the impact of protection providers falling outside the eligibility criteria.
Article 178 Default of an obligor
1. A default shall be considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when either or both of the following have taken place: (a) the institution considers that the obligor is unlikely to pay its credit obligations to the institution, the parent undertaking or any of its subsidiaries in full, without recourse by the institution to actions such as realising security; (b) the obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the institution, the parent undertaking or any of its subsidiaries. Competent authorities may replace the 90 days with 180 days for exposures secured by residential property or SME commercial immovable property in the retail exposure class, as well as exposures to public sector entities. The 180 days shall not apply for the purposes of Article 127. In the case of retail exposures, institutions may apply the definition of default laid down in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph at the level of an individual credit facility rather than in relation to the total obligations of a borrower. 2. The following shall apply for the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1: (a) for overdrafts, days past due commence once an obligor has breached an advised limit, has been advised a limit smaller than current outstandings, or has drawn credit without authorisation and the underlying amount is material; (b) for the purposes of point (a), an advised limit comprises any credit limit determined by the institution and about which the obligor has been informed by the institution; (c) days past due for credit cards commence on the minimum payment due date; (d) materiality of a credit obligation past due shall be assessed against a threshold, defined by the competent authorities. This threshold shall reflect a level of risk that the competent authority considers to be reasonable; (e) institutions shall have documented policies in respect of the counting of days past due, in particular in respect of the re-ageing of the facilities and the granting of extensions, amendments or deferrals, renewals, and netting of existing accounts. These policies shall be applied consistently over time, and shall be in line with the internal risk management and decision processes of the institution. 3. For the purpose of point (a) of paragraph 1, elements to be taken as indications of unlikeliness to pay shall include the following: (a) the institution puts the credit obligation on non-accrued status; (b) the institution recognises a specific credit adjustment resulting from a significant perceived decline in credit quality subsequent to the institution taking on the exposure; (c) the institution sells the credit obligation at a material credit-related economic loss; (d) the institution consents to a distressed restructuring of the credit obligation where this is likely to result in a diminished financial obligation caused by the material forgiveness, or postponement, of principal, interest or, where relevant fees. This includes, in the case of equity exposures assessed under a PD/LGD Approach, distressed restructuring of the equity itself; (e) the institution has filed for the obligor's bankruptcy or a similar order in respect of an obligor's credit obligation to the institution, the parent undertaking or any of its subsidiaries; (f) the obligor has sought or has been placed in bankruptcy or similar protection where this would avoid or delay repayment of a credit obligation to the institution, the parent undertaking or any of its subsidiaries. 4. Institutions that use external data that is not itself consistent with the definition of default laid down in paragraph 1, shall make appropriate adjustments to achieve broad equivalence with the definition of default. 5. If the institution considers that a previously defaulted exposure is such that no trigger of default continues to apply, the institution shall rate the obligor or facility as they would for a non-defaulted exposure. Where the definition of default is subsequently triggered, another default would be deemed to have occurred. 6. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions according to which a competent authority shall set the threshold referred to in paragraph 2(d). EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 7. EBA shall issue guidelines on the application of this Article. Those guidelines shall be adopted in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 178 Default of an obligor):
In the case of retail exposures, institutions may apply the definition of default laid down in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph at the level of an individual credit facility rather than in relation to the total obligations of a borrower. 4. Institutions that use external data that is not itself consistent with the definition of default laid down in paragraph 1, shall make appropriate adjustments to achieve broad equivalence with the definition of default. 5. If the institution considers that a previously defaulted exposure is such that no trigger of default continues to apply, the institution shall rate the obligor or facility as they would for a non-defaulted exposure. Where the definition of default is subsequently triggered, another default would be deemed to have occurred. 6. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions according to which a competent authority shall set the threshold referred to in paragraph 2(d). EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 7. EBA shall issue guidelines on the application of this Article. Those guidelines shall be adopted in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. By 10 July 2025, EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, to update the guidelines referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph. In particular, that update shall take due account of the necessity to encourage institutions to engage in proactive, preventive and meaningful debt restructuring to support obligors. In developing those guidelines, EBA shall duly consider the need for granting a sufficient flexibility to institutions when specifying what constitutes a diminished financial obligation for the purposes of paragraph 3, point (d).
Article 179 Overall requirements for estimation
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements: (a) an institution's own estimates of the risk parameters PD, LGD, conversion factor and EL shall incorporate all relevant data, information and methods. The estimates shall be derived using both historical experience and empirical evidence, and not based purely on judgemental considerations. The estimates shall be plausible and intuitive and shall be based on the material drivers of the respective risk parameters. The less data an institution has, the more conservative it shall be in its estimation; (b) an institution shall be able to provide a breakdown of its loss experience in terms of default frequency, LGD, conversion factor, or loss where EL estimates are used, by the factors it sees as the drivers of the respective risk parameters. The institution's estimates shall be representative of long run experience; (c) any changes in lending practice or the process for pursuing recoveries over the observation periods referred to in Article 180(1)(h) and (2)(e), Article 181(1)(j) and (2), and Article 182(2) and (3) shall be taken into account. An institution's estimates shall reflect the implications of technical advances and new data and other information, as it becomes available. Institutions shall review their estimates when new information comes to light but at least on an annual basis; (d) the population of exposures represented in the data used for estimation, the lending standards used when the data was generated and other relevant characteristics shall be comparable with those of the institution's exposures and standards. The economic or market conditions that underlie the data shall be relevant to current and foreseeable conditions. The number of exposures in the sample and the data period used for quantification shall be sufficient to provide the institution with confidence in the accuracy and robustness of its estimates; (e) for purchased receivables the estimates shall reflect all relevant information available to the purchasing institution regarding the quality of the underlying receivables, including data for similar pools provided by the seller, by the purchasing institution, or by external sources. The purchasing institution shall evaluate any data relied upon which is provided by the seller; (f) an institution shall add to its estimates a margin of conservatism that is related to the expected range of estimation errors. Where methods and data are considered to be less satisfactory, the expected range of errors is larger, the margin of conservatism shall be larger. Where institutions use different estimates for the calculation of risk weights and for internal purposes, it shall be documented and be reasonable. If institutions can demonstrate to their competent authorities that for data that have been collected prior to 1 January 2007 appropriate adjustments have been made to achieve broad equivalence with the definition of default laid down in Article 178 or with loss, competent authorities may permit the institutions some flexibility in the application of the required standards for data. 2. Where an institution uses data that is pooled across institutions it shall meet the following requirements: (a) the rating systems and criteria of other institutions in the pool are similar to its own; (b) the pool is representative of the portfolio for which the pooled data is used; (c) the pooled data is used consistently over time by the institution for its estimates; (d) the institution shall remain responsible for the integrity of its rating systems; (e) the institution shall maintain sufficient in-house understanding of its rating systems, including the ability to effectively monitor and audit the rating process.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 179 Overall requirements for estimation):
In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements: (a) an institution's own estimates of the risk parameters PD, LGD, conversion factor and EL shall incorporate all relevant data, information and methods. The estimates shall be derived using both historical experience and empirical evidence, and not based purely on judgemental considerations. The estimates shall be plausible and intuitive and shall be based on the material drivers of the respective risk parameters. The less data an institution has, the more conservative it shall be in its estimation; (b) an institution shall be able to provide a breakdown of its loss experience in terms of default frequency, LGD, conversion factor, or loss where EL estimates are used, by the factors it sees as the drivers of the respective risk parameters. The institution's estimates shall be representative of long run experience; (d) the population of exposures represented in the data used for estimation, the lending standards used when the data was generated and other relevant characteristics shall be comparable with those of the institution's exposures and standards. The economic or market conditions that underlie the data shall be relevant to current and foreseeable conditions. The number of exposures in the sample and the data period used for quantification shall be sufficient to provide the institution with confidence in the accuracy and robustness of its estimates; (e) for purchased receivables the estimates shall reflect all relevant information available to the purchasing institution regarding the quality of the underlying receivables, including data for similar pools provided by the seller, by the purchasing institution, or by external sources. The purchasing institution shall evaluate any data relied upon which is provided by the seller; (f) an institution shall add to its estimates a margin of conservatism that is related to the expected range of estimation errors. Where methods and data are considered to be less satisfactory, the expected range of errors is larger, the margin of conservatism shall be larger. Where institutions use different estimates for the calculation of risk weights and for internal purposes, it shall be documented and be reasonable. If institutions can demonstrate to their competent authorities that for data that have been collected prior to 1 January 2007 appropriate adjustments have been made to achieve broad equivalence with the definition of default laid down in Article 178 or with loss, competent authorities may permit the institutions some flexibility in the application of the required standards for data. 2. Where an institution uses data that is pooled across institutions it shall meet the following requirements: (a) the rating systems and criteria of other institutions in the pool are similar to its own; (b) the pool is representative of the portfolio for which the pooled data is used; (c) the pooled data is used consistently over time by the institution for its estimates; (d) the institution shall remain responsible for the integrity of its rating systems; (e) the institution shall maintain sufficient in-house understanding of its rating systems, including the ability to effectively monitor and audit the rating process.
Article 180 Requirements specific to PD estimation
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements specific to PD estimation to exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks and for equity exposures where an institution uses the PD/LGD approach set out in Article 155(3): (a) institutions shall estimate PDs by obligor grade from long run averages of one-year default rates. PD estimates for obligors that are highly leveraged or for obligors whose assets are predominantly traded assets shall reflect the performance of the underlying assets based on periods of stressed volatilities; (b) for purchased corporate receivables institutions may estimate the EL by obligor grade from long run averages of one-year realised default rates; (c) if an institution derives long run average estimates of PDs and LGDs for purchased corporate receivables from an estimate of EL, and an appropriate estimate of PD or LGD, the process for estimating total losses shall meet the overall standards for estimation of PD and LGD set out in this part, and the outcome shall be consistent with the concept of LGD as set out in Article 181(1)(a); (d) institutions shall use PD estimation techniques only with supporting analysis. Institutions shall recognise the importance of judgmental considerations in combining results of techniques and in making adjustments for limitations of techniques and information; (e) to the extent that an institution uses data on internal default experience for the estimation of PDs, the estimates shall be reflective of underwriting standards and of any differences in the rating system that generated the data and the current rating system. Where underwriting standards or rating systems have changed, the institution shall add a greater margin of conservatism in its estimate of PD; (f) to the extent that an institution associates or maps its internal grades to the scale used by an ECAI or similar organisations and then attributes the default rate observed for the external organisation's grades to the institution's grades, mappings shall be based on a comparison of internal rating criteria to the criteria used by the external organisation and on a comparison of the internal and external ratings of any common obligors. Biases or inconsistencies in the mapping approach or underlying data shall be avoided. The criteria of the external organisation underlying the data used for quantification shall be oriented to default risk only and not reflect transaction characteristics. The analysis undertaken by the institution shall include a comparison of the default definitions used, subject to the requirements in Article 178. The institution shall document the basis for the mapping; (g) to the extent that an institution uses statistical default prediction models it is allowed to estimate PDs as the simple average of default-probability estimates for individual obligors in a given grade. The institution's use of default probability models for this purpose shall meet the standards specified in Article 174; (h) irrespective of whether an institution is using external, internal, or pooled data sources, or a combination of the three, for its PD estimation, the length of the underlying historical observation period used shall be at least five years for at least one source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and this data is relevant, this longer period shall be used. This point also applies to the PD/LGD Approach to equity. Subject to the permission of competent authorities, institutions which have not received the permission of the competent authority pursuant to Article 143 to use own estimates of LGDs or conversion factors may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years. 2. For retail exposures, the following requirements shall apply: (a) institutions shall estimate PDs by obligor grade or pool from long run averages of one-year default rates; (b) PD estimates may also be derived from an estimate of total losses and appropriate estimates of LGDs; (c) institutions shall regard internal data for assigning exposures to grades or pools as the primary source of information for estimating loss characteristics. Institutions may use external data (including pooled data) or statistical models for quantification provided that the following strong links both exist: (i) between the institution's process of assigning exposures to grades or pools and the process used by the external data source; and (ii) between the institution's internal risk profile and the composition of the external data; (c) institutions shall regard internal data for assigning exposures to grades or pools as the primary source of information for estimating loss characteristics. Institutions may use external data (including pooled data) or statistical models for quantification provided that the following strong links both exist: (i) between the institution's process of assigning exposures to grades or pools and the process used by the external data source; and (ii) between the institution's internal risk profile and the composition of the external data; (d) if an institution derives long run average estimates of PD and LGD for retail exposures from an estimate of total losses and an appropriate estimate of PD or LGD, the process for estimating total losses shall meet the overall standards for estimation of PD and LGD set out in this part, and the outcome shall be consistent with the concept of LGD as set out in point (a) of Article 181(1); (e) irrespective of whether an institution is using external, internal or pooled data sources or a combination of the three, for their estimation of loss characteristics, the length of the underlying historical observation period used shall be at least five years for at least one source. If the available observation spans a longer period for any source, and these data are relevant, this longer period shall be used. An institution need not give equal importance to historic data if more recent data is a better predictor of loss rates. Subject to the permission of the competent authorities, institutions may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years; (f) institutions shall identify and analyse expected changes of risk parameters over the life of credit exposures (seasoning effects). For purchased retail receivables, institutions may use external and internal reference data. Institutions shall use all relevant data sources as points of comparison. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the conditions according to which competent authorities may grant the permissions referred to in point (h) of paragraph 1 and point (e) of paragraph 2; (b) the methodologies according to which competent authorities shall assess the methodology of an institution for estimating PD pursuant to Article 143. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 180 Requirements specific to PD estimation):
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements specific to PD estimation to exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks and for equity exposures where an institution uses the PD/LGD approach set out in Article 155(3): (a) institutions shall estimate PDs by obligor grade from long run averages of one-year default rates. PD estimates for obligors that are highly leveraged or for obligors whose assets are predominantly traded assets shall reflect the performance of the underlying assets based on periods of stressed volatilities; (b) for purchased corporate receivables institutions may estimate the EL by obligor grade from long run averages of one-year realised default rates; (c) if an institution derives long run average estimates of PDs and LGDs for purchased corporate receivables from an estimate of EL, and an appropriate estimate of PD or LGD, the process for estimating total losses shall meet the overall standards for estimation of PD and LGD set out in this part, and the outcome shall be consistent with the concept of LGD as set out in Article 181(1)(a); (d) institutions shall use PD estimation techniques only with supporting analysis. Institutions shall recognise the importance of judgmental considerations in combining results of techniques and in making adjustments for limitations of techniques and information; (e) to the extent that an institution uses data on internal default experience for the estimation of PDs, the estimates shall be reflective of underwriting standards and of any differences in the rating system that generated the data and the current rating system. Where underwriting standards or rating systems have changed, the institution shall add a greater margin of conservatism in its estimate of PD; (f) to the extent that an institution associates or maps its internal grades to the scale used by an ECAI or similar organisations and then attributes the default rate observed for the external organisation's grades to the institution's grades, mappings shall be based on a comparison of internal rating criteria to the criteria used by the external organisation and on a comparison of the internal and external ratings of any common obligors. Biases or inconsistencies in the mapping approach or underlying data shall be avoided. The criteria of the external organisation underlying the data used for quantification shall be oriented to default risk only and not reflect transaction characteristics. The analysis undertaken by the institution shall include a comparison of the default definitions used, subject to the requirements in Article 178. The institution shall document the basis for the mapping; (g) to the extent that an institution uses statistical default prediction models it is allowed to estimate PDs as the simple average of default-probability estimates for individual obligors in a given grade. The institution's use of default probability models for this purpose shall meet the standards specified in Article 174; (h) irrespective of whether an institution is using external, internal, or pooled data sources, or a combination of the three, for its PD estimation, the length of the underlying historical observation period used shall be at least five years for at least one source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and this data is relevant, this longer period shall be used. This point also applies to the PD/LGD Approach to equity. Subject to the permission of competent authorities, institutions which have not received the permission of the competent authority pursuant to Article 143 to use own estimates of LGDs or conversion factors may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years. 2. For retail exposures, the following requirements shall apply: (a) institutions shall estimate PDs by obligor grade or pool from long run averages of one-year default rates; (b) PD estimates may also be derived from an estimate of total losses and appropriate estimates of LGDs; (c) institutions shall regard internal data for assigning exposures to grades or pools as the primary source of information for estimating loss characteristics. Institutions may use external data (including pooled data) or statistical models for quantification provided that the following strong links both exist: (i) between the institution's process of assigning exposures to grades or pools and the process used by the external data source; and (ii) between the institution's internal risk profile and the composition of the external data; (d) if an institution derives long run average estimates of PD and LGD for retail exposures from an estimate of total losses and an appropriate estimate of PD or LGD, the process for estimating total losses shall meet the overall standards for estimation of PD and LGD set out in this part, and the outcome shall be consistent with the concept of LGD as set out in point (a) of Article 181(1); (e) irrespective of whether an institution is using external, internal or pooled data sources or a combination of the three, for their estimation of loss characteristics, the length of the underlying historical observation period used shall be at least five years for at least one source. If the available observation spans a longer period for any source, and these data are relevant, this longer period shall be used. An institution need not give equal importance to historic data if more recent data is a better predictor of loss rates. Subject to the permission of the competent authorities, institutions may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years; (f) institutions shall identify and analyse expected changes of risk parameters over the life of credit exposures (seasoning effects). For purchased retail receivables, institutions may use external and internal reference data. Institutions shall use all relevant data sources as points of comparison. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the conditions according to which competent authorities may grant the permissions referred to in point (h) of paragraph 1 and point (e) of paragraph 2; (b) the methodologies according to which competent authorities shall assess the methodology of an institution for estimating PD pursuant to Article 143. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 181 Requirements specific to own-LGD estimates
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements specific to own-LGD estimates: (a) institutions shall estimate LGDs by facility grade or pool on the basis of the average realised LGDs by facility grade or pool using all observed defaults within the data sources (default weighted average); (b) institutions shall use LGD estimates that are appropriate for an economic downturn if those are more conservative than the long-run average. To the extent a rating system is expected to deliver realised LGDs at a constant level by grade or pool over time, institutions shall make adjustments to their estimates of risk parameters by grade or pool to limit the capital impact of an economic downturn; (c) an institution shall consider the extent of any dependence between the risk of the obligor and that of the collateral or collateral provider. Cases where there is a significant degree of dependence shall be addressed in a conservative manner; (d) currency mismatches between the underlying obligation and the collateral shall be treated conservatively in the institution's assessment of LGD; (e) to the extent that LGD estimates take into account the existence of collateral, these estimates shall not solely be based on the collateral's estimated market value. LGD estimates shall take into account the effect of the potential inability of institutions to expeditiously gain control of their collateral and liquidate it; (f) to the extent that LGD estimates take into account the existence of collateral, institutions shall establish internal requirements for collateral management, legal certainty and risk management that are generally consistent with those set out in Chapter 4, Section 3; (g) to the extent that an institution recognises collateral for determining the exposure value for counterparty credit risk in accordance with Chapter 6, Section 5 or 6, any amount expected to be recovered from the collateral shall not be taken into account in the LGD estimates; (h) for the specific case of exposures already in default, the institution shall use the sum of its best estimate of expected loss for each exposure given current economic circumstances and exposure status and its estimate of the increase of loss rate caused by possible additional unexpected losses during the recovery period, i.e. between date of default and final liquidation of the exposure; (i) to the extent that unpaid late fees have been capitalised in the institution's income statement, they shall be added to the institution's measure of exposure and loss; (j) for exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, estimates of LGD shall be based on data over a minimum of five years, increasing by one year each year after implementation until a minimum of seven years is reached, for at least one data source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and the data is relevant, this longer period shall be used. 2. For retail exposures, institutions may do the following: (a) derive LGD estimates from realised losses and appropriate estimates of PDs; (b) reflect future drawings either in their conversion factors or in their LGD estimates; (c) For purchased retail receivables use external and internal reference data to estimate LGDs. For retail exposures, estimates of LGD shall be based on data over a minimum of five years. An institution need not give equal importance to historic data if more recent data is a better predictor of loss rates. Subject to the permission of the competent authorities, institutions may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the nature, severity and duration of an economic downturn referred to in paragraph 1; (b) the conditions according to which a competent authority may permit an institution pursuant to paragraph 2 to use relevant data covering a period of two years when the institution implements the IRB Approach. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 181 Requirements specific to own-LGD estimates):
In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements specific to own-LGD estimates: (a) institutions shall estimate LGDs by facility grade or pool on the basis of the average realised LGDs by facility grade or pool using all observed defaults within the data sources (default weighted average); (b) institutions shall use LGD estimates that are appropriate for an economic downturn if those are more conservative than the long-run average. To the extent a rating system is expected to deliver realised LGDs at a constant level by grade or pool over time, institutions shall make adjustments to their estimates of risk parameters by grade or pool to limit the capital impact of an economic downturn; (c) an institution shall consider the extent of any dependence between the risk of the obligor and that of the collateral or collateral provider. Cases where there is a significant degree of dependence shall be addressed in a conservative manner; (d) currency mismatches between the underlying obligation and the collateral shall be treated conservatively in the institution's assessment of LGD; (e) to the extent that LGD estimates take into account the existence of collateral, these estimates shall not solely be based on the collateral's estimated market value. LGD estimates shall take into account the effect of the potential inability of institutions to expeditiously gain control of their collateral and liquidate it; (f) to the extent that LGD estimates take into account the existence of collateral, institutions shall establish internal requirements for collateral management, legal certainty and risk management that are generally consistent with those set out in Chapter 4, Section 3; (g) to the extent that an institution recognises collateral for determining the exposure value for counterparty credit risk in accordance with Chapter 6, Section 5 or 6, any amount expected to be recovered from the collateral shall not be taken into account in the LGD estimates; (h) for the specific case of exposures already in default, the institution shall use the sum of its best estimate of expected loss for each exposure given current economic circumstances and exposure status and its estimate of the increase of loss rate caused by possible additional unexpected losses during the recovery period, i.e. between date of default and final liquidation of the exposure; (i) to the extent that unpaid late fees have been capitalised in the institution's income statement, they shall be added to the institution's measure of exposure and loss; (j) for exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, estimates of LGD shall be based on data over a minimum of five years, increasing by one year each year after implementation until a minimum of seven years is reached, for at least one data source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and the data is relevant, this longer period shall be used. For retail exposures, institutions may do the following: (a) derive LGD estimates from realised losses and appropriate estimates of PDs; (b) reflect future drawings either in their conversion factors or in their LGD estimates; (c) For purchased retail receivables use external and internal reference data to estimate LGDs. For retail exposures, estimates of LGD shall be based on data over a minimum of five years. An institution need not give equal importance to historic data if more recent data is a better predictor of loss rates. Subject to the permission of the competent authorities, institutions may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the nature, severity and duration of an economic downturn referred to in paragraph 1; (b) the conditions according to which a competent authority may permit an institution pursuant to paragraph 2 to use relevant data covering a period of two years when the institution implements the IRB Approach. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the nature, severity and duration of an economic downturn referred to in paragraph 1; (b) the conditions according to which a competent authority may permit an institution pursuant to paragraph 2 to use relevant data covering a period of two years when the institution implements the IRB Approach. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 182 Requirements specific to own-conversion factor estimates
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements specific to own-conversion factor estimates: (a) institutions shall estimate conversion factors by facility grade or pool on the basis of the average realised conversion factors by facility grade or pool using the default weighted average resulting from all observed defaults within the data sources; (b) institutions shall use conversion factor estimates that are appropriate for an economic downturn if those are more conservative than the long-run average. To the extent a rating system is expected to deliver realised conversion factors at a constant level by grade or pool over time, institutions shall make adjustments to their estimates of risk parameters by grade or pool to limit the capital impact of an economic downturn; (c) institutions' estimates of conversion factors shall reflect the possibility of additional drawings by the obligor up to and after the time a default event is triggered. The conversion factor estimate shall incorporate a larger margin of conservatism where a stronger positive correlation can reasonably be expected between the default frequency and the magnitude of conversion factor; (d) in arriving at estimates of conversion factors institutions shall consider their specific policies and strategies adopted in respect of account monitoring and payment processing. Institutions shall also consider their ability and willingness to prevent further drawings in circumstances short of payment default, such as covenant violations or other technical default events; (e) institutions shall have adequate systems and procedures in place to monitor facility amounts, current outstandings against committed lines and changes in outstandings per obligor and per grade. The institution shall be able to monitor outstanding balances on a daily basis; (f) if institutions use different estimates of conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and internal purposes it shall be documented and be reasonable. 2. For exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, estimates of conversion factors shall be based on data over a minimum of five years, increasing by one year each year after implementation until a minimum of seven years is reached, for at least one data source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and the data is relevant, this longer period shall be used. 3. For retail exposures, institutions may reflect future drawings either in their conversion factors or in their LGD estimates. For retail exposures, estimates of conversion factors shall be based on data over a minimum of five years. By way of derogation from point (a) of paragraph 1, an institution need not give equal importance to historic data if more recent data is a better predictor of draw downs. Subject to the permission of competent authorities, institutions may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the nature, severity and duration of an economic downturn referred to in paragraph 1; (b) conditions according to which a competent authority may permit and institution to use relevant data covering a period of two years at the time an institution first implements the IRB Approach. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 182 Requirements specific to own-conversion factor estimates):
In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools, institutions shall apply the following requirements specific to own-conversion factor estimates: (a) institutions shall estimate conversion factors by facility grade or pool on the basis of the average realised conversion factors by facility grade or pool using the default weighted average resulting from all observed defaults within the data sources; (b) institutions shall use conversion factor estimates that are appropriate for an economic downturn if those are more conservative than the long-run average. To the extent a rating system is expected to deliver realised conversion factors at a constant level by grade or pool over time, institutions shall make adjustments to their estimates of risk parameters by grade or pool to limit the capital impact of an economic downturn; (c) institutions' estimates of conversion factors shall reflect the possibility of additional drawings by the obligor up to and after the time a default event is triggered. The conversion factor estimate shall incorporate a larger margin of conservatism where a stronger positive correlation can reasonably be expected between the default frequency and the magnitude of conversion factor; (d) in arriving at estimates of conversion factors institutions shall consider their specific policies and strategies adopted in respect of account monitoring and payment processing. Institutions shall also consider their ability and willingness to prevent further drawings in circumstances short of payment default, such as covenant violations or other technical default events; (e) institutions shall have adequate systems and procedures in place to monitor facility amounts, current outstandings against committed lines and changes in outstandings per obligor and per grade. The institution shall be able to monitor outstanding balances on a daily basis; (f) if institutions use different estimates of conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts and internal purposes it shall be documented and be reasonable. 2. For exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks, estimates of conversion factors shall be based on data over a minimum of five years, increasing by one year each year after implementation until a minimum of seven years is reached, for at least one data source. If the available observation period spans a longer period for any source, and the data is relevant, this longer period shall be used. 3. For retail exposures, institutions may reflect future drawings either in their conversion factors or in their LGD estimates. For retail exposures, estimates of conversion factors shall be based on data over a minimum of five years. By way of derogation from point (a) of paragraph 1, an institution need not give equal importance to historic data if more recent data is a better predictor of draw downs. Subject to the permission of competent authorities, institutions may use, when they implement the IRB Approach, relevant data covering a period of two years. The period to be covered shall increase by one year each year until relevant data cover a period of five years. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the nature, severity and duration of an economic downturn referred to in paragraph 1; (b) conditions according to which a competent authority may permit and institution to use relevant data covering a period of two years at the time an institution first implements the IRB Approach. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the nature, severity and duration of an economic downturn referred to in paragraph 1; (b) conditions according to which a competent authority may permit and institution to use relevant data covering a period of two years at the time an institution first implements the IRB Approach. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 183 Requirements for assessing the effect of guarantees and credit derivatives for exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks where own estimates of LGD are used and for retail exposures
1. The following requirements shall apply in relation to eligible guarantors and guarantees: (a) institutions shall have clearly specified criteria for the types of guarantors they recognise for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts; (b) for recognised guarantors the same rules as for obligors as set out in Articles 171, 172 and 173 shall apply; (c) the guarantee shall be evidenced in writing, non-cancellable on the part of the guarantor, in force until the obligation is satisfied in full (to the extent of the amount and tenor of the guarantee) and legally enforceable against the guarantor in a jurisdiction where the guarantor has assets to attach and enforce a judgement. Conditional guarantees prescribing conditions under which the guarantor may not be obliged to perform may be recognised subject to permission of the competent authorities. The assignment criteria shall adequately address any potential reduction in the risk mitigation effect. 2. An institution shall have clearly specified criteria for adjusting grades, pools or LGD estimates, and, in the case of retail and eligible purchased receivables, the process of allocating exposures to grades or pools, to reflect the impact of guarantees for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts. These criteria shall comply with the requirements set out in Articles 171, 172 and 173. The criteria shall be plausible and intuitive. They shall address the guarantor's ability and willingness to perform under the guarantee, the likely timing of any payments from the guarantor, the degree to which the guarantor's ability to perform under the guarantee is correlated with the obligor's ability to repay, and the extent to which residual risk to the obligor remains. 3. The requirements for guarantees in this Article shall apply also for single-name credit derivatives. In relation to a mismatch between the underlying obligation and the reference obligation of the credit derivative or the obligation used for determining whether a credit event has occurred, the requirements set out under Article 216(2) shall apply. For retail exposures and eligible purchased receivables, this paragraph applies to the process of allocating exposures to grades or pools. The criteria shall address the payout structure of the credit derivative and conservatively assess the impact this has on the level and timing of recoveries. The institution shall consider the extent to which other forms of residual risk remain. 4. The requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not apply for guarantees provided by institutions, central governments and central banks, and corporate entities which meet the requirements laid down in Article 201(1)(g) if the institution has received permission to apply the Standardised Approach for exposures to such entities pursuant to Articles 148 and 150. In this case the requirements of Chapter 4 shall apply. 5. For retail guarantees, the requirements set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also apply to the assignment of exposures to grades or pools, and the estimation of PD. 6. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions according to which competent authorities may permit conditional guarantees to be recognised. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 183 Requirements for assessing the effect of guarantees and credit derivatives for exposures to corporates, institutions and central governments and central banks where own estimates of LGD are used and for retail exposures):
2. An institution shall have clearly specified criteria for adjusting grades, pools or LGD estimates, and, in the case of retail and eligible purchased receivables, the process of allocating exposures to grades or pools, to reflect the impact of guarantees for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts. These criteria shall comply with the requirements set out in Articles 171, 172 and 173. The criteria shall be plausible and intuitive. They shall address the guarantor's ability and willingness to perform under the guarantee, the likely timing of any payments from the guarantor, the degree to which the guarantor's ability to perform under the guarantee is correlated with the obligor's ability to repay, and the extent to which residual risk to the obligor remains. 3. The requirements for guarantees in this Article shall apply also for single-name credit derivatives. In relation to a mismatch between the underlying obligation and the reference obligation of the credit derivative or the obligation used for determining whether a credit event has occurred, the requirements set out under Article 216(2) shall apply. For retail exposures and eligible purchased receivables, this paragraph applies to the process of allocating exposures to grades or pools. The criteria shall address the payout structure of the credit derivative and conservatively assess the impact this has on the level and timing of recoveries. The institution shall consider the extent to which other forms of residual risk remain. 4. The requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall not apply for guarantees provided by institutions, central governments and central banks, and corporate entities which meet the requirements laid down in Article 201(1)(g) if the institution has received permission to apply the Standardised Approach for exposures to such entities pursuant to Articles 148 and 150. In this case the requirements of Chapter 4 shall apply. 5. For retail guarantees, the requirements set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall also apply to the assignment of exposures to grades or pools, and the estimation of PD. 6. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions according to which competent authorities may permit conditional guarantees to be recognised. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 184 Requirements for purchased receivables
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools for purchased receivables, institutions shall ensure the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 to 6 are met. 2. The structure of the facility shall ensure that under all foreseeable circumstances the institution has effective ownership and control of all cash remittances from the receivables. When the obligor makes payments directly to a seller or servicer, the institution shall verify regularly that payments are forwarded completely and within the contractually agreed terms. Institutions shall have procedures to ensure that ownership over the receivables and cash receipts is protected against bankruptcy stays or legal challenges that could materially delay the lender's ability to liquidate or assign the receivables or retain control over cash receipts. 3. The institution shall monitor both the quality of the purchased receivables and the financial condition of the seller and servicer. The following shall apply: (a) the institution shall assess the correlation among the quality of the purchased receivables and the financial condition of both the seller and servicer, and have in place internal policies and procedures that provide adequate safeguards to protect against any contingencies, including the assignment of an internal risk rating for each seller and servicer; (b) the institution shall have clear and effective policies and procedures for determining seller and servicer eligibility. The institution or its agent shall conduct periodic reviews of sellers and servicers in order to verify the accuracy of reports from the seller or servicer, detect fraud or operational weaknesses, and verify the quality of the seller's credit policies and servicer's collection policies and procedures. The findings of these reviews shall be documented; (c) the institution shall assess the characteristics of the purchased receivables pools, including over-advances; history of the seller's arrears, bad debts, and bad debt allowances; payment terms, and potential contra accounts; (d) the institution shall have effective policies and procedures for monitoring on an aggregate basis single-obligor concentrations both within and across purchased receivables pools; (e) the institution shall ensure that it receives from the servicer timely and sufficiently detailed reports of receivables ageings and dilutions to ensure compliance with the institution's eligibility criteria and advancing policies governing purchased receivables, and provide an effective means with which to monitor and confirm the seller's terms of sale and dilution. 4. The institution shall have systems and procedures for detecting deteriorations in the seller's financial condition and purchased receivables quality at an early stage, and for addressing emerging problems pro-actively. In particular, the institution shall have clear and effective policies, procedures, and information systems to monitor covenant violations, and clear and effective policies and procedures for initiating legal actions and dealing with problem purchased receivables. 5. The institution shall have clear and effective policies and procedures governing the control of purchased receivables, credit, and cash. In particular, written internal policies shall specify all material elements of the receivables purchase programme, including the advancing rates, eligible collateral, necessary documentation, concentration limits, and the way cash receipts are to be handled. These elements shall take appropriate account of all relevant and material factors, including the seller and servicer's financial condition, risk concentrations, and trends in the quality of the purchased receivables and the seller's customer base, and internal systems shall ensure that funds are advanced only against specified supporting collateral and documentation. 6. The institution shall have an effective internal process for assessing compliance with all internal policies and procedures. The process shall include regular audits of all critical phases of the institution's receivables purchase programme, verification of the separation of duties between firstly the assessment of the seller and servicer and the assessment of the obligor and secondly between the assessment of the seller and servicer and the field audit of the seller and servicer, and evaluations of back office operations, with particular focus on qualifications, experience, staffing levels, and supporting automation systems. Sub-Section 3 Validation of internal estimates
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 184 Requirements for purchased receivables):
1. In quantifying the risk parameters to be associated with rating grades or pools for purchased receivables, institutions shall ensure the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 to 6 are met. 2. The structure of the facility shall ensure that under all foreseeable circumstances the institution has effective ownership and control of all cash remittances from the receivables. When the obligor makes payments directly to a seller or servicer, the institution shall verify regularly that payments are forwarded completely and within the contractually agreed terms. Institutions shall have procedures to ensure that ownership over the receivables and cash receipts is protected against bankruptcy stays or legal challenges that could materially delay the lender's ability to liquidate or assign the receivables or retain control over cash receipts. 4. The institution shall have systems and procedures for detecting deteriorations in the seller's financial condition and purchased receivables quality at an early stage, and for addressing emerging problems pro-actively. In particular, the institution shall have clear and effective policies, procedures, and information systems to monitor covenant violations, and clear and effective policies and procedures for initiating legal actions and dealing with problem purchased receivables. 5. The institution shall have clear and effective policies and procedures governing the control of purchased receivables, credit, and cash. In particular, written internal policies shall specify all material elements of the receivables purchase programme, including the advancing rates, eligible collateral, necessary documentation, concentration limits, and the way cash receipts are to be handled. These elements shall take appropriate account of all relevant and material factors, including the seller and servicer's financial condition, risk concentrations, and trends in the quality of the purchased receivables and the seller's customer base, and internal systems shall ensure that funds are advanced only against specified supporting collateral and documentation. 6. The institution shall have an effective internal process for assessing compliance with all internal policies and procedures. The process shall include regular audits of all critical phases of the institution's receivables purchase programme, verification of the separation of duties between firstly the assessment of the seller and servicer and the assessment of the obligor and secondly between the assessment of the seller and servicer and the field audit of the seller and servicer, and evaluations of back office operations, with particular focus on qualifications, experience, staffing levels, and supporting automation systems.
Article 185 Validation of internal estimates
Institutions shall validate their internal estimates subject to the following requirements: (a) institutions shall have robust systems in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of rating systems, processes, and the estimation of all relevant risk parameters. The internal validation process shall enable the institution to assess the performance of internal rating and risk estimation systems consistently and meaningfully; (b) institutions shall regularly compare realised default rates with estimated PDs for each grade and, where realised default rates are outside the expected range for that grade, institutions shall specifically analyse the reasons for the deviation. Institutions using own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors shall also perform analogous analysis for these estimates. Such comparisons shall make use of historical data that cover as long a period as possible. The institution shall document the methods and data used in such comparisons. This analysis and documentation shall be updated at least annually; (c) institutions shall also use other quantitative validation tools and comparisons with relevant external data sources. The analysis shall be based on data that are appropriate to the portfolio, are updated regularly, and cover a relevant observation period. Institutions' internal assessments of the performance of their rating systems shall be based on as long a period as possible; (d) the methods and data used for quantitative validation shall be consistent through time. Changes in estimation and validation methods and data (both data sources and periods covered) shall be documented; (e) institutions shall have sound internal standards for situations where deviations in realised PDs, LGDs, conversion factors and total losses, where EL is used, from expectations, become significant enough to call the validity of the estimates into question. These standards shall take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in default experience. Where realised values continue to be higher than expected values, institutions shall revise estimates upward to reflect their default and loss experience; Sub-Section 4 Requirements for equity exposures under the internal models approach
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 185 Validation of internal estimates):
Institutions shall validate their internal estimates subject to the following requirements: (a) institutions shall have robust systems in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of rating systems, processes, and the estimation of all relevant risk parameters. The internal validation process shall enable the institution to assess the performance of internal rating and risk estimation systems consistently and meaningfully; (b) institutions shall regularly compare realised default rates with estimated PDs for each grade and, where realised default rates are outside the expected range for that grade, institutions shall specifically analyse the reasons for the deviation. Institutions using own estimates of LGDs and conversion factors shall also perform analogous analysis for these estimates. Such comparisons shall make use of historical data that cover as long a period as possible. The institution shall document the methods and data used in such comparisons. This analysis and documentation shall be updated at least annually; (c) institutions shall also use other quantitative validation tools and comparisons with relevant external data sources. The analysis shall be based on data that are appropriate to the portfolio, are updated regularly, and cover a relevant observation period. Institutions' internal assessments of the performance of their rating systems shall be based on as long a period as possible; (d) the methods and data used for quantitative validation shall be consistent through time. Changes in estimation and validation methods and data (both data sources and periods covered) shall be documented; (e) institutions shall have sound internal standards for situations where deviations in realised PDs, LGDs, conversion factors and total losses, where EL is used, from expectations, become significant enough to call the validity of the estimates into question. These standards shall take account of business cycles and similar systematic variability in default experience. Where realised values continue to be higher than expected values, institutions shall revise estimates upward to reflect their default and loss experience;