Article 45 Publication of decisions
1. Subject to paragraph 2, a competent authority shall publish any decision imposing an administrative sanction or other administrative measure in relation to infringements of this Regulation on its official website immediately after the person subject to that decision has been informed of that decision. Such publication shall include at least information on the type and nature of the infringement and the identity of the persons subject to the decision. The first subparagraph does not apply to decisions imposing measures that are of an investigatory nature. 2. Where a competent authority considers that the publication of the identity of the legal person or of the personal data of a natural person, would be disproportionate following a case-by-case assessment conducted on the proportionality of the publication of such data, or where such publication would jeopardise the stability of financial markets or an on-going investigation, it shall do any of the following: (a) defer publication of the decision until such time as the reasons for that deferral cease to exist; (b) publish the decision on an anonymous basis in accordance with national law where such anonymous publication ensures an effective protection of the personal data concerned; (c) not publish the decision at all in the event that the competent authority is of the opinion that publication in accordance with point (a) or (b) will be insufficient to ensure: (i) that the stability of financial markets is not jeopardised; or (ii) the proportionality of the publication of such decisions with regard to measures which are deemed to be of a minor nature. Where a competent authority decides to publish a decision on an anonymous basis as referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph, it may postpone the publication of the relevant data for a reasonable period of time where it is foreseeable that the reasons for anonymous publication shall cease to exist during that period. 3. Where the decision is subject to an appeal before a national judicial, administrative or other authority, the competent authority shall also publish, immediately, on its official website such information and any subsequent information on the outcome of such appeal. Any decision annulling a previous decision to impose a sanction or a measure shall also be published. 4. The competent authority shall ensure that any decision that is published in accordance with this Article shall remain accessible on its official website for a period of at least five years after its publication. Personal data contained in the publication shall only be kept on the official website of the competent authority for the period which is necessary in accordance with the applicable data protection rules. 5. Member States shall annually provide ESMA with aggregated information regarding all administrative sanctions and other administrative measures imposed pursuant to Article 42. That obligation does not apply to measures of an investigatory nature. ESMA shall publish that information in an annual report. Where Member States have chosen, in accordance with Article 42, to lay down criminal sanctions for infringements of the provisions referred to in that Article, their competent authorities shall annually provide ESMA with anonymised and aggregated data regarding all criminal investigations undertaken and criminal sanctions imposed. ESMA shall publish data on criminal sanctions imposed in an annual report.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 45 Publication of decisions):
1. Subject to paragraph 2, a competent authority shall publish any decision imposing an administrative sanction or other administrative measure in relation to infringements of this Regulation on its official website immediately after the person subject to that decision has been informed of that decision. Such publication shall include at least information on the type and nature of the infringement and the identity of the persons subject to the decision. The first subparagraph does not apply to decisions imposing measures that are of an investigatory nature. 2. Where a competent authority decides to publish a decision on an anonymous basis as referred to in point (b) of the first subparagraph, it may postpone the publication of the relevant data for a reasonable period of time where it is foreseeable that the reasons for anonymous publication shall cease to exist during that period. 3. Where the decision is subject to an appeal before a national judicial, administrative or other authority, the competent authority shall also publish, immediately, on its official website such information and any subsequent information on the outcome of such appeal. Any decision annulling a previous decision to impose a sanction or a measure shall also be published. 4. The competent authority shall ensure that any decision that is published in accordance with this Article shall remain accessible on its official website for a period of at least five years after its publication. Personal data contained in the publication shall only be kept on the official website of the competent authority for the period which is necessary in accordance with the applicable data protection rules. 5. Member States shall provide ESMA with aggregated information regarding all administrative sanctions and other administrative measures imposed pursuant to Article 42 on an annual basis. That obligation shall not apply to measures of an investigatory nature. ESMA shall publish that information in an annual report, together with aggregated information on all administrative sanctions and other administrative measures it has imposed pursuant to Article 48f. Where Member States have chosen, in accordance with Article 42, to lay down criminal sanctions for infringements of the provisions referred to in that Article, their competent authorities shall annually provide ESMA with anonymised and aggregated data regarding all criminal investigations undertaken and criminal sanctions imposed. ESMA shall publish data on criminal sanctions imposed in an annual report.
Article 46 Colleges
1. Within 30 working days from the inclusion of a benchmark referred to in points (a) and (c) of Article 20(1) in the list of critical benchmarks, with the exception of benchmarks where the majority of contributors are non-supervised entities, the competent authority shall establish a college. 2. The college shall comprise the competent authority of the administrator, ESMA, and the competent authorities of supervised contributors. 3. Competent authorities of other Member States shall have the right to be members of the college where, if the critical benchmark in question were to cease to be provided, it would have a significant adverse impact on the market integrity, financial stability, consumers, real economy, or financing of households and businesses of those Member States. Where a competent authority intends to become a member of a college, it shall submit a request to the competent authority of the administrator containing evidence that the requirements of the first subparagraph of this paragraph are fulfilled. The relevant competent authority of the administrator shall consider the request and notify the requesting authority within 20 working days of receipt of the request whether or not it considers those requirements to be fulfilled. Where it considers those requirements not to be fulfilled, the requesting authority may refer the matter to ESMA in accordance with paragraph 9. 4. ESMA shall contribute to promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of colleges referred to in this Article in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. To that end, ESMA shall participate as appropriate and shall be considered to be a competent authority for that purpose. Where ESMA acts in accordance with Article 17(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 regarding a critical benchmark, it shall ensure appropriate exchange of information and cooperation with the other members of the college. 5. The competent authority of an administrator shall chair the meetings of the college, coordinate the actions of the college and ensure efficient exchange of information among members of the college. Where an administrator provides more than one critical benchmark, the competent authority of that administrator may establish a single college in respect of all the benchmarks provided by that administrator. 6. The competent authority of an administrator shall establish written arrangements within the framework of the college regarding the following matters: (a) the information to be exchanged between competent authorities; (b) the decision-making process between the competent authorities and the time frame within which each decision has to be taken; (c) the cases in which the competent authorities must consult each other; (d) the cooperation to be provided under Article 23(7) and (8). 7. The competent authority of an administrator shall give due consideration to any advice provided by ESMA concerning the written arrangements under paragraph 6 before agreeing their final text. The written arrangements shall be set out in a single document containing full reasons for any significant deviation from the advice of ESMA. The competent authority of the administrator shall transmit the written arrangements to the members of the college and to ESMA. 8. Before taking any measures referred to in Article 23(6), (7) and (9), and Articles 34, 35 and 42, the competent authority of an administrator shall consult the members of the college. The members of the college shall do everything reasonable within their power to reach an agreement within the time frame specified in the written arrangements referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article. Any decision of the competent authority of the administrator to take such measures shall take into account the impact on the other Member States concerned, in particular the potential impact on the stability of their financial systems. With regard to the decision to withdraw the authorisation or registration of an administrator in accordance with Article 35, whenever the cessation of a benchmark would result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument, or the rules of any investment fund, which references that benchmark in the Union, within the meaning specified by the Commission in any delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 51(6), the competent authorities within the college shall consider whether to adopt measures to mitigate the effects referred to in this paragraph, including: (a) a change to the code of conduct referred to in Article 15, the methodology or other rules of the benchmark; (b) a transitional period, during which the procedures envisaged under Article 28(2) shall apply. 9. In the absence of agreement between the members of a college, competent authorities may refer to ESMA any of the following situations: (a) where a competent authority has not communicated essential information; (b) where, following a request made under paragraph 3, the competent authority of the administrator has notified the requesting authority that the requirements of that paragraph are not fulfilled or where it has not acted upon such request within a reasonable time; (c) where the competent authorities have failed to reach an agreement on the matters set out in paragraph 6; (d) where there is a disagreement concerning the measures to be taken in accordance with Articles 34, 35 and 42; (e) where there is a disagreement concerning the measures to be taken in accordance with Article 23(6); (f) where there is a disagreement concerning the measures to be taken in accordance with the third subparagraph of paragraph 8 of this Article. 10. In the situations referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) of paragraph 9, if the issue is not settled within 30 days after referral to ESMA, the competent authority of an administrator shall take the final decision and provide a detailed explanation of its decision in writing to the competent authorities referred to in that paragraph and to ESMA. The period of time referred to in point (a) of Article 34(6) shall be suspended from the date of referral to ESMA until such time as a decision is taken in accordance with the first subparagraph of this paragraph. Where ESMA considers that the competent authority of the administrator has taken any measures referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article which may not be in conformity with Union law it shall act in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 11. In the situation referred to in point (e) of paragraph 9 of this Article, and without prejudice to Article 258 TFEU, ESMA may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The power of the competent authority of an administrator under Article 23(6) may be exercised until such time as ESMA publishes its decision.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 46 Colleges):
2. The college shall comprise representatives of the competent authority of the administrator, ESMA, unless it is the competent authority of the administrator, and the competent authorities of supervised contributors. 3. Competent authorities of other Member States shall have the right to be members of the college where, if the critical benchmark in question were to cease to be provided, it would have a significant adverse impact on the market integrity, financial stability, consumers, real economy, or financing of households and businesses of those Member States. Where a competent authority intends to become a member of a college, it shall submit a request to the competent authority of the administrator containing evidence that the requirements of the first subparagraph of this paragraph are fulfilled. The relevant competent authority of the administrator shall consider the request and notify the requesting authority within 20 working days of receipt of the request whether or not it considers those requirements to be fulfilled. Where it considers those requirements not to be fulfilled, the requesting authority may refer the matter to ESMA in accordance with paragraph 9. 4. ESMA shall contribute to promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of colleges referred to in this Article in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. To that end, ESMA shall participate as appropriate and shall be considered to be a competent authority for that purpose. Where ESMA acts in accordance with Article 17(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 regarding a critical benchmark, it shall ensure appropriate exchange of information and cooperation with the other members of the college. 5. The competent authority of an administrator shall chair the meetings of the college, coordinate the actions of the college and ensure efficient exchange of information among members of the college. Where an administrator provides more than one critical benchmark, the competent authority of that administrator may establish a single college in respect of all the benchmarks provided by that administrator. 7. The competent authority of an administrator shall give due consideration to any advice provided by ESMA concerning the written arrangements under paragraph 6 before agreeing their final text. The written arrangements shall be set out in a single document containing full reasons for any significant deviation from the advice of ESMA. The competent authority of the administrator shall transmit the written arrangements to the members of the college and to ESMA. Any decision of the competent authority of the administrator to take such measures shall take into account the impact on the other Member States concerned, in particular the potential impact on the stability of their financial systems. With regard to the decision to withdraw the authorisation or registration of an administrator in accordance with Article 35, whenever the cessation of a benchmark would result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument, or the rules of any investment fund, which references that benchmark in the Union, within the meaning specified by the Commission in any delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 51(6), the competent authorities within the college shall consider whether to adopt measures to mitigate the effects referred to in this paragraph, including: (a) a change to the code of conduct referred to in Article 15, the methodology or other rules of the benchmark; (b) a transitional period, during which the procedures envisaged under Article 28(2) shall apply. 10. In the situations referred to in points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) of paragraph 9, if the issue is not settled within 30 days after referral to ESMA, the competent authority of an administrator shall take the final decision and provide a detailed explanation of its decision in writing to the competent authorities referred to in that paragraph and to ESMA. The period of time referred to in point (a) of Article 34(6) shall be suspended from the date of referral to ESMA until such time as a decision is taken in accordance with the first subparagraph of this paragraph. Where ESMA considers that the competent authority of the administrator has taken any measures referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article which may not be in conformity with Union law it shall act in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 11. In the situation referred to in point (e) of paragraph 9 of this Article, and without prejudice to Article 258 TFEU, ESMA may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The power of the competent authority of an administrator under Article 23(6) may be exercised until such time as ESMA publishes its decision.
Article 47 Cooperation with ESMA
1. The competent authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this Regulation, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 2. The competent authorities shall, without delay, provide ESMA with all information necessary to carry out its duties, in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 3. ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the procedures and forms for exchange of information as referred to in paragraph 2. ESMA shall submit the draft implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by 1 April 2017. Power is conferred to the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 47 Cooperation with ESMA):
1. The competent authorities referred to in Article 40(2) shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this Regulation, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 2. The competent authorities referred to in Article 40(2) shall, without undue delay, provide ESMA with all information necessary to carry out its duties, in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 3. ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the procedures and forms for exchange of information as referred to in paragraph 2. ESMA shall submit the draft implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by 1 April 2017. Power is conferred to the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 48 Professional secrecy
1. Any confidential information received, exchanged or transmitted pursuant to this Regulation shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy laid down in paragraph 2. 2. The obligation of professional secrecy applies to all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authority or for any authority or market undertaking or natural or legal person to whom the competent authority has delegated its powers, including auditors and experts contracted by the competent authority. 3. Information covered by professional secrecy may not be disclosed to any other person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by Union or national law. 4. All information exchanged between the competent authorities under this Regulation that concerns business or operational conditions and other economic or personal affairs shall be considered confidential and shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy, except where the competent authority states at the time of communication that such information may be disclosed or where such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.
Article 49 Exercise of the delegation
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3(2), 20(6), 24(2), 33(7), 51(6) and 54(3) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from 30 June 2016. 3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 3(2), 20(6), 24(2), 33(7), 51(6) and 54(3) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of power specified in that decision. It shall take effect on the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or on a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016. 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 3(2), 20(6), 24(2), 33(7), 51(6) and 54(3) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Integrated financial markets bring significant benefits to the funding of the European economy and for promoting jobs and growth on a sound and sustainable basis. To promote financial integration and market integrity while safeguarding financial stability, the EU internal market for financial services requires common rules and strong supervisory coordination. When the EU overhauled its financial system in response to the financial crisis, and in line with global efforts, it therefore introduced a Single Rulebook for financial regulation in Europe and created the European Supervisory Authorities ("ESAs"). The ESAs constitute an institutional cornerstone of the comprehensive reform package and have played a key role in ensuring that the financial markets across the EU are well regulated, strong and stable. They contribute to the development and consistent application of the Single Rulebook, solve cross-border problems, and thereby promote both regulatory and supervisory convergence. Despite the post-crisis measures, there remains significant potential to enhance regulatory and supervisory convergence in the internal market. Integrated financial markets require more integrated supervisory arrangements to function effectively, while more centralised supervisory arrangements can, in turn, foster market integration. For this reason, the EU has engaged in further integration across the broader financial sector on a sound and stable basis. In particular, the Capital Markets Union ("CMU") has been launched so a s to lay the foundations for a fully functional internal market for capital markets. In this context, the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union of June 2015 1 highlighted the need to strengthen the EU supervisory framew ork, leading ultimately to a single capital-markets supervisor. More recently, the Commission Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 2 suggests that a review of the EU supervisory framework – in particular of the European Secu rities and Markets Authority ("ESMA") - should deliver the first steps towards such a single supervisor by 2019. The Reflection Paper also called for completing the Financial Union - comprising both a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union– by 2019 so a s to guarantee the integrity of the euro and improve the functioning of the euro area and the EU as a whole. Global financial markets are strongly interconnected, and the EU's regulatory framework is largely based on international standards agreed in the w ake of the financial crisis notably among G20 countries. As the EU is striving to accelerate the completion of the CMU, it is therefore essential that EU supervisory arrangements continue to develop in a manner which allows to reap the full potential of i nternationally integrated financial markets while ensuring that cross-border risks between the EU and the rest of the world can be monitored and managed effectively. The ESAs have a key role to play in this regard. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU reinforces these challenges for supervisory arrangements within the remaining EU27. The future departure of the EU’s currently largest financial centre means that EU27 capital markets need to develop further and supervisory arrangements must be strengthened to ensure that financial markets continue to support the economy on an adequate and sound basis. The objective of the present proposal is to adjust and upgrade the ESAs framework to ensure they can assume an enhanced responsibility for financial market supervision. The ESAs must be adequately equipped in terms of powers, governance and funding. First, where existing powers of the ESAs have proven partially insufficient and unclearly defined, for example as regards the consistent application of EU law, the drafting of technical advice or the provision of ongoing support to equivalence decisions, they must be strengthened and improved. The current scope of the ESAs' mandate must also be reconsidered in light of the policy objectives of the CMU. More common direct supervision in targeted areas is necessary to ensure more consistent supervisory practices and implementation of EU financial services rules. The 2017 review of the ESA Regulations concluded that the supervision of certain activities and entities with particular importance for the Union as a whole or with a significant degree of cross-border business should be carried out by the ESAs instead of by national competent authorities. Similarly, the ESAs should be more involved in the authorisation and supervision of entities from non-EU countries that are active in the Union. Second, this proposal aims at establishing a more effective governance of the ESAs. The incentive structure in the decision-making process of the ESAs as it stands today leads to the absence of decisions in particular in the area of regulatory convergence and supervisory convergence, or promotes decisions that are predominantly oriented towards national instead of broader EU interests. This reflects, to so me extent, an inherent tension between the European mandate of the ESAs and the national mandate of the competent authorities that are members of the ESA Boards. 3 This position is not well aligned with the objective of supervisory convergence. A greater role for the ESAs in deepening financial integration or strengthening the stability of the internal market will also require more effective convergence powers. 4 Third, the ESAs need an appropriate funding base which allows them to allocate resources in relation to their needs to fulfil their objective. Current budget arrangements constrain and will continue to constrain the ESAs' activities, as Member States for different reasons might be unwilling to increase national contributions further. The present proposal sets out specific amendments to the ESA Regulations 5 and various sector acts 6 to reinforce the powers, governance and funding framework of the ESAs, as these are the areas which need to be reinforced to allow the ESAs to meet the challenges outlin ed above. The impact assessment report accompanying this proposal considers the costs and benefits of these amendments. It sets out a number of options of measures intended to enhance the powers of the ESAs at EU level, improve their governance (including decision- making), and to ensure that their funding framework is sustainable and commensurate with current and future tasks. The impact assessment provides comprehensive evidence that the proposed amendments contribute effectively to reinforcing the ESA framework and thereby to the overall stability of the EU financial system, while keeping costs to the EU General Budget and stakeholders at a minimum. The proposed amendments also contribute to the further development and deepening of the CMU, in line with the political priorities of the Commission. 
Revised version (Article 49 Exercise of the delegation):
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 3(2), 13(2a), 19a(2), 19c(1), 20(6), 24(2), 27(2b), 33(7), 51(6) and 54(3) shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of five years from 10 December 2019. The Commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power no later than 11 March 2024. The delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for further periods of identical duration, unless the European Parliament or the Council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. 3. The delegations of power referred to in Articles 3(2), 13(2a), 19a(2), 19c(1), 20(6), 24(2), 27(2b), 33(7), 51(6) and 54(3) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of power specified in that decision. It shall take effect on the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or on a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 3(2), 13(2a), 19a(2), 19c(1), 20(6), 24(2), 27(2b), 33(7), 51(6) or 54(3) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or by the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and to the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.
Article 50 Committee procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the European Securities Committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.
Article 51 Transitional provisions
1. An index provider providing a benchmark on 30 June 2016 shall apply for authorisation or registration in accordance with Article 34 by 1 January 2020. 2. By 1 January 2020, the competent authority of the Member State where an index provider applying for authorisation in accordance with Article 34 is located shall have the power to decide to register that index provider as an administrator even if it is not a supervised entity, under the following conditions: (a) the index provider does not provide a critical benchmark; (b) the competent authority is aware, on a reasonable basis, that the index or indices provided by the index provider are not widely used, within the meaning of this Regulation, in the Member State where the index provider is located as well as in other Member States. The competent authority shall notify ESMA of its decision adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph. The competent authority shall keep evidence of the reasons for its decision adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph, in such a form that it is possible to fully understand the evaluations of the competent authority that the index or indices provided by the index provider are not widely used, including any market data, judgement or other information, as well as information received from the index provider. 3. An index provider may continue to provide an existing benchmark which may be used by supervised entities until 1 January 2020 or, where the index provider submits an application for authorisation or registration in accordance with paragraph 1, unless and until such authorisation or registration is refused. 4. Where an existing benchmark does not meet the requirements of this Regulation, but ceasing or changing that benchmark to fulfil the requirements of this Regulation would result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument or the rules of any investment fund, which references that benchmark, the use of the benchmark shall be permitted by the competent authority of the Member State where the index provider is located. No financial instruments, financial contracts, or measurements of the performance of an investment fund shall add a reference to such an existing benchmark after 1 January 2020. 5. Unless the Commission has adopted an equivalence decision as referred to in Article 30(2) or (3) or unless an administrator has been recognised pursuant to Article 32, or a benchmark has been endorsed pursuant to Article 33, the use in the Union by supervised entities of a benchmark provided by an administrator located in a third country where the benchmark is already used in the Union as a reference for financial instruments, financial contracts, or for measuring the performance of an investment fund, shall be permitted only for such financial instruments, financial contracts and measurements of the performance of an investment fund that already reference the benchmark in the Union on, or which add a reference to such benchmark prior to, 1 January 2020. 6. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 concerning measures to determine the conditions on which the relevant competent authority may assess whether the cessation or the changing of an existing benchmark to conform with the requirements of this Regulation could reasonably result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument or the rules of any investment fund which references such benchmark.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Integrated financial markets bring significant benefits to the funding of the European economy and for promoting jobs and growth on a sound and sustainable basis. To promote financial integration and market integrity while safeguarding financial stability, the EU internal market for financial services requires common rules and strong supervisory coordination. When the EU overhauled its financial system in response to the financial crisis, and in line with global efforts, it therefore introduced a Single Rulebook for financial regulation in Europe and created the European Supervisory Authorities ("ESAs"). The ESAs constitute an institutional cornerstone of the comprehensive reform package and have played a key role in ensuring that the financial markets across the EU are well regulated, strong and stable. They contribute to the development and consistent application of the Single Rulebook, solve cross-border problems, and thereby promote both regulatory and supervisory convergence. Despite the post-crisis measures, there remains significant potential to enhance regulatory and supervisory convergence in the internal market. Integrated financial markets require more integrated supervisory arrangements to function effectively, while more centralised supervisory arrangements can, in turn, foster market integration. For this reason, the EU has engaged in further integration across the broader financial sector on a sound and stable basis. In particular, the Capital Markets Union ("CMU") has been launched so a s to lay the foundations for a fully functional internal market for capital markets. In this context, the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union of June 2015 1 highlighted the need to strengthen the EU supervisory framew ork, leading ultimately to a single capital-markets supervisor. More recently, the Commission Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 2 suggests that a review of the EU supervisory framework – in particular of the European Secu rities and Markets Authority ("ESMA") - should deliver the first steps towards such a single supervisor by 2019. The Reflection Paper also called for completing the Financial Union - comprising both a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union– by 2019 so a s to guarantee the integrity of the euro and improve the functioning of the euro area and the EU as a whole. Global financial markets are strongly interconnected, and the EU's regulatory framework is largely based on international standards agreed in the w ake of the financial crisis notably among G20 countries. As the EU is striving to accelerate the completion of the CMU, it is therefore essential that EU supervisory arrangements continue to develop in a manner which allows to reap the full potential of i nternationally integrated financial markets while ensuring that cross-border risks between the EU and the rest of the world can be monitored and managed effectively. The ESAs have a key role to play in this regard. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU reinforces these challenges for supervisory arrangements within the remaining EU27. The future departure of the EU’s currently largest financial centre means that EU27 capital markets need to develop further and supervisory arrangements must be strengthened to ensure that financial markets continue to support the economy on an adequate and sound basis. The objective of the present proposal is to adjust and upgrade the ESAs framework to ensure they can assume an enhanced responsibility for financial market supervision. The ESAs must be adequately equipped in terms of powers, governance and funding. First, where existing powers of the ESAs have proven partially insufficient and unclearly defined, for example as regards the consistent application of EU law, the drafting of technical advice or the provision of ongoing support to equivalence decisions, they must be strengthened and improved. The current scope of the ESAs' mandate must also be reconsidered in light of the policy objectives of the CMU. More common direct supervision in targeted areas is necessary to ensure more consistent supervisory practices and implementation of EU financial services rules. The 2017 review of the ESA Regulations concluded that the supervision of certain activities and entities with particular importance for the Union as a whole or with a significant degree of cross-border business should be carried out by the ESAs instead of by national competent authorities. Similarly, the ESAs should be more involved in the authorisation and supervision of entities from non-EU countries that are active in the Union. Second, this proposal aims at establishing a more effective governance of the ESAs. The incentive structure in the decision-making process of the ESAs as it stands today leads to the absence of decisions in particular in the area of regulatory convergence and supervisory convergence, or promotes decisions that are predominantly oriented towards national instead of broader EU interests. This reflects, to so me extent, an inherent tension between the European mandate of the ESAs and the national mandate of the competent authorities that are members of the ESA Boards. 3 This position is not well aligned with the objective of supervisory convergence. A greater role for the ESAs in deepening financial integration or strengthening the stability of the internal market will also require more effective convergence powers. 4 Third, the ESAs need an appropriate funding base which allows them to allocate resources in relation to their needs to fulfil their objective. Current budget arrangements constrain and will continue to constrain the ESAs' activities, as Member States for different reasons might be unwilling to increase national contributions further. The present proposal sets out specific amendments to the ESA Regulations 5 and various sector acts 6 to reinforce the powers, governance and funding framework of the ESAs, as these are the areas which need to be reinforced to allow the ESAs to meet the challenges outlin ed above. The impact assessment report accompanying this proposal considers the costs and benefits of these amendments. It sets out a number of options of measures intended to enhance the powers of the ESAs at EU level, improve their governance (including decision- making), and to ensure that their funding framework is sustainable and commensurate with current and future tasks. The impact assessment provides comprehensive evidence that the proposed amendments contribute effectively to reinforcing the ESA framework and thereby to the overall stability of the EU financial system, while keeping costs to the EU General Budget and stakeholders at a minimum. The proposed amendments also contribute to the further development and deepening of the CMU, in line with the political priorities of the Commission. 
Revised version (Article 51 Transitional provisions):
1. An index provider providing a benchmark on 30 June 2016 shall apply for authorisation or registration in accordance with Article 34 by 1 January 2020. 2. By 1 January 2020, the competent authority of the Member State where an index provider applying for authorisation in accordance with Article 34 is located shall have the power to decide to register that index provider as an administrator even if it is not a supervised entity, under the following conditions: (a) the index provider does not provide a critical benchmark; (b) the competent authority is aware, on a reasonable basis, that the index or indices provided by the index provider are not widely used, within the meaning of this Regulation, in the Member State where the index provider is located as well as in other Member States. The competent authority shall notify ESMA of its decision adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph. The competent authority shall keep evidence of the reasons for its decision adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph, in such a form that it is possible to fully understand the evaluations of the competent authority that the index or indices provided by the index provider are not widely used, including any market data, judgement or other information, as well as information received from the index provider. 3. An index provider may continue to provide an existing benchmark which may be used by supervised entities until 1 January 2020 or, where the index provider submits an application for authorisation or registration in accordance with paragraph 1, unless and until such authorisation or registration is refused. 4. Where an existing benchmark does not meet the requirements of this Regulation, but ceasing or changing that benchmark to fulfil the requirements of this Regulation would result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument or the rules of any investment fund, which references that benchmark, the use of the benchmark shall be permitted by the competent authority of the Member State where the index provider is located. No financial instruments, financial contracts, or measurements of the performance of an investment fund shall add a reference to such an existing benchmark after 1 January 2020. 4a. An index provider may continue to provide an existing benchmark that has been recognised as a critical benchmark by an implementing act adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 20 until 31 December 2021 or, where the index provider submits an application for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1, unless and until such authorisation is refused. 4b. An existing benchmark that has been recognised as a critical benchmark by an implementing act adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 20 may be used for existing and new financial instruments, financial contracts, or for measuring the performance of an investment fund until 31 December 2021 or, where the index provider submits an application for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1, unless and until such authorisation is refused. 5. Unless the Commission has adopted an equivalence decision as referred to in Article 30(2) or (3) or unless an administrator has been recognised pursuant to Article 32, or a benchmark has been endorsed pursuant to Article 33, the use in the Union by supervised entities of a benchmark provided by an administrator located in a third country where the benchmark is already used in the Union as a reference for financial instruments, financial contracts, or for measuring the performance of an investment fund, shall be permitted only for such financial instruments, financial contracts and measurements of the performance of an investment fund that already reference the benchmark in the Union on, or which add a reference to such benchmark prior to, 31 December 2021. 6. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 concerning measures to determine the conditions on which the relevant competent authority may assess whether the cessation or the changing of an existing benchmark to conform with the requirements of this Regulation could reasonably result in a force majeure event, frustrate or otherwise breach the terms of any financial contract or financial instrument or the rules of any investment fund which references such benchmark.
Article 52 Deadline for updating the prospectuses and key information documents
Article 29(2) is without prejudice to outstanding prospectuses approved under Directive 2003/71/EC prior to 1 January 2018. For prospectuses approved prior to 1 January 2018 under Directive 2009/65/EC, the underlying documents shall be updated at the first occasion or at the latest within 12 months after that date.
Article 53 ESMA reviews
1. ESMA shall seek to build a common European supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices and ensure consistent approaches among competent authorities in relation to the application of Articles 32 and 33. To that end, the recognitions granted in accordance with Article 32 and the endorsements authorised in accordance with Article 33 shall be reviewed by ESMA every two years. ESMA shall issue an opinion to each competent authority that has recognised a third country administrator or endorsed a third country benchmark assessing how that competent authority applies the relevant requirements of Articles 32 and 33 respectively and the requirements of any relevant delegated act and regulatory or implementing technical standard based on this Regulation. 2. ESMA shall have the power to require the documented evidence from a competent authority for any of the decisions adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 51(2), Article 24(1) and Article 25(2).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 53 ESMA reviews):
1. ESMA shall seek to build a common European supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices and ensure consistent approaches among competent authorities in relation to the application of Article 33. To that end, the endorsements authorised in accordance with Article 33 shall be reviewed by ESMA every two years. ESMA shall issue an opinion to each competent authority that has endorsed a third-country benchmark assessing how that competent authority applies the relevant requirements of Article 33 and the requirements of any relevant delegated act and regulatory or implementing technical standards based on this Regulation. 2. ESMA shall have the power to require the documented evidence from a competent authority for any of the decisions adopted in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 51(2) and Article 25(2), as well as for actions taken with regard to the enforcement of Article 24(1).
Article 54 Review
1. By 1 January 2020, the Commission shall review and submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on this Regulation and in particular on: (a) the functioning and effectiveness of the critical benchmark, mandatory administration and mandatory contribution regime under Articles 20, 21 and 23 and the definition of a critical benchmark in point (25) of Article 3(1); (b) the effectiveness of the authorisation, registration and supervision regime of administrators under Title VI and the colleges under Article 46 and the appropriateness of supervision of certain benchmarks by a Union body; (c) the functioning and effectiveness of Article 19(2), in particular the scope of its application. 2. The Commission shall review the evolution of international principles applicable to benchmarks and of legal frameworks and supervisory practices in third countries concerning the provision of benchmarks and report to the European Parliament and to the Council every five years after 1 January 2018. That report shall assess in particular whether there is a need to amend this Regulation and shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal, if appropriate. 3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 in order to extend the 42-month period referred to in Article 51(2) by 24 months, if the report referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article provides evidence that the transitional registration regime under Article 51(2) is not detrimental to a common European supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices and approaches among competent authorities.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Integrated financial markets bring significant benefits to the funding of the European economy and for promoting jobs and growth on a sound and sustainable basis. To promote financial integration and market integrity while safeguarding financial stability, the EU internal market for financial services requires common rules and strong supervisory coordination. When the EU overhauled its financial system in response to the financial crisis, and in line with global efforts, it therefore introduced a Single Rulebook for financial regulation in Europe and created the European Supervisory Authorities ("ESAs"). The ESAs constitute an institutional cornerstone of the comprehensive reform package and have played a key role in ensuring that the financial markets across the EU are well regulated, strong and stable. They contribute to the development and consistent application of the Single Rulebook, solve cross-border problems, and thereby promote both regulatory and supervisory convergence. Despite the post-crisis measures, there remains significant potential to enhance regulatory and supervisory convergence in the internal market. Integrated financial markets require more integrated supervisory arrangements to function effectively, while more centralised supervisory arrangements can, in turn, foster market integration. For this reason, the EU has engaged in further integration across the broader financial sector on a sound and stable basis. In particular, the Capital Markets Union ("CMU") has been launched so a s to lay the foundations for a fully functional internal market for capital markets. In this context, the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union of June 2015 1 highlighted the need to strengthen the EU supervisory framew ork, leading ultimately to a single capital-markets supervisor. More recently, the Commission Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 2 suggests that a review of the EU supervisory framework – in particular of the European Secu rities and Markets Authority ("ESMA") - should deliver the first steps towards such a single supervisor by 2019. The Reflection Paper also called for completing the Financial Union - comprising both a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union– by 2019 so a s to guarantee the integrity of the euro and improve the functioning of the euro area and the EU as a whole. Global financial markets are strongly interconnected, and the EU's regulatory framework is largely based on international standards agreed in the w ake of the financial crisis notably among G20 countries. As the EU is striving to accelerate the completion of the CMU, it is therefore essential that EU supervisory arrangements continue to develop in a manner which allows to reap the full potential of i nternationally integrated financial markets while ensuring that cross-border risks between the EU and the rest of the world can be monitored and managed effectively. The ESAs have a key role to play in this regard. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU reinforces these challenges for supervisory arrangements within the remaining EU27. The future departure of the EU’s currently largest financial centre means that EU27 capital markets need to develop further and supervisory arrangements must be strengthened to ensure that financial markets continue to support the economy on an adequate and sound basis. The objective of the present proposal is to adjust and upgrade the ESAs framework to ensure they can assume an enhanced responsibility for financial market supervision. The ESAs must be adequately equipped in terms of powers, governance and funding. First, where existing powers of the ESAs have proven partially insufficient and unclearly defined, for example as regards the consistent application of EU law, the drafting of technical advice or the provision of ongoing support to equivalence decisions, they must be strengthened and improved. The current scope of the ESAs' mandate must also be reconsidered in light of the policy objectives of the CMU. More common direct supervision in targeted areas is necessary to ensure more consistent supervisory practices and implementation of EU financial services rules. The 2017 review of the ESA Regulations concluded that the supervision of certain activities and entities with particular importance for the Union as a whole or with a significant degree of cross-border business should be carried out by the ESAs instead of by national competent authorities. Similarly, the ESAs should be more involved in the authorisation and supervision of entities from non-EU countries that are active in the Union. Second, this proposal aims at establishing a more effective governance of the ESAs. The incentive structure in the decision-making process of the ESAs as it stands today leads to the absence of decisions in particular in the area of regulatory convergence and supervisory convergence, or promotes decisions that are predominantly oriented towards national instead of broader EU interests. This reflects, to so me extent, an inherent tension between the European mandate of the ESAs and the national mandate of the competent authorities that are members of the ESA Boards. 3 This position is not well aligned with the objective of supervisory convergence. A greater role for the ESAs in deepening financial integration or strengthening the stability of the internal market will also require more effective convergence powers. 4 Third, the ESAs need an appropriate funding base which allows them to allocate resources in relation to their needs to fulfil their objective. Current budget arrangements constrain and will continue to constrain the ESAs' activities, as Member States for different reasons might be unwilling to increase national contributions further. The present proposal sets out specific amendments to the ESA Regulations 5 and various sector acts 6 to reinforce the powers, governance and funding framework of the ESAs, as these are the areas which need to be reinforced to allow the ESAs to meet the challenges outlin ed above. The impact assessment report accompanying this proposal considers the costs and benefits of these amendments. It sets out a number of options of measures intended to enhance the powers of the ESAs at EU level, improve their governance (including decision- making), and to ensure that their funding framework is sustainable and commensurate with current and future tasks. The impact assessment provides comprehensive evidence that the proposed amendments contribute effectively to reinforcing the ESA framework and thereby to the overall stability of the EU financial system, while keeping costs to the EU General Budget and stakeholders at a minimum. The proposed amendments also contribute to the further development and deepening of the CMU, in line with the political priorities of the Commission. 
Revised version (Article 54 Review):
1. By 1 January 2020, the Commission shall review and submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on this Regulation and in particular on: (a) the functioning and effectiveness of the critical benchmark, mandatory administration and mandatory contribution regime under Articles 20, 21 and 23 and the definition of a critical benchmark in point (25) of Article 3(1); (b) the effectiveness of the authorisation, registration and supervision regime of administrators under Title VI and the colleges under Article 46 and the appropriateness of supervision of certain benchmarks by a Union body; (c) the functioning and effectiveness of Article 19(2), in particular the scope of its application. 2. The Commission shall review the evolution of international principles applicable to benchmarks and of legal frameworks and supervisory practices in third countries concerning the provision of benchmarks and report to the European Parliament and to the Council every five years after 1 January 2018. That report shall assess in particular whether there is a need to amend this Regulation and shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal, if appropriate. 3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 49 in order to extend the 42-month period referred to in Article 51(2) by 24 months, if the report referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article provides evidence that the transitional registration regime under Article 51(2) is not detrimental to a common European supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices and approaches among competent authorities. 4. By 31 December 2022, the Commission shall review the minimum standards for EU Climate Transition Benchmarks and for EU Paris-aligned Benchmarks in order to ensure that the selection of the underlying assets is coherent with environmentally sustainable investments as defined in a Union-wide framework. 5. Before 31 December 2022, the Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the impact of this Regulation and the feasibility of an ‘ESG benchmark’, taking into account the evolving nature of sustainability indicators and the methods used to measure them. That report shall be accompanied, where appropriate by a legislative proposal. 6. By 1 April 2020, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the impact of this Regulation on the operation of third country benchmarks in the Union, including on the recourse by third country benchmark administrators to endorsement, recognition or equivalence, and on potential shortcomings of the current framework. That report shall analyse the consequences of the application of paragraphs 4a, 4b and 4c of Article 51 for Union and third-country benchmark administrators, including in terms of a level playing field. That report shall assess in particular whether there is a need to amend this Regulation and shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal, if appropriate.
Article 55 Notification of benchmarks referenced and their administrators
When a benchmark is referenced in a financial instrument covered by Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, the notifications under Article 4(1) of that Regulation shall include the name of the benchmark referenced and its administrator.
Article 56 Amendments to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 is amended as follows: (1) Article 19 is amended as follows: (a) the following paragraph is inserted: ‘1a. The notification obligation referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to transactions in financial instruments linked to shares or to debt instruments of the issuer referred to in that paragraph where at the time of the transaction any of the following conditions is met: (a) the financial instrument is a unit or share in a collective investment undertaking in which the exposure to the issuer's shares or debt instruments does not exceed 20 % of the assets held by the collective investment undertaking; (b) the financial instrument provides exposure to a portfolio of assets in which the exposure to the issuer's shares or debt instruments does not exceed 20 % of the portfolio's assets; (c) the financial instrument is a unit or share in a collective investment undertaking or provides exposure to a portfolio of assets and the person discharging managerial responsibilities or person closely associated with such a person does not know, and could not know, the investment composition or exposure of such collective investment undertaking or portfolio of assets in relation to the issuer's shares or debt instruments, and furthermore there is no reason for that person to believe that the issuer's shares or debt instruments exceed the thresholds in point (a) or (b). If information regarding the investment composition of the collective investment undertaking or exposure to the portfolio of assets is available, then the person discharging managerial responsibility or person closely associated with such a person shall make all reasonable efforts to avail themselves of that information.’; (b) in paragraph 7, the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph: ‘For the purposes of point (b), transactions executed in shares or debt instruments of an issuer or derivatives or other financial instruments linked thereto by managers of a collective investment undertaking in which the person discharging managerial responsibilities or a person closely associated with them has invested do not need to be notified where the manager of the collective investment undertaking operates with full discretion, which excludes the manager receiving any instructions or suggestions on portfolio composition directly or indirectly from investors in that collective investment undertaking.’. (2) Article 35 is amended as follows: (a) in paragraphs (2) and (3), the phrase ‘and Article 19(13) and (14)’ is replaced by ‘, Article 19(13) and (14) and Article 38’; (b) paragraph (5) is replaced by the following: ‘5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 6(5) or (6), Article 12(5), the third subparagraph of Article 17(2), Article 17(3), Article 19(13) or (14) or Article 38, shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.’. (3) In Article 38, the following paragraphs are added: ‘By 3 July 2019, the Commission shall, after consulting ESMA, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the level of the thresholds set out in Article 19(1a)(a) and (b) in relation to managers' transactions where the issuer's shares or debt instruments form part of a collective investment undertaking or provide exposure to a portfolio of assets, with a view to assessing whether that level is appropriate or should be adjusted. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 35 adjusting the thresholds in Article 19(1a)(a) and (b), if it determines in that report that those thresholds should be adjusted.’.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 56 Amendments to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014):
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 is amended as follows: (3) In Article 38, the following paragraphs are added: ‘By 3 July 2019, the Commission shall, after consulting ESMA, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the level of the thresholds set out in Article 19(1a)(a) and (b) in relation to managers' transactions where the issuer's shares or debt instruments form part of a collective investment undertaking or provide exposure to a portfolio of assets, with a view to assessing whether that level is appropriate or should be adjusted. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 35 adjusting the thresholds in Article 19(1a)(a) and (b), if it determines in that report that those thresholds should be adjusted.’.
Article 57 Amendments to Directive 2008/48/EC
Directive 2008/48/EC is amended as follows: (1) In Article 5(1), the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph: ‘Where the credit agreement references a benchmark as defined in point 3 of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( *1 ) , the name of the benchmark and of its administrator and the potential implications on the consumer shall be provided by the creditor, or where applicable, by the credit intermediary, to the consumer in a separate document, which may be annexed to the Standard European Consumer Credit Information form. ( *1 ) Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 ( OJ L 171, 29.6.2016, p. 1 ).’."
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Integrated financial markets bring significant benefits to the funding of the European economy and for promoting jobs and growth on a sound and sustainable basis. To promote financial integration and market integrity while safeguarding financial stability, the EU internal market for financial services requires common rules and strong supervisory coordination. When the EU overhauled its financial system in response to the financial crisis, and in line with global efforts, it therefore introduced a Single Rulebook for financial regulation in Europe and created the European Supervisory Authorities ("ESAs"). The ESAs constitute an institutional cornerstone of the comprehensive reform package and have played a key role in ensuring that the financial markets across the EU are well regulated, strong and stable. They contribute to the development and consistent application of the Single Rulebook, solve cross-border problems, and thereby promote both regulatory and supervisory convergence. Despite the post-crisis measures, there remains significant potential to enhance regulatory and supervisory convergence in the internal market. Integrated financial markets require more integrated supervisory arrangements to function effectively, while more centralised supervisory arrangements can, in turn, foster market integration. For this reason, the EU has engaged in further integration across the broader financial sector on a sound and stable basis. In particular, the Capital Markets Union ("CMU") has been launched so a s to lay the foundations for a fully functional internal market for capital markets. In this context, the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union of June 2015 1 highlighted the need to strengthen the EU supervisory framew ork, leading ultimately to a single capital-markets supervisor. More recently, the Commission Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 2 suggests that a review of the EU supervisory framework – in particular of the European Secu rities and Markets Authority ("ESMA") - should deliver the first steps towards such a single supervisor by 2019. The Reflection Paper also called for completing the Financial Union - comprising both a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union– by 2019 so a s to guarantee the integrity of the euro and improve the functioning of the euro area and the EU as a whole. Global financial markets are strongly interconnected, and the EU's regulatory framework is largely based on international standards agreed in the w ake of the financial crisis notably among G20 countries. As the EU is striving to accelerate the completion of the CMU, it is therefore essential that EU supervisory arrangements continue to develop in a manner which allows to reap the full potential of i nternationally integrated financial markets while ensuring that cross-border risks between the EU and the rest of the world can be monitored and managed effectively. The ESAs have a key role to play in this regard. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU reinforces these challenges for supervisory arrangements within the remaining EU27. The future departure of the EU’s currently largest financial centre means that EU27 capital markets need to develop further and supervisory arrangements must be strengthened to ensure that financial markets continue to support the economy on an adequate and sound basis. The objective of the present proposal is to adjust and upgrade the ESAs framework to ensure they can assume an enhanced responsibility for financial market supervision. The ESAs must be adequately equipped in terms of powers, governance and funding. First, where existing powers of the ESAs have proven partially insufficient and unclearly defined, for example as regards the consistent application of EU law, the drafting of technical advice or the provision of ongoing support to equivalence decisions, they must be strengthened and improved. The current scope of the ESAs' mandate must also be reconsidered in light of the policy objectives of the CMU. More common direct supervision in targeted areas is necessary to ensure more consistent supervisory practices and implementation of EU financial services rules. The 2017 review of the ESA Regulations concluded that the supervision of certain activities and entities with particular importance for the Union as a whole or with a significant degree of cross-border business should be carried out by the ESAs instead of by national competent authorities. Similarly, the ESAs should be more involved in the authorisation and supervision of entities from non-EU countries that are active in the Union. Second, this proposal aims at establishing a more effective governance of the ESAs. The incentive structure in the decision-making process of the ESAs as it stands today leads to the absence of decisions in particular in the area of regulatory convergence and supervisory convergence, or promotes decisions that are predominantly oriented towards national instead of broader EU interests. This reflects, to so me extent, an inherent tension between the European mandate of the ESAs and the national mandate of the competent authorities that are members of the ESA Boards. 3 This position is not well aligned with the objective of supervisory convergence. A greater role for the ESAs in deepening financial integration or strengthening the stability of the internal market will also require more effective convergence powers. 4 Third, the ESAs need an appropriate funding base which allows them to allocate resources in relation to their needs to fulfil their objective. Current budget arrangements constrain and will continue to constrain the ESAs' activities, as Member States for different reasons might be unwilling to increase national contributions further. The present proposal sets out specific amendments to the ESA Regulations 5 and various sector acts 6 to reinforce the powers, governance and funding framework of the ESAs, as these are the areas which need to be reinforced to allow the ESAs to meet the challenges outlin ed above. The impact assessment report accompanying this proposal considers the costs and benefits of these amendments. It sets out a number of options of measures intended to enhance the powers of the ESAs at EU level, improve their governance (including decision- making), and to ensure that their funding framework is sustainable and commensurate with current and future tasks. The impact assessment provides comprehensive evidence that the proposed amendments contribute effectively to reinforcing the ESA framework and thereby to the overall stability of the EU financial system, while keeping costs to the EU General Budget and stakeholders at a minimum. The proposed amendments also contribute to the further development and deepening of the CMU, in line with the political priorities of the Commission. 
Revised version (Article 57 Amendments to Directive 2008/48/EC):
Directive 2008/48/EC is amended as follows: (1) In Article 5(1), the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph: ‘Where the credit agreement references a benchmark as defined in point 3 of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( *1 ), the name of the benchmark and of its administrator and the potential implications on the consumer shall be provided by the creditor, or where applicable, by the credit intermediary, to the consumer in a separate document, which may be annexed to the Standard European Consumer Credit Information form. (2) In Article 27(1), the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph: ‘By 1 July 2018 Member States shall adopt and publish the provisions necessary to comply with the third subparagraph of Article 5(1) and shall communicate them to the Commission. They shall apply those provisions from 1 July 2018.’.
Article 58 Amendments to Directive 2014/17/EU
Directive 2014/17/EU is amended as follows: (1) In the second subparagraph of Article 13(1), the following point is inserted: ‘(ea) where contracts that reference a benchmark as defined in point (3) of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( *2 ) are available, the names of the benchmarks and of their administrators and the potential implications on the consumer; ( *2 ) Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 ( OJ L 171, 29.6.2016, p. 1 ).’;"
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Integrated financial markets bring significant benefits to the funding of the European economy and for promoting jobs and growth on a sound and sustainable basis. To promote financial integration and market integrity while safeguarding financial stability, the EU internal market for financial services requires common rules and strong supervisory coordination. When the EU overhauled its financial system in response to the financial crisis, and in line with global efforts, it therefore introduced a Single Rulebook for financial regulation in Europe and created the European Supervisory Authorities ("ESAs"). The ESAs constitute an institutional cornerstone of the comprehensive reform package and have played a key role in ensuring that the financial markets across the EU are well regulated, strong and stable. They contribute to the development and consistent application of the Single Rulebook, solve cross-border problems, and thereby promote both regulatory and supervisory convergence. Despite the post-crisis measures, there remains significant potential to enhance regulatory and supervisory convergence in the internal market. Integrated financial markets require more integrated supervisory arrangements to function effectively, while more centralised supervisory arrangements can, in turn, foster market integration. For this reason, the EU has engaged in further integration across the broader financial sector on a sound and stable basis. In particular, the Capital Markets Union ("CMU") has been launched so a s to lay the foundations for a fully functional internal market for capital markets. In this context, the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union of June 2015 1 highlighted the need to strengthen the EU supervisory framew ork, leading ultimately to a single capital-markets supervisor. More recently, the Commission Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 2 suggests that a review of the EU supervisory framework – in particular of the European Secu rities and Markets Authority ("ESMA") - should deliver the first steps towards such a single supervisor by 2019. The Reflection Paper also called for completing the Financial Union - comprising both a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union– by 2019 so a s to guarantee the integrity of the euro and improve the functioning of the euro area and the EU as a whole. Global financial markets are strongly interconnected, and the EU's regulatory framework is largely based on international standards agreed in the w ake of the financial crisis notably among G20 countries. As the EU is striving to accelerate the completion of the CMU, it is therefore essential that EU supervisory arrangements continue to develop in a manner which allows to reap the full potential of i nternationally integrated financial markets while ensuring that cross-border risks between the EU and the rest of the world can be monitored and managed effectively. The ESAs have a key role to play in this regard. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU reinforces these challenges for supervisory arrangements within the remaining EU27. The future departure of the EU’s currently largest financial centre means that EU27 capital markets need to develop further and supervisory arrangements must be strengthened to ensure that financial markets continue to support the economy on an adequate and sound basis. The objective of the present proposal is to adjust and upgrade the ESAs framework to ensure they can assume an enhanced responsibility for financial market supervision. The ESAs must be adequately equipped in terms of powers, governance and funding. First, where existing powers of the ESAs have proven partially insufficient and unclearly defined, for example as regards the consistent application of EU law, the drafting of technical advice or the provision of ongoing support to equivalence decisions, they must be strengthened and improved. The current scope of the ESAs' mandate must also be reconsidered in light of the policy objectives of the CMU. More common direct supervision in targeted areas is necessary to ensure more consistent supervisory practices and implementation of EU financial services rules. The 2017 review of the ESA Regulations concluded that the supervision of certain activities and entities with particular importance for the Union as a whole or with a significant degree of cross-border business should be carried out by the ESAs instead of by national competent authorities. Similarly, the ESAs should be more involved in the authorisation and supervision of entities from non-EU countries that are active in the Union. Second, this proposal aims at establishing a more effective governance of the ESAs. The incentive structure in the decision-making process of the ESAs as it stands today leads to the absence of decisions in particular in the area of regulatory convergence and supervisory convergence, or promotes decisions that are predominantly oriented towards national instead of broader EU interests. This reflects, to so me extent, an inherent tension between the European mandate of the ESAs and the national mandate of the competent authorities that are members of the ESA Boards. 3 This position is not well aligned with the objective of supervisory convergence. A greater role for the ESAs in deepening financial integration or strengthening the stability of the internal market will also require more effective convergence powers. 4 Third, the ESAs need an appropriate funding base which allows them to allocate resources in relation to their needs to fulfil their objective. Current budget arrangements constrain and will continue to constrain the ESAs' activities, as Member States for different reasons might be unwilling to increase national contributions further. The present proposal sets out specific amendments to the ESA Regulations 5 and various sector acts 6 to reinforce the powers, governance and funding framework of the ESAs, as these are the areas which need to be reinforced to allow the ESAs to meet the challenges outlin ed above. The impact assessment report accompanying this proposal considers the costs and benefits of these amendments. It sets out a number of options of measures intended to enhance the powers of the ESAs at EU level, improve their governance (including decision- making), and to ensure that their funding framework is sustainable and commensurate with current and future tasks. The impact assessment provides comprehensive evidence that the proposed amendments contribute effectively to reinforcing the ESA framework and thereby to the overall stability of the EU financial system, while keeping costs to the EU General Budget and stakeholders at a minimum. The proposed amendments also contribute to the further development and deepening of the CMU, in line with the political priorities of the Commission. 
Revised version (Article 58 Amendments to Directive 2014/17/EU):
Directive 2014/17/EU is amended as follows: (1) In the second subparagraph of Article 13(1), the following point is inserted: ‘(ea) where contracts that reference a benchmark as defined in point (3) of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( *2 ) are available, the names of the benchmarks and of their administrators and the potential implications on the consumer; (2) In Article 42(2), the following subparagraph is inserted after the first subparagraph: ‘By 1 July 2018, Member States shall adopt and publish the provisions necessary to comply with point (ea) of the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) and shall communicate them to the Commission. They shall apply those provisions from 1 July 2018.’; (3) In Article 43(1), the following subparagraph is added: ‘Point (ea) of the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) shall not apply to credit agreements existing before 1 July 2018.’.
Article 59 Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union . It shall apply from 1 January 2018. Notwithstanding the second paragraph of this Article, Articles 3(2), 5(5), 11(5), 13(3), 15(6), 16(5), Article 20 (excluding point (b) of paragraph (6)), Articles 21 and 23, Articles 25(8), 25(9), 26(5), 27(3), 30(5), 32(9), 33(7), 34(8), Article 46, and Articles 47(3) and 51(6) shall apply from 30 June 2016. Notwithstanding the second paragraph of this Article, Article 56 shall apply from 3 July 2016.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Integrated financial markets bring significant benefits to the funding of the European economy and for promoting jobs and growth on a sound and sustainable basis. To promote financial integration and market integrity while safeguarding financial stability, the EU internal market for financial services requires common rules and strong supervisory coordination. When the EU overhauled its financial system in response to the financial crisis, and in line with global efforts, it therefore introduced a Single Rulebook for financial regulation in Europe and created the European Supervisory Authorities ("ESAs"). The ESAs constitute an institutional cornerstone of the comprehensive reform package and have played a key role in ensuring that the financial markets across the EU are well regulated, strong and stable. They contribute to the development and consistent application of the Single Rulebook, solve cross-border problems, and thereby promote both regulatory and supervisory convergence. Despite the post-crisis measures, there remains significant potential to enhance regulatory and supervisory convergence in the internal market. Integrated financial markets require more integrated supervisory arrangements to function effectively, while more centralised supervisory arrangements can, in turn, foster market integration. For this reason, the EU has engaged in further integration across the broader financial sector on a sound and stable basis. In particular, the Capital Markets Union ("CMU") has been launched so a s to lay the foundations for a fully functional internal market for capital markets. In this context, the Five Presidents' Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union of June 2015 1 highlighted the need to strengthen the EU supervisory framew ork, leading ultimately to a single capital-markets supervisor. More recently, the Commission Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 2 suggests that a review of the EU supervisory framework – in particular of the European Secu rities and Markets Authority ("ESMA") - should deliver the first steps towards such a single supervisor by 2019. The Reflection Paper also called for completing the Financial Union - comprising both a Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union– by 2019 so a s to guarantee the integrity of the euro and improve the functioning of the euro area and the EU as a whole. Global financial markets are strongly interconnected, and the EU's regulatory framework is largely based on international standards agreed in the w ake of the financial crisis notably among G20 countries. As the EU is striving to accelerate the completion of the CMU, it is therefore essential that EU supervisory arrangements continue to develop in a manner which allows to reap the full potential of i nternationally integrated financial markets while ensuring that cross-border risks between the EU and the rest of the world can be monitored and managed effectively. The ESAs have a key role to play in this regard. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU reinforces these challenges for supervisory arrangements within the remaining EU27. The future departure of the EU’s currently largest financial centre means that EU27 capital markets need to develop further and supervisory arrangements must be strengthened to ensure that financial markets continue to support the economy on an adequate and sound basis. The objective of the present proposal is to adjust and upgrade the ESAs framework to ensure they can assume an enhanced responsibility for financial market supervision. The ESAs must be adequately equipped in terms of powers, governance and funding. First, where existing powers of the ESAs have proven partially insufficient and unclearly defined, for example as regards the consistent application of EU law, the drafting of technical advice or the provision of ongoing support to equivalence decisions, they must be strengthened and improved. The current scope of the ESAs' mandate must also be reconsidered in light of the policy objectives of the CMU. More common direct supervision in targeted areas is necessary to ensure more consistent supervisory practices and implementation of EU financial services rules. The 2017 review of the ESA Regulations concluded that the supervision of certain activities and entities with particular importance for the Union as a whole or with a significant degree of cross-border business should be carried out by the ESAs instead of by national competent authorities. Similarly, the ESAs should be more involved in the authorisation and supervision of entities from non-EU countries that are active in the Union. Second, this proposal aims at establishing a more effective governance of the ESAs. The incentive structure in the decision-making process of the ESAs as it stands today leads to the absence of decisions in particular in the area of regulatory convergence and supervisory convergence, or promotes decisions that are predominantly oriented towards national instead of broader EU interests. This reflects, to so me extent, an inherent tension between the European mandate of the ESAs and the national mandate of the competent authorities that are members of the ESA Boards. 3 This position is not well aligned with the objective of supervisory convergence. A greater role for the ESAs in deepening financial integration or strengthening the stability of the internal market will also require more effective convergence powers. 4 Third, the ESAs need an appropriate funding base which allows them to allocate resources in relation to their needs to fulfil their objective. Current budget arrangements constrain and will continue to constrain the ESAs' activities, as Member States for different reasons might be unwilling to increase national contributions further. The present proposal sets out specific amendments to the ESA Regulations 5 and various sector acts 6 to reinforce the powers, governance and funding framework of the ESAs, as these are the areas which need to be reinforced to allow the ESAs to meet the challenges outlin ed above. The impact assessment report accompanying this proposal considers the costs and benefits of these amendments. It sets out a number of options of measures intended to enhance the powers of the ESAs at EU level, improve their governance (including decision- making), and to ensure that their funding framework is sustainable and commensurate with current and future tasks. The impact assessment provides comprehensive evidence that the proposed amendments contribute effectively to reinforcing the ESA framework and thereby to the overall stability of the EU financial system, while keeping costs to the EU General Budget and stakeholders at a minimum. The proposed amendments also contribute to the further development and deepening of the CMU, in line with the political priorities of the Commission. 
Revised version (Article 59 Entry into force):
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union . It shall apply from 1 January 2018. Notwithstanding the second paragraph of this Article, Articles 3(2), 5(5), 11(5), 13(3), 15(6), 16(5), Article 20 (excluding point (b) of paragraph (6)), Articles 21 and 23, Articles 25(8), 25(9), 26(5), 27(3), 30(5), 32(9), 33(7), 34(8), Article 46, and Articles 47(3) and 51(6) shall apply from 30 June 2016. Notwithstanding the second paragraph of this Article, Article 56 shall apply from 3 July 2016. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.