Article 1 Objectives
The objectives of this Directive are: (a) to establish a Community framework in order to maintain and promote the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and its regulation; (b) to ensure that Member States shall provide for appropriate national arrangements for a high level of nuclear safety to protect workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations.
Article 2 Scope
1. This Directive shall apply to any civilian nuclear installation operating under a licence as defined in Article 3(4) at all stages covered by this licence. 2. This Directive does not prevent Member States from taking more stringent safety measures in the subject-matter covered by this Directive, in compliance with Community law. 3. This Directive supplements the basic standards referred to in Article 30 of the Treaty as regards the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and is without prejudice to Directive 96/29/Euratom.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 2 Scope):
1. This Directive shall apply to any civilian nuclear installation subject to a licence. 2. This Directive does not prevent Member States from taking more stringent safety measures in the subject-matter covered by this Directive, in compliance with Community law. 3. This Directive supplements the basic standards referred to in Article 30 of the Treaty as regards the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and is without prejudice to the existing Community legislation for the protection of the health of the workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation, and in particular Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom ( 11 ).
Article 3 Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply: 1. ‘nuclear installation’ means: (a) an enrichment plant, nuclear fuel fabrication plant, nuclear power plant, reprocessing plant, research reactor facility, spent fuel storage facility; and (b) storage facilities for radioactive waste that are on the same site and are directly related to nuclear installations listed under point (a); 2. ‘nuclear safety’ means the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers and the general public from dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations; 3. ‘competent regulatory authority’ means an authority or a system of authorities designated in a Member State in the field of regulation of nuclear safety of nuclear installations as referred to in Article 5; 4. ‘licence’ means any legal document granted under the jurisdiction of a Member State to confer responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning and operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation; 5. ‘licence holder’ means a legal or natural person having overall responsibility for a nuclear installation as specified in a licence.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 3 Definitions):
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply: 2. ‘nuclear safety’ means the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers and the general public from dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations; 3. ‘competent regulatory authority’ means an authority or a system of authorities designated in a Member State in the field of regulation of nuclear safety of nuclear installations as referred to in Article 5; 4. ‘licence’ means any legal document granted under the jurisdiction of a Member State to confer responsibility for the siting, design, construction, commissioning and operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation; 5. ‘licence holder’ means a legal or natural person having overall responsibility for a nuclear installation as specified in a licence; 6. ‘accident’ means any unintended event, the consequences or potential consequences of which are significant from the point of view of radiation protection or nuclear safety; 7. ‘incident’ means any unintended event, the consequences or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view of radiation protection or nuclear safety; 8. ‘abnormal operations’ means an operational process deviating from normal operation which is expected to occur at least once during the operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of appropriate design provisions, does not cause any significant damage to items important to safety or lead to accident conditions; 9. ‘design basis’ means the range of conditions and events taken explicitly into account in the design, including upgrades, of a nuclear installation, according to established criteria, so that the installation can withstand them without exceeding authorised limits by the planned operation of safety systems; 10. ‘design basis accident’ means accident conditions against which a nuclear installation is designed according to established design criteria, and for which the damage to the fuel, where applicable, and the release of radioactive material are kept within authorised limits; 11. ‘severe conditions’ means conditions that are more severe than conditions related to design basis accidents; such conditions may be caused by multiple failures, such as the complete loss of all trains of a safety system, or by an extremely unlikely event.
Article 4 Legislative, regulatory and organisational framework
1. Member States shall establish and maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework (hereinafter referred to as the ‘national framework’) for nuclear safety of nuclear installations that allocates responsibilities and provides for coordination between relevant state bodies. The national framework shall establish responsibilities for: (a) the adoption of national nuclear safety requirements. The determination on how they are adopted and through which instrument they are applied rests with the competence of the Member States; (b) the provision of a system of licensing and prohibition of operation of nuclear installations without a licence; (c) the provision of a system of nuclear safety supervision; (d) enforcement actions, including suspension of operation and modification or revocation of a licence. 2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework is maintained and improved when appropriate, taking into account operating experience, insights gained from safety analyses for operating nuclear installations, development of technology and results of safety research, when available and relevant.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 4 Legislative, regulatory and organisational framework):
The determination on how national nuclear safety requirements referred to in point (b) are adopted and through which instrument they are applied remains within the competences of the Member States. 2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework is maintained and improved when appropriate, taking into account operating experience, insights gained from safety analyses for operating nuclear installations, development of technology and results of safety research, when available and relevant.
Article 5 Competent regulatory authority
1. Member States shall establish and maintain a competent regulatory authority in the field of nuclear safety of nuclear installations. 2. Member States shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is functionally separate from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion, or utilisation of nuclear energy, including electricity production, in order to ensure effective independence from undue influence in its regulatory decision making. 3. Member States shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is given the legal powers and human and financial resources necessary to fulfil its obligations in connection with the national framework described in Article 4(1) with due priority to safety. This includes the powers and resources to: (a) require the licence holder to comply with national nuclear safety requirements and the terms of the relevant licence; (b) require demonstration of this compliance, including the requirements under paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 6; (c) verify this compliance through regulatory assessments and inspections; and (d) carry out regulatory enforcement actions, including suspending the operation of nuclear installation in accordance with conditions defined by the national framework referred to in Article 4(1).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 5 Competent regulatory authority):
1. Member States shall establish and maintain a competent regulatory authority in the field of nuclear safety of nuclear installations.
Article 6 Licence holders
1. Member States shall ensure that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety of a nuclear installation rests with the licence holder. This responsibility cannot be delegated. 2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework in place requires licence holders, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority, to regularly assess and verify, and continuously improve, as far as reasonably achievable, the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations in a systematic and verifiable manner. 3. The assessments referred to in paragraph 2 shall include verification that measures are in place for prevention of accidents and mitigation of consequences of accidents, including verification of the physical barriers and licence holder’s administrative procedures of protection that would have to fail before workers and the general public would be significantly affected by ionizing radiations. 4. Member States shall ensure that the national framework in place requires licence holders to establish and implement management systems which give due priority to nuclear safety and are regularly verified by the competent regulatory authority. 5. Member States shall ensure that the national framework in place requires licence holders to provide for and maintain adequate financial and human resources to fulfil their obligations with respect to nuclear safety of a nuclear installation, laid down in paragraphs 1 to 4.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 6 Licence holders):
Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that: (a) the prime responsibility for the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation rests with the licence holder. That responsibility cannot be delegated and includes responsibility for the activities of contractors and sub-contractors whose activities might affect the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation; (b) when applying for a licence, the applicant is required to submit a demonstration of nuclear safety. Its scope and level of detail shall be commensurate with the potential magnitude and nature of the hazard relevant for the nuclear installation and its site; (c) licence holders are to regularly assess, verify, and continuously improve, as far as reasonably practicable, the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations in a systematic and verifiable manner. That shall include verification that measures are in place for the prevention of accidents and mitigation of the consequences of accidents, including the verification of the application of defence-in-depth provisions; (d) licence holders establish and implement management systems which give due priority to nuclear safety; (f) licence holders provide for and maintain financial and human resources with appropriate qualifications and competences, necessary to fulfil their obligations with respect to the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation. Licence holders shall also ensure that contractors and subcontractors under their responsibility and whose activities might affect the nuclear safety of a nuclear installation have the necessary human resources with appropriate qualifications and competences to fulfil their obligations.
Article 7 Expertise and skills in nuclear safety
Member States shall ensure that the national framework in place requires arrangements for education and training to be made by all parties for their staff having responsibilities relating to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations in order to maintain and to further develop expertise and skills in nuclear safety.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 7 Expertise and skills in nuclear safety):
Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires all parties to make arrangements for the education and training for their staff having responsibilities related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations so as to obtain, maintain and to further develop expertise and skills in nuclear safety and on-site emergency preparedness.
Article 8 Information to the public
Member States shall ensure that information in relation to the regulation of nuclear safety is made available to the workers and the general public. This obligation includes ensuring that the competent regulatory authority informs the public in the fields of its competence. Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with national legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not jeopardise other interests such as, inter alia, security, recognised in national legislation or international obligations.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 8 Transparency):
1. Member States shall ensure that necessary information in relation to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and its regulation is made available to workers and the general public, with specific consideration to local authorities, population and stakeholders in the vicinity of a nuclear installation. That obligation includes ensuring that the competent regulatory authority and the licence holders, within their fields of responsibility, provide in the framework of their communication policy: (a) information on normal operating conditions of nuclear installations to workers and the general public; and (b) prompt information in case of incidents and accidents to workers and the general public and to the competent regulatory authorities of other Member States in the vicinity of a nuclear installation. 2. Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with relevant legislation and international instruments, provided that this does not jeopardise other overriding interests, such as security, which are recognised in relevant legislation or international instruments. 3. Member States shall, without prejudice to Article 5(2), ensure that the competent regulatory authority engages, as appropriate, in cooperation activities on the nuclear safety of nuclear installations with competent regulatory authorities of other Member States in the vicinity of a nuclear installation, inter alia, via the exchange and/or sharing of information. 4. Member States shall ensure that the general public is given the appropriate opportunities to participate effectively in the decision-making process relating to the licensing of nuclear installations, in accordance with relevant legislation and international instruments.
Article 9 Reporting
1. Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on the implementation of this Directive for the first time by 22 July 2014, and every three years thereafter, taking advantage of the review and reporting cycles under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. 2. On the basis of the Member States′ reports, the Commission shall submit a report to the Council and the European Parliament on progress made with the implementation of this Directive. 3. Member States shall at least every 10 years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and/or authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review shall be reported to the Member States and the Commission, when available.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 9 Reporting):
1. Member States shall submit a report to the Commission on the implementation of this Directive for the first time by 22 July 2014, and then by 22 July 2020. 2. On the basis of the Member States′ reports, the Commission shall submit a report to the Council and the European Parliament on progress made with the implementation of this Directive.
Article 10 Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 22 July 2011. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States. 2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive and of any subsequent amendments to those provisions.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. General context The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) in 2011 resulted in significant environmental, economic and social damage, and raised concerns about possible health effects in the affected population in Japan. Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude, investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident reveals quite substantial and recurring technical issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear accidents decades ago. This latest nuclear accident once again undermined public confidence in the safety of nuclear power; and particularly so at a time when the use of nuclear power is being debated as a possible option to meet global energy demands in a sustainable manner. The Fukushima nuclear accident renewed attention on the paramount importance of ensuring the most robust levels of nuclear safety in the EU and worldwide. Nuclear energy currently generates close to 30% of all electricity in the EU and about two-thirds of its low-carbon electricity. The EU has 132 operating reactors, representing about one-third of the 437 operating nuclear power reactors in the world. Many of the EU NPPs were constructed already three to four decades ago, and are based on designs and safety provisions that were continuously updated since then. Nuclear safety is of the utmost importance to the EU and its people. The effects of nuclear accidents do not stop at national borders and can entail potential harmful consequences for the health of workers and citizens but also wide-ranging economic implications. It is therefore essential for society and the economy to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident in an EU Member State by applying high nuclear safety standards and guaranteeing a high quality of regulatory oversight. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the EU response to the events was immediate. Based upon a mandate from the European Council at its meeting of 24-25 March 2011[1], the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), launched EU-wide comprehensive risk & safety assessments of nuclear power plants ('Stress Tests'). The Stress Tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of NPPs in the light of the events in Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging the plants safety functions. All fourteen EU Member States that operate nuclear power plants[2] plus Lithuania[3] participated in these assessments. Switzerland, Ukraine and Croatia participated fully in the EU Stress Tests and the peer review process, while other neighbouring countries (e.g. Turkey, Belarus and Armenia) that agreed to use the same methodology, are working within different timetables. Stress Tests were started in 2011 by self-assessments carried out by nuclear operators and the preparation of national reports by national regulators. Preliminary findings were presented in a Commission Communication on an Interim Stress Tests Report[4] in November 2011 and an extensive EU-wide peer review process was carried out from January to April 2012. An overview report was produced by the ENSREG Peer Review Board[5] and endorsed by ENSREG. In addition, ENSREG also agreed on an Action Plan[6] to follow up the implementation of the peer review recommendations. In October 2012, the Commission issued a Communication on the Final Stress Tests Report[7]. Currently, in line with the requirements of the ENSREG Action Plan, National Action Plans[8] associated with post-Fukushima lessons learned and Stress Test peer review recommendations have been prepared and were reviewed in terms of contents and status of implementation in the framework of a Workshop in April 2013. The Summary Report of the Workshop is intended to be presented at the 2013 Second ENSREG Conference on Nuclear Safety in Europe[9]. Furthermore in the process of ensuring a proper follow-up of the Stress Tests, the Commission will elaborate, in close cooperation with ENSREG, a consolidated report on the status of the implementation of the Stress Tests recommendations, envisaged to be issued in June 2014 and transmitted to the European Council. In the legislative domain, the European Commission received a clear mandate from the European Council in March 2011 "to review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear installations" and propose any improvements that may be necessary. The European Parliament has also encouraged a legislative review. In the 2011 Resolution on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond[10], it stated that "future legislative initiatives to set up a common framework for nuclear safety are essential in order to continuously improve safety standards in Europe". Furthermore, in the 2011 Resolution on the Commission Work Programme 2012[11], the Parliament called for "an urgent revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive with a view to its strengthening, namely by taking into account the results of the Stress Tests implemented in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident". More recently, in the 2013 Resolution on Stress Tests[12], it called on the revision to be "ambitious in nature", including major improvements in areas such as "safety procedures and frameworks – in particular through the definition and implementation of binding nuclear safety standards that reflect state-of-the-art practices in the EU in technical, regulatory and operational respects – as well as in the role and resources of the nuclear regulatory authorities and, in particular, should boost the latter's independence, openness and transparency, while also strengthening monitoring and peer review". The European Economic and Social Committee expressed in the 2012 Opinion on the Commission Communication on a Final Stress Tests Report[13] its support for the "Commission's intention to undertake an ambitious revision of the Nuclear Safety Directive". In response to the mandate from the European Council and the calls from the other EU institutions and bodies, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive process of analysis and opinion gathering, to identify the appropriate areas and mechanisms for legislative intervention. This process included an open on-line public consultation (December 2011 – February 2012), complemented by an extensive dialogue with the stakeholders. The 2011 and 2012 Stress Tests Communications contain indications on the potential areas of legislative improvement. In this context, with reference to the existing Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations[14] (hereinafter referred to as "Nuclear Safety Directive"), the latter Communication highlights the areas of safety procedures and frameworks, role and means of nuclear regulatory authorities, openness and transparency, monitoring and verification. Moreover, the Commission services developed in the course of 2012 an Impact Assessment, based on a wide range of information sources and taking into account the post-Fukushima EU and international developments in the nuclear domain. On this basis, a proposal for a Directive amending the Nuclear Safety Directive has been developed, benefiting from the input and expertise of the Euratom Treaty Article 31 Group of scientific experts, of the European Economic and Social Committee, as well as an extensive consultation process with the high-level representatives of the national nuclear regulatory authorities reunited in ENSREG. 1.2. Grounds and objectives of the proposal The current Nuclear Safety Directive has been a key advancement. However, in the spirit of nuclear safety's philosophy of continuous improvement, and thus with the intention to take account inter alia of the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident and of the outcomes of the subsequent Stress Tests, it was necessary to reconsider the sufficiency of the existing provisions. The Fukushima nuclear accident has shown that well-known lessons learned from accidents decades ago have not been taken up voluntarily by parts of the industry and not been sufficiently enforced by regulators, even in a nation – Japan – that was assumed to have particularly high standards of industrial and nuclear safety. The technical and organisational issues arising from the analysis of this accident are therefore relevant for wider consideration. In Europe, the Stress Tests have confirmed that there are continued differences between Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and management of key safety issues. Moreover, the Stress Tests clearly showed the benefits of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties having responsibilities for nuclear safety, such as peer reviews. In addition, in the course of the public meetings held in the framework of the Stress Tests, demands have emerged to extend the assessment to emergency preparedness and response arrangements. The Commission considers it therefore appropriate to amend, strengthen and supplement the Nuclear Safety Directive, by combining technical improvements with wider safety issues such as governance, transparency and on-site emergency preparedness and response. The proposed amendments aim at enhancing the regulatory framework for nuclear safety in the EU, in particular by: – Strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities; – Enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters; – Strengthening existing principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire lifecycle of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs; – Reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European system of peer reviews; – Establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonised nuclear safety guidelines.
Revised version (Article 10 Transposition):
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 22 July 2011. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by Member States. 1a. The obligations of transposition and implementation of Articles 6, 8a, 8b, 8c and 8d shall not apply to Member States without nuclear installations, unless they decide to develop any activity related to nuclear installations subject to a licence under their jurisdiction. 2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive and of any subsequent amendments to those provisions.
Article 11 Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .
Article 12 Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.