Article 36 Deductions from Common Equity Tier 1 items
1. Institutions shall deduct the following from Common Equity Tier 1 items: (a) losses for the current financial year; (b) intangible assets; (c) deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability; (d) for institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts using the Internal Ratings Based Approach (the IRB Approach), negative amounts resulting from the calculation of expected loss amounts laid down in Articles 158 and 159; (e) defined benefit pension fund assets on the balance sheet of the institution; (f) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by an institution of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, including own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments that an institution is under an actual or contingent obligation to purchase by virtue of an existing contractual obligation; (g) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where those entities have a reciprocal cross holding with the institution that the competent authority considers to have been designed to inflate artificially the own funds of the institution; (h) the applicable amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where the institution does not have a significant investment in those entities; (i) the applicable amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where the institution has a significant investment in those entities; (j) the amount of items required to be deducted from Additional Tier 1 items pursuant to Article 56 that exceeds the Additional Tier 1 capital of the institution; (k) the exposure amount of the following items which qualify for a risk weight of 1 250 %, where the institution deducts that exposure amount from the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items as an alternative to applying a risk weight of 1 250 %: (i) qualifying holdings outside the financial sector; (ii) securitisation positions, in accordance with Article 243(1)(b), Article 244(1)(b) and Article 258; (iii) free deliveries, in accordance with Article 379(3); (iv) positions in a basket for which an institution cannot determine the risk weight under the IRB Approach, in accordance with Article 153(8); (v) equity exposures under an internal models approach, in accordance with Article 155(4). (k) the exposure amount of the following items which qualify for a risk weight of 1 250 %, where the institution deducts that exposure amount from the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items as an alternative to applying a risk weight of 1 250 %: (i) qualifying holdings outside the financial sector; (ii) securitisation positions, in accordance with Article 243(1)(b), Article 244(1)(b) and Article 258; (iii) free deliveries, in accordance with Article 379(3); (iv) positions in a basket for which an institution cannot determine the risk weight under the IRB Approach, in accordance with Article 153(8); (v) equity exposures under an internal models approach, in accordance with Article 155(4). (l) any tax charge relating to Common Equity Tier 1 items foreseeable at the moment of its calculation, except where the institution suitably adjusts the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items insofar as such tax charges reduce the amount up to which those items may be used to cover risks or losses. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the application of the deductions referred to in points (a), (c), (e), (f), (h), (i) and (l) of paragraph 1 of this Article and related deductions referred to in points (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Article 56 and points (a), (c) and (d) of Article 66. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the types of capital instruments of financial institutions and, in consultation with the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) (EIOPA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 ( 26 ), of third country insurance and reinsurance undertakings, and of undertakings excluded from the scope of Directive 2009/138/EC in accordance with Article 4 of that Directive that shall be deducted from the following elements of own funds: (a) Common Equity Tier 1 items; (b) Additional Tier 1 items; (c) Tier 2 items.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 36 Deductions from Common Equity Tier 1 items):
1. Institutions shall deduct the following from Common Equity Tier 1 items: (a) losses for the current financial year; (b) intangible assets; (c) deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability; (d) for institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts using the Internal Ratings Based Approach (the IRB Approach), negative amounts resulting from the calculation of expected loss amounts laid down in Articles 158 and 159; (e) defined benefit pension fund assets on the balance sheet of the institution; (f) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by an institution of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, including own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments that an institution is under an actual or contingent obligation to purchase by virtue of an existing contractual obligation; (g) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where those entities have a reciprocal cross holding with the institution that the competent authority considers to have been designed to inflate artificially the own funds of the institution; (h) the applicable amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where the institution does not have a significant investment in those entities; (i) the applicable amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where the institution has a significant investment in those entities; (j) the amount of items required to be deducted from Additional Tier 1 items pursuant to Article 56 that exceeds the Additional Tier 1 items of the institution; (k) the exposure amount of the following items which qualify for a risk weight of 1 250 %, where the institution deducts that exposure amount from the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items as an alternative to applying a risk weight of 1 250 %: (i) qualifying holdings outside the financial sector; (ii) securitisation positions, in accordance with Article 243(1)(b), Article 244(1)(b) and Article 258; (iii) free deliveries, in accordance with Article 379(3); (iv) positions in a basket for which an institution cannot determine the risk weight under the IRB Approach, in accordance with Article 153(8); (v) equity exposures under an internal models approach, in accordance with Article 155(4). (l) any tax charge relating to Common Equity Tier 1 items foreseeable at the moment of its calculation, except where the institution suitably adjusts the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items insofar as such tax charges reduce the amount up to which those items may be used to cover risks or losses. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the application of the deductions referred to in points (a), (c), (e), (f), (h), (i) and (l) of paragraph 1 of this Article and related deductions referred to in points (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Article 56 and points (a), (c) and (d) of Article 66. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the types of capital instruments of financial institutions and, in consultation with the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) (EIOPA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 ( 7 ), of third country insurance and reinsurance undertakings, and of undertakings excluded from the scope of Directive 2009/138/EC in accordance with Article 4 of that Directive that shall be deducted from the following elements of own funds: (a) Common Equity Tier 1 items; (b) Additional Tier 1 items; (c) Tier 2 items.
Article 37 Deduction of intangible assets
Institutions shall determine the amount of intangible assets to be deducted in accordance with the following: (a) the amount to be deducted shall be reduced by the amount of associated deferred tax liabilities that would be extinguished if the intangible assets became impaired or were derecognised under the applicable accounting framework; (b) the amount to be deducted shall include goodwill included in the valuation of significant investments of the institution.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 37 Deduction of intangible assets):
Institutions shall determine the amount of intangible assets to be deducted in accordance with the following: (a) the amount to be deducted shall be reduced by the amount of associated deferred tax liabilities that would be extinguished if the intangible assets became impaired or were derecognised under the applicable accounting framework; (b) the amount to be deducted shall include goodwill included in the valuation of significant investments of the institution; (c) the amount to be deducted shall be reduced by the amount of the accounting revaluation of the subsidiaries' intangible assets derived from the consolidation of subsidiaries attributable to persons other than the undertakings included in the consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One.
Article 38 Deduction of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability
1. Institutions shall determine the amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability that require deduction in accordance with this Article. 2. Except where the conditions laid down in paragraph 3 are met, the amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability shall be calculated without reducing it by the amount of the associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution. 3. The amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability may be reduced by the amount of the associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution, provided the following conditions are met: (a) the entity has a legally enforceable right under applicable national law to set off those current tax assets against current tax liabilities; (b) the deferred tax assets and the deferred tax liabilities relate to taxes levied by the same tax authority and on the same taxable entity. 4. Associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution used for the purposes of paragraph 3 may not include deferred tax liabilities that reduce the amount of intangible assets or defined benefit pension fund assets required to be deducted. 5. The amount of associated deferred tax liabilities referred to in paragraph 4 shall be allocated between the following: (a) deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences that are not deducted in accordance with Article 48(1); (b) all other deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability. Institutions shall allocate the associated deferred tax liabilities according to the proportion of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability that the items referred to in points (a) and (b) represent.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 38 Deduction of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability):
1. Institutions shall determine the amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability that require deduction in accordance with this Article. 2. Except where the conditions laid down in paragraph 3 are met, the amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability shall be calculated without reducing it by the amount of the associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution. 3. The amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability may be reduced by the amount of the associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution, provided the following conditions are met: (a) the entity has a legally enforceable right under applicable national law to set off those current tax assets against current tax liabilities; (b) the deferred tax assets and the deferred tax liabilities relate to taxes levied by the same tax authority and on the same taxable entity. The amount of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability may be reduced by the amount of the associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution, provided the following conditions are met: (a) the entity has a legally enforceable right under applicable national law to set off those current tax assets against current tax liabilities; (b) the deferred tax assets and the deferred tax liabilities relate to taxes levied by the same tax authority and on the same taxable entity. 4. Associated deferred tax liabilities of the institution used for the purposes of paragraph 3 may not include deferred tax liabilities that reduce the amount of intangible assets or defined benefit pension fund assets required to be deducted. The amount of associated deferred tax liabilities referred to in paragraph 4 shall be allocated between the following: (a) deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences that are not deducted in accordance with Article 48(1); (b) all other deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability. Institutions shall allocate the associated deferred tax liabilities according to the proportion of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability that the items referred to in points (a) and (b) represent.
Article 39 Tax overpayments, tax loss carry backs and deferred tax assets that do not rely on future profitability
1. The following items shall not be deducted from own funds and shall be subject to a risk weight in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three, as applicable: (a) overpayments of tax by the institution for the current year; (b) current year tax losses of the institution carried back to previous years that give rise to a claim on, or a receivable from, a central government, regional government or local tax authority. 2. Deferred tax assets that do not rely on future profitability shall be limited to deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences, where all the following conditions are met: (a) they are automatically and mandatorily replaced without delay with a tax credit in the event that the institution reports a loss when the annual financial statements of the institution are formally approved, or in the event of liquidation or insolvency of the institution; (b) an institution is able under the applicable national tax law to offset a tax credit referred to in point (a) against any tax liability of the institution or any other undertaking included in the same consolidation as the institution for tax purposes under that law or any other undertaking subject to the supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One; (c) where the amount of tax credits referred to in point (b) exceeds the tax liabilities referred to in that point, any such excess is replaced without delay with a direct claim on the central government of the Member State in which the institution is incorporated. Institutions shall apply a risk weight of 100 % to deferred tax assets where the conditions laid down in points (a), (b) and (c) are met.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 39 Tax overpayments, tax loss carry backs and deferred tax assets that do not rely on future profitability):
1. The following items shall not be deducted from own funds and shall be subject to a risk weight in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three, as applicable: (a) overpayments of tax by the institution for the current year; (b) current year tax losses of the institution carried back to previous years that give rise to a claim on, or a receivable from, a central government, regional government or local tax authority. 2. Deferred tax assets that do not rely on future profitability shall be limited to deferred tax assets which were created before 23 November 2016 and which arise from temporary differences, where all the following conditions are met: (a) they are automatically and mandatorily replaced without delay with a tax credit in the event that the institution reports a loss when the annual financial statements of the institution are formally approved, or in the event of liquidation or insolvency of the institution; (b) an institution is able under the applicable national tax law to offset a tax credit referred to in point (a) against any tax liability of the institution or any other undertaking included in the same consolidation as the institution for tax purposes under that law or any other undertaking subject to the supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One; (c) where the amount of tax credits referred to in point (b) exceeds the tax liabilities referred to in that point, any such excess is replaced without delay with a direct claim on the central government of the Member State in which the institution is incorporated. Institutions shall apply a risk weight of 100 % to deferred tax assets where the conditions laid down in points (a), (b) and (c) are met.
Article 40 Deduction of negative amounts resulting from the calculation of expected loss amounts
The amount to be deducted in accordance with point (d) of Article 36(1) shall not be reduced by a rise in the level of deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability, or other additional tax effects, that could occur if provisions were to rise to the level of expected losses referred to in Section 3 of Chapter 3 of Title II of Part Three.
Article 41 Deduction of defined benefit pension fund assets
1. For the purposes of point (e) of Article 36(1), the amount of defined benefit pension fund assets to be deducted shall be reduced by the following: (a) the amount of any associated deferred tax liability which could be extinguished if the assets became impaired or were derecognised under the applicable accounting framework; (b) the amount of assets in the defined benefit pension fund which the institution has an unrestricted ability to use, provided that the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority. Those assets used to reduce the amount to be deducted shall receive a risk weight in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three, as applicable. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the criteria according to which a competent authority shall permit an institution to reduce the amount of assets in the defined benefit pension fund as specified in point (b) of paragraph 1. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 41 Deduction of defined benefit pension fund assets):
2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the criteria according to which a competent authority shall permit an institution to reduce the amount of assets in the defined benefit pension fund as specified in point (b) of paragraph 1. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 42 Deduction of holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments
For the purposes of point (f) of Article 36(1), institutions shall calculate holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments on the basis of gross long positions subject to the following exceptions: (a) institutions may calculate the amount of holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments on the basis of the net long position provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying exposure and the short positions involve no counterparty risk; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (a) institutions may calculate the amount of holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments on the basis of the net long position provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying exposure and the short positions involve no counterparty risk; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (b) institutions shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments included in those indices; (c) institutions may net gross long positions in own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments resulting from holdings of index securities against short positions in own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments resulting from short positions in the underlying indices, including where those short positions involve counterparty risk, provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying indices; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book. (c) institutions may net gross long positions in own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments resulting from holdings of index securities against short positions in own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments resulting from short positions in the underlying indices, including where those short positions involve counterparty risk, provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying indices;
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 42 Deduction of holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments):
For the purposes of point (f) of Article 36(1), institutions shall calculate holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments on the basis of gross long positions subject to the following exceptions: (a) institutions may calculate the amount of holdings of own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments on the basis of the net long position provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying exposure and the short positions involve no counterparty risk; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (b) institutions shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments included in those indices; (c) institutions may net gross long positions in own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments resulting from holdings of index securities against short positions in own Common Equity Tier 1 instruments resulting from short positions in the underlying indices, including where those short positions involve counterparty risk, provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying indices;
Article 43 Significant investment in a financial sector entity
For the purposes of deduction, a significant investment of an institution in a financial sector entity shall arise where any of the following conditions is met: (a) the institution owns more than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments issued by that entity; (b) the institution has close links with that entity and owns Common Equity Tier 1 instruments issued by that entity; (c) the institution owns Common Equity Tier 1 instruments issued by that entity and the entity is not included in consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One but is included in the same accounting consolidation as the institution for the purposes of financial reporting under the applicable accounting framework.
Article 44 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities and where an institution has a reciprocal cross holding designed artificially to inflate own funds
Institutions shall make the deductions referred to in points (g), (h) and (i) of Article 36(1) in accordance with the following: (a) holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments and other capital instruments of financial sector entities shall be calculated on the basis of the gross long positions; (b) Tier 1 own-fund insurance items shall be treated as holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments for the purposes of deduction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 44 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities and where an institution has a reciprocal cross holding designed artificially to inflate own funds):
(a) holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments and other capital instruments of financial sector entities shall be calculated on the basis of the gross long positions; (b) Tier 1 own-fund insurance items shall be treated as holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments for the purposes of deduction.
Article 45 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities
Institutions shall make the deductions required by points (h) and (i) of Article 36(1) in accordance with the following provisions: (a) they may calculate direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of the financial sector entities on the basis of the net long position in the same underlying exposure provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the maturity of the short position matches the maturity of the long position or has a residual maturity of at least one year; (ii) either both the long position and the short position are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (a) they may calculate direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of the financial sector entities on the basis of the net long position in the same underlying exposure provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the maturity of the short position matches the maturity of the long position or has a residual maturity of at least one year; (ii) either both the long position and the short position are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (b) they shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to the capital instruments of the financial sector entities in those indices.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 45 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities):
Institutions shall make the deductions required by points (h) and (i) of Article 36(1) in accordance with the following provisions: (a) they may calculate direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of the financial sector entities on the basis of the net long position in the same underlying exposure provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the maturity of the short position matches the maturity of the long position or has a residual maturity of at least one year; (ii) either both the long position and the short position are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (b) they shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to the capital instruments of the financial sector entities in those indices.
Article 46 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments where an institution does not have a significant investment in a financial sector entity
1. For the purposes of point (h) of Article 36(1), institutions shall calculate the applicable amount to be deducted by multiplying the amount referred to in point (a) of this paragraph by the factor derived from the calculation referred to in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the aggregate amount by which the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment exceeds 10 % of the aggregate amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following to Common Equity Tier 1 items: (i) Articles 32 to 35; (ii) the deductions referred to in points (a) to (g), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l) of Article 36(1), excluding the amount to be deducted for deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences; (iii) Articles 44 and 45; (a) the aggregate amount by which the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment exceeds 10 % of the aggregate amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following to Common Equity Tier 1 items: (i) Articles 32 to 35; (ii) the deductions referred to in points (a) to (g), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l) of Article 36(1), excluding the amount to be deducted for deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences; (iii) Articles 44 and 45; (b) the amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of those financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment divided by the aggregate amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of those financial sector entities. 2. Institutions shall exclude underwriting positions held for five working days or fewer from the amount referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 and from the calculation of the factor referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1. 3. The amount to be deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be apportioned across all Common Equity Tier 1 instruments held. Institutions shall determine the amount of each Common Equity Tier 1 instrument that is deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 by multiplying the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the proportion specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of holdings required to be deducted pursuant to paragraph 1; (b) the proportion of the aggregate amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment represented by each Common Equity Tier 1 instrument held. 4. The amount of holdings referred to in point (h) of Article 36(1) that is equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution after applying the provisions laid down in points (a)(i) to (iii) of paragraph 1 shall not be deducted and shall be subject to the applicable risk weights in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three and the requirements laid down in Title IV of Part Three, as applicable. 5. Institutions shall determine the amount of each Common Equity Tier 1 instrument that is risk weighted pursuant to paragraph 4 by multiplying the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the amount specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of holdings required to be risk weighted pursuant to paragraph 4; (b) the proportion resulting from the calculation in point (b) of paragraph 3.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 46 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments where an institution does not have a significant investment in a financial sector entity):
1. For the purposes of point (h) of Article 36(1), institutions shall calculate the applicable amount to be deducted by multiplying the amount referred to in point (a) of this paragraph by the factor derived from the calculation referred to in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the aggregate amount by which the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment exceeds 10 % of the aggregate amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following to Common Equity Tier 1 items: (i) Articles 32 to 35; (ii) the deductions referred to in points (a) to (g), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l) of Article 36(1), excluding the amount to be deducted for deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences; (iii) Articles 44 and 45; (b) the amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of those financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment divided by the aggregate amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments of those financial sector entities. 2. Institutions shall exclude underwriting positions held for five working days or fewer from the amount referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 and from the calculation of the factor referred to in point (b) of paragraph 1. 3. The amount to be deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be apportioned across all Common Equity Tier 1 instruments held. Institutions shall determine the amount of each Common Equity Tier 1 instrument that is deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 by multiplying the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the proportion specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of holdings required to be deducted pursuant to paragraph 1; (b) the proportion of the aggregate amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution does not have a significant investment represented by each Common Equity Tier 1 instrument held. 4. The amount of holdings referred to in point (h) of Article 36(1) that is equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution after applying the provisions laid down in points (a)(i) to (iii) of paragraph 1 shall not be deducted and shall be subject to the applicable risk weights in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three and the requirements laid down in Title IV of Part Three, as applicable. 5. Institutions shall determine the amount of each Common Equity Tier 1 instrument that is risk weighted pursuant to paragraph 4 by multiplying the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the amount specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of holdings required to be risk weighted pursuant to paragraph 4; (b) the proportion resulting from the calculation in point (b) of paragraph 3.
Article 47 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity
For the purposes of point (i) of Article 36(1), the applicable amount to be deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 items shall exclude underwriting positions held for five working days or fewer and shall be determined in accordance with Articles 44 and 45 and Sub-section 2. Sub-Section 2 Exemptions from and alternatives to deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 items
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 47 Deduction of holdings of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity):
For the purposes of point (i) of Article 36(1), the applicable amount to be deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 items shall exclude underwriting positions held for five working days or fewer and shall be determined in accordance with Articles 44 and 45 and Sub-section 2.
Article 48 Threshold exemptions from deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 items
1. In making the deductions required pursuant to points (c) and (i) of Article 36(1), institutions are not required to deduct the amounts of the items listed in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph which in aggregate are equal to or less than the threshold amount referred to in paragraph 2: (a) deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following: (i) Articles 32 to 35; (ii) points (a) to (h), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. (a) deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following: (i) Articles 32 to 35; (ii) points (a) to (h), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. (b) where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity, the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of that institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of those entities that in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following: (i) Article 32 to 35; (ii) points (a) to (h), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l), of Article 36(1) excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. (b) where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity, the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of that institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of those entities that in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following: (i) Article 32 to 35; (ii) points (a) to (h), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l), of Article 36(1) excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the threshold amount shall be equal to the amount referred to in point (a) of this paragraph multiplied by the percentage referred to in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the residual amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items after applying the adjustments and deductions in Articles 32 to 36 in full and without applying the threshold exemptions specified in this Article; (b) 17,65 %. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an institution shall determine the portion of deferred tax assets in the total amount of items that is not required to be deducted by dividing the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the amount specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution; (b) the sum of the following: (i) the amount referred to in point (a); (ii) the amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the own funds instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution has a significant investment, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution. (b) the sum of the following: (i) the amount referred to in point (a); (ii) the amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the own funds instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution has a significant investment, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution. The proportion of significant investments in the total amount of items that is not required to be deducted is equal to one minus the proportion referred to in the first subparagraph. 4. The amounts of the items that are not deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be risk weighted at 250 %.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 48 Threshold exemptions from deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 items):
1. In making the deductions required pursuant to points (c) and (i) of Article 36(1), institutions are not required to deduct the amounts of the items listed in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph which in aggregate are equal to or less than the threshold amount referred to in paragraph 2: (a) deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following: (i) Articles 32 to 35; (ii) points (a) to (h), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. (b) where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity, the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of that institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of those entities that in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the following: (i) Article 32 to 35; (ii) points (a) to (h), points (k)(ii) to (v) and point (l), of Article 36(1) excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the threshold amount shall be equal to the amount referred to in point (a) of this paragraph multiplied by the percentage referred to in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the residual amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items after applying the adjustments and deductions in Articles 32 to 36 in full and without applying the threshold exemptions specified in this Article; (b) 17,65 %. 3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, an institution shall determine the portion of deferred tax assets in the total amount of items that is not required to be deducted by dividing the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the amount specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution; (b) the sum of the following: (i) the amount referred to in point (a); (ii) the amount of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the own funds instruments of financial sector entities in which the institution has a significant investment, and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution. The proportion of significant investments in the total amount of items that is not required to be deducted is equal to one minus the proportion referred to in the first subparagraph. 4. The amounts of the items that are not deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be risk weighted at 250 %.
Article 49 Requirement for deduction where consolidation, supplementary supervision or institutional protection schemes are applied
1. For the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual basis, a sub-consolidated basis and a consolidated basis, where the competent authorities require or permit institutions to apply method 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC, the competent authorities may permit institutions not to deduct the holdings of own funds instruments of a financial sector entity in which the parent institution, parent financial holding company or parent mixed financial holding company or institution has a significant investment, provided that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (e) of this paragraph are met: (a) the financial sector entity is an insurance undertaking, a re-insurance undertaking or an insurance holding company; (b) that insurance undertaking, re-insurance undertaking or insurance holding company is included in the same supplementary supervision under Directive 2002/87/EC as the parent institution, parent financial holding company or parent mixed financial holding company or institution that has the holding; (c) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authorities; (d) prior to granting the permission referred to in point (c), and on a continuing basis, the competent authorities are satisfied that the level of integrated management, risk management and internal control regarding the entities that would be included in the scope of consolidation under method 1, 2 or 3 is adequate; (e) the holdings in the entity belong to one of the following: (i) the parent credit institution; (ii) the parent financial holding company; (iii) the parent mixed financial holding company; (iv) the institution; (v) a subsidiary of one of the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv) that is included in the scope of consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One. (e) the holdings in the entity belong to one of the following: (i) the parent credit institution; (ii) the parent financial holding company; (iii) the parent mixed financial holding company; (iv) the institution; (v) a subsidiary of one of the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv) that is included in the scope of consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One. The method chosen shall be applied in a consistent manner over time. 2. For the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual basis and a sub-consolidated basis, institutions subject to supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One shall not deduct holdings of own funds instruments issued by financial sector entities included in the scope of consolidated supervision, unless the competent authorities determine those deductions to be required for specific purposes, in particular structural separation of banking activities and resolution planning. Applying the approach referred to in the first subparagraph shall not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. 3. Competent authorities may, for the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual or sub-consolidated basis permit institutions not to deduct holdings of own funds instruments in the following cases: (a) where an institution has a holding in another institution and the conditions referred to in points (i) to (v) are met: (i) the institutions fall within the same institutional protection scheme referred to in Article 113(7); (ii) the competent authorities have granted the permission referred to in Article 113(7); (iii) the conditions laid down in Article 113(7) are satisfied; (iv) the institutional protection scheme draws up a consolidated balance sheet referred to in point (e) of Article 113(7) or, where it is not required to draw up consolidated accounts, an extended aggregated calculation that is, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, equivalent to the provisions of Directive 86/635/EEC, which incorporates certain adaptations of the provisions of Directive 83/349/EEC or of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, governing the consolidated accounts of groups of credit institutions. The equivalence of that extended aggregated calculation shall be verified by an external auditor and in particular that the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation of own funds as well as any inappropriate creation of own funds between the members of the institutional protection scheme is eliminated in the calculation. The consolidated balance sheet or the extended aggregated calculation shall be reported to the competent authorities no less frequently than the frequency laid down in Article 99; (v) the institutions included in an institutional protection scheme meet together on a consolidated or extended aggregated basis the requirements laid down in Article 92 and carry out reporting of compliance with those requirements in accordance with Article 99. Within an institutional protection scheme the deduction of the interest owned by co-operative members or legal entities, which are not members of the institutional protection scheme, is not required, provided that the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation of own funds as well as any inappropriate creation of own funds between the members of the institutional protection scheme and the minority shareholder, when it is an institution, is eliminated. (a) where an institution has a holding in another institution and the conditions referred to in points (i) to (v) are met: (i) the institutions fall within the same institutional protection scheme referred to in Article 113(7); (ii) the competent authorities have granted the permission referred to in Article 113(7); (iii) the conditions laid down in Article 113(7) are satisfied; (iv) the institutional protection scheme draws up a consolidated balance sheet referred to in point (e) of Article 113(7) or, where it is not required to draw up consolidated accounts, an extended aggregated calculation that is, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, equivalent to the provisions of Directive 86/635/EEC, which incorporates certain adaptations of the provisions of Directive 83/349/EEC or of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, governing the consolidated accounts of groups of credit institutions. The equivalence of that extended aggregated calculation shall be verified by an external auditor and in particular that the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation of own funds as well as any inappropriate creation of own funds between the members of the institutional protection scheme is eliminated in the calculation. The consolidated balance sheet or the extended aggregated calculation shall be reported to the competent authorities no less frequently than the frequency laid down in Article 99; (v) the institutions included in an institutional protection scheme meet together on a consolidated or extended aggregated basis the requirements laid down in Article 92 and carry out reporting of compliance with those requirements in accordance with Article 99. Within an institutional protection scheme the deduction of the interest owned by co-operative members or legal entities, which are not members of the institutional protection scheme, is not required, provided that the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation of own funds as well as any inappropriate creation of own funds between the members of the institutional protection scheme and the minority shareholder, when it is an institution, is eliminated. (b) where a regional credit institution has a holding in its central or another regional credit institution and the conditions laid down in points (a)(i) to (v) are met. 4. The holdings in respect of which deduction is not made in accordance with paragraph 1, 2 or 3 shall qualify as exposures and shall be risk weighted in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three, as applicable. 5. Where an institution applies method 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC, the institution shall disclose the supplementary own funds requirement and capital adequacy ratio of the financial conglomerate as calculated in accordance with Article 6 of and Annex I to that Directive. 6. EBA, EIOPA and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 ( 27 ) shall, through the Joint Committee, develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify for the purposes of this Article the conditions of application of the calculation methods listed in Annex I, Part II of Directive 2002/87/EC for the purposes of the alternatives to deduction referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 respectively.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 49 Requirement for deduction where consolidation, supplementary supervision or institutional protection schemes are applied):
1. For the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual basis, a sub-consolidated basis and a consolidated basis, where the competent authorities require or permit institutions to apply method 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC, the competent authorities may permit institutions not to deduct the holdings of own funds instruments of a financial sector entity in which the parent institution, parent financial holding company or parent mixed financial holding company or institution has a significant investment, provided that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (e) of this paragraph are met: (a) the financial sector entity is an insurance undertaking, a re-insurance undertaking or an insurance holding company; (b) that insurance undertaking, re-insurance undertaking or insurance holding company is included in the same supplementary supervision under Directive 2002/87/EC as the parent institution, parent financial holding company or parent mixed financial holding company or institution that has the holding; (c) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authorities; (d) prior to granting the permission referred to in point (c), and on a continuing basis, the competent authorities are satisfied that the level of integrated management, risk management and internal control regarding the entities that would be included in the scope of consolidation under method 1, 2 or 3 is adequate; (e) the holdings in the entity belong to one of the following: (i) the parent credit institution; (ii) the parent financial holding company; (iii) the parent mixed financial holding company; (iv) the institution; (v) a subsidiary of one of the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv) that is included in the scope of consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One. The method chosen shall be applied in a consistent manner over time. 2. For the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual basis and a sub-consolidated basis, institutions subject to supervision on a consolidated basis in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One shall not deduct holdings of own funds instruments issued by financial sector entities included in the scope of consolidated supervision, unless the competent authorities determine those deductions to be required for specific purposes, in particular structural separation of banking activities and resolution planning. Applying the approach referred to in the first subparagraph shall not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. 3. Competent authorities may, for the purposes of calculating own funds on an individual or sub-consolidated basis permit institutions not to deduct holdings of own funds instruments in the following cases: (a) where an institution has a holding in another institution and the conditions referred to in points (i) to (v) are met: (i) the institutions fall within the same institutional protection scheme referred to in Article 113(7); (ii) the competent authorities have granted the permission referred to in Article 113(7); (iii) the conditions laid down in Article 113(7) are satisfied; (iv) the institutional protection scheme draws up a consolidated balance sheet referred to in point (e) of Article 113(7) or, where it is not required to draw up consolidated accounts, an extended aggregated calculation that is, to the satisfaction of the competent authorities, equivalent to the provisions of Directive 86/635/EEC, which incorporates certain adaptations of the provisions of Directive 83/349/EEC or of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002, governing the consolidated accounts of groups of credit institutions. The equivalence of that extended aggregated calculation shall be verified by an external auditor and in particular that the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation of own funds as well as any inappropriate creation of own funds between the members of the institutional protection scheme is eliminated in the calculation. The consolidated balance sheet or the extended aggregated calculation shall be reported to the competent authorities no less frequently than the frequency laid down in Article 99; (v) the institutions included in an institutional protection scheme meet together on a consolidated or extended aggregated basis the requirements laid down in Article 92 and carry out reporting of compliance with those requirements in accordance with Article 99. Within an institutional protection scheme the deduction of the interest owned by co-operative members or legal entities, which are not members of the institutional protection scheme, is not required, provided that the multiple use of elements eligible for the calculation of own funds as well as any inappropriate creation of own funds between the members of the institutional protection scheme and the minority shareholder, when it is an institution, is eliminated. (b) where a regional credit institution has a holding in its central or another regional credit institution and the conditions laid down in points (a)(i) to (v) are met. 4. The holdings in respect of which deduction is not made in accordance with paragraph 1, 2 or 3 shall qualify as exposures and shall be risk weighted in accordance with Chapter 2 or 3 of Title II of Part Three, as applicable. 5. Where an institution applies method 1, 2 or 3 of Annex I to Directive 2002/87/EC, the institution shall disclose the supplementary own funds requirement and capital adequacy ratio of the financial conglomerate as calculated in accordance with Article 6 of and Annex I to that Directive. 6. EBA, EIOPA and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 ( 8 ) shall, through the Joint Committee, develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify for the purposes of this Article the conditions of application of the calculation methods listed in Annex I, Part II of Directive 2002/87/EC for the purposes of the alternatives to deduction referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 respectively.
Article 50 Common Equity Tier 1 capital
The Common Equity Tier 1 capital of an institution shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 items after the application of the adjustments required by Articles 32 to 35, the deductions pursuant to Article 36 and the exemptions and alternatives laid down in Articles 48, 49 and 79.
Article 51 Additional Tier 1 items
Additional Tier 1 items shall consist of the following: (a) capital instruments, where the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) are met; (b) the share premium accounts related to the instruments referred to in point (a). Instruments included under point (a) shall not qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 or Tier 2 items.
Article 52 Additional Tier 1 instruments
1. Capital instruments shall qualify as Additional Tier 1 instruments only if the following conditions are met: (a) the instruments are issued and paid up; (b) the instruments are not purchased by any of the following: (i) the institution or its subsidiaries; (ii) an undertaking in which the institution has a participation in the form of ownership, direct or by way of control, of 20 % or more of the voting rights or capital of that undertaking; (b) the instruments are not purchased by any of the following: (i) the institution or its subsidiaries; (ii) an undertaking in which the institution has a participation in the form of ownership, direct or by way of control, of 20 % or more of the voting rights or capital of that undertaking; (c) the purchase of the instruments is not funded directly or indirectly by the institution; (d) the instruments rank below Tier 2 instruments in the event of the insolvency of the institution; (e) the instruments are neither secured nor subject to a guarantee that enhances the seniority of the claims by any of the following: (i) the institution or its subsidiaries; (ii) the parent undertaking of the institution or its subsidiaries; (iii) the parent financial holding company or its subsidiaries; (iv) the mixed activity holding company or its subsidiaries; (v) the mixed financial holding company or its subsidiaries; (vi) any undertaking that has close links with entities referred to in points (i) to (v); (e) the instruments are neither secured nor subject to a guarantee that enhances the seniority of the claims by any of the following: (ii) the parent undertaking of the institution or its subsidiaries; (iii) the parent financial holding company or its subsidiaries; (iv) the mixed activity holding company or its subsidiaries; (v) the mixed financial holding company or its subsidiaries; (vi) any undertaking that has close links with entities referred to in points (i) to (v); (f) the instruments are not subject to any arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that enhances the seniority of the claim under the instruments in insolvency or liquidation; (g) the instruments are perpetual and the provisions governing them include no incentive for the institution to redeem them; (h) where the provisions governing the instruments include one or more call options, the option to call may be exercised at the sole discretion of the issuer; (i) the instruments may be called, redeemed or repurchased only where the conditions laid down in Article 77 are met, and not before five years after the date of issuance except where the conditions laid down in Article 78(4) are met; (j) the provisions governing the instruments do not indicate explicitly or implicitly that the instruments would or might be called, redeemed or repurchased and the institution does not otherwise provide such an indication, except in the following cases: (i) the liquidation of the institution; (ii) discretionary repurchases of the instruments or other discretionary means of reducing the amount of Additional Tier 1 capital, where the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority in accordance with Article 77; (j) the provisions governing the instruments do not indicate explicitly or implicitly that the instruments would or might be called, redeemed or repurchased and the institution does not otherwise provide such an indication, except in the following cases: (i) the liquidation of the institution; (ii) discretionary repurchases of the instruments or other discretionary means of reducing the amount of Additional Tier 1 capital, where the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority in accordance with Article 77; (k) the institution does not indicate explicitly or implicitly that the competent authority would consent to a request to call, redeem or repurchase the instruments; (l) distributions under the instruments meet the following conditions: (i) they are paid out of distributable items; (ii) the level of distributions made on the instruments will not be amended on the basis of the credit standing of the institution or its parent undertaking; (iii) the provisions governing the instruments give the institution full discretion at all times to cancel the distributions on the instruments for an unlimited period and on a non-cumulative basis, and the institution may use such cancelled payments without restriction to meet its obligations as they fall due; (iv) cancellation of distributions does not constitute an event of default of the institution; (v) the cancellation of distributions imposes no restrictions on the institution; (l) distributions under the instruments meet the following conditions: (i) they are paid out of distributable items; (ii) the level of distributions made on the instruments will not be amended on the basis of the credit standing of the institution or its parent undertaking; (iii) the provisions governing the instruments give the institution full discretion at all times to cancel the distributions on the instruments for an unlimited period and on a non-cumulative basis, and the institution may use such cancelled payments without restriction to meet its obligations as they fall due; (iv) cancellation of distributions does not constitute an event of default of the institution; (v) the cancellation of distributions imposes no restrictions on the institution; (m) the instruments do not contribute to a determination that the liabilities of an institution exceed its assets, where such a determination constitutes a test of insolvency under applicable national law; (n) the provisions governing the instruments require that, upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the principal amount of the instruments be written down on a permanent or temporary basis or the instruments be converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments; (o) the provisions governing the instruments include no feature that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution; (p) where the instruments are not issued directly by an institution, both the following conditions shall be met: (i) the instruments are issued through an entity within the consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One; (ii) the proceeds are immediately available to the institution without limitation and in a form that satisfies the conditions laid down in this paragraph. (p) where the instruments are not issued directly by an institution, both the following conditions shall be met: (i) the instruments are issued through an entity within the consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One; (ii) the proceeds are immediately available to the institution without limitation and in a form that satisfies the conditions laid down in this paragraph. The condition set out in point (d) of the first subparagraph shall be deemed to be met notwithstanding the fact that the instruments are included in Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 by virtue of Article 484(3), provided that they rank pari passu. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify all the following: (a) the form and nature of incentives to redeem; (b) the nature of any write up of the principal amount of an Additional Tier 1 instrument following a write down of its principal amount on a temporary basis; (c) the procedures and timing for the following: (i) determining that a trigger event has occurred; (ii) writing up the principal amount of an Additional Tier 1 instrument following a write down of its principal amount on a temporary basis; (c) the procedures and timing for the following: (i) determining that a trigger event has occurred; (ii) writing up the principal amount of an Additional Tier 1 instrument following a write down of its principal amount on a temporary basis; (d) features of instruments that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution; (e) the use of special purpose entities for indirect issuance of own funds instruments. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 52 Additional Tier 1 instruments):
1. Capital instruments shall qualify as Additional Tier 1 instruments only if the following conditions are met: (a) the instruments are issued and paid up; (b) the instruments are not purchased by any of the following: (i) the institution or its subsidiaries; (ii) an undertaking in which the institution has a participation in the form of ownership, direct or by way of control, of 20 % or more of the voting rights or capital of that undertaking; (c) the purchase of the instruments is not funded directly or indirectly by the institution; (d) the instruments rank below Tier 2 instruments in the event of the insolvency of the institution; (e) the instruments are neither secured nor subject to a guarantee that enhances the seniority of the claims by any of the following: (ii) the parent undertaking of the institution or its subsidiaries; (iii) the parent financial holding company or its subsidiaries; (iv) the mixed activity holding company or its subsidiaries; (v) the mixed financial holding company or its subsidiaries; (vi) any undertaking that has close links with entities referred to in points (i) to (v); (f) the instruments are not subject to any arrangement, contractual or otherwise, that enhances the seniority of the claim under the instruments in insolvency or liquidation; (g) the instruments are perpetual and the provisions governing them include no incentive for the institution to redeem them; (h) where the provisions governing the instruments include one or more call options, the option to call may be exercised at the sole discretion of the issuer; (i) the instruments may be called, redeemed or repurchased only where the conditions laid down in Article 77 are met, and not before five years after the date of issuance except where the conditions laid down in Article 78(4) are met; (j) the provisions governing the instruments do not indicate explicitly or implicitly that the instruments would or might be called, redeemed or repurchased and the institution does not otherwise provide such an indication, except in the following cases: (i) the liquidation of the institution; (ii) discretionary repurchases of the instruments or other discretionary means of reducing the amount of Additional Tier 1 capital, where the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority in accordance with Article 77; (k) the institution does not indicate explicitly or implicitly that the competent authority would consent to a request to call, redeem or repurchase the instruments; (l) distributions under the instruments meet the following conditions: (i) they are paid out of distributable items; (ii) the level of distributions made on the instruments will not be amended on the basis of the credit standing of the institution or its parent undertaking; (iii) the provisions governing the instruments give the institution full discretion at all times to cancel the distributions on the instruments for an unlimited period and on a non-cumulative basis, and the institution may use such cancelled payments without restriction to meet its obligations as they fall due; (iv) cancellation of distributions does not constitute an event of default of the institution; (v) the cancellation of distributions imposes no restrictions on the institution; (m) the instruments do not contribute to a determination that the liabilities of an institution exceed its assets, where such a determination constitutes a test of insolvency under applicable national law; (n) the provisions governing the instruments require that, upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the principal amount of the instruments be written down on a permanent or temporary basis or the instruments be converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments; (o) the provisions governing the instruments include no feature that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution; (p) where the instruments are not issued directly by an institution, both the following conditions shall be met: (i) the instruments are issued through an entity within the consolidation pursuant to Chapter 2 of Title II of Part One; (ii) the proceeds are immediately available to the institution without limitation and in a form that satisfies the conditions laid down in this paragraph. The condition set out in point (d) of the first subparagraph shall be deemed to be met notwithstanding the fact that the instruments are included in Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 by virtue of Article 484(3), provided that they rank pari passu. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify all the following: (a) the form and nature of incentives to redeem; (b) the nature of any write up of the principal amount of an Additional Tier 1 instrument following a write down of its principal amount on a temporary basis; (c) the procedures and timing for the following: (i) determining that a trigger event has occurred; (ii) writing up the principal amount of an Additional Tier 1 instrument following a write down of its principal amount on a temporary basis; (d) features of instruments that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution; (e) the use of special purpose entities for indirect issuance of own funds instruments. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 July 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 53 Restrictions on the cancellation of distributions on Additional Tier 1 instruments and features that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution
For the purposes of points (l)(v) and (o) of Article 52(1), the provisions governing Additional Tier 1 instruments shall, in particular, not include the following: (a) a requirement for distributions on the instruments to be made in the event of a distribution being made on an instrument issued by the institution that ranks to the same degree as, or more junior than, an Additional Tier 1 instrument, including a Common Equity Tier 1 instrument; (b) a requirement for the payment of distributions on Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments to be cancelled in the event that distributions are not made on those Additional Tier 1 instruments; (c) an obligation to substitute the payment of interest or dividend by a payment in any other form. The institution shall not otherwise be subject to such an obligation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 53 Restrictions on the cancellation of distributions on Additional Tier 1 instruments and features that could hinder the recapitalisation of the institution):
(a) a requirement for distributions on the instruments to be made in the event of a distribution being made on an instrument issued by the institution that ranks to the same degree as, or more junior than, an Additional Tier 1 instrument, including a Common Equity Tier 1 instrument; (b) a requirement for the payment of distributions on Common Equity Tier 1, Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 instruments to be cancelled in the event that distributions are not made on those Additional Tier 1 instruments; (c) an obligation to substitute the payment of interest or dividend by a payment in any other form. The institution shall not otherwise be subject to such an obligation.
Article 54 Write down or conversion of Additional Tier 1 instruments
1. For the purposes of point (n) of Article 52(1), the following provisions shall apply to Additional Tier 1 instruments: (a) a trigger event occurs when the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the institution referred to in point (a) of Article 92(1) falls below either of the following: (i) 5,125 %; (ii) a level higher than 5,125 %, where determined by the institution and specified in the provisions governing the instrument; (a) a trigger event occurs when the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the institution referred to in point (a) of Article 92(1) falls below either of the following: (i) 5,125 %; (ii) a level higher than 5,125 %, where determined by the institution and specified in the provisions governing the instrument; (b) institutions may specify in the provisions governing the instrument one or more trigger events in addition to that referred to in point (a); (c) where the provisions governing the instruments require them to be converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments upon the occurrence of a trigger event, those provisions shall specify either of the following: (i) the rate of such conversion and a limit on the permitted amount of conversion; (ii) a range within which the instruments will convert into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments; (c) where the provisions governing the instruments require them to be converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments upon the occurrence of a trigger event, those provisions shall specify either of the following: (i) the rate of such conversion and a limit on the permitted amount of conversion; (ii) a range within which the instruments will convert into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments; (d) where the provisions governing the instruments require their principal amount to be written down upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the write down shall reduce all the following: (i) the claim of the holder of the instrument in the insolvency or liquidation of the institution; (ii) the amount required to be paid in the event of the call or redemption of the instrument; (iii) the distributions made on the instrument. (d) where the provisions governing the instruments require their principal amount to be written down upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the write down shall reduce all the following: (i) the claim of the holder of the instrument in the insolvency or liquidation of the institution; (ii) the amount required to be paid in the event of the call or redemption of the instrument; (iii) the distributions made on the instrument. 2. Write down or conversion of an Additional Tier 1 instrument shall, under the applicable accounting framework, generate items that qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 items. 3. The amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments recognised in Additional Tier 1 items is limited to the minimum amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items that would be generated if the principal amount of the Additional Tier 1 instruments were fully written down or converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments. 4. The aggregate amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments that is required to be written down or converted upon the occurrence of a trigger event shall be no less than the lower of the following: (a) the amount required to restore fully the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of the institution to 5,125 %; (b) the full principal amount of the instrument. 5. When a trigger event occurs institutions shall do the following: (a) immediately inform the competent authorities; (b) inform the holders of the Additional Tier 1 instruments; (c) write down the principal amount of the instruments, or convert the instruments into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments without delay, but no later than within one month, in accordance with the requirement laid down in this Article. 6. An institution issuing Additional Tier 1 instruments that convert to Common Equity Tier 1 on the occurrence of a trigger event shall ensure that its authorised share capital is at all times sufficient, for converting all such convertible Additional Tier 1 instruments into shares if a trigger event occurs. All necessary authorisations shall be obtained at the date of issuance of such convertible Additional Tier 1 instruments. The institution shall maintain at all times the necessary prior authorisation to issue the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments into which such Additional Tier 1 instruments would convert upon occurrence of a trigger event. 7. An institution issuing Additional Tier 1 instruments that convert to Common Equity Tier 1 on the occurrence of a trigger event shall ensure that there are no procedural impediments to that conversion by virtue of its incorporation or statutes or contractual arrangements.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 54 Write down or conversion of Additional Tier 1 instruments):
1. For the purposes of point (n) of Article 52(1), the following provisions shall apply to Additional Tier 1 instruments: (a) a trigger event occurs when the Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of the institution referred to in point (a) of Article 92(1) falls below either of the following: (i) 5,125 %; (ii) a level higher than 5,125 %, where determined by the institution and specified in the provisions governing the instrument; (b) institutions may specify in the provisions governing the instrument one or more trigger events in addition to that referred to in point (a); (c) where the provisions governing the instruments require them to be converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments upon the occurrence of a trigger event, those provisions shall specify either of the following: (i) the rate of such conversion and a limit on the permitted amount of conversion; (ii) a range within which the instruments will convert into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments; (d) where the provisions governing the instruments require their principal amount to be written down upon the occurrence of a trigger event, the write down shall reduce all the following: (i) the claim of the holder of the instrument in the insolvency or liquidation of the institution; (ii) the amount required to be paid in the event of the call or redemption of the instrument; (iii) the distributions made on the instrument. 2. Write down or conversion of an Additional Tier 1 instrument shall, under the applicable accounting framework, generate items that qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 items. 3. The amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments recognised in Additional Tier 1 items is limited to the minimum amount of Common Equity Tier 1 items that would be generated if the principal amount of the Additional Tier 1 instruments were fully written down or converted into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments. 4. The aggregate amount of Additional Tier 1 instruments that is required to be written down or converted upon the occurrence of a trigger event shall be no less than the lower of the following: (a) the amount required to restore fully the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of the institution to 5,125 %; (b) the full principal amount of the instrument. 5. When a trigger event occurs institutions shall do the following: (a) immediately inform the competent authorities; (b) inform the holders of the Additional Tier 1 instruments; (c) write down the principal amount of the instruments, or convert the instruments into Common Equity Tier 1 instruments without delay, but no later than within one month, in accordance with the requirement laid down in this Article. 6. An institution issuing Additional Tier 1 instruments that convert to Common Equity Tier 1 on the occurrence of a trigger event shall ensure that its authorised share capital is at all times sufficient, for converting all such convertible Additional Tier 1 instruments into shares if a trigger event occurs. All necessary authorisations shall be obtained at the date of issuance of such convertible Additional Tier 1 instruments. The institution shall maintain at all times the necessary prior authorisation to issue the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments into which such Additional Tier 1 instruments would convert upon occurrence of a trigger event. 7. An institution issuing Additional Tier 1 instruments that convert to Common Equity Tier 1 on the occurrence of a trigger event shall ensure that there are no procedural impediments to that conversion by virtue of its incorporation or statutes or contractual arrangements.
Article 55 Consequences of the conditions for Additional Tier 1 instruments ceasing to be met
The following shall apply where, in the case of an Additional Tier 1 instrument, the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) cease to be met: (a) that instrument shall immediately cease to qualify as an Additional Tier 1 instrument; (b) the part of the share premium accounts that relates to that instrument shall immediately cease to qualify as an Additional Tier 1 item.
Article 56 Deductions from Additional Tier 1 items
Institutions shall deduct the following from Additional Tier 1 items: (a) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by an institution of own Additional Tier 1 instruments, including own Additional Tier 1 instruments that an institution could be obliged to purchase as a result of existing contractual obligations; (b) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of the Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities with which the institution has reciprocal cross holdings that the competent authority considers to have been designed to inflate artificially the own funds of the institution; (c) the applicable amount determined in accordance with Article 60 of direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of the Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities, where an institution does not have a significant investment in those entities; (d) direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities where the institution has a significant investment in those entities, excluding underwriting positions held for five working days or fewer; (e) the amount of items required to be deducted from Tier 2 items pursuant to Article 66 that exceed the Tier 2 capital of the institution; (f) any tax charge relating to Additional Tier 1 items foreseeable at the moment of its calculation, except where the institution suitably adjusts the amount of Additional Tier 1 items insofar as such tax charges reduce the amount up to which those items may be applied to cover risks or losses.
Article 57 Deductions of holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments
For the purposes of point (a) of Article 56, institutions shall calculate holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments on the basis of gross long positions subject to the following exceptions: (a) institutions may calculate the amount of holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments on the basis of the net long position provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying exposure and the short positions involve no counterparty risk; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (a) institutions may calculate the amount of holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments on the basis of the net long position provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying exposure and the short positions involve no counterparty risk; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (b) institutions shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect or synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to own Additional Tier 1 instruments in those indices; (c) institutions may net gross long positions in own Additional Tier 1 instruments resulting from holdings of index securities against short positions in own Additional Tier 1 instruments resulting from short positions in the underlying indices, including where those short positions involve counterparty risk, provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying indices; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (c) institutions may net gross long positions in own Additional Tier 1 instruments resulting from holdings of index securities against short positions in own Additional Tier 1 instruments resulting from short positions in the underlying indices, including where those short positions involve counterparty risk, provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying indices;
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 57 Deductions of holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments):
For the purposes of point (a) of Article 56, institutions shall calculate holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments on the basis of gross long positions subject to the following exceptions: (a) institutions may calculate the amount of holdings of own Additional Tier 1 instruments on the basis of the net long position provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying exposure and the short positions involve no counterparty risk; (ii) either both the long and the short positions are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book; (b) institutions shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect or synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to own Additional Tier 1 instruments in those indices; (c) institutions may net gross long positions in own Additional Tier 1 instruments resulting from holdings of index securities against short positions in own Additional Tier 1 instruments resulting from short positions in the underlying indices, including where those short positions involve counterparty risk, provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the long and short positions are in the same underlying indices;
Article 58 Deduction of holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities and where an institution has a reciprocal cross holding designed artificially to inflate own funds
Institutions shall make the deductions required by points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 56 in accordance with the following: (a) holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments shall be calculated on the basis of the gross long positions; (b) Additional Tier 1 own-fund insurance items shall be treated as holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments for the purposes of deduction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 58 Deduction of holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities and where an institution has a reciprocal cross holding designed artificially to inflate own funds):
(a) holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments shall be calculated on the basis of the gross long positions; (b) Additional Tier 1 own-fund insurance items shall be treated as holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments for the purposes of deduction.
Article 59 Deduction of holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities
Institutions shall make the deductions required by points (c) and (d) of Article 56 in accordance with the following: (a) they may calculate direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of the financial sector entities on the basis of the net long position in the same underlying exposure provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the maturity of the short position matches the maturity of the long position or has a residual maturity of at least one year; (ii) either both the short position and the long position are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book. (a) they may calculate direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of the financial sector entities on the basis of the net long position in the same underlying exposure provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the maturity of the short position matches the maturity of the long position or has a residual maturity of at least one year; (ii) either both the short position and the long position are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book. (b) they shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to the capital instruments of the financial sector entities in those indices.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 59 Deduction of holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of financial sector entities):
Institutions shall make the deductions required by points (c) and (d) of Article 56 in accordance with the following: (a) they may calculate direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of Additional Tier 1 instruments of the financial sector entities on the basis of the net long position in the same underlying exposure provided that both the following conditions are met: (i) the maturity of the short position matches the maturity of the long position or has a residual maturity of at least one year; (ii) either both the short position and the long position are held in the trading book or both are held in the non-trading book. (b) they shall determine the amount to be deducted for direct, indirect and synthetic holdings of index securities by calculating the underlying exposure to the capital instruments of the financial sector entities in those indices.