Article 1 
1. This Directive aims to prevent the use of the Union's financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. 2. Member States shall ensure that money laundering and terrorist financing are prohibited. 3. For the purposes of this Directive, the following conduct, when committed intentionally, shall be regarded as money laundering: (a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an activity to evade the legal consequences of that person's action; (b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an activity; (c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an activity; (d) participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions referred to in points (a), (b) and (c). 4. Money laundering shall be regarded as such even where the activities which generated the property to be laundered were carried out in the territory of another Member State or in that of a third country. 5. For the purposes of this Directive, ‘terrorist financing’ means the provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or indirectly, with the intention that they be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any of the offences within the meaning of Articles 1 to 4 of Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA ( 20 ) . 6. Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of the activities referred to in paragraphs 3 and 5 may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
Article 2 
1. This Directive shall apply to the following obliged entities: (1) credit institutions; (2) financial institutions; (3) the following natural or legal persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities: (a) auditors, external accountants and tax advisors; (b) notaries and other independent legal professionals, where they participate, whether by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate transaction, or by assisting in the planning or carrying out of transactions for their client concerning the: (i) buying and selling of real property or business entities; (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts; (iv) organisation of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies; (v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies, foundations, or similar structures; (c) trust or company service providers not already covered under point (a) or (b); (d) estate agents; (e) other persons trading in goods to the extent that payments are made or received in cash in an amount of EUR 10 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked; (f) providers of gambling services. 2. With the exception of casinos, and following an appropriate risk assessment, Member States may decide to exempt, in full or in part, providers of certain gambling services from national provisions transposing this Directive on the basis of the proven low risk posed by the nature and, where appropriate, the scale of operations of such services. Among the factors considered in their risk assessments, Member States shall assess the degree of vulnerability of the applicable transactions, including with respect to the payment methods used. In their risk assessments, Member States shall indicate how they have taken into account any relevant findings in the reports issued by the Commission pursuant to Article 6. Any decision taken by a Member State pursuant to the first subparagraph shall be notified to the Commission, together with a justification based on the specific risk assessment. The Commission shall communicate that decision to the other Member States. 3. Member States may decide that persons that engage in a financial activity on an occasional or very limited basis where there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing do not fall within the scope of this Directive, provided that all of the following criteria are met: (a) the financial activity is limited in absolute terms; (b) the financial activity is limited on a transaction basis; (c) the financial activity is not the main activity of such persons; (d) the financial activity is ancillary and directly related to the main activity of such persons; (e) the main activity of such persons is not an activity referred to in points (a) to (d) or point (f) of paragraph 1(3); (f) the financial activity is provided only to the customers of the main activity of such persons and is not generally offered to the public. The first subparagraph shall not apply to persons engaged in the activity of money remittance as defined in point (13) of Article 4 of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 21 ) . 4. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 3, Member States shall require that the total turnover of the financial activity does not exceed a threshold which must be sufficiently low. That threshold shall be established at national level, depending on the type of financial activity. 5. For the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 3, Member States shall apply a maximum threshold per customer and per single transaction, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked. That maximum threshold shall be established at national level, depending on the type of financial activity. It shall be sufficiently low in order to ensure that the types of transactions in question are an impractical and inefficient method for money laundering or terrorist financing, and shall not exceed EUR 1 000. 6. For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 3, Member States shall require that the turnover of the financial activity does not exceed 5 % of the total turnover of the natural or legal person concerned. 7. In assessing the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing for the purposes of this Article, Member States shall pay particular attention to any financial activity which is considered to be particularly likely, by its nature, to be used or abused for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 8. Decisions taken by Member States pursuant to paragraph 3 shall state the reasons on which they are based. Member States may decide to withdraw such decisions where circumstances change. They shall notify such decisions to the Commission. The Commission shall communicate such decisions to the other Member States. 9. Member States shall establish risk-based monitoring activities or take other adequate measures to ensure that the exemption granted by decisions pursuant to this Article is not abused.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 2 ):
1. This Directive shall apply to the following obliged entities: (1) credit institutions; (2) financial institutions; (3) the following natural or legal persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities: (a) auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, and any other person that undertakes to provide, directly or by means of other persons to which that other person is related, material aid, assistance or advice on tax matters as principal business or professional activity; (b) notaries and other independent legal professionals, where they participate, whether by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate transaction, or by assisting in the planning or carrying out of transactions for their client concerning the: (i) buying and selling of real property or business entities; (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts; (iv) organisation of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management of companies; (v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies, foundations, or similar structures; (c) trust or company service providers not already covered under point (a) or (b); (d) estate agents including when acting as intermediaries in the letting of immovable property, but only in relation to transactions for which the monthly rent amounts to EUR 10 000 or more; (e) other persons trading in goods to the extent that payments are made or received in cash in an amount of EUR 10 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked; (f) providers of gambling services; (g) providers engaged in exchange services between virtual currencies and fiat currencies; (h) custodian wallet providers; (i) persons trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art, including when this is carried out by art galleries and auction houses, where the value of the transaction or a series of linked transactions amounts to EUR 10 000 or more; (j) persons storing, trading or acting as intermediaries in the trade of works of art when this is carried out by free ports, where the value of the transaction or a series of linked transactions amounts to EUR 10 000 or more. 2. With the exception of casinos, and following an appropriate risk assessment, Member States may decide to exempt, in full or in part, providers of certain gambling services from national provisions transposing this Directive on the basis of the proven low risk posed by the nature and, where appropriate, the scale of operations of such services. Among the factors considered in their risk assessments, Member States shall assess the degree of vulnerability of the applicable transactions, including with respect to the payment methods used. In their risk assessments, Member States shall indicate how they have taken into account any relevant findings in the reports issued by the Commission pursuant to Article 6. Any decision taken by a Member State pursuant to the first subparagraph shall be notified to the Commission, together with a justification based on the specific risk assessment. The Commission shall communicate that decision to the other Member States. 3. Member States may decide that persons that engage in a financial activity on an occasional or very limited basis where there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing do not fall within the scope of this Directive, provided that all of the following criteria are met: (a) the financial activity is limited in absolute terms; (b) the financial activity is limited on a transaction basis; (c) the financial activity is not the main activity of such persons; (d) the financial activity is ancillary and directly related to the main activity of such persons; (e) the main activity of such persons is not an activity referred to in points (a) to (d) or point (f) of paragraph 1(3); (f) the financial activity is provided only to the customers of the main activity of such persons and is not generally offered to the public. The first subparagraph shall not apply to persons engaged in the activity of money remittance as defined in point (13) of Article 4 of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 2 ). 4. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 3, Member States shall require that the total turnover of the financial activity does not exceed a threshold which must be sufficiently low. That threshold shall be established at national level, depending on the type of financial activity. 5. For the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 3, Member States shall apply a maximum threshold per customer and per single transaction, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked. That maximum threshold shall be established at national level, depending on the type of financial activity. It shall be sufficiently low in order to ensure that the types of transactions in question are an impractical and inefficient method for money laundering or terrorist financing, and shall not exceed EUR 1 000 . 6. For the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 3, Member States shall require that the turnover of the financial activity does not exceed 5 % of the total turnover of the natural or legal person concerned. 7. In assessing the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing for the purposes of this Article, Member States shall pay particular attention to any financial activity which is considered to be particularly likely, by its nature, to be used or abused for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 8. Decisions taken by Member States pursuant to paragraph 3 shall state the reasons on which they are based. Member States may decide to withdraw such decisions where circumstances change. They shall notify such decisions to the Commission. The Commission shall communicate such decisions to the other Member States. 9. Member States shall establish risk-based monitoring activities or take other adequate measures to ensure that the exemption granted by decisions pursuant to this Article is not abused.
Article 3 
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply: (1) ‘credit institution’ means a credit institution as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 22 ) , including branches thereof, as defined in point (17) of Article 4(1) of that Regulation, located in the Union, whether its head office is situated within the Union or in a third country; (2) ‘financial institution’ means: (a) an undertaking other than a credit institution, which carries out one or more of the activities listed in points (2) to (12), (14) and (15) of Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 23 ) , including the activities of currency exchange offices (bureaux de change); (b) an insurance undertaking as defined in point (1) of Article 13 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 24 ) , insofar as it carries out life assurance activities covered by that Directive; (c) an investment firm as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 25 ) ; (d) a collective investment undertaking marketing its units or shares; (e) an insurance intermediary as defined in point (5) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 26 ) where it acts with respect to life insurance and other investment-related services, with the exception of a tied insurance intermediary as defined in point (7) of that Article; (f) branches, when located in the Union, of financial institutions as referred to in points (a) to (e), whether their head office is situated in a Member State or in a third country; (3) ‘property’ means assets of any kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments in any form including electronic or digital, evidencing title to or an interest in such assets; (4) ‘criminal activity’ means any kind of criminal involvement in the commission of the following serious crimes: (a) acts set out in Articles 1 to 4 of Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA; (b) any of the offences referred in Article 3(1)(a) of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; (c) the activities of criminal organisations as defined in Article 1 of Council Joint Action 98/733/JHA ( 27 ) ; (d) fraud affecting the Union's financial interests, where it is at least serious, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests ( 28 ) ; (e) corruption; (f) all offences, including tax crimes relating to direct taxes and indirect taxes and as defined in the national law of the Member States, which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year or, as regards Member States that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, all offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months; (5) ‘self-regulatory body’ means a body that represents members of a profession and has a role in regulating them, in performing certain supervisory or monitoring type functions and in ensuring the enforcement of the rules relating to them; (6) ‘beneficial owner’ means any natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted and includes at least: (a) in the case of corporate entities: (i) the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity through direct or indirect ownership of a sufficient percentage of the shares or voting rights or ownership interest in that entity, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other means, other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements consistent with Union law or subject to equivalent international standards which ensure adequate transparency of ownership information. A shareholding of 25 % plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25 % in the customer held by a natural person shall be an indication of direct ownership. A shareholding of 25 % plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25 % in the customer held by a corporate entity, which is under the control of a natural person(s), or by multiple corporate entities, which are under the control of the same natural person(s), shall be an indication of indirect ownership. This applies without prejudice to the right of Member States to decide that a lower percentage may be an indication of ownership or control. Control through other means may be determined, inter alia, in accordance with the criteria in Article 22(1) to (5) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 29 ) ; (ii) if, after having exhausted all possible means and provided there are no grounds for suspicion, no person under point (i) is identified, or if there is any doubt that the person(s) identified are the beneficial owner(s), the natural person(s) who hold the position of senior managing official(s), the obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken in order to identify the beneficial ownership under point (i) and this point; (b) in the case of trusts: (i) the settlor; (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector, if any; (iv) the beneficiaries, or where the individuals benefiting from the legal arrangement or entity have yet to be determined, the class of persons in whose main interest the legal arrangement or entity is set up or operates; (v) any other natural person exercising ultimate control over the trust by means of direct or indirect ownership or by other means; (c) in the case of legal entities such as foundations, and legal arrangements similar to trusts, the natural person(s) holding equivalent or similar positions to those referred to in point (b); (7) ‘trust or company service provider’ means any person that, by way of its business, provides any of the following services to third parties: (a) the formation of companies or other legal persons; (b) acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons; (c) providing a registered office, business address, correspondence or administrative address and other related services for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; (d) acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, a trustee of an express trust or a similar legal arrangement; (e) acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, a nominee shareholder for another person other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements in accordance with Union law or subject to equivalent international standards; (8) ‘correspondent relationship’ means: (a) the provision of banking services by one bank as the correspondent to another bank as the respondent, including providing a current or other liability account and related services, such as cash management, international funds transfers, cheque clearing, payable-through accounts and foreign exchange services; (b) the relationships between and among credit institutions and financial institutions including where similar services are provided by a correspondent institution to a respondent institution, and including relationships established for securities transactions or funds transfers; (9) ‘politically exposed person’ means a natural person who is or who has been entrusted with prominent public functions and includes the following: (a) heads of State, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers; (b) members of parliament or of similar legislative bodies; (c) members of the governing bodies of political parties; (d) members of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-level judicial bodies, the decisions of which are not subject to further appeal, except in exceptional circumstances; (e) members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks; (f) ambassadors, chargés d'affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces; (g) members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of State-owned enterprises; (h) directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent function of an international organisation. No public function referred to in points (a) to (h) shall be understood as covering middle-ranking or more junior officials; (10) ‘family members’ includes the following: (a) the spouse, or a person considered to be equivalent to a spouse, of a politically exposed person; (b) the children and their spouses, or persons considered to be equivalent to a spouse, of a politically exposed person; (c) the parents of a politically exposed person; (11) ‘persons known to be close associates’ means: (a) natural persons who are known to have joint beneficial ownership of legal entities or legal arrangements, or any other close business relations, with a politically exposed person; (b) natural persons who have sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement which is known to have been set up for the de facto benefit of a politically exposed person. (12) ‘senior management’ means an officer or employee with sufficient knowledge of the institution's money laundering and terrorist financing risk exposure and sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting its risk exposure, and need not, in all cases, be a member of the board of directors; (13) ‘business relationship’ means a business, professional or commercial relationship which is connected with the professional activities of an obliged entity and which is expected, at the time when the contact is established, to have an element of duration; (14) ‘gambling services’ means a service which involves wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance, including those with an element of skill such as lotteries, casino games, poker games and betting transactions that are provided at a physical location, or by any means at a distance, by electronic means or any other technology for facilitating communication, and at the individual request of a recipient of services; (15) ‘group’ means a group of undertakings which consists of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries, and the entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation, as well as undertakings linked to each other by a relationship within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2013/34/EU; (16) ‘electronic money’ means electronic money as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of Directive 2009/110/EC; (17) ‘shell bank’ means a credit institution or financial institution, or an institution that carries out activities equivalent to those carried out by credit institutions and financial institutions, incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence, involving meaningful mind and management, and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial group.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 3 ):
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply: (1) ‘credit institution’ means a credit institution as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 3 ), including branches thereof, as defined in point (17) of Article 4(1) of that Regulation, located in the Union, whether its head office is situated within the Union or in a third country; (2) ‘financial institution’ means: (a) an undertaking other than a credit institution, which carries out one or more of the activities listed in points (2) to (12), (14) and (15) of Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 4 ), including the activities of currency exchange offices (bureaux de change); (b) an insurance undertaking as defined in point (1) of Article 13 of Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ), insofar as it carries out life assurance activities covered by that Directive; (c) an investment firm as defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 6 ); (d) a collective investment undertaking marketing its units or shares; (e) an insurance intermediary as defined in point (5) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 7 ) where it acts with respect to life insurance and other investment-related services, with the exception of a tied insurance intermediary as defined in point (7) of that Article; (f) branches, when located in the Union, of financial institutions as referred to in points (a) to (e), whether their head office is situated in a Member State or in a third country; (3) ‘property’ means assets of any kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments in any form including electronic or digital, evidencing title to or an interest in such assets; (4) ‘criminal activity’ means any kind of criminal involvement in the commission of the following serious crimes: (a) terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities as set out in Titles II and III of Directive (EU) 2017/541 ( 8 ); (b) any of the offences referred in Article 3(1)(a) of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; (c) the activities of criminal organisations as defined in Article 1(1) of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA ( 9 ); (d) fraud affecting the Union's financial interests, where it is at least serious, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests ( 10 ); (e) corruption; (f) all offences, including tax crimes relating to direct taxes and indirect taxes and as defined in the national law of the Member States, which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a maximum of more than one year or, as regards Member States that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, all offences punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months; (5) ‘self-regulatory body’ means a body that represents members of a profession and has a role in regulating them, in performing certain supervisory or monitoring type functions and in ensuring the enforcement of the rules relating to them; (6) ‘beneficial owner’ means any natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls the customer and/or the natural person(s) on whose behalf a transaction or activity is being conducted and includes at least: (a) in the case of corporate entities: (i) the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a legal entity through direct or indirect ownership of a sufficient percentage of the shares or voting rights or ownership interest in that entity, including through bearer shareholdings, or through control via other means, other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements consistent with Union law or subject to equivalent international standards which ensure adequate transparency of ownership information. A shareholding of 25 % plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25 % in the customer held by a natural person shall be an indication of direct ownership. A shareholding of 25 % plus one share or an ownership interest of more than 25 % in the customer held by a corporate entity, which is under the control of a natural person(s), or by multiple corporate entities, which are under the control of the same natural person(s), shall be an indication of indirect ownership. This applies without prejudice to the right of Member States to decide that a lower percentage may be an indication of ownership or control. Control through other means may be determined, inter alia, in accordance with the criteria in Article 22(1) to (5) of Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 11 ); (ii) if, after having exhausted all possible means and provided there are no grounds for suspicion, no person under point (i) is identified, or if there is any doubt that the person(s) identified are the beneficial owner(s), the natural person(s) who hold the position of senior managing official(s), the obliged entities shall keep records of the actions taken in order to identify the beneficial ownership under point (i) and this point; (b) in the case of trusts, all following persons: (i) the settlor(s); (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector(s), if any; (iv) the beneficiaries or where the individuals benefiting from the legal arrangement or entity have yet to be determined, the class of persons in whose main interest the legal arrangement or entity is set up or operates; (v) any other natural person exercising ultimate control over the trust by means of direct or indirect ownership or by other means; (c) in the case of legal entities such as foundations, and legal arrangements similar to trusts, the natural person(s) holding equivalent or similar positions to those referred to in point (b); (7) ‘trust or company service provider’ means any person that, by way of its business, provides any of the following services to third parties: (a) the formation of companies or other legal persons; (b) acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons; (c) providing a registered office, business address, correspondence or administrative address and other related services for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; (d) acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, a trustee of an express trust or a similar legal arrangement; (e) acting as, or arranging for another person to act as, a nominee shareholder for another person other than a company listed on a regulated market that is subject to disclosure requirements in accordance with Union law or subject to equivalent international standards; (8) ‘correspondent relationship’ means: (a) the provision of banking services by one bank as the correspondent to another bank as the respondent, including providing a current or other liability account and related services, such as cash management, international funds transfers, cheque clearing, payable-through accounts and foreign exchange services; (b) the relationships between and among credit institutions and financial institutions including where similar services are provided by a correspondent institution to a respondent institution, and including relationships established for securities transactions or funds transfers; (9) ‘politically exposed person’ means a natural person who is or who has been entrusted with prominent public functions and includes the following: (a) heads of State, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers; (b) members of parliament or of similar legislative bodies; (c) members of the governing bodies of political parties; (d) members of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high-level judicial bodies, the decisions of which are not subject to further appeal, except in exceptional circumstances; (e) members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks; (f) ambassadors, chargés d'affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces; (g) members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of State-owned enterprises; (h) directors, deputy directors and members of the board or equivalent function of an international organisation. No public function referred to in points (a) to (h) shall be understood as covering middle-ranking or more junior officials; (10) ‘family members’ includes the following: (a) the spouse, or a person considered to be equivalent to a spouse, of a politically exposed person; (b) the children and their spouses, or persons considered to be equivalent to a spouse, of a politically exposed person; (c) the parents of a politically exposed person; (11) ‘persons known to be close associates’ means: (a) natural persons who are known to have joint beneficial ownership of legal entities or legal arrangements, or any other close business relations, with a politically exposed person; (b) natural persons who have sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal arrangement which is known to have been set up for the de facto benefit of a politically exposed person. (12) ‘senior management’ means an officer or employee with sufficient knowledge of the institution's money laundering and terrorist financing risk exposure and sufficient seniority to take decisions affecting its risk exposure, and need not, in all cases, be a member of the board of directors; (13) ‘business relationship’ means a business, professional or commercial relationship which is connected with the professional activities of an obliged entity and which is expected, at the time when the contact is established, to have an element of duration; (14) ‘gambling services’ means a service which involves wagering a stake with monetary value in games of chance, including those with an element of skill such as lotteries, casino games, poker games and betting transactions that are provided at a physical location, or by any means at a distance, by electronic means or any other technology for facilitating communication, and at the individual request of a recipient of services; (15) ‘group’ means a group of undertakings which consists of a parent undertaking, its subsidiaries, and the entities in which the parent undertaking or its subsidiaries hold a participation, as well as undertakings linked to each other by a relationship within the meaning of Article 22 of Directive 2013/34/EU; (16) ‘electronic money’ means electronic money as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of Directive 2009/110/EC, but excluding monetary value as referred to in Article 1(4) and (5) of that Directive; (17) ‘shell bank’ means a credit institution or financial institution, or an institution that carries out activities equivalent to those carried out by credit institutions and financial institutions, incorporated in a jurisdiction in which it has no physical presence, involving meaningful mind and management, and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial group; (18) ‘virtual currencies’ means a digital representation of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically; (19) ‘custodian wallet provider’ means an entity that provides services to safeguard private cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers, to hold, store and transfer virtual currencies.
Article 4 
1. Member States shall, in accordance with the risk-based approach, ensure that the scope of this Directive is extended in whole or in part to professions and to categories of undertakings, other than the obliged entities referred to in Article 2(1), which engage in activities which are particularly likely to be used for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 2. Where a Member State extends the scope of this Directive to professions or to categories of undertaking other than those referred to in Article 2(1), it shall inform the Commission thereof.
Article 5 
Member States may adopt or retain in force stricter provisions in the field covered by this Directive to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, within the limits of Union law.
Article 6 
1. The Commission shall conduct an assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities. To that end, the Commission shall, by 26 June 2017, draw up a report identifying, analysing and evaluating those risks at Union level. Thereafter, the Commission shall update its report every two years, or more frequently if appropriate. 2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover at least the following: (a) the areas of the internal market that are at greatest risk; (b) the risks associated with each relevant sector; (c) the most widespread means used by criminals by which to launder illicit proceeds. 3. The Commission shall make the report referred to in paragraph 1 available to the Member States and obliged entities in order to assist them to identify, understand, manage and mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, and to allow other stakeholders, including national legislators, the European Parliament, the ESAs, and representatives from FIUs to better understand the risks. 4. The Commission shall make recommendations to Member States on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks. In the event that Member States decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national AML/CFT regimes, they shall notify the Commission thereof and provide a justification for such a decision. 5. By 26 December 2016, the ESAs, through the Joint Committee, shall issue an opinion on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the Union's financial sector (the ‘joint opinion’). Thereafter, the ESAs, through the Joint Committee, shall issue an opinion every two years. 6. In conducting the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall organise the work at Union level, shall take into account the joint opinions referred to in paragraph 5 and shall involve the Member States' experts in the area of AML/CFT, representatives from FIUs and other Union level bodies where appropriate. The Commission shall make the joint opinions available to the Member States and obliged entities in order to assist them to identify, manage and mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. 7. Every two years, or more frequently if appropriate, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the findings resulting from the regular risk assessments and the action taken based on those findings.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 6 ):
1. The Commission shall conduct an assessment of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities. To that end, the Commission shall, by 26 June 2017, draw up a report identifying, analysing and evaluating those risks at Union level. Thereafter, the Commission shall update its report every two years, or more frequently if appropriate. 2. The report referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover at least the following: (a) the areas of the internal market that are at greatest risk; (b) the risks associated with each relevant sector including, where available, estimates of the monetary volumes of money laundering provided by Eurostat for each of those sectors; (c) the most widespread means used by criminals to launder illicit proceeds, including, where available, those particularly used in transactions between Member States and third countries, independently of the identification of a third country as high-risk pursuant to Article 9(2). 3. The Commission shall make the report referred to in paragraph 1 available to Member States and obliged entities in order to assist them to identify, understand, manage and mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, and to allow other stakeholders, including national legislators, the European Parliament, the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), and representatives from FIUs, to better understand the risks. Reports shall be made public at the latest six months after having been made available to Member States, except for the elements of the reports which contain classified information. 4. The Commission shall make recommendations to Member States on the measures suitable for addressing the identified risks. In the event that Member States decide not to apply any of the recommendations in their national AML/CFT regimes, they shall notify the Commission thereof and provide a justification for such a decision. 5. By 26 December 2016, the ESAs, through the Joint Committee, shall issue an opinion on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the Union's financial sector (the ‘joint opinion’). Thereafter, the ESAs, through the Joint Committee, shall issue an opinion every two years. 6. In conducting the assessment referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall organise the work at Union level, shall take into account the joint opinions referred to in paragraph 5 and shall involve the Member States' experts in the area of AML/CFT, representatives from FIUs and other Union level bodies where appropriate. The Commission shall make the joint opinions available to the Member States and obliged entities in order to assist them to identify, manage and mitigate the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. 7. Every two years, or more frequently if appropriate, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the findings resulting from the regular risk assessments and the action taken based on those findings.
Article 7 
1. Each Member State shall take appropriate steps to identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting it, as well as any data protection concerns in that regard. It shall keep that risk assessment up to date. 2. Each Member State shall designate an authority or establish a mechanism by which to coordinate the national response to the risks referred to in paragraph 1. The identity of that authority or the description of the mechanism shall be notified to the Commission, the ESAs, and other Member States. 3. In carrying out the risk assessments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall make use of the findings of the report referred to in Article 6(1). 4. As regards the risk assessment referred to in paragraph 1, each Member State shall: (a) use it to improve its AML/CFT regime, in particular by identifying any areas where obliged entities are to apply enhanced measures and, where appropriate, specifying the measures to be taken; (b) identify, where appropriate, sectors or areas of lower or greater risk of money laundering and terrorist financing; (c) use it to assist it in the allocation and prioritisation of resources to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; (d) use it to ensure that appropriate rules are drawn up for each sector or area, in accordance with the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing; (e) make appropriate information available promptly to obliged entities to facilitate the carrying out of their own money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments. 5. Member States shall make the results of their risk assessments available to the Commission, the ESAs and the other Member States.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 7 ):
1. Each Member State shall take appropriate steps to identify, assess, understand and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting it, as well as any data protection concerns in that regard. It shall keep that risk assessment up to date. 2. Each Member State shall designate an authority or establish a mechanism by which to coordinate the national response to the risks referred to in paragraph 1. The identity of that authority or the description of the mechanism shall be notified to the Commission, the ESAs, and other Member States. 3. In carrying out the risk assessments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, Member States shall make use of the findings of the report referred to in Article 6(1). 4. As regards the risk assessment referred to in paragraph 1, each Member State shall: (a) use it to improve its AML/CFT regime, in particular by identifying any areas where obliged entities are to apply enhanced measures and, where appropriate, specifying the measures to be taken; (b) identify, where appropriate, sectors or areas of lower or greater risk of money laundering and terrorist financing; (c) use it to assist it in the allocation and prioritisation of resources to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; (d) use it to ensure that appropriate rules are drawn up for each sector or area, in accordance with the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing; (e) make appropriate information available promptly to obliged entities to facilitate the carrying out of their own money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessments; (f) report the institutional structure and broad procedures of their AML/CFT regime, including, inter alia, the FIU, tax authorities and prosecutors, as well as the allocated human and financial resources to the extent that this information is available; (g) report on national efforts and resources (labour forces and budget) allocated to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 5. Member States shall make the results of their risk assessments, including their updates, available to the Commission, the ESAs and the other Member States. Other Member States may provide relevant additional information, where appropriate, to the Member State carrying out the risk assessment. A summary of the assessment shall be made publicly available. That summary shall not contain classified information.
Article 8 
1. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, taking into account risk factors including those relating to their customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions or delivery channels. Those steps shall be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities. 2. The risk assessments referred to in paragraph 1 shall be documented, kept up-to-date and made available to the relevant competent authorities and self-regulatory bodies concerned. Competent authorities may decide that individual documented risk assessments are not required where the specific risks inherent in the sector are clear and understood. 3. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities have in place policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing identified at the level of the Union, the Member State and the obliged entity. Those policies, controls and procedures shall be proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities. 4. The policies, controls and procedures referred to in paragraph 3 shall include: (a) the development of internal policies, controls and procedures, including model risk management practices, customer due diligence, reporting, record-keeping, internal control, compliance management including, where appropriate with regard to the size and nature of the business, the appointment of a compliance officer at management level, and employee screening; (b) where appropriate with regard to the size and nature of the business, an independent audit function to test the internal policies, controls and procedures referred to in point (a). 5. Member States shall require obliged entities to obtain approval from their senior management for the policies, controls and procedures that they put in place and to monitor and enhance the measures taken, where appropriate.
Article 9 
1. Third-country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT regimes that pose significant threats to the financial system of the Union (‘high-risk third countries’) shall be identified in order to protect the proper functioning of the internal market. 2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64 in order to identify high-risk third countries, taking into account strategic deficiencies, in particular in relation to: (a) the legal and institutional AML/CFT framework of the third country, in particular: (i) criminalisation of money laundering and terrorist financing; (ii) measures relating to customer due diligence; (iii) requirements relating to record-keeping; and (iv) requirements to report suspicious transactions; (b) the powers and procedures of the third country's competent authorities for the purposes of combating money laundering and terrorist financing; (c) the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system in addressing money laundering or terrorist financing risks of the third country. 3. The delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2 shall be adopted within one month after the identification of the strategic deficiencies referred to in that paragraph. 4. The Commission shall take into account, as appropriate, when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2, relevant evaluations, assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing, in relation to the risks posed by individual third countries.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 9 ):
1. Third-country jurisdictions which have strategic deficiencies in their national AML/CFT regimes that pose significant threats to the financial system of the Union (‘high-risk third countries’) shall be identified in order to protect the proper functioning of the internal market. 2. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 64 in order to identify high-risk third countries, taking into account strategic deficiencies in particular in the following areas: (a) the legal and institutional AML/CFT framework of the third country, in particular: (i) the criminalisation of money laundering and terrorist financing; (ii) measures relating to customer due diligence; (iii) requirements relating to record-keeping; (iv) requirements to report suspicious transactions; (v) the availability of accurate and timely information of the beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements to competent authorities; (b) the powers and procedures of the third country’s competent authorities for the purposes of combating money laundering and terrorist financing including appropriately effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, as well as the third country’s practice in cooperation and exchange of information with Member States’ competent authorities; (c) the effectiveness of the third country’s AML/CFT system in addressing money laundering or terrorist financing risks. 3. The delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2 shall be adopted within one month after the identification of the strategic deficiencies referred to in that paragraph. 4. The Commission, when drawing up the delegated acts referred to in paragraph 2, shall take into account relevant evaluations, assessments or reports drawn up by international organisations and standard setters with competence in the field of preventing money laundering and combating terrorist financing.
Article 10 
1. Member States shall prohibit their credit institutions and financial institutions from keeping anonymous accounts or anonymous passbooks. Member States shall, in any event, require that the owners and beneficiaries of existing anonymous accounts or anonymous passbooks be subject to customer due diligence measures as soon as possible and in any event before such accounts or passbooks are used in any way. 2. Member States shall take measures to prevent misuse of bearer shares and bearer share warrants.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 10 ):
1. Member States shall prohibit their credit institutions and financial institutions from keeping anonymous accounts, anonymous passbooks or anonymous safe-deposit boxes. Member States shall, in any event, require that the owners and beneficiaries of existing anonymous accounts, anonymous passbooks or anonymous safe-deposit boxes be subject to customer due diligence measures no later than 10 January 2019 and in any event before such accounts, passbooks or deposit boxes are used in any way. 2. Member States shall take measures to prevent misuse of bearer shares and bearer share warrants.
Article 11 
Member States shall ensure that obliged entities apply customer due diligence measures in the following circumstances: (a) when establishing a business relationship; (b) when carrying out an occasional transaction that: (i) amounts to EUR 15 000 or more, whether that transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked; or (ii) constitutes a transfer of funds, as defined in point (9) of Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 30 ) , exceeding EUR 1 000; (c) in the case of persons trading in goods, when carrying out occasional transactions in cash amounting to EUR 10 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked; (d) for providers of gambling services, upon the collection of winnings, the wagering of a stake, or both, when carrying out transactions amounting to EUR 2 000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations which appear to be linked; (e) when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, regardless of any derogation, exemption or threshold; (f) when there are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.
Article 12 
1. By way of derogation from points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) and Article 14, and based on an appropriate risk assessment which demonstrates a low risk, a Member State may allow obliged entities not to apply certain customer due diligence measures with respect to electronic money, where all of the following risk-mitigating conditions are met: (a) the payment instrument is not reloadable, or has a maximum monthly payment transactions limit of EUR 250 which can be used only in that Member State; (b) the maximum amount stored electronically does not exceed EUR 250; (c) the payment instrument is used exclusively to purchase goods or services; (d) the payment instrument cannot be funded with anonymous electronic money; (e) the issuer carries out sufficient monitoring of the transactions or business relationship to enable the detection of unusual or suspicious transactions. For the purposes of point (b) of the first subparagraph, a Member State may increase the maximum amount to EUR 500 for payment instruments that can be used only in that Member State. 2. Member States shall ensure that the derogation provided for in paragraph 1 is not applicable in the case of redemption in cash or cash withdrawal of the monetary value of the electronic money where the amount redeemed exceeds EUR 100.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 12 ):
1. By way of derogation from points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) and Article 14, and based on an appropriate risk assessment which demonstrates a low risk, a Member State may allow obliged entities not to apply certain customer due diligence measures with respect to electronic money, where all of the following risk-mitigating conditions are met: (a) the payment instrument is not reloadable, or has a maximum monthly payment transactions limit of EUR 150 which can be used only in that Member State; (b) the maximum amount stored electronically does not exceed EUR 150; (c) the payment instrument is used exclusively to purchase goods or services; (d) the payment instrument cannot be funded with anonymous electronic money; (e) the issuer carries out sufficient monitoring of the transactions or business relationship to enable the detection of unusual or suspicious transactions. 2. Member States shall ensure that the derogation provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article is not applicable in the case of redemption in cash or cash withdrawal of the monetary value of the electronic money where the amount redeemed exceeds EUR 50, or in the case of remote payment transactions as defined in point (6) of Article 4 of the Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 13 ) where the amount paid exceeds EUR 50 per transaction. 3. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions and financial institutions acting as acquirers only accept payments carried out with anonymous prepaid cards issued in third countries where such cards meet requirements equivalent to those set out in paragraphs 1 and 2. Member States may decide not to accept on their territory payments carried out by using anonymous prepaid cards.
Article 13 
1. Customer due diligence measures shall comprise: (a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer's identity on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source; (b) identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable measures to verify that person's identity so that the obliged entity is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, including, as regards legal persons, trusts, companies, foundations and similar legal arrangements, taking reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer; (c) assessing and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; (d) conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship including scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the obliged entity's knowledge of the customer, the business and risk profile, including where necessary the source of funds and ensuring that the documents, data or information held are kept up-to-date. When performing the measures referred to in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph, obliged entities shall also verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised and identify and verify the identity of that person. 2. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities apply each of the customer due diligence requirements laid down in paragraph 1. However, obliged entities may determine the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis. 3. Member States shall require that obliged entities take into account at least the variables set out in Annex I when assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. 4. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities are able to demonstrate to competent authorities or self-regulatory bodies that the measures are appropriate in view of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that have been identified. 5. For life or other investment-related insurance business, Member States shall ensure that, in addition to the customer due diligence measures required for the customer and the beneficial owner, credit institutions and financial institutions conduct the following customer due diligence measures on the beneficiaries of life insurance and other investment-related insurance policies, as soon as the beneficiaries are identified or designated: (a) in the case of beneficiaries that are identified as specifically named persons or legal arrangements, taking the name of the person; (b) in the case of beneficiaries that are designated by characteristics or by class or by other means, obtaining sufficient information concerning those beneficiaries to satisfy the credit institutions or financial institution that it will be able to establish the identity of the beneficiary at the time of the payout. With regard to points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph, the verification of the identity of the beneficiaries shall take place at the time of the payout. In the case of assignment, in whole or in part, of the life or other investment-related insurance to a third party, credit institutions and financial institutions aware of the assignment shall identify the beneficial owner at the time of the assignment to the natural or legal person or legal arrangement receiving for its own benefit the value of the policy assigned. 6. In the case of beneficiaries of trusts or of similar legal arrangements that are designated by particular characteristics or class, an obliged entity shall obtain sufficient information concerning the beneficiary to satisfy the obliged entity that it will be able to establish the identity of the beneficiary at the time of the payout or at the time of the exercise by the beneficiary of its vested rights.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 13 ):
1. Customer due diligence measures shall comprise: (a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity on the basis of documents, data or information obtained from a reliable and independent source, including, where available, electronic identification means, relevant trust services as set out in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 14 ) or any other secure, remote or electronic identification process regulated, recognised, approved or accepted by the relevant national authorities; (b) identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable measures to verify that person's identity so that the obliged entity is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is, including, as regards legal persons, trusts, companies, foundations and similar legal arrangements, taking reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer. Where the beneficial owner identified is the senior managing official as referred to in Article 3(6)(a) (ii), obliged entities shall take the necessary reasonable measures to verify the identity of the natural person who holds the position of senior managing official and shall keep records of the actions taken as well as any difficulties encountered during the verification process; (c) assessing and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; (d) conducting ongoing monitoring of the business relationship including scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the obliged entity's knowledge of the customer, the business and risk profile, including where necessary the source of funds and ensuring that the documents, data or information held are kept up-to-date. When performing the measures referred to in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph, obliged entities shall also verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised and identify and verify the identity of that person. 2. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities apply each of the customer due diligence requirements laid down in paragraph 1. However, obliged entities may determine the extent of such measures on a risk-sensitive basis. 3. Member States shall require that obliged entities take into account at least the variables set out in Annex I when assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. 4. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities are able to demonstrate to competent authorities or self-regulatory bodies that the measures are appropriate in view of the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that have been identified. 5. For life or other investment-related insurance business, Member States shall ensure that, in addition to the customer due diligence measures required for the customer and the beneficial owner, credit institutions and financial institutions conduct the following customer due diligence measures on the beneficiaries of life insurance and other investment-related insurance policies, as soon as the beneficiaries are identified or designated: (a) in the case of beneficiaries that are identified as specifically named persons or legal arrangements, taking the name of the person; (b) in the case of beneficiaries that are designated by characteristics or by class or by other means, obtaining sufficient information concerning those beneficiaries to satisfy the credit institutions or financial institution that it will be able to establish the identity of the beneficiary at the time of the payout. With regard to points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph, the verification of the identity of the beneficiaries shall take place at the time of the payout. In the case of assignment, in whole or in part, of the life or other investment-related insurance to a third party, credit institutions and financial institutions aware of the assignment shall identify the beneficial owner at the time of the assignment to the natural or legal person or legal arrangement receiving for its own benefit the value of the policy assigned. 6. In the case of beneficiaries of trusts or of similar legal arrangements that are designated by particular characteristics or class, an obliged entity shall obtain sufficient information concerning the beneficiary to satisfy the obliged entity that it will be able to establish the identity of the beneficiary at the time of the payout or at the time of the exercise by the beneficiary of its vested rights.
Article 14 
1. Member States shall require that verification of the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner take place before the establishment of a business relationship or the carrying out of the transaction. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States may allow verification of the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner to be completed during the establishment of a business relationship if necessary so as not to interrupt the normal conduct of business and where there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. In such situations, those procedures shall be completed as soon as practicable after initial contact. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States may allow the opening of an account with a credit institution or financial institution, including accounts that permit transactions in transferable securities, provided that there are adequate safeguards in place to ensure that transactions are not carried out by the customer or on its behalf until full compliance with the customer due diligence requirements laid down in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) is obtained. 4. Member States shall require that, where an obliged entity is unable to comply with the customer due diligence requirements laid down in point (a), (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1), it shall not carry out a transaction through a bank account, establish a business relationship or carry out the transaction, and shall terminate the business relationship and consider making a suspicious transaction report to the FIU in relation to the customer in accordance with Article 33. Member States shall not apply the first subparagraph to notaries, other independent legal professionals, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors only to the strict extent that those persons ascertain the legal position of their client, or perform the task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, judicial proceedings, including providing advice on instituting or avoiding such proceedings. 5. Member States shall require that obliged entities apply the customer due diligence measures not only to all new customers but also at appropriate times to existing customers on a risk-sensitive basis, including at times when the relevant circumstances of a customer change.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 14 ):
1. Member States shall require that verification of the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner take place before the establishment of a business relationship or the carrying out of the transaction. Whenever entering into a new business relationship with a corporate or other legal entity, or a trust or a legal arrangement having a structure or functions similar to trusts (‘similar legal arrangement’) which are subject to the registration of beneficial ownership information pursuant to Article 30 or 31, the obliged entities shall collect proof of registration or an excerpt of the register. 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States may allow verification of the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner to be completed during the establishment of a business relationship if necessary so as not to interrupt the normal conduct of business and where there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. In such situations, those procedures shall be completed as soon as practicable after initial contact. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States may allow the opening of an account with a credit institution or financial institution, including accounts that permit transactions in transferable securities, provided that there are adequate safeguards in place to ensure that transactions are not carried out by the customer or on its behalf until full compliance with the customer due diligence requirements laid down in points (a) and (b) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) is obtained. 4. Member States shall require that, where an obliged entity is unable to comply with the customer due diligence requirements laid down in point (a), (b) or (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1), it shall not carry out a transaction through a bank account, establish a business relationship or carry out the transaction, and shall terminate the business relationship and consider making a suspicious transaction report to the FIU in relation to the customer in accordance with Article 33. Member States shall not apply the first subparagraph to notaries, other independent legal professionals, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors only to the strict extent that those persons ascertain the legal position of their client, or perform the task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning, judicial proceedings, including providing advice on instituting or avoiding such proceedings. 5. Member States shall require that obliged entities apply the customer due diligence measures not only to all new customers but also at appropriate times to existing customers on a risk-sensitive basis, or when the relevant circumstances of a customer change, or when the obliged entity has any legal duty in the course of the relevant calendar year to contact the customer for the purpose of reviewing any relevant information relating to the beneficial owner(s), or if the obliged entity has had this duty under Council Directive 2011/16/EU ( 15 ).
Article 15 
1. Where a Member State or an obliged entity identifies areas of lower risk, that Member State may allow obliged entities to apply simplified customer due diligence measures. 2. Before applying simplified customer due diligence measures, obliged entities shall ascertain that the business relationship or the transaction presents a lower degree of risk. 3. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities carry out sufficient monitoring of the transactions and business relationships to enable the detection of unusual or suspicious transactions.
Article 16 
When assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing relating to types of customers, geographic areas, and particular products, services, transactions or delivery channels, Member States and obliged entities shall take into account at least the factors of potentially lower risk situations set out in Annex II.
Article 17 
By 26 June 2017, the ESAs shall issue guidelines addressed to competent authorities and the credit institutions and financial institutions in accordance with Article 16 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010 on the risk factors to be taken into consideration and the measures to be taken in situations where simplified customer due diligence measures are appropriate. Specific account shall be taken of the nature and size of the business, and, where appropriate and proportionate, specific measures shall be laid down.
Article 18 
1. In the cases referred to in Articles 19 to 24, and when dealing with natural persons or legal entities established in the third countries identified by the Commission as high-risk third countries, as well as in other cases of higher risk that are identified by Member States or obliged entities, Member States shall require obliged entities to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures to manage and mitigate those risks appropriately. Enhanced customer due diligence measures need not be invoked automatically with respect to branches or majority-owned subsidiaries of obliged entities established in the Union which are located in high-risk third countries, where those branches or majority-owned subsidiaries fully comply with the group-wide policies and procedures in accordance with Article 45. Member States shall ensure that those cases are handled by obliged entities by using a risk-based approach. 2. Member States shall require obliged entities to examine, as far as reasonably possible, the background and purpose of all complex and unusually large transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose. In particular, obliged entities shall increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear suspicious. 3. When assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, Member States and obliged entities shall take into account at least the factors of potentially higher-risk situations set out in Annex III. 4. By 26 June 2017, the ESAs shall issue guidelines addressed to competent authorities and the credit institutions and financial institutions, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010 on the risk factors to be taken into consideration and the measures to be taken in situations where enhanced customer due diligence measures are appropriate. Specific account shall be taken of the nature and size of the business, and, where appropriate and proportionate, specific measures shall be laid down.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 18 ):
1. In the cases referred to in Articles 18a to 24, as well as in other cases of higher risk that are identified by Member States or obliged entities, Member States shall require obliged entities to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures to manage and mitigate those risks appropriately. Enhanced customer due diligence measures need not be invoked automatically with respect to branches or majority-owned subsidiaries of obliged entities established in the Union which are located in high-risk third countries, where those branches or majority-owned subsidiaries fully comply with the group-wide policies and procedures in accordance with Article 45. Member States shall ensure that those cases are handled by obliged entities by using a risk-based approach. 2. Member States shall require obliged entities to examine, as far as reasonably possible, the background and purpose of all transactions that fulfil at least one of the following conditions: (i) they are complex transactions; (ii) they are unusually large transactions; (iii) they are conducted in an unusual pattern; (iv) they do not have an apparent economic or lawful purpose. In particular, obliged entities shall increase the degree and nature of monitoring of the business relationship, in order to determine whether those transactions or activities appear suspicious. 3. When assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, Member States and obliged entities shall take into account at least the factors of potentially higher-risk situations set out in Annex III. 4. By 26 June 2017, the ESAs shall issue guidelines addressed to competent authorities and the credit institutions and financial institutions, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010, and (EU) No 1095/2010 on the risk factors to be taken into consideration and the measures to be taken in situations where enhanced customer due diligence measures are appropriate. Specific account shall be taken of the nature and size of the business, and, where appropriate and proportionate, specific measures shall be laid down.
Article 19 
With respect to cross-border correspondent relationships with a third-country respondent institution, Member States shall, in addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 13, require their credit institutions and financial institutions to: (a) gather sufficient information about the respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the respondent's business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision; (b) assess the respondent institution's AML/CFT controls; (c) obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent relationships; (d) document the respective responsibilities of each institution; (e) with respect to payable-through accounts, be satisfied that the respondent institution has verified the identity of, and performed ongoing due diligence on, the customers having direct access to accounts of the correspondent institution, and that it is able to provide relevant customer due diligence data to the correspondent institution, upon request.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 19 ):
With respect to cross-border correspondent relationships involving the execution of payments with a third-country respondent institution, Member States shall, in addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 13, require their credit institutions and financial institutions when entering into a business relationship to: (a) gather sufficient information about the respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the respondent's business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision; (b) assess the respondent institution's AML/CFT controls; (c) obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent relationships; (d) document the respective responsibilities of each institution; (e) with respect to payable-through accounts, be satisfied that the respondent institution has verified the identity of, and performed ongoing due diligence on, the customers having direct access to accounts of the correspondent institution, and that it is able to provide relevant customer due diligence data to the correspondent institution, upon request.
Article 20 
With respect to transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons, Member States shall, in addition to the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 13, require obliged entities to: (a) have in place appropriate risk management systems, including risk-based procedures, to determine whether the customer or the beneficial owner of the customer is a politically exposed person; (b) apply the following measures in cases of business relationships with politically exposed persons: (i) obtain senior management approval for establishing or continuing business relationships with such persons; (ii) take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds that are involved in business relationships or transactions with such persons; (iii) conduct enhanced, ongoing monitoring of those business relationships.
Article 21 
Member States shall require obliged entities to take reasonable measures to determine whether the beneficiaries of a life or other investment-related insurance policy and/or, where required, the beneficial owner of the beneficiary are politically exposed persons. Those measures shall be taken no later than at the time of the payout or at the time of the assignment, in whole or in part, of the policy. Where there are higher risks identified, in addition to applying the customer due diligence measures laid down in Article 13, Member States shall require obliged entities to: (a) inform senior management before payout of policy proceeds; (b) conduct enhanced scrutiny of the entire business relationship with the policyholder.
Article 22 
Where a politically exposed person is no longer entrusted with a prominent public function by a Member State or a third country, or with a prominent public function by an international organisation, obliged entities shall, for at least 12 months, be required to take into account the continuing risk posed by that person and to apply appropriate and risk-sensitive measures until such time as that person is deemed to pose no further risk specific to politically exposed persons.
Article 23 
The measures referred to in Articles 20 and 21 shall also apply to family members or persons known to be close associates of politically exposed persons.
Article 24 
Member States shall prohibit credit institutions and financial institutions from entering into, or continuing, a correspondent relationship with a shell bank. They shall require that those institutions take appropriate measures to ensure that they do not engage in or continue correspondent relationships with a credit institution or financial institution that is known to allow its accounts to be used by a shell bank.
Article 25 
Member States may permit obliged entities to rely on third parties to meet the customer due diligence requirements laid down in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1). However, the ultimate responsibility for meeting those requirements shall remain with the obliged entity which relies on the third party.
Article 26 
1. For the purposes of this Section, ‘third parties’ means obliged entities listed in Article 2, the member organisations or federations of those obliged entities, or other institutions or persons situated in a Member State or third country that: (a) apply customer due diligence requirements and record-keeping requirements that are consistent with those laid down in this Directive; and (b) have their compliance with the requirements of this Directive supervised in a manner consistent with Section 2 of Chapter VI. 2. Member States shall prohibit obliged entities from relying on third parties established in high-risk third countries. Member States may exempt branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of obliged entities established in the Union from that prohibition where those branches and majority-owned subsidiaries fully comply with the group-wide policies and procedures in accordance with Article 45.
Article 27 
1. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities obtain from the third party relied upon the necessary information concerning the customer due diligence requirements laid down in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1). 2. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities to which the customer is referred take adequate steps to ensure that the third party provides, immediately, upon request, relevant copies of identification and verification data and other relevant documentation on the identity of the customer or the beneficial owner.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 27 ):
1. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities obtain from the third party relied upon the necessary information concerning the customer due diligence requirements laid down in points (a), (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1). 2. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities to which the customer is referred take adequate steps to ensure that the third party provides immediately, upon request, relevant copies of identification and verification data, including, where available, data obtained through electronic identification means, relevant trust services as set out in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, or any other secure, remote or electronic, identification process regulated, recognised, approved or accepted by the relevant national authorities.
Article 28 
Member States shall ensure that the competent authority of the home Member State (for group-wide policies and procedures) and the competent authority of the host Member State (for branches and subsidiaries) may consider an obliged entity to comply with the provisions adopted pursuant to Articles 26 and 27 through its group programme, where all of the following conditions are met: (a) the obliged entity relies on information provided by a third party that is part of the same group; (b) that group applies customer due diligence measures, rules on record-keeping and programmes against money laundering and terrorist financing in accordance with this Directive or equivalent rules; (c) the effective implementation of the requirements referred to in point (b) is supervised at group level by a competent authority of the home Member State or of the third country.
Article 29 
This Section shall not apply to outsourcing or agency relationships where, on the basis of a contractual arrangement, the outsourcing service provider or agent is to be regarded as part of the obliged entity.
Article 30 
1. Member States shall ensure that corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory are required to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership, including the details of the beneficial interests held. Member States shall ensure that those entities are required to provide, in addition to information about their legal owner, information on the beneficial owner to obliged entities when the obliged entities are taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with Chapter II. 2. Member States shall require that the information referred to in paragraph 1 can be accessed in a timely manner by competent authorities and FIUs. 3. Member States shall ensure that the information referred to in paragraph 1 is held in a central register in each Member State, for example a commercial register, companies register as referred to in Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 31 ) , or a public register. Member States shall notify to the Commission the characteristics of those national mechanisms. The information on beneficial ownership contained in that database may be collected in accordance with national systems. 4. Member States shall require that the information held in the central register referred to in paragraph 3 is adequate, accurate and current. 5. Member States shall ensure that the information on the beneficial ownership is accessible in all cases to: (a) competent authorities and FIUs, without any restriction; (b) obliged entities, within the framework of customer due diligence in accordance with Chapter II; (c) any person or organisation that can demonstrate a legitimate interest. The persons or organisations referred to in point (c) shall access at least the name, the month and year of birth, the nationality and the country of residence of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held. For the purposes of this paragraph, access to the information on beneficial ownership shall be in accordance with data protection rules and may be subject to online registration and to the payment of a fee. The fees charged for obtaining the information shall not exceed the administrative costs thereof. 6. The central register referred to in paragraph 3 shall ensure timely and unrestricted access by competent authorities and FIUs, without alerting the entity concerned. It shall also allow timely access by obliged entities when taking customer due diligence measures. 7. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities and FIUs are able to provide the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 to the competent authorities and to the FIUs of other Member States in a timely manner. 8. Member States shall require that obliged entities do not rely exclusively on the central register referred to in paragraph 3 to fulfil their customer due diligence requirements in accordance with Chapter II. Those requirements shall be fulfilled by using a risk-based approach. 9. Member States may provide for an exemption to the access referred to in points (b) and (c) of paragraph 5 to all or part of the information on the beneficial ownership on a case-by-case basis in exceptional circumstances, where such access would expose the beneficial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, violence or intimidation, or where the beneficial owner is a minor or otherwise incapable. Exemptions granted pursuant to this paragraph shall not apply to the credit institutions and financial institutions, and to obliged entities referred to in point (3)(b) of Article 2(1) that are public officials. 10. By 26 June 2019, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council assessing the conditions and the technical specifications and procedures for ensuring the safe and efficient interconnection of the central registers referred to in paragraph 3 via the European central platform established by Article 4a(1) of Directive 2009/101/EC. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 30 ):
1. Member States shall ensure that corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory are required to obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership, including the details of the beneficial interests held. Member States shall ensure that breaches of this Article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures or sanctions. Member States shall ensure that those entities are required to provide, in addition to information about their legal owner, information on the beneficial owner to obliged entities when the obliged entities are taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with Chapter II. Member States shall require that the beneficial owners of corporate or other legal entities, including through shares, voting rights, ownership interest, bearer shareholdings or control via other means, provide those entities with all the information necessary for the corporate or other legal entity to comply with the requirements in the first subparagraph. 2. Member States shall require that the information referred to in paragraph 1 can be accessed in a timely manner by competent authorities and FIUs. 3. Member States shall ensure that the information referred to in paragraph 1 is held in a central register in each Member State, for example a commercial register, companies register as referred to in Article 3 of Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 16 ), or a public register. Member States shall notify to the Commission the characteristics of those national mechanisms. The information on beneficial ownership contained in that database may be collected in accordance with national systems. 4. Member States shall require that the information held in the central register referred to in paragraph 3 is adequate, accurate and current, and shall put in place mechanisms to this effect. Such mechanisms shall include requiring obliged entities and, if appropriate and to the extent that this requirement does not interfere unnecessarily with their functions, competent authorities to report any discrepancies they find between the beneficial ownership information available in the central registers and the beneficial ownership information available to them. In the case of reported discrepancies, Member States shall ensure that appropriate actions be taken to resolve the discrepancies in a timely manner and, if appropriate, a specific mention be included in the central register in the meantime. 5. Member States shall ensure that the information on the beneficial ownership is accessible in all cases to: (a) competent authorities and FIUs, without any restriction; (b) obliged entities, within the framework of customer due diligence in accordance with Chapter II; (c) any member of the general public. The persons referred to in point (c) shall be permitted to access at least the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held. Member States may, under conditions to be determined in national law, provide for access to additional information enabling the identification of the beneficial owner. That additional information shall include at least the date of birth or contact details in accordance with data protection rules. 5a. Member States may choose to make the information held in their national registers referred to in paragraph 3 available on the condition of online registration and the payment of a fee, which shall not exceed the administrative costs of making the information available, including costs of maintenance and developments of the register. 6. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities and FIUs have timely and unrestricted access to all information held in the central register referred to in paragraph 3 without alerting the entity concerned. Member States shall also allow timely access by obliged entities when taking customer due diligence measures in accordance with Chapter II. Competent authorities granted access to the central register referred to in paragraph 3 shall be those public authorities with designated responsibilities for combating money laundering or terrorist financing, as well as tax authorities, supervisors of obliged entities and authorities that have the function of investigating or prosecuting money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, tracing and seizing or freezing and confiscating criminal assets. 7. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities and FIUs are able to provide the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 to the competent authorities and to the FIUs of other Member States in a timely manner and free of charge. 8. Member States shall require that obliged entities do not rely exclusively on the central register referred to in paragraph 3 to fulfil their customer due diligence requirements in accordance with Chapter II. Those requirements shall be fulfilled by using a risk-based approach. 9. In exceptional circumstances to be laid down in national law, where the access referred to in points (b) and (c) of the first subparagraph of paragraph 5 would expose the beneficial owner to disproportionate risk, risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, extortion, harassment, violence or intimidation, or where the beneficial owner is a minor or otherwise legally incapable, Member States may provide for an exemption from such access to all or part of the information on the beneficial ownership on a case-by-case basis. Member States shall ensure that these exemptions are granted upon a detailed evaluation of the exceptional nature of the circumstances. Rights to an administrative review of the exemption decision and to an effective judicial remedy shall be guaranteed. A Member State that has granted exemptions shall publish annual statistical data on the number of exemptions granted and reasons stated and report the data to the Commission. Exemptions granted pursuant to the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall not apply to credit institutions and financial institutions, or to the obliged entities referred to in point (3)(b) of Article 2(1) that are public officials. 10. Member States shall ensure that the central registers referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article are interconnected via the European Central Platform established by Article 22(1) of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 17 ). The connection of the Member States’ central registers to the platform shall be set up in accordance with the technical specifications and procedures established by implementing acts adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 24 of Directive (EU) 2017/1132 and with Article 31a of this Directive. Member States shall ensure that the information referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is available through the system of interconnection of registers established by Article 22(1) of Directive (EU) 2017/1132, in accordance with Member States’ national laws implementing paragraphs 5, 5a and 6 of this Article. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of registers for at least five years and no more than 10 years after the corporate or other legal entity has been struck off from the register. Member States shall cooperate among themselves and with the Commission in order to implement the different types of access in accordance with this Article.
Article 31 
1. Member States shall require that trustees of any express trust governed under their law obtain and hold adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on beneficial ownership regarding the trust. That information shall include the identity of: (a) the settlor; (b) the trustee(s); (c) the protector (if any); (d) the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries; and (e) any other natural person exercising effective control over the trust. 2. Member States shall ensure that trustees disclose their status and provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 to obliged entities in a timely manner where, as a trustee, the trustee forms a business relationship or carries out an occasional transaction above the thresholds set out in points (b), (c) and (d) of Article 11. 3. Member States shall require that the information referred to in paragraph 1 can be accessed in a timely manner by competent authorities and FIUs. 4. Member States shall require that the information referred to in paragraph 1 is held in a central register when the trust generates tax consequences. The central register shall ensure timely and unrestricted access by competent authorities and FIUs, without alerting the parties to the trust concerned. It may also allow timely access by obliged entities, within the framework of customer due diligence in accordance with Chapter II. Member States shall notify to the Commission the characteristics of those national mechanisms. 5. Member States shall require that the information held in the central register referred to in paragraph 4 is adequate, accurate and up-to-date. 6. Member States shall ensure that obliged entities do not rely exclusively on the central register referred to in paragraph 4 to fulfil their customer due diligence requirements as laid down in Chapter II. Those requirements shall be fulfilled by using a risk-based approach. 7. Member States shall ensure that competent authorities and FIUs are able to provide the information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 to the competent authorities and to the FIUs of other Member States in a timely manner. 8. Member States shall ensure that the measures provided for in this Article apply to other types of legal arrangements having a structure or functions similar to trusts. 9. By 26 June 2019, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council assessing the conditions and the technical specifications and procedures for ensuring safe and efficient interconnection of the central registers. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice.
Article 32 
1. Each Member State shall establish an FIU in order to prevent, detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 2. Member States shall notify the Commission in writing of the name and address of their respective FIUs. 3. Each FIU shall be operationally independent and autonomous, which means that the FIU shall have the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the ability to take autonomous decisions to analyse, request and disseminate specific information. The FIU as the central national unit shall be responsible for receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. The FIU shall be responsible for disseminating the results of its analyses and any additional relevant information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. It shall be able to obtain additional information from obliged entities. Member States shall provide their FIUs with adequate financial, human and technical resources in order to fulfil their tasks. 4. Member States shall ensure that their FIUs have access, directly or indirectly, in a timely manner, to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that they require to fulfil their tasks properly. FIUs shall be able to respond to requests for information by competent authorities in their respective Member States when such requests for information are motivated by concerns relating to money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. The decision on conducting the analysis or dissemination of information shall remain with the FIU. 5. Where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative impact on ongoing investigations or analyses, or, in exceptional circumstances, where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested, the FIU shall be under no obligation to comply with the request for information. 6. Member States shall require competent authorities to provide feedback to the FIU about the use made of the information provided in accordance with this Article and about the outcome of the investigations or inspections performed on the basis of that information. 7. Member States shall ensure that the FIU is empowered to take urgent action, directly or indirectly, where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction that is proceeding, in order to analyse the transaction, confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. The FIU shall be empowered to take such action, directly or indirectly, at the request of an FIU from another Member State for the periods and under the conditions specified in the national law of the FIU receiving the request. 8. The FIU's analysis function shall consist of the following: (a) an operational analysis which focuses on individual cases and specific targets or on appropriate selected information, depending on the type and volume of the disclosures received and the expected use of the information after dissemination; and (b) a strategic analysis addressing money laundering and terrorist financing trends and patterns.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 32 ):
1. Each Member State shall establish an FIU in order to prevent, detect and effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 2. Member States shall notify the Commission in writing of the name and address of their respective FIUs. 3. Each FIU shall be operationally independent and autonomous, which means that the FIU shall have the authority and capacity to carry out its functions freely, including the ability to take autonomous decisions to analyse, request and disseminate specific information. The FIU as the central national unit shall be responsible for receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant to money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. The FIU shall be responsible for disseminating the results of its analyses and any additional relevant information to the competent authorities where there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. It shall be able to obtain additional information from obliged entities. Member States shall provide their FIUs with adequate financial, human and technical resources in order to fulfil their tasks. 4. Member States shall ensure that their FIUs have access, directly or indirectly, in a timely manner, to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that they require to fulfil their tasks properly. FIUs shall be able to respond to requests for information by competent authorities in their respective Member States when such requests for information are motivated by concerns relating to money laundering, associated predicate offences or terrorist financing. The decision on conducting the analysis or dissemination of information shall remain with the FIU. 5. Where there are objective grounds for assuming that the provision of such information would have a negative impact on ongoing investigations or analyses, or, in exceptional circumstances, where disclosure of the information would be clearly disproportionate to the legitimate interests of a natural or legal person or irrelevant with regard to the purposes for which it has been requested, the FIU shall be under no obligation to comply with the request for information. 6. Member States shall require competent authorities to provide feedback to the FIU about the use made of the information provided in accordance with this Article and about the outcome of the investigations or inspections performed on the basis of that information. 7. Member States shall ensure that the FIU is empowered to take urgent action, directly or indirectly, where there is a suspicion that a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing, to suspend or withhold consent to a transaction that is proceeding, in order to analyse the transaction, confirm the suspicion and disseminate the results of the analysis to the competent authorities. The FIU shall be empowered to take such action, directly or indirectly, at the request of an FIU from another Member State for the periods and under the conditions specified in the national law of the FIU receiving the request. 8. The FIU's analysis function shall consist of the following: (a) an operational analysis which focuses on individual cases and specific targets or on appropriate selected information, depending on the type and volume of the disclosures received and the expected use of the information after dissemination; and (b) a strategic analysis addressing money laundering and terrorist financing trends and patterns. 9. Without prejudice to Article 34(2), in the context of its functions, each FIU shall be able to request, obtain and use information from any obliged entity for the purpose set in paragraph 1 of this Article, even if no prior report is filed pursuant to Article 33(1)(a) or 34(1).