Article 76 Treatment of risks
1. Member States shall ensure that the management body approves and periodically reviews the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the institution is or might be exposed to, including those posed by the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the status of the business cycle. 2. Member States shall ensure that the management body devotes sufficient time to consideration of risk issues. The management body shall be actively involved in and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the management of all material risks addressed in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as in the valuation of assets, the use of external credit ratings and internal models relating to those risks. The institution shall establish reporting lines to the management body that cover all material risks and risk management policies and changes thereof. 3. Member States shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. Members of the risk committee shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the institution. The risk committee shall advise the management body on the institution's overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assist the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for risks. The risk committee shall review whether prices of liabilities and assets offered to clients take fully into account the institution's business model and risk strategy. Where prices do not properly reflect risks in accordance with the business model and risk strategy, the risk committee shall present a remedy plan to the management body. Competent authorities may allow an institution which is not considered significant as referred to in the first subparagraph to combine the risk committee with the audit committee as referred to in Article 41 of Directive 2006/43/EC. Members of the combined committee shall have the knowledge, skills and expertise required for the risk committee and for the audit committee. 4. Member States shall ensure that the management body in its supervisory function and, where a risk committee has been established, the risk committee have adequate access to information on the risk situation of the institution and, if necessary and appropriate, to the risk management function and to external expert advice. The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee shall determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the frequency of the information on risk which it is to receive. In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee shall, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings. 5. Member States shall, in accordance with the proportionality requirement laid down in Article 7(2) of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC ( 11 ), ensure that institutions have a risk management function independent from the operational functions and which shall have sufficient authority, stature, resources and access to the management body. Member States shall ensure that the risk management function ensures that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. They shall ensure that the risk management function is actively involved in elaborating the institution's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and that it can deliver a complete view of the whole range of risks of the institution. Where necessary, Member States shall ensure that the risk management function can report directly to the management body in its supervisory function, independent from senior management, and can raise concerns and warn that body, where appropriate, where specific risk developments affect or may affect the institution, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and/or managerial functions pursuant to this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. The head of the risk management function shall be an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. Where the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution do not justify a specially appointed person, another senior person within the institution may fulfil that function, provided there is no conflict of interest. The head of the risk management function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body in its supervisory function and shall be able to have direct access to the management body in its supervisory function where necessary. The application of this Directive shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2006/73/EC to investment firms.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal EU Member States have been severely affected by the economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. This calls for a quick reaction to support capital markets participants. In the Communication of the Commission of 13 March 2020, entitled ‘Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak’, the Commission highlighted the importance of ensuring the liquidity of the EU financial sector and countering a threatening recession through actions at all levels. Furthermore, on 27 May 2020, in its Communication entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ , the Commission presented key instruments supporting the recovery plan for Europe, including measures that aim at kick-starting the economy and helping private investment. This Communication also stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge for companies. The objective of this targeted amendment is to provide for the best possible conditions for European economies to emerge from the current COVID-19 pandemic. The rules on investments services can play a key role in promoting the recapitalisation of European companies as they emerge from the crisis. The modified commodities regime will allow companies in the real economy to react to market volatility while also enabling nascent commodity contracts, which is also important to promote the international role of the Euro. The present review is driven by two key objectives: · Facilitating investments in the real economy and · Allowing for a rapid recapit alisation of European companies. To ensure that financial institutions and intermediaries can fulfil their essential function in financing the real economy, targeted adjustments of certain requirements of Directive 2014/65/EU (‘MiFID II’) are appropriate. Already in 2019, stakeholders had warned the Commission that several aspects of the MiFID II distribution rules were either unnecessary or perceived as overly burdensome. The current COVID-19 pandemic makes it even more important to remove formal burdens where they are not strictly necessary. A more finely calibrated view of investor requirements would also leave more resources for dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission therefore strives to recalibrate those areas to strike the right balance between a sufficient level of transparency towards the client, the highest standards of protection and acceptable compliance costs for firms. In that context, this amendment to MiFID II applying to investments in financial instrument has the aim of removing administrative burdens that result from documentation and disclosure rules that are not counterbalanced by corresponding increases in investor protection. It also recalibrates the position limit and corresponding hedging exemption regime to foster nascent euro denominated markets. 
Revised version (Article 76 Treatment of risks):
1. Member States shall ensure that the management body approves and periodically reviews the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the institution is or might be exposed to, including those posed by the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the status of the business cycle. 2. Member States shall ensure that the management body devotes sufficient time to consideration of risk issues. The management body shall be actively involved in and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the management of all material risks addressed in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as in the valuation of assets, the use of external credit ratings and internal models relating to those risks. The institution shall establish reporting lines to the management body that cover all material risks and risk management policies and changes thereof. 3. Member States shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. Members of the risk committee shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the institution. The risk committee shall advise the management body on the institution's overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assist the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for risks. The risk committee shall review whether prices of liabilities and assets offered to clients take fully into account the institution's business model and risk strategy. Where prices do not properly reflect risks in accordance with the business model and risk strategy, the risk committee shall present a remedy plan to the management body. Competent authorities may allow an institution which is not considered significant as referred to in the first subparagraph to combine the risk committee with the audit committee as referred to in Article 41 of Directive 2006/43/EC. Members of the combined committee shall have the knowledge, skills and expertise required for the risk committee and for the audit committee. 4. Member States shall ensure that the management body in its supervisory function and, where a risk committee has been established, the risk committee have adequate access to information on the risk situation of the institution and, if necessary and appropriate, to the risk management function and to external expert advice. The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee shall determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the frequency of the information on risk which it is to receive. In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee shall, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings. 5. Member States shall, in accordance with the proportionality requirement laid down in Article 7(2) of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC ( 16 ), ensure that institutions have a risk management function independent from the operational functions and which shall have sufficient authority, stature, resources and access to the management body. Member States shall ensure that the risk management function ensures that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. They shall ensure that the risk management function is actively involved in elaborating the institution's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and that it can deliver a complete view of the whole range of risks of the institution. Where necessary, Member States shall ensure that the risk management function can report directly to the management body in its supervisory function, independent from senior management, and can raise concerns and warn that body, where appropriate, where specific risk developments affect or may affect the institution, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and/or managerial functions pursuant to this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. The head of the risk management function shall be an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. Where the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution do not justify a specially appointed person, another senior person within the institution may fulfil that function, provided there is no conflict of interest. The head of the risk management function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body in its supervisory function and shall be able to have direct access to the management body in its supervisory function where necessary.
Article 77 Internal Approaches for calculating own funds requirements
1. Competent authorities shall encourage institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities to develop internal credit risk assessment capacity and to increase use of the internal ratings based approach for calculating own funds requirements for credit risk where their exposures are material in absolute terms and where they have at the same time a large number of material counterparties. This Article shall be without prejudice to the fulfilment of criteria laid down in Part Three, Title I, Chapter 3, Section 1 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 2. Competent authorities shall, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of institutions' activities, monitor that they do not solely or mechanistically rely on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or financial instrument. 3. Competent authorities shall encourage institutions, taking into account their size, internal organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, to develop internal specific risk assessment capacity and to increase use of internal models for calculating own funds requirements for specific risk of debt instruments in the trading book, together with internal models to calculate own funds requirements for default and migration risk where their exposures to specific risk are material in absolute terms and where they have a large number of material positions in debt instruments of different issuers. This Article shall be without prejudice to the fulfilment of the criteria laid down in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5, Sections 1 to 5, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further define the notion 'exposures to specific risk which are material in absolute terms' referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 and the thresholds for large numbers of material counterparties and positions in debt instruments of different issuers. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 78 Supervisory benchmarking of internal approaches for calculating own funds requirements
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions permitted to use internal approaches for the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts or own fund requirements except for operational risk report the results of the calculations of their internal approaches for their exposures or positions that are included in the benchmark portfolios. Institutions shall submit the results of their calculations, together with an explanation of the methodologies used to produce them, to the competent authorities at an appropriate frequency, and at least annually. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions submit the results of the calculations referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with the template developed by EBA in accordance with paragraph 8 to the competent authorities and to EBA. Where competent authorities choose to develop specific portfolios, they shall do so in consultation with EBA and ensure that institutions report the results of the calculations separately from the results of the calculations for EBA portfolios. 3. Competent authorities shall, on the basis of the information submitted by institutions in accordance with paragraph 1, monitor the range of risk weighted exposure amounts or own funds requirements, as applicable, except for operational risk, for the exposures or transactions in the benchmark portfolio resulting from the internal approaches of those institutions. At least annually, competent authorities shall make an assessment of the quality of those approaches paying particular attention to: (a) those approaches that exhibit significant differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure; (b) approaches where there is particularly high or low diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic under-estimation of own funds requirements. EBA shall produce a report to assist the competent authorities in the assessment of the quality of the internal approaches based on the information referred to in paragraph 2. 4. Where particular institutions diverge significantly from the majority of their peers or where there is little commonality in approach leading to a wide variance of results, competent authorities shall investigate the reasons therefor and, if it can be clearly identified that an institution's approach leads to an underestimation of own funds requirements which is not attributable to differences in the underlying risks of the exposures or positions, shall take corrective action. 5. The competent authorities shall ensure that their decisions on the appropriateness of corrective actions as referred to in paragraph 4 comply with the principle that such actions must maintain the objectives of an internal approach and therefore do not: (a) lead to standardisation or preferred methods; (b) create wrong incentives; or (c) cause herd behaviour. 6. EBA may issue guidelines and recommendations in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 where it considers them necessary on the basis of the information and assessments referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article in order to improve supervisory practices or practices of institutions with regard to internal approaches. 7. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (a) the procedures for sharing assessments made in accordance with paragraph 3 between the competent authorities and with EBA; (b) the standards for the assessment made by competent authorities referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 8. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify: (a) the template, the definitions and the IT-solutions to be applied in the Union for the reporting referred to in paragraph 2; (b) the benchmark portfolio or portfolios referred to in paragraph 1. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 9. The Commission shall, by 1 April 2015 and after consulting EBA, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the benchmarking of internal models including the scope of the model. Where appropriate, the report shall be followed by a legislative proposal.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes also amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR), to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), and to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR). Over the past years the EU implemented a substantial reform of the financial services regulatory framework to enhance the resilience of institutions (i.e. credit institutions and investment firms) operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners. In particular, the reform package included Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD), on prudential requirements for and supervision of institutions, Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), on recovery and resolution of institutions and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). These measures were taken in response to the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008 and reflect internationally agreed standards. While the reforms have rendered the financial system more stable and resilient against many types of possible future shocks and crises, they do not yet comprehensively address all identified problems. The present proposals therefore aim to complete the reform agenda by tackling remaining weaknesses and implementing some outstanding elements of the reform that are essential to ensure the institutions' resilience but have only recently been finalised by global standard setters (i.e. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)):  a binding leverage ratio which will prevent institutions from excessively increasing leverage, e.g. to compensate for low profitability;  a binding net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which will build on institutions’ improved funding profiles and establish a harmonised standard for how much stable, long-term sources of funding an institution needs to weather periods of market and funding stress;  more risk sensitive own funds (i.e. capital) requirements for institutions that trade to an important extent in securities and derivatives which will prevent too much divergence in those requirements that is not based on the institutions' risk profiles;  last but not least, new standards on the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) which will require those institutions to have more loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, tackle interconnections in the global financial markets and further strengthen the EU’s ability to resolve failing G-SIIs while minimising risks for taxpayers. The Commission recognised the need for further risk reduction in its Communication of 24 November 2015 and committed to bring forward a legislative proposal that builds on the international agreements listed above. Such risk reduction measures will not only further strengthen the resilience of the European banking system and the markets' confidence in it, but will also provide the basis for further progress in completing the Banking Union. The need for further concrete legislative steps to be taken in terms of reducing risks in the financial sector has been recognised also by the Ecofin Council Conclusions from 17 June 2016. The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union – Annual Report 2015 also indicates some areas in the current regulatory framework that could be further addressed. At the same time, the Commission needed to take account of the existing regulatory framework and the new regulatory developments at international level and respond to challenges affecting the EU economy, especially the need to promote growth and jobs at times of uncertain economic outlook. Various major policy initiatives, such as the Investment Plan for Europe (EFSI) and the Capital Markets Union have been launched in order to strengthen the economy of the Union. The ability of institutions to contribute to financing the economy needs to be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. In order to ensure that recent reforms in the financial sector interact smoothly with each other and with new policy initiatives, but also with broader recent reforms in the financial sector, the Commission carried out, on the basis of a call for evidence, a thorough holistic assessment of the existing financial services framework (including the CRR, CRD, BRRD and SRMR). The upcoming review of global standards was also assessed from a wider economic impact perspective. Amendments based on international developments represent a faithful implementation of international standards into Union law, subject to targeted adjustments in order to reflect EU specificities and broader policy considerations. For instance, the predominant reliance on bank financing by EU small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or for infrastructure projects prompts specific regulatory adjustments that ensure institutions remain capable of funding them as they constitute the backbone of the single market. A smooth interaction with existing requirements, such as for central clearing and collateralisation of derivatives exposures, or a gradual transition to some of the new requirements are necessary. Such adjustments, limited in terms of scope or time, do therefore not impinge on the overall soundness of the proposals, which are aligned with the basic level of ambition of the international standards. Moreover, based on the call for evidence, the proposals aim at improving existing rules. The analysis of the Commission showed that the present framework can be applied in a more proportionate way, taking into account in particular the situation of smaller and less complex institutions where some of the current disclosure, reporting and complex trading book-related requirements appear not to be justified by prudential considerations. Furthermore, the Commission has considered the risk attached to loans to SMEs and for funding infrastructure projects and found that for some of those loans, it would be justified to apply lower own funds requirements than are applied at present. Accordingly, the present proposals will bring corrections to these requirements and will enhance the proportionality of the prudential framework for institutions. Thereby, the ability of institutions to finance the economy will be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. Finally, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance has assessed the application of options and discretions set out in the CRD and the CRR. Based on this analysis, the present proposal is intending to eliminate some options and discretions concerning the provisions on the leverage ratio, on large exposures and on own funds. It is proposed to end to the possibility to create new State guaranteed deferred tax assets not relying on future profitability that would be exempted from deduction from regulatory capital. 
Revised version (Article 78 Supervisory benchmarking of internal approaches for calculating own funds requirements):
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions permitted to use internal approaches for the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts or own fund requirements except for operational risk report the results of the calculations of their internal approaches for their exposures or positions that are included in the benchmark portfolios. Institutions shall submit the results of their calculations, together with an explanation of the methodologies used to produce them, to the competent authorities at an appropriate frequency, and at least annually. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions submit the results of the calculations referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with the template developed by EBA in accordance with paragraph 8 to the competent authorities and to EBA. Where competent authorities choose to develop specific portfolios, they shall do so in consultation with EBA and ensure that institutions report the results of the calculations separately from the results of the calculations for EBA portfolios. 3. Competent authorities shall, on the basis of the information submitted by institutions in accordance with paragraph 1, monitor the range of risk weighted exposure amounts or own funds requirements, as applicable, except for operational risk, for the exposures or transactions in the benchmark portfolio resulting from the internal approaches of those institutions. At least annually, competent authorities shall make an assessment of the quality of those approaches paying particular attention to: (a) those approaches that exhibit significant differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure; (b) approaches where there is particularly high or low diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic under-estimation of own funds requirements. Competent authorities shall, on the basis of the information submitted by institutions in accordance with paragraph 1, monitor the range of risk weighted exposure amounts or own funds requirements, as applicable, except for operational risk, for the exposures or transactions in the benchmark portfolio resulting from the internal approaches of those institutions. At least annually, competent authorities shall make an assessment of the quality of those approaches paying particular attention to: (a) those approaches that exhibit significant differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure; (b) approaches where there is particularly high or low diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic under-estimation of own funds requirements. EBA shall produce a report to assist the competent authorities in the assessment of the quality of the internal approaches based on the information referred to in paragraph 2. 4. Where particular institutions diverge significantly from the majority of their peers or where there is little commonality in approach leading to a wide variance of results, competent authorities shall investigate the reasons therefor and, if it can be clearly identified that an institution's approach leads to an underestimation of own funds requirements which is not attributable to differences in the underlying risks of the exposures or positions, shall take corrective action. The competent authorities shall ensure that their decisions on the appropriateness of corrective actions as referred to in paragraph 4 comply with the principle that such actions must maintain the objectives of an internal approach and therefore do not: (a) lead to standardisation or preferred methods; (b) create wrong incentives; or (c) cause herd behaviour. 6. EBA may issue guidelines and recommendations in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 where it considers them necessary on the basis of the information and assessments referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article in order to improve supervisory practices or practices of institutions with regard to internal approaches. 7. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (a) the procedures for sharing assessments made in accordance with paragraph 3 between the competent authorities and with EBA; (b) the standards for the assessment made by competent authorities referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (a) the procedures for sharing assessments made in accordance with paragraph 3 between the competent authorities and with EBA; (b) the standards for the assessment made by competent authorities referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 8. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify: (a) the template, the definitions and the IT-solutions to be applied in the Union for the reporting referred to in paragraph 2; (b) the benchmark portfolio or portfolios referred to in paragraph 1. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify: (a) the template, the definitions and the IT-solutions to be applied in the Union for the reporting referred to in paragraph 2; (b) the benchmark portfolio or portfolios referred to in paragraph 1. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 9. The Commission shall, by 1 April 2015 and after consulting EBA, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the benchmarking of internal models including the scope of the model. Where appropriate, the report shall be followed by a legislative proposal.
Article 79 Credit and counterparty risk
Competent authorities shall ensure that: (a) credit-granting is based on sound and well-defined criteria and that the process for approving, amending, renewing, and re-financing credits is clearly established; (b) institutions have internal methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk of exposures to individual obligors, securities or securitisation positions and credit risk at the portfolio level. In particular, internal methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings. Where own funds requirements are based on a rating by an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) or based on the fact that an exposure is unrated, this shall not exempt institutions from additionally considering other relevant information for assessing their allocation of internal capital; (c) the ongoing administration and monitoring of the various credit risk-bearing portfolios and exposures of institutions, including for identifying and managing problem credits and for making adequate value adjustments and provisions, is operated through effective systems; (d) diversification of credit portfolios is adequate given an institution's target markets and overall credit strategy.
Article 80 Residual risk
Competent authorities shall ensure that the risk that recognised credit risk mitigation techniques used by institutions prove less effective than expected is addressed and controlled including by means of written policies and procedures.
Article 81 Concentration risk
Competent authorities shall ensure that the concentration risk arising from exposures to each counterparty, including central counterparties, groups of connected counterparties, and counterparties in the same economic sector, geographic region or from the same activity or commodity, the application of credit risk mitigation techniques, and including in particular risks associated with large indirect credit exposures such as a single collateral issuer, is addressed and controlled including by means of written policies and procedures.
Article 82 Securitisation risk
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that the risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which the credit institutions are investor, originator or sponsor, including reputational risks, such as arise in relation to complex structures or products, are evaluated and addressed through appropriate policies and procedures, to ensure that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in the risk assessment and management decisions. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that liquidity plans to address the implications of both scheduled and early amortisation exist at institutions which are originators of revolving securitisation transactions involving early amortisation provisions.
Article 83 Market risk
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that policies and processes for the identification, measurement and management of all material sources and effects of market risks are implemented. 2. Where the short position falls due before the long position, competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also take measures against the risk of a shortage of liquidity. 3. The internal capital shall be adequate for material market risks that are not subject to an own funds requirement. Institutions, which have, in calculating own funds requirements for position risk in accordance with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, netted off their positions in one or more of the equities constituting a stock-index against one or more positions in the stock-index future or other stock-index product shall have adequate internal capital to cover the basis risk of loss caused by the future's or other product's value not moving fully in line with that of its constituent equities. Institutions shall also have such adequate internal capital where they hold opposite positions in stock-index futures which are not identical in respect of either their maturity or their composition or both. Where using the treatment in Article 345 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, institutions shall ensure that they hold sufficient internal capital against the risk of loss which exists between the time of the initial commitment and the following working day.
Article 84 Interest risk arising from non-trading book activities
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement systems to identify, evaluate and manage the risk arising from potential changes in interest rates that affect an institution's non-trading activities.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal EU Member States have been severely affected by the economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. This calls for a quick reaction to support capital markets participants. In the Communication of the Commission of 13 March 2020, entitled ‘Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak’, the Commission highlighted the importance of ensuring the liquidity of the EU financial sector and countering a threatening recession through actions at all levels. Furthermore, on 27 May 2020, in its Communication entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ , the Commission presented key instruments supporting the recovery plan for Europe, including measures that aim at kick-starting the economy and helping private investment. This Communication also stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge for companies. The objective of this targeted amendment is to provide for the best possible conditions for European economies to emerge from the current COVID-19 pandemic. The rules on investments services can play a key role in promoting the recapitalisation of European companies as they emerge from the crisis. The modified commodities regime will allow companies in the real economy to react to market volatility while also enabling nascent commodity contracts, which is also important to promote the international role of the Euro. The present review is driven by two key objectives: · Facilitating investments in the real economy and · Allowing for a rapid recapit alisation of European companies. To ensure that financial institutions and intermediaries can fulfil their essential function in financing the real economy, targeted adjustments of certain requirements of Directive 2014/65/EU (‘MiFID II’) are appropriate. Already in 2019, stakeholders had warned the Commission that several aspects of the MiFID II distribution rules were either unnecessary or perceived as overly burdensome. The current COVID-19 pandemic makes it even more important to remove formal burdens where they are not strictly necessary. A more finely calibrated view of investor requirements would also leave more resources for dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission therefore strives to recalibrate those areas to strike the right balance between a sufficient level of transparency towards the client, the highest standards of protection and acceptable compliance costs for firms. In that context, this amendment to MiFID II applying to investments in financial instrument has the aim of removing administrative burdens that result from documentation and disclosure rules that are not counterbalanced by corresponding increases in investor protection. It also recalibrates the position limit and corresponding hedging exemption regime to foster nascent euro denominated markets. 
Revised version (Article 84 Interest risk arising from non-trading book activities):
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement internal systems, use the standardised methodology or the simplified standardised methodology to identify, evaluate, manage and mitigate the risks arising from potential changes in interest rates that affect both the economic value of equity and the net interest income of an institution's non-trading book activities. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement systems to assess and monitor the risks arising from potential changes in credit spreads that affect both the economic value of equity and the net interest income of an institution's non-trading book activities. 3. A competent authority may require an institution to use the standardised methodology referred to in paragraph 1 where the internal systems implemented by that institution for the purpose of evaluating the risks referred to in that paragraph are not satisfactory. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 28 June 2020. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. EBA shall issue guidelines to specify the criteria for: (a) the evaluation by an institution's internal system of the risks referred to in paragraph 1; (b) the identification, management and mitigation by institutions of the risks referred to in paragraph 1; (c) the assessment and monitoring by institutions of the risks referred to in paragraph 2; (d) determining which of the internal systems implemented by institutions for the purposes of paragraph 1 are not satisfactory as referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall issue those guidelines by 28 June 2020.
Article 85 Operational risk
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement policies and processes to evaluate and manage the exposure to operational risk, including model risk, and to cover low-frequency high-severity events. Institutions shall articulate what constitutes operational risk for the purposes of those policies and procedures. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that contingency and business continuity plans are in place to ensure an institution's ability to operate on an ongoing basis and limit losses in the event of severe business disruption.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes also amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR), to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), and to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR). Over the past years the EU implemented a substantial reform of the financial services regulatory framework to enhance the resilience of institutions (i.e. credit institutions and investment firms) operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners. In particular, the reform package included Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD), on prudential requirements for and supervision of institutions, Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), on recovery and resolution of institutions and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). These measures were taken in response to the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008 and reflect internationally agreed standards. While the reforms have rendered the financial system more stable and resilient against many types of possible future shocks and crises, they do not yet comprehensively address all identified problems. The present proposals therefore aim to complete the reform agenda by tackling remaining weaknesses and implementing some outstanding elements of the reform that are essential to ensure the institutions' resilience but have only recently been finalised by global standard setters (i.e. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)):  a binding leverage ratio which will prevent institutions from excessively increasing leverage, e.g. to compensate for low profitability;  a binding net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which will build on institutions’ improved funding profiles and establish a harmonised standard for how much stable, long-term sources of funding an institution needs to weather periods of market and funding stress;  more risk sensitive own funds (i.e. capital) requirements for institutions that trade to an important extent in securities and derivatives which will prevent too much divergence in those requirements that is not based on the institutions' risk profiles;  last but not least, new standards on the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) which will require those institutions to have more loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, tackle interconnections in the global financial markets and further strengthen the EU’s ability to resolve failing G-SIIs while minimising risks for taxpayers. The Commission recognised the need for further risk reduction in its Communication of 24 November 2015 and committed to bring forward a legislative proposal that builds on the international agreements listed above. Such risk reduction measures will not only further strengthen the resilience of the European banking system and the markets' confidence in it, but will also provide the basis for further progress in completing the Banking Union. The need for further concrete legislative steps to be taken in terms of reducing risks in the financial sector has been recognised also by the Ecofin Council Conclusions from 17 June 2016. The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union – Annual Report 2015 also indicates some areas in the current regulatory framework that could be further addressed. At the same time, the Commission needed to take account of the existing regulatory framework and the new regulatory developments at international level and respond to challenges affecting the EU economy, especially the need to promote growth and jobs at times of uncertain economic outlook. Various major policy initiatives, such as the Investment Plan for Europe (EFSI) and the Capital Markets Union have been launched in order to strengthen the economy of the Union. The ability of institutions to contribute to financing the economy needs to be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. In order to ensure that recent reforms in the financial sector interact smoothly with each other and with new policy initiatives, but also with broader recent reforms in the financial sector, the Commission carried out, on the basis of a call for evidence, a thorough holistic assessment of the existing financial services framework (including the CRR, CRD, BRRD and SRMR). The upcoming review of global standards was also assessed from a wider economic impact perspective. Amendments based on international developments represent a faithful implementation of international standards into Union law, subject to targeted adjustments in order to reflect EU specificities and broader policy considerations. For instance, the predominant reliance on bank financing by EU small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or for infrastructure projects prompts specific regulatory adjustments that ensure institutions remain capable of funding them as they constitute the backbone of the single market. A smooth interaction with existing requirements, such as for central clearing and collateralisation of derivatives exposures, or a gradual transition to some of the new requirements are necessary. Such adjustments, limited in terms of scope or time, do therefore not impinge on the overall soundness of the proposals, which are aligned with the basic level of ambition of the international standards. Moreover, based on the call for evidence, the proposals aim at improving existing rules. The analysis of the Commission showed that the present framework can be applied in a more proportionate way, taking into account in particular the situation of smaller and less complex institutions where some of the current disclosure, reporting and complex trading book-related requirements appear not to be justified by prudential considerations. Furthermore, the Commission has considered the risk attached to loans to SMEs and for funding infrastructure projects and found that for some of those loans, it would be justified to apply lower own funds requirements than are applied at present. Accordingly, the present proposals will bring corrections to these requirements and will enhance the proportionality of the prudential framework for institutions. Thereby, the ability of institutions to finance the economy will be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. Finally, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance has assessed the application of options and discretions set out in the CRD and the CRR. Based on this analysis, the present proposal is intending to eliminate some options and discretions concerning the provisions on the leverage ratio, on large exposures and on own funds. It is proposed to end to the possibility to create new State guaranteed deferred tax assets not relying on future profitability that would be exempted from deduction from regulatory capital. 
Revised version (Article 85 Operational risk):
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement policies and processes to evaluate and manage the exposures to operational risk, including model risk and risks resulting from outsourcing, and to cover low-frequency high-severity events. Institutions shall articulate what constitutes operational risk for the purposes of those policies and procedures. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that contingency and business continuity plans are in place to ensure an institution's ability to operate on an ongoing basis and limit losses in the event of severe business disruption.
Article 86 Liquidity risk
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons, including intra-day, so as to ensure that institutions maintain adequate levels of liquidity buffers. Those strategies, policies, processes and systems shall be tailored to business lines, currencies, branches and legal entities and shall include adequate allocation mechanisms of liquidity costs, benefits and risks. 2. The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate to the complexity, risk profile, scope of operation of the institutions and risk tolerance set by the management body and reflect the institution's importance in each Member State in which it carries out business. Institutions shall communicate risk tolerance to all relevant business lines. 3. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, have liquidity risk profiles that are consistent with and, not in excess of, those required for a well-functioning and robust system. Competent authorities shall monitor developments in relation to liquidity risk profiles, for example product design and volumes, risk management, funding policies and funding concentrations. Competent authorities shall take effective action where developments referred to in the second subparagraph may lead to individual institution or systemic instability. Competent authorities shall inform EBA about any actions carried out pursuant to the third subparagraph. EBA shall make recommendations where appropriate in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 4. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies shall include the current and projected material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk. 5. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions distinguish between pledged and unencumbered assets that are available at all times, in particular during emergency situations. They shall also ensure that institutions take into account the legal entity in which assets reside, the country where assets are legally recorded either in a register or in an account and their eligibility and shall monitor how assets can be mobilised in a timely manner. 6. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also have regard to existing legal, regulatory and operational limitations to potential transfers of liquidity and unencumbered assets amongst entities, both within and outside the European Economic Area. 7. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider different liquidity risk mitigation tools, including a system of limits and liquidity buffers in order to be able to withstand a range of different stress events and an adequately diversified funding structure and access to funding sources. Those arrangements shall be reviewed regularly. 8. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider alternative scenarios on liquidity positions and on risk mitigants and review the assumptions underlying decisions concerning the funding position at least annually. For those purposes, alternative scenarios shall address, in particular, off-balance sheet items and other contingent liabilities, including those of Securitisation Special Purpose Entities (SSPE) or other special purpose entities, as referred to in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in relation to which the institution acts as sponsor or provides material liquidity support. 9. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider the potential impact of institution-specific, market-wide and combined alternative scenarios. Different time periods and varying degrees of stress conditions shall be considered. 10. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions adjust their strategies, internal policies and limits on liquidity risk and develop effective contingency plans, taking into account the outcome of the alternative scenarios referred to in paragraph 8. 11. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have in place liquidity recovery plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures in order to address possible liquidity shortfalls, including in relation to branches established in another Member State. Competent authorities shall ensure that those plans are tested by the institutions at least annually, updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in paragraph 8, reported to and approved by senior management, so that internal policies and processes can be adjusted accordingly. Institutions shall take the necessary operational steps in advance to ensure that liquidity recovery plans can be implemented immediately. For credit institutions, such operational steps shall include holding collateral immediately available for central bank funding. This includes holding collateral where necessary in the currency of another Member State, or the currency of a third country to which the credit institution has exposures, and where operationally necessary within the territory of a host Member State or of a third country to whose currency it is exposed.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal EU Member States have been severely affected by the economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. This calls for a quick reaction to support capital markets participants. In the Communication of the Commission of 13 March 2020, entitled ‘Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 outbreak’, the Commission highlighted the importance of ensuring the liquidity of the EU financial sector and countering a threatening recession through actions at all levels. Furthermore, on 27 May 2020, in its Communication entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ , the Commission presented key instruments supporting the recovery plan for Europe, including measures that aim at kick-starting the economy and helping private investment. This Communication also stressed that liquidity and access to finance will be a continued challenge for companies. The objective of this targeted amendment is to provide for the best possible conditions for European economies to emerge from the current COVID-19 pandemic. The rules on investments services can play a key role in promoting the recapitalisation of European companies as they emerge from the crisis. The modified commodities regime will allow companies in the real economy to react to market volatility while also enabling nascent commodity contracts, which is also important to promote the international role of the Euro. The present review is driven by two key objectives: · Facilitating investments in the real economy and · Allowing for a rapid recapit alisation of European companies. To ensure that financial institutions and intermediaries can fulfil their essential function in financing the real economy, targeted adjustments of certain requirements of Directive 2014/65/EU (‘MiFID II’) are appropriate. Already in 2019, stakeholders had warned the Commission that several aspects of the MiFID II distribution rules were either unnecessary or perceived as overly burdensome. The current COVID-19 pandemic makes it even more important to remove formal burdens where they are not strictly necessary. A more finely calibrated view of investor requirements would also leave more resources for dealing with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission therefore strives to recalibrate those areas to strike the right balance between a sufficient level of transparency towards the client, the highest standards of protection and acceptable compliance costs for firms. In that context, this amendment to MiFID II applying to investments in financial instrument has the aim of removing administrative burdens that result from documentation and disclosure rules that are not counterbalanced by corresponding increases in investor protection. It also recalibrates the position limit and corresponding hedging exemption regime to foster nascent euro denominated markets. 
Revised version (Article 86 Liquidity risk):
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons, including intra-day, so as to ensure that institutions maintain adequate levels of liquidity buffers. Those strategies, policies, processes and systems shall be tailored to business lines, currencies, branches and legal entities and shall include adequate allocation mechanisms of liquidity costs, benefits and risks. 2. The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate to the complexity, risk profile, scope of operation of the institutions and risk tolerance set by the management body and reflect the institution's importance in each Member State in which it carries out business. Institutions shall communicate risk tolerance to all relevant business lines. 3. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, have liquidity risk profiles that are consistent with and, not in excess of, those required for a well-functioning and robust system. Competent authorities shall monitor developments in relation to liquidity risk profiles, for example product design and volumes, risk management, funding policies and funding concentrations. Competent authorities shall take effective action where developments referred to in the second subparagraph may lead to individual institution or systemic instability. Competent authorities shall inform EBA about any actions carried out pursuant to the third subparagraph. EBA shall make recommendations where appropriate in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 4. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies shall include the current and projected material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk. 5. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions distinguish between pledged and unencumbered assets that are available at all times, in particular during emergency situations. They shall also ensure that institutions take into account the legal entity in which assets reside, the country where assets are legally recorded either in a register or in an account and their eligibility and shall monitor how assets can be mobilised in a timely manner. 6. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also have regard to existing legal, regulatory and operational limitations to potential transfers of liquidity and unencumbered assets amongst entities, both within and outside the European Economic Area. 7. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider different liquidity risk mitigation tools, including a system of limits and liquidity buffers in order to be able to withstand a range of different stress events and an adequately diversified funding structure and access to funding sources. Those arrangements shall be reviewed regularly. 8. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider alternative scenarios on liquidity positions and on risk mitigants and review the assumptions underlying decisions concerning the funding position at least annually. For those purposes, alternative scenarios shall address, in particular, off-balance sheet items and other contingent liabilities, including those of Securitisation Special Purpose Entities (SSPE) or other special purpose entities, as referred to in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in relation to which the institution acts as sponsor or provides material liquidity support. 9. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider the potential impact of institution-specific, market-wide and combined alternative scenarios. Different time periods and varying degrees of stress conditions shall be considered. 10. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions adjust their strategies, internal policies and limits on liquidity risk and develop effective contingency plans, taking into account the outcome of the alternative scenarios referred to in paragraph 8. 11. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have in place liquidity recovery plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures to address possible liquidity shortfalls, including in relation to branches established in another Member State. Competent authorities shall ensure that those plans are tested by the institutions at least annually, updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in paragraph 8, reported to and approved by senior management, so that internal policies and processes can be adjusted accordingly. Institutions shall take the necessary operational steps in advance to ensure that liquidity recovery plans can be implemented immediately. Those operational steps shall include holding collateral immediately available for central bank funding. This includes holding collateral in the currency of another Member State where necessary, or the currency of a third country to which the institution has exposures, and where operationally necessary within the territory of a host Member State or of a third country to whose currency it is exposed.
Article 87 Risk of excessive leverage
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have policies and processes in place for the identification, management and monitoring of the risk of excessive leverage. Indicators for the risk of excessive leverage shall include the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and mismatches between assets and obligations. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions address the risk of excessive leverage in a precautionary manner by taking due account of potential increases in the risk of excessive leverage caused by reductions of the institution's own funds through expected or realised losses, depending on the applicable accounting rules. To that end, institutions shall be able to withstand a range of different stress events with respect to the risk of excessive leverage. Sub-Section 3 Governance
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The establishment of a European Single Access Point (ESAP) by 2024 is a flagship action of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) Action Plan adopted by the European Commission in September 2020 1 . ESAP will contribute to the achievement of the CMU’s objectives by providing EU-wide access to information published by entities that is relevant to capital markets, financial services and sustainable finance, i.e. mainly information about their economic activities and products. ESAP will provide access to this information in an efficient and non-discriminatory manner. Information about entities’ activities and products is essential for decision-making by providers of capital. ESAP will contribute to further integrating the financial services and capital markets in the single market, to allocating capital more efficiently across the EU and promoting the development of smaller national capital markets and economies by giving them greater visibility. ESAP will also allow non-listed entities including Small and Medium-Sized enterprises (SMEs) to make available information on a voluntary basis. This will facilitate their access to capital. This proposal is part of a package comprised of: · a proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Single Access Point; · a proposal for a Directive amending certain Directives (this proposal); and · a proposal for a Regulation amending certain Regulations. Amendments to certain Directives are necessary to achieve the above objectives to contribute to the integration of the single market, particularly as regards the collection of information to be made available to ESAP. 
Revised version (Article 87 Risk of excessive leverage):
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have policies and processes in place for the identification, management and monitoring of the risk of excessive leverage. Indicators for the risk of excessive leverage shall include the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and mismatches between assets and obligations. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions address the risk of excessive leverage in a precautionary manner by taking due account of potential increases in the risk of excessive leverage caused by reductions of the institution's own funds through expected or realised losses, depending on the applicable accounting rules. To that end, institutions shall be able to withstand a range of different stress events with respect to the risk of excessive leverage.
Article 88 Governance arrangements
1. Member States shall ensure that the management body defines, oversees and is accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure effective and prudent management of an institution, including the segregation of duties in the organisation and the prevention of conflicts of interest. Those arrangements shall comply with the following principles: (a) the management body must have the overall responsibility for the institution and approve and oversee the implementation of the institution's strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal governance; (b) the management body must ensure the integrity of the accounting and financial reporting systems, including financial and operational controls and compliance with the law and relevant standards; (c) the management body must oversee the process of disclosure and communications; (d) the management body must be responsible for providing effective oversight of senior management; (e) the chairman of the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorised by competent authorities. Member States shall ensure that the management body monitors and periodically assesses the effectiveness of the institution's governance arrangements and takes appropriate steps to address any deficiencies. 2. Member States shall ensure that institutions which are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a nomination committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. The nomination committee shall: (a) identify and recommend, for the approval of the management body or for approval of the general meeting, candidates to fill management body vacancies, evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity and experience of the management body and prepare a description of the roles and capabilities for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected. Furthermore, the nomination committee shall decide on a target for the representation of the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender in the management body in order to meet that target. The target, policy and its implementation shall be made public in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) periodically, and at least annually, assess the structure, size, composition and performance of the management body and make recommendations to the management body with regard to any changes; (c) periodically, and at least annually, assess the knowledge, skills and experience of individual members of the management body and of the management body collectively, and report to the management body accordingly; (d) periodically review the policy of the management body for selection and appointment of senior management and make recommendations to the management body. In performing its duties, the nomination committee shall, to the extent possible and on an ongoing basis, take account of the need to ensure that the management body's decision making is not dominated by any one individual or small group of individuals in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of the institution as a whole. The nomination committee shall be able to use any forms of resources that it considers to be appropriate, including external advice, and shall receive appropriate funding to that effect. Where, under national law, the management body does not have any competence in the process of selection and appointment of any of its members, this paragraph shall not apply.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 88 Governance arrangements):
1. Member States shall ensure that the management body defines, oversees and is accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure effective and prudent management of an institution, including the segregation of duties in the organisation and the prevention of conflicts of interest. Those arrangements shall comply with the following principles: (a) the management body must have the overall responsibility for the institution and approve and oversee the implementation of the institution's strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal governance; (b) the management body must ensure the integrity of the accounting and financial reporting systems, including financial and operational controls and compliance with the law and relevant standards; (c) the management body must oversee the process of disclosure and communications; (d) the management body must be responsible for providing effective oversight of senior management; (e) the chairman of the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorised by competent authorities. Member States shall ensure that the management body monitors and periodically assesses the effectiveness of the institution's governance arrangements and takes appropriate steps to address any deficiencies. 2. Member States shall ensure that institutions which are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a nomination committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. The nomination committee shall: identify and recommend, for the approval of the management body or for approval of the general meeting, candidates to fill management body vacancies, evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity and experience of the management body and prepare a description of the roles and capabilities for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected. (b) periodically, and at least annually, assess the structure, size, composition and performance of the management body and make recommendations to the management body with regard to any changes; (c) periodically, and at least annually, assess the knowledge, skills and experience of individual members of the management body and of the management body collectively, and report to the management body accordingly; (d) periodically review the policy of the management body for selection and appointment of senior management and make recommendations to the management body. In performing its duties, the nomination committee shall, to the extent possible and on an ongoing basis, take account of the need to ensure that the management body's decision making is not dominated by any one individual or small group of individuals in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of the institution as a whole. The nomination committee shall be able to use any forms of resources that it considers to be appropriate, including external advice, and shall receive appropriate funding to that effect. Where, under national law, the management body does not have any competence in the process of selection and appointment of any of its members, this paragraph shall not apply.
Article 89 Country-by-country reporting
1. From 1 January 2015 Member States shall require each institution to disclose annually, specifying, by Member State and by third country in which it has an establishment, the following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year: (a) name(s), nature of activities and geographical location; (b) turnover; (c) number of employees on a full time equivalent basis; (d) profit or loss before tax; (e) tax on profit or loss; (f) public subsidies received. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States shall require institutions to disclose the information referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) for the first time on 1 July 2014. 3. By 1 July 2014, all global systemically important institutions authorised within the Union, as identified internationally, shall submit to the Commission the information referred to in paragraph 1(d), (e) and (f) on a confidential basis. The Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, as appropriate, shall conduct a general assessment as regards potential negative economic consequences of the public disclosure of such information, including the impact on competitiveness, investment and credit availability and the stability of the financial system. The Commission shall submit its report to the European Parliament and to the Council by 31 December 2014. In the event that the Commission report identifies significant negative effects, the Commission shall consider making an appropriate legislative proposal for an amendment of the disclosure obligations set out in paragraph 1 and may, in accordance with point (h) of Article 145, decide to defer those obligations. The Commission shall review the necessity to extend deferral annually. 4. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be audited in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC and shall be published, where possible, as an annex to the annual financial statements or, where applicable, to the consolidated financial statements of the institution concerned. 5. To the extent that future Union legislative acts for disclosure obligations go beyond those laid down in this Article, this Article shall cease to apply and shall be deleted accordingly.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes also amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR), to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), and to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR). Over the past years the EU implemented a substantial reform of the financial services regulatory framework to enhance the resilience of institutions (i.e. credit institutions and investment firms) operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners. In particular, the reform package included Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD), on prudential requirements for and supervision of institutions, Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), on recovery and resolution of institutions and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). These measures were taken in response to the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008 and reflect internationally agreed standards. While the reforms have rendered the financial system more stable and resilient against many types of possible future shocks and crises, they do not yet comprehensively address all identified problems. The present proposals therefore aim to complete the reform agenda by tackling remaining weaknesses and implementing some outstanding elements of the reform that are essential to ensure the institutions' resilience but have only recently been finalised by global standard setters (i.e. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)):  a binding leverage ratio which will prevent institutions from excessively increasing leverage, e.g. to compensate for low profitability;  a binding net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which will build on institutions’ improved funding profiles and establish a harmonised standard for how much stable, long-term sources of funding an institution needs to weather periods of market and funding stress;  more risk sensitive own funds (i.e. capital) requirements for institutions that trade to an important extent in securities and derivatives which will prevent too much divergence in those requirements that is not based on the institutions' risk profiles;  last but not least, new standards on the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) which will require those institutions to have more loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, tackle interconnections in the global financial markets and further strengthen the EU’s ability to resolve failing G-SIIs while minimising risks for taxpayers. The Commission recognised the need for further risk reduction in its Communication of 24 November 2015 and committed to bring forward a legislative proposal that builds on the international agreements listed above. Such risk reduction measures will not only further strengthen the resilience of the European banking system and the markets' confidence in it, but will also provide the basis for further progress in completing the Banking Union. The need for further concrete legislative steps to be taken in terms of reducing risks in the financial sector has been recognised also by the Ecofin Council Conclusions from 17 June 2016. The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union – Annual Report 2015 also indicates some areas in the current regulatory framework that could be further addressed. At the same time, the Commission needed to take account of the existing regulatory framework and the new regulatory developments at international level and respond to challenges affecting the EU economy, especially the need to promote growth and jobs at times of uncertain economic outlook. Various major policy initiatives, such as the Investment Plan for Europe (EFSI) and the Capital Markets Union have been launched in order to strengthen the economy of the Union. The ability of institutions to contribute to financing the economy needs to be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. In order to ensure that recent reforms in the financial sector interact smoothly with each other and with new policy initiatives, but also with broader recent reforms in the financial sector, the Commission carried out, on the basis of a call for evidence, a thorough holistic assessment of the existing financial services framework (including the CRR, CRD, BRRD and SRMR). The upcoming review of global standards was also assessed from a wider economic impact perspective. Amendments based on international developments represent a faithful implementation of international standards into Union law, subject to targeted adjustments in order to reflect EU specificities and broader policy considerations. For instance, the predominant reliance on bank financing by EU small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or for infrastructure projects prompts specific regulatory adjustments that ensure institutions remain capable of funding them as they constitute the backbone of the single market. A smooth interaction with existing requirements, such as for central clearing and collateralisation of derivatives exposures, or a gradual transition to some of the new requirements are necessary. Such adjustments, limited in terms of scope or time, do therefore not impinge on the overall soundness of the proposals, which are aligned with the basic level of ambition of the international standards. Moreover, based on the call for evidence, the proposals aim at improving existing rules. The analysis of the Commission showed that the present framework can be applied in a more proportionate way, taking into account in particular the situation of smaller and less complex institutions where some of the current disclosure, reporting and complex trading book-related requirements appear not to be justified by prudential considerations. Furthermore, the Commission has considered the risk attached to loans to SMEs and for funding infrastructure projects and found that for some of those loans, it would be justified to apply lower own funds requirements than are applied at present. Accordingly, the present proposals will bring corrections to these requirements and will enhance the proportionality of the prudential framework for institutions. Thereby, the ability of institutions to finance the economy will be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. Finally, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance has assessed the application of options and discretions set out in the CRD and the CRR. Based on this analysis, the present proposal is intending to eliminate some options and discretions concerning the provisions on the leverage ratio, on large exposures and on own funds. It is proposed to end to the possibility to create new State guaranteed deferred tax assets not relying on future profitability that would be exempted from deduction from regulatory capital. 
Revised version (Article 89 Country-by-country reporting):
From 1 January 2015 Member States shall require each institution to disclose annually, specifying, by Member State and by third country in which it has an establishment, the following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year: (a) name(s), nature of activities and geographical location; (b) turnover; (c) number of employees on a full time equivalent basis; (d) profit or loss before tax; (e) tax on profit or loss; (f) public subsidies received. 2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States shall require institutions to disclose the information referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) for the first time on 1 July 2014. 3. By 1 July 2014, all global systemically important institutions authorised within the Union, as identified internationally, shall submit to the Commission the information referred to in paragraph 1(d), (e) and (f) on a confidential basis. The Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, as appropriate, shall conduct a general assessment as regards potential negative economic consequences of the public disclosure of such information, including the impact on competitiveness, investment and credit availability and the stability of the financial system. The Commission shall submit its report to the European Parliament and to the Council by 31 December 2014. In the event that the Commission report identifies significant negative effects, the Commission shall consider making an appropriate legislative proposal for an amendment of the disclosure obligations set out in paragraph 1 and may, in accordance with point (h) of Article 145, decide to defer those obligations. The Commission shall review the necessity to extend deferral annually. 4. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be audited in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC and shall be published, where possible, as an annex to the annual financial statements or, where applicable, to the consolidated financial statements of the institution concerned. 5. To the extent that future Union legislative acts for disclosure obligations go beyond those laid down in this Article, this Article shall cease to apply and shall be deleted accordingly. 6. By 1 January 2021, the Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, shall review whether the information referred to in points (a) to (f) of paragraph 1 is still adequate, while taking into account previous impact assessments, international agreements and legislative developments in the Union, and whether further relevant information requirements may be added to paragraph 1. By 30 June 2021, the Commission shall, on the basis of the consultation with EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the assessment referred to in this paragraph and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Article 90 Public disclosure of return on assets
Institutions shall disclose in their annual report among the key indicators their return on assets, calculated as their net profit divided by their total balance sheet.
Article 91 Management body
1. Members of the management body shall at all times be of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The overall composition of the management body shall reflect an adequately broad range of experiences. Members of the management body shall, in particular, fulfil the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 8. 2. All members of the management body shall commit sufficient time to perform their functions in the institution. 3. The number of directorships which may be held by a member of the management body at the same time shall take into account individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of the institution's activities. Unless representing the Member State, members of the management body of an institution that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities shall, from 1 July 2014, not hold more than one of the following combinations of directorships at the same time: (a) one executive directorship with two non-executive directorships; (b) four non-executive directorships. 4. For the purposes of paragraph 3, the following shall count as a single directorship: (a) executive or non-executive directorships held within the same group; (b) executive or non-executive directorships held within: (i) institutions which are members of the same institutional protection scheme provided that the conditions set out in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are fulfilled; or (ii) undertakings (including non-financial entities) in which the institution holds a qualifying holding. 5. Directorships in organisations which do not pursue predominantly commercial objectives shall not count for the purposes of paragraph 3. 6. Competent authorities may authorise members of the management body to hold one additional non-executive directorship. Competent authorities shall regularly inform EBA of such authorisations. 7. The management body shall possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks. 8. Each member of the management body shall act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management decision-making. 9. Institutions shall devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body. 10. Member States or competent authorities shall require institutions and their respective nomination committees to engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose to put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body. 11. Competent authorities shall collect the information disclosed in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and shall use it to benchmark diversity practices. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information. EBA shall use that information to benchmark diversity practices at Union level. 12. EBA shall issue guidelines on the following: (a) the notion of sufficient time commitment of a member of the management body to perform his functions, in relation to the individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of activities of the institution; (b) the notion of adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 7; (c) the notions of honesty, integrity and independence of mind of a member of the management body as referred to in paragraph 8; (d) the notion of adequate human and financial resources devoted to the induction and training of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 9; (e) the notion of diversity to be taken into account for the selection of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 10. EBA shall issue those guidelines by 31 December 2015. 13. This Article shall be without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in the management body as provided for by national law.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 91 Management body):
1. Members of the management body shall at all times be of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. The overall composition of the management body shall reflect an adequately broad range of experiences. Members of the management body shall, in particular, fulfil the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 8. 2. All members of the management body shall commit sufficient time to perform their functions in the institution. 3. The number of directorships which may be held by a member of the management body at the same time shall take into account individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of the institution's activities. Unless representing the Member State, members of the management body of an institution that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities shall, from 1 July 2014, not hold more than one of the following combinations of directorships at the same time: (a) one executive directorship with two non-executive directorships; (b) four non-executive directorships. 4. For the purposes of paragraph 3, the following shall count as a single directorship: (a) executive or non-executive directorships held within the same group; executive or non-executive directorships held within: institutions which are members of the same institutional protection scheme provided that the conditions set out in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are fulfilled; or (ii) undertakings (including non-financial entities) in which the institution holds a qualifying holding. 5. Directorships in organisations which do not pursue predominantly commercial objectives shall not count for the purposes of paragraph 3. 6. Competent authorities may authorise members of the management body to hold one additional non-executive directorship. Competent authorities shall regularly inform EBA of such authorisations. 7. The management body shall possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks. 8. Each member of the management body shall act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management decision-making. 9. Institutions shall devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body. 10. Member States or competent authorities shall require institutions and their respective nomination committees to engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose to put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body. 12. EBA shall issue guidelines on the following: (a) the notion of sufficient time commitment of a member of the management body to perform his functions, in relation to the individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of activities of the institution; (b) the notion of adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 7; (c) the notions of honesty, integrity and independence of mind of a member of the management body as referred to in paragraph 8; (d) the notion of adequate human and financial resources devoted to the induction and training of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 9; (e) the notion of diversity to be taken into account for the selection of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 10. EBA shall issue those guidelines by 31 December 2015. 13. This Article shall be without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in the management body as provided for by national law.
Article 92 Remuneration policies
1. The application of paragraph 2 of this Article and of Articles 93, 94 and 95 shall be ensured by competent authorities for institutions at group, parent company and subsidiary levels, including those established in offshore financial centres. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that, when establishing and applying the total remuneration policies, inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits, for categories of staff including senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile, institutions comply with the following principles in a manner and to the extent that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities: (a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the institution; (b) the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest; (c) the institution' s management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for overseeing its implementation; (d) the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function; (e) staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control; (f) the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in Article 95 or, if such a committee has not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function; (g) the remuneration policy, taking into account national criteria on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting: (i) basic fixed remuneration, which should primarily reflect relevant professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in an employee's job description as part of the terms of employment; and (ii) variable remuneration which should reflect a sustainable and risk adjusted performance as well as performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description as part of the terms of employment.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 92 Remuneration policies):
1. The application of paragraph 2 of this Article and of Articles 93, 94 and 95 shall be ensured by competent authorities for institutions at group, parent company and subsidiary levels, including those established in offshore financial centres. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that, when establishing and applying the total remuneration policies, inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits, for categories of staff including senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile, institutions comply with the following principles in a manner and to the extent that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities: (a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the institution; (b) the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest; (c) the institution' s management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for overseeing its implementation; (d) the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function; (e) staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control; (f) the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in Article 95 or, if such a committee has not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function; the remuneration policy, taking into account national criteria on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting: (i) basic fixed remuneration, which should primarily reflect relevant professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in an employee's job description as part of the terms of employment; and (ii) variable remuneration which should reflect a sustainable and risk adjusted performance as well as performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description as part of the terms of employment. the remuneration policy, taking into account national criteria on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting: (i) basic fixed remuneration, which should primarily reflect relevant professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in an employee's job description as part of the terms of employment; and (ii) variable remuneration which should reflect a sustainable and risk adjusted performance as well as performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description as part of the terms of employment.
Article 93 Institutions that benefit from government intervention
In the case of institutions that benefit from exceptional government intervention, the following principles shall apply in addition to those set out in Article 92(2): (a) variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenue where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support; (b) the relevant competent authorities require institutions to restructure remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including, where appropriate, establishing limits to the remuneration of the members of the management body of the institution; (c) no variable remuneration is paid to members of the management body of the institution unless justified.
Article 94 Variable elements of remuneration
1. For variable elements of remuneration, the following principles shall apply in addition to, and under the same conditions as, those set out in Article 92(2): (a) where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account; (b) the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks; (c) the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base; (d) guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans; (e) guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only when hiring new staff and where the institution has a sound and strong capital base and is limited to the first year of employment; (f) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component; (g) institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby the following principles shall apply: (i) the variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage; (ii) Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure: — the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base; — shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented; — the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought; — the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations; — the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected; — staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution; (iii) Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014, guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years; (h) payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct; (i) remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements; (j) the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required; (k) the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks; (l) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of a balance of the following: (i) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments, in the case of a non-listed institution; (ii) where possible, other instruments within the meaning of Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration. The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (m) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred; (m) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years and is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question; (n) the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned. Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements. Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member: (i) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution; (ii) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety; (o) the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution. If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period; (p) staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements; (q) variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards with respect to specifying the classes of instruments that satisfy the conditions set out in point (l)(ii) of paragraph 1 and with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile as referred to in Article 92(2). EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 March 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 94 Variable elements of remuneration):
1. For variable elements of remuneration, the following principles shall apply in addition to, and under the same conditions as, those set out in Article 92(2): (a) where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account; (b) the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks; (c) the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base; (d) guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans; (e) guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only when hiring new staff and where the institution has a sound and strong capital base and is limited to the first year of employment; (f) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component; institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby the following principles shall apply: (i) the variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage; (ii) Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure: — the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base; — shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented; — the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought; — the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations; — the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected; — staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution; Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure: — the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base; — shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented; — the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought; — the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations; — the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected; — staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution; (iii) Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014, guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years; Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage. EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014, guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years; (h) payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct; (i) remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements; (j) the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required; (k) the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks; a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of a balance of the following: (i) shares or equivalent ownership interests, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments, in the case of a non-listed institution; (ii) where possible, other instruments within the meaning of Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration. The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (m) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred; (m) a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years and is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question; a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three to five years and is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question. Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question; the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned. Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements. Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member: (i) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution; (ii) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety; the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned. Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements. Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member: (i) participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution; (ii) failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety; the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution. If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period; the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution. If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period; (p) staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements; (q) variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 2. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards with respect to specifying the classes of instruments that satisfy the conditions set out in point (l)(ii) of paragraph 1 and with respect to qualitative and appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile as referred to in Article 92(2). EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 March 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 95 Remuneration Committee
1. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities establish a remuneration committee. The remuneration committee shall be constituted in such a way as to enable it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity. 2. Competent authorities shall ensure that the remuneration committee is responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which have implications for the risk and risk management of the institution concerned and which are to be taken by the management body. The Chair and the members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. If employee representation on the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. When preparing such decisions, the remuneration committee shall take into account the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the institution and the public interest.
Article 96 Maintenance of a website on corporate governance and remuneration
Institutions that maintain a website shall explain there how they comply with the requirements of Articles 88 to 95.
Article 97 Supervisory review and evaluation
1. Taking into account the technical criteria set out in Article 98, the competent authorities shall review the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the institutions to comply with this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and evaluate: (a) risks to which the institutions are or might be exposed; (b) risks that an institution poses to the financial system taking into account the identification and measurement of systemic risk under Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, or recommendations of the ESRB, where appropriate; and (c) risks revealed by stress testing taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities. 2. The scope of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover all requirements of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 3. On the basis of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions and the own funds and liquidity held by them ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks. 4. Competent authorities shall establish the frequency and intensity of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution concerned and taking into account the principle of proportionality. The review and evaluation shall be updated at least on an annual basis for institutions covered by the supervisory examination programme referred to in Article 99(2). 5. Member States shall ensure that where a review shows that an institution may pose systemic risk in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 the competent authorities inform EBA without delay about the results of the review.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes also amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR), to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), and to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR). Over the past years the EU implemented a substantial reform of the financial services regulatory framework to enhance the resilience of institutions (i.e. credit institutions and investment firms) operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners. In particular, the reform package included Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD), on prudential requirements for and supervision of institutions, Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), on recovery and resolution of institutions and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). These measures were taken in response to the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008 and reflect internationally agreed standards. While the reforms have rendered the financial system more stable and resilient against many types of possible future shocks and crises, they do not yet comprehensively address all identified problems. The present proposals therefore aim to complete the reform agenda by tackling remaining weaknesses and implementing some outstanding elements of the reform that are essential to ensure the institutions' resilience but have only recently been finalised by global standard setters (i.e. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)):  a binding leverage ratio which will prevent institutions from excessively increasing leverage, e.g. to compensate for low profitability;  a binding net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which will build on institutions’ improved funding profiles and establish a harmonised standard for how much stable, long-term sources of funding an institution needs to weather periods of market and funding stress;  more risk sensitive own funds (i.e. capital) requirements for institutions that trade to an important extent in securities and derivatives which will prevent too much divergence in those requirements that is not based on the institutions' risk profiles;  last but not least, new standards on the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) which will require those institutions to have more loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, tackle interconnections in the global financial markets and further strengthen the EU’s ability to resolve failing G-SIIs while minimising risks for taxpayers. The Commission recognised the need for further risk reduction in its Communication of 24 November 2015 and committed to bring forward a legislative proposal that builds on the international agreements listed above. Such risk reduction measures will not only further strengthen the resilience of the European banking system and the markets' confidence in it, but will also provide the basis for further progress in completing the Banking Union. The need for further concrete legislative steps to be taken in terms of reducing risks in the financial sector has been recognised also by the Ecofin Council Conclusions from 17 June 2016. The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union – Annual Report 2015 also indicates some areas in the current regulatory framework that could be further addressed. At the same time, the Commission needed to take account of the existing regulatory framework and the new regulatory developments at international level and respond to challenges affecting the EU economy, especially the need to promote growth and jobs at times of uncertain economic outlook. Various major policy initiatives, such as the Investment Plan for Europe (EFSI) and the Capital Markets Union have been launched in order to strengthen the economy of the Union. The ability of institutions to contribute to financing the economy needs to be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. In order to ensure that recent reforms in the financial sector interact smoothly with each other and with new policy initiatives, but also with broader recent reforms in the financial sector, the Commission carried out, on the basis of a call for evidence, a thorough holistic assessment of the existing financial services framework (including the CRR, CRD, BRRD and SRMR). The upcoming review of global standards was also assessed from a wider economic impact perspective. Amendments based on international developments represent a faithful implementation of international standards into Union law, subject to targeted adjustments in order to reflect EU specificities and broader policy considerations. For instance, the predominant reliance on bank financing by EU small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or for infrastructure projects prompts specific regulatory adjustments that ensure institutions remain capable of funding them as they constitute the backbone of the single market. A smooth interaction with existing requirements, such as for central clearing and collateralisation of derivatives exposures, or a gradual transition to some of the new requirements are necessary. Such adjustments, limited in terms of scope or time, do therefore not impinge on the overall soundness of the proposals, which are aligned with the basic level of ambition of the international standards. Moreover, based on the call for evidence, the proposals aim at improving existing rules. The analysis of the Commission showed that the present framework can be applied in a more proportionate way, taking into account in particular the situation of smaller and less complex institutions where some of the current disclosure, reporting and complex trading book-related requirements appear not to be justified by prudential considerations. Furthermore, the Commission has considered the risk attached to loans to SMEs and for funding infrastructure projects and found that for some of those loans, it would be justified to apply lower own funds requirements than are applied at present. Accordingly, the present proposals will bring corrections to these requirements and will enhance the proportionality of the prudential framework for institutions. Thereby, the ability of institutions to finance the economy will be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. Finally, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance has assessed the application of options and discretions set out in the CRD and the CRR. Based on this analysis, the present proposal is intending to eliminate some options and discretions concerning the provisions on the leverage ratio, on large exposures and on own funds. It is proposed to end to the possibility to create new State guaranteed deferred tax assets not relying on future profitability that would be exempted from deduction from regulatory capital. 
Revised version (Article 97 Supervisory review and evaluation):
1. Taking into account the technical criteria set out in Article 98, the competent authorities shall review the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the institutions to comply with this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and evaluate: (a) risks to which the institutions are or might be exposed; (c) risks revealed by stress testing taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities. 2. The scope of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover all requirements of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 3. On the basis of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions and the own funds and liquidity held by them ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks. 4. Competent authorities shall establish the frequency and intensity of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution concerned and taking into account the principle of proportionality. The review and evaluation shall be updated at least on an annual basis for institutions covered by the supervisory examination programme referred to in Article 99(2). When conducting the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, competent authorities shall apply the principle of proportionality in accordance with the criteria disclosed pursuant to point (c) of Article 143(1). 4a. Competent authorities may tailor the methodologies for the application of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to take into account institutions with a similar risk profile, such as similar business models or geographical location of exposures. Such tailored methodologies may include risk-oriented benchmarks and quantitative indicators, shall allow for due consideration of the specific risks that each institution may be exposed to, and shall not affect the institution-specific nature of measures imposed in accordance with Article 104. Where competent authorities use tailored methodologies pursuant to this paragraph, they shall notify EBA. EBA shall monitor supervisory practices and issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, specifying how similar risk profiles shall be assessed for the purposes of this paragraph and to ensure the consistent and proportionate application of methodologies across the Union that are tailored to similar institutions. 5. Member States shall ensure that where a review shows that an institution may pose systemic risk in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 the competent authorities inform EBA without delay about the results of the review. 6. Where a review, in particular the evaluation of the governance arrangements, the business model, or the activities of an institution, gives competent authorities reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with that institution, money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or there is increased risk thereof, the competent authority shall immediately notify EBA and the authority or body that supervises the institution in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and is competent for ensuring compliance with that Directive. In the event of potential increased risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, the competent authority and the authority or body that supervises the institution in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and is competent for ensuring compliance with that Directive shall liaise and notify their common assessment immediately to EBA. The competent authority shall take, as appropriate, measures in accordance with this Directive.
Article 98 Technical criteria for the supervisory review and evaluation
1. In addition to credit, market and operational risks, the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities pursuant to Article 97 shall include at least: (a) the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with Article 177 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by institutions applying an internal ratings based approach; (b) the exposure to and management of concentration risk by institutions, including their compliance with the requirements set out in Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 81 of this Directive; (c) the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the policies and procedures implemented by institutions for the management of the residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit risk mitigation techniques; (d) the extent to which the own funds held by an institution in respect of assets which it has securitised are adequate having regard to the economic substance of the transaction, including the degree of risk transfer achieved; (e) the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity risk by institutions, including the development of alternative scenario analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular the level, composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective contingency plans; (f) the impact of diversification effects and how such effects are factored into the risk measurement system; (g) the results of stress tests carried out by institutions using an internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (h) the geographical location of institutions' exposures; (i) the business model of the institution; (j) the assessment of systemic risk, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 97. 2. For the purposes of point (e) of paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall regularly carry out a comprehensive assessment of the overall liquidity risk management by institutions and promote the development of sound internal methodologies. While conducting those reviews, the competent authorities shall have regard to the role played by institutions in the financial markets. The competent authorities in one Member State shall duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned. 3. Competent authorities shall monitor whether an institution has provided implicit support to a securitisation. If an institution is found to have provided implicit support on more than one occasion the competent authority shall take appropriate measures reflective of the increased expectation that it will provide future support to its securitisation thus failing to achieve a significant transfer of risk. 4. For the purposes of the determination to be made under Article 97(3) of this Directive, competent authorities shall consider whether the valuation adjustments taken for positions or portfolios in the trading book, as set out in Article 105 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, enable the institution to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions. 5. The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the interest rate risk arising from non-trading activities. Measures shall be required at least in the case of institutions whose economic value declines by more than 20 % of their own funds as a result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates of 200 basis points or such change as defined in the EBA guidelines. 6. The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the risk of excessive leverage as reflected by indicators of excessive leverage, including the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In determining the adequacy of the leverage ratio of institutions and of the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions to manage the risk of excessive leverage, competent authorities shall take into account the business model of those institutions. 7. The review and evaluation conducted by competent authorities shall include governance arrangements of institutions, their corporate culture and values, and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties. In conducting that review and evaluation, competent authorities shall, at least, have access to agendas and supporting documents for meetings of the management body and its committees, and the results of the internal or external evaluation of performance of the management body.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The proposed amendment to Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) is part of a legislative package that includes also amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR), to Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), and to Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation or SRMR). Over the past years the EU implemented a substantial reform of the financial services regulatory framework to enhance the resilience of institutions (i.e. credit institutions and investment firms) operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners. In particular, the reform package included Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD), on prudential requirements for and supervision of institutions, Directive 2014/59/EU (the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive or BRRD), on recovery and resolution of institutions and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). These measures were taken in response to the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008 and reflect internationally agreed standards. While the reforms have rendered the financial system more stable and resilient against many types of possible future shocks and crises, they do not yet comprehensively address all identified problems. The present proposals therefore aim to complete the reform agenda by tackling remaining weaknesses and implementing some outstanding elements of the reform that are essential to ensure the institutions' resilience but have only recently been finalised by global standard setters (i.e. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)):  a binding leverage ratio which will prevent institutions from excessively increasing leverage, e.g. to compensate for low profitability;  a binding net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which will build on institutions’ improved funding profiles and establish a harmonised standard for how much stable, long-term sources of funding an institution needs to weather periods of market and funding stress;  more risk sensitive own funds (i.e. capital) requirements for institutions that trade to an important extent in securities and derivatives which will prevent too much divergence in those requirements that is not based on the institutions' risk profiles;  last but not least, new standards on the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) of global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) which will require those institutions to have more loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity, tackle interconnections in the global financial markets and further strengthen the EU’s ability to resolve failing G-SIIs while minimising risks for taxpayers. The Commission recognised the need for further risk reduction in its Communication of 24 November 2015 and committed to bring forward a legislative proposal that builds on the international agreements listed above. Such risk reduction measures will not only further strengthen the resilience of the European banking system and the markets' confidence in it, but will also provide the basis for further progress in completing the Banking Union. The need for further concrete legislative steps to be taken in terms of reducing risks in the financial sector has been recognised also by the Ecofin Council Conclusions from 17 June 2016. The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2016 on the Banking Union – Annual Report 2015 also indicates some areas in the current regulatory framework that could be further addressed. At the same time, the Commission needed to take account of the existing regulatory framework and the new regulatory developments at international level and respond to challenges affecting the EU economy, especially the need to promote growth and jobs at times of uncertain economic outlook. Various major policy initiatives, such as the Investment Plan for Europe (EFSI) and the Capital Markets Union have been launched in order to strengthen the economy of the Union. The ability of institutions to contribute to financing the economy needs to be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. In order to ensure that recent reforms in the financial sector interact smoothly with each other and with new policy initiatives, but also with broader recent reforms in the financial sector, the Commission carried out, on the basis of a call for evidence, a thorough holistic assessment of the existing financial services framework (including the CRR, CRD, BRRD and SRMR). The upcoming review of global standards was also assessed from a wider economic impact perspective. Amendments based on international developments represent a faithful implementation of international standards into Union law, subject to targeted adjustments in order to reflect EU specificities and broader policy considerations. For instance, the predominant reliance on bank financing by EU small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or for infrastructure projects prompts specific regulatory adjustments that ensure institutions remain capable of funding them as they constitute the backbone of the single market. A smooth interaction with existing requirements, such as for central clearing and collateralisation of derivatives exposures, or a gradual transition to some of the new requirements are necessary. Such adjustments, limited in terms of scope or time, do therefore not impinge on the overall soundness of the proposals, which are aligned with the basic level of ambition of the international standards. Moreover, based on the call for evidence, the proposals aim at improving existing rules. The analysis of the Commission showed that the present framework can be applied in a more proportionate way, taking into account in particular the situation of smaller and less complex institutions where some of the current disclosure, reporting and complex trading book-related requirements appear not to be justified by prudential considerations. Furthermore, the Commission has considered the risk attached to loans to SMEs and for funding infrastructure projects and found that for some of those loans, it would be justified to apply lower own funds requirements than are applied at present. Accordingly, the present proposals will bring corrections to these requirements and will enhance the proportionality of the prudential framework for institutions. Thereby, the ability of institutions to finance the economy will be enhanced without impinging on the stability of the regulatory framework. Finally, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Expert Group on Banking, Payments and Insurance has assessed the application of options and discretions set out in the CRD and the CRR. Based on this analysis, the present proposal is intending to eliminate some options and discretions concerning the provisions on the leverage ratio, on large exposures and on own funds. It is proposed to end to the possibility to create new State guaranteed deferred tax assets not relying on future profitability that would be exempted from deduction from regulatory capital. 
Revised version (Article 98 Technical criteria for the supervisory review and evaluation):
In addition to credit, market and operational risks, the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities pursuant to Article 97 shall include at least: (a) the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with Article 177 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by institutions applying an internal ratings based approach; (b) the exposure to and management of concentration risk by institutions, including their compliance with the requirements set out in Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 81 of this Directive; (c) the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the policies and procedures implemented by institutions for the management of the residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit risk mitigation techniques; (d) the extent to which the own funds held by an institution in respect of assets which it has securitised are adequate having regard to the economic substance of the transaction, including the degree of risk transfer achieved; (e) the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity risk by institutions, including the development of alternative scenario analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular the level, composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective contingency plans; (f) the impact of diversification effects and how such effects are factored into the risk measurement system; (g) the results of stress tests carried out by institutions using an internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (h) the geographical location of institutions' exposures; (i) the business model of the institution; (j) the assessment of systemic risk, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 97. 2. For the purposes of point (e) of paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall regularly carry out a comprehensive assessment of the overall liquidity risk management by institutions and promote the development of sound internal methodologies. While conducting those reviews, the competent authorities shall have regard to the role played by institutions in the financial markets. The competent authorities in one Member State shall duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned. 3. Competent authorities shall monitor whether an institution has provided implicit support to a securitisation. If an institution is found to have provided implicit support on more than one occasion the competent authority shall take appropriate measures reflective of the increased expectation that it will provide future support to its securitisation thus failing to achieve a significant transfer of risk. 4. For the purposes of the determination to be made under Article 97(3) of this Directive, competent authorities shall consider whether the valuation adjustments taken for positions or portfolios in the trading book, as set out in Article 105 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, enable the institution to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions. 5. The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the interest rate risk arising from non-trading activities. Measures shall be required at least in the case of institutions whose economic value declines by more than 20 % of their own funds as a result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates of 200 basis points or such change as defined in the EBA guidelines. 6. The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the risk of excessive leverage as reflected by indicators of excessive leverage, including the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In determining the adequacy of the leverage ratio of institutions and of the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions to manage the risk of excessive leverage, competent authorities shall take into account the business model of those institutions. 7. The review and evaluation conducted by competent authorities shall include governance arrangements of institutions, their corporate culture and values, and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties. In conducting that review and evaluation, competent authorities shall, at least, have access to agendas and supporting documents for meetings of the management body and its committees, and the results of the internal or external evaluation of performance of the management body. 8. EBA shall assess the potential inclusion in the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities of environmental, social and governance risks (ESG risks). For the purposes of the first subparagraph, EBA's assessment shall comprise at least the following: (a) the development of a uniform definition of ESG risks, including physical risks and transition risks; the latter shall comprise the risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory changes; (b) the development of appropriate qualitative and quantitative criteria for the assessment of the impact of ESG risks on the financial stability of institutions in the short, medium and long term; such criteria shall include stress testing processes and scenario analyses to assess the impact of ESG risks under scenarios with different severities; (c) the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies to be implemented by the institutions to identify, assess and manage ESG risks; (d) the analysis methods and tools to assess the impact of ESG risks on lending and financial intermediation activities of institutions. EBA shall submit a report on its findings to the Commission, the European Parliament and to the Council by 28 June 2021. On the basis of the outcome of its report, EBA may, if appropriate, issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, regarding the uniform inclusion of ESG risks in the supervisory review and evaluation process performed by competent authorities.
Article 99 Supervisory examination programme
1. The competent authorities shall, at least annually, adopt a supervisory examination programme for the institutions they supervise. Such programme shall take into account the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97. It shall contain the following: (a) an indication of how competent authorities intend to carry out their tasks and allocate their resources; (b) an identification of which institutions are intended to be subject to enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision as set out in paragraph 3; (c) a plan for inspections at the premises used by an institution, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member States in accordance with Articles 52, 119 and 122. 2. Supervisory examination programmes shall include the following institutions: (a) institutions for which the results of the stress tests referred to in points (a) and (g) of Article 98(1) and Article 100, or the outcome of the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97, indicate significant risks to their ongoing financial soundness or indicate breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; (b) institutions that pose systemic risk to the financial system; (c) any other institution for which the competent authorities deem it to be necessary. 3. Where appropriate under Article 97 the following measures shall, in particular, be taken if necessary: (a) an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections of the institution; (b) a permanent presence of the competent authority at the institution; (c) additional or more frequent reporting by the institution; (d) additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic or business plans of the institution; (e) thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely to materialise. 4. Adoption of a supervisory examination programme by the competent authority of the home Member State shall not prevent the competent authorities of the host Member State from carrying out, on a case-by-case basis, on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of institutions on their territory in accordance with Article 52(3).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal sets out a series of measures to better counter the financing of terrorism and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions and of corporate entities under the preventive legal framework in place in the Union, namely Directive (EU) 2015/849 (the "4AMLD") 1 . It also sets out certain consequential changes to the relevant company law rules under Directive 2009/101/EC 2 . The adoption of the updated Anti-Money Laundering rules in May 2015 represented a significant step in improving the effectiveness of the EU's efforts to combat the laundering of money from criminal activities and to counter the financing of terrorist activities. But the terrorist threat has grown and evolved recently. At the same time, fuelled by advances in technology and communications, the globally interconnected financial system makes it simple to hide and move funds around the world, by quickly and easily setting up layer upon layer of paper companies, crossing borders and jurisdictions and making it increasingly difficult to track down the money. Money launderers, tax evaders, terrorists, fraudsters and other criminals are all able to cover their tracks in this way. A sound financial system, with proper scrutiny and analytical tools in place, may, by helping to uncover anomalous transaction patterns, contribute to a better understanding of terrorist and criminal connections, networks and threats, and lead to relevant preventive actions by all competent authorities involved. However, gaps still exist in the oversight of the many financial means used by terrorists, from cash and trade in cultural artefacts to virtual currencies and anonymous pre-paid cards. This proposal seeks to address those gaps while avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the functioning of payments and financial markets for ordinary, lawabiding citizens and businesses, so balancing the need to increase security with the need to protect fundamental rights, including data protection, and economic freedoms. At the same time and in addition to terrorist financing issues, significant gaps in the transparency of financial transactions around the world have been revealed which indicate that offshore jurisdictions are often used as locations of intermediary entities that distance the real owner from the assets owned, often to avoid or evade tax. This proposal seeks to prevent the large-scale concealment of funds which can hinder the effective fight against financial crime, and to ensure enhanced corporate transparency so that true beneficial owners of companies or other legal arrangements cannot hide behind undisclosed identities. In the European Agenda on Security 3 the Commission identified as a priority the upgrading of the EU legal framework to address terrorism. The conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 November 2015 4 , the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 8 December 2015 5 , as well as of the European Council of 18 December 2015 6 all stressed the need to further intensify the work in this field, building on the improvements made in the 4AMLD. On 2 February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing 7 that focuses on two main strands of action: tracing terrorists through financial movements and preventing them from moving funds or other assets; and disrupting the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, by targeting their capacity to raise funds. The Action Plan announced a number of targeted operational and legislative measures, including the present proposal, to be put in place rapidly. On 12 February 2016, the Economic and Financial Affairs Ministers Council called on the Commission to submit its proposal to amend the 4AMLD as soon as possible and no later than the second quarter of 2016. On 22 April 2016 the informal ECOFIN Council also called for action in particular to enhance the accessibility of beneficial ownership registers, to clarify the registration requirements for trusts, to speed up the interconnection of national beneficial ownership registers, promote automatic exchange of information on beneficial ownership, and strengthen customer due diligence rules 8 . In its Resolution of 16 December 2015 9 , the European Parliament had already stressed that improved transparency, coordination and convergence in relation to corporate tax policies provides an effective framework to guarantee fair competition between firms in the Union and protect state budgets from adverse outcomes. The proposed revision of the 4AMLD is also consistent with global developments. At international level, the UN Security Council Resolutions 2199(2015) and 2253(2015) called for measures to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to international financial institutions. In addition, the G20 statement of 18 April 2016 calls on the Financial Action Task Force ('FATF') and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to make initial proposals to improve the implementation of the international standards on transparency, including on the availability of beneficial ownership information, and its international exchange. Effective supervision and enforcement are crucial to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and crime in general. The Commission will be monitoring the correct transposition of the Union requirements in national law, as well as their effective implementation by Member States in practice. 
Revised version (Article 99 Supervisory examination programme):
1. The competent authorities shall, at least annually, adopt a supervisory examination programme for the institutions they supervise. Such programme shall take into account the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97. It shall contain the following: (a) an indication of how competent authorities intend to carry out their tasks and allocate their resources; (b) an identification of which institutions are intended to be subject to enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision as set out in paragraph 3; (c) a plan for inspections at the premises used by an institution, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member States in accordance with Articles 52, 119 and 122. 2. Supervisory examination programmes shall include the following institutions: (b) institutions that pose systemic risk to the financial system; (c) any other institution for which the competent authorities deem it to be necessary. 3. Where appropriate under Article 97 the following measures shall, in particular, be taken if necessary: (a) an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections of the institution; (b) a permanent presence of the competent authority at the institution; (c) additional or more frequent reporting by the institution; (d) additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic or business plans of the institution; (e) thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely to materialise. 4. Adoption of a supervisory examination programme by the competent authority of the home Member State shall not prevent the competent authorities of the host Member State from carrying out, on a case-by-case basis, on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of institutions on their territory in accordance with Article 52(3).
Article 100 Supervisory stress testing
1. The competent authorities shall carry out as appropriate but at least annually supervisory stress tests on institutions they supervise, to facilitate the review and evaluation process under Article 97. 2. EBA shall issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to ensure that common methodologies are used by the competent authorities when conducting annual supervisory stress tests.