Article 224 Supervisory volatility adjustment under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method
1. The volatility adjustments to be applied by institutions under the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach, assuming daily revaluation, shall be those set out in Tables 1 to 4 of this paragraph. VOLATILITY ADJUSTMENTS Table 1 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 1 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 2,829 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 5,657 11,314 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 > 5 years 22,628 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 2-3 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 4,243 2,121 8,485 16,971 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 33,942 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 21,213 10,607 N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 2 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 Table 2 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 2,829 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 2-3 2,828 5,657 Table 3 Other collateral or exposure types 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 Table 3 Other collateral or exposure types 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 Table 4 Volatility adjustment for currency mismatch 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 Table 4 Volatility adjustment for currency mismatch 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 11,314 2. The calculation of volatility adjustments in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be subject to the following conditions: (a) for secured lending transactions the liquidation period shall be 20 business days; (b) for repurchase transactions, except insofar as such transactions involve the transfer of commodities or guaranteed rights relating to title to commodities, and securities lending or borrowing transactions the liquidation period shall be 5 business days; (c) for other capital market driven transactions, the liquidation period shall be 10 business days. Where an institution has a transaction or netting set which meets the criteria set out in Article 285(2), (3) and (4), the minimum holding period shall be brought in line with the margin period of risk that would apply under those paragraphs. 3. In Tables 1 to 4 of paragraph 1 and in paragraphs 4 to 6, the credit quality step with which a credit assessment of the debt security is associated is the credit quality step with which the credit assessment is determined by EBA to be associated under Chapter 2. For the purpose of determining the credit quality step with which a credit assessment of the debt security is associated referred to in the first subparagraph, Article 197(7) also applies. 4. For non-eligible securities or for commodities lent or sold under repurchase transactions or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, the volatility adjustment is the same as for non-main index equities listed on a recognised exchange. 5. For eligible units in CIUs the volatility adjustment is the weighted average volatility adjustments that would apply, having regard to the liquidation period of the transaction as specified in paragraph 2, to the assets in which the fund has invested. Where the assets in which the fund has invested are not known to the institution, the volatility adjustment is the highest volatility adjustment that would apply to any of the assets in which the fund has the right to invest. 6. For unrated debt securities issued by institutions and satisfying the eligibility criteria in Article 197(4) the volatility adjustments is the same as for securities issued by institutions or corporates with an external credit assessment associated with credit quality step 2 or 3.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 224 Supervisory volatility adjustment under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method):
1. The volatility adjustments to be applied by institutions under the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach, assuming daily revaluation, shall be those set out in Tables 1 to 4 of this paragraph. VOLATILITY ADJUSTMENTS Table 1 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 2 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 Table 3 Other collateral or exposure types 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 Table 4 Volatility adjustment for currency mismatch 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 The volatility adjustments to be applied by institutions under the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach, assuming daily revaluation, shall be those set out in Tables 1 to 4 of this paragraph. VOLATILITY ADJUSTMENTS Table 1 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 1 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of the debt security is associated Residual Maturity Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1) (h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 ≤ 1 year 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 2,829 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 >1 ≤ 5 years 2,828 5,657 11,314 > 5 years 5,657 4 2,828 11,314 8 5,657 22,628 16 11,313 > 5 years 22,628 11,313 2-3 ≤ 1 year 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 2-3 >1 ≤ 5 years 4,243 3 2,121 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 4,243 2,121 8,485 16,971 > 5 years 8,485 6 4,243 16,971 12 8,485 33,942 24 16,970 33,942 16,970 4 ≤ 1 year 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 21,213 10,607 N/A >1 ≤ 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 5 years 21,213 15 10,607 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Table 2 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 Table 2 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) Credit quality step with which the credit assessment of a short term debt security is associated Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1)(b) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for debt securities issued by entities described in Article 197(1) (c) and (d) with short-term credit assessments Volatility adjustments for securitisation positions and meeting the criteria in Article 197(1)(h) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) 1 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 1 0,707 2,829 2 1,414 0,707 0,5 0,354 1,414 2,829 2-3 1,414 1 0,707 2,828 2 1,414 5,657 4 2,828 2-3 2,828 5,657 Table 3 Other collateral or exposure types 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 Table 3 Other collateral or exposure types 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period (%) Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 15 10,607 Main Index Equities, Main Index Convertible Bonds 21,213 10,607 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 25 17,678 Other Equities or Convertible Bonds listed on a recognised exchange 35,355 17,678 Cash 0 0 0 Gold 21,213 15 10,607 Table 4 Volatility adjustment for currency mismatch 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 Table 4 Volatility adjustment for currency mismatch 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 20-day liquidation period (%) 10-day liquidation period (%) 5-day liquidation period %) 11,314 8 5,657 11,314 The calculation of volatility adjustments in accordance with paragraph 1 shall be subject to the following conditions: (a) for secured lending transactions the liquidation period shall be 20 business days; (b) for repurchase transactions, except insofar as such transactions involve the transfer of commodities or guaranteed rights relating to title to commodities, and securities lending or borrowing transactions the liquidation period shall be 5 business days; (c) for other capital market driven transactions, the liquidation period shall be 10 business days. Where an institution has a transaction or netting set which meets the criteria set out in Article 285(2), (3) and (4), the minimum holding period shall be brought in line with the margin period of risk that would apply under those paragraphs. 3. In Tables 1 to 4 of paragraph 1 and in paragraphs 4 to 6, the credit quality step with which a credit assessment of the debt security is associated is the credit quality step with which the credit assessment is determined by EBA to be associated under Chapter 2. For the purpose of determining the credit quality step with which a credit assessment of the debt security is associated referred to in the first subparagraph, Article 197(7) also applies. 4. For non-eligible securities or for commodities lent or sold under repurchase transactions or securities or commodities lending or borrowing transactions, the volatility adjustment is the same as for non-main index equities listed on a recognised exchange. 5. For eligible units in CIUs the volatility adjustment is the weighted average volatility adjustments that would apply, having regard to the liquidation period of the transaction as specified in paragraph 2, to the assets in which the fund has invested. Where the assets in which the fund has invested are not known to the institution, the volatility adjustment is the highest volatility adjustment that would apply to any of the assets in which the fund has the right to invest. 6. For unrated debt securities issued by institutions and satisfying the eligibility criteria in Article 197(4) the volatility adjustments is the same as for securities issued by institutions or corporates with an external credit assessment associated with credit quality step 2 or 3.
Article 225 Own estimates of volatility adjustments under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method
1. The competent authorities shall permit institutions to use their own volatility estimates for calculating the volatility adjustments to be applied to collateral and exposures where those institutions comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3. Institutions which have obtained permission to use their own volatility estimates shall not revert to the use of other methods except for demonstrated good cause and subject to the permission of the competent authorities. For debt securities that have a credit assessment from an ECAI equivalent to investment grade or better, institutions may calculate a volatility estimate for each category of security. For debt securities that have a credit assessment from an ECAI equivalent to below investment grade, and for other eligible collateral, institutions shall calculate the volatility adjustments for each individual item. Institutions using the Own Estimates Approach shall estimate volatility of the collateral or foreign exchange mismatch without taking into account any correlations between the unsecured exposure, collateral or exchange rates. In determining relevant categories, institutions shall take into account the type of issuer of the security, the external credit assessment of the securities, their residual maturity, and their modified duration. Volatility estimates shall be representative of the securities included in the category by the institution. 2. The calculation of the volatility adjustments shall be subject to all the following criteria: (a) institutions shall base the calculation on a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval; (b) institutions shall base the calculation on the following liquidation periods: (i) 20 business days for secured lending transactions; (ii) 5 business days for repurchase transactions, except insofar as such transactions involve the transfer of commodities or guaranteed rights relating to title to commodities and securities lending or borrowing transactions; (iii) 10 business days for other capital market driven transactions; (b) institutions shall base the calculation on the following liquidation periods: (i) 20 business days for secured lending transactions; (ii) 5 business days for repurchase transactions, except insofar as such transactions involve the transfer of commodities or guaranteed rights relating to title to commodities and securities lending or borrowing transactions; (iii) 10 business days for other capital market driven transactions; (c) institutions may use volatility adjustment numbers calculated in accordance with shorter or longer liquidation periods, scaled up or down to the liquidation period set out in point (b) for the type of transaction in question, using the square root of time formula: where: T M = the relevant liquidation period; H M = the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T M ; H N = the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T N . (c) institutions may use volatility adjustment numbers calculated in accordance with shorter or longer liquidation periods, scaled up or down to the liquidation period set out in point (b) for the type of transaction in question, using the square root of time formula: where: T M = the relevant liquidation period; T M = the relevant liquidation period; H M = the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T M ; H M the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T M ; H N = the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T N . H N the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T N . (d) institutions shall take into account the illiquidity of lower-quality assets. They shall adjust the liquidation period upwards in cases where there is doubt concerning the liquidity of the collateral. They shall also identify where historical data may understate potential volatility. Such cases shall be dealt with by means of a stress scenario; (e) the length of the historical observation period institutions use for calculating volatility adjustments shall be at least one year. For institutions that use a weighting scheme or other methods for the historical observation period, the length of the effective observation period shall be at least one year. The competent authorities may also require an institution to calculate its volatility adjustments using a shorter observation period where, in the competent authorities' judgement, this is justified by a significant upsurge in price volatility; (f) institutions shall update their data sets and calculate volatility adjustments at least once every three months. They shall also reassess their data sets whenever market prices are subject to material changes. 3. The estimation of volatility adjustments shall meet all the following qualitative criteria: (a) an institutions shall use the volatility estimates in the day-to-day risk management process including in relation to its internal exposure limits; (b) where the liquidation period used by an institution in its day-to-day risk management process is longer than that set out in this Section for the type of transaction in question, that institution shall scale up its volatility adjustments in accordance with the square root of time formula set out in point (c) of paragraph 2; (c) an institution shall have in place established procedures for monitoring and ensuring compliance with a documented set of policies and controls for the operation of its system for the estimation of volatility adjustments and for the integration of such estimations into its risk management process; (d) an independent review of the institution's system for the estimation of volatility adjustments shall be carried out regularly within the institution's own internal auditing process. A review of the overall system for the estimation of volatility adjustments and for the integration of those adjustments into the institution's risk management process shall take place at least once a year. The subject of that review shall include at least the following: (i) the integration of estimated volatility adjustments into daily risk management; (ii) the validation of any significant change in the process for the estimation of volatility adjustments; (iii) the verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run the system for the estimation of volatility adjustments, including the independence of such data sources; (iv) the accuracy and appropriateness of the volatility assumptions. (d) an independent review of the institution's system for the estimation of volatility adjustments shall be carried out regularly within the institution's own internal auditing process. A review of the overall system for the estimation of volatility adjustments and for the integration of those adjustments into the institution's risk management process shall take place at least once a year. The subject of that review shall include at least the following: (i) the integration of estimated volatility adjustments into daily risk management; (ii) the validation of any significant change in the process for the estimation of volatility adjustments; (iii) the verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run the system for the estimation of volatility adjustments, including the independence of such data sources; (iv) the accuracy and appropriateness of the volatility assumptions.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 225 Own estimates of volatility adjustments under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method):
1. The competent authorities shall permit institutions to use their own volatility estimates for calculating the volatility adjustments to be applied to collateral and exposures where those institutions comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 and 3. Institutions which have obtained permission to use their own volatility estimates shall not revert to the use of other methods except for demonstrated good cause and subject to the permission of the competent authorities. For debt securities that have a credit assessment from an ECAI equivalent to investment grade or better, institutions may calculate a volatility estimate for each category of security. For debt securities that have a credit assessment from an ECAI equivalent to below investment grade, and for other eligible collateral, institutions shall calculate the volatility adjustments for each individual item. Institutions using the Own Estimates Approach shall estimate volatility of the collateral or foreign exchange mismatch without taking into account any correlations between the unsecured exposure, collateral or exchange rates. In determining relevant categories, institutions shall take into account the type of issuer of the security, the external credit assessment of the securities, their residual maturity, and their modified duration. Volatility estimates shall be representative of the securities included in the category by the institution. 2. The calculation of the volatility adjustments shall be subject to all the following criteria: (a) institutions shall base the calculation on a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval; (b) institutions shall base the calculation on the following liquidation periods: (i) 20 business days for secured lending transactions; (ii) 5 business days for repurchase transactions, except insofar as such transactions involve the transfer of commodities or guaranteed rights relating to title to commodities and securities lending or borrowing transactions; (iii) 10 business days for other capital market driven transactions; (c) institutions may use volatility adjustment numbers calculated in accordance with shorter or longer liquidation periods, scaled up or down to the liquidation period set out in point (b) for the type of transaction in question, using the square root of time formula: where: T M = the relevant liquidation period; T M = the relevant liquidation period; H M = the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T M ; H M the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T M ; H N = the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T N . H N the volatility adjustment based on the liquidation period T N . (d) institutions shall take into account the illiquidity of lower-quality assets. They shall adjust the liquidation period upwards in cases where there is doubt concerning the liquidity of the collateral. They shall also identify where historical data may understate potential volatility. Such cases shall be dealt with by means of a stress scenario; (e) the length of the historical observation period institutions use for calculating volatility adjustments shall be at least one year. For institutions that use a weighting scheme or other methods for the historical observation period, the length of the effective observation period shall be at least one year. The competent authorities may also require an institution to calculate its volatility adjustments using a shorter observation period where, in the competent authorities' judgement, this is justified by a significant upsurge in price volatility; (f) institutions shall update their data sets and calculate volatility adjustments at least once every three months. They shall also reassess their data sets whenever market prices are subject to material changes. 3. The estimation of volatility adjustments shall meet all the following qualitative criteria: (a) an institutions shall use the volatility estimates in the day-to-day risk management process including in relation to its internal exposure limits; (b) where the liquidation period used by an institution in its day-to-day risk management process is longer than that set out in this Section for the type of transaction in question, that institution shall scale up its volatility adjustments in accordance with the square root of time formula set out in point (c) of paragraph 2; (c) an institution shall have in place established procedures for monitoring and ensuring compliance with a documented set of policies and controls for the operation of its system for the estimation of volatility adjustments and for the integration of such estimations into its risk management process; (d) an independent review of the institution's system for the estimation of volatility adjustments shall be carried out regularly within the institution's own internal auditing process. A review of the overall system for the estimation of volatility adjustments and for the integration of those adjustments into the institution's risk management process shall take place at least once a year. The subject of that review shall include at least the following: (i) the integration of estimated volatility adjustments into daily risk management; (ii) the validation of any significant change in the process for the estimation of volatility adjustments; (iii) the verification of the consistency, timeliness and reliability of data sources used to run the system for the estimation of volatility adjustments, including the independence of such data sources; (iv) the accuracy and appropriateness of the volatility assumptions.
Article 226 Scaling up of volatility adjustment under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method
The volatility adjustments set out in Article 224 are the volatility adjustments an institution shall apply where there is daily revaluation. Similarly, where an institution uses its own estimates of the volatility adjustments in accordance with Article 225, it shall calculate them in the first instance on the basis of daily revaluation. Where the frequency of revaluation is less than daily, institutions shall apply larger volatility adjustments. Institutions shall calculate them by scaling up the daily revaluation volatility adjustments, using the following square-root-of-time formula: where: H = the volatility adjustment to be applied; = the volatility adjustment to be applied; H M = the volatility adjustment where there is daily revaluation; H M the volatility adjustment where there is daily revaluation; N R = the actual number of business days between revaluations; N R the actual number of business days between revaluations; T M = the liquidation period for the type of transaction in question. T M the liquidation period for the type of transaction in question.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 226 Scaling up of volatility adjustment under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method):
The volatility adjustments set out in Article 224 are the volatility adjustments an institution shall apply where there is daily revaluation. Similarly, where an institution uses its own estimates of the volatility adjustments in accordance with Article 225, it shall calculate them in the first instance on the basis of daily revaluation. Where the frequency of revaluation is less than daily, institutions shall apply larger volatility adjustments. Institutions shall calculate them by scaling up the daily revaluation volatility adjustments, using the following square-root-of-time formula: where: H = the volatility adjustment to be applied; H M = the volatility adjustment where there is daily revaluation; N R = the actual number of business days between revaluations; T M = the liquidation period for the type of transaction in question.
Article 227 Conditions for applying a 0 % volatility adjustment under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method
1. In relation to repurchase transactions and securities lending or borrowing transactions, where an institution uses the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach under Article 224 or the Own Estimates Approach under Article 225 and where the conditions set out in points (a) to (h) of paragraph 2 are satisfied, institutions may, instead of applying the volatility adjustments calculated under Articles 224 to 226, apply a 0 % volatility adjustment. Institutions using the internal models approach set out in Article 221 shall not use the treatment set out in this Article. 2. Institutions may apply a 0 % volatility adjustment where all the following conditions are met: (a) both the exposure and the collateral are cash or debt securities issued by central governments or central banks within the meaning of Article 197(1)(b) and eligible for a 0 % risk weight under Chapter 2; (b) both the exposure and the collateral are denominated in the same currency; (c) either the maturity of the transaction is no more than one day or both the exposure and the collateral are subject to daily marking-to-market or daily re-margining; (d) the time between the last marking-to-market before a failure to re-margin by the counterparty and the liquidation of the collateral is no more than four business days; (e) the transaction is settled in a settlement system proven for that type of transaction; (f) the documentation covering the agreement or transaction is standard market documentation for repurchase transactions or securities lending or borrowing transactions in the securities concerned; (g) the transaction is governed by documentation specifying that where the counterparty fails to satisfy an obligation to deliver cash or securities or to deliver margin or otherwise defaults, then the transaction is immediately terminable; (h) the counterparty is considered a core market participant by the competent authorities. 3. The core market participants referred to in point (h) of paragraph 2 shall include the following entities: (a) the entities mentioned in Article 197(1)(b) exposures to which are assigned a 0 % risk weight under Chapter 2; (b) institutions; (c) other financial undertakings within the meaning of points (25)(b) and (d) of Article 13 of Directive 2009/138/EC exposures to which are assigned a 20 % risk weight under the Standardised Approach or which, in the case of institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach, do not have a credit assessment by a recognised ECAI and are internally rated by the institution; (d) regulated CIUs that are subject to capital or leverage requirements; (e) regulated pension funds; (f) recognised clearing organisations.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 227 Conditions for applying a 0 % volatility adjustment under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method):
1. In relation to repurchase transactions and securities lending or borrowing transactions, where an institution uses the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach under Article 224 or the Own Estimates Approach under Article 225 and where the conditions set out in points (a) to (h) of paragraph 2 are satisfied, institutions may, instead of applying the volatility adjustments calculated under Articles 224 to 226, apply a 0 % volatility adjustment. Institutions using the internal models approach set out in Article 221 shall not use the treatment set out in this Article. 2. Institutions may apply a 0 % volatility adjustment where all the following conditions are met: both the exposure and the collateral are cash or debt securities issued by central governments or central banks within the meaning of Article 197(1)(b) and eligible for a 0 % risk weight under Chapter 2; (b) both the exposure and the collateral are denominated in the same currency; (c) either the maturity of the transaction is no more than one day or both the exposure and the collateral are subject to daily marking-to-market or daily re-margining; (d) the time between the last marking-to-market before a failure to re-margin by the counterparty and the liquidation of the collateral is no more than four business days; (e) the transaction is settled in a settlement system proven for that type of transaction; (f) the documentation covering the agreement or transaction is standard market documentation for repurchase transactions or securities lending or borrowing transactions in the securities concerned; (g) the transaction is governed by documentation specifying that where the counterparty fails to satisfy an obligation to deliver cash or securities or to deliver margin or otherwise defaults, then the transaction is immediately terminable; (h) the counterparty is considered a core market participant by the competent authorities. The core market participants referred to in point (h) of paragraph 2 shall include the following entities: the entities mentioned in Article 197(1)(b) exposures to which are assigned a 0 % risk weight under Chapter 2; (b) institutions; (d) regulated CIUs that are subject to capital or leverage requirements; (e) regulated pension funds; (f) recognised clearing organisations.
Article 228 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive method
1. Under the Standardised Approach, institutions shall use E* as calculated under Article 223(5) as the exposure value for the purposes of Article 113. In the case of off-balance sheet items listed in Annex I, institutions shall use E* as the value to which the percentages indicated in Article 111(1) shall be applied to arrive at the exposure value. 2. Under the IRB Approach, institutions shall use the effective LGD (LGD*) as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3. Institutions shall calculate LGD* as follows: where: LGD = the LGD that would apply to the exposure under Chapter 3 where the exposure was not collateralised; = the LGD that would apply to the exposure under Chapter 3 where the exposure was not collateralised; E = the exposure value in accordance with Article 223(3); the exposure value in accordance with Article 223(3); E* = the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). E* the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 228 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive method):
1. Under the Standardised Approach, institutions shall use E* as calculated under Article 223(5) as the exposure value for the purposes of Article 113. In the case of off-balance sheet items listed in Annex I, institutions shall use E* as the value to which the percentages indicated in Article 111(1) shall be applied to arrive at the exposure value. 2. Under the IRB Approach, institutions shall use the effective LGD (LGD*) as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3. Institutions shall calculate LGD* as follows: where: LGD = the LGD that would apply to the exposure under Chapter 3 where the exposure was not collateralised; E = the exposure value in accordance with Article 223(3); E* = the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). Under the IRB Approach, institutions shall use the effective LGD (LGD*) as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3. Institutions shall calculate LGD* as follows: where: LGD = the LGD that would apply to the exposure under Chapter 3 where the exposure was not collateralised; = the LGD that would apply to the exposure under Chapter 3 where the exposure was not collateralised; E = the exposure value in accordance with Article 223(3); the exposure value in accordance with Article 223(3); E* = the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5). E* the fully adjusted exposure value in accordance with Article 223(5).
Article 229 Valuation principles for other eligible collateral under the IRB Approach
1. For immovable property collateral, the collateral shall be valued by an independent valuer at or at less than the market value. An institution shall require the independent valuer to document the market value in a transparent and clear manner. In those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions the immovable property may instead be valued by an independent valuer at or at less than the mortgage lending value. Institutions shall require the independent valuer not to take into account speculative elements in the assessment of the mortgage lending value and to document that value in a transparent and clear manner. The value of the collateral shall be the market value or mortgage lending value reduced as appropriate to reflect the results of the monitoring required under Article 208(3) and to take account of any prior claims on the immovable property. 2. For receivables, the value of receivables shall be the amount receivable. 3. Institutions shall value physical collateral other than immovable property at its market value. For the purposes of this Article, the market value is the estimated amount for which the property would exchange on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm's-length transaction.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 229 Valuation principles for other eligible collateral under the IRB Approach):
1. For immovable property collateral, the collateral shall be valued by an independent valuer at or at less than the market value. An institution shall require the independent valuer to document the market value in a transparent and clear manner. In those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions the immovable property may instead be valued by an independent valuer at or at less than the mortgage lending value. Institutions shall require the independent valuer not to take into account speculative elements in the assessment of the mortgage lending value and to document that value in a transparent and clear manner. The value of the collateral shall be the market value or mortgage lending value reduced as appropriate to reflect the results of the monitoring required under Article 208(3) and to take account of any prior claims on the immovable property. 2. For receivables, the value of receivables shall be the amount receivable. 3. Institutions shall value physical collateral other than immovable property at its market value. For the purposes of this Article, the market value is the estimated amount for which the property would exchange on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm's-length transaction. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the criteria and factors to be considered for the assessment of the term ‘comparable property’, as referred to in paragraph 1, point (e). EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 10 July 2027. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 230 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts for other eligible collateral under the IRB Approach
1. Institutions shall use LGD* calculated in accordance with this paragraph and paragraph 2 as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3. Where the ratio of the value of the collateral (C) to the exposure value (E) is below the required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) as laid down in Table 5, LGD* shall be the LGD laid down in Chapter 3 for uncollateralised exposures to the counterparty. For this purpose, institutions shall calculate the exposure value of the items listed in Article 166(8) to (10) by using a conversion factor or percentage of 100 % rather than the conversion factors or percentages indicated in those paragraphs. Where the ratio of the value of the collateral to the exposure value exceeds a second, higher threshold level of C** as laid down in Table 5, LGD* shall be that prescribed in Table 5. Where the required level of collateralisation C** is not achieved in respect of the exposure as a whole, institutions shall consider the exposure to be two exposures — one corresponding to the part in respect of which the required level of collateralisation C** is achieved and one corresponding to the remainder. 2. The applicable LGD* and required collateralisation levels for the secured parts of exposures are set out in Table 5 of this paragraph. Table 5 Minimum LGD for secured parts of exposures LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % Table 5 Minimum LGD for secured parts of exposures LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Receivables 35 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Residential property/commercial immovable property Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 3. As an alternative to the treatment set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, and subject to Article 124(2), institutions may assign a 50 % risk weight to the part of the exposure that is, within the limits set out in Article 125(2)(d) and Article 126(2)(d) respectively, fully collateralised by residential property or commercial immovable property situated within the territory of a Member State where all the conditions in Article 199(3) or (4) are met.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 230 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts for other eligible collateral under the IRB Approach):
1. Institutions shall use LGD* calculated in accordance with this paragraph and paragraph 2 as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3. Where the ratio of the value of the collateral (C) to the exposure value (E) is below the required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) as laid down in Table 5, LGD* shall be the LGD laid down in Chapter 3 for uncollateralised exposures to the counterparty. For this purpose, institutions shall calculate the exposure value of the items listed in Article 166(8) to (10) by using a conversion factor or percentage of 100 % rather than the conversion factors or percentages indicated in those paragraphs. Where the ratio of the value of the collateral to the exposure value exceeds a second, higher threshold level of C** as laid down in Table 5, LGD* shall be that prescribed in Table 5. Where the required level of collateralisation C** is not achieved in respect of the exposure as a whole, institutions shall consider the exposure to be two exposures — one corresponding to the part in respect of which the required level of collateralisation C** is achieved and one corresponding to the remainder. 2. The applicable LGD* and required collateralisation levels for the secured parts of exposures are set out in Table 5 of this paragraph. Table 5 Minimum LGD for secured parts of exposures LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % The applicable LGD* and required collateralisation levels for the secured parts of exposures are set out in Table 5 of this paragraph. Table 5 Minimum LGD for secured parts of exposures LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % Table 5 Minimum LGD for secured parts of exposures LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) LGD* for senior exposure LGD* for subordinated exposures Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C*) Required minimum collateralisation level of the exposure (C**) Receivables 35 % 65 % 0 % 125 % Receivables 35 % Residential property/commercial immovable property 35 % 65 % 30 % 140 % Residential property/commercial immovable property Other collateral 40 % 70 % 30 % 140 % Other collateral 3. As an alternative to the treatment set out in paragraphs 1 and 2, and subject to Article 124(2), institutions may assign a 50 % risk weight to the part of the exposure that is, within the limits set out in Article 125(2)(d) and Article 126(2)(d) respectively, fully collateralised by residential property or commercial immovable property situated within the territory of a Member State where all the conditions in Article 199(3) or (4) are met.
Article 231 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts in the case of mixed pools of collateral
1. An institution shall calculate the value of LGD* that it shall use as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3 in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 where both the following conditions are met: (a) the institution uses the IRB Approach to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts; (b) an exposure is collateralised by both financial collateral and other eligible collateral. 2. Institutions shall be required to subdivide the volatility-adjusted value of the exposure, obtained by applying the volatility adjustment as set out in Article 223(5) to the value of the exposure, into parts so as to obtain a part covered by eligible financial collateral, a part covered by receivables, a part covered by commercial immovable property collateral or residential property collateral, a part covered by other eligible collateral, and the unsecured part, as applicable. 3. Institutions shall calculate LGD* for each part of the exposure obtained in paragraph 2 separately in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Chapter.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 231 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts in the case of mixed pools of collateral):
1. An institution shall calculate the value of LGD* that it shall use as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3 in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 where both the following conditions are met: (a) the institution uses the IRB Approach to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts; (b) an exposure is collateralised by both financial collateral and other eligible collateral. An institution shall calculate the value of LGD* that it shall use as the LGD for the purposes of Chapter 3 in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 where both the following conditions are met: (a) the institution uses the IRB Approach to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts; (b) an exposure is collateralised by both financial collateral and other eligible collateral. 2. Institutions shall be required to subdivide the volatility-adjusted value of the exposure, obtained by applying the volatility adjustment as set out in Article 223(5) to the value of the exposure, into parts so as to obtain a part covered by eligible financial collateral, a part covered by receivables, a part covered by commercial immovable property collateral or residential property collateral, a part covered by other eligible collateral, and the unsecured part, as applicable. 3. Institutions shall calculate LGD* for each part of the exposure obtained in paragraph 2 separately in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Chapter.
Article 232 Other funded credit protection
1. Where the conditions set out in Article 212(1) are met, a deposit with a third party institution may be treated as a guarantee by the third party institution. 2. Where the conditions set out in Article 212(2) are met, institutions shall subject the portion of the exposure collateralised by the current surrender value of life insurance policies pledged to the lending institution to the following treatment: (a) where the exposure is subject to the Standardised Approach, it shall be risk-weighted by using the risk weights specified in paragraph 3; (b) where the exposure is subject to the IRB Approach but not subject to the institution's own estimates of LGD, it shall be assigned an LGD of 40 %. In the event of a currency mismatch, institutions shall reduce the current surrender value in accordance with Article 233(3), the value of the credit protection being the current surrender value of the life insurance policy. 3. For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 2, institutions shall assign the following risk weights on the basis of the risk weight assigned to a senior unsecured exposure to the undertaking providing the life insurance: (a) a risk weight of 20 %, where the senior unsecured exposure to the undertaking providing the life insurance is assigned a risk weight of 20 %; (b) a risk weight of 35 %, where the senior unsecured exposure to the undertaking providing the life insurance is assigned a risk weight of 50 %; (c) a risk weight of 70 %, where the senior unsecured exposure to the undertaking providing the life insurance is assigned a risk weight of 100 %; (d) a risk weight of 150 %, where the senior unsecured exposure to the undertaking providing the life insurance is assigned a risk weight of 150 %. 4. Institutions may treat instruments repurchased on request that are eligible under Article 200(c) as a guarantee by the issuing institution. The value of the eligible credit protection shall be the following: (a) where the instrument will be repurchased at its face value, the value of the protection shall be that amount; (b) where the instrument will be repurchased at market price, the value of the protection shall be the value of the instrument valued in the same way as the debt securities that meet the conditions in Article 197(4). Sub-Section 2 Unfunded credit protection
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 232 Other funded credit protection):
1. Where the conditions set out in Article 212(1) are met, a deposit with a third party institution may be treated as a guarantee by the third party institution. In the event of a currency mismatch, institutions shall reduce the current surrender value in accordance with Article 233(3), the value of the credit protection being the current surrender value of the life insurance policy.
Article 233 Valuation
1. For the purpose of calculating the effects of unfunded credit protection in accordance with this Sub-section, the value of unfunded credit protection (G) shall be the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay in the event of the default or non-payment of the borrower or on the occurrence of other specified credit events. 2. In the case of credit derivatives which do not include as a credit event restructuring of the underlying obligation involving forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest or fees that result in a credit loss event the following shall apply: (a) where the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay is not higher than the exposure value, institutions shall reduce the value of the credit protection calculated under paragraph 1 by 40 %; (b) where the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay is higher than the exposure value, the value of the credit protection shall be no higher than 60 % of the exposure value. 3. Where unfunded credit protection is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure is denominated, institutions shall reduce the value of the credit protection by the application of a volatility adjustment as follows: where: G* = the amount of credit protection adjusted for foreign exchange risk, G* = the amount of credit protection adjusted for foreign exchange risk, G = the nominal amount of the credit protection; the nominal amount of the credit protection; H fx = the volatility adjustment for any currency mismatch between the credit protection and the underlying obligation determined in accordance with paragraph 4. H fx the volatility adjustment for any currency mismatch between the credit protection and the underlying obligation determined in accordance with paragraph 4. Where there is no currency mismatch H fx is equal to zero. 4. Institutions shall base the volatility adjustments for any currency mismatch on a 10 business day liquidation period, assuming daily revaluation, and may calculate them based on the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach or the Own Estimates Approach as set out in Articles 224 and 225 respectively. Institutions shall scale up the volatility adjustments in accordance with Article 226.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 233 Valuation):
1. For the purpose of calculating the effects of unfunded credit protection in accordance with this Sub-section, the value of unfunded credit protection (G) shall be the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay in the event of the default or non-payment of the borrower or on the occurrence of other specified credit events. 2. In the case of credit derivatives which do not include as a credit event restructuring of the underlying obligation involving forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest or fees that result in a credit loss event the following shall apply: (a) where the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay is not higher than the exposure value, institutions shall reduce the value of the credit protection calculated under paragraph 1 by 40 %; (b) where the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay is higher than the exposure value, the value of the credit protection shall be no higher than 60 % of the exposure value. In the case of credit derivatives which do not include as a credit event restructuring of the underlying obligation involving forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest or fees that result in a credit loss event the following shall apply: (a) where the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay is not higher than the exposure value, institutions shall reduce the value of the credit protection calculated under paragraph 1 by 40 %; (b) where the amount that the protection provider has undertaken to pay is higher than the exposure value, the value of the credit protection shall be no higher than 60 % of the exposure value. 3. Where unfunded credit protection is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure is denominated, institutions shall reduce the value of the credit protection by the application of a volatility adjustment as follows: where: G* = the amount of credit protection adjusted for foreign exchange risk, G = the nominal amount of the credit protection; H fx = the volatility adjustment for any currency mismatch between the credit protection and the underlying obligation determined in accordance with paragraph 4. Where unfunded credit protection is denominated in a currency different from that in which the exposure is denominated, institutions shall reduce the value of the credit protection by the application of a volatility adjustment as follows: where: G* = the amount of credit protection adjusted for foreign exchange risk, G* = the amount of credit protection adjusted for foreign exchange risk, G = the nominal amount of the credit protection; the nominal amount of the credit protection; H fx = the volatility adjustment for any currency mismatch between the credit protection and the underlying obligation determined in accordance with paragraph 4. H fx the volatility adjustment for any currency mismatch between the credit protection and the underlying obligation determined in accordance with paragraph 4. Where there is no currency mismatch H fx is equal to zero. 4. Institutions shall base the volatility adjustments for any currency mismatch on a 10 business day liquidation period, assuming daily revaluation, and may calculate them based on the Supervisory Volatility Adjustments Approach or the Own Estimates Approach as set out in Articles 224 and 225 respectively. Institutions shall scale up the volatility adjustments in accordance with Article 226.
Article 234 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts in the event of partial protection and tranching
Where an institution transfers a part of the risk of a loan in one or more tranches, the rules set out in Chapter 5 shall apply. Institutions may consider materiality thresholds on payments below which no payment shall be made in the event of loss to be equivalent to retained first loss positions and to give rise to a tranched transfer of risk.
Article 235 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach
1. For the purposes of Article 113(3) institutions shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with the following formula: where: E = the exposure value in accordance with Article 111; for this purpose, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet item listed in Annex I shall be 100 % of its value rather than the exposure value indicated in Article 111(1); = the exposure value in accordance with Article 111; for this purpose, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet item listed in Annex I shall be 100 % of its value rather than the exposure value indicated in Article 111(1); G A = the amount of credit risk protection as calculated under Article 233(3) (G*) further adjusted for any maturity mismatch as laid down in Section 5; G A the amount of credit risk protection as calculated under Article 233(3) (G*) further adjusted for any maturity mismatch as laid down in Section 5; r = the risk weight of exposures to the obligor as specified under Chapter 2; the risk weight of exposures to the obligor as specified under Chapter 2; g = the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under Chapter 2. the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under Chapter 2. 2. Where the protected amount (G A ) is less than the exposure (E), institutions may apply the formula specified in paragraph 1 only where the protected and unprotected parts of the exposure are of equal seniority. 3. Institutions may extend the treatment set out in Article 114(4) and (7) to exposures or parts of exposures guaranteed by the central government or central bank, where the guarantee is denominated in the domestic currency of the borrower and the exposure is funded in that currency.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 235 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach):
1. For the purposes of Article 113(3) institutions shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with the following formula: where: E = the exposure value in accordance with Article 111; for this purpose, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet item listed in Annex I shall be 100 % of its value rather than the exposure value indicated in Article 111(1); G A = the amount of credit risk protection as calculated under Article 233(3) (G*) further adjusted for any maturity mismatch as laid down in Section 5; r = the risk weight of exposures to the obligor as specified under Chapter 2; g = the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under Chapter 2. For the purposes of Article 113(3) institutions shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with the following formula: where: E = the exposure value in accordance with Article 111; for this purpose, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet item listed in Annex I shall be 100 % of its value rather than the exposure value indicated in Article 111(1); = the exposure value in accordance with Article 111; for this purpose, the exposure value of an off-balance sheet item listed in Annex I shall be 100 % of its value rather than the exposure value indicated in Article 111(1); G A = the amount of credit risk protection as calculated under Article 233(3) (G*) further adjusted for any maturity mismatch as laid down in Section 5; G A the amount of credit risk protection as calculated under Article 233(3) (G*) further adjusted for any maturity mismatch as laid down in Section 5; r = the risk weight of exposures to the obligor as specified under Chapter 2; the risk weight of exposures to the obligor as specified under Chapter 2; g = the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under Chapter 2. the risk weight of exposures to the protection provider as specified under Chapter 2. 2. Where the protected amount (G A ) is less than the exposure (E), institutions may apply the formula specified in paragraph 1 only where the protected and unprotected parts of the exposure are of equal seniority. 3. Institutions may extend the treatment set out in Article 114(4) and (7) to exposures or parts of exposures guaranteed by the central government or central bank, where the guarantee is denominated in the domestic currency of the borrower and the exposure is funded in that currency.
Article 236 Calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts under the IRB Approach
1. For the covered portion of the exposure value (E), based on the adjusted value of the credit protection G A , the PD for the purposes of Section 4 of Chapter 3 may be the PD of the protection provider, or a PD between that of the borrower and that of the guarantor where a full substitution is deemed not to be warranted. In the case of subordinated exposures and non-subordinated unfunded protection, the LGD to be applied by institutions for the purposes of Section 4 of Chapter 3 may be that associated with senior claims. 2. For any uncovered portion of the exposure value (E) the PD shall be that of the borrower and the LGD shall be that of the underlying exposure. 3. For the purposes of this Article, G A is the value of G* as calculated under Article 233(3) further adjusted for any maturity mismatch as laid down in Section 5. E is the exposure value determined in accordance with Section 5 of Chapter 3. For this purpose, institutions shall calculate the exposure value of the items listed in Article 166(8) to (10) by using a conversion factor or percentage of 100 % rather than the conversion factors or percentages indicated in those paragraphs.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal This proposal aims to amend Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) to maintain the current transitional approach to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement. The NSFR requirement is part of the Basel III international standards, which the European Union (EU) agreed to implement as part of the wide-ranging reform of the prudential framework for banks in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The NSFR requirement aims to ensure that banks have stable funding sources to fund their activities and reduce their dependency on short-term wholesale funding. It was designed to mitigate maturity transformation risk, as a globally consistent regulatory requirement, aiming to foster convergence across jurisdictions and eliminate opportunities for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. In particular, the Basel NSFR standard introduces a minimum requirement on the amount of stable funding that banks must issue to finance their activities, based on the liquidity profile of their assets. It mitigates a bank’s liquidity risk by setting a required stable funding (RSF) level based on the bank’s assets, which is then compared to the available stable funding (ASF) that results from their liability instruments. Securities Financing Transactions ( SFT s) as defined u nder Article 4(1 ), point 139 of the CRR encompass different secured transaction types in which assets (collateral) are exchanged for cash: (i) rep urchase (rep os ) and reverse-repurchase (reverse-repos) , (ii) securities lending , (iii) buy-sell-back , and (iv) margin lending. Repos and reverse-repos make up the largest share of SFTs, account ing for 68% of the total, followed by securities lending ( 23% ) , buy-sell-back ( 8% ) , and margin lending ( 1% ) (September 2023 data) 1 . A repo is a collateralised and generally short-term borrowing transaction. A reverse-repo is a collateralised lending transaction, mirroring a repo transaction, where a bank (the lender) temporarily purchases securities or commodities (i.e. collateral) from a counterparty (the borrower) in exchange for cash with a commitment to sell the collateral back in the future at a predetermined price. Unsecured lending transactions are loans that are not secured by any collateral. They are based on the borrower’s creditworthiness and promise to repay. They were mainly found on the interbank markets before the GFC. Since the GFC and the closure of the unsecured interbank markets, SFTs have play ed a crucial role in the circulation of short-term funding between banks and market players through collateralised transactions. SFT market activity also links the short-term money market to the longer-term capital market. The bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. SFT s are characterised as a high-volume, low-margin business activity for large banks, and th is wholesale market activity is prone to international competition as highlighted by the very cross-border nature of these transactions . Only 41% of the EU SFT amount s are between EU counterparties , meanwhile 59% of the EU SFT amount s involve one non-EU counterparty 2 . For monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months, the Basel NSFR standard requires a conservative non-zero RSF requirement on banks. The objective is to discourage excessive short-term exposures between banks, which may give rise to contagion during times of financial distress. The NSFR standard was implemented in EU law on 20 May 2019 through an amendment of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2). The related requirements entered into application at the end of June 2021. In its proposal amending the CRR, published on 23 November 2016 3 , the Commission suggested the permanent use of RSF levels low e r than those included in the Basel accord . The Commission concluded at the time that ‘ it seems reasonable to bring limited changes to the treatment of both short-term transactions with financial institutions, and of HQLA Level 1 [ in order ] not to hinder the good functioning of EU financial and repo markets ’ . The arguments and analysis that led to this approach and the impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal are still valid 4 . The co-legislators , however, allowed for a transitional 0% RSF requirement – instead of the 10% RSF specified in the Basel III standards and the lower one (5%) proposed by the Commission – for monies due from SFTs with maturities up to six months , when collateralised with Level 1 High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) 5 , such as sovereign debt. This provision is set to expire in June 2025, when the non-zero RSF requirement set out in the Basel standard would start to apply. The transitional provision aimed to give banks sufficient time to adapt to the more conservative requirement imposed by the Basel standards and to mitigate any consequential effect on the EU capital market, and in particular on the sovereign debt market. Similar transitional provisions were also agreed for short-term monies due from SFTs collateralised by assets other than Level 1 HQLA and for short-term unsecured transactions with financial customers. These exposures are relatively less material compared to monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA. They are also characterised by higher margins. The considerations of the co-legislators when granting a transitional treatment for these transactions were their inherent funding characteristics and the impact of the level of RSF factors for these transactions on the market liquidity, especially of assets received as collateral in SFT transactions. The transitional prudential charge defined by co-legislators maintains a difference in the stable funding requirement that is consistent with the Basel standard, between monies due from SFTs collateralised by Level 1 HQLA, such as sovereign bonds, and monies due from SFTs collateralised by other assets. It contributes however not to increase the pressure on very high-quality collateral, beyond addressing the sovereign-bank nexus. It also supports the market liquidity and the diversity of collateral assets eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks, under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). As regards unsecured funding transactions with a residual maturity below six months, with financial customers, the transitional treatment aims to apply a proportionate funding requirement to these transactions, in line with their funding risk profile, and to support the revive of the unsecured funding market that vanished after the 2008 GFC. Unsecured funding transactions should indeed be considered as a necessary complement to secured funding transactions such as SFTs, to support overall market liquidity and monetary policy transmission, in particular during periods of monetary policy tightening. The United States , the United Kingdom , Japan and Switzerland have adopted a similar treatment as the EU’s transitional treatment, but these countries have made it a permanent one . The US agencies argue that ‘ the 0% RSF factor assignment was made based on the determination that Level 1 HQLA pose minimal liquidity risk and contribute importantly to the good functioning of short-term funding markets, i.e. that a non-zero RSF factor on Level 1 HQLA could discourage intermediation in US Treasury and repo markets ’ 6 . The end of the current transitional treatment and the resulting tightening of the NSFR requirement in the EU raises some concerns. It could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and reduce the liquidity in these markets because these high-volume low-margin transactions would become more costly. Further increasing the costs of these transactions when operated by EU counterparties, while 59% of EU transactions already involve one non-EU counterparty, may develop the attractiveness of non-EU counterparties or non-EU capital markets. This would contradict the development and sustainability of capital markets and liquidity for collateral assets, such as sovereign bonds, in the EU. If the EU was to increase the RSF factors for these transactions, in a unilateral way, it would distort the international level playing field, putting EU banks at a disadvantage compared to non-EU peers operating on this very international and competitive activity. Somehow, reinforcing the unlevel playing field would be at odd with one of the initial objectives of the Basel standards to support the implementation of globally consistent regulatory requirements and to reduce opportunities for cross border regulatory arbitrage. Conversely, maintaining the current treatment, in line with the approach retained by other jurisdictions, may support the development of a liquid and attractive sovereign debt market and a deep SFT market for EU collateral instruments. The current requirements have proven to be prudentially sound since their entry into application in mid-2021 and do not seem to have raised any financial stability concerns, in particular during the recent stress episodes (Russian aggression, UK Gilt crisis, March 2023 banking turmoil). Since mid-2021, EU banks have built up strong NSFR buffers, beyond minimum requirements, subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. Any effect of maintaining the transitional treatment will continue to be monitored and subject to adequate supervisory scrutiny, including on banks’ funding practices and liquidity risk profile, through ongoing supervision and periodic reports. Under Article 510(7) of the CRR2, the Commission is required to assess the relevance of the transitional NSFR treatment of monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions, with financial customers, with a residual maturity below six months, by the end of June 2024, based on a report from the European Banking Authority (EBA). As explained in Section 3, the EBA’s report only analysed the impact on banks’ NSFR levels, that appears negligible. However, a broader analysis points to possible undesirable effects of moving towards the RSF prescribed by Basel accord. The EU’s SFT market plays a crucial role in financing EU government debt as the bulk of SFTs are collateralised by sovereign debt. In addition, maintaining the transitional treatment supports the liquidity and diversity of assets that are also eligible to the liquidity buffer of banks under the LCR. It may indeed not be appropriate to disconnect the two dimensions of the liquidity requirements. It is also important to maintain the existing steps between the RSF factors for sovereign bonds collateral and other collateral used in SFTs as doing otherwise would affect the preference for one or the other, thereby risking reinforcing the pressure on (scarce) high quality collateral, beyond contributing to the sovereign-bank nexus. The unsecured funding market for banks has vanished after the 2008 GFC and has never been revived, at least not to a significant level. A non-zero RSF factor already applies to short-term unsecured transactions under the NSFR. An increase in this factor will not materially strengthen the prudential profile of banks, i.e. the impact on the NSFR would be negligible, while it may disincentivise the use of unsecured funding transactions that may prove helpful in a period of monetary policy tightening. An increase in the RSF level applicable to monies due from SFTs and unsecured transactions could discourage EU banks from intermediating in government debt and other collateral and reduce liquidity in the EU capital markets overall. An increase in the RSF for these transactions will not lead to a material change in the average level of the NSFR ratio of EU banks that already appears above the minimum requirements and is already subject to an ongoing supervision by competent authorities. It will therefore not change fundamentally the prudential profile of EU banks. This, in turn, could increase funding costs for Member States and EU market players in a period of normalised monetary policy when central banks are expected to reduce their market presence and private market players are expected to take over. To avoid possible unintended consequences on capital markets liquidity and considering the safeguards provided by the current framework for banks, the Commission proposes to maintain the transitional treatment for monies due from SFT and for unsecured transactions with a residual maturity of less than six months, with financial customers. In addition to the ongoing monitoring of capital market developments by central banks and to the ongoing supervision by competent authorities, the Commission also proposes to mandate the EBA to report the impact of this treatment every 5 years. This would allow the Commission to act accordingly and propose amendments if evidence emerges from these periodic monitoring reports.
Article 237 Maturity mismatch
1. For the purpose of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts, a maturity mismatch occurs when the residual maturity of the credit protection is less than that of the protected exposure. Where protection has a residual maturity of less than three months and the maturity of the protection is less than the maturity of the underlying exposure that protection does not qualify as eligible credit protection. 2. Where there is a maturity mismatch the credit protection shall not qualify as eligible where either of the following conditions is met: (a) the original maturity of the protection is less than one year; (b) the exposure is a short term exposure specified by the competent authorities as being subject to a one-day floor rather than a one-year floor in respect of the maturity value (M) under Article 162(3).
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 237 Maturity mismatch):
1. For the purpose of calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts, a maturity mismatch occurs when the residual maturity of the credit protection is less than that of the protected exposure. Where protection has a residual maturity of less than three months and the maturity of the protection is less than the maturity of the underlying exposure that protection does not qualify as eligible credit protection.
Article 238 Maturity of credit protection
1. Subject to a maximum of five years, the effective maturity of the underlying shall be the longest possible remaining time before the obligor is scheduled to fulfil its obligations. Subject to paragraph 2, the maturity of the credit protection shall be the time to the earliest date at which the protection may terminate or be terminated. 2. Where there is an option to terminate the protection which is at the discretion of the protection seller, institutions shall take the maturity of the protection to be the time to the earliest date at which that option may be exercised. Where there is an option to terminate the protection which is at the discretion of the protection buyer and the terms of the arrangement at origination of the protection contain a positive incentive for the institution to call the transaction before contractual maturity, an institution shall take the maturity of the protection to be the time to the earliest date at which that option may be exercised; otherwise the institution may consider that such an option does not affect the maturity of the protection. 3. Where a credit derivative is not prevented from terminating prior to expiration of any grace period required for a default on the underlying obligation to occur as a result of a failure to pay institutions shall reduce the maturity of the protection by the length of the grace period.
Article 239 Valuation of protection
1. For transactions subject to funded credit protection under the Financial Collateral Simple Method, where there is a mismatch between the maturity of the exposure and the maturity of the protection, the collateral does not qualify as eligible funded credit protection. 2. For transactions subject to funded credit protection under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method, institutions shall reflect the maturity of the credit protection and of the exposure in the adjusted value of the collateral in accordance with the following formula: where: C VA = the volatility adjusted value of the collateral as specified in Article 223(2) or the amount of the exposure, whichever is lower; C VA = the volatility adjusted value of the collateral as specified in Article 223(2) or the amount of the exposure, whichever is lower; t = the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; T = the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; t* = 0,25. t* 0,25. Institutions shall use C VAM as C VA further adjusted for maturity mismatch in the formula for the calculation of the fully adjusted value of the exposure (E*) set out in Article 223(5). 3. For transactions subject to unfunded credit protection, institutions shall reflect the maturity of the credit protection and of the exposure in the adjusted value of the credit protection in accordance with the following formula: G A = G* adjusted for any maturity mismatch; G A G* adjusted for any maturity mismatch; G* = the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch; G* the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch; t = is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; T = is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; Institutions shall use G A as the value of the protection for the purposes of Articles 233 to 236.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 239 Valuation of protection):
1. For transactions subject to funded credit protection under the Financial Collateral Simple Method, where there is a mismatch between the maturity of the exposure and the maturity of the protection, the collateral does not qualify as eligible funded credit protection. 2. For transactions subject to funded credit protection under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method, institutions shall reflect the maturity of the credit protection and of the exposure in the adjusted value of the collateral in accordance with the following formula: where: C VA = the volatility adjusted value of the collateral as specified in Article 223(2) or the amount of the exposure, whichever is lower; t = the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; T = the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; t* = 0,25. For transactions subject to funded credit protection under the Financial Collateral Comprehensive Method, institutions shall reflect the maturity of the credit protection and of the exposure in the adjusted value of the collateral in accordance with the following formula: where: C VA = the volatility adjusted value of the collateral as specified in Article 223(2) or the amount of the exposure, whichever is lower; C VA = the volatility adjusted value of the collateral as specified in Article 223(2) or the amount of the exposure, whichever is lower; t = the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; T = the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; t* = 0,25. t* 0,25. Institutions shall use C VAM as C VA further adjusted for maturity mismatch in the formula for the calculation of the fully adjusted value of the exposure (E*) set out in Article 223(5). 3. For transactions subject to unfunded credit protection, institutions shall reflect the maturity of the credit protection and of the exposure in the adjusted value of the credit protection in accordance with the following formula: where: G A = G* adjusted for any maturity mismatch; G* = the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch; t = is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; T = is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; t* = 0,25. For transactions subject to unfunded credit protection, institutions shall reflect the maturity of the credit protection and of the exposure in the adjusted value of the credit protection in accordance with the following formula: G A = G* adjusted for any maturity mismatch; G A G* adjusted for any maturity mismatch; G* = the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch; G* the amount of the protection adjusted for any currency mismatch; t = is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the credit protection calculated in accordance with Article 238, or the value of T, whichever is lower; T = is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; is the number of years remaining to the maturity date of the exposure calculated in accordance with Article 238, or five years, whichever is lower; Institutions shall use G A as the value of the protection for the purposes of Articles 233 to 236.