Article 25 Recognition of a third-country CCP
1. A CCP established in a third country may provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the Union only where that CCP is recognised by ESMA. 2. ESMA, after consulting the authorities referred to in paragraph 3, may recognise a CCP established in a third country that has applied for recognition to provide certain clearing services or activities where: (a) the Commission has adopted an implementing act in accordance with paragraph 6; (b) the CCP is authorised in the relevant third country, and is subject to effective supervision and enforcement ensuring full compliance with the prudential requirements applicable in that third country; (c) cooperation arrangements have been established pursuant to paragraph 7; (d) the CCP is established or authorised in a third country that is not considered, by the Commission in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 8 ), as having strategic deficiencies in its national anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism regime that poses significant threats to the financial system of the Union. 3. When assessing whether the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are met, ESMA shall consult: (a) the competent authority of a Member State in which the CCP provides or intends to provide clearing services and which has been selected by the CCP; (b) the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in the three Member States which make or are anticipated by the CCP to make the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP referred to in Article 42 on an aggregate basis over a one-year period; (c) the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of trading venues located in the Union, served or to be served by the CCP; (d) the competent authorities supervising CCPs established in the Union with which interoperability arrangements have been established; (e) the relevant members of the ESCB of the Member States in which the CCP provides or intends to provide clearing services and the relevant members of the ESCB responsible for the oversight of the CCPs with which interoperability arrangements have been established; (f) the central banks of issue of the most relevant Union currencies of the financial instruments cleared or to be cleared. 4. The CCP referred to in paragraph 1 shall submit its application to ESMA. The applicant CCP shall provide ESMA with all information necessary for its recognition. Within 30 working days of receipt, ESMA shall assess whether the application is complete. If the application is not complete, ESMA shall set a deadline by which the applicant CCP has to provide additional information. The recognition decision shall be based on the conditions set out in paragraph 2 and shall be independent of any assessment as the basis for the equivalence decision as referred to in Article 13(3). ESMA shall consult the authorities and entities referred to in paragraph 3 prior to taking its decision. Within 180 working days of the submission of a complete application, ESMA shall inform the applicant CCP in writing, with a fully reasoned explanation, whether the recognition has been granted or refused. ESMA shall publish on its website a list of the CCPs recognised in accordance with this Regulation. 5. ESMA shall, after consulting the authorities and entities referred to in paragraph 3, review the recognition of the CCP established in a third country where that CCP has extended the range of its activities and services in the Union. That review shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. ESMA may withdraw the recognition of that CCP where the conditions set out in paragraph 2 are no longer met and in the same circumstances as those described in Article 20. 6. The Commission may adopt an implementing act under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, determining that the legal and supervisory arrangements of a third country ensure that CCPs authorised in that third country comply with legally binding requirements which are equivalent to the requirements laid down in Title IV of this Regulation, that those CCPs are subject to effective supervision and enforcement in that third country on an ongoing basis and that the legal framework of that third country provides for an effective equivalent system for the recognition of CCPs authorised under third-country legal regimes. 7. ESMA shall establish cooperation arrangements with the relevant competent authorities of third countries whose legal and supervisory frameworks have been recognised as equivalent to this Regulation in accordance with paragraph 6. Such arrangements shall specify at least: (a) the mechanism for the exchange of information between ESMA and the competent authorities of the third countries concerned, including access to all information requested by ESMA regarding CCPs authorised in third countries; (b) the mechanism for prompt notification to ESMA where a third-country competent authority deems a CCP it is supervising to be in breach of the conditions of its authorisation or of other law to which it is subject; (c) the mechanism for prompt notification to ESMA by a third-country competent authority where a CCP it is supervising has been granted the right to provide clearing services to clearing members or clients established in the Union; (d) the procedures concerning the coordination of supervisory activities including, where appropriate, on-site inspections. 8. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the information that the applicant CCP shall provide ESMA in its application for recognition. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 25 Recognition of a third-country CCP):
1. A CCP established in a third country may only provide clearing services to clearing members or trading venues established in the Union where that CCP is recognised by ESMA. 2. ESMA, after consulting the authorities referred to in paragraph 3, may recognise a CCP established in a third country that has applied for recognition to provide certain clearing services or activities where: (a) the Commission has adopted an implementing act in accordance with paragraph 6; (b) the CCP is authorised in the relevant third country, and is subject to effective supervision and enforcement ensuring full compliance with the prudential requirements applicable in that third country; (c) cooperation arrangements have been established pursuant to paragraph 7; (d) the CCP is established or authorised in a third country that is not considered, by the Commission in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 15 ), as having strategic deficiencies in its national anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism regime that poses significant threats to the financial system of the Union; (e) the CCP has not been determined as systemically important or likely to become systemically important in accordance with paragraph 2a and is therefore a Tier 1 CCP. ESMA shall, after consulting the ESRB and the central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3, determine whether a third-country CCP is systemically important or likely to become systemically important for the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States (Tier 2 CCP) by taking into account all of the following criteria: the nature, size and complexity of the CCP's business in the Union, and outside the Union to the extent its business may have a systemic impact on the Union or on one or more of its Member States, including: (i) the value in aggregate terms and in each Union currency of transactions cleared by the CCP, or the aggregate exposure of the CCP engaged in clearing activities to its clearing members and, to the extent the information is available, their clients and indirect clients established in the Union, including where they have been designated by Member States as other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) pursuant to Article 131(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU; and (ii) the risk profile of the CCP in terms of, amongst others, legal, operational and business risk; the effect that the failure of or a disruption to the CCP would have on: (i) financial markets, including the liquidity of the markets served; (ii) financial institutions; (iii) the broader financial system; or (iv) the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States; (c) the CCP's clearing membership structure including, to the extent the information is available, the structure of its clearing members' network of clients and indirect clients, established in the Union; (d) the extent to which alternative clearing services provided by other CCPs exist in financial instruments denominated in Union currencies for clearing members and, to the extent the information is available, their clients and indirect clients established in the Union; (e) the CCP's relationships, interdependencies, or other interactions with other financial market infrastructures, other financial institutions and the broader financial system to the extent that that is likely to have an impact on the financial stability of the Union or one or more of its Member States. The Commission shall adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 82 to specify further the criteria set out in the first subparagraph by 2 January 2021. Without prejudice to the outcome of the recognition process, ESMA shall, after conducting the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph, inform the applicant CCP whether or not it is considered to be a Tier 1 CCP within 30 working days of the determination that that CCP's application is complete in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 4. 2b. Where ESMA determines a CCP to be systemically important or likely to become systemically important (Tier 2 CCP) in accordance with paragraph 2a, it shall only recognise that CCP to provide certain clearing services or activities where, in addition to the conditions referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2, the following conditions are fulfilled: the CCP complies, at the moment of recognition and thereafter on an ongoing basis, with the requirements set out in Article 16 and in Titles IV and V. With regard to the CCP's compliance with Articles 41, 44, 46, 50 and 54, ESMA shall consult the central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3 in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 24b(1). ESMA shall take into account, in accordance with Article 25a, the extent to which a CCP's compliance with those requirements is satisfied by its compliance with comparable requirements applicable in the third country; the central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3 have provided ESMA with written confirmation, within 30 working days of the determination that a third-country CCP is not a Tier 1 CCP in accordance with paragraph 2a or following the review in accordance with paragraph 5, that the CCP complies with the following requirements that those central banks of issue may have imposed in the carrying out of their monetary policy tasks: (i) to submit any information which the central bank of issue may require upon its reasoned request, where that information has not otherwise been obtained by ESMA; (ii) to fully and duly cooperate with the central bank of issue in the context of the assessment of the CCP's resilience to adverse market developments carried out in accordance with Article 25b(3); (iii) to open or notify the intent to open, in accordance with relevant access criteria and requirements, an overnight deposit account with the central bank of issue; (iv) to comply with requirements, applied in exceptional situations by the central bank of issue, within its competences to address temporary systemic liquidity risks affecting the transmission of monetary policy or the smooth operation of payment systems, and relating to liquidity risk control, margin requirements, collateral, settlement arrangements or interoperability arrangements. The requirements referred to in subpoint (iv) shall ensure the efficiency, soundness and resilience of CCPs and be aligned with those set out in Article 16 and in Titles IV and V of this Regulation. The application of the requirements referred to in subpoint (iv) shall be a condition for recognition for a limited period of time of up to six months. Where at the end of that period the central bank of issue considers that the exceptional situation persists, the application of the requirements for recognition purposes may be extended once by an additional period not exceeding six months. The central bank of issue shall also inform the European Parliament and the Council before extending the application of requirements referred to in subpoint (iv). The central bank of issue shall cooperate and share information on a continuous basis with ESMA and the other central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3 in relation to the requirements referred to in subpoint (iv), in particular in relation to the assessment of systemic liquidity risks and the effects of the imposed requirements on the efficiency, soundness and resilience of CCPs. Where a central bank of issue imposes any of the requirements referred to in this point after a Tier 2 CCP has been recognised, compliance with any such requirement shall be considered as a condition for recognition and the central banks of issue shall provide ESMA with written confirmation, within 90 working days, that the CCP complies with the requirement. Where a central bank of issue has not provided a written confirmation to ESMA within the deadline, ESMA may consider that requirement to be fulfilled; the CCP has provided ESMA with: (i) a written statement, signed by its legal representative, expressing the unconditional consent of the CCP to: — provide within three working days after service of a request by ESMA any documents, records, information and data held by that CCP at the time the request is served, and — allow ESMA to access any of the CCP's business premises; (ii) a reasoned legal opinion by an independent legal expert confirming that the consent expressed is valid and enforceable under the relevant applicable laws; the CCP has provided ESMA with: (i) a written statement, signed by its legal representative, expressing the unconditional consent of the CCP to: — provide within three working days after service of a request by ESMA any documents, records, information and data held by that CCP at the time the request is served, and — allow ESMA to access any of the CCP's business premises; a written statement, signed by its legal representative, expressing the unconditional consent of the CCP to: — provide within three working days after service of a request by ESMA any documents, records, information and data held by that CCP at the time the request is served, and — allow ESMA to access any of the CCP's business premises; (ii) a reasoned legal opinion by an independent legal expert confirming that the consent expressed is valid and enforceable under the relevant applicable laws; the CCP has implemented all necessary measures and established all necessary procedures to ensure the effective compliance with the requirements laid down in points (a) and (c); (e) the Commission has not adopted an implementing act in accordance with paragraph 2c. 2c. ESMA, after consulting the ESRB and in agreement with the central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3 in accordance with Article 24b(3) and commensurate with the degree of systemic importance of the CCP in accordance with paragraph 2a of this Article, may, on the basis of a fully reasoned assessment, conclude that a CCP or some of its clearing services are of such substantial systemic importance that that CCP should not be recognised to provide certain clearing services or activities. The agreement of a central bank of issue shall only relate to the currency it issues and not to the recommendation as a whole as referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph. In its assessment ESMA shall also: (a) explain how compliance with the conditions set out in paragraph 2b would not sufficiently address the financial stability risk for the Union or for one or more of its Member States; (b) describe the characteristics of the clearing services provided by the CCP, including the liquidity and physical settlement requirements associated with the provision of such services; provide a quantitative technical assessment of the costs and benefits and consequences of a decision not to recognise the CCP to provide certain clearing services or activities, taking into account: (i) the existence of potential alternative substitutes for the provision of the clearing services concerned in the currencies concerned to clearing members, and to the extent the information is available, their clients and indirect clients established in the Union; (ii) the potential consequences of including the outstanding contracts held at the CCP within the scope of the implementing act. provide a quantitative technical assessment of the costs and benefits and consequences of a decision not to recognise the CCP to provide certain clearing services or activities, taking into account: (i) the existence of potential alternative substitutes for the provision of the clearing services concerned in the currencies concerned to clearing members, and to the extent the information is available, their clients and indirect clients established in the Union; (ii) the potential consequences of including the outstanding contracts held at the CCP within the scope of the implementing act. On the basis of its assessment, ESMA shall recommend that the Commission adopt an implementing act confirming that that CCP should not be recognised to provide certain clearing services or activities. The Commission shall have a minimum of 30 working days to assess ESMA's recommendation. After submission of the recommendation referred to in the second subparagraph, the Commission may, as a measure of last resort, adopt an implementing act specifying: (a) that following the adaptation period specified by the Commission in accordance with point (b) of this subparagraph, some or all of the clearing services of that third-country CCP can only be provided to clearing members and trading venues established in the Union by that CCP after it has been authorised to do so in accordance with Article 14; (b) an appropriate adaptation period for the CCP, its clearing members and their clients. The adaptation period shall not exceed two years, and may only be extended once by an additional period of six months where the reasons for granting an adaptation period still exist; (c) the conditions under which that CCP may continue to provide certain clearing services or activities during the adaptation period referred to in point (b); (d) any measures that shall be taken during the adaptation period, in order to limit the potential costs to clearing members and their clients, in particular those established in the Union. In specifying the services and adaptation period referred to in points (a) and (b) of the fourth subparagraph, the Commission shall consider: (a) the characteristics of the services offered by the CCP and their substitutability; (b) whether and to what extent, outstanding cleared transactions shall be included within the scope of the implementing act, taking into account the legal and economic consequences of that inclusion; (c) the potential cost implications to clearing members and, where that information is available, their clients, in particular those established in the Union. The implementing act shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 86(2). When assessing whether the conditions referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2 are met, ESMA shall consult: (a) the competent authority of a Member State in which the CCP provides or intends to provide clearing services and which has been selected by the CCP; (b) the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of the clearing members of the CCP that are established in the three Member States which make or are anticipated by the CCP to make the largest contributions to the default fund of the CCP referred to in Article 42 on an aggregate basis over a one-year period; (c) the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of trading venues located in the Union, served or to be served by the CCP; (d) the competent authorities supervising CCPs established in the Union with which interoperability arrangements have been established; (e) the relevant members of the ESCB of the Member States in which the CCP provides or intends to provide clearing services and the relevant members of the ESCB responsible for the oversight of the CCPs with which interoperability arrangements have been established; (f) the central banks of issue of all Union currencies of the financial instruments cleared or to be cleared by the CCP. 4. The CCP referred to in paragraph 1 shall submit its application to ESMA. The applicant CCP shall provide ESMA with all information necessary for its recognition. Within 30 working days of receipt, ESMA shall assess whether the application is complete. If the application is not complete, ESMA shall set a deadline by which the applicant CCP is to provide additional information. ESMA shall immediately transmit all information received from the applicant CCP to the third-country CCP college. ESMA shall publish on its website a list of the CCPs recognised in accordance with this Regulation, indicating their classification as Tier 1 CCPs or Tier 2 CCPs. 5. ESMA shall, after consulting the authorities and entities referred to in paragraph 3, review the recognition of a CCP established in a third country: (a) if that CCP intends to extend or reduce the range of its activities and services in the Union, in which case the CCP shall inform ESMA thereof submitting all necessary information; and (b) in any case at least every five years. That review shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 4. Where, following the review referred to in the first subparagraph, ESMA determines that a third-country CCP that has been classified as Tier 1 CCP should be classified as a Tier 2 CCP, ESMA shall set an appropriate adaptation period which shall not exceed 18 months within which the CCP must comply with the requirements referred to in paragraph 2b. ESMA may extend that adaptation period by up to an additional six months upon the reasoned request of the CCP or competent authority responsible for the supervision of the clearing members, where such extension is justified by exceptional circumstances and implications for the clearing members established in the Union. ESMA shall, after consulting the authorities and entities referred to in paragraph 3, review the recognition of a CCP established in a third country: (a) if that CCP intends to extend or reduce the range of its activities and services in the Union, in which case the CCP shall inform ESMA thereof submitting all necessary information; and (b) in any case at least every five years. That review shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 4. Where, following the review referred to in the first subparagraph, ESMA determines that a third-country CCP that has been classified as Tier 1 CCP should be classified as a Tier 2 CCP, ESMA shall set an appropriate adaptation period which shall not exceed 18 months within which the CCP must comply with the requirements referred to in paragraph 2b. ESMA may extend that adaptation period by up to an additional six months upon the reasoned request of the CCP or competent authority responsible for the supervision of the clearing members, where such extension is justified by exceptional circumstances and implications for the clearing members established in the Union. The Commission may adopt an implementing act under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, determining that: (a) the legal and supervisory arrangements of a third country ensure that CCPs authorised in that third country comply on an ongoing basis with legally binding requirements which are equivalent to the requirements laid down in Title IV of this Regulation; (b) those CCPs are subject to effective supervision and enforcement in that third country on an ongoing basis; (c) the legal framework of that third country provides for an effective equivalent system for the recognition of CCPs authorised under third-country legal regimes. The Commission may subject the application of the implementing act referred to in the first subparagraph to the effective fulfilment of any requirement set out therein by a third country on an ongoing basis and to the ability by ESMA to effectively exercise its responsibilities in relation to third-country CCPs recognised under paragraphs 2 and 2b or in relation to monitoring referred to in paragraph 6b, including by way of agreeing and applying the cooperation arrangements referred to in paragraph 7. 6b. ESMA shall monitor the regulatory and supervisory developments in third countries for which implementing acts have been adopted pursuant to paragraph 6. Where ESMA identifies any regulatory or supervisory development in those third countries that may impact the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States, it shall inform the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the members of the third-country CCP college referred to in Article 25c without delay. All such information shall be treated confidentially. ESMA shall submit a confidential report to the Commission and to the members of the third-country CCP college referred to in Article 25c on the regulatory and supervisory developments in the third countries referred to in the first subparagraph on an annual basis. ESMA shall monitor the regulatory and supervisory developments in third countries for which implementing acts have been adopted pursuant to paragraph 6. Where ESMA identifies any regulatory or supervisory development in those third countries that may impact the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States, it shall inform the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the members of the third-country CCP college referred to in Article 25c without delay. All such information shall be treated confidentially. ESMA shall submit a confidential report to the Commission and to the members of the third-country CCP college referred to in Article 25c on the regulatory and supervisory developments in the third countries referred to in the first subparagraph on an annual basis. ESMA shall establish effective cooperation arrangements with the relevant competent authorities of third countries whose legal and supervisory frameworks have been recognised as equivalent to this Regulation in accordance with paragraph 6. Such arrangements shall specify at least: (a) the mechanism for the exchange of information between ESMA, the central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3 and the competent authorities of the third countries concerned, including access to all information requested by ESMA regarding CCPs authorised in third countries, such as significant changes to risk models and parameters, extension of CCP activities and services, changes in the client account structure and in the use of payment systems that substantially affect the Union; (b) the mechanism for prompt notification to ESMA where a third-country competent authority deems a CCP it is supervising to be in breach of the conditions of its authorisation or of other law to which it is subject; (c) the mechanism for prompt notification to ESMA by a third-country competent authority where a CCP it is supervising has been granted the right to provide clearing services to clearing members or clients established in the Union; (d) the procedures concerning the coordination of supervisory activities, including the agreement of third-country authorities to allow investigations and on-site inspections in accordance with Articles 25g and 25h respectively; (e) the procedures necessary for the effective monitoring of regulatory and supervisory developments in a third country; (f) the procedures for third-country authorities to assure the effective enforcement of decisions adopted by ESMA in accordance with Articles 25b, 25f to 25m, 25p and 25q; (g) the procedures for third-country authorities to inform ESMA, the third-country CCP college referred to in Article 25c, and the central banks of issue referred to in point (f) of paragraph 3 without undue delay of any emergency situations relating to the recognised CCP, including developments in financial markets, which may have an adverse effect on market liquidity and the stability of the financial system in the Union or one of its Member States and the procedures and contingency plans to address such situations; (h) the consent of third-country authorities to the onward sharing of any information they have provided to ESMA under the cooperation arrangements with the authorities referred to in paragraph 3 and the members of the third-country CCP college, subject to the professional secrecy requirements set out in Article 83. Where ESMA considers that a third-country competent authority fails to apply any of the provisions laid down in a cooperation arrangement established in accordance with this paragraph, it shall inform the Commission thereof confidentially and without delay. In such a case, the Commission may decide to review the implementing act adopted in accordance with paragraph 6. 8. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the information that the applicant CCP shall provide ESMA in its application for recognition. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 26 General provisions
1. A CCP shall have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks to which it is or might be exposed, and adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures. 2. A CCP shall adopt policies and procedures which are sufficiently effective so as to ensure compliance with this Regulation, including compliance of its managers and employees with all the provisions of this Regulation. 3. A CCP shall maintain and operate an organisational structure that ensures continuity and orderly functioning in the performance of its services and activities. It shall employ appropriate and proportionate systems, resources and procedures. 4. A CCP shall maintain a clear separation between the reporting lines for risk management and those for the other operations of the CCP. 5. A CCP shall adopt, implement and maintain a remuneration policy which promotes sound and effective risk management and which does not create incentives to relax risk standards. 6. A CCP shall maintain information technology systems adequate to deal with the complexity, variety and type of services and activities performed so as to ensure high standards of security and the integrity and confidentiality of the information maintained. 7. A CCP shall make its governance arrangements, the rules governing the CCP, and its admission criteria for clearing membership, available publicly free of charge. 8. The CCP shall be subject to frequent and independent audits. The results of those audits shall be communicated to the board and shall be made available to the competent authority. 9. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA, after consulting the members of the ESCB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the minimum content of the rules and governance arrangements referred to in paragraphs 1 to 8. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 26 General provisions):
1. A CCP shall have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks to which it is or might be exposed, and adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures. Without prejudice to interoperability arrangements under Title V or the conduct of its investment policy in accordance with Article 47, a CCP shall not be or become a clearing member, a client, or establish indirect clearing arrangements with a clearing member with the aim of undertaking clearing activities at a CCP. 2. A CCP shall adopt policies and procedures which are sufficiently effective so as to ensure compliance with this Regulation, including compliance of its managers and employees with all the provisions of this Regulation. 3. A CCP shall maintain and operate an organisational structure that ensures continuity and orderly functioning in the performance of its services and activities. It shall employ appropriate and proportionate systems, resources and procedures. 4. A CCP shall maintain a clear separation between the reporting lines for risk management and those for the other operations of the CCP. 5. A CCP shall adopt, implement and maintain a remuneration policy which promotes sound and effective risk management and which does not create incentives to relax risk standards. 6. A CCP shall maintain information technology systems adequate to deal with the complexity, variety and type of services and activities performed so as to ensure high standards of security and the integrity and confidentiality of the information maintained. 7. A CCP shall make its governance arrangements, the rules governing the CCP, and its admission criteria for clearing membership, available publicly free of charge. 8. The CCP shall be subject to frequent and independent audits. The results of those audits shall be communicated to the board of the CCP and shall be made available to ESMA and to the CCP’s competent authority. 9. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA, after consulting the members of the ESCB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the minimum content of the rules and governance arrangements referred to in paragraphs 1 to 8. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 27 Senior management and the board
1. The senior management of a CCP shall be of sufficiently good repute and shall have sufficient experience so as to ensure the sound and prudent management of the CCP. 2. A CCP shall have a board. At least one third, but no less than two, of the members of that board shall be independent. Representatives of the clients of clearing members shall be invited to board meetings for matters relevant to Articles 38 and 39. The compensation of the independent and other non-executive members of the board shall not be linked to the business performance of the CCP. The members of a CCP’s board, including its independent members, shall be of sufficiently good repute and shall have adequate expertise in financial services, risk management and clearing services. 3. A CCP shall clearly determine the roles and responsibilities of the board and shall make the minutes of the board meetings available to the competent authority and auditors.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 27 Senior management and the board):
1. The senior management of a CCP shall be of sufficiently good repute and shall have sufficient experience so as to ensure the sound and prudent management of the CCP. 2. A CCP shall have a board. At least one third, but no less than two, of the members of that board shall be independent. Representatives of the clients of clearing members shall be invited to board meetings for matters relevant to Articles 38 and 39. The compensation of the independent and other non-executive members of the board shall not be linked to the business performance of the CCP. The members of a CCP’s board, including its independent members, shall be of sufficiently good repute and shall have adequate expertise in financial services, risk management and clearing services. 2a. The composition of the CCP’s board shall duly take into account the principle of gender balance. 3. A CCP shall clearly determine the roles and responsibilities of the board and shall make the minutes of the board meetings available to the competent authority and auditors.
Article 28 Risk committee
1. A CCP shall establish a risk committee, which shall be composed of representatives of its clearing members, independent members of the board and representatives of its clients. The risk committee may invite employees of the CCP and external independent experts to attend risk-committee meetings in a non-voting capacity. Competent authorities may request to attend risk-committee meetings in a non-voting capacity and to be duly informed of the activities and decisions of the risk committee. The advice of the risk committee shall be independent of any direct influence by the management of the CCP. None of the groups of representatives shall have a majority in the risk committee. 2. A CCP shall clearly determine the mandate, the governance arrangements to ensure its independence, the operational procedures, the admission criteria and the election mechanism for risk-committee members. The governance arrangements shall be publicly available and shall, at least, determine that the risk committee is chaired by an independent member of the board, reports directly to the board and holds regular meetings. 3. The risk committee shall advise the board on any arrangements that may impact the risk management of the CCP, such as a significant change in its risk model, the default procedures, the criteria for accepting clearing members, the clearing of new classes of instruments, or the outsourcing of functions. The advice of the risk committee is not required for the daily operations of the CCP. Reasonable efforts shall be made to consult the risk committee on developments impacting the risk management of the CCP in emergency situations. 4. Without prejudice to the right of competent authorities to be duly informed, the members of the risk committee shall be bound by confidentiality. Where the chairman of the risk committee determines that a member has an actual or potential conflict of interest on a particular matter, that member shall not be allowed to vote on that matter. 5. A CCP shall promptly inform the competent authority of any decision in which the board decides not to follow the advice of the risk committee.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 28 Risk committee):
1. A CCP shall establish a risk committee, which shall be composed of representatives of its clearing members, independent members of the board and representatives of its clients. The risk committee may invite employees of the CCP and external independent experts to attend risk-committee meetings in a non-voting capacity. ESMA and competent authorities may request to attend risk-committee meetings in a non-voting capacity and to be duly informed of the activities and decisions of the risk committee. The advice of the risk committee shall be independent of any direct influence by the management of the CCP. None of the groups of representatives shall have a majority in the risk committee. 2. A CCP shall clearly determine the mandate, the governance arrangements to ensure its independence, the operational procedures, the admission criteria and the election mechanism for risk-committee members. The governance arrangements shall be publicly available and shall, at least, determine that the risk committee is chaired by an independent member of the board, reports directly to the board and holds regular meetings. 3. The risk committee shall advise the board on any arrangements that may impact the risk management of the CCP, such as a significant change in its risk model, the default procedures, the criteria for accepting clearing members, the clearing of new classes of instruments, or the outsourcing of functions. The risk committee shall inform the board in a timely manner of any new risk affecting the resilience of the CCP. The advice of the risk committee is not required for the daily operations of the CCP. Reasonable efforts shall be made to consult the risk committee on developments impacting the risk management of the CCP in emergency situations, including on developments relevant to clearing members’ exposures to the CCP and interdependencies with other CCPs. 4. Without prejudice to the right of ESMA and of the competent authorities to be duly informed, the members of the risk committee shall be bound by confidentiality. Where the chairman of the risk committee determines that a member has an actual or potential conflict of interest on a particular matter, that member shall not be allowed to vote on that matter. 5. A CCP shall promptly inform ESMA, the competent authority and the risk committee of any decision in which the board decides not to follow the advice of the risk committee and explain such decision. The risk committee or any member of the risk committee may inform the competent authority of any areas in which it considers that the advice of the risk committee has not been followed.
Article 29 Record keeping
1. A CCP shall maintain, for a period of at least 10 years, all the records on the services and activity provided so as to enable the competent authority to monitor the CCP’s compliance with this Regulation. 2. A CCP shall maintain, for a period of at least 10 years following the termination of a contract, all information on all contracts it has processed. That information shall at least enable the identification of the original terms of a transaction before clearing by that CCP. 3. A CCP shall make the records and information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 and all information on the positions of cleared contracts, irrespective of the venue where the transactions were executed, available upon request to the competent authority, to ESMA and to the relevant members of the ESCB. 4. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the details of the records and information to be retained as referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 5. In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of paragraphs 1 and 2, ESMA shall develop draft implementing technical standards specifying the format of the records and information to be retained. ESMA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 30 Shareholders and members with qualifying holdings
1. The competent authority shall not authorise a CCP unless it has been informed of the identities of the shareholders or members, whether direct or indirect, natural or legal persons, that have qualifying holdings and of the amounts of those holdings. 2. The competent authority shall refuse to authorise a CCP where it is not satisfied as to the suitability of the shareholders or members that have qualifying holdings in the CCP, taking into account the need to ensure the sound and prudent management of a CCP. 3. Where close links exist between the CCP and other natural or legal persons, the competent authority shall grant authorisation only where those links do not prevent the effective exercise of the supervisory functions of the competent authority. 4. Where the persons referred to in paragraph 1 exercise an influence which is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the CCP, the competent authority shall take appropriate measures to terminate that situation, which may include the withdrawal of the authorisation of the CCP. 5. The competent authority shall refuse authorisation where the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of a third country governing one or more natural or legal persons with which the CCP has close links, or difficulties involved in their enforcement, prevent the effective exercise of the supervisory functions of the competent authority.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 30 Shareholders and members with qualifying holdings):
1. The competent authority shall not authorise a CCP unless it has been informed of the identities of the shareholders or members, whether direct or indirect, natural or legal persons, that have qualifying holdings and of the amounts of those holdings. 2. The competent authority shall not authorise a CCP where it is not satisfied as to the suitability of the shareholders or members that have qualifying holdings in the CCP, taking into account the need to ensure the sound and prudent management of a CCP. Where a college referred to in Article 18 has been established, that college shall issue an opinion as to the suitability of the shareholders or members that have qualifying holdings in the CCP, pursuant to Article 19 and in accordance with the procedure under Article 17b. 3. Where close links exist between the CCP and other natural or legal persons, the competent authority shall grant authorisation only where those links do not prevent the effective exercise of the supervisory functions. 4. Where the persons referred to in paragraph 1 exercise an influence which is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the CCP, the competent authority shall take appropriate measures to terminate that situation, which may include the withdrawal of the authorisation of the CCP. The college referred to in Article 18 shall issue an opinion on whether the influence is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the CCP and on the measures envisaged to terminate that situation, pursuant to Article 19 and in accordance with the procedure under Article 17b. 5. The competent authority shall not authorise the CCP where the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of a third country governing one or more natural or legal persons with which that CCP has close links, or difficulties involved in their enforcement, prevent the effective exercise of the supervisory functions.
Article 31 Information to competent authorities
1. A CCP shall notify its competent authority of any changes to its management, and shall provide the competent authority with all the information necessary to assess compliance with Article 27(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 27(2). Where the conduct of a member of the board is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the CCP, the competent authority shall take appropriate measures, which may include removing that member from the board. 2. Any natural or legal person or such persons acting in concert (the ‘proposed acquirer’), who have taken a decision either to acquire, directly or indirectly, a qualifying holding in a CCP or to further increase, directly or indirectly, such a qualifying holding in a CCP as a result of which the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would reach or exceed 10 %, 20 %, 30 % or 50 % or so that the CCP would become its subsidiary (the ‘proposed acquisition’), shall first notify in writing the competent authority of the CCP in which they are seeking to acquire or increase a qualifying holding, indicating the size of the intended holding and relevant information, as referred to in Article 32(4). Any natural or legal person who has taken a decision to dispose, directly or indirectly, of a qualifying holding in a CCP (the ‘proposed vendor’) shall first notify the competent authority in writing thereof, indicating the size of such holding. Such a person shall likewise notify the competent authority where it has taken a decision to reduce a qualifying holding so that the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would fall below 10 %, 20 %, 30 % or 50 % or so that the CCP would cease to be that person’s subsidiary. The competent authority shall, promptly and in any event within two working days of receipt of the notification referred to in this paragraph and of the information referred to in paragraph 3, acknowledge receipt in writing thereof to the proposed acquirer or vendor. The competent authority shall have a maximum of 60 working days as from the date of the written acknowledgement of receipt of the notification and all documents required to be attached to the notification on the basis of the list referred to in Article 32(4) (the assessment period), to carry out the assessment provided for in Article 32(1) (the assessment). The competent authority shall inform the proposed acquirer or vendor of the date of the expiry of the assessment period at the time of acknowledging receipt. 3. The competent authority may, during the assessment period, where necessary, but no later than on the 50th working day of the assessment period, request any further information that is necessary to complete the assessment. Such request shall be made in writing and shall specify the additional information needed. The assessment period shall be interrupted for the period between the date of request for information by the competent authority and the receipt of a response thereto by the proposed acquirer. The interruption shall not exceed 20 working days. Any further requests by the competent authority for completion or clarification of the information shall be at its discretion but may not result in an interruption of the assessment period. 4. The competent authority may extend the interruption referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3 up to 30 working days where the proposed acquirer or vendor is either: (a) situated or regulated outside the Union; (b) a natural or legal person not subject to supervision under this Regulation or Directive 73/239/EEC, Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance ( 9 ) or Directives 2002/83/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2009/65/EC or 2011/61/EU. 5. Where the competent authority, upon completion of the assessment, decides to oppose the proposed acquisition, it shall, within two working days, and not exceeding the assessment period, inform the proposed acquirer in writing and provide the reasons for that decision. The competent authority shall notify the college referred to in Article 18 accordingly. Subject to national law, an appropriate statement of the reasons for the decision may be made accessible to the public at the request of the proposed acquirer. However, Member States may allow a competent authority to make such disclosure in the absence of a request by the proposed acquirer. 6. Where the competent authority does not oppose the proposed acquisition within the assessment period, it shall be deemed to be approved. 7. The competent authority may fix a maximum period for concluding the proposed acquisition and extend it where appropriate. 8. Member States shall not impose requirements for notification to, and approval by, the competent authority of direct or indirect acquisitions of voting rights or capital that are more stringent than those set out in this Regulation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 31 Information to competent authorities):
1. A CCP shall notify its competent authority of any changes to its management, and shall provide the competent authority with all the information necessary to assess compliance with Article 27(1) and the second subparagraph of Article 27(2). Where the conduct of a member of the board is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the CCP, the competent authority shall take appropriate measures, which may include removing that member from the board. 2. Any natural or legal person or such persons acting in concert (the ‘proposed acquirer’), who have taken a decision either to acquire, directly or indirectly, a qualifying holding in a CCP or to further increase, directly or indirectly, such a qualifying holding in a CCP as a result of which the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would reach or exceed 10 %, 20 %, 30 % or 50 % or so that the CCP would become its subsidiary (the ‘proposed acquisition’), shall first notify in writing the competent authority of the CCP in which they are seeking to acquire or increase a qualifying holding, indicating the size of the intended holding and relevant information, as referred to in Article 32(4). Any natural or legal person who has taken a decision to dispose, directly or indirectly, of a qualifying holding in a CCP (the ‘proposed vendor’) shall first notify the competent authority in writing thereof, indicating the size of such holding. Such a person shall likewise notify the competent authority where it has taken a decision to reduce a qualifying holding so that the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would fall below 10 %, 20 %, 30 % or 50 % or so that the CCP would cease to be that person’s subsidiary. The competent authority shall, promptly and in any event within two working days of receipt of the notification referred to in this paragraph and of the information referred to in paragraph 3, acknowledge receipt in writing thereof to the proposed acquirer or vendor. The competent authority shall have a maximum of 60 working days as from the date of the written acknowledgement of receipt of the notification and all documents required to be attached to the notification on the basis of the list referred to in Article 32(4) (the assessment period), to carry out the assessment provided for in Article 32(1) (the assessment). The competent authority shall inform the proposed acquirer or vendor of the date of the expiry of the assessment period at the time of acknowledging receipt. 3. The competent authority may, during the assessment period, where necessary, but no later than on the 50th working day of the assessment period, request any further information that is necessary to complete the assessment. Such request shall be made in writing and shall specify the additional information needed. The assessment period shall be interrupted for the period between the date of request for information by the competent authority and the receipt of a response thereto by the proposed acquirer. The interruption shall not exceed 20 working days. Any further requests by the competent authority for completion or clarification of the information shall be at its discretion but may not result in an interruption of the assessment period. 4. The competent authority may extend the interruption referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3 up to 30 working days where the proposed acquirer or vendor is either: (a) situated or regulated outside the Union; (b) a natural or legal person not subject to supervision under this Regulation or Directive 73/239/EEC, Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance ( 16 ) or Directives 2002/83/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2009/65/EC or 2011/61/EU. The competent authority may extend the interruption referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3 up to 30 working days where the proposed acquirer or vendor is either: (a) situated or regulated outside the Union; (b) a natural or legal person not subject to supervision under this Regulation or Directive 73/239/EEC, Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance ( 16 ) or Directives 2002/83/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2009/65/EC or 2011/61/EU. 5. Where the competent authority, upon completion of the assessment, decides to oppose the proposed acquisition, it shall, within two working days, and not exceeding the assessment period, inform the proposed acquirer in writing and provide the reasons for that decision. The competent authority shall notify the college referred to in Article 18 accordingly. Subject to national law, an appropriate statement of the reasons for the decision may be made accessible to the public at the request of the proposed acquirer. However, Member States may allow a competent authority to make such disclosure in the absence of a request by the proposed acquirer. 6. Where the competent authority does not oppose the proposed acquisition within the assessment period, it shall be deemed to be approved. 7. The competent authority may fix a maximum period for concluding the proposed acquisition and extend it where appropriate. 8. Member States shall not impose requirements for notification to, and approval by, the competent authority of direct or indirect acquisitions of voting rights or capital that are more stringent than those set out in this Regulation.
Article 32 Assessment
1. Where assessing the notification provided for in Article 31(2) and the information referred to in Article 31(3), the competent authority shall, in order to ensure the sound and prudent management of the CCP in which an acquisition is proposed, and having regard to the likely influence of the proposed acquirer on the CCP, appraise the suitability of the proposed acquirer and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition against all of the following: (a) the reputation and financial soundness of the proposed acquirer; (b) the reputation and experience of any person who will direct the business of the CCP as a result of the proposed acquisition; (c) whether the CCP will be able to comply and continue to comply with this Regulation; (d) whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with the proposed acquisition, money laundering or terrorist financing within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 2005/60/EC is being or has been committed or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition could increase the risk thereof. Where assessing the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, the competent authority shall pay particular attention to the type of business pursued and envisaged in the CCP in which the acquisition is proposed. Where assessing the CCP’s ability to comply with this Regulation, the competent authority shall pay particular attention to whether the group of which it will become a part has a structure that makes it possible to exercise effective supervision, to effectively exchange information among the competent authorities and to determine the allocation of responsibilities among the competent authorities. 2. The competent authorities may oppose the proposed acquisition only where there are reasonable grounds for doing so on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 1 or where the information provided by the proposed acquirer is incomplete. 3. Member States shall neither impose any prior conditions in respect of the level of holding that shall be acquired nor allow their competent authorities to examine the proposed acquisition in terms of the economic needs of the market. 4. Member States shall make publicly available a list specifying the information that is necessary to carry out the assessment and that shall be provided to the competent authorities at the time of notification referred to in Article 31(2). The information required shall be proportionate and shall be adapted to the nature of the proposed acquirer and the proposed acquisition. Member States shall not require information that is not relevant for a prudential assessment. 5. Notwithstanding Article 31(2), (3) and (4), where two or more proposals to acquire or increase qualifying holdings in the same CCP have been notified to the competent authority, the latter shall treat the proposed acquirers in a non-discriminatory manner. 6. The relevant competent authorities shall cooperate closely with each other when carrying out the assessment where the proposed acquirer is one of the following: (a) another CCP, a credit institution, assurance undertaking, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, market operator, an operator of a securities settlement system, a UCITS management company or an AIFM authorised in another Member State; (b) the parent undertaking of another CCP, a credit institution, assurance undertaking, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, market operator, an operator of a securities settlement system, a UCITS management company or an AIFM authorised in another Member State; (c) a natural or legal person controlling another CCP, a credit institution, assurance undertaking, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, market operator, an operator of a securities settlement system, a UCITS management company or an AIFM authorised in another Member State. 7. The competent authorities shall, without undue delay, provide each other with any information which is essential or relevant for the assessment. The competent authorities shall, upon request, communicate all relevant information to each other and shall communicate all essential information at their own initiative. A decision by the competent authority that has authorised the CCP in which the acquisition is proposed shall indicate any views or reservations expressed by the competent authority responsible for the proposed acquirer.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 32 Assessment):
1. Where assessing the notification provided for in Article 31(2) and the information referred to in Article 31(3), the competent authority shall, in order to ensure the sound and prudent management of the CCP in which an acquisition is proposed, and having regard to the likely influence of the proposed acquirer on the CCP, appraise the suitability of the proposed acquirer and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition against all of the following: (a) the reputation and financial soundness of the proposed acquirer; (b) the reputation and experience of any person who will direct the business of the CCP as a result of the proposed acquisition; (c) whether the CCP will be able to comply and continue to comply with this Regulation; (d) whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with the proposed acquisition, money laundering or terrorist financing within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 2005/60/EC is being or has been committed or attempted, or that the proposed acquisition could increase the risk thereof. Where assessing the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, the competent authority shall pay particular attention to the type of business pursued and envisaged in the CCP in which the acquisition is proposed. Where assessing the CCP’s ability to comply with this Regulation, the competent authority shall pay particular attention to whether the group of which it will become a part has a structure that makes it possible to exercise effective supervision, to effectively exchange information among the competent authorities and to determine the allocation of responsibilities among the competent authorities. The assessment of the competent authority concerning the notification provided for in Article 31(2) and the information referred to in Article 31(3), shall be subject to an opinion of the college pursuant to Article 19. 2. The competent authorities may oppose the proposed acquisition only where there are reasonable grounds for doing so on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 1 or where the information provided by the proposed acquirer is incomplete. 3. Member States shall neither impose any prior conditions in respect of the level of holding that shall be acquired nor allow their competent authorities to examine the proposed acquisition in terms of the economic needs of the market. 4. Member States shall make publicly available a list specifying the information that is necessary to carry out the assessment and that shall be provided to the competent authorities at the time of notification referred to in Article 31(2). The information required shall be proportionate and shall be adapted to the nature of the proposed acquirer and the proposed acquisition. Member States shall not require information that is not relevant for a prudential assessment. The relevant competent authorities shall cooperate closely with each other when carrying out the assessment where the proposed acquirer is one of the following: (a) another CCP, a credit institution, assurance undertaking, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, market operator, an operator of a securities settlement system, a UCITS management company or an AIFM authorised in another Member State; (b) the parent undertaking of another CCP, a credit institution, assurance undertaking, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, market operator, an operator of a securities settlement system, a UCITS management company or an AIFM authorised in another Member State; (c) a natural or legal person controlling another CCP, a credit institution, assurance undertaking, insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking, investment firm, market operator, an operator of a securities settlement system, a UCITS management company or an AIFM authorised in another Member State. 7. The competent authorities shall, without undue delay, provide each other with any information which is essential or relevant for the assessment. The competent authorities shall, upon request, communicate all relevant information to each other and shall communicate all essential information at their own initiative. A decision by the competent authority that has authorised the CCP in which the acquisition is proposed shall indicate any views or reservations expressed by the competent authority responsible for the proposed acquirer.
Article 33 Conflicts of interest
1. A CCP shall maintain and operate effective written organisational and administrative arrangements to identify and manage any potential conflicts of interest between itself, including its managers, employees, or any person with direct or indirect control or close links, and its clearing members or their clients known to the CCP. It shall maintain and implement adequate procedures aiming at resolving possible conflicts of interest. 2. Where the organisational or administrative arrangements of a CCP to manage conflicts of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of damage to the interests of a clearing member or client are prevented, it shall clearly disclose the general nature or sources of conflicts of interest to the clearing member before accepting new transactions from that clearing member. Where the client is known to the CCP, the CCP shall inform the client and the clearing member whose client is concerned. 3. Where the CCP is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary, the written arrangements shall also take into account any circumstances, of which the CCP is or should be aware, which may give rise to a conflict of interest arising as a result of the structure and business activities of other undertakings with which it has a parent undertaking or a subsidiary relationship. 4. The written arrangements established in accordance with paragraph 1 shall include the following: (a) the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clearing members or clients; (b) procedures to be followed and measures to be adopted in order to manage such conflict. 5. A CCP shall take all reasonable steps to prevent any misuse of the information held in its systems and shall prevent the use of that information for other business activities. A natural person who has a close link to a CCP or a legal person that has a parent undertaking or a subsidiary relationship with a CCP shall not use confidential information recorded in that CCP for any commercial purposes without the prior written consent of the client to whom such confidential information belongs.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 33 Conflicts of interest):
1. A CCP shall maintain and operate effective written organisational and administrative arrangements to identify and manage any potential conflicts of interest between itself, including its managers, employees, or any person with direct or indirect control or close links, and its clearing members or their clients known to the CCP. It shall maintain and implement adequate procedures aiming at resolving possible conflicts of interest. 2. Where the organisational or administrative arrangements of a CCP to manage conflicts of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of damage to the interests of a clearing member or client are prevented, it shall clearly disclose the general nature or sources of conflicts of interest to the clearing member before accepting new transactions from that clearing member. Where the client is known to the CCP, the CCP shall inform the client and the clearing member whose client is concerned. 3. Where the CCP is a parent undertaking or a subsidiary, the written arrangements shall also take into account any circumstances, of which the CCP is or should be aware, which may give rise to a conflict of interest arising as a result of the structure and business activities of other undertakings with which it has a parent undertaking or a subsidiary relationship. 4. The written arrangements established in accordance with paragraph 1 shall include the following: (a) the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clearing members or clients; (b) procedures to be followed and measures to be adopted in order to manage such conflict. The written arrangements established in accordance with paragraph 1 shall include the following: (a) the circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest entailing a material risk of damage to the interests of one or more clearing members or clients; (b) procedures to be followed and measures to be adopted in order to manage such conflict. 5. A CCP shall take all reasonable steps to prevent any misuse of the information held in its systems and shall prevent the use of that information for other business activities. A natural person who has a close link to a CCP or a legal person that has a parent undertaking or a subsidiary relationship with a CCP shall not use confidential information recorded in that CCP for any commercial purposes without the prior written consent of the client to whom such confidential information belongs.
Article 34 Business continuity
1. A CCP shall establish, implement and maintain an adequate business continuity policy and disaster recovery plan aiming at ensuring the preservation of its functions, the timely recovery of operations and the fulfilment of the CCP’s obligations. Such a plan shall at least allow for the recovery of all transactions at the time of disruption to allow the CCP to continue to operate with certainty and to complete settlement on the scheduled date. 2. A CCP shall establish, implement and maintain an adequate procedure ensuring the timely and orderly settlement or transfer of the assets and positions of clients and clearing members in the event of a withdrawal of authorisation pursuant to a decision under Article 20. 3. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA shall, after consulting the members of the ESCB, develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the minimum content and requirements of the business continuity policy and of the disaster recovery plan. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 30 September 2012. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 35 Outsourcing
1. Where a CCP outsources operational functions, services or activities, it shall remain fully responsible for discharging all of its obligations under this Regulation and shall ensure at all times that: (a) outsourcing does not result in the delegation of its responsibility; (b) the relationship and obligations of the CCP towards its clearing members or, where relevant, towards their clients are not altered; (c) the conditions for authorisation of the CCP do not effectively change; (d) outsourcing does not prevent the exercise of supervisory and oversight functions, including on-site access to acquire any relevant information needed to fulfil those mandates; (e) outsourcing does not result in depriving the CCP from the necessary systems and controls to manage the risks it faces; (f) the service provider implements equivalent business continuity requirements to those that the CCP must fulfil under this Regulation; (g) the CCP retains the necessary expertise and resources to evaluate the quality of the services provided and the organisational and capital adequacy of the service provider, and to supervise the outsourced functions effectively and manage the risks associated with the outsourcing and supervises those functions and manages those risks on an ongoing basis; (h) the CCP has direct access to the relevant information of the outsourced functions; (i) the service provider cooperates with the competent authority in connection with the outsourced activities; (j) the service provider protects any confidential information relating to the CCP and its clearing members and clients or, where that service provider is established in a third country, ensures that the data protection standards of that third country, or those set out in the agreement between the parties concerned, are comparable to the data protection standards in effect in the Union. A CCP shall not outsource major activities linked to risk management unless such outsourcing is approved by the competent authority. 2. The competent authority shall require the CCP to allocate and set out its rights and obligations, and those of the service provider, clearly in a written agreement. 3. A CCP shall make all information necessary to enable the competent authority to assess the compliance of the performance of the outsourced activities with this Regulation available on request.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 35 Outsourcing):
1. Where a CCP outsources operational functions, services or activities, it shall remain fully responsible for discharging all of its obligations under this Regulation and shall ensure at all times that: (a) outsourcing does not result in the delegation of its responsibility; (b) the relationship and obligations of the CCP towards its clearing members or, where relevant, towards their clients are not altered; (c) the conditions for authorisation of the CCP do not effectively change; (d) outsourcing does not prevent the exercise of supervisory and oversight functions, including on-site access to acquire any relevant information needed to fulfil those mandates; (e) outsourcing does not result in depriving the CCP from the necessary systems and controls to manage the risks it faces; (f) the service provider implements equivalent business continuity requirements to those that the CCP must fulfil under this Regulation; (g) the CCP retains the necessary expertise and resources to evaluate the quality of the services provided and the organisational and capital adequacy of the service provider, and to supervise the outsourced functions effectively and manage the risks associated with the outsourcing and supervises those functions and manages those risks on an ongoing basis; (h) the CCP has direct access to the relevant information of the outsourced functions; (i) the service provider cooperates with the competent authority in connection with the outsourced activities; (j) the service provider protects any confidential information relating to the CCP and its clearing members and clients or, where that service provider is established in a third country, ensures that the data protection standards of that third country, or those set out in the agreement between the parties concerned, are comparable to the data protection standards in effect in the Union. A CCP shall not outsource major activities linked to risk management unless such outsourcing is approved by the competent authority. The decision of the competent authority shall be subject to an opinion of the college pursuant to Article 19. 2. The competent authority shall require the CCP to allocate and set out its rights and obligations, and those of the service provider, clearly in a written agreement. 3. A CCP shall make all information necessary to enable the competent authority to assess the compliance of the performance of the outsourced activities with this Regulation available on request.
Article 36 General provisions
1. When providing services to its clearing members, and where relevant, to their clients, a CCP shall act fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of such clearing members and clients and sound risk management. 2. A CCP shall have accessible, transparent and fair rules for the prompt handling of complaints.
Article 37 Participation requirements
1. A CCP shall establish, where relevant per type of product cleared, the categories of admissible clearing members and the admission criteria, upon the advice of the risk committee pursuant to Article 28(3). Such criteria shall be non-discriminatory, transparent and objective so as to ensure fair and open access to the CCP and shall ensure that clearing members have sufficient financial resources and operational capacity to meet the obligations arising from participation in a CCP. Criteria that restrict access shall be permitted only to the extent that their objective is to control the risk for the CCP. 2. A CCP shall ensure that the application of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 is met on an ongoing basis and shall have timely access to the information relevant for such assessment. A CCP shall conduct, at least once a year, a comprehensive review of compliance with this Article by its clearing members. 3. Clearing members that clear transactions on behalf of their clients shall have the necessary additional financial resources and operational capacity to perform this activity. The CCP’s rules for clearing members shall allow it to gather relevant basic information to identify, monitor and manage relevant concentrations of risk relating to the provision of services to clients. Clearing members shall, upon request, inform the CCP about the criteria and arrangements they adopt to allow their clients to access the services of the CCP. Responsibility for ensuring that clients comply with their obligations shall remain with clearing members. 4. A CCP shall have objective and transparent procedures for the suspension and orderly exit of clearing members that no longer meet the criteria referred to in paragraph 1. 5. A CCP may only deny access to clearing members meeting the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 where duly justified in writing and based on a comprehensive risk analysis. 6. A CCP may impose specific additional obligations on clearing members, such as the participation in auctions of a defaulting clearing member’s position. Such additional obligations shall be proportional to the risk brought by the clearing member and shall not restrict participation to certain categories of clearing members.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 37 Participation requirements):
1. A CCP shall establish, where relevant per type of product cleared, the categories of admissible clearing members and the admission criteria, upon the advice of the risk committee pursuant to Article 28(3). Such criteria shall be non-discriminatory, transparent and objective so as to ensure fair and open access to the CCP and shall ensure that clearing members have sufficient financial resources and operational capacity to meet the obligations arising from participation in a CCP. Criteria that restrict access shall be permitted only to the extent that their objective is to control the risk for the CCP. Without prejudice to interoperability arrangements under Title V or the conduct of the CCP’s investment policy in accordance with Article 47, the criteria shall ensure that CCPs or clearing houses cannot be clearing members, directly or indirectly, of the CCP. 1a. A CCP shall accept non-financial counterparties as clearing members only if those non-financial counterparties are able to demonstrate how they intend to fulfil the margin requirements and default fund contributions, including in stressed market conditions. The competent authority of a CCP that accepts non-financial counterparties as clearing members shall regularly review the arrangements established by the CCP to monitor that the condition under the first subparagraph is met. The CCP’s competent authority shall report on an annual basis to the college referred to in Article 18 on the products cleared by those non-financial counterparties, their overall exposure and any identified risks. A non-financial counterparty acting as a clearing member of a CCP may provide client clearing services only to non-financial counterparties belonging to the same group as that non-financial counterparty and may keep accounts at the CCP only for assets and positions held for its own account or the account of those non-financial counterparties. ESMA may issue an opinion or a recommendation on the appropriateness of such arrangements following an ad hoc peer review. 2. A CCP shall ensure that the application of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 is met on an ongoing basis and shall have timely access to the information relevant for such assessment. A CCP shall conduct, at least once a year, a comprehensive review of compliance with this Article by its clearing members. The CCP shall inform the competent authority of any significant negative development regarding the risk profile of any of its clearing members determined in the context of the CCP’s assessment referred to in the first subparagraph or any other assessment with similar conclusion, including any increase in the risk that any of its clearing members brings to the CCP, which the CCP considers to have the potential of triggering a default procedure. 3. Clearing members that clear transactions on behalf of their clients shall have the necessary additional financial resources and operational capacity to perform this activity. The CCP’s rules for clearing members shall allow it to gather relevant basic information to identify, monitor and manage relevant concentrations of risk relating to the provision of services to clients. Clearing members shall, upon request, inform the CCP about the criteria and arrangements they adopt to allow their clients to access the services of the CCP. Responsibility for ensuring that clients comply with their obligations shall remain with clearing members. 4. A CCP shall have objective and transparent procedures for the suspension and orderly exit of clearing members that no longer meet the criteria referred to in paragraph 1. 5. A CCP may only deny access to clearing members meeting the criteria referred to in paragraph 1 where duly justified in writing and based on a comprehensive risk analysis. 6. A CCP may impose specific additional obligations on clearing members, such as the participation in auctions of a defaulting clearing member’s position. Such additional obligations shall be proportional to the risk brought by the clearing member and shall not restrict participation to certain categories of clearing members. 7. ESMA, after consulting EBA and the ESCB, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further specify the elements to be considered when a CCP: (a) establishes its admission criteria referred to in paragraph 1; (b) assesses the ability of non-financial counterparties acting as clearing members to meet margin requirements and default fund contributions referred to in paragraph 1a. When developing those draft regulatory technical standards, ESMA shall take into account: (a) the modalities and specificities through which non-financial counterparties might, or already do, access clearing services, including as direct clearing members in sponsored models; (b) the need to facilitate prudentially sound direct access of non-financial counterparties to CCP clearing services and activities; (c) the need to ensure proportionality; (d) the need to ensure an effective management of risks. ESMA shall submit the draft regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph to the Commission by 25 December 2025. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 38 Transparency
1. A CCP and its clearing members shall publicly disclose the prices and fees associated with the services provided. They shall disclose the prices and fees of each service provided separately, including discounts and rebates and the conditions to benefit from those reductions. A CCP shall allow its clearing members and, where relevant, their clients separate access to the specific services provided. A CCP shall account separately for costs and revenues of the services provided and shall disclose that information to the competent authority. 2. A CCP shall disclose to clearing members and clients the risks associated with the services provided. 3. A CCP shall disclose to its clearing members and to its competent authority the price information used to calculate its end-of-day exposures to its clearing members. A CCP shall publicly disclose the volumes of the cleared transactions for each class of instruments cleared by the CCP on an aggregated basis. 4. A CCP shall publicly disclose the operational and technical requirements relating to the communication protocols covering content and message formats it uses to interact with third parties, including the operational and technical requirements referred to in Article 7. 5. A CCP shall publicly disclose any breaches by clearing members of the criteria referred to in Article 37(1) and the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article, except where the competent authority, after consulting ESMA, considers that such disclosure would constitute a threat to financial stability or to market confidence or would seriously jeopardise the financial markets or cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 1.1. Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Under the heading “An Economy that Works for People”, the Commission Work Programme for 2020 provides for a review of its regulation on financial benchmarks, the “Benchmark Regulation” (“BMR”). Financial benchmarks are indices by reference to which the amount payable under a financial instrument or a financial contract or the value of a financial instrument is determined. By setting out governance and data quality standards for benchmarks that are referenced in financial contracts, the Benchmark Regulation aims to strengthen the trust of capital market participants in indices used as benchmarks in the Union. It contributes to the Commission’ efforts in favour of a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The BMR introduces an authorisation requirement for administrators of financial benchmarks as well as requirements for contributors of input data used to calculate the financial benchmark. The BMR also regulates the use of financial benchmarks 1 . In particular, the BMR rules require EU supervised entities (such as banks, investment firms, insurance undertakings, UCITS 2 ) to use only indices whose administrator has been authorised. Benchmarks administered in third countries can only be used in the EU following an equivalence, recognition or endorsement procedure. The Benchmark Regulation applies since January 2018 3 . However, EU market participants can continue to use benchmarks administered in a country outside the Union - regardless of whether an equivalence decision is in place, the index has been recognised or endorsed for use in the Union 4 – until the transitional regime expires at the end of December 2021. 1.1.1. The orderly cessation of financial benchmarks Due to concerns about whether the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) adequately represents an underlying market or economic reality reflective of interbank borrowing, the national competent authority for LIBOR (the UK Financial Conduct Authority or “FCA”) has announced the likely cessation of LIBOR after the end of 2021. The FCA, in all its public statements, has been clear that, where a benchmark loses representativeness and its representativeness will not be restored, use of the benchmark by supervised entities must cease. Relying on a very small number of panel banks such that LIBOR was no longer representative of the underlying market or economic reality that LIBOR sought to measure, means that its value could deviate significantly from that economic reality, as well as becoming more volatile. As documented in the Commission’s impact assessment, many financial instruments and contracts that reference LIBOR will not have reached maturity by the expected cessation date after the end of 2021. Many of these contracts involve debt issued by supervised entities, debt instruments held on the balance sheet by supervised entities, the loan portfolio of supervised entities and derivative contracts that these entities have concluded to hedge their positions. As mentioned above, supervised entities within the scope of the EU Benchmark Regulation may only use indices that are authorised as compliant with the BMR. The disappearance of LIBOR will have significant economic impacts that EU supervised entities could not have anticipated when concluding these often longer maturity contracts. Many of these contracts, especially those concluded before adoption of the BMR in 2016, often lack any contractual “fall-back” provisions that deal with the permanent discontinuation of the LIBOR rate. Amending the terms of thousands of contracts that currently contain references to LIBOR will not always be possible in the short period remaining until the expected end of the LIBOR at the end of 2021. Many currently existing debt, loan, deposit and many of the derivative contracts would, upon a permanent cessation of an interest rate benchmark, such as LIBOR, lack a contractual fall-back rate that allows parties to continue to comply with their contractual obligations. If no remedies were envisaged, the discontinuation of a widely used interest rate benchmark will have negative consequences for EU supervised entities and their contractual counterparts from whom these entities either borrow or to whom they lend funds. All counterparts in contracts referencing such a benchmark that are still pending at the date of cessation will face legal uncertainty as to the validity and enforcement of their contractual obligations. The range of contracts that will be affected by the cessation of a widely used interest rate benchmark includes: (1) debt issuances by supervised entities; (2) debt held on the balance sheet of supervised entities; (3) loans; (4) deposits and (5) derivative contracts. A large part of the financial contracts that reference widely used interest rate benchmarks involve supervised entities within the scope of the BMR. The legal uncertainty and potentially adverse economic impact that may result from difficulties in the ability to enforce contractual obligations will pose a risk for financial stability in the Union. To mitigate the risk of contract frustration and the ensuing risk to financial stability, central banks in various currency areas have set up working groups to recommend fall-back rates that would apply to the legacy stock of contracts that reference interest rate benchmarks in cessation and that could not be renegotiated by the date of the permanent cessation of this benchmark. For example, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee (ARRC) in the United State has recommended a waterfall that includes a replacement rate calculation based on a risk-free overnight rate (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to make the replacement rate resemble, as close as possible, the economic properties of the discontinued benchmark. The aim of these replacement rates would therefore be to mimic, to the extent possible, what the contract parties intended to achieve by references to the benchmark in cessation. It is a deliberate policy choice underpinning all recommendations for a replacement rate for legacy contracts that no new contracts (defined as contracts concluded after cessation of the benchmark) may reference the replacement rate. This is because the replacement rate is most likely a synthetic version of the benchmark in cessation and is meant to ease the transition to a new rate. For example, a replacement rate for USD LIBOR will most likely be calculated based on a risk-free overnight rate in borrowing (SOFR) plus a spread adjustment to reflect the historical spread between the risk-free overnight rate and the replaced LIBOR rate. While a synthetic version of a benchmark should be stable enough to accompany the wind-down of legacy portfolios, it is not a permanent solution, reflective of a supervised entity’s forward looking financing cost. However, even once these replacement rates are available, it will be difficult to amend all existing legacy contracts given the scale of the LIBOR references and the short period of time before LIBOR is expected to be discontinued. A reform of the BMR is therefore the right tool to establish a statutory replacement rate that mitigates the adverse consequences for legal certainty and financial stability that might ensue if LIBOR, or any other benchmark whose cessation would result in significant disruption in the functioning of financial markets in the Union, was discontinued without such a replacement rate being both available and integrated into legacy contracts that involve a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. 1.1.2. Spot f oreign exchange rates While spot foreign exchange rates play a crucial role for the international economy, for several currencies, the rates that are available are largely unregulated and are often reflective of central bank monetary policies. In some countries, central banks have implemented controls to restrict the publication of spot foreign exchange rates outside their local jurisdiction. In addition to preventing publication of off-shore foreign exchange rates, certain countries have in place capital controls that limit the convertibility of their currencies. Since their currencies are not freely convertible, the availability of on-shore currency hedging tools, such as currency forwards, swaps or options, is limited. Demand for hedging tools against currency volatility in these countries outstrips the shallow liquidity offered by the on-shore market. In consequence, European financial institutions have developed off-shore derivatives markets that, due to the convertibility restrictions in place, settle into the base currency of the hedging entity, albeit by reference to the foreign exchange rate published at the moment of the hedging contract’s expiry. Therefore, hedging against movements in currencies subject to such convertibility restrictions is done with off-shore derivative contracts. These include financial instruments such as non-deliverable currency forwards and non-deliverable swaps. Where these forwards and swaps are offered by an EU supervised entity (a dealer bank ) 1 and traded on an EU trading venue or via an EU systematic internaliser, the spot currency rate that is used to determine the pay-out due under the forward or swap agreement constitutes a “use” of the spot exchange rate which brings the offer of forwards and swaps by a supervised entity within the scope of the BMR. At the end of the current transitional period set out in Article 51 of the BMR the reference to foreign exchange spot rates in EU-traded currency forwards or swaps will no longer be allowed. This means that, at the beginning of 2022, EU supervised entities are at risk of losing access to many public policy rates administered outside the EU, including spot foreign exchange rates that they reference in derivative contracts that they offer corporate counterparts to help them manage their day-to-day hedging of currency risk. The urgency of the issue arises as almost no other jurisdiction apart from the EU regulates spot exchange rates. Due to the absence of regulation, currency spot rates could not, therefore, be the subject of an equivalence assessment under the BMR. Neither can they be recognised or endorsed for use in the Union under the BMR, as both of these mechanisms, in turn, require some form of regulation and oversight. In conclusion, foreign exchange spot rates are not suitable candidates for equivalence, endorsement or recognition by the end of the transition period. This proposal, therefore, makes targeted modification of the scope of the BMR in order to ensure that European companies retain access to hedging tools against volatility of currencies that are not freely convertible into their base currency, ensuring seamless continuation of their business activities abroad after the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 2021. 
Revised version (Article 38 Transparency):
1. A CCP and its clearing members shall publicly disclose the prices and fees associated with the services provided. They shall disclose the prices and fees of each service provided separately, including discounts and rebates and the conditions to benefit from those reductions. A CCP shall allow its clearing members and, where relevant, their clients separate access to the specific services provided. A CCP shall account separately for costs and revenues of the services provided and shall disclose that information to the competent authority. 2. A CCP shall disclose to clearing members and clients the risks associated with the services provided. 3. A CCP shall disclose to its clearing members and to its competent authority the price information used to calculate its end-of-day exposures to its clearing members. A CCP shall publicly disclose the volumes of the cleared transactions for each class of instruments cleared by the CCP on an aggregated basis. 4. A CCP shall publicly disclose the operational and technical requirements relating to the communication protocols covering content and message formats it uses to interact with third parties, including the operational and technical requirements referred to in Article 7. 5. A CCP shall publicly disclose any breaches by clearing members of the criteria referred to in Article 37(1) and the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article, except where the competent authority, after consulting ESMA, considers that such disclosure would constitute a threat to financial stability or to market confidence or would seriously jeopardise the financial markets or cause disproportionate damage to the parties involved. 6. A CCP shall provide its clearing members with a simulation tool allowing them to determine the amount of additional initial margin, on a gross basis, that the CCP may require upon the clearing of a new transaction. That tool shall only be accessible on a secured access basis, and the results of the simulation shall not be binding. A CCP shall provide its clearing members with information on the initial margin models it uses. That information shall: (a) clearly explain the design of the initial margin model and how it operates; (b) clearly describe the key assumptions and limitations of the initial margin model and the circumstances under which those assumptions are no longer valid; (c) be documented.