Article 307 Own funds requirements for pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a CCP
An institution acting as a clearing member shall apply the following treatment to its exposures arising from its contributions to the default fund of a CCP: (a) it shall calculate the own funds requirement for its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a QCCP in accordance with the approach set out in Article 308; (b) it shall calculate the own funds requirement for its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP in accordance with the approach set out in Article 309.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 307 Own funds requirements for contributions to the default fund of a CCP):
An institution that acts as a clearing member shall apply the following treatment to its exposures arising from its contributions to the default fund of a CCP: (a) it shall calculate the own funds requirement for its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a QCCP in accordance with the approach set out in Article 308; (b) it shall calculate the own funds requirement for its pre-funded and unfunded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP in accordance with the approach set out in Article 309; (c) it shall calculate the own funds requirement for its unfunded contributions to the default fund of a QCCP in accordance with the treatment set out in Article 310.
Article 308 Own funds requirements for pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a QCCP
1. The exposure value for an institution's pre-funded contribution to the default fund of a QCCP (DFi) shall be the amount paid in or the market value of the assets delivered by that institution reduced by any amount of that contribution that the QCCP has already used to absorb its losses following the default of one or more of its clearing members. 2. An institution shall calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) to cover the exposure arising from its pre-funded contribution (DF i ) as follows: where: β = the concentration factor communicated to the institution by the CCP; β = the concentration factor communicated to the institution by the CCP; N = the number of clearing members communicated to the institution by the CCP; the number of clearing members communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CM = the sum of pre-funded contributions of all clearing members of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CM K CM = the sum of the own funds requirements of all clearing members of the CCP calculated in accordance with the applicable formula specified in paragraph 3 . K CM 3. An institution shall calculate K CM as follows: (a) where K CCP ≤ DF CCP , the institution shall use the following formula: ; (b) where DF CCP < K CCP ≤DF*, the institution shall use the following formula: ; (c) where DF* < K CCP , the institution shall use the following formula: DF CCP = the pre-funded financial resources of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CCP the pre-funded financial resources of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; K CCP = the hypothetical capital of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; K CCP the hypothetical capital of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF* = ; DF* = the average pre-funded contribution, , communicated to the institution by the CCP; c 1 = a capital factor equal to c 1 c 2 = a capital factor equal to 100 %; c 2 a capital factor equal to 100 %; μ = 1,2. μ 1,2. 4. An institution shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures arising from an institution's pre-funded contribution for the purposes of Article 92(3) as the own funds requirement (K i ) determined in accordance with paragraph 2 multiplied by 12,5. 5. Where K CCP is equal to zero, institutions shall use the value for c1 of 0,16 % for the purpose of the calculation in paragraph 3.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 308 Own funds requirements for pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a QCCP):
1. The exposure value for an institution's pre-funded contribution to the default fund of a QCCP (DFi) shall be the amount paid in or the market value of the assets delivered by that institution reduced by any amount of that contribution that the QCCP has already used to absorb its losses following the default of one or more of its clearing members. 2. An institution shall calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) to cover the exposure arising from its pre-funded contribution (DF i ) as follows: where: β = the concentration factor communicated to the institution by the CCP; N = the number of clearing members communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CM = the sum of pre-funded contributions of all clearing members of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; K CM = the sum of the own funds requirements of all clearing members of the CCP calculated in accordance with the applicable formula specified in paragraph 3 . An institution shall calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) to cover the exposure arising from its pre-funded contribution (DF i ) as follows: where: β = the concentration factor communicated to the institution by the CCP; β = the concentration factor communicated to the institution by the CCP; N = the number of clearing members communicated to the institution by the CCP; the number of clearing members communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CM = the sum of pre-funded contributions of all clearing members of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CM K CM = the sum of the own funds requirements of all clearing members of the CCP calculated in accordance with the applicable formula specified in paragraph 3 . K CM An institution shall calculate K CM as follows: (a) where K CCP ≤ DF CCP , the institution shall use the following formula: ; (b) where DF CCP < K CCP ≤DF*, the institution shall use the following formula: ; (c) where DF* < K CCP , the institution shall use the following formula: DF CCP = the pre-funded financial resources of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF CCP the pre-funded financial resources of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; K CCP = the hypothetical capital of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; K CCP the hypothetical capital of the CCP communicated to the institution by the CCP; DF* = ; DF* = the average pre-funded contribution, , communicated to the institution by the CCP; c 1 = a capital factor equal to c 1 c 2 = a capital factor equal to 100 %; c 2 a capital factor equal to 100 %; μ = 1,2. μ 1,2. 4. An institution shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures arising from an institution's pre-funded contribution for the purposes of Article 92(3) as the own funds requirement (K i ) determined in accordance with paragraph 2 multiplied by 12,5. 5. Where K CCP is equal to zero, institutions shall use the value for c1 of 0,16 % for the purpose of the calculation in paragraph 3.
Article 309 Own funds requirements for pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP and for unfunded contributions to a non-qualifying CCP
1. An institution shall apply the following formula to calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) for the exposures arising from its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP (DF i ) and from unfunded contributions (UC i ) to such CCP: where c 2 ·and μ are defined as in Article 308(3). 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, unfunded contributions means contributions that an institution acting as a clearing member has contractually committed to provide to a CCP after the CCP has depleted its default fund to cover the losses it incurred following the default of one or more of its clearing members. 3. An institution shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures arising from an institution's pre-funded contribution for the purposes of Article 92(3) as the own funds requirement (K i ) determined in accordance with paragraph 1 multiplied by 12,5.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 309 Own funds requirements for pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP and for unfunded contributions to a non-qualifying CCP):
1. An institution shall apply the following formula to calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) for the exposures arising from its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP (DF i ) and from unfunded contributions (UC i ) to such CCP: where c 2 ·and μ are defined as in Article 308(3). An institution shall apply the following formula to calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) for the exposures arising from its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of a non-qualifying CCP (DF i ) and from unfunded contributions (UC i ) to such CCP: where c 2 ·and μ are defined as in Article 308(3). 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, unfunded contributions means contributions that an institution acting as a clearing member has contractually committed to provide to a CCP after the CCP has depleted its default fund to cover the losses it incurred following the default of one or more of its clearing members. 3. An institution shall calculate the risk-weighted exposure amounts for exposures arising from an institution's pre-funded contribution for the purposes of Article 92(3) as the own funds requirement (K i ) determined in accordance with paragraph 1 multiplied by 12,5.
Article 310 Alternative calculation of own funds requirement for exposures to a QCCP
An institution shall apply the following formula to calculate the own funds requirement (K i ) for the exposures arising from its trade exposures and the trade exposures of its clients (TE i ) and pre-funded contributions (DF i ) to the default fund of a QCCP:
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 311 Own funds requirements for exposures to CCPs that cease to meet certain conditions
1. An institution shall apply the treatment set out in this Article where one or both of the following conditions have been met: (a) the institution has received from a CCP a notification required by point (j)(ii) of Article 50b of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 that the CCP has stopped calculating K CCP ; (b) it has become known to the institution, following a public announcement or notification from the competent authority of a CCP used by the institution or from that CCP itself, that the CCP will no longer comply with the conditions for authorisation or recognition, as applicable. 2. Where only the condition in point (a) of paragraph 1 has been met, the competent authority of the institution shall verify the reasons why the CCP has stopped calculating K CCP . Where the competent authority considers that the reasons referred to in the first subparagraph are valid, it may permit institutions in its Member State to apply the treatment set out in Article 310 to their trade exposures and default fund contributions to that CCP. Where it grants such permission, it shall disclose the reasons for its decision. Where the competent authority considers that the reasons referred to in the first subparagraph are not valid, all institutions in its Member State, irrespective of the treatment they chose in accordance with Article 301(2), shall apply the treatment set out in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 3 of this Article. 3. Where the condition in point (b) of paragraph 1 has been met, irrespective of whether the condition in point (a) of that paragraph has been met or not, an institution shall, within three months of the circumstance set out in point (b) of that paragraph arising, or earlier where the competent authority of the institution requires it, do the following with respect to its exposures to that CCP: (a) cease to apply the treatment it chose in accordance with Article 301(2); (b) apply the treatment set out in point (b) of Article 306(1) to its trade exposures to that CCP; (c) apply the treatment set out in Article 309 to its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of that CCP and to its unfunded contributions to that CCP; (d) treat exposures other than those listed in points (b) and (c) to that CCP as exposures to a corporate in accordance with the Standardised Approach for credit risk as set out in Chapter 2.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 311 Own funds requirements for exposures to CCPs that cease to meet certain conditions):
An institution shall apply the treatment set out in this Article where one or both of the following conditions have been met: (b) it has become known to the institution, following a public announcement or notification from the competent authority of a CCP used by the institution or from that CCP itself, that the CCP will no longer comply with the conditions for authorisation or recognition, as applicable. 2. Where only the condition in point (a) of paragraph 1 has been met, the competent authority of the institution shall verify the reasons why the CCP has stopped calculating K CCP . Where the competent authority considers that the reasons referred to in the first subparagraph are valid, it may permit institutions in its Member State to apply the treatment set out in Article 310 to their trade exposures and default fund contributions to that CCP. Where it grants such permission, it shall disclose the reasons for its decision. (a) cease to apply the treatment it chose in accordance with Article 301(2); apply the treatment set out in point (b) of Article 306(1) to its trade exposures to that CCP; (c) apply the treatment set out in Article 309 to its pre-funded contributions to the default fund of that CCP and to its unfunded contributions to that CCP; (d) treat exposures other than those listed in points (b) and (c) to that CCP as exposures to a corporate in accordance with the Standardised Approach for credit risk as set out in Chapter 2.
Article 312 Permission and notification
1. To qualify for use of the Standardised Approach, institutions shall meet the criteria set out in Article 320, in addition to meeting the general risk management standards set out in Articles 74 and 85 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Institutions shall notify the competent authorities prior to using the Standardised Approach. Competent authorities shall permit institutions to use an alternative relevant indicator for the business lines of retail banking and commercial banking where the conditions set out in Articles 319(2) and 320 are met. 2. Competent authorities shall permit institutions to use Advanced Measurement Approaches based on their own operational risk measurement systems, where all the qualitative and quantitative standards set out in Articles 321 and 322 respectively are met and where institutions meet the general risk management standards set out in Articles 74 and 85 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Section II, Chapter 3, Title VII of that Directive. Institutions shall also apply for permission from their competent authorities where they want to implement material extensions and changes to those Advanced Measurement Approaches. Competent authorities shall grant the permission only where institutions would continue to meet the standards specified in the first subparagraph following those material extensions and changes. 3. Institutions shall notify the competent authorities of all changes to their Advanced Measurement Approaches models. 4. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the assessment methodology under which the competent authorities permit institutions to use Advanced Measurement Approaches; (b) the conditions for assessing the materiality of extensions and changes to the Advanced Measurement Approaches; (c) the modalities of the notification required in paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 312 Permission and notification):
1. To qualify for use of the Standardised Approach, institutions shall meet the criteria set out in Article 320, in addition to meeting the general risk management standards set out in Articles 74 and 85 of Directive 2013/36/EU. Institutions shall notify the competent authorities prior to using the Standardised Approach. Competent authorities shall permit institutions to use an alternative relevant indicator for the business lines of retail banking and commercial banking where the conditions set out in Articles 319(2) and 320 are met. 2. Competent authorities shall permit institutions to use Advanced Measurement Approaches based on their own operational risk measurement systems, where all the qualitative and quantitative standards set out in Articles 321 and 322 respectively are met and where institutions meet the general risk management standards set out in Articles 74 and 85 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Section II, Chapter 3, Title VII of that Directive. Institutions shall also apply for permission from their competent authorities where they want to implement material extensions and changes to those Advanced Measurement Approaches. Competent authorities shall grant the permission only where institutions would continue to meet the standards specified in the first subparagraph following those material extensions and changes. 3. Institutions shall notify the competent authorities of all changes to their Advanced Measurement Approaches models. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 313 Reverting to the use of less sophisticated approaches
1. Institutions that use the Standardised Approach shall not revert to the use of the Basic Indicator Approach unless the conditions in paragraph 3 are met. 2. Institutions that use the Advanced Measurement Approaches shall not revert to the use of the Standardised Approach or the Basic Indicator Approach unless the conditions in paragraph 3 are met. 3. An institution may only revert to the use of a less sophisticated approach for operational risk where both the following conditions are met: (a) the institution has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the use of a less sophisticated approach is not proposed in order to reduce the operational risk related own funds requirements of the institution, is necessary on the basis of nature and complexity of the institution and would not have a material adverse impact on the solvency of the institution or its ability to manage operational risk effectively; (b) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 313 Reverting to the use of less sophisticated approaches):
1. Institutions that use the Standardised Approach shall not revert to the use of the Basic Indicator Approach unless the conditions in paragraph 3 are met. 2. Institutions that use the Advanced Measurement Approaches shall not revert to the use of the Standardised Approach or the Basic Indicator Approach unless the conditions in paragraph 3 are met. 3. An institution may only revert to the use of a less sophisticated approach for operational risk where both the following conditions are met: (a) the institution has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the use of a less sophisticated approach is not proposed in order to reduce the operational risk related own funds requirements of the institution, is necessary on the basis of nature and complexity of the institution and would not have a material adverse impact on the solvency of the institution or its ability to manage operational risk effectively; (b) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority. An institution may only revert to the use of a less sophisticated approach for operational risk where both the following conditions are met: (a) the institution has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authority that the use of a less sophisticated approach is not proposed in order to reduce the operational risk related own funds requirements of the institution, is necessary on the basis of nature and complexity of the institution and would not have a material adverse impact on the solvency of the institution or its ability to manage operational risk effectively; (b) the institution has received the prior permission of the competent authority.
Article 314 Combined use of different approaches
1. Institutions may use a combination of approaches provided that they obtain permission from the competent authorities. Competent authorities shall grant such permission where the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4, as applicable, are met. 2. An institution may use an Advanced Measurement Approach in combination with either the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach, where both of the following conditions are met: (a) the combination of Approaches used by the institution captures all its operational risks and competent authorities are satisfied with the methodology used by the institution to cover different activities, geographical locations, legal structures or other relevant divisions determined on an internal basis; (b) the criteria set out in Article 320 and the standards set out in Articles 321 and 322 are fulfilled for the part of activities covered by the Standardised Approach and the Advanced Measurement Approaches respectively. 3. For institutions that want to use an Advanced Measurement Approach in combination with either the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach competent authorities shall impose the following additional conditions for granting permission: (a) on the date of implementation of an Advanced Measurement Approach, a significant part of the institution's operational risks are captured by that Approach; (b) the institution takes a commitment to apply the Advanced Measurement Approach across a material part of its operations within a time schedule that was submitted to and approved by its competent authorities. 4. An institution may request permission from a competent authority to use a combination of the Basic Indicator Approach and the Standardised Approach only in exceptional circumstances such as the recent acquisition of new business which may require a transitional period for the application of the Standardised Approach. A competent authority shall grant such permission only where the institution has committed to apply the Standardised Approach within a time schedule that was submitted to and approved by the competent authority. 5. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the conditions that competent authorities shall use when assessing the methodology referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2; (b) the conditions that the competent authorities shall use when deciding whether to impose the additional conditions referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2016. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 314 Combined use of different approaches):
1. Institutions may use a combination of approaches provided that they obtain permission from the competent authorities. Competent authorities shall grant such permission where the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 4, as applicable, are met. 2. An institution may use an Advanced Measurement Approach in combination with either the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach, where both of the following conditions are met: (a) the combination of Approaches used by the institution captures all its operational risks and competent authorities are satisfied with the methodology used by the institution to cover different activities, geographical locations, legal structures or other relevant divisions determined on an internal basis; (b) the criteria set out in Article 320 and the standards set out in Articles 321 and 322 are fulfilled for the part of activities covered by the Standardised Approach and the Advanced Measurement Approaches respectively. An institution may use an Advanced Measurement Approach in combination with either the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach, where both of the following conditions are met: (a) the combination of Approaches used by the institution captures all its operational risks and competent authorities are satisfied with the methodology used by the institution to cover different activities, geographical locations, legal structures or other relevant divisions determined on an internal basis; (b) the criteria set out in Article 320 and the standards set out in Articles 321 and 322 are fulfilled for the part of activities covered by the Standardised Approach and the Advanced Measurement Approaches respectively. 3. For institutions that want to use an Advanced Measurement Approach in combination with either the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach competent authorities shall impose the following additional conditions for granting permission: (a) on the date of implementation of an Advanced Measurement Approach, a significant part of the institution's operational risks are captured by that Approach; (b) the institution takes a commitment to apply the Advanced Measurement Approach across a material part of its operations within a time schedule that was submitted to and approved by its competent authorities. For institutions that want to use an Advanced Measurement Approach in combination with either the Basic Indicator Approach or the Standardised Approach competent authorities shall impose the following additional conditions for granting permission: (a) on the date of implementation of an Advanced Measurement Approach, a significant part of the institution's operational risks are captured by that Approach; (b) the institution takes a commitment to apply the Advanced Measurement Approach across a material part of its operations within a time schedule that was submitted to and approved by its competent authorities. 4. An institution may request permission from a competent authority to use a combination of the Basic Indicator Approach and the Standardised Approach only in exceptional circumstances such as the recent acquisition of new business which may require a transitional period for the application of the Standardised Approach. A competent authority shall grant such permission only where the institution has committed to apply the Standardised Approach within a time schedule that was submitted to and approved by the competent authority. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the following: (a) the conditions that competent authorities shall use when assessing the methodology referred to in point (a) of paragraph 2; (b) the conditions that the competent authorities shall use when deciding whether to impose the additional conditions referred to in paragraph 3. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2016. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 315 Own funds requirement
1. Under the Basic Indicator Approach, the own funds requirement for operational risk is equal to 15 % of the average over three years of the relevant indicator as set out in Article 316. Institutions shall calculate the average over three years of the relevant indicator on the basis of the last three twelve-monthly observations at the end of the financial year. When audited figures are not available, institutions may use business estimates. 2. Where an institution has been in operation for less than three years it may use forward-looking business estimates in calculating the relevant indicator, provided that it starts using historical data as soon as it is available. 3. Where an institution can prove to its competent authority that, due to a merger, an acquisition or a disposal of entities or activities, using a three year average to calculate the relevant indicator would lead to a biased estimation for the own funds requirement for operational risk, the competent authority may permit the institution to amend the calculation in a way that would take into account such events and shall duly inform EBA thereof. In such circumstances, the competent authority may, on its own initiative, also require an institution to amend the calculation. 4. Where for any given observation, the relevant indicator is negative or equal to zero, institutions shall not take into account this figure in the calculation of the average over three years. Institutions shall calculate the average over three years as the sum of positive figures divided by the number of positive figures.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 315 Own funds requirement):
1. Under the Basic Indicator Approach, the own funds requirement for operational risk is equal to 15 % of the average over three years of the relevant indicator as set out in Article 316. Institutions shall calculate the average over three years of the relevant indicator on the basis of the last three twelve-monthly observations at the end of the financial year. When audited figures are not available, institutions may use business estimates. 2. Where an institution has been in operation for less than three years it may use forward-looking business estimates in calculating the relevant indicator, provided that it starts using historical data as soon as it is available. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 10 January 2026. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 4. Where for any given observation, the relevant indicator is negative or equal to zero, institutions shall not take into account this figure in the calculation of the average over three years. Institutions shall calculate the average over three years as the sum of positive figures divided by the number of positive figures.
Article 316 Relevant indicator
1. For institutions applying accounting standards established by Directive 86/635/EEC, based on the accounting categories for the profit and loss account of institutions under Article 27 of that Directive, the relevant indicator is the sum of the elements listed in Table 1 of this paragraph. Institutions shall include each element in the sum with its positive or negative sign. 1 Interest receivable and similar income 2 Interest payable and similar charges 3 Income from shares and other variable/fixed-yield securities 4 Commissions/fees receivable 5 Commissions/fees payable 6 Net profit or net loss on financial operations 7 Other operating income Institutions shall adjust these elements to reflect the following qualifications: (a) institutions shall calculate the relevant indicator before the deduction of any provisions and operating expenses. Institutions shall include in operating expenses fees paid for outsourcing services rendered by third parties which are not a parent or subsidiary of the institution or a subsidiary of a parent which is also the parent of the institution. Institutions may use expenditure on the outsourcing of services rendered by third parties to reduce the relevant indicator where the expenditure is incurred from an undertaking subject to rules under, or equivalent to, this Regulation; (b) institutions shall not use the following elements in the calculation of the relevant indicator: (i) realised profits/losses from the sale of non-trading book items; (ii) income from extraordinary or irregular items; (iii) income derived from insurance. (b) institutions shall not use the following elements in the calculation of the relevant indicator: (i) realised profits/losses from the sale of non-trading book items; (ii) income from extraordinary or irregular items; (iii) income derived from insurance. (c) when revaluation of trading items is part of the profit and loss statement, institutions may include revaluation. When institutions apply Article 36(2) of Directive 86/635/EEC, they shall include revaluation booked in the profit and loss account. 2. When institutions apply accounting standards different from those established by Directive 86/635/EEC, they shall calculate the relevant indicator on the basis of data that best reflect the definition set out in this Article. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine the methodology to calculate the relevant indicator referred to in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2017. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 316 Relevant indicator):
1. For institutions applying accounting standards established by Directive 86/635/EEC, based on the accounting categories for the profit and loss account of institutions under Article 27 of that Directive, the relevant indicator is the sum of the elements listed in Table 1 of this paragraph. Institutions shall include each element in the sum with its positive or negative sign. 1 Interest receivable and similar income 2 Interest payable and similar charges 3 Income from shares and other variable/fixed-yield securities 4 Commissions/fees receivable 5 Commissions/fees payable 6 Net profit or net loss on financial operations 7 Other operating income Institutions shall adjust these elements to reflect the following qualifications: (a) institutions shall calculate the relevant indicator before the deduction of any provisions and operating expenses. Institutions shall include in operating expenses fees paid for outsourcing services rendered by third parties which are not a parent or subsidiary of the institution or a subsidiary of a parent which is also the parent of the institution. Institutions may use expenditure on the outsourcing of services rendered by third parties to reduce the relevant indicator where the expenditure is incurred from an undertaking subject to rules under, or equivalent to, this Regulation; (b) institutions shall not use the following elements in the calculation of the relevant indicator: (i) realised profits/losses from the sale of non-trading book items; (ii) income from extraordinary or irregular items; (iii) income derived from insurance. (c) when revaluation of trading items is part of the profit and loss statement, institutions may include revaluation. When institutions apply Article 36(2) of Directive 86/635/EEC, they shall include revaluation booked in the profit and loss account. 2. When institutions apply accounting standards different from those established by Directive 86/635/EEC, they shall calculate the relevant indicator on the basis of data that best reflect the definition set out in this Article. 3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine the methodology to calculate the relevant indicator referred to in paragraph 2. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2017. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 317 Own funds requirement
1. Under the Standardised Approach, institutions shall divide their activities into the business lines set out in Table 2 of paragraph 4 and in accordance with the principles set out in Article 318. 2. Institutions shall calculate the own funds requirement for operational risk as the average over three years of the sum of the annual own funds requirements across all business lines referred to in Table 2 of paragraph 4. The annual own funds requirement of each business line is equal to the product of the corresponding beta factor referred to in that Table and the part of the relevant indicator mapped to the respective business line. 3. In any given year, institutions may offset negative own funds requirements resulting from a negative part of the relevant indicator in any business line with positive own funds requirements in other business lines without limit. However, where the aggregate own funds requirement across all business lines within a given year is negative, institutions shall use the value zero as the input to the numerator for that year. 4. Institutions shall calculate the average over three years of the sum referred to in paragraph 2 on the basis of the last three twelve-monthly observations at the end of the financial year. When audited figures are not available, institutions may use business estimates. Where an institution can prove to its competent authority that, due to a merger, an acquisition or a disposal of entities or activities, using a three year average to calculate the relevant indicator would lead to a biased estimation for the own funds requirement for operational risk, the competent authority may permit institutions to amend the calculation in a way that would take into account such events and shall duly inform EBA thereof. In such circumstances, the competent authority may, on its own initiative, also require an institution to amend the calculation. Where an institution has been in operation for less than three years it may use forward-looking business estimates in calculating the relevant indicator, provided that it starts using historical data as soon as it is available. Table 2 Business line List of activities Percentage (beta factor) Corporate finance Underwriting of financial instruments or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis Services related to underwriting Investment advice Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related matters and advice and services relating to the mergers and the purchase of undertakings Investment research and financial analysis and other forms of general recommendation relating to transactions in financial instruments 18 % Trading and sales Dealing on own account Money broking Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis Operation of Multilateral Trading Facilities 18 % Retail brokerage (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis 12 % Commercial banking Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 15 % Retail banking (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 12 % Payment and settlement Money transmission services, Issuing and administering means of payment 18 % Agency services Safekeeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of clients, including custodianship and related services such as cash/collateral management 15 % Asset management Portfolio management Managing of UCITS Other forms of asset management 12 % Table 2 Business line List of activities Percentage (beta factor) Corporate finance Underwriting of financial instruments or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis Services related to underwriting Investment advice Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related matters and advice and services relating to the mergers and the purchase of undertakings Investment research and financial analysis and other forms of general recommendation relating to transactions in financial instruments 18 % Trading and sales Dealing on own account Money broking Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis Operation of Multilateral Trading Facilities 18 % Retail brokerage (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis 12 % Commercial banking Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 15 % Retail banking (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 12 % Payment and settlement Money transmission services, Issuing and administering means of payment 18 % Agency services Safekeeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of clients, including custodianship and related services such as cash/collateral management 15 % Asset management Portfolio management Managing of UCITS Other forms of asset management 12 % Business line List of activities Percentage (beta factor) Business line List of activities Percentage (beta factor) Corporate finance Underwriting of financial instruments or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis Services related to underwriting Investment advice Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related matters and advice and services relating to the mergers and the purchase of undertakings Investment research and financial analysis and other forms of general recommendation relating to transactions in financial instruments 18 % Corporate finance Underwriting of financial instruments or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis Services related to underwriting Investment advice Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related matters and advice and services relating to the mergers and the purchase of undertakings Investment research and financial analysis and other forms of general recommendation relating to transactions in financial instruments 18 % Trading and sales Dealing on own account Money broking Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis Operation of Multilateral Trading Facilities 18 % Trading and sales Dealing on own account Money broking Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis Operation of Multilateral Trading Facilities Retail brokerage (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis 12 % Retail brokerage (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Commercial banking Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 15 % Commercial banking Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments Retail banking (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 12 % Retail banking Payment and settlement Money transmission services, Issuing and administering means of payment 18 % Payment and settlement Money transmission services, Issuing and administering means of payment Agency services Safekeeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of clients, including custodianship and related services such as cash/collateral management 15 % Agency services Safekeeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of clients, including custodianship and related services such as cash/collateral management Asset management Portfolio management Managing of UCITS Other forms of asset management 12 % Asset management Portfolio management Managing of UCITS Other forms of asset management
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 317 Own funds requirement):
1. Under the Standardised Approach, institutions shall divide their activities into the business lines set out in Table 2 of paragraph 4 and in accordance with the principles set out in Article 318. 2. Institutions shall calculate the own funds requirement for operational risk as the average over three years of the sum of the annual own funds requirements across all business lines referred to in Table 2 of paragraph 4. The annual own funds requirement of each business line is equal to the product of the corresponding beta factor referred to in that Table and the part of the relevant indicator mapped to the respective business line. 3. In any given year, institutions may offset negative own funds requirements resulting from a negative part of the relevant indicator in any business line with positive own funds requirements in other business lines without limit. However, where the aggregate own funds requirement across all business lines within a given year is negative, institutions shall use the value zero as the input to the numerator for that year. 4. Institutions shall calculate the average over three years of the sum referred to in paragraph 2 on the basis of the last three twelve-monthly observations at the end of the financial year. When audited figures are not available, institutions may use business estimates. Where an institution can prove to its competent authority that, due to a merger, an acquisition or a disposal of entities or activities, using a three year average to calculate the relevant indicator would lead to a biased estimation for the own funds requirement for operational risk, the competent authority may permit institutions to amend the calculation in a way that would take into account such events and shall duly inform EBA thereof. In such circumstances, the competent authority may, on its own initiative, also require an institution to amend the calculation. Where an institution has been in operation for less than three years it may use forward-looking business estimates in calculating the relevant indicator, provided that it starts using historical data as soon as it is available. Table 2 Business line List of activities Percentage (beta factor) Corporate finance Underwriting of financial instruments or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis Services related to underwriting Investment advice Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related matters and advice and services relating to the mergers and the purchase of undertakings Investment research and financial analysis and other forms of general recommendation relating to transactions in financial instruments 18 % Trading and sales Dealing on own account Money broking Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis Operation of Multilateral Trading Facilities 18 % Retail brokerage (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more financial instruments Execution of orders on behalf of clients Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis 12 % Commercial banking Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 15 % Retail banking (Activities with natural persons or with SMEs meeting the criteria set out in Article 123 for the retail exposure class) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds Lending Financial leasing Guarantees and commitments 12 % Payment and settlement Money transmission services, Issuing and administering means of payment 18 % Agency services Safekeeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of clients, including custodianship and related services such as cash/collateral management 15 % Asset management Portfolio management Managing of UCITS Other forms of asset management 12 % 9. For the purposes of paragraph 7, EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards establishing a risk taxonomy on operational risk that complies with international standards and a methodology to classify the loss events included in the loss data set based on that risk taxonomy on operational risk. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 10 January 2026. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 10. For the purposes of paragraph 8, EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, explaining the technical elements necessary to ensure the soundness, robustness and performance of governance arrangements to maintain the loss data set, with a particular focus on IT systems and infrastructures.
Article 318 Principles for business line mapping
1. Institutions shall develop and document specific policies and criteria for mapping the relevant indicator for current business lines and activities into the standardised framework set out in Article 317. They shall review and adjust those policies and criteria as appropriate for new or changing business activities and risks. 2. Institutions shall apply the following principles for business line mapping: (a) institutions shall map all activities into the business lines in a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive manner; (b) institutions shall allocate any activity which cannot be readily mapped into the business line framework, but which represents an ancillary activity to an activity included in the framework, to the business line it supports. Where more than one business line is supported through the ancillary activity, institutions shall use an objective-mapping criterion; (c) where an activity cannot be mapped into a particular business line then institutions shall use the business line yielding the highest percentage. The same business line equally applies to any ancillary activity associated with that activity; (d) institutions may use internal pricing methods to allocate the relevant indicator between business lines. Costs generated in one business line which are imputable to a different business line may be reallocated to the business line to which they pertain; (e) the mapping of activities into business lines for operational risk capital purposes shall be consistent with the categories institutions use for credit and market risks; (f) senior management shall be responsible for the mapping policy under the control of the management body of the institution; (g) institutions shall subject the mapping process to business lines to independent review. 3. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the conditions of application of the principles for business line mapping provided in this Article. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2017. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 318 Principles for business line mapping):
1. Institutions shall develop and document specific policies and criteria for mapping the relevant indicator for current business lines and activities into the standardised framework set out in Article 317. They shall review and adjust those policies and criteria as appropriate for new or changing business activities and risks. 3. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the conditions of application of the principles for business line mapping provided in this Article. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2017. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 319 Alternative Standardised Approach
1. Under the Alternative Standardised Approach, for the business lines ‘retail banking’ and ‘commercial banking’, institutions shall apply the following: (a) the relevant indicator is a normalised income indicator equal to the nominal amount of loans and advances multiplied by 0,035; (b) the loans and advances consist of the total drawn amounts in the corresponding credit portfolios. For the ‘commercial banking’ business line, institutions shall also include securities held in the non trading book in the nominal amount of loans and advances. 2. To be permitted to use the Alternative Standardised Approach, an institution shall meet all the following conditions: (a) its retail or commercial banking activities shall account for at least 90 % of its income; (b) a significant proportion of its retail or commercial banking activities shall comprise loans associated with a high PD; (c) the Alternative Standardised Approach provides an appropriate basis for calculating its own funds requirement for operational risk.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 319 Alternative Standardised Approach):
1. Under the Alternative Standardised Approach, for the business lines ‘retail banking’ and ‘commercial banking’, institutions shall apply the following: (a) the relevant indicator is a normalised income indicator equal to the nominal amount of loans and advances multiplied by 0,035; (b) the loans and advances consist of the total drawn amounts in the corresponding credit portfolios. For the ‘commercial banking’ business line, institutions shall also include securities held in the non trading book in the nominal amount of loans and advances. Under the Alternative Standardised Approach, for the business lines ‘retail banking’ and ‘commercial banking’, institutions shall apply the following: (a) the relevant indicator is a normalised income indicator equal to the nominal amount of loans and advances multiplied by 0,035; (b) the loans and advances consist of the total drawn amounts in the corresponding credit portfolios. For the ‘commercial banking’ business line, institutions shall also include securities held in the non trading book in the nominal amount of loans and advances. To be permitted to use the Alternative Standardised Approach, an institution shall meet all the following conditions: (a) its retail or commercial banking activities shall account for at least 90 % of its income; (b) a significant proportion of its retail or commercial banking activities shall comprise loans associated with a high PD; (c) the Alternative Standardised Approach provides an appropriate basis for calculating its own funds requirement for operational risk.
Article 320 Criteria for the Standardised Approach
The criteria referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 312(1) are the following: (a) an institution shall have in place a well-documented assessment and management system for operational risk with clear responsibilities assigned for this system. It shall identify its exposures to operational risk and track relevant operational risk data, including material loss data. This system shall be subject to regular independent review carried out by an internal or external party possessing the necessary knowledge to carry out such review; (b) an institution's operational risk assessment system shall be closely integrated into the risk management processes of the institution. Its output shall be an integral part of the process of monitoring and controlling the institution's operational risk profile; (c) an institution shall implement a system of reporting to senior management that provides operational risk reports to relevant functions within the institution. An institution shall have in place procedures for taking appropriate action according to the information within the reports to management.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Revised version (Article 320 Criteria for the Standardised Approach):
3. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the conditions that the competent authority has to assess pursuant to paragraph 1, including how the average annual operational risk loss is to be computed and the specifications on the information to be collected pursuant to paragraph 2 or any further information deemed necessary to carry out the assessment. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 10 January 2027. Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Regulation by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Article 321 Qualitative standards
The qualitative standards referred to in Article 312(2) are the following: (a) an institution's internal operational risk measurement system shall be closely integrated into its day-to-day risk management processes; (b) an institution shall have an independent risk management function for operational risk; (c) an institution shall have in place regular reporting of operational risk exposures and loss experience and shall have in place procedures for taking appropriate corrective action; (d) an institution's risk management system shall be well documented. An institution shall have in place routines for ensuring compliance and policies for the treatment of non-compliance; (e) an institution shall subject its operational risk management processes and measurement systems to regular reviews performed by internal or external auditors; (f) an institution's internal validation processes shall operate in a sound and effective manner; (g) data flows and processes associated with an institution's risk measurement system shall be transparent and accessible.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.
Article 322 Quantitative Standards
1. The quantitative standards referred to in Article 312(2) include the standards relating to process, to internal data, to external data, to scenario analysis, to business environment and to internal control factors laid down in paragraphs 2 to 6 respectively. 2. The standards relating to process are the following: (a) an institution shall calculate its own funds requirement as comprising both expected loss and unexpected loss, unless expected loss is adequately captured in its internal business practices. The operational risk measure shall capture potentially severe tail events, achieving a soundness standard comparable to a 99,9 % confidence interval over a one year period; (b) an institution's operational risk measurement system shall include the use of internal data, external data, scenario analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and internal control systems as set out in paragraphs 3 to 6. An institution shall have in place a well documented approach for weighting the use of these four elements in its overall operational risk measurement system; (c) an institution's risk measurement system shall capture the major drivers of risk affecting the shape of the tail of the estimated distribution of losses; (d) an institution may recognise correlations in operational risk losses across individual operational risk estimates only where its systems for measuring correlations are sound, implemented with integrity, and take into account the uncertainty surrounding any such correlation estimates, particularly in periods of stress. An institution shall validate its correlation assumptions using appropriate quantitative and qualitative techniques; (e) an institution's risk measurement system shall be internally consistent and shall avoid the multiple counting of qualitative assessments or risk mitigation techniques recognised in other areas of this Regulation. 3. The standards relating to internal data are the following: (a) an institution shall base its internally generated operational risk measures on a minimum historical observation period of five years. When an institution first moves to an Advanced Measurement Approach, it may use a three-year historical observation period; (b) an institution shall be able to map their historical internal loss data into the business lines defined in Article 317 and into the event types defined in Article 324, and to provide these data to competent authorities upon request. In exceptional circumstances, an institution may allocate loss events which affect the entire institution to an additional business line ‘corporate items’. An institution shall have in place documented, objective criteria for allocating losses to the specified business lines and event types. An institution shall record the operational risk losses that are related to credit risk and that the institution has historically included in the internal credit risk databases in the operational risk databases and shall identify them separately. Such losses shall not be subject to the operational risk charge, provided that the institution is required to continue to treat them as credit risk for the purposes of calculating own funds requirements. An institution shall include operational risk losses that are related to market risks in the scope of the own funds requirement for operational risk; (c) an institution's internal loss data shall be comprehensive in that it captures all material activities and exposures from all appropriate sub-systems and geographic locations. An institution shall be able to justify that any excluded activities or exposures, both individually and in combination, would not have a material impact on the overall risk estimates. An institution shall define appropriate minimum loss thresholds for internal loss data collection; (d) aside from information on gross loss amounts, an institution shall collect information about the date of the loss event, any recoveries of gross loss amounts, as well as descriptive information about the drivers or causes of the loss event; (e) an institution shall have in place specific criteria for assigning loss data arising from a loss event in a centralised function or an activity that spans more than one business line, as well as from related loss events over time; (f) an institution shall have in place documented procedures for assessing the on-going relevance of historical loss data, including those situations in which judgement overrides, scaling, or other adjustments may be used, to what extent they may be used and who is authorised to make such decisions. 4. The qualifying standards relating to external data are the following: (a) an institution's operational risk measurement system shall use relevant external data, especially when there is reason to believe that the institution is exposed to infrequent, yet potentially severe, losses. An institution shall have a systematic process for determining the situations for which external data shall be used and the methodologies used to incorporate the data in its measurement system; (b) an institution shall regularly review the conditions and practices for external data and shall document them and subject them to periodic independent review. 5. An institution shall use scenario analysis of expert opinion in conjunction with external data to evaluate its exposure to high severity events. Over time, the institution shall validate and reassess such assessments through comparison to actual loss experience to ensure their reasonableness. 6. The qualifying standards relating to business environment and internal control factors are the following: (a) an institution's firm-wide risk assessment methodology shall capture key business environment and internal control factors that can change the institutions operational risk profile; (b) an institution shall justify the choice of each factor as a meaningful driver of risk, based on experience and involving the expert judgment of the affected business areas; (c) an institution shall be able to justify to competent authorities the sensitivity of risk estimates to changes in the factors and the relative weighting of the various factors. In addition to capturing changes in risk due to improvements in risk controls, an institution's risk measurement framework shall also capture potential increases in risk due to greater complexity of activities or increased business volume; (d) an institution shall document its risk measurement framework and shall subject it to independent review within the institution and by competent authorities. Over time, an institution shall validate and reassess the process and the outcomes through comparison to actual internal loss experience and relevant external data.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 322 Quantitative Standards):
1. The quantitative standards referred to in Article 312(2) include the standards relating to process, to internal data, to external data, to scenario analysis, to business environment and to internal control factors laid down in paragraphs 2 to 6 respectively. The standards relating to process are the following: (a) an institution shall calculate its own funds requirement as comprising both expected loss and unexpected loss, unless expected loss is adequately captured in its internal business practices. The operational risk measure shall capture potentially severe tail events, achieving a soundness standard comparable to a 99,9 % confidence interval over a one year period; (b) an institution's operational risk measurement system shall include the use of internal data, external data, scenario analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and internal control systems as set out in paragraphs 3 to 6. An institution shall have in place a well documented approach for weighting the use of these four elements in its overall operational risk measurement system; (c) an institution's risk measurement system shall capture the major drivers of risk affecting the shape of the tail of the estimated distribution of losses; (d) an institution may recognise correlations in operational risk losses across individual operational risk estimates only where its systems for measuring correlations are sound, implemented with integrity, and take into account the uncertainty surrounding any such correlation estimates, particularly in periods of stress. An institution shall validate its correlation assumptions using appropriate quantitative and qualitative techniques; (e) an institution's risk measurement system shall be internally consistent and shall avoid the multiple counting of qualitative assessments or risk mitigation techniques recognised in other areas of this Regulation. The standards relating to internal data are the following: (a) an institution shall base its internally generated operational risk measures on a minimum historical observation period of five years. When an institution first moves to an Advanced Measurement Approach, it may use a three-year historical observation period; (b) an institution shall be able to map their historical internal loss data into the business lines defined in Article 317 and into the event types defined in Article 324, and to provide these data to competent authorities upon request. In exceptional circumstances, an institution may allocate loss events which affect the entire institution to an additional business line ‘corporate items’. An institution shall have in place documented, objective criteria for allocating losses to the specified business lines and event types. An institution shall record the operational risk losses that are related to credit risk and that the institution has historically included in the internal credit risk databases in the operational risk databases and shall identify them separately. Such losses shall not be subject to the operational risk charge, provided that the institution is required to continue to treat them as credit risk for the purposes of calculating own funds requirements. An institution shall include operational risk losses that are related to market risks in the scope of the own funds requirement for operational risk; (c) an institution's internal loss data shall be comprehensive in that it captures all material activities and exposures from all appropriate sub-systems and geographic locations. An institution shall be able to justify that any excluded activities or exposures, both individually and in combination, would not have a material impact on the overall risk estimates. An institution shall define appropriate minimum loss thresholds for internal loss data collection; (d) aside from information on gross loss amounts, an institution shall collect information about the date of the loss event, any recoveries of gross loss amounts, as well as descriptive information about the drivers or causes of the loss event; (e) an institution shall have in place specific criteria for assigning loss data arising from a loss event in a centralised function or an activity that spans more than one business line, as well as from related loss events over time; (f) an institution shall have in place documented procedures for assessing the on-going relevance of historical loss data, including those situations in which judgement overrides, scaling, or other adjustments may be used, to what extent they may be used and who is authorised to make such decisions. 4. The qualifying standards relating to external data are the following: (a) an institution's operational risk measurement system shall use relevant external data, especially when there is reason to believe that the institution is exposed to infrequent, yet potentially severe, losses. An institution shall have a systematic process for determining the situations for which external data shall be used and the methodologies used to incorporate the data in its measurement system; (b) an institution shall regularly review the conditions and practices for external data and shall document them and subject them to periodic independent review. The qualifying standards relating to external data are the following: (a) an institution's operational risk measurement system shall use relevant external data, especially when there is reason to believe that the institution is exposed to infrequent, yet potentially severe, losses. An institution shall have a systematic process for determining the situations for which external data shall be used and the methodologies used to incorporate the data in its measurement system; (b) an institution shall regularly review the conditions and practices for external data and shall document them and subject them to periodic independent review. 5. An institution shall use scenario analysis of expert opinion in conjunction with external data to evaluate its exposure to high severity events. Over time, the institution shall validate and reassess such assessments through comparison to actual loss experience to ensure their reasonableness. The qualifying standards relating to business environment and internal control factors are the following: (a) an institution's firm-wide risk assessment methodology shall capture key business environment and internal control factors that can change the institutions operational risk profile; (b) an institution shall justify the choice of each factor as a meaningful driver of risk, based on experience and involving the expert judgment of the affected business areas; (c) an institution shall be able to justify to competent authorities the sensitivity of risk estimates to changes in the factors and the relative weighting of the various factors. In addition to capturing changes in risk due to improvements in risk controls, an institution's risk measurement framework shall also capture potential increases in risk due to greater complexity of activities or increased business volume; (d) an institution shall document its risk measurement framework and shall subject it to independent review within the institution and by competent authorities. Over time, an institution shall validate and reassess the process and the outcomes through comparison to actual internal loss experience and relevant external data.
Article 323 Impact of insurance and other risk transfer mechanisms
1. The competent authorities shall permit institutions to recognise the impact of insurance subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 and other risk transfer mechanisms where the institution can demonstrate that a noticeable risk mitigating effect is achieved. 2. The insurance provider shall be authorised to provide insurance or re-insurance and shall have a minimum claims paying ability rating by an ECAI which has been determined by EBA to be associated with credit quality step 3 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to institutions under Title II, Chapter 2. 3. The insurance and the institutions' insurance framework shall meet all the following conditions: (a) the insurance policy has an initial term of no less than one year. For policies with a residual term of less than one year, an institution shall make appropriate haircuts reflecting the declining residual term of the policy, up to a full 100 % haircut for policies with a residual term of 90 days or less; (b) the insurance policy has a minimum notice period for cancellation of the contract of 90 days; (c) the insurance policy has no exclusions or limitations triggered by supervisory actions or, in the case of a failed institution, that preclude the institution's receiver or liquidator from recovering the damages suffered or expenses incurred by the institution, except in respect of events occurring after the initiation of receivership or liquidation proceedings in respect of the institution. However, the insurance policy may exclude any fine, penalty, or punitive damages resulting from actions by the competent authorities; (d) the risk mitigation calculations shall reflect the insurance coverage in a manner that is transparent in its relationship to, and consistent with, the actual likelihood and impact of loss used in the overall determination of operational risk capital; (e) the insurance is provided by a third party entity. In the case of insurance through captives and affiliates, the exposure has to be laid off to an independent third party entity that meets the eligibility criteria set out in paragraph 2; (f) the framework for recognising insurance is well reasoned and documented. 4. The methodology for recognising insurance shall capture all the following elements through discounts or haircuts in the amount of insurance recognition: (a) the residual term of the insurance policy, where less than one year; (b) the policy's cancellation terms, where less than one year; (c) the uncertainty of payment as well as mismatches in coverage of insurance policies. 5. The reduction in own funds requirements from the recognition of insurances and other risk transfer mechanisms shall not exceed 20 % of the own funds requirement for operational risk before the recognition of risk mitigation techniques.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 64 8 /2012 1 (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”) regulates derivatives transactions, including measures to limit their risks through clearing in central counterparties (CCPs). 2 CCPs take on the risks faced by the parties to a trade, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer. By doing so, they increase market transparency and efficiency and reduce the risks in financial markets, especially for derivatives . EMIR was adopted in the wake of the 2008/2009 financial crisis to promote financial stability and to make markets more transparent, more standardised, and thus safer. EMIR requires that derivatives transactions are reported to ensure market transparency for regulators and supervisors and that their risks are appropriately mitigated through central clearing at a CCP or by exchanging collateral, known as ‘margin’, in bilateral transactions. CCPs, and the risks they manage, have grown considerably since the adoption of EMIR. In 2017, the Commission published two legislative proposals amending EMIR, both of which were adopted by the co-legislators in 2019. EMIR REFIT 3 recalibrated some of the requirements under EMIR to ensure their proportionality, while ensuring financial stability. Acknowledging the emerging issues related to the increasing concentration of risks in CCPs, in particular third-country CCPs, EMIR 2.2 4 revised the supervisory framework and set out a process for assessing the systemic nature of third-country CCPs by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the central banks of issue. EMIR is complemented by the CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation 5 , adopted in 2020, 6 to prepare for the unlikely – though massively impactful - event that an EU CCP faces severe financial distress. 7 Whilst EMIR has established a robust framework for central clearing, certain areas of the current supervisory framework have proven overly complex. This limits EU CCPs’ ability to attract business both within the EU and internationally. The supervisory approval procedures for launching new clearing services and activities by EU CCPs, as well as changes in their risk models, are in many cases unnecessarily long and burdensome. The current rules are there to ensure the safety and soundness of EU CCPs, but this could be done in many ways and the existing processes have been challenged as too slow and, at times, disproportionate in light of the envisaged change. It should not take years for approving a new product, and changes to risk models need to be swift to reflect changing market and economic circumstances. Delays in approvals increase costs and reduce the attractiveness of EU CCPs, and consequently of the EU as a place to do business. The proposal aims at mitigating these obstacles in order to foster modern and competitive CCPs in the EU that can attract business. EMIR provides a comprehensive and robust prudential framework for CCPs and the newly adopted CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation further strengthens the soundness of EU CCPs. This proposal aims for the EU to continue to base the evolution of its central clearing ecosystem on the strength of its rules and supervision. Robust and safe CCPs enhance the trust of the financial system and crucially support the liquidity of key markets. A safe, robust and resilient clearing ecosystem is a pre-condition for it to grow further. The EU central clearing ecosystem should enable EU firms to hedge their risks efficiently and safely, while at the same time safeguarding the wider financial stability. In this way, central clearing will support the EU economy. This proposal aims to put firms in a better position by being able to predict the liquidity needs associated with central clearing. A competitive and efficient EU clearing ecosystem will increase central clearing activities, but central clearing also entails risks by centralising transactions in a few CCPs being financially systemically important. Hence, those risks must be appropriately managed by CCPs and CCPs must continue to be thoroughly supervised both at the national and the wider EU level. Therefore, this proposal aims at ensuring a robust and joined-up supervision, building on the supervisory system the EU currently has in place. In addition, since 2017, concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the ongoing risks to the EU financial stability arising from the excessive concentration of clearing in some third-country CCPs, notably in a stress scenario. H igh-risk but low-probability events can happen, and the EU must be prepared to face them 8 . While EU CCPs have generally proven resilient, experience has shown that the EU clearing ecosystem can be made stronger, to the benefit of financial stability. However, open strategic autonomy also means that the EU needs to safeguard itself against the financial stability risks which can arise when EU market participants are excessively reliant on third-country entities, as this can be a source of vulnerabilit y . Therefore, this proposal aims at making the equivalence framework in EMIR more proportionate and to better tailor cooperation with foreign supervisors taking into account the risks posed by CCPs based in third countries – and without compromising on the need for third countries to have sound rules in place . It is also proposed that the equivalence procedure is made simpler when the risks involved in central clearing in a third country are particularly low. In addition, this proposal seeks to build up the EU’s central clearing capacity and thereby increase liquidity at EU CCPs with the aim to reduce the risks posed to the EU financial stability by excessive exposures to third-country CCPs. Therefore, this proposal requires all market participants subject to a clearing obligation, to hold active accounts at EU CCPs for clearing products that have been identified by ESMA as of substantial systemic importance for the EU financial stability. T his proposal is complemented by a proposal for a Directive introducing a limited number of changes to Directive 2013/36/EU 9 (Capital Requirements Directive or ‘CRD’), Directive (EU) 2019/2034 10 (Investment Firms Directive or ‘IFD’) and Directive 2009/65/EU 11 (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive or ‘UCITS Directive’) as regards the treatment of concentration risk towards CCPs and the counterparty risk on centrally cleared derivative transactions. These amendments are necessary to ensure that the objectives of this EMIR review are achieved as well as to assure coherence. The two proposals should therefore be read in conjunction.