Article 450 Remuneration policy
1. Institutions shall disclose at least the following information, regarding the remuneration policy and practices of the institution for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile: (a) information concerning the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration policy, as well as the number of meetings held by the main body overseeing remuneration during the financial year, including, if applicable, information about the composition and the mandate of a remuneration committee, the external consultant whose services have been used for the determination of the remuneration policy and the role of the relevant stakeholders; (b) information on link between pay and performance; (c) the most important design characteristics of the remuneration system, including information on the criteria used for performance measurement and risk adjustment, deferral policy and vesting criteria; (d) the ratios between fixed and variable remuneration set in accordance with Article 94(1)(g) of Directive 2013/36/EU; (e) information on the performance criteria on which the entitlement to shares, options or variable components of remuneration is based; (f) the main parameters and rationale for any variable component scheme and any other non-cash benefits; (g) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by business area; (h) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by senior management and members of staff whose actions have a material impact on the risk profile of the institution, indicating the following: (i) the amounts of remuneration for the financial year, split into fixed and variable remuneration, and the number of beneficiaries; (ii) the amounts and forms of variable remuneration, split into cash, shares, share-linked instruments and other types; (iii) the amounts of outstanding deferred remuneration, split into vested and unvested portions; (iv) the amounts of deferred remuneration awarded during the financial year, paid out and reduced through performance adjustments; (v) new sign-on and severance payments made during the financial year, and the number of beneficiaries of such payments; (vi) the amounts of severance payments awarded during the financial year, number of beneficiaries and highest such award to a single person; (h) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by senior management and members of staff whose actions have a material impact on the risk profile of the institution, indicating the following: (i) the amounts of remuneration for the financial year, split into fixed and variable remuneration, and the number of beneficiaries; (ii) the amounts and forms of variable remuneration, split into cash, shares, share-linked instruments and other types; (iii) the amounts of outstanding deferred remuneration, split into vested and unvested portions; (iv) the amounts of deferred remuneration awarded during the financial year, paid out and reduced through performance adjustments; (v) new sign-on and severance payments made during the financial year, and the number of beneficiaries of such payments; (vi) the amounts of severance payments awarded during the financial year, number of beneficiaries and highest such award to a single person; (i) the number of individuals being remunerated EUR 1 million or more per financial year, for remuneration between EUR 1 million and EUR 5 million broken down into pay bands of EUR 500 000 and for remuneration of EUR 5 million and above broken down into pay bands of EUR 1 million; (j) upon demand from the Member State or competent authority, the total remuneration for each member of the management body or senior management. 2. For institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and the complexity of their activities, the quantitative information referred to in this Article shall also be made available to the public at the level of members of the management body of the institution. Institutions shall comply with the requirements set out in this Article in a manner that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities and without prejudice to Directive 95/46/EC.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 450 Remuneration policy):
1. Institutions shall disclose at least the following information, regarding the remuneration policy and practices of the institution for those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on its risk profile: (a) information concerning the decision-making process used for determining the remuneration policy, as well as the number of meetings held by the main body overseeing remuneration during the financial year, including, if applicable, information about the composition and the mandate of a remuneration committee, the external consultant whose services have been used for the determination of the remuneration policy and the role of the relevant stakeholders; (b) information on link between pay and performance; (c) the most important design characteristics of the remuneration system, including information on the criteria used for performance measurement and risk adjustment, deferral policy and vesting criteria; (d) the ratios between fixed and variable remuneration set in accordance with Article 94(1)(g) of Directive 2013/36/EU; (e) information on the performance criteria on which the entitlement to shares, options or variable components of remuneration is based; (f) the main parameters and rationale for any variable component scheme and any other non-cash benefits; (g) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by business area; (h) aggregate quantitative information on remuneration, broken down by senior management and members of staff whose actions have a material impact on the risk profile of the institution, indicating the following: (i) the amounts of remuneration for the financial year, split into fixed and variable remuneration, and the number of beneficiaries; (ii) the amounts and forms of variable remuneration, split into cash, shares, share-linked instruments and other types; (iii) the amounts of outstanding deferred remuneration, split into vested and unvested portions; (iv) the amounts of deferred remuneration awarded during the financial year, paid out and reduced through performance adjustments; (v) new sign-on and severance payments made during the financial year, and the number of beneficiaries of such payments; (vi) the amounts of severance payments awarded during the financial year, number of beneficiaries and highest such award to a single person; (i) the number of individuals being remunerated EUR 1 million or more per financial year, for remuneration between EUR 1 million and EUR 5 million broken down into pay bands of EUR 500 000 and for remuneration of EUR 5 million and above broken down into pay bands of EUR 1 million; (j) upon demand from the Member State or competent authority, the total remuneration for each member of the management body or senior management. 2. For institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and the complexity of their activities, the quantitative information referred to in this Article shall also be made available to the public at the level of members of the management body of the institution. Institutions shall comply with the requirements set out in this Article in a manner that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities and without prejudice to Directive 95/46/EC.
Article 451 Leverage
1. Institutions shall disclose the following information regarding their leverage ratio calculated in accordance with Article 429 and their management of the risk of excessive leverage: (a) the leverage ratio and how the institution applies Article 499(2) and (3); (b) a breakdown of the total exposure measure as well as a reconciliation of the total exposure measure with the relevant information disclosed in published financial statements; (c) where applicable, the amount of derecognised fiduciary items in accordance with Article 429(11); (d) a description of the processes used to manage the risk of excessive leverage; (e) a description of the factors that had an impact on the leverage ratio during the period to which the disclosed leverage ratio refers. 2. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the uniform disclosure template for the disclosure referred to in paragraph 1 and the instructions on how to use such template. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 30 June 2014. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 452 Use of the IRB Approach to credit risk
Institutions calculating the risk-weighted exposure amounts under the IRB Approach shall disclose the following information: (a) the competent authority's permission of the approach or approved transition; (b) an explanation and review of: (i) the structure of internal rating systems and relation between internal and external ratings; (ii) the use of internal estimates other than for calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3; (iii) the process for managing and recognising credit risk mitigation; (iv) the control mechanisms for rating systems including a description of independence, accountability, and rating systems review; (b) an explanation and review of: (i) the structure of internal rating systems and relation between internal and external ratings; (ii) the use of internal estimates other than for calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3; (iii) the process for managing and recognising credit risk mitigation; (iv) the control mechanisms for rating systems including a description of independence, accountability, and rating systems review; (c) a description of the internal ratings process, provided separately for the following exposure classes: (i) central governments and central banks; (ii) institutions; (iii) corporate, including SMEs, specialised lending and purchased corporate receivables; (iv) retail, for each of the categories of exposures to which the different correlations in Article 154(1) to (4) correspond; (v) equities; (c) a description of the internal ratings process, provided separately for the following exposure classes: (i) central governments and central banks; (ii) institutions; (iii) corporate, including SMEs, specialised lending and purchased corporate receivables; (iv) retail, for each of the categories of exposures to which the different correlations in Article 154(1) to (4) correspond; (v) equities; (d) the exposure values for each of the exposure classes specified in Article 147. Exposures to central governments and central banks, institutions and corporates where institutions use own estimates of LGDs or conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, shall be disclosed separately from exposures for which the institutions do not use such estimates; (e) for each of the exposure classes central governments and central banks, institutions, corporates and equity, and across a sufficient number of obligor grades (including default) to allow for a meaningful differentiation of credit risk, institutions shall disclose: (i) the total exposures, including for the exposure classes central governments and central banks, institutions and corporates, the sum of outstanding loans and exposure values for undrawn commitments; and for equities the outstanding amount; (ii) the exposure-weighted average risk weight; (iii) for the institutions using own estimates of conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, the amount of undrawn commitments and exposure-weighted average exposure values for each exposure class; (e) for each of the exposure classes central governments and central banks, institutions, corporates and equity, and across a sufficient number of obligor grades (including default) to allow for a meaningful differentiation of credit risk, institutions shall disclose: (i) the total exposures, including for the exposure classes central governments and central banks, institutions and corporates, the sum of outstanding loans and exposure values for undrawn commitments; and for equities the outstanding amount; (ii) the exposure-weighted average risk weight; (iii) for the institutions using own estimates of conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, the amount of undrawn commitments and exposure-weighted average exposure values for each exposure class; (f) For the retail exposure class and for each of the categories set out in point (c)(iv), either the disclosures outlined in point (e) (if applicable, on a pooled basis), or an analysis of exposures (outstanding loans and exposure values for undrawn commitments) against a sufficient number of EL grades to allow for a meaningful differentiation of credit risk (if applicable, on a pooled basis); (g) the actual specific credit risk adjustments in the preceding period for each exposure class (for retail, for each of the categories as set out in point (c)(iv)) and how they differ from past experience; (h) a description of the factors that impacted on the loss experience in the preceding period (for example, has the institution experienced higher than average default rates, or higher than average LGDs and conversion factors); (i) the institution's estimates against actual outcomes over a longer period. At a minimum, this shall include information on estimates of losses against actual losses in each exposure class (for retail, for each of the categories as set out in point (c)(iv) over a period sufficient to allow for a meaningful assessment of the performance of the internal rating processes for each exposure class (for retail for each of the categories as set out in point (c)(iv). Where appropriate, the institutions shall further decompose this to provide analysis of PD and, for the institutions using own estimates of LGDs and/or conversion factors, LGD and conversion factor outcomes against estimates provided in the quantitative risk assessment disclosures set out in this Article; (j) for all exposure classes specified in Article 147 and for each category of exposure to which the different correlations in Article 154 (1) to (4) correspond: (i) for the institutions using own LGD estimates for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, the exposure-weighted average LGD and PD in percentage for each relevant geographical location of credit exposures; (ii) for the institutions that do not use own LGD estimates, the exposure-weighted average PD in percentage for each relevant geographical location of credit exposures. (j) for all exposure classes specified in Article 147 and for each category of exposure to which the different correlations in Article 154 (1) to (4) correspond: (i) for the institutions using own LGD estimates for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, the exposure-weighted average LGD and PD in percentage for each relevant geographical location of credit exposures; (ii) for the institutions that do not use own LGD estimates, the exposure-weighted average PD in percentage for each relevant geographical location of credit exposures. For the purposes of point (c), the description shall include the types of exposure included in the exposure class, the definitions, methods and data for estimation and validation of PD and, if applicable, LGD and conversion factors, including assumptions employed in the derivation of these variables, and the descriptions of material deviations from the definition of default as set out in Article 178, including the broad segments affected by such deviations. For the purposes of point (j), the relevant geographical location of credit exposures means exposures in the Member States in which the institution has been authorised and Member States or third countries in which institutions carry out activities through a branch or a subsidiary.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 452 Use of the IRB Approach to credit risk):
Institutions calculating the risk-weighted exposure amounts under the IRB Approach shall disclose the following information: (a) the competent authority's permission of the approach or approved transition; (b) an explanation and review of: (i) the structure of internal rating systems and relation between internal and external ratings; (ii) the use of internal estimates other than for calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts in accordance with Part Three, Title II, Chapter 3; (iii) the process for managing and recognising credit risk mitigation; (iv) the control mechanisms for rating systems including a description of independence, accountability, and rating systems review; (c) a description of the internal ratings process, provided separately for the following exposure classes: (i) central governments and central banks; (ii) institutions; (iii) corporate, including SMEs, specialised lending and purchased corporate receivables; (iv) retail, for each of the categories of exposures to which the different correlations in Article 154(1) to (4) correspond; (v) equities; (d) the exposure values for each of the exposure classes specified in Article 147. Exposures to central governments and central banks, institutions and corporates where institutions use own estimates of LGDs or conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, shall be disclosed separately from exposures for which the institutions do not use such estimates; (e) for each of the exposure classes central governments and central banks, institutions, corporates and equity, and across a sufficient number of obligor grades (including default) to allow for a meaningful differentiation of credit risk, institutions shall disclose: (i) the total exposures, including for the exposure classes central governments and central banks, institutions and corporates, the sum of outstanding loans and exposure values for undrawn commitments; and for equities the outstanding amount; (ii) the exposure-weighted average risk weight; (iii) for the institutions using own estimates of conversion factors for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, the amount of undrawn commitments and exposure-weighted average exposure values for each exposure class; (f) For the retail exposure class and for each of the categories set out in point (c)(iv), either the disclosures outlined in point (e) (if applicable, on a pooled basis), or an analysis of exposures (outstanding loans and exposure values for undrawn commitments) against a sufficient number of EL grades to allow for a meaningful differentiation of credit risk (if applicable, on a pooled basis); (g) the actual specific credit risk adjustments in the preceding period for each exposure class (for retail, for each of the categories as set out in point (c)(iv)) and how they differ from past experience; (h) a description of the factors that impacted on the loss experience in the preceding period (for example, has the institution experienced higher than average default rates, or higher than average LGDs and conversion factors); (i) the institution's estimates against actual outcomes over a longer period. At a minimum, this shall include information on estimates of losses against actual losses in each exposure class (for retail, for each of the categories as set out in point (c)(iv) over a period sufficient to allow for a meaningful assessment of the performance of the internal rating processes for each exposure class (for retail for each of the categories as set out in point (c)(iv). Where appropriate, the institutions shall further decompose this to provide analysis of PD and, for the institutions using own estimates of LGDs and/or conversion factors, LGD and conversion factor outcomes against estimates provided in the quantitative risk assessment disclosures set out in this Article; (j) for all exposure classes specified in Article 147 and for each category of exposure to which the different correlations in Article 154 (1) to (4) correspond: (i) for the institutions using own LGD estimates for the calculation of risk-weighted exposure amounts, the exposure-weighted average LGD and PD in percentage for each relevant geographical location of credit exposures; (ii) for the institutions that do not use own LGD estimates, the exposure-weighted average PD in percentage for each relevant geographical location of credit exposures. For the purposes of point (c), the description shall include the types of exposure included in the exposure class, the definitions, methods and data for estimation and validation of PD and, if applicable, LGD and conversion factors, including assumptions employed in the derivation of these variables, and the descriptions of material deviations from the definition of default as set out in Article 178, including the broad segments affected by such deviations. For the purposes of point (j), the relevant geographical location of credit exposures means exposures in the Member States in which the institution has been authorised and Member States or third countries in which institutions carry out activities through a branch or a subsidiary.
Article 453 Use of credit risk mitigation techniques
The institutions applying credit risk mitigation techniques shall disclose the following information: (a) the policies and processes for, and an indication of the extent to which the entity makes use of, on- and off-balance sheet netting; (b) the policies and processes for collateral valuation and management; (c) a description of the main types of collateral taken by the institution; (d) the main types of guarantor and credit derivative counterparty and their creditworthiness; (e) information about market or credit risk concentrations within the credit mitigation taken; (f) for institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach or the IRB Approach, but not providing own estimates of LGDs or conversion factors in respect of the exposure class, separately for each exposure class, the total exposure value (after, where applicable, on- or off-balance sheet netting) that is covered — after the application of volatility adjustments — by eligible financial collateral, and other eligible collateral; (g) for institutions calculating risk-weighted exposure amounts under the Standardised Approach or the IRB Approach, separately for each exposure class, the total exposure (after, where applicable, on- or off-balance sheet netting) that is covered by guarantees or credit derivatives. For the equity exposure class, this requirement applies to each of the approaches provided in Article 155.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Article 454 Use of the Advanced Measurement Approaches to operational risk
The institutions using the Advanced Measurement Approaches set out in Articles 321 to 324 for the calculation of their own funds requirements for operational risk shall disclose a description of the use of insurances and other risk transfer mechanisms for the purpose of mitigation of this risk.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 454 Disclosure of the use of the Advanced Measurement Approaches to operational risk):
The institutions using the Advanced Measurement Approaches set out in Articles 321 to 324 for the calculation of their own funds requirements for operational risk shall disclose a description of their use of insurance and other risk-transfer mechanisms for the purpose of mitigating that risk.
Article 455 Use of Internal Market Risk Models
Institutions calculating their capital requirements in accordance with Article 363 shall disclose the following information: (a) for each sub-portfolio covered: (i) the characteristics of the models used; (ii) where applicable, for the internal models for incremental default and migration risk and for correlation trading, the methodologies used and the risks measured through the use of an internal model including a description of the approach used by the institution to determine liquidity horizons, the methodologies used to achieve a capital assessment that is consistent with the required soundness standard and the approaches used in the validation of the model; (iii) a description of stress testing applied to the sub-portfolio; (iv) a description of the approaches used for back-testing and validating the accuracy and consistency of the internal models and modelling processes; (a) for each sub-portfolio covered: (i) the characteristics of the models used; (ii) where applicable, for the internal models for incremental default and migration risk and for correlation trading, the methodologies used and the risks measured through the use of an internal model including a description of the approach used by the institution to determine liquidity horizons, the methodologies used to achieve a capital assessment that is consistent with the required soundness standard and the approaches used in the validation of the model; (iii) a description of stress testing applied to the sub-portfolio; (iv) a description of the approaches used for back-testing and validating the accuracy and consistency of the internal models and modelling processes; (b) the scope of permission by the competent authority; (c) a description of the extent and methodologies for compliance with the requirements set out in Articles 104 and 105; (d) the highest, the lowest and the mean of the following: (i) the daily value-at-risk measures over the reporting period and as per the period end; (ii) the stressed value-at-risk measures over the reporting period and as per the period end; (iii) the risk numbers for incremental default and migration risk and for the specific risk of the correlation trading portfolio over the reporting period and as per the period-end; (d) the highest, the lowest and the mean of the following: (i) the daily value-at-risk measures over the reporting period and as per the period end; (ii) the stressed value-at-risk measures over the reporting period and as per the period end; (iii) the risk numbers for incremental default and migration risk and for the specific risk of the correlation trading portfolio over the reporting period and as per the period-end; (e) the elements of the own funds requirement as specified in Article 364; (f) the weighted average liquidity horizon for each sub-portfolio covered by the internal models for incremental default and migration risk and for correlation trading; (g) a comparison of the daily end-of-day value-at-risk measures to the one-day changes of the portfolio's value by the end of the subsequent business day together with an analysis of any important overshooting during the reporting period.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 455 Use of Internal Market Risk Models):
Institutions calculating their capital requirements in accordance with Article 363 shall disclose the following information: (a) for each sub-portfolio covered: (i) the characteristics of the models used; (ii) where applicable, for the internal models for incremental default and migration risk and for correlation trading, the methodologies used and the risks measured through the use of an internal model including a description of the approach used by the institution to determine liquidity horizons, the methodologies used to achieve a capital assessment that is consistent with the required soundness standard and the approaches used in the validation of the model; (iii) a description of stress testing applied to the sub-portfolio; (iv) a description of the approaches used for back-testing and validating the accuracy and consistency of the internal models and modelling processes; (b) the scope of permission by the competent authority; (c) a description of the extent and methodologies for compliance with the requirements set out in Articles 104 and 105; (d) the highest, the lowest and the mean of the following: (i) the daily value-at-risk measures over the reporting period and as per the period end; (ii) the stressed value-at-risk measures over the reporting period and as per the period end; (iii) the risk numbers for incremental default and migration risk and for the specific risk of the correlation trading portfolio over the reporting period and as per the period-end; (e) the elements of the own funds requirement as specified in Article 364; (f) the weighted average liquidity horizon for each sub-portfolio covered by the internal models for incremental default and migration risk and for correlation trading; (g) a comparison of the daily end-of-day value-at-risk measures to the one-day changes of the portfolio's value by the end of the subsequent business day together with an analysis of any important overshooting during the reporting period.
Article 456 Delegated acts
1. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462, concerning the following matters: (a) clarification of the definitions set out in Articles 4, 5, 142, 153, 192, 242, 272, 300, 381 and 411 to ensure uniform application of this Regulation; (b) clarification of the definitions set out in Articles 4, 5, 142, 153, 192, 242, 272, 300, 381 and 411 in order to take account, in the application of this Regulation, of developments on financial markets; (c) amendment of the list of exposure classes in Articles 112 and 147 in order to take account of developments on financial markets; (d) the amount specified in point (c) of Article 123, Article 147(5)(a), Article 153(4) and Article 162(4), to take into account the effects of inflation; (e) the list and classification of the off-balance sheet items in Annexes I and II, in order to take account of developments on financial markets; (f) adjustment of the categories of investment firms in Article 95(1) and Article 96(1) to take account of developments on financial markets; (g) clarification of the requirement laid down in Article 97 to ensure uniform application of this Regulation. (h) amendment of the own funds requirements as set out in Articles 301 to 311 of this Regulation and Articles 50a to 50d of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to take account of developments or amendments of the international standards for exposures to a central counterparty; (i) clarification of the terms referred to in the exemptions provided for in Article 400; (j) amendment of the capital measure and the total exposure measure of the leverage ratio referred to in Article 429(2) in order to correct any shortcomings discovered on the basis of the reporting referred to in Article 430(1) before the leverage ratio has to be published by institutions as set out in Article 451(1)(a). 2. EBA shall monitor the own funds requirements for credit valuation adjustment risk and by 1 January 2015 submit a report to the Commission. In particular, the report shall assess: (a) the treatment of CVA risk as a stand-alone charge versus an integrated component of the market risk framework; (b) the scope of the CVA risk charge including the exemption in Article 482; (c) eligible hedges; (d) calculation of capital requirements of CVA risk. On the basis of that report and where the findings are that such action is necessary the Commission shall also be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 462 to amend Article 381, Article 382(1) to (3) and Articles 383 to 386 concerning those items.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 456 Delegated acts):
The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462, concerning the following matters: (a) clarification of the definitions set out in Articles 4, 5, 142, 153, 192, 242, 272, 300, 381 and 411 to ensure uniform application of this Regulation; (b) clarification of the definitions set out in Articles 4, 5, 142, 153, 192, 242, 272, 300, 381 and 411 in order to take account, in the application of this Regulation, of developments on financial markets; (c) amendment of the list of exposure classes in Articles 112 and 147 in order to take account of developments on financial markets; (e) the list and classification of the off-balance sheet items in Annexes I and II, in order to take account of developments on financial markets; adjustment of the categories of investment firms in Article 95(1) and Article 96(1) to take account of developments on financial markets; (g) clarification of the requirement laid down in Article 97 to ensure uniform application of this Regulation. (h) amendment of the own funds requirements as set out in Articles 301 to 311 of this Regulation and Articles 50a to 50d of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to take account of developments or amendments of the international standards for exposures to a central counterparty; (i) clarification of the terms referred to in the exemptions provided for in Article 400; EBA shall monitor the own funds requirements for credit valuation adjustment risk and by 1 January 2015 submit a report to the Commission. In particular, the report shall assess: (a) the treatment of CVA risk as a stand-alone charge versus an integrated component of the market risk framework; (b) the scope of the CVA risk charge including the exemption in Article 482; (c) eligible hedges; (d) calculation of capital requirements of CVA risk. On the basis of that report and where the findings are that such action is necessary the Commission shall also be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 462 to amend Article 381, Article 382(1) to (3) and Articles 383 to 386 concerning those items.
Article 457 Technical adjustments and corrections
The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462, to make technical adjustment and corrections of non-essential elements in the following provisions in order to take account of developments in new financial products or activities, to make adjustments taking into account developments after the adoption of this Regulation in other legislative acts of the Union on financial services and accounting including accounting standards based on Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002: (a) the own funds requirements for credit risk laid down in Articles 111 to 134, and in Articles 143 to 191; (b) the effects of credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 193 to 241; (c) the own funds requirements for securitisation laid down in Articles 243 to 266; (d) the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risks in accordance with Articles 272 to 311; (e) the own funds requirements for operational risk laid down in Articles 315 to 324; (f) the own funds requirements for market risk laid down in Articles 325 to 377; (g) the own funds requirements for settlement risk laid down in Articles 378 and 379; (h) the own funds requirements for credit valuation adjustment risk laid down in Articles 383, 384 and 386; (i) Part Two and Article 99 only as a result of developments in accounting standards or requirements which take account of Union legislation.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council, known as the Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter “the CRR”), establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 , known as the Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter “the CRD”), the prudential regul atory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and the CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global stan dards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in particular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended on several occasions to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to imp lement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. One set of amendments, contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 3 , has implemented the revised securitisation framework adopted by the BCBS in December 2014 4 ("the revised Basel framework"). The revised Basel framework has been designed to reduce the complexity of the regulatory capital requirements applicable at the time, reflect better the risks of positions in a securitisation and allow institutions to determine capital requirements through own calculations and on the basis of the information available to institutions, thus reducing reliance on external ratings. In order to further promote the development of a high quality EU secur itisation market based on sound practices, Regulation (EU) 2017/2401 also included amendments aiming at providing for a more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations in line with the standards on th e alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” securitisations published by the BCBS in July 2016 5 . The eligibility criteria for STS securitisations are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 6 that also provides for a set of commo n requirements on risk retention, due diligence and disclosure for all financial services sectors. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector, including for the expected increase in the volume of non-performing loans due to the deep recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy. Building essentially on recent work carried out by the EBA, this result can be achieved through three targeted amendments aiming at increasing the overall risk-sensitivity of the EU securitisation framework that would make the recourse to the securitisation tool more economically viable for institutions whithin a prudential framework adequate to safeguard the EU financal stability. First, it is necessary to provide for a more risk-sensitiv e treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation, in line with the EBA recommandation included in its “Report on STS framework for synthetic securitisation” 7 . Based on an extensive analysis of the on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation market develop ments and trends in the EU, including data on the historical default and loss performance of the synthetic transactions, the report recommends the establishment of a cross-sectoral EU framework for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation that is limited to on- balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and is based on a common set of eligibility criteria. It also recommends a targeted differentiated prudential treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation exposures, taking into account in particlar the reduced a gency and modelling risk compared to non-STS on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation exposures. The alignment of the prudential treatment is also widely acknowledged as a necessary step to further encourage institutions to bear the costs incurred to comply with the STS criteria when structuring the securitisation transactions. Second, it is necessary to remove the existing regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs) embedded in the current framework. As highlighted in the EBA Opinion 2019/13 on the regulatory treatment of NPE securitisations 8 , the current framework does not incorporate the specific features of NPE securitisation, thereby leading to excessive capital requirements for this category of exposures, particularly under the Securitisation Internal Ratings Based Approach (SEC-IRBA) and the Securitisation Standardised Approach (SEC-SA). The excessive conservativeness of the framework is due to the fact that it has been designed having exclusive regard to the specific risk drivers of performing loans. It is therefore proposed to amend the treatment of NPE securitisations by providing for a simple and sufficiently conservative approach based on a flat 100% risk weight applicable to the senior tranche of traditional NPE securitisations and on the application of a floor of 100% to the risk we ights of any other tranches of both traditional and on-balance-sheet synthetic NPE securitisations that remain subject to the general framework for the calcualtion of risk-weighted exposures. The proposed treatment is aligned with the main elements of the approach currently being finalised by the BCBS. Third, it is proposed to amend Article 249(3) which introduces an additional eligibility criterion for the recognition of unfunded credit protection for institutions applying the standardised approach to cal culate capital requirements for securitisation exposures. Specifically, it imposes a minimum credit rating requirement for almost all 9 types of providers of unfunded credit protection, including central governments. This provision appears to be inconsisten t with the general credit risk mitigation rules set out in the CRR , with the objectives of that Regulation, but also with the new international standards set by the revised Basel III framework imposing a minimum credit rating requirement only to a limited set of protection providers in case of securitisation exposures. This amendment will enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise NPEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic . These proposed changes, together with the proposed changes to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, will enable institutions to maintain a high volume of lending to the economy in the coming months and therefore will provide an important contribution to the absorption of the impact of the shock of the COVID-19 crisis. As such, and compared to the current regulatory framework, the changes will reinforce the role of securitisation as a tool available to institutions to maintain and possibly even enhance their lending capacity in two ways: · by facilitating the recourse to this technique to offload NPEs that can be expected to grow in the aftermath of the crisis. By doing so, institutions will be able to better spread the risk to other financial actors and ultimately reduce regulator y capital constraints stemming from the impact of the high volume of NPEs, while maintaining high prudential standards; and · by implementing a more risk-sensitive treatment of the senior tranche held by the originator institution in case of STS on-balance-s heet securitisation. As pointed out by many stakeholders, the development of STS eligibility criteria would not be sufficient ' per se ' to achieve the objective of making the compliance with these criteria economically viable if the introduction of the new criteria is not accompanied with a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment in the area of capital requirements, better reflecting their specific features. The more risk-sensitive treatment for NPE securitisations and for the senior tranche of STS on-balance-sheet securitisations are set out in the present proposal, while the eligibility criteria for the latter type of securitisations, together with other cross-sectoral provisions, are contained in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 
Revised version (Article 457 Technical adjustments and corrections):
The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462, to make technical adjustment and corrections of non-essential elements in the following provisions in order to take account of developments in new financial products or activities, to make adjustments taking into account developments after the adoption of this Regulation in other legislative acts of the Union on financial services and accounting including accounting standards based on Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002: (a) the own funds requirements for credit risk laid down in Articles 111 to 134, and in Articles 143 to 191; (b) the effects of credit risk mitigation in accordance with Articles 193 to 241; (c) the own funds requirements for securitisation laid down in Articles 242 to 270a; (d) the own funds requirements for counterparty credit risks in accordance with Articles 272 to 311; (e) the own funds requirements for operational risk laid down in Articles 315 to 324; (f) the own funds requirements for market risk laid down in Articles 325 to 377; (g) the own funds requirements for settlement risk laid down in Articles 378 and 379; (h) the own funds requirements for credit valuation adjustment risk laid down in Articles 383, 384 and 386; (i) Part Two and Article 430 only as a result of developments in accounting standards or requirements which take account of Union legislative acts.
Article 458 Macroprudential or systemic risk identified at the level of a Member State
1. Member States shall designate the authority in charge of the application of this Article. This authority shall be the competent authority or the designated authority. 2. Where the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1 identifies changes in the intensity of macroprudential or systemic risk in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a specific Member State and which that authority considers would better be addressed by means of stricter national measures, it shall notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the ESRB and EBA of that fact and submit relevant quantitative or qualitative evidence of all of the following: (a) the changes in the intensity of macroprudential or systemic risk; (b) the reasons why such changes could pose a threat to financial stability at national level; (c) a justification of why Articles 124 and 164 of this Regulation and Articles 101, 103, 104, 105, 133, and 136 of Directive 2013/36/EU cannot adequately address the macroprudential or systemic risk identified, taking into account the relative effectiveness of those measures; (d) draft national measures for domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of those institutions, intended to mitigate the changes in the intensity of risk and concerning: (i) the level of own funds laid down in Article 92; (ii) the requirements for large exposures laid down in Article 392 and Article 395 to 403; (iii) the public disclosure requirements laid down in Articles 431 to 455; (iv) the level of the capital conservation buffer laid down in Article 129 of Directive 2013/36/EU; (v) liquidity requirements laid down in Part Six; (vi) risk weights for targeting asset bubbles in the residential property and commercial immovable property sector; or (vii) intra financial sector exposures; (d) draft national measures for domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of those institutions, intended to mitigate the changes in the intensity of risk and concerning: (i) the level of own funds laid down in Article 92; (ii) the requirements for large exposures laid down in Article 392 and Article 395 to 403; (iii) the public disclosure requirements laid down in Articles 431 to 455; (iv) the level of the capital conservation buffer laid down in Article 129 of Directive 2013/36/EU; (v) liquidity requirements laid down in Part Six; (vi) risk weights for targeting asset bubbles in the residential property and commercial immovable property sector; or (vii) intra financial sector exposures; (e) an explanation as to why the draft measures are deemed by the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1 to be suitable, effective and proportionate to address the situation; and (f) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the draft measures on the internal market based on information which is available to the Member State concerned. 3. When authorised to apply national measures in accordance with this Article, the authorities determined in accordance with paragraph 1 shall provide relevant competent authorities or designated authorities in other Member States with all relevant information. 4. The power to adopt an implementing act to reject the draft national measures referred to in point (d) of paragraph 2 is conferred on the Council, acting by qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission. Within one month of receiving the notification referred to in paragraph 2, the ESRB and EBA shall provide their opinions on the points mentioned in that paragraph to the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned. Taking utmost account of the opinions referred to in the second subparagraph and if there is robust, strong and detailed evidence that the measure will have a negative impact on the internal market that outweighs the financial stability benefits resulting in a reduction of the macroprudential or systemic risk identified, the Commission may, within one month, propose to the Council an implementing act to reject the draft national measures. In the absence of a Commission proposal within that period of one month, the Member State concerned may immediately adopt the draft national measures for a period of up to two years or until the macroprudential or systemic risk ceases to exist if that occurs sooner. The Council shall decide on the proposal by the Commission within one month after receipt of the proposal and state its reasons for rejecting or not rejecting the draft national measures. The Council shall only reject the draft national measures if it considers that one or more of the following conditions are not complied with: (a) the changes in the intensity of macroprudential or systemic risk are of such nature as to pose risk to financial stability at national level; (b) Articles 124 and 164 of this Regulation and Articles 101, 103, 104, 105, 133, and 136 of Directive 2013/36/EU cannot adequately address the macroprudential or systemic risk identified, taking into account the relative effectiveness of those measures; (c) the draft national measures are more suitable to address the identified macroprudential or systemic risk and do not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole, thus forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market; (d) the issue concerns only one Member State; and (e) the risks have not already been addressed by other measures in this Regulation or in Directive 2013/36/EU. The assessment of the Council shall take into account the opinion of the ESRB and EBA and shall be based on the evidence presented in accordance with paragraph 2 by the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1. In the absence of a Council implementing act to reject the draft national measures within one month after receipt of the proposal by the Commission, the Member State may adopt the measures and apply them for a period of up to two years or until the macroprudential or systemic risk ceases to exist if that occurs sooner. 5. Other Member States may recognise the measures set in accordance with this Article and apply them to domestically authorised branches located in the Member State authorised to apply the measures. 6. Where Member States recognise the measures set in accordance with this Article, they shall notify the Council, the Commission, EBA, the ESRB and the Member State authorised to apply the measures. 7. When deciding whether to recognise the measures set in accordance with this Article, the Member State shall take into consideration the criteria set in paragraph 4. 8. The Member State authorised to apply the measures may ask the ESRB to issue a recommendation as referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 to one or more Member States which do not recognise the measures. 9. Before the expiry of the authorisation issued in accordance with paragraph 4, the Member State shall, in consultation with the ESRB and EBA, review the situation and may adopt, in accordance with the procedure referred to in paragraph 4, a new decision for the extension of the period of application of national measures for one additional year each time. After the first extension, the Commission shall in consultation with the ESRB and EBA review the situation at least annually. 10. Notwithstanding the procedure as set out in paragraphs 3 to 9, Member States shall be allowed to increase the risk weights beyond those provided in this Regulation by up to 25 %, for those exposures identified in points (vi) and (vii) of paragraph 2(d) of this Article and tighten the large exposure limit provided in Article 395 by up to 15 % for a period of up to two years or until the macroprudential or systemic risk ceases to exist if that occurs sooner, provided that the conditions and notification requirements in paragraph 2 of this Article are met.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The term 'commodity dealer' covers a wide spectrum of actors in energy and commodity markets: some trade exclusively in commodity derivative contracts and resemble investment firms in terms of functions and risks, whereas others trade commodity derivatives purely as an ancillary activity to commodities production. The requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the 'Capital Requirements Regulation' or 'CRR') and in Directive 2013/36/EU (the 'Capital Requirements Directive' or 'CRD') apply to both credit institutions and investment firms. The prudential regime applicable to investment firms is derived from that imposed on credit institutions, adapted as a function of the investment services that they provide. Articles 493(1) and 498(1) of the CRR exempt commodity dealers ("investment firms whose main business consists exclusively of the provision of investment services or activities in relation to the financial instruments set out in points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC and to whom Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field did not apply on 31 December 2006") from large exposures requirements and from own funds requirements respectively. Both exemptions expire on 31 December 2017. This 'sunset clause' was originally included in the CRR in order to allow time for regulators to determine a prudential regulation adapted to the risk profile of commodity dealers. 1 To this end, Articles 493(2) and 498(2) of the CRR mandate the Commission to prepare reports by the end of 2015. On the basis of those reports, the Commission may decide to submit proposals to amend the CRR. The Commission is also required to submit, within the same deadline, a report on an appropriate regime for the prudential supervision of investment firms in general. Here again, the report may be followed by a Commission proposal. Since the abovementioned reports are related, the Commission decided to undertake a single review (henceforth 'investment firms review') and prepare a single report on the above topics. This was deemed necessary in order to ensure the development of a coherent prudential framework for all types of investment firms. The work on the investment firms review is already underway: the Commission asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to provide technical advice on the matter. The advice is expected by the end of September 2015. The Commission will then use the advice to prepare its own report. Should the Commission decide to change the existing prudential framework for investment firms, the report will detail the next steps of the investment firms review and the broad outline of the changes the Commission is contemplating. The investment firms review is a complex project which will not be completed by the end of this year. It is therefore highly improbable that any legislation that may result from this review can be prepared, adopted and applied before the current exemptions expire (i.e. before the end of 2017). This has implications for commodity dealers: if no specific prudential framework that may result from the investment firm review would be in place by then, they would be subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements starting from 1 January 2018. There are two problems related to this scenario. First, commodity dealers would become subject to the full CRR/CRD requirements without a conscious (and informed) decision that such treatment is indeed the most appropriate one for them. Second, assuming that the investment firm review would result in a tailor-made prudential framework for commodity dealers, they would be deprived of a stable regulatory framework. They would move from the current treatment where they are exempted from large exposures and own funds requirements, to a temporary treatment comprising the full CRR/CRD requirements, and eventually to the aforementioned tailor-made framework within a very short period of time (one to two years). This is not a desirable outcome. To prevent that this situation arises it is therefore opportune to extend the existing exemptions laid down in the CRR. The extension should take into account the amount of time that will be necessary to conclude the investment firms review and to prepare, adopt and apply any legislation that may result from that review.
Revised version (Article 458 Macroprudential or systemic risk identified at the level of a Member State):
1. Member States shall designate the authority in charge of the application of this Article. This authority shall be the competent authority or the designated authority. 2. Where the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1 identifies changes in the intensity of macroprudential or systemic risk in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a specific Member State and which that authority considers would better be addressed by means of stricter national measures, it shall notify the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the ESRB and EBA of that fact and submit relevant quantitative or qualitative evidence of all of the following: (a) the changes in the intensity of macroprudential or systemic risk; (b) the reasons why such changes could pose a threat to financial stability at national level; (c) a justification of why Articles 124 and 164 of this Regulation and Articles 101, 103, 104, 105, 133, and 136 of Directive 2013/36/EU cannot adequately address the macroprudential or systemic risk identified, taking into account the relative effectiveness of those measures; (d) draft national measures for domestically authorised institutions, or a subset of those institutions, intended to mitigate the changes in the intensity of risk and concerning: (i) the level of own funds laid down in Article 92; (ii) the requirements for large exposures laid down in Article 392 and Article 395 to 403; (iii) the public disclosure requirements laid down in Articles 431 to 455; (iv) the level of the capital conservation buffer laid down in Article 129 of Directive 2013/36/EU; (v) liquidity requirements laid down in Part Six; (vi) risk weights for targeting asset bubbles in the residential property and commercial immovable property sector; or (vii) intra financial sector exposures; (e) an explanation as to why the draft measures are deemed by the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1 to be suitable, effective and proportionate to address the situation; and (f) an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the draft measures on the internal market based on information which is available to the Member State concerned. 3. When authorised to apply national measures in accordance with this Article, the authorities determined in accordance with paragraph 1 shall provide relevant competent authorities or designated authorities in other Member States with all relevant information. 4. The power to adopt an implementing act to reject the draft national measures referred to in point (d) of paragraph 2 is conferred on the Council, acting by qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission. Within one month of receiving the notification referred to in paragraph 2, the ESRB and EBA shall provide their opinions on the points mentioned in that paragraph to the Council, the Commission and the Member State concerned. Taking utmost account of the opinions referred to in the second subparagraph and if there is robust, strong and detailed evidence that the measure will have a negative impact on the internal market that outweighs the financial stability benefits resulting in a reduction of the macroprudential or systemic risk identified, the Commission may, within one month, propose to the Council an implementing act to reject the draft national measures. In the absence of a Commission proposal within that period of one month, the Member State concerned may immediately adopt the draft national measures for a period of up to two years or until the macroprudential or systemic risk ceases to exist if that occurs sooner. The Council shall decide on the proposal by the Commission within one month after receipt of the proposal and state its reasons for rejecting or not rejecting the draft national measures. The Council shall only reject the draft national measures if it considers that one or more of the following conditions are not complied with: (a) the changes in the intensity of macroprudential or systemic risk are of such nature as to pose risk to financial stability at national level; (b) Articles 124 and 164 of this Regulation and Articles 101, 103, 104, 105, 133, and 136 of Directive 2013/36/EU cannot adequately address the macroprudential or systemic risk identified, taking into account the relative effectiveness of those measures; (c) the draft national measures are more suitable to address the identified macroprudential or systemic risk and do not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system in other Member States or in the Union as a whole, thus forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market; (d) the issue concerns only one Member State; and (e) the risks have not already been addressed by other measures in this Regulation or in Directive 2013/36/EU. The assessment of the Council shall take into account the opinion of the ESRB and EBA and shall be based on the evidence presented in accordance with paragraph 2 by the authority determined in accordance with paragraph 1. In the absence of a Council implementing act to reject the draft national measures within one month after receipt of the proposal by the Commission, the Member State may adopt the measures and apply them for a period of up to two years or until the macroprudential or systemic risk ceases to exist if that occurs sooner. 5. Other Member States may recognise the measures set in accordance with this Article and apply them to domestically authorised branches located in the Member State authorised to apply the measures. 6. Where Member States recognise the measures set in accordance with this Article, they shall notify the Council, the Commission, EBA, the ESRB and the Member State authorised to apply the measures. 7. When deciding whether to recognise the measures set in accordance with this Article, the Member State shall take into consideration the criteria set in paragraph 4. 8. The Member State authorised to apply the measures may ask the ESRB to issue a recommendation as referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 to one or more Member States which do not recognise the measures. 9. Before the expiry of the authorisation issued in accordance with paragraph 4, the Member State shall, in consultation with the ESRB and EBA, review the situation and may adopt, in accordance with the procedure referred to in paragraph 4, a new decision for the extension of the period of application of national measures for one additional year each time. After the first extension, the Commission shall in consultation with the ESRB and EBA review the situation at least annually. 10. Notwithstanding the procedure as set out in paragraphs 3 to 9, Member States shall be allowed to increase the risk weights beyond those provided in this Regulation by up to 25 %, for those exposures identified in points (vi) and (vii) of paragraph 2(d) of this Article and tighten the large exposure limit provided in Article 395 by up to 15 % for a period of up to two years or until the macroprudential or systemic risk ceases to exist if that occurs sooner, provided that the conditions and notification requirements in paragraph 2 of this Article are met.
Article 459 Prudential requirements
The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 462, to impose, for a period of one year, stricter prudential requirements for exposures where this is necessary to address changes in the intensity of microprudential and macroprudential risks which arise from market developments in the Union or outside the Union affecting all Member States, and where the instruments of this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU are not sufficient to address these risks, in particular upon the recommendation or opinion of the ESRB or EBA, concerning: (a) the level of own funds laid down in Article 92; (b) the requirements for large exposures laid down in Article 392 and Articles 395 to 403; (c) the public disclosure requirements laid down in Articles 431 to 455. The Commission, assisted by the ESRB shall, at least on an annual basis, submit to the European Parliament and the Council, a report on market developments potentially requiring the use of this Article.
Article 460 Liquidity
1. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 462 to specify in detail the general requirement set out in Article 412(1). The delegated act adopted in accordance with this paragraph shall be based on the items to be reported in accordance with Part Six, Title II and Annex III, shall specify under which circumstances competent authorities have to impose specific in- and outflow levels on credit institutions in order to capture specific risks to which they are exposed and shall respect the thresholds set out in paragraph 2. 2. The liquidity coverage requirement referred to in Article 412 shall be introduced in accordance with the following phasing-in: (a) 60 % of the liquidity coverage requirement in 2015; (b) 70 % as from 1 January 2016; (c) 80 % as from 1 January 2017; (d) 100 % as from 1 January 2018. For this purpose the Commission shall take into account the reports referred to in Article 509(1), (2) and (3) and international standards developed by international fora as well as Union specificities. The Commission shall adopt the delegated act referred to in paragraph 1 by 30 June 2014. It shall enter into force by 31 December 2014, but shall not apply before 1 January 2015.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 460 Liquidity):
1. The Commission is empowered to supplement this Regulation by adopting delegated acts in accordance with Article 462 to specify in detail the general requirement set out in Article 412(1). Delegated acts adopted in accordance with this paragraph shall be based on the items to be reported in accordance with Title II of Part Six and Annex III and shall specify under which circumstances competent authorities have to impose specific in- and outflow levels on institutions in order to capture specific risks to which they are exposed and shall respect the thresholds set out in paragraph 2 of this Article. In particular, the Commission is empowered to supplement this Regulation by adopting delegated acts specifying the detailed liquidity requirements for the purposes of the application of Article 8(3), Articles 411 to 416, 419, 422, 425, 428a, 428f, 428g, 428j to 428n, 428p, 428r, 428s, 428w, 428ae, 428ag, 428ah, 428ak and 451a. 2. The liquidity coverage requirement referred to in Article 412 shall be introduced in accordance with the following phasing-in: (a) 60 % of the liquidity coverage requirement in 2015; (b) 70 % as from 1 January 2016; (c) 80 % as from 1 January 2017; (d) 100 % as from 1 January 2018. For this purpose the Commission shall take into account the reports referred to in Article 509(1), (2) and (3) and international standards developed by international fora as well as Union specificities. The Commission shall adopt the delegated act referred to in paragraph 1 by 30 June 2014. It shall enter into force by 31 December 2014, but shall not apply before 1 January 2015. 3. The Commission is empowered to amend this Regulation by adopting delegated acts in accordance with Article 462 amending the list of products or services set out in Article 428f(2) if it considers that assets and liabilities directly linked to other products or services meet the conditions set out in Article 428f(1). The Commission shall adopt the delegated act referred to in the first subparagraph by 28 June 2024.
Article 461 Review of the phasing-in of the liquidity coverage requirement
1. EBA shall, after consulting the ESRB, by 30 June 2016 report to the Commission on whether the phase-in of the liquidity coverage requirement as specified in Article 460(2) should be amended. Such analysis shall take due account of market and international regulatory developments as well as Union specificities. EBA shall in its report assess in particular a deferred introduction of the 100 % minimum binding standard, until 1 January 2019. The report shall take into account the annual reports referred to in Article 509(1), relevant market data and the recommendations of all competent authorities. 2. Where necessary to address market and other developments, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 462 to alter the phase-in specified in Article 460 and defer until 2019 the introduction of a 100 % binding minimum standard for the liquidity coverage requirement set out in Article 412(1) and to apply in 2018 a 90 % binding minimum standard for the liquidity coverage requirement. For the purposes of assessing the necessity of deferral the Commission shall take into account the report and assessment referred to in paragraph 1. A delegated act adopted in accordance with this Article shall not apply before 1 January 2018 and shall enter into force by 30 June 2017.
Article 462 Exercise of the delegation
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 456 to 460 shall be conferred for an indeterminate period of time from 28 June 2013. 3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 456 to 460 may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of the delegated acts already in force. 4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 456 to 460 shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 462 Exercise of the delegation):
1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The power to adopt delegated acts referred to in Articles 244(6) and 245(6), in Articles 456 to 460 and in Article 461a shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from 28 June 2013. 3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 244(6) and 245(6), in Articles 456 to 460 and in Article 461a may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of the delegated acts already in force. 4. Before adopting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult experts designated by each Member State in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making. 5. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 6. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 244(6) and 245(6), Articles 456 to 460 and in Article 461a shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or of the Council.
Article 463 Objections to regulatory technical standards
Where the Commission adopts a regulatory technical standard pursuant to this Regulation which is the same as the draft regulatory technical standard submitted by EBA, the period during which the European Parliament and the Council may object to that regulatory technical standard shall be one month from the date of notification. At the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council that period shall be extended by one month. By way of derogation from the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the period during which the European Parliament or the Council may object to that regulatory technical standard may, where appropriate, be further extended by one month.
Article 464 European Banking Committee
1. The Commission shall be assisted by the European Banking Committee established by Commission Decision 2004/10/EC ( 32 ). That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. 2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.
Article 465 Own funds requirements
1. By way of derogation from points (a) and (b) of Article 92(1) the following own funds requirements shall apply during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014: (a) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 4 % to 4,5 %; (b) a Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 5,5 % to 6 %. 2. Competent authorities shall determine and publish the levels of the Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 capital ratios in the ranges specified in paragraph 1 that institutions shall meet or exceed.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 465 Own funds requirements):
(a) a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 4 % to 4,5 %; (b) a Tier 1 capital ratio of a level that falls within a range of 5,5 % to 6 %. 2. Competent authorities shall determine and publish the levels of the Common Equity Tier 1 and Tier 1 capital ratios in the ranges specified in paragraph 1 that institutions shall meet or exceed.
Article 466 First time application of International Financial Reporting Standards
By way of derogation from Article 24(2), competent authorities shall grant institutions which are required to effect the valuation of assets and off-balance sheet items and the determination of own funds in accordance with the international accounting standards as applicable under Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 for the first time a lead time of 24 months for the implementation of the necessary internal processes and technical requirements.
Article 467 Unrealised losses measured at fair value
1. By way of derogation from Article 35, during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017 institutions shall include in the calculation of their Common Equity Tier 1 items only the applicable percentage of unrealised losses related to assets or liabilities measured at fair value, and reported on the balance sheet, excluding those referred to in Article 33 and all other unrealised losses reported as part of the profit and loss account. 2. The applicable percentage for the purposes of paragraph 1 shall fall within following ranges: (a) 20 % to 100 % during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014; (b) 40 % to 100 % during the period from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015; (c) 60 % to 100 % during the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016; and (d) 80 % to 100 % for the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities may, in cases where such treatment was applied before 1 January 2014, allow institutions not to include in any element of own funds unrealised gains or losses on exposures to central governments classified in the ‘Available for Sale’ category of EU-endorsed IAS 39. The treatment set out in the second subparagraph shall be applied until the Commission has adopted a regulation on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 endorsing the International Financial Reporting Standard replacing IAS 39. 3. Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentage in the ranges specified in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2;
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Article 468 Unrealised gains measured at fair value
1. By way of derogation from Article 35, during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, institutions shall remove from their Common Equity Tier 1 items the applicable percentage of unrealised gains related to assets or liabilities measured at fair value and reported on the balance sheet, excluding those referred to in Article 33 and all other unrealised gains with the exception of those related to investment properties reported as part of the profit and loss account. The resulting residual amount shall not be removed from Common Equity Tier 1 items. 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the applicable percentage shall be 100 % during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2014, and shall, after that date, fall within the following ranges: (a) 60 % to 100 % during the period from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015; (b) 40 % to 100 % during the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016; (c) 20 % to 100 % for the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017. From 1 January 2015, where under Article 467 a competent authority requires institutions to include in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 capital 100 % of their unrealised losses measured at fair value, that competent authority may also permit institutions to include in that calculation 100 % of their unrealised gains at fair value. From 1 January 2015, where under Article 467 a competent authority requires institutions to include a percentage of unrealised losses measured at fair value in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 capital, that competent authority shall not set an applicable percentage of unrealised gains under paragraph 2 of this Article which results in a percentage of unrealised gains that is included in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1 capital that exceeds the applicable percentage of unrealised losses set in accordance with Article 467. 3. Competent authorities shall determine and publish the applicable percentage of unrealised gains in the ranges specified in points (a) to (c) of paragraph 2 that is removed from Common Equity Tier 1 capital. 4. By way of derogation from Article 33(1)(c), during the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2017, institutions shall not include in their own funds the applicable percentage, as specified in Article 478, of the fair value gains and losses from derivative liabilities arising from changes in the own credit standing of the institution. The percentage applied to fair value losses arising from changes in the own credit standing of the institution shall not exceed the percentage applied to fair value gains arising from changes in the own credit standing of the institution.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Article 469 Deductions from Common Equity Tier 1 items
1. By way of derogation from Article 36(1), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, the following shall apply: (a) institutions shall deduct from Common Equity Tier 1 items the applicable percentage specified in Article 478 of the amounts required to be deducted pursuant to points (a) to (h) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences; (b) institutions shall apply the relevant provisions laid down in Article 472 to the residual amounts of items required to be deducted pursuant to points (a) to (h) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences; (c) institutions shall deduct from Common Equity Tier 1 items the applicable percentage specified in Article 478 of the total amount required to be deducted pursuant to points (c) and (i) of Article 36(1) after applying Article 470; (d) institutions shall apply the requirements laid down in Article 472(5) or (11), as applicable, to the total residual amount of items required to be deducted pursuant to points (c) and (i) of Article 36(1) after applying Article 470. 2. Institutions shall determine the portion of the total residual amount referred to in point (d) of paragraph 1, that is subject to Article 472(5), by dividing the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the amount specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences referred to in point (a) of Article 470(2); (b) the sum of the amounts referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 470(2). 3. Institutions shall determine the portion of the total residual amount referred to point (d) of paragraph 1 that is subject to Article 472(11) by dividing the amount specified in point (a) of this paragraph by the amount specified in point (b) of this paragraph: (a) the amount of direct and indirect holdings of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments referred to in point (b) of Article 470(2);
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 469 Deductions from Common Equity Tier 1 items):
By way of derogation from Article 36(1), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, the following shall apply: 2. (a) the amount of deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences referred to in point (a) of Article 470(2); the amount of direct and indirect holdings of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments referred to in point (b) of Article 470(2); (b) the sum of the amounts referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 470(2).
Article 470 Exemption from deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 items
1. For the purposes of this Article, relevant Common Equity Tier 1 items shall comprise the Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution calculated after applying the provisions of Articles 32 to 35 and making the deductions pursuant to points (a) to (h), (k)(ii) to (v) and (l) of Article 36(1), excluding deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences. 2. By way of derogation from Article 48(1), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017, institutions shall not deduct the items listed in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph which in aggregate are equal to or less than 15 % of relevant Common Equity Tier 1 items of the institution: (a) deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of relevant Common Equity Tier 1 items; (b) where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity, the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of that entity that in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of relevant Common Equity Tier 1 items. 3. By way of derogation from Article 48(4), the items exempt from deduction pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall be risk weighted at 250 %. The items referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article shall be subject to the requirements of Title IV of Part Three, as applicable.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 1 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Capital Requirements Regulation or CRR) establishes together with Directive 2013/36/EU 2 (the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD) the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions operating in the Union. The CRR and CRD were adopted in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis to enhance the resilience of institutions operating in the EU financial sector, largely based on global standards agreed with the EU’s international partners, in pa rticular the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The CRR has been subsequently amended to tackle remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensure institutions' resilience. Amongst various subsequent changes, Regulation (EU) 2017/2395 3 has inserted in the CRR transitional arrangements for mitigating the impact on own funds from the introduction of the new accounting standard, the International Financial Reporting Standard – Financial Instruments (IFRS) 9. Regulation (EU) 2019/630 4 has introduced in the CRR a requirement for minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (the so-called prudential backstop). Furthermore, Reg ulation (EU) 2019/876 5 (CRR II) has added to the CRR some of the final elements of the international reforms (the finalised Basel III framework), which entail amongst others, a new definition of the leverage ratio and a leverage ratio buffer, which will pr event institutions from excessively increasing leverage. The latter Regulation has also introduced in the CRR more favourable prudential treatments of certain software assets, of certain pension- and salary-backed loans, as well as of loans to small and me dium sized enterprises (SMEs) and infrastructure projects. The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures are having a far-reaching impact on the economy. Businesses are facing disruption in supply chains, temporary closures and reduced demand, while households are confronted with unemployment and a fall in income. Public authorities at Union and Member State levels have taken decisive actions to support households and solvent undertakings to withstand this severe but temporary slowdown in economic activity and the liquidity shortages that it will cause. Due to the reforms undertaken in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, credit institutions are today well capitalised and much more resilient than they were in 2008. This enables them to play a key role in managing the economic shock that stems from the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, uncertainty related to the pace of recovery of economic activity will inevitably have an impact on the banking sector. In reaction to the new circumstances, competent authorities across the Union have provided temporary capital and operational relief to ensure favourable conditions for credit institutions to continue lending amid COVID-19. It is therefore important that capital is deployed where it is most needed and that the prudential framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. The CRR offers ample leeway for banks to support public and private initiatives to promote contin ued lending in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while ensuring a prudent approach. The flexibility embedded in the CRR is described in the Commission Interpretative Communication of 28 April 2020 6 on the application of the accounting and prudential frameworks to facilitate bank lending in the Union amid COVID-19. Besides making full use of the flexibility allowed for in the existing framework, some limited changes to specific aspects of the CRR ar e necessary in order to maximise the capacity of credit institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring their continued resilience. Moreover, at international level, the BCBS has agreed a one-year delay in t he deadline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III framework, of which some elements had been already incorporated in the CRR 7 , as well as a greater flexibility to the phase-in of the impact of the IFRS 9 on capital . These changes need to be reflected in the existing rules. First, it is necessary to adjust the transitional arrangements that allow credit institutions to alleviate the impact from expected credit-loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 on their own funds. This adjustment would allow credit institutions to better mitigate the impact of any potential increase in ECL provisioning caused by the deterioration in the credit quality of credit institutions’ exposures due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to account for the impact of COVID-19 related guarantees, the rules on the minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures (NPEs) need to be adjusted to extend temporarily the treatment that is currently applicable to NPEs guaranteed or insured by export credit agencies to NPEs that would arise as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and that are covered by the various guarantee schemes that were put in place by Member States. This would recognise the similar characteristics shared by export credit agencies guarantees and COVID-19 related guarantees. Third, the offsetting mechanism associated with the competent authority discretion to allow credit institutions to temporarily exclude exposures in the form of central bank reserves from the calculation of the leverage ratio needs to be modified. This would ensure that liquidity measures provided by central banks in a crisis context would be effectively channelled by credit institutions to the economy. Fourth, it is necessary to defer, in line with the decision of the BCBS, the application date of the new leverage ratio buffer requirement. This would free up credit institutions’ operational capacity and allow them to focus on the more immediate challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Fifth, the application dates of some of the capital benefits envisaged in the CRR but not yet applicable need to be anticipated, namely the provisions on the treatment of certain software assets, the provisions on certain loans backed by pensions or salaries, the revised supporting factor for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and the new supporting factor for infrastructure finance. Advancing the date of application of the two supporting factors, the preferential treatment of certain software assets, and the preferential treatment of certain loans backed by pensions or salaries would free up own funds of institutions, allowing them to boost much needed lending during the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath. These proposed changes will not fundamentally alter the prudential regulatory framework. They form part of the response of the Commission to address the emergency situation triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. These adjustments to the prudential framework would facilitate collective efforts aimed at mitigating the impact of the pandemic and thus moving towards a fast recovery.
Revised version (Article 470 Exemption from deduction from Common Equity Tier 1 items):
(a) deferred tax assets that are dependent on future profitability and arise from temporary differences and in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of relevant Common Equity Tier 1 items; (b) where an institution has a significant investment in a financial sector entity, the direct, indirect and synthetic holdings by the institution of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments of that entity that in aggregate are equal to or less than 10 % of relevant Common Equity Tier 1 items. 3. By way of derogation from Article 48(4), the items exempt from deduction pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall be risk weighted at 250 %. The items referred to in point (b) of paragraph 2 of this Article shall be subject to the requirements of Title IV of Part Three, as applicable.
Article 471 Exemption from Deduction of Equity Holdings in Insurance Companies from Common Equity Tier 1 Items
1. By way of derogation from Article 49(1), during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2022, competent authorities may permit institutions to not deduct equity holdings in insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and insurance holding companies where the following conditions are met: (a) the conditions laid down in points (a), (c) and (e) of Article 49(1); (b) the competent authorities are satisfied with the level of risk control and financial analysis procedures specifically adopted by the institution in order to supervise the investment in the undertaking or holding company; (c) the equity holdings of the institution in the insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or insurance holding company do not exceed 15 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments issued by that insurance entity as at 31 December 2012 and during the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2022; (d) the amount of the equity holding which is not deducted does not exceed the amount held in the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments in the insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or insurance holding company as at 31 December 2012. 2. The equity holdings which are not deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall qualify as exposures and be risk weighted at 370 %.
Amendment rationale: CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL Reasons for and objectives of the proposal The Commission has today adopted a package of measures to deepen the Capital Markets Union together with the Communication "Completing Capital Markets Union by 2019 – time to accelerate delivery". The package includes this proposal, as well as a proposal for an enabling EU framework on covered bonds, a proposal to facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds, a proposal for an enabling framework on European crowdfunding service providers (ECSP) for business, as well as a proposal on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims and a Communication on the applicable law to the proprietary effects of transactions in securities. Covered bonds are debt obligations issued by credit institutions and secured against a ringfenced pool of assets to which bondholders have direct recourse as preferred creditors. At the same time, bondholders remain entitled to claim against the issuing entity as ordinary creditors. This double claim against the cover pool and the issuer is referred to as the ‘dual recourse’ mechanism. Covered bonds are issued by credit institutions and are as such an important and efficient source of funding for European banks. They facilitate the financing of mortgage and public sector loans, thereby supporting lending more broadly. A significant advantage of covered bonds compared with other kinds of bank funding sources such as asset-backed securities is the fact that banks retain the risk on their balance sheets and investors have claims directly with the bank. Therefore, covered bonds allow banks to lend not only more, but also more safely. Not least for that reason, covered bonds fared well during the financial crisis compared with other funding instruments. They proved to be a reliable and stable funding source for European banks at a time when other funding channels were drying up. An enabling framework for covered bonds at EU level would enhance their use as a stable and cost-effective source of funding for credit institutions, especially where markets are less developed, in order to help finance the real economy in line with the objectives of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). The enabling framework would also provide investors with a wider and safer range of investment opportunities and would help preserve financial stability. Member States will have to transpose these rules, ensuring that national covered bond frameworks comply with the principles-based requirements set out in this proposal. All covered bonds across Europe will therefore have to respect the minimum harmonisation requirements as set out in this proposal. Th e enabling framework for covered bonds is featured in the Commission Work Programme for 2018 1 . In the letter of intent following up his latest State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission confirmed that an enabling framewor k for covered bonds should be launched or completed by end-2018 to ensure a deeper and fairer internal market. 2 The Commission confirmed this intention in the Mid-Term Review of the CMU Action Plan of June 2017 3 . The development of covered bonds across th e single market is uneven; they are very important in some Member States, less so in others. Furthermore, they are only partially addressed in Union law. While they benefit from preferential prudential and regulatory treatment in various respects in the li ght of the lower risks (e.g. banks investing in them do not have to set aside as much regulatory capital as when they invest in other assets), Union law does not comprehensively address what actually constitutes a covered bond. Rather, preferential treatme nts are granted to covered bonds as defined in Directive 2009/65/EC 4 . However, that definition was drafted with a specific purpose in mind – limiting what undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) could invest in – and is no t fit for the broader policy objectives of the CMU. A Union legislative framework on covered bonds should expand the capacity of credit institutions to provide financing to the real economy and contribute to the development of covered bonds across the Union, particularly in Member States where no market for them currently exists. The framework would also increase cross-border flows of capital and investment. It would thus contribute to the CMU and in particular to the further leveraging of credit institutions’ capacity to support the wider economy. In particular, it would ensure that banks have a broad range of safe and efficient funding tools at their disposal. The framework consists of a Directive and a Regulation – the two instruments should be seen as a single package. This proposed Regulation will mainly amend Article 129 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). The amendments build on the current prudential treatment but add requirements on minimum overcollateralisation and substitution assets. They would strengthen the requirements for covered bonds being granted preferential capital treatment. The proposed Directive will specify the core elements of covered bonds and provide a common definition as a consistent and sufficiently detailed point of reference for prudential regulation purposes, applicable across financial sectors. It will establish the structural features of the instrument, a covered bond specific public supervision, rules allowing use of the ‘European Covered Bonds’ label and competent authorities’ publication obligations in the field of covered bonds.
Revised version (Article 471 Exemption from Deduction of Equity Holdings in Insurance Companies from Common Equity Tier 1 Items):
1. By way of derogation from Article 49(1), during the period from 31 December 2018 to 31 December 2024, institutions may choose not to deduct equity holdings in insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and insurance holding companies where the following conditions are met: (a) the conditions set out in points (a), and (e) of Article 49(1); (b) the competent authorities are satisfied with the level of risk control and financial analysis procedures specifically adopted by the institution in order to supervise the investment in the undertaking or holding company; (c) the equity holdings of the institution in the insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or insurance holding company do not exceed 15 % of the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments issued by that insurance entity as at 31 December 2012 and during the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2024; (d) the amount of the equity holding which is not deducted does not exceed the amount held in the Common Equity Tier 1 instruments in the insurance undertaking, reinsurance undertaking or insurance holding company as at 31 December 2012. 2. The equity holdings which are not deducted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall qualify as exposures and be risk weighted at 370 %.