Article 1 
1. For the purposes of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure and of this Regulation, the terms given in paragraphs 2 to 6 are defined according to the European system of national and regional accounts in the Community (hereinafter referred to as ESA 95), adopted by Regulation (EC) No 2223/96. The codes in brackets refer to ESA 95. 2. ‘Government’ means the sector of ‘general government’ (S.13), that is ‘central government’ (S.1311), ‘state government’ (S.1312), ‘local government’ (S.1313) and ‘social security funds’ (S.1314), to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in ESA 95. The exclusion of commercial operations means that the sector of ‘general government’ (S.13) comprises only institutional units producing non-market services as their main activity. 3. ‘Government deficit (surplus)’ means the net borrowing (net lending) (EDP B.9) of the sector of ‘general government’ (S.13), as defined in ESA 95. The interest comprised in the government deficit is the interest (EDP D.41), as defined in ESA 95. 4. ‘Government investment’ means the gross fixed capital formation (P.51) of the sector of ‘general government’ (S.13), as defined in ESA 95. 5. ‘Government debt’ means the total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year of the sector of ‘general government’ (S.13), with the exception of those liabilities the corresponding financial assets of which are held by the sector of ‘general government’ (S.13). Government debt is constituted by the liabilities of general government in the following categories: currency and deposits (AF.2); securities other than shares, excluding financial derivatives (AF.33) and loans (AF.4), as defined in ESA 95. The nominal value of a liability outstanding at the end of the year is the face value. The nominal value of an index-linked liability corresponds to its face value adjusted by the index-related change in the value of the principal accrued to the end of the year. Liabilities denominated in a foreign currency, or exchanged from one foreign currency through contractual agreements to one or more other foreign currencies shall be converted into the other foreign currencies at the rate agreed on in those contracts and shall be converted into the national currency on the basis of the representative market exchange rate prevailing on the last working day of each year. Liabilities denominated in the national currency and exchanged through contractual agreements to a foreign currency shall be converted into the foreign currency at the rate agreed on in those contracts and shall be converted into the national currency on the basis of the representative market exchange rate prevailing on the last working day of each year. Liabilities denominated in a foreign currency and exchanged through contractual agreements to the national currency shall be converted into the national currency at the rate agreed on in those contracts. 6. ‘Gross domestic product’ means gross domestic product at current market prices (GDP mp) (B.1*g), as defined in ESA 95.
Article 2 
1. ‘Planned government deficit and government debt level figures’ means the figures established for the current year by the Member States. They shall be the most recent official forecasts, taking into account the most recent budgetary decisions and economic developments and prospects. They should be produced in as short a time as possible before the reporting deadline. 2. ‘Actual government deficit and government debt level figures’ means estimated, provisional, half-finalised or final results for a past year. The planned data together with the actual data shall form a consistent time series as far as the definitions and concepts are concerned.
Article 3 
1. Member States shall report to the Commission (Eurostat) their planned and actual government deficits and levels of government debt twice a year, the first time before 1 April of the current year (year n ) and the second time before 1 October of year n . Member States shall inform the Commission (Eurostat) which national authorities are responsible for the excessive deficit procedure reporting. 2. Before 1 April of year n , Member States shall: (a) report to the Commission (Eurostat) their planned government deficit for year n , an up-to-date estimate of their actual government deficit for year n-1 and their actual government deficits for years n-2 , n-3 and n-4 ; (b) simultaneously provide the Commission (Eurostat) with their planned data for year n and the actual data for years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 of their corresponding public accounts budget deficits in accordance with the definition which is given most prominence nationally and with the figures which explain the transition between the public accounts budget deficit and their government deficit for the sub-sector S.1311; (c) simultaneously provide the Commission (Eurostat) with their actual data for years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 of their corresponding working balances and with the figures which explain the transition between the working balances of each government sub-sector and their government deficit for the sub-sectors S.1312, S.1313 and S.1314; (d) report to the Commission (Eurostat) their planned level of government debt at the end of year n and their levels of actual government debt at the end of years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 ; (e) simultaneously provide the Commission (Eurostat), for years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 , with the figures which explain the contribution of the government deficit and other factors relevant to the variation in the level of their government debt by sub-sector. 3. Before 1 October of year n , Member States shall report to the Commission (Eurostat) their: (a) updated planned government deficit for year n and their actual government deficits for years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 and shall comply with the requirements of points (b) and (c) of paragraph 2; (b) updated planned level of government debt at the end of year n and their levels of actual government debt at the end of years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 , and shall comply with the requirements of paragraph 2(e). 4. The figures for the planned government deficit reported to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be expressed in national currency and in budget years. The figures for actual government deficit and actual government debt level reported to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be expressed in national currency and in calendar years, with the exception of the up-to-date estimates for year n-1 , which may be expressed in budget years. Where the budget year differs from the calendar year, Member States shall also report to the Commission (Eurostat) their figures for actual government deficit and actual government debt level in budget years for the two budget years preceding the current budget year.
Article 4 
Member States shall, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 3(1), (2) and (3), provide the Commission (Eurostat) with the figures for their government investment expenditure and interest expenditure (consolidated).
Article 5 
Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat) with a forecast of their gross domestic product for year n and the actual amount of their gross domestic product for years n-1 , n-2 , n-3 and n-4 , under the same timing conditions as those indicated in Article 3(1).
Article 6 
1. Member States shall inform the Commission (Eurostat), as soon as it becomes available, of any major revision in their actual and planned government deficit and debt figures already reported. 2. Major revisions in the actual deficit and debt figures already reported shall be properly documented. In any case, revisions which result in the reference values as specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure being exceeded, or revisions which mean that a Member State’s data no longer exceed the reference values, shall be reported and properly documented.
Article 7 
Member States shall make public the actual deficit and debt data and other data for past years reported to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Articles 3 to 6.
Article 8 
1. The Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95 (hereinafter referred to as government accounts). Quality of actual data means compliance with accounting rules, completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. The assessment will focus on areas specified in the inventories of Member States such as the delimitation of the government sector, the classification of government transactions and liabilities, and the time of recording. 2. Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality of Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 of 17 February 1997 on Community Statistics ( 7 ) . ‘Statistical information’ referred to in the first subparagraph shall be limited to the information strictly necessary to check the compliance to ESA rules. In particular, statistical information means: (a) data from national accounts; (b) inventories; (c) EDP notification tables; (d) additional questionnaires and clarification related to the notifications. The format of the questionnaires shall be defined by the Commission (Eurostat) after consultation of the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics (hereinafter referred to as CMFB). 3. The Commission (Eurostat) shall report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the quality of the actual data reported by Member States. The report shall address the overall assessment of the actual data reported by Member States as regards to the compliance with accounting rules, completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the data.
Amendment rationale: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM The basis for the EU fiscal surveillance system is laid down in the Treaties and further specified in EU legislation, notably through the requirements to the quality of fiscal statistics for the purpose of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) exercise. Quality of data in the fiscal statistics framework relies primarily on the correct implementation by the Member States of the legal acts relevant in the context of the EDP, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96[1] (ESA 95) and Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009[2] establishing the statistical reference system for standards, definitions and accountancy provisions. The Commission has been entrusted with the task of supervising the quality of the reported fiscal data. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 sets forth that the Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95. Quality of actual data means compliance of such data with accounting rules, as well as completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. Further, according to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality. Following the 'Greek case' in 2004, and a subsequent request by the Council to strengthen the monitoring of the quality of the reported fiscal data, the Commission proposed in 2005 the amendments to the legislation in force, i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, governing the quality of EDP data. The amendments in the Commission’s proposal of 2005[3] sought to increase the transparency of the EDP-related statistics, and, to that end, to strengthen the powers of Eurostat with respect to data quality. In particular, the Commission proposed to establish "in-depth monitoring visits". Coupled with a general requirement for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to the information required for the purposes of the data quality assessment, the proposal was seeking for strengthened competence related to the quality of data. However, the additional tools provided to the Commission by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005[4] were more limited than initially requested. In particular, there is no general obligation for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information requested for the purposes of the data quality assessment and the scope of the methodological visits (only conducted in one Member State since the adoption of the legislation) is confined to the purely statistical domain. Recent developments and, in particular, the Greek government deficit and debt statistics notified in October 2009[5], have revealed and made these limitations more acute and have demonstrated that the current system for fiscal statistics does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of, for instance, incorrect or inaccurate data being notified to the Commission. Without an action to countervail this weakness, such instances of non-compliance with the rules by individual Member States will hence continue to compromise the reliability of the governance system by its participants at both European and Member States’ levels. For that reason, it is at this stage both appropriate and policy-consistent to propose certain modifications of the governance framework for fiscal statistics. The purpose of the amended regulation is to allow the Commission and Member States to work more effectively together in improving the quality and reliability of government finance statistics, based on a two-pillar approach: first, more frequent and comprehensive regular statistical visits in the context of the standard EDP procedure; second, where a risk-based assessment identifies specific and significant problems, Eurostat may conduct additional methodological visits. To tackle the existing weaknesses, the Commission, therefore, deems it necessary to propose supplementing the existing rules in order to strengthen data monitoring mechanisms. However, the methodological visits will only be undertaken in cases where substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data are identified, as it is also currently the case pursuant to existing legal framework. Insofar as Eurostat, as a statistical authority, must be able to actually verify the figures provided, there is a need to supplement the current framework in several regards. In particular, there is a need for the recognition of the right for Eurostat to directly examine public accounts where there are substantial doubts about the reliability of the statistical data submitted by a national statistical authority – together with the corresponding obligation of national authorities to keep and make available all of the relevant sources of information. Furthermore, there is a need for Member States to ensure the assistance of experts in national accounting, including for the preparation and undertaking of the methodological visits.
Revised version (Article 8 ):
1. The Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95 (hereinafter referred to as government accounts). Quality of actual data means compliance with accounting rules, completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. The assessment will focus on areas specified in the inventories of Member States such as the delimitation of the government sector, the classification of government transactions and liabilities, and the time of recording. 2. Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics ( 7 ) relating to statistical confidentiality. The statistical information referred to in the first subparagraph shall be limited to the information strictly necessary to check the compliance with ESA rules. In particular, ‘statistical information’ means: (a) data from national accounts; (b) inventories; (c) EDP notification tables; (d) additional questionnaires and clarification related to the notifications. The format of the questionnaires shall be defined by the Commission (Eurostat) after consultation of the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics (hereinafter referred to as CMFB). 3. The Commission (Eurostat) shall report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the quality of the actual data reported by Member States. The report shall address the overall assessment of the actual data reported by Member States as regards to the compliance with accounting rules, completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the data.
Article 9 
1. Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat) with a detailed inventory of the methods, procedures and sources used to compile actual deficit and debt data and the underlying government accounts. 2. The inventories shall be prepared in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Commission (Eurostat) after consultation of CMFB. 3. The inventories shall be updated following revisions in the methods, procedures and sources adopted by Member States to compile their statistical data. 4. Member States shall make their inventories public. 5. The issues referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 may be addressed in the visits mentioned in Article 11.
Article 10 
1. In the event of a doubt regarding the correct implementation of the ESA 95 accounting rules, the Member State concerned shall request clarification from the Commission (Eurostat). The Commission (Eurostat) shall promptly examine the issue and communicate its clarification to the Member State concerned and, when appropriate, to the CMFB. 2. For cases which are either complex or of general interest in the view of the Commission or the Member State concerned, the Commission (Eurostat) shall take a decision after consultation of the CMFB. The Commission (Eurostat) shall make decisions public, together with the opinion of the CMFB, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality of Regulation (EC) No 322/97.
Article 11 
1. The Commission (Eurostat) shall ensure a permanent dialogue with Member States’ statistical authorities. To this end, the Commission (Eurostat) shall carry out in all Member States regular dialogue visits, as well as possible methodological visits. 2. The dialogue visits are designed to review reported data, to examine methodological issues, to discuss statistical processes and sources described in the inventories, and to assess compliance with the accounting rules. The dialogue visits shall be used to identify risks or potential problems about the quality of the reported data. 3. The methodological visits shall not go beyond the purely statistical domain. This shall be reflected in the composition of the delegations referred to in Article 12. The methodological visits are designed to monitor the processes and the government accounts which justify the reported actual data and to draw detailed conclusions as to the quality of reported data, as defined in Article 8(1). The methodological visits shall only be undertaken in cases where substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data are identified, especially as they relate to the methods, concepts and classification applied to the data, which Member States are obliged to report. 4. When organising dialogue and methodological visits, the Commission (Eurostat) shall transmit its provisional findings to the Member States concerned for comments.
Amendment rationale: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM The basis for the EU fiscal surveillance system is laid down in the Treaties and further specified in EU legislation, notably through the requirements to the quality of fiscal statistics for the purpose of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) exercise. Quality of data in the fiscal statistics framework relies primarily on the correct implementation by the Member States of the legal acts relevant in the context of the EDP, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96[1] (ESA 95) and Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009[2] establishing the statistical reference system for standards, definitions and accountancy provisions. The Commission has been entrusted with the task of supervising the quality of the reported fiscal data. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 sets forth that the Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95. Quality of actual data means compliance of such data with accounting rules, as well as completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. Further, according to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality. Following the 'Greek case' in 2004, and a subsequent request by the Council to strengthen the monitoring of the quality of the reported fiscal data, the Commission proposed in 2005 the amendments to the legislation in force, i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, governing the quality of EDP data. The amendments in the Commission’s proposal of 2005[3] sought to increase the transparency of the EDP-related statistics, and, to that end, to strengthen the powers of Eurostat with respect to data quality. In particular, the Commission proposed to establish "in-depth monitoring visits". Coupled with a general requirement for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to the information required for the purposes of the data quality assessment, the proposal was seeking for strengthened competence related to the quality of data. However, the additional tools provided to the Commission by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005[4] were more limited than initially requested. In particular, there is no general obligation for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information requested for the purposes of the data quality assessment and the scope of the methodological visits (only conducted in one Member State since the adoption of the legislation) is confined to the purely statistical domain. Recent developments and, in particular, the Greek government deficit and debt statistics notified in October 2009[5], have revealed and made these limitations more acute and have demonstrated that the current system for fiscal statistics does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of, for instance, incorrect or inaccurate data being notified to the Commission. Without an action to countervail this weakness, such instances of non-compliance with the rules by individual Member States will hence continue to compromise the reliability of the governance system by its participants at both European and Member States’ levels. For that reason, it is at this stage both appropriate and policy-consistent to propose certain modifications of the governance framework for fiscal statistics. The purpose of the amended regulation is to allow the Commission and Member States to work more effectively together in improving the quality and reliability of government finance statistics, based on a two-pillar approach: first, more frequent and comprehensive regular statistical visits in the context of the standard EDP procedure; second, where a risk-based assessment identifies specific and significant problems, Eurostat may conduct additional methodological visits. To tackle the existing weaknesses, the Commission, therefore, deems it necessary to propose supplementing the existing rules in order to strengthen data monitoring mechanisms. However, the methodological visits will only be undertaken in cases where substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data are identified, as it is also currently the case pursuant to existing legal framework. Insofar as Eurostat, as a statistical authority, must be able to actually verify the figures provided, there is a need to supplement the current framework in several regards. In particular, there is a need for the recognition of the right for Eurostat to directly examine public accounts where there are substantial doubts about the reliability of the statistical data submitted by a national statistical authority – together with the corresponding obligation of national authorities to keep and make available all of the relevant sources of information. Furthermore, there is a need for Member States to ensure the assistance of experts in national accounting, including for the preparation and undertaking of the methodological visits.
Article 12 
1. When carrying out methodological visits in Member States, the Commission (Eurostat) may request the assistance of national accounts experts, proposed by other Member States on a voluntary basis, and of officials from other Commission departments. The list of national accounts experts from whom the Commission (Eurostat) may request assistance, shall be constituted on the basis of proposals sent to the Commission (Eurostat) by the national authorities responsible for the excessive deficit reporting. 2. Member States shall take all necessary measures to facilitate the methodological visits. Those visits should be confined to the national authorities involved in the excessive deficit procedure reporting. Member States shall, however, ensure that their services which are directly or indirectly involved in the production of government accounts and debt, and where necessary their national authorities which have a functional responsibility for the control of the public accounts, provide the Commission officials or other experts referred to in paragraph 1 with the assistance necessary to carry out their duties, including making documents available to justify the reported actual deficit and debt data and the underlying government accounts. Confidential records of the national statistical system shall only be provided to the Commission (Eurostat). Without prejudice to the general obligation of the Member States to take all measures required to facilitate the methodological visits, the interlocutors of the Commission (Eurostat) for the methodological visits referred to in the first subparagraph are, in each Member State, the services responsible for the excessive deficit procedure reporting. 3. The Commission (Eurostat) shall ensure that officials and experts participating in these visits meet every guarantee as regards technical competence, professional independence and observance of confidentiality.
Amendment rationale: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM The basis for the EU fiscal surveillance system is laid down in the Treaties and further specified in EU legislation, notably through the requirements to the quality of fiscal statistics for the purpose of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) exercise. Quality of data in the fiscal statistics framework relies primarily on the correct implementation by the Member States of the legal acts relevant in the context of the EDP, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96[1] (ESA 95) and Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009[2] establishing the statistical reference system for standards, definitions and accountancy provisions. The Commission has been entrusted with the task of supervising the quality of the reported fiscal data. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 sets forth that the Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95. Quality of actual data means compliance of such data with accounting rules, as well as completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. Further, according to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality. Following the 'Greek case' in 2004, and a subsequent request by the Council to strengthen the monitoring of the quality of the reported fiscal data, the Commission proposed in 2005 the amendments to the legislation in force, i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, governing the quality of EDP data. The amendments in the Commission’s proposal of 2005[3] sought to increase the transparency of the EDP-related statistics, and, to that end, to strengthen the powers of Eurostat with respect to data quality. In particular, the Commission proposed to establish "in-depth monitoring visits". Coupled with a general requirement for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to the information required for the purposes of the data quality assessment, the proposal was seeking for strengthened competence related to the quality of data. However, the additional tools provided to the Commission by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005[4] were more limited than initially requested. In particular, there is no general obligation for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information requested for the purposes of the data quality assessment and the scope of the methodological visits (only conducted in one Member State since the adoption of the legislation) is confined to the purely statistical domain. Recent developments and, in particular, the Greek government deficit and debt statistics notified in October 2009[5], have revealed and made these limitations more acute and have demonstrated that the current system for fiscal statistics does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of, for instance, incorrect or inaccurate data being notified to the Commission. Without an action to countervail this weakness, such instances of non-compliance with the rules by individual Member States will hence continue to compromise the reliability of the governance system by its participants at both European and Member States’ levels. For that reason, it is at this stage both appropriate and policy-consistent to propose certain modifications of the governance framework for fiscal statistics. The purpose of the amended regulation is to allow the Commission and Member States to work more effectively together in improving the quality and reliability of government finance statistics, based on a two-pillar approach: first, more frequent and comprehensive regular statistical visits in the context of the standard EDP procedure; second, where a risk-based assessment identifies specific and significant problems, Eurostat may conduct additional methodological visits. To tackle the existing weaknesses, the Commission, therefore, deems it necessary to propose supplementing the existing rules in order to strengthen data monitoring mechanisms. However, the methodological visits will only be undertaken in cases where substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data are identified, as it is also currently the case pursuant to existing legal framework. Insofar as Eurostat, as a statistical authority, must be able to actually verify the figures provided, there is a need to supplement the current framework in several regards. In particular, there is a need for the recognition of the right for Eurostat to directly examine public accounts where there are substantial doubts about the reliability of the statistical data submitted by a national statistical authority – together with the corresponding obligation of national authorities to keep and make available all of the relevant sources of information. Furthermore, there is a need for Member States to ensure the assistance of experts in national accounting, including for the preparation and undertaking of the methodological visits.
Revised version (Article 12 ):
1. Member States are expected to provide, at the request of the Commission (Eurostat), and on a voluntary basis, the assistance of experts in national accounting, including for the preparation and carrying-out of the methodological visits. In the exercise of their duties, these experts shall provide independent expertise. A list of those experts in national accounting shall be constituted on the basis of proposals sent to the Commission (Eurostat) by the national authorities responsible for the excessive deficit reporting. The Commission shall lay down the rules and procedures related to the selection of the experts, taking into account an appropriate distribution of experts across Member States and an appropriate rotation of experts between Member States, their working arrangements and the financial details. The Commission shall share with the Member States the full cost incurred by the Member States for the assistance of their national experts. 2. In the framework of the methodological visits, the Commission (Eurostat) shall have the right to access the accounts of all government entities at central, state, local and social security levels, including the provision of existing underlying detailed accounting and budgetary information. In this context, accounting and budgetary information includes: — transactions and balance sheets, — relevant statistical surveys and questionnaires of general government and further related information, such as analytical documents, — information from relevant national, regional and local authorities on the execution of the budget of all sub-sectors of the general government, — the accounts of extra-budgetary bodies, corporations, and non-profit institutions and other similar bodies that are part of the general government sector in national accounts, — the accounts of social security funds. Member States shall take all necessary measures to facilitate the methodological visits. Those visits may be carried out at national authorities involved in the excessive deficit procedure reporting, as well as at all services directly or indirectly involved in the production of government accounts and debt. In both cases, the national statistical institutes as national coordinators according to Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009, shall support the Commission (Eurostat) in the organisation and coordination of the visits. Member States shall ensure that those national authorities and services, and where necessary, their national authorities who have a functional responsibility for the control of the public accounts, provide the Commission officials or other experts referred to in paragraph 1 with the assistance necessary to carry out their duties, including making documents available to justify the reported actual deficit and debt data and the underlying government accounts. Confidential records of the national statistical system as well as other confidential data should be provided to the Commission (Eurostat) only for the purpose of assessing the quality thereof. Experts in national accounting assisting the Commission (Eurostat) in the framework of the methodological visits shall sign a commitment to respect the confidentiality before accessing those confidential records or data. 3. The Commission (Eurostat) shall ensure that officials and experts participating in these visits meet every guarantee as regards technical competence, professional independence and observance of confidentiality.
Article 13 
The Commission (Eurostat) shall report to the Economic and Financial Committee on the findings of dialogue and methodological visits, including any comments on these findings made by the Member State concerned. Those reports, along with any comments made by the Member State concerned, after having been transmitted to the Economic and Financial Committee, shall be made public, without prejudice to the provisions concerning statistical confidentiality in Regulation (EC) No 322/97.
Article 14 
1. The Commission (Eurostat) shall provide the actual government deficit and debt data for the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, within three weeks after the reporting deadlines referred to in Article 3(1) or after revisions as referred to in Article 6(1). That provision of data shall be effected through publication. 2. The Commission (Eurostat) shall not delay the provision of the actual government deficit and debt data of Member States where a Member State has not reported its own data.
Article 15 
1. The Commission (Eurostat) may express a reservation on the quality of the actual data reported by the Member States. No later than three working days before the planned publication date, the Commission (Eurostat) shall communicate to the Member State concerned and to the President of the Economic and Financial Committee the reservation it intends to express and make public. Where the issue is resolved after publication of the data and the reservation, withdrawal of the reservation shall be made public immediately thereafter. 2. The Commission (Eurostat) may amend actual data reported by Member States and provide the amended data and a justification of the amendment where there is evidence that actual data reported by Member States do not comply with the requirements of Article 8(1). No later than three working days before the planned publication date, the Commission (Eurostat) shall communicate to the Member State concerned and to the President of the Economic and Financial Committee the amended data and the justification for the amendment.
Article 16 
1. Member States shall ensure that the actual data reported to the Commission (Eurostat) are provided in accordance with the principles established by Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 322/97. In this regard, the responsibility of the national statistical authorities is to ensure the compliance of reported data with Article 1 of this Regulation and the underlying ESA 95 accounting rules. 2. Member States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that officials responsible for the reporting of the actual data to the Commission (Eurostat) and of the underlying government accounts act in accordance with the principles established by Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 322/97.
Amendment rationale: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM The basis for the EU fiscal surveillance system is laid down in the Treaties and further specified in EU legislation, notably through the requirements to the quality of fiscal statistics for the purpose of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) exercise. Quality of data in the fiscal statistics framework relies primarily on the correct implementation by the Member States of the legal acts relevant in the context of the EDP, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96[1] (ESA 95) and Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009[2] establishing the statistical reference system for standards, definitions and accountancy provisions. The Commission has been entrusted with the task of supervising the quality of the reported fiscal data. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 sets forth that the Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95. Quality of actual data means compliance of such data with accounting rules, as well as completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. Further, according to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality. Following the 'Greek case' in 2004, and a subsequent request by the Council to strengthen the monitoring of the quality of the reported fiscal data, the Commission proposed in 2005 the amendments to the legislation in force, i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, governing the quality of EDP data. The amendments in the Commission’s proposal of 2005[3] sought to increase the transparency of the EDP-related statistics, and, to that end, to strengthen the powers of Eurostat with respect to data quality. In particular, the Commission proposed to establish "in-depth monitoring visits". Coupled with a general requirement for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to the information required for the purposes of the data quality assessment, the proposal was seeking for strengthened competence related to the quality of data. However, the additional tools provided to the Commission by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005[4] were more limited than initially requested. In particular, there is no general obligation for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information requested for the purposes of the data quality assessment and the scope of the methodological visits (only conducted in one Member State since the adoption of the legislation) is confined to the purely statistical domain. Recent developments and, in particular, the Greek government deficit and debt statistics notified in October 2009[5], have revealed and made these limitations more acute and have demonstrated that the current system for fiscal statistics does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of, for instance, incorrect or inaccurate data being notified to the Commission. Without an action to countervail this weakness, such instances of non-compliance with the rules by individual Member States will hence continue to compromise the reliability of the governance system by its participants at both European and Member States’ levels. For that reason, it is at this stage both appropriate and policy-consistent to propose certain modifications of the governance framework for fiscal statistics. The purpose of the amended regulation is to allow the Commission and Member States to work more effectively together in improving the quality and reliability of government finance statistics, based on a two-pillar approach: first, more frequent and comprehensive regular statistical visits in the context of the standard EDP procedure; second, where a risk-based assessment identifies specific and significant problems, Eurostat may conduct additional methodological visits. To tackle the existing weaknesses, the Commission, therefore, deems it necessary to propose supplementing the existing rules in order to strengthen data monitoring mechanisms. However, the methodological visits will only be undertaken in cases where substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data are identified, as it is also currently the case pursuant to existing legal framework. Insofar as Eurostat, as a statistical authority, must be able to actually verify the figures provided, there is a need to supplement the current framework in several regards. In particular, there is a need for the recognition of the right for Eurostat to directly examine public accounts where there are substantial doubts about the reliability of the statistical data submitted by a national statistical authority – together with the corresponding obligation of national authorities to keep and make available all of the relevant sources of information. Furthermore, there is a need for Member States to ensure the assistance of experts in national accounting, including for the preparation and undertaking of the methodological visits.
Revised version (Article 16 ):
1. Member States shall ensure that the actual data reported to the Commission (Eurostat) are provided in accordance with the principles established by Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009. In this regard, the responsibility of the national statistical authorities is to ensure the compliance of reported data with Article 1 of this Regulation and the underlying ESA 95 accounting rules. Member States shall ensure that the national statistical authorities are provided with access to all relevant information necessary to perform these tasks. 2. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that institutions and officials responsible for the reporting of the actual data to the Commission (Eurostat) and of the underlying government accounts are accountable and act in accordance with principles established by Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 223/2009.
Article 17 
In the event of a revision of ESA 95 or of an amendment to its methodology decided on by the European Parliament and the Council or the Commission in accordance with the rules of competence and procedure laid down in the Treaty and in Regulation (EC) No 2223/96, the Commission shall introduce the new references to ESA 95 into Articles 1 and 3 of this Regulation.
Article 18 
Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 is repealed. References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and be read in accordance with the correlation table set out in Annex II.
Article 19 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .
Amendment rationale: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM The basis for the EU fiscal surveillance system is laid down in the Treaties and further specified in EU legislation, notably through the requirements to the quality of fiscal statistics for the purpose of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) exercise. Quality of data in the fiscal statistics framework relies primarily on the correct implementation by the Member States of the legal acts relevant in the context of the EDP, such as Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96[1] (ESA 95) and Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009[2] establishing the statistical reference system for standards, definitions and accountancy provisions. The Commission has been entrusted with the task of supervising the quality of the reported fiscal data. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 sets forth that the Commission (Eurostat) shall regularly assess the quality both of actual data reported by Member States and of the underlying government sector accounts compiled according to ESA 95. Quality of actual data means compliance of such data with accounting rules, as well as completeness, reliability, timeliness, and consistency of the statistical data. Further, according to Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009, Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), as promptly as possible, with the relevant statistical information requested for the needs of the data quality assessment, without prejudice to the provisions relating to statistical confidentiality. Following the 'Greek case' in 2004, and a subsequent request by the Council to strengthen the monitoring of the quality of the reported fiscal data, the Commission proposed in 2005 the amendments to the legislation in force, i.e. Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93, governing the quality of EDP data. The amendments in the Commission’s proposal of 2005[3] sought to increase the transparency of the EDP-related statistics, and, to that end, to strengthen the powers of Eurostat with respect to data quality. In particular, the Commission proposed to establish "in-depth monitoring visits". Coupled with a general requirement for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to the information required for the purposes of the data quality assessment, the proposal was seeking for strengthened competence related to the quality of data. However, the additional tools provided to the Commission by the Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005[4] were more limited than initially requested. In particular, there is no general obligation for Member States to provide the Commission (Eurostat) with access to all the information requested for the purposes of the data quality assessment and the scope of the methodological visits (only conducted in one Member State since the adoption of the legislation) is confined to the purely statistical domain. Recent developments and, in particular, the Greek government deficit and debt statistics notified in October 2009[5], have revealed and made these limitations more acute and have demonstrated that the current system for fiscal statistics does not mitigate, to the extent necessary, the risk of, for instance, incorrect or inaccurate data being notified to the Commission. Without an action to countervail this weakness, such instances of non-compliance with the rules by individual Member States will hence continue to compromise the reliability of the governance system by its participants at both European and Member States’ levels. For that reason, it is at this stage both appropriate and policy-consistent to propose certain modifications of the governance framework for fiscal statistics. The purpose of the amended regulation is to allow the Commission and Member States to work more effectively together in improving the quality and reliability of government finance statistics, based on a two-pillar approach: first, more frequent and comprehensive regular statistical visits in the context of the standard EDP procedure; second, where a risk-based assessment identifies specific and significant problems, Eurostat may conduct additional methodological visits. To tackle the existing weaknesses, the Commission, therefore, deems it necessary to propose supplementing the existing rules in order to strengthen data monitoring mechanisms. However, the methodological visits will only be undertaken in cases where substantial risks or potential problems with the quality of the data are identified, as it is also currently the case pursuant to existing legal framework. Insofar as Eurostat, as a statistical authority, must be able to actually verify the figures provided, there is a need to supplement the current framework in several regards. In particular, there is a need for the recognition of the right for Eurostat to directly examine public accounts where there are substantial doubts about the reliability of the statistical data submitted by a national statistical authority – together with the corresponding obligation of national authorities to keep and make available all of the relevant sources of information. Furthermore, there is a need for Member States to ensure the assistance of experts in national accounting, including for the preparation and undertaking of the methodological visits.
Revised version (Article 19 ):
This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union . This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.