軍事情報
Published on 1 April 1974, the interim report caused a sensation. Its headline recommendation was the dismissal of four senior officers in military intelligence: The Chief of Military Intelligence Major General Eliyahu Zeira, his deputy Brigadier Aryeh Shalev, the head of the Egyptian Department Lt Colonel Yona Bendman, and the chief intelligence officer in the Southern Command Lt Colonel David Gedalia. The report also was critical of what it called the "concept" in military intelligence thinking. The "concept" was based on the assumption that Egypt would only attack if it had the air-power to take on the Israeli Air Force. Military intelligence also thought that Syria would only attack if Egypt did. In the absence of any upgrading of Egypt's air force, the directorate concluded there was no threat of imminent war. This assumption led to complacency and evidence being ignored. For example, on 1 October and again on 3 October 1973, Lieutenant Benjamin Siman Yov, order of battle intelligence officer for the Southern Command, gave his superior Lt Colonel Gadalia documents indicating Egypt's war preparations.