台湾海峡危機
Hu Zongnan, as a capable military commander was not unaware of these problems the nationalists had faced, but as a loyal subject of this superior, Hu could not challenge Chiang Kai-shek, especially when such actions would provide the false impression of him being holding and expanding his own power, leading the way to become a new warlord, since he was already being called the Northwestern King not only by the communists, but also his rivalries within the Kuomintang itself. Therefore, Hu faithfully obeyed his orders given by Chiang Kai-shek and did not offer any opposition when his force was drastically reduced even though it needed to be greatly boosted if Chiang Kai-shek's intentions to be carried out, and eventually ended up in the inevitable defeats: it was merely after losing only a little more than 13,000 troops out of the total 230,000 in the three battles, the nationalists offensives in the former communist base had effectively ended because there was not enough troops to guard every newly conquered region and launching assaults on the communist main force at the same time. The communists were able to rest and regroup after these three battles and capitalize on this stalemate, eventually turning the table on the nationalist by decimating the Kuomintang force gradually, one small chunk at a time. Although Chiang Kai-shek would send Hu Zongnan reinforcement which was eventually greater than what Hu had commanded during World War II, it did not help Hu's situation because such reinforcement was sent in small numbers one at a time, thus a decisive blow to the communist main force could not be launched with numerical and technical superiority in a single strike. In contrast, the communists were able to concentrate their force to launch decisive blows to every nationalist garrison they engaged every time by achieving numerical superiority, taking out the Kuomintang units gradually. Hu Zongnan's failure was large not due to his military capability, but he was blamed by his rivals afterward. Another reason for Hu's failure was because that his most trusted assistant, Major General Xiong Xianghui was a communist spy. Xiong secretly joined communist party in December 1936 at Tsinghua University and under the direct order of Zhou Enlai, Xiong went to work for Hu Zongnan in December 1937. Xiong excelled in his work and since March 1939, he had become Hu's most trusted subordinate and named Xiong his secretary, a position Xiong held until May, 1947, when he was sent to USA by Hu Zongnan to study. It was not after Xiong left Hu did Hu discovered Xiong's true identity, and obviously, it was not Hu Zongnan's fault and Hu himself was fooled and thus a victim as well, but Hu's political enemy, such as those in Chen Cheng's camp, accused him of harboring communists, a charge later resurfaced after the nationalist had withdrawn to Taiwan, and Hu was cleared for both times. After the KMT fled to Taiwan, he served as governor of Zhejiang (Chekiang) from 1952, commanded the ROC defense in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis and retired from the army in 1955. He went on to serve as the President's military strategy advisor until his death on 14 February 1962.