EXPO-SEDE_ET_2007_381405_EN.pdf — page 9

risk – they may be seen as an excellent method for safe and deniable covert method for targeted 
attacks on high level ‘enemies’. The use of armed UAVs by the US to assassinate suspected 
terrorist leaders, even in non-combat areas (e.g. the attack in Yemen) has already raised moral 
and legal questions. 
 
A second important risk - a lesson learned from UAV use in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan - 
is the danger of micro-management of combat operations by commanders (both military and 
political) who are stationed away from the combat zone10. Instead of letting their operational 
and tactical commanders ‘get on’ with the action, top level commanders may now be tempted to 
think that UAVs and other information gathering systems such as satellites give them the ability 
to see what is going on in the zone of operations in real time. This may then encourage them to 
try and micro-command the operation, and lead to rules of engagement that always demand 
authorization from top level commanders, thereby curtailing the decision-making powers of the 
lower level commanders. Extensive use of UAVs demands clear doctrines on who is in charge 
of which levels of operation. 
 
Thirdly, while UAVs are extremely useful, their often slow speed (most have a maximum speed 
of less than 300km/hour) leaves them vulnerable to enemy action and other attrition11. The 
development of faster UAVs, capable of using defensive measures such as flares, will help to 
overcome their vulnerability, while the acquisition of larger numbers of UAVs will alleviate the 
attrition problem.  
 
Lastly, photographs or video images gathered by UAVs for use as evidence in formal legal 
proceedings (as one might expect in peacekeeping operations) is questionable. This point was 
made by British officers with experience in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. They maintained that 
while the UAV imagery was good enough for use in war, it would probably not stand up in court 
– unlike imagery derived from heavier but better equipment mounted on manned helicopters12. 
 
 
3. History of European UAVs 
 
Until the 1960s UAVs were limited in their operations to either pre-programmed flight or to 
remote radio control. The first option enabled long-range operations, but no flexibility once the 
UAV was launched, whereas the second option gave flexibility, but severely restricted the range 
because the controller needed to see the UAV he was steering. In the 1960s developments in 
data transmission and in electronic miniaturization opened the way for reliable and small sensors 
to provide live data of sufficient quality to give operators on the ground a chance to see what the 
UAV’s sensors were seeing and thus to steer the UAV based on these pictures. 
 
                                                 
10 Ripley, T., ‘UAVs over Kosovo – did the earth move?’, Defence Systems Daily, 1 Dec. 1999, URL http://defence-
data.com/features/fpage34.htm; Biass, E. and Braybrook, R., ‘The UAV as sensor platform – from Pioneer to 
Global Hawk’, Armada International, Oct/Nov. 2001, p. 3. 
11 During the 1999 operations in Kosovo, at least 21 and possibly over 27 Allied UAVs were lost. The Canadians 
had all their four Sperwers out of action within a few weeks of the start of their operations in Afghanistan. Of some 
30 Pioneer UAVs used by the US forces in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, 13 were out of action by the end of he short 
war, while 13 had been temporarily out of action due to damage, leaving US forces with a very limited UAV force. 
Biass, E. and Braybrook, R., ‘The UAV as sensor platform – from Pioneer to Global Hawk’, Armada International, 
Oct/Nov. 2001, pp. 2-3. 
12 Ripley, T., ‘UAVs over Kosovo – did the earth move?’, Defence Systems Daily, 1 Dec. 1999, URL http://defence-
data.com/features/fpage34.htm. 
 
5