SN06493.pdf — page 30

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 30 
The use of Remotely Piloted Air Systems are entirely dependent upon 
data feeds.122 They also require access to frequencies and spectrum to 
operate.123 Failure of these datalinks, and failure to restore control, can 
lead to the loss of the aircraft.  
Major Haider notes in his NATO study that current beyond line of sight 
RPAS operations are entirely dependent on a reliable satellite data link 
network. Haider assesses the threat to RPAS from anti-satellite weapons 
to be low because of the low availability of such weapons. However he 
assesses the threat from electronic warfare to RPAS to be high. He notes 
that electronic warfare attack equipment has historically required less 
sophisticated technology than is needed to defend against that attack – 
simple jammers can be bought for less than a $100.124  
The threat of cyber-attack is also rated high by Major Haider because 
although RPAS are part of secured military networks there have been 
instances of RPAS being ‘hacked’. In 2011 a computer virus was 
discovered at Creech Air Force base in Nevada following the key strokes 
of Predator and Reaper pilots flying missions over Afghanistan.125 In his 
study of RPAS operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Joe Doyle cites 
examples of US Predators lost because of the failure of datalinks during 
operations in Afghanistan. In one instance, a Predator had to be shot 
down by a USAF F-15. In 2009 the US discovered insurgents in Iraq had 
hacked into the real-time video feeds transmitted by Predator aircraft.126 
The Ministry of Defence has explained what happens in the event of the 
loss of control of an RPAS in UK airspace: 
Should a flight be aborted, standard operating procedures 
applicable to each UAV type allow a safe recovery, either to an 
established airfield or to a pre-selected emergency recovery site. In 
the event of a loss of the control link between the ground station 
and the aircraft, a UAV will revert to a pre-programmed 
emergency flight plan and fly to an established airfield where 
operators will attempt to regain the control link or, failing that, 
continue to a pre-selected emergency recovery site where it will 
automatically land. The flight-paths of UAVs operating in UK 
segregated airspace and danger areas are designed to minimise or 
eliminate the overflight of populated areas, thus mitigating risk to 
third parties to the absolute minimum.127 
Restrictions on operational use: weather 
One of the greatest constraints to operational use of RPAS is the effects 
of weather, the Ministry of Defence told the Defence Committee. The 
                                                                                             
122  A. Haider, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systemsin Contested Environments: A 
Vulnerability Analysis”, NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, September 2014  
123  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and 
future UK use, 25 March 2014, HC 772 2013-14, Ev 1 
124  A. Haider, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systemsin Contested Environments: A 
Vulnerability Analysis”, NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, September 2014 
p34 
125  “computer virus hits US drone fleet”, Wired, 10 July 2011 
126  Joe Doyle, “Rise of the Robots? Western unmanned air operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2001 to 2010”, Air Power Review summer 2013, vol 16 no 2, p20; 
Further analysis of RPAS crashes and causes can be found in the Drone crash 
database maintained by Drone Wars UK 
127  HC Deb 28 February 2011 c83-84W