kamrulkonok/evalllm2026-french-defense huggingface dataset:
SN06493.pdf — page 14

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 14 
2.4 Scan Eagle 
The only Royal Navy/Royal Fleet Auxiliary operated RPAS is Scan Eagle. 
It entered service in early 2014 and so far has been deployed on HMS 
Somerset, HMS Northumberland and RFA Cardigan Bay.43 Scan Eagle’s 
deployment on HMS Somerset for operations in the Gulf was the first 
time the Navy had operated an unmanned air system on maritime 
operations, according to then Defence Secretary Philip Hammond. He 
described it as a “new era of aviation and intelligence gathering in the 
Royal Navy.”44  
ScanEagle has a wingspan of just over 3 metres and is launched from a 
catapult on the deck. It can remain airborne for 12 hours operating up 
to 40 nautical miles from the launch platform. It provides a day or night 
persistent ISR and beams live video directly into the ship’s operating 
room. It was brought in as an urgent operational requirement is 
provided by Boeing Defence UK on a £30 million contractor-
owned/contractor-operated service contract. Navy personnel direct the 
ScanEagle’s operations and a civilian team from the aircraft’s 
manufacturer Boeing Insitu, fly and maintain the aircraft.45 It is operated 
by 700X Naval Air Squadron (formerly the Royal Navy’s 831 Flight) 
which was reformed at Royal Naval Air Station Culdrose in late 2014.  
2.5 New classification regulations introduced 
in 2015 
New regulations for RPAS were published in January 2015 by the 
Military Aviation Authority. The regulations introduce a classification 
system which categorise RPAs according to size, how they are operated 
and what risk to life they potential pose to people on the ground. The 
category an RPAS receives will determine the level of regulation it will 
have to meet, ranging from full compliance for the largest RPAS 
presenting the greatest risk to life down to no regulation for the 
smallest.  
The MOD says this new classification system and regulations for RPAS 
has created “a much improved regulatory regime which is proportional 
and effective because it recognises the broad range of RPAS types and 
the appropriate level of regulation for each of them.”46  
The Regulations advise organisations or service seeking to bring an RPAS 
into use is advised to present a case to the Military Aviation Authority 
prior to Main Gate for classification. The regulations recommend that 
for RPAS procured through Defence Equipment and Support, the 
MOD’s procurement arm, an approach to the MAA should be made 
prior to Initial Gate and certainly no later than Main Gate.47 
                                                                                             
43  “X-men take to the Cornish skies”, Royal Navy news, 25 November 2014 
44  “Eagle scans the skies”, Desider, April 2014 
45  Royal Navy website, accessed 18 February 2015; “ScanEagle set for RN operations”, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 January 2014 
46  “New regulations for Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) go live”, Ministry of 
Defence, 19 January 2015 
47  Initial Gate is when initial funds are released for a programme’s assessment phase. 
Main Gate is when the programme is approved and funds released for manufacture.
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15 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
The new categorisation divides RPAs into three classes: I, II and III. Class 
1 is further subdivided into four (a, b, c and d). The MAA will categorise 
a RPAS on a case by case basis. The categorisation process is based 
initially on the minimum take-off weight combined with how the RPAS 
is intended to be used and where it is expected to be operated.  
The minimum take-off weight (MTOW) is based on NATO RPAS MTOW 
classification, as provided in Annex A of RA 1600:48 
Table 1: NATO Class and Common Taxonomy 
MTOW  
NATO Class  
Common 
Taxonomy  
Starting MAA 
category 
< 200g  
Class I < 150 
kg  
NANO  
Class I(a) 
200g to 2kg  
MICRO <2kg  
Class I(b) 
2kg-20kg  
MINI 2-20 kg  
Class I(c) 
20kg-150kg  
SMALL >20 kg  
Class I(d) 
> 150kg  
Class II 150 - 
600kg  
TACTICAL >150 
kg  
Class II 
> 600kg  
Class III > 
600kg  
MALE / HALE / 
Strike  
Class III 
 
Weight alone is not the defining factor in how the MAA will categorise 
an RPAS. The regulations say mitigating and aggravating factors are 
likely to be the more significant factors in understanding the risk to life 
to individuals. A non-exhaustive list of such factors is provided in Annex 
A of RA 1600: 
Table 2: Categorisation of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
Mitigating factors 
Aggravating factors 
Operation in visual line of sight  
Operation in segregated airspace 
Overflight of low population density 
Flight termination system 
Redundancy  
Frangibility of RPAS structure49 
Extended range of operation beyond 
visual line of sight 
Operation in non-segregated airspace 
Overflight of congested areas / high 
population density 
Weaponisation 
Failure mode – high kinetic energy 
Complexity 
 
All Military Aviation Authority Regulations can be found on the gov.uk 
website. The regulation covering the categorisation of RPAS and the 
specific regulations to assure their safe operation is: Regulatory Article 
(RA) 1600: remotely piloted air systems (RPAS).  
 
                                                                                             
48  RA 1600 issue 2 1 April 2015, annex A 
49  A frangible object is an object of low mass designed to break, distort or yield on 
impact so as to present the minimum hazard to aircraft.
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Number 06493, 8 October 2015 16 
2.6 International regulation 
There are two principle multilateral regimes that address exports of 
UAVs – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement. Both are voluntary, nonbinding arrangements 
among like-minded supplier countries. The UK belongs to both.  
The MTCR is a voluntary association of 34 countries and focuses on 
limiting the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles and UAVs capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction.50 The MOD has said the UK 
discusses the developments of unmanned aerial vehicles/systems with 
MTCR partners but notes it works on a consensus basis and therefore 
each member must be in agreement before any changes to guidelines 
can be implemented.51 The UK was a founding partner of the MTCR 
when it was established in 1987. 
The Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) 
is a voluntary association of 41 countries which want to limit the spread 
of certain conventional weapons.52  
Arms exports 
The Committee on Arms Export Controls has questioned the 
Government on its export policy regarding RPAS (referred to as UAVS in 
the committee report.53 The Government said in its response: 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), their technology and 
components, are controlled for export by both the MTCR and the 
WA. Export licences for all UAVs are approved in accordance with 
the Consolidated Criteria, which include an explicit requirement to 
comply with the UK’s international commitments (Criterion 1) and 
to consider human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
country of final destination (Criterion 2). The Government always 
acts in accordance with international humanitarian law and 
international standards.54 
Further information about UK arms exports can be found Library 
Briefing Paper: UK Arms Export Control Policy.55 
                                                                                             
50  “Non-proliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use 
Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports”, US Government Accountability 
Office, July 2012, GAO-12-536, p4 
51  HC Deb 16 April 2012 c75W 
52  “Non-proliferation: Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use 
Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports”, US Government Accountability 
Office, July 2012, GAO-12-536, p4 
53  Committee on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation 
and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of 
Session 2014–15, HC 186, 23 July 2014 2013-14 
54  Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2014) – Government response, Cm 8935, 15 October 
2014, para 115 
55  J. Lunn, UK Arms Export Control Policy, House of Commons Library Standard Note 
SN02729, 8 May 2015
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17 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
3. UK Armed Forces inventory: 
Future capabilities 
Summary 
The Ministry of Defence is actively exploring a range of future possible remotely piloted 
aircraft systems. This includes: 
• 
a replacement for Reaper  
• 
options for maritime surveillance 
• 
a remotely piloted maritime helicopter 
• 
co-funding a project examining a future unmanned combat aircraft with France 
The forthcoming 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review may give some indication as to 
where the MOD intends to focus its efforts.  
 
3.1 Protector/Scavenger: Reaper’s 
replacement 
Protector, the programme previously known as Scavenger, will replace 
Reaper from the end of this decade. Protector is the name of the 
programme to provide a core medium altitude, long-endurance (MALE) 
capability to provide ISTAR56 and an offensive capability from 2018 to 
2030. The programme, then known as Scavenger, passed initial gate in 
November 2013 is currently in its assessment phase.57 The MOD has not 
yet decided on what capability will fulfil the programme’s requirements 
and the Ministry has said a particular requirement is for the capability to 
be certified to fly in UK/European airspace.58  
The UK and France agreed to collaborate in acquiring a MALE RPAS 
from 2018 as part of the work following the 2010 Lancaster House 
Treaties. The 2012 summit declaration announced a jointly funded 
contract would shortly be placed with BAES and Dassault.59 However no 
contract has so far been placed and the programme looks to have fallen 
by the wayside. Instead, the 2014 summit declaration said the two 
countries will “look to develop cooperative opportunities through a 
‘joint user group’ for REAPER, to exchange lessons learnt and work 
together on air certification, training, through life support and 
interoperability.” France is separately involved in a seven-nation MALE 
RPAS exploration programme to develop RPAS from 2020 onwards.60   
The current ten-strong fleet of Reaper aircraft will be replaced by a fleet 
of more than 20 new aircraft, to be called Protector, the Prime Minister 
                                                                                             
56  Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance 
57  PQ 216428, 5 December 2014 
58  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems-current and 
future UK use: Government response, HC 611, 29 July 2014 2013-14, para 12 
59  UK-France declaration on security and defence, February 2012 
60  The other nations are Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
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19 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
3.2 Maritime surveillance 
Maritime surveillance is an area which could, in part, be provided a 
remotely piloted air system.  
The UK has a maritime surveillance capability gap following the decision 
in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review to cancel the Nimrod 
MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) programme.   
The MOD has been exploring options for maritime surveillance ahead of 
the next Strategic Defence and Security Review. The AIR ISTAR 
Optimisation Study (AIOS) will look at the requirements and capabilities 
of air-based ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance). The study is considering a number of options for wide 
area surveillance which includes the use of unmanned aircraft and 
manned aircraft and the use of space-based assets. The MOD has said it 
does not intend to publish the results of the study.67 
Separately the Royal Navy is developing a Maritime UAS Strategy paper 
looking at this topic out to 2050. This was mentioned by the Ministry to 
the Defence Committee in July 2013. It is unclear if and when this 
strategy paper will be published and the MOD said in response to a PQ 
in November 2014 the paper is still in development.68 
In terms of actual equipment, the Department has confirmed it has 
considered the MQ-4c Triton as part of this review.69 The Northrop 
Grumman MQ-4C Triton is being developed for the US Navy as a 
surveillance aircraft. It is based on the USAF RQ-4B Global Hawk and is 
expected to be a forward deployed, land-based system providing a 
persistent maritime ISR capability. The US Navy anticipates using it 
alongside the Poseidon P-8A manned aircraft and says Triton will 
perform ISR within a range of 2,000 nm while the P-8A aircraft focuses 
on its core missions and anti-surface ship warfare. The US Navy has an 
initial operational capability date of 2018.70  
The UK has embedded a number of personnel with the US Navy on P-8 
Poseidon aircraft as part of its Seedcorn Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) 
programme to embed personnel in MPA capabilities of close allies to 
retain the necessary skills and experience of operating a maritime patrol 
aircraft capability.71 
It is worth noting that Australia intends to operate a fleet of Triton and 
P-8A aircraft to provide maritime surveillance.72 
                                                                                             
67  PQ 218393, 18 December 2014 
68  Letter from Ministry of Defence to Defence Committee entitled: Defence Committee 
report on future maritime surveillance: Government update, 10 July 2013; 
PQ214079, 18 November 2014 
69  HC Deb 16 June 2014 c366W 
70  MQ-4c Triton, Naval Air Systems Command, accessed 27 March 2015 
71  HC Deb 3 April 2014 c807W 
72  “Avalon 2015: Australia seeks co-operative development with US on Triton UAV”, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 February 2015
SN06493.pdf — page 20

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 20 
3.3 Remotely-piloted helicopters 
Rotary-wing remotely piloted air systems (helicopters) have so far not 
featured in the UK’s inventory. However in 2013 the Royal Navy placed 
a £2.3 million two year contract with AugustaWestland to research a 
rotary-wing UAS. The programme is known as the Rotary Wing 
Unmanned Air System (RWUAS) Capability Concept Demonstrator 
(CCD). The company is developing the SW-4 Solo Rotorcraft Unmanned 
Air System/Optionally Piloted Helicopter73 (RUAS/OPH) based on the 
EASA certified SW-4 light single helicopter. The demonstrator will focus 
on demonstrating radar, electro-optics, mine counter measures and 
hydrographic survey capabilities.74  
The MOD has ruled out acquiring the US Navy developed MQ-8 Fire 
Scout system, saying it “does not meet any endorsed UK capability 
need.”75 Fire Scout is a rotary-wing RPAS which can operate from air-
capable ships and is designed to provide ISR. The US Navy currently 
operates the MQ-8B Fire Scout and is developing the larger MQ-8C Fire 
Scout.  
Further discussion of rotary and fixed-wing Remotely Piloted Air Systems 
in the context of maritime air power and maritime surveillance can be 
found in a Royal Aeronautical Society discussion paper published in July 
2014.76 
3.4 Unmanned Combat Aircraft 
Could an unmanned combat aircraft fly alongside the manned Lightning 
II in the future? 
The RAF’s fast jet fleet from 2020 will consist of Typhoon and the new 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II. Typhoon is expected to leave 
service around 2030 and the MOD is conducting a two year Future 
Combat Air System (FCAS) programme to consider the most appropriate 
force mix of platforms and systems for combat air from 2030.  
The MOD has said the options for this force mix include an Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) along with an additional buy of Lightning 
II, a Typhoon extension programme or a new-build manned aircraft.77 
This programme will inform the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security 
Review.  
An unmanned combat air system is described by the Ministry of Defence 
as a “proposed class of Unmanned Aerial Systems with offensive and 
defensive capabilities on a par with current manned systems to allow 
                                                                                             
73  ‘Optionally Piloted Helicopter’ refers to a helicopter than can be flown by a pilot on 
board or can be remotely piloted. 
74  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and 
future UK use, 25 March 2014, HC 772 2013-14, Ev 1 
75  HC Deb 1 November 2012 c374W 
76  “Current and future maritime air power for the United Kingdom”, Royal 
Aeronautical Society, July 2014 
77  The others being additional buy of Lightning II, a Typhoon life extension, or an 
alternative new-build manned aircraft.
SN06493.pdf — page 22

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 22 
Tom Fillingham describes the advantages of a UCAS when combined 
with manned combat aircraft like Typhoon or Lightning II: 
By placing an autonomous, low-observable UCAS close to or 
inside the contested/high-threat airspace, commanders will be 
able to deliver effects, either directly or via stand-off, that would 
otherwise be either impossible or too risky to achieve.  Risk of 
platform loss, latency of action and overall utilisation of force 
resources would be reduced, while persistence, flexibility and 
effective force mass could all be increased. 
He adds that through-life costs of UCAS could be “considerably lower 
than manned alternatives.” He argues that training costs will be 
reduced because there will be no need for flying training beyond that 
provided for in the simulator: “The majority of flying hours consumed 
by manned combat aircraft are training hours. This would not be 
necessary with a UCAV system, and there would be a consequent, and 
significant, saving in operating, support and maintenance costs, as well 
as an increased airframe fatigue lifespan.”83 
 
3.5 The Equipment Plan  
The budget for unmanned air systems falls under the Combat Air sector 
in the MOD’s Equipment plan 2014. The MOD envisages spending 
£17.9bn on the combat air sector over the next ten years. This includes 
procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II and Typhoon 
upgrades. It does not specify how much it expects to spend on 
unmanned air systems beyond the £130 million already committed to 
develop the future combat air system concept. 
The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review is expected to give 
some indication as to how the MOD envisages the future air force mix 
of manned and unmanned aircraft.  
 
 
 
                                                                                             
83  T Fillingham, “Unmanned Combat Air Systems: An Autonomous Revolution on the 
Horizon”, RUSI Defence Systems, Jan 2015, Vol. 16, No. 2
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23 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
4. Operational use of RPAS 
Summary 
Until 2014 unmanned and remotely piloted air systems were only deployed in support of 
operations in Afghanistan. Upon the end of combat operations in Afghanistan in October 
2014 Reaper aircraft were transferred to the Middle East for operations in Iraq and Syria.84 An 
RAF Reaper killed two British nationals in Syria on 21 August 2015, the first time a British 
asset has been used to conduct a strike in a country in which the UK is not involved in a war.85 
2014 also saw the first operational deployment of an unmanned air system on maritime 
operations with the deployment of Scan Eagle on HMS Somerset on Operation Kipion in the 
Gulf.86 
 
Afghanistan 
In the latter years of Operation Herrick the Armed Forces operated six 
types of RPAs in Afghanistan: Reaper, Hermes 450, Desert Hawk III, 
Black Hornet, Tarantula Hawk and Watchkeeper (from September 
2014). The latter deployed in the very last few weeks of operations. All 
were withdrawn from Afghanistan by December 2014. The Hermes 450 
has since been replaced by Watchkeeper and the Tarantula Hawk is no 
longer in service.87 The Government has said it has no plans to 
redeployed RPAS to Afghanistan following the end of combat 
operations in December 2014.88 
The entire fleet had flown nearly 170,000 in support of operations in 
Afghanistan up to February 2014 (the fleet included Army operated 
Hermes 450 but does not include Watchkeeper which had not deployed 
during that time period).89 
Reapers flew over 5,000 sorties in Afghanistan since first deploying in 
2007 (it did not conduct air strikes until 2008).90 The MOD has provided 
information on the number of weapons fired from Reapers in response 
to Parliamentary questions. This information includes: 
• 
8% of sorties flown between 2008 and July 2013 included a 
weapon release.91 
                                                                                             
84  PQ HL5185, 10 March 2015 
85  HC Deb 7 September 2015 c30 
86  “Eagle scans the skies”, Desider, April 2014; PQ HL5185, 10 March 2015 
87  The Tarantula Hawk was used by Explosive Ordnance Device operators to examine 
suspicious vehicles or structures because it can hover and stare. It takes-off and 
lands vertically. It was operated in Afghanistan by 32 Regiment, Royal Artillery, 
embedded in the Royal Engineers Counter IED task force. Withdrawal from service 
confirmed by author with the Ministry of Defence on 11 June 2015 
88  PQ 216885, 8 December 2014 
89  “UK eyes in the sky”, Desider, February 2014, p30 
90  5262 sorties between 2008 and 15 November 2014. PQ 216079, 8 December 2014 
91  HC Deb 5 September 2013 c480W
SN06493.pdf — page 24

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 24 
• 
317 precision-guided weapons were released by Reapers between 
24 March 2011 and 16 June 2014. By comparison, 71 such 
weapons were released from fixed-wing aircraft.92  
 
 
Iraq and Syria: 2014 to present 
Reaper aircraft redeployed from Afghanistan to the Middle East for use 
in operations against ISIS in the Middle East in mid-October 2014. This 
marked the first operational use of Reaper outside of Afghanistan. 
Reaper is flying surveillance missions over both countries but is only 
authorised to carry out air strikes in Iraq. Initially two Reaper aircraft 
were redeployed from Afghanistan for operations in the Middle East.93 
However the MOD has since then refused to say how many Reaper have 
been deployed or where they are based, saying its disclosure “would or 
would be likely to prejudice operational capability, effectiveness or 
security of the Armed Forces and also relations between the United 
Kingdom and another State.”94 By comparison, the Government has 
given those details for Tornado aircraft operating in Iraq: eight aircraft 
operating from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus.95 
The Ministry of Defence has said “no UK Reaper missions have been 
conducted in Syria other than for surveillance purposes. No authority 
has been granted for the discharge of weapons from UK Reaper aircraft 
operating in Syrian airspace.”96 
However this position changed on 21 August 2015 when an RAF 
Reaper killed two British nationals, Reyaad Khan, the target of the 
strike, Ruhul Amin, and a third individual, in a targeted strike in Syria. 
The Prime Minister said the strike was lawful and authorised on the 
basis of self-defence, a reference to Article 51 of the UN charter. The 
Prime Minister said the strike was not as not part of coalition military 
action against ISIL in Syria but a target strike “to deal with a clear, 
credible and specific terrorist threat to our country at home.”97 The 
Prime Minister noted this action was a “new departure.” See section 
6.3 for further discussion of the legal argument. 
Figures released under a Freedom of Information request by Drone Wars 
UK show: 
• 
87 Reaper strikes in Iraq between November 2014 and March 
2015 
• 
184 Reaper sorties in Iraq between January and March 2015 
• 
30 Reaper sorties in Syria between January and March 2015 
• 
64 Hellfire missiles released at targets in Iraq between January and 
March 201598 
                                                                                             
92  PQ 200904, 7 July 2014; Other PQs giving statistics on usage can be found in 
Hansard: HL Deb 19 November 2013 c187WA 
93  PQ 211832, 4 November 2014 
94  PQ 213744, 18 November 2014; PQ 211833 4 November 2014 
95  PQ 209771, 17 October 2014 
96  PQ 22433, 2 February 2015 
97  HC Deb 7 September 2015 c25-26 
98  “New figures for British air and drone strikes in Iraq”, Drone Wars UK, 15 May 2015
SN06493.pdf — page 25

25 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
Information about air strikes in Iraq, including those conducted by 
Reaper aircraft, can be found on the Gov.uk website. 
Libya  
UK operated armed UAVs were not deployed in Libya.99 However UK 
personnel embedded within a US unit flew American UAVs (Predators) 
during Operation Ellamy in Libya in 2011.100 
Maritime operations 
The first unmanned air system to be flown on maritime operations 
occured in early 2014 on HMS Somerset, on her way to the Gulf for 
Operation Kipion.101 The then Defence Secretary Philip Hammond 
described it as a “new era of aviation and intelligence gathering in the 
Royal Navy.”102 ScanEagle has since been deployed on HMS 
Northumberland and RFA Cardigan Bay for operational deployments in 
2014.103  
 
 
                                                                                             
99  HC Deb 6 November 2012 c204WH   
100  HC Deb 26 November 2012 c29W & HC Deb 29 November 2012 c461W; see also 
“British pilots flew armed US drones in Libya, MoD reveals”, The Guardian, 26 July 
2012 
101  “Eagle scans the skies”, Desider, April 2014 
102  “Eagle scans the skies”, Desider, April 2014 
103  “X-men take to the Cornish skies”, Royal Navy news, 25 November 2014
SN06493.pdf — page 26

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 26 
5. Restrictions on use 
Summary 
The operational deployment of Remotely Piloted Aircraft is constrained by a number of 
factors.  
RPA designed for medium and high-altitude flying are restricted in where they can fly because 
all lack the sense-and-avoid technology that enables aircraft to fly in unsegregated airspace.  
Current RPAS were not designed to operate in contested airspace and so lack defences 
against a sophisticated enemy air defence network: the UK has so far only deployed Reaper in 
permissive airspace in Afghanistan and Iraq (2014-to present).  
Lighter aircraft may find it difficult to operate in extreme environments because of the effect 
of high cross winds or icing. The dependency on satellites and datalinks means RPAS are 
vulnerable to failure or data link interference. 
 
Identifying restrictions and vulnerabilities 
The Ministry of Defence identified a number of constraints to the use of 
RPAS in evidence to the Defence committee. These include the use of 
airspace and safety; basing (the need for UAS to be based as close as 
possible to the target area to allow for the longest loiter time possible); 
command delay; weather and the electromagnetic environment 
(dependence upon data feeds).104 
NATO released a detailed study into the vulnerabilities of RPAS in 
contested environments in September 2014. The study, conducted 
NATO’s Joint Air Power Competency Centre, identified the 
vulnerabilities of and threats to RPAS currently in use by NATO allies. 
The author made more than 100 individual recommendations to 
enhance RPAS survivability, encompassing measures in the air, ground 
and cyber-domains.105  
Restrictions on operational use: air space 
The operation of unmanned aircraft within the United Kingdom is 
governed by the Air Navigation Order 2009. Full guidance on the use of 
UAVs is contained in the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) publication 
Civil Aviation Publication 722-Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in 
UK airspace. 
All military remotely piloted aircraft (UAVs) are treated as UK military 
aircraft and subject to the same regulations as military aircraft. They are 
regulated by the Military Aviation Authority (MAA). 
New regulations for RPAS were published in January 2015 by the 
Military Aviation Authority. This includes a new classification system and 
specific regulations for RPAS which the MOD says has created “a much 
                                                                                             
104  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and 
future UK use, 25 March 2014, HC 772 2013-14, Ev 1 
105  Major A Haider, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systemsin Contested Environments: A 
Vulnerability Analysis”, NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, September 2014
SN06493.pdf — page 28

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 28 
activities dangerous to the flight of aircraft may take place or exist at 
such times as may be notified.”112 
Watchkeeper received its full release to service in March 2014.113 It is 
permitted to fly in segregated airspace and flew test flights had test 
flights at the Parc Aberporth facility at West Wales airport, which is in 
segregated airspace. In 2013 the Ministry of Defence said it had no 
plans to conduct operational flights for Watchkeeper in the UK.114 
Reaper cannot fly in UK airspace.  
The Army trains Desert Hawk operators at Salisbury Plain. Black Hornet 
does not need to be limited to segregated airspace because of its 
weight, size and the height at which it operates. 
Further information on the civilian use of drones in UK and EU airspace 
can be found the following briefings:  
• 
House of Lords European Union Committee, Civilian use of drones 
in the EU, 5 March 2015, HL 122 2014-15 
• 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Environment, Civilian drones, 
2 October 2014 
 
Restrictions on operational use: contested airspace 
One of the major vulnerabilities of current RPAS is that they are not 
designed to operate in contested airspace. That is, airspace in which 
they might face a sophisticated air defence network. This is a major 
consideration for future procurement plans: will future RPAS be 
expected to operate in permissive, non-permissive or hostile 
environments? This decision impacts on the design of future RPAS. 
Current RPAs were not intended to operate in contested environments. 
The Vice Chief of the Air Staff of the United States Air Force noted this 
limitation in 2011:  
One has to remember that the current ISR fleet… is absolutely a 
permissive fleet… The Predator, the Reaper, the Global Hawk will 
not fly in contested [airspace] and will certainly not fly in denied 
airspace.115 
Current medium and high-altitude aircraft have a high radar visibility, 
operate at relatively low speed, have limited manoeuvrability and have 
little or no defensive measures to defend themselves against surface-to-
air missiles or enemy combat aircraft. As the NATO study notes: 
“signature reducing measures, warning receivers, countermeasures, 
high airspeeds and manoeuvrability were not a design priority.”116 An 
example of defensive measures is the defensive aids subsystem on the 
manned Sentinel R1 reconnaissance aircraft that has a missile warning 
                                                                                             
112  HC Deb 10 July 2012 c141W 
113  “Thales’s Watchkeeper given Release To Service by UK Ministry of Defence”, Thales 
press release, 5 March 2014 
114  HC Deb 25 February 2013 c36W 
115  Joe Doyle, “Rise of the Robots? Western unmanned air operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2001 to 2010”, Air Power Review summer 2013, vol 16 no 2, p15 
116  A. Haider, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systemsin Contested Environments: A 
Vulnerability Analysis”, NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, September 2014
SN06493.pdf — page 29

29 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
system, radar warning receiver, towed radar decoy and chaff and flare 
dispensers.117  
UK Reapers have only flown in permissive airspace in Afghanistan 
(2007-2014) and Iraq (2014-present). Watchkeeper has only flown, 
briefly, in Afghanistan. In neither environment were they threatened by 
a sophisticated enemy air defence system.  
Unrealistic expectations? 
Some commentators have cautioned that the successful use of RPAS in 
permissive environments may have created unrealistic expectations of 
what RPAS might be able to do in the future.  
International Defence Review found a growing sense of among air 
operators that “the unusually permissive air environments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq fostered a potentially unrealistically high level of 
reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).”118   
RAF Squadron Leader Joe Doyle analysed RPAS operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2010. He concluded that RPAS did not 
show themselves to be genuine competitors to conventional manned 
aircraft, because the aircraft operated in an environment which 
presented little or no threat to it: 
Success in mission areas where UAV utility was most evidence was 
enabled by a counterinsurgency-dominated strategic context 
combined with a permissive air environment. Significant technical 
and conceptual limitations endured throughout this period. The 
limited and context-specific extent of this UAV “revolution” 
should warn against the premature replacement of manned 
capabilities in Western force structures and doctrine.119 
Doyle notes the US military refused to deploy Global Hawk into the 
Libyan theatre in early 2011 until integrated air defence systems had 
been sufficiently degraded.120 
The author of the NATO study warns that future adversaries should be 
assumed to have the “will have the capability and intent to oppose or 
disrupt NATO air operations and will represent a serious threat to Allied 
RPAS assets.”121 
The joint UK/France study into a future unmanned combat air system 
(UCAS) is specifically working on a capability that would be able to carry 
out strikes in hostile territories. 
 
Restrictions on operational use: satellites and data 
links 
                                                                                             
117  C Heyman, The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom 2014-2015, 2013, p154 
118  “Fragile invaders: can UAVs survive in contested airspace?”, International Defence 
Review, 6 July 2012 
119  Joe Doyle, “Rise of the Robots? Western unmanned air operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2001 to 2010”, Air Power Review summer 2013, vol 16 no 2, p12 
120  Joe Doyle, “Rise of the Robots? Western unmanned air operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2001 to 2010”, Air Power Review summer 2013, vol 16 no 2, p15 
121  A. Haider, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systemsin Contested Environments: A 
Vulnerability Analysis”, NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, September 2014
SN06493.pdf — page 31

31 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
Ministry said this is the case for all aircraft but can be particularly 
difficult for lighter airframes to manage in certain environments, such as 
areas that suffer from high cross winds, icing or lightning strikes.128 
Drone Wars UK database of crashes identifies the loss of a two 
Predators in June 2011 because of bad weather and lightning strikes.129 
Afghanistan’s harsh environment posed difficulties for the Royal Artillery 
operating the Hermes 450. Major Claire Button of 32 Regiment, Royal 
Artillery, has written about how high crosswinds often exceeded the 
Hermes maximum for take-off. Carburettor icing was a serious problem 
that led to engine failure and the near loss of aircraft. Major Button said 
to mitigate the weather conditions the army developed comprehensive 
meteorological training for operators to assist them in minimising the 
risk of placing an aircraft in conditions outside its performance 
envelope.130 
 
                                                                                             
128  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and 
future UK use, 25 March 2014, HC 772 2013-14, Ev 1 
129  Drone crash database, Drone Wars UK, accessed 15 May 2015 
130  Major Claire Button, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles on operations: overcoming the 
challenges”, RUSI Defence Systems, June 2009, p78
SN06493.pdf — page 32

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 32 
6. Deploying weapons from RPAS 
Summary 
Reaper is the only UK RPA that can conduct air strikes and the Government says operators 
abide by the same rules of engagement as manned combat aircraft and comply with 
International Humanitarian Law. However the use of armed RPA by the United States 
combined with a perceived lack of transparency about their operational has prompted 
questions about the UK’s policy on using Reaper to conduct air strikes. 
 
The Ministry of Defence states the rules of engagement for the use of 
weapons from remotely piloted aircraft are the same as those that apply 
to manned combat aircraft.  
However public perception of the rules of engagement has arguably 
been driven by the policy of the United States to use its remotely piloted 
aircraft to conduct air strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere. US 
policy is beyond the scope of this note.131  But the US policy has raised 
public awareness of ‘drone strikes’ and prompted questions about their 
use by the UK Armed Forces. These questions came to the fore again in 
light of the killing of a British national in Syria by an RAF Reaper aircraft 
on 21 August 2015 which, the Prime Minister acknowledged, was a 
“new departure.”  
Specific areas of concern, which are explored in the following two 
sections, include: 
• 
The rules of engagement and accordance with international law 
• 
How civilian casualties are minimised and investigated if they 
occur 
• 
The applicable rules of engagement for UK personnel embedded 
with the US Air Force 
• 
The applicable rules of engagement for US or other allies when 
operating UK-owned Reaper aircraft 
• 
The use of intelligence gathered by UK RPAS by allies  
The Defence Committee, the Birmingham Policy Commission, the APPG 
on drones and Drone Wars UK are calling on the Government to be 
more transparent about RPAS operations. The Committee and the 
Commission have also called on the Government to engage more with 
the public in explaining the rules of engagement to assist in improving 
wider public understanding and acceptance of the use of armed RPAS.  
                                                                                             
131  For more about US policy on targeted killings, see Council on Foreign Relations 
backgrounder, 23 May 2013; “Legal Issues Related to the Lethal Targeting of U.S. 
Citizens Suspected of Terrorist Activities” Congressional Research Service 
memorandum, 4 May 2012 
The rules of 
engagement for the 
use of weapons from 
remotely piloted 
aircraft are the same 
as those that apply to 
manned aircraft.
SN06493.pdf — page 36

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 36 
available, it would be within the law.146 On the other hand Philippe 
Sands QC called for more evidence on how the attack met the legal 
requirement of self-defence. Roy Greenslade summarised press reaction 
to the news in an article in the Guardian: drone strikes, right or wrong? 
What the national newspapers say. The attack prompted a wider debate 
about a possible vote on UK military action in Syria but that is beyond 
the scope of this particular note.  
Further discussion about the UN Charter and self-defence can be found 
in section 3.3 of a 2011 House of Commons Library briefing paper: 
Drone attacks and the killing of Anwar al-Awlaqi.  
Further legal justification for the action was provided in a letter by the 
UK Government to the UN Security Council. The UK Permanent 
Representative said: 
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and further to our letter of 25 November 2014 
(S/2014/851), I am writing to report to the Security Council that 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has 
undertaken military action in Syria against the so-called Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in exercise of the inherent right 
of individual and collective self-defence. 
On 21 August 2015 armed forces of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland carried out a precision airstrike 
against an ISIL vehicle in which a target known to be actively 
engaged in planning and directing imminent armed attacks 
against the United Kingdom was travelling. This airstrike was a 
necessary and proportionate exercise of the individual right of 
self-defence of the United Kingdom. 
As reported in our letter of 25 November 2014, ISIL is engaged in 
an ongoing armed attack against Iraq, and therefore action 
against ISIL in Syria is lawful in the collective self-defence of 
Iraq.147 
6.4 UK Rules of Engagement 
The rules of engagement for the use of weapons from Reaper are the 
same as those that apply to manned combat aircraft. The MOD does 
not publish the Rules of Engagement as “disclosure would, or would be 
likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of our Armed 
Forces.” 148 
Then Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey detailed the legal use of 
Reaper in Afghanistan in July 2012: 
In Afghanistan, the policy governing the use of Reaper is identical 
to that for conventionally piloted combat aircraft. UK forces in 
Afghanistan come under the command of the NATO International 
Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) and operate in accordance 
with international humanitarian law (also known as the law of 
armed conflict) and UK rules of engagement. Military lawyers 
based in Afghanistan advise on all aspects of operations including 
                                                                                             
146  “Was it lawful for UK forces to kill British ISIS fighters in Syria?” Comment is Free, 7 
September 2015 
147  Letter from the Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN Security Council, 7 
September 2015, S/2015/688, provided by the Reprieve 
148  HC Deb 13 September 2011 c1153W
SN06493.pdf — page 39

39 Overview of military drones used by the UK armed forces 
Government to routinely make public the outcome of such 
investigations except where operational considerations preclude this.163 
It argued a lack of information makes it difficult for Parliament to hold 
the executive to account.164 
The UN Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson, has called on the United 
Kingdom to declassify and publish the results of the investigation report 
into the incident of 25 March 2011, as cited above, and any other 
report relating to the infliction of civilian casualties through the use of 
remotely piloted aircraft by the UK in Afghanistan.165 
6.6 British personnel operating American 
RPAS 
UK personnel embedded with the US Air Force have operated US 
Reaper aircraft in Afghanistan, Libya and Iraq. This has led to questions 
about the applicable rules of engagement – whether they operate under 
UK or US rules of engagement. 
• 
UK aircrew operated a US Air Force Reaper on 512 UK sorties in 
Afghanistan between 2008 and August 2014.166 
• 
UK aircrew had flown approximately 2,150 operational missions 
using US Reaper and Predator RPAS in operations in Afghanistan 
and Libya between October 2006 and 31 December 2012.167 
• 
Of the 2,150 missions flown by UK personnel, there were 271 
missions in Afghanistan when UK personnel utilised a US Reaper 
as a UK Reaper was unavailable. During these missions, UK 
personnel released 39 weapons.168  
• 
UK Reaper was not deployed in Libya.169 Three RAF officers of 
flight lieutenant rank were embedded with the USAF and piloted 
USAF RPAS during operations in Libya.170 UK personnel 
contributed to around 200 armed RPAS missions.171 All missions 
involving a Predator required a US sensor operator.172 
• 
No RAF-operated RPA flew in Iraq during Operation Telic in Iraq. 
RAF personnel embedded with the US Air Force flew armed and 
unarmed US RPAS in Iraq between 2004 and 2007.173 
UK aircraft operated US Air Force Reaper aircraft in Afghanistan 
predominantly because of: the unavailability of UK Reaper aircraft; short 
term unserviceability or routine maintenance; an increase in ISAF tasking 
in 2014 and the availability of UK aircrews being ready before the 
                                                                                             
163  Birmingham Policy Commission, The security impact of drones: challenges and 
opportunities for the UK, October 2014, p51 
164  Birmingham Policy Commission, The security impact of drones: challenges and 
opportunities for the UK, October 2014, p48 
165  UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/25/59, 11 March 2014, para 39 
166  PQ 207734, 25 November 2014 
167  HC Deb 24 April 2013 c906W 
168  Ministry of Defence FOI, 4 February 2014 
169  HC Deb 6 November 2012 c204WH 
170  HC Deb 15 October 2013 c637W 
171  HC Deb 21 November 2012 c494W. Note the MOD did not clarify or expand upon 
the use of the word ‘contributed’. 
172  HC Deb 31 January 2013 c882W 
173  HC Deb 13 May 2013 c101W and 3 June 2013 c994W
SN06493.pdf — page 40

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 40 
additional Reaper aircraft procured were available for operations. These 
aircrew were therefore used to fly US Air Force aircraft.174 
The Defence Committee asked the Government to clarify the 
operational use of RPAS in Afghanistan. In response, The Government 
explained ISAF Reaper missions were issued to a combined pool of 
available aircraft from both the UK and US Reaper RPAS squadrons. The 
Government said the UK had, on occasions, used a USAF Reaper for UK-
tasked missions when “UK Reaper RPAS were not available to them due 
to serviceability issues. UK aircrew are subject to UK Rules of 
Engagement for all weapons releases.”175  
The Birmingham Policy Commission report on drones examined the 
legal implications of UK personnel using armed RPA with the US Air 
Force. It welcomed the above confirmation from the MOD that UK 
aircrew are subject to UK rules of engagement when releasing a 
weapon. The Commission’s overarching message to the Government is 
for greater transparency in its operational use of RPAS. The Commission 
recommended that in situations where UK forces are embedded with 
US or other forces: “the UK Government should do more by way of 
reassurance to explain the safeguards which are in place to ensure that 
embedded personnel remain compliant with international humanitarian 
law.”176  
6.7 US operational use of UK Reaper 
US personnel operated UK Reaper aircraft in Afghanistan during the 
Launch and Recovery phase. The Ministry of Defence says that only UK 
personnel operated UK Reaper aircraft in Afghanistan during flight. 177 
During Operation Herrick, RPA were piloted by UK personnel located in 
the United States and the United Kingdom but required ground crew in 
Afghanistan to take-off and land. The MOD has said: “in all cases, UK 
Reaper RPAS are operated in line with UK procedures and rules of 
engagement.”178  
The US Air Force has never requested the use of a UK Reaper in 
Afghanistan, the MOD said in July 2014.179 
The Birmingham Policy Commission recommended “if allied forces use 
UK RPA, assurances should be obtained that their use is in accordance 
with UK legal guidelines.”180 
                                                                                             
174  PQ 207734, 25 November 2014 
175  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and 
future use: Government response, 22 July 2014, HC 611 2013-14, para 5. 
176  Birmingham Policy Commission, The security impact of drones: challenges and 
opportunities for the UK, October 2014, p51 
177  PQ 216916, 9 December 2014 
178  HC 15 January 2014 c578W 
179  Defence Committee, Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems – current and 
future use: Government response, 22 July 2014, HC 611 2013-14, para 5. 
180  Birmingham Policy Commission, The security impact of drones: challenges and 
opportunities for the UK, October 2014, p51