SN06493.pdf — page 44

Number 06493, 8 October 2015 44 
Some argue that without the risk to the crew, it encourages the 
early use of force. However, any UK operations (manned or 
unmanned) using armed force in an international context require 
political authorisation. This is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and 
its associated checks and balances.197 
The Birmingham Policy Commission said it had heard no evidence that 
would support a judgement that the acquisition of new, remotely 
piloted capabilities by British forces would lead automatically to their 
excessive or reckless use. The Commission pointed to Parliament’s role 
in reining in any alleged propensity to resort to easily to force, naming 
the Defence and Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committees in 
particular, and cited the 2013 vote on Syria as example of where 
Parliament refused to endorse military action. 
7.2 Do RPAS encourage a video-game 
mentality? 
Some commentators suggest the physical distance between those 
operating an armed RPA and the target of the strike makes the act of 
killing much easier.198 Philip Alston, then UN Special Rapporteur on 
extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, raised the concept of a 
video-game mentality in a 2010 report to the UN Human Rights 
Council: 
because operators are based thousands of miles away from the 
battlefield, and undertake operations entirely through computer 
screens and remote audiofeed, there is a risk of developing a 
“Playstation” mentality to killing. States must ensure that training 
programs for drone operators who have never been subjected to 
the risks and rigors of battle instill respect for IHL and adequate 
safeguards for compliance with it.199  
The UK Government addresses this issue in Air and Space Doctrine: 
Remote crews are always subject to stringent rules of engagement 
that ensure we lawfully use armed force. The persistence of 
remotely piloted air systems also means crews usually observe the 
target area for a significant period prior to, and following, an 
engagement. This allows them to assess target validity, the 
likelihood of collateral damage and observe the consequences of 
an attack in detail. This is a sobering reality rarely afforded to 
other pilots or anyone delivering indirect fire.200 
A United States Air Force RPAS operator counters the ‘play station’ 
view: 
You are 18 inches away from 32-inch, high-definition combat, 
where you are in contact [by headset with] the guys on the 
ground... You are there. You are there. You fly with them, you 
support them and a person you are tasked with supporting gets 
engaged, hurt, possibly killed, it’s a deeply, deeply emotional 
                                                                                             
197  JDP0-30 UK Air and Space Doctrine, July 2013, para 215 
198  C Cole “What’s wrong with drones?” Drone Wars UK website, 20 January 2014; 
“think drone technology is not really the problem? Think again”, Drone Wars UK 
website, 31 March 2015 
199  “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Philip Alston”, UN General Assembly Human Right s Council, 28 May 2010, GE-10 
13753, Para 84 
200  JDP0-30 UK Air and Space Doctrine, July 2013, para 215