EXPO-SEDE_ET_2007_381405_EN.pdf — page 18

pressure for exports may limit a country’s options to impose embargoes or limit technology 
nly complete UAVs can cause problems: the associated technology for remote-
ontrol beyond the line of sight can also be used to modify normal aircraft into precision-guided 
arded against more conventional forms of attack, such as specific 
arts of) government buildings, targets deep inside a military installation or other sensitive 
00 UAVs 
upplied by Italy into cruise missiles and, as mentioned earlier, modified L-29 jet trainer aircraft 
UAVs and true UCAVs would exceed the 
mits of the MTCR agreement , which means that large parts of the world (e.g. Middle East) 
re basically off-limits for UAV and UCAV exports. 
 
 
                                                
access. 
 
5.1 Risks of UAV exports 
 
The dangers of exporting UAVs, capable of delivering stand-off weapons or even WMD, are 
obvious. With UAVs proliferating, it is probably only a matter of time before dangerous 
governments or terrorists get their hands on them and use them51. Such fears gained strength 
after the discovery of Iraqi programmes to develop UAVs to deliver biological or chemical 
weapons, and to modify them as cruise missiles with high explosive payloads. For instance, 
Hezbollah used UAVs (supplied by Iran) in its 2006 war with Israel. At least three were 
reportedly fitted with a limited (10-50kg) payload of explosives and used as crude cruise 
missiles52. Not o
c
cruise missiles. 
 
Questions remain as to why terrorists would want to acquire and use UAVs when they have 
many, much easier, means available. The only advantage for terrorists of a UAV modified to a 
precision-guided weapon would be when very specific small objects are targeted - sensitive 
targets normally heavily gu
(p
places, or a moving target. 
 
UAVs or UAV technology in the hands of dangerous governments is probably of greater 
concern. Unarmed UAVs are easily modified through the simple addition of an explosive 
payload. The result is an inexpensive cruise missile, which, while slow, is also accurate and 
stealthy. And although they are only able to deliver very limited payloads, this could be a 
chemical or biological one. Alternatively the control system for a UAV can be used to modify 
normal aircraft into remote-controlled cruise missiles, capable of carrying a much heavier 
weapon load. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s Iraq reportedly modified Mirach-6
s
into remote-controlled UAVs for possible use with biological or chemical weapons53. 
 
The risks UAVs and UCAVs and their technologies pose vis-à-vis WMD proliferation is 
recognized internationally. These systems and their associated technologies are covered by the 
MTCR, to which most EU members are party. Large 
54
li
a
 
51 See for example: Gormley, D. M., ‘New developments in unmanned air vehicles and land-attack cruise missiles’, 
SIPRI Yearbook 2003 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2003), pp. 409-432. 
52 None reached their target – two were intercepted and shot down by the Israeli air defences and the third exploded 
on launch. Wezeman, Siemon T. et al, ‘International arms transfers’, SIPRI Yearbook 2007, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK, 2007), p. 411. 
53 Gormley, op. cit., pp. 413-414. 
54 The MTCR limits were until 2002 for example an issue for US export permits for the Predator UAV to European 
countries. The Predator has a range exceeding the MTCR limits, but its payload is less than the MTCR limit. 
Defense News, 15 Apr. 2002. 
 
14