kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MORRIS.
text: Mr. Chairman, I think you're right that, at least temporarily, we're really locked into a no-change policy, which I would interpret as alternative "B". I would make the directive symmetric. With regard to operating procedures, I would stay with our current stance of trying to stabilize the funds rate over the next few weeks in the 6-3/4 - 6-7/8 percent area. But once the Desk has concluded that the year-end adjustment is over and the relationships appear to be moving back toward normality, I would move to option (4), our pre-October 19 operating procedure, with a borrowing level of $300 million. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Johnson. 

MR. JOHNSON. "I have no real borrowing number because I don't see how we can decide on that."

Full utterance: I would choose alternative "A", I think, if I weren't somewhat concerned about the potential effect on the exchange rate and the fragility of the financial markets right now. I still lean that way, but I guess I would be happy with something like alternative "B", with asymmetric language toward ease if events unfold in support of that. Like Frank Morris, I would prefer current operating procedures in terms of emphasizing the funds rate. So, I'd support alternative (1) until we see a stable relationship develop. Once we see that, I'm for going back to our old procedures. In other words, I'd stay with (1) and, when we are sure that we are back to a traditional relationship, go to (4). So, I'm at alternative "B", with the 6-3/4 - 6-7/8 percent range on the funds rate, and asymmetric language. I have no real borrowing number because I don't see how we can decide on that.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: What we have done, in effect, while adhering to the requirements of the statute, is basically establish the notion that setting the 1989 ranges is clearly a problem in July 1988, and the fact that it turned out to be a problem in June or July of 1988 isn't that much of a surprise. That gives us, I think, a reasonable basis to change, which could be captured if we were to be very vague in the report and in my testimony, but I gather that really is inappropriate, given the Humphrey-Hawkins statute language. Jerry's notion, within the statutory language, creates the type of conditionality which I think that Wayne and Don and a few others have indicated. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: Mr. Chairman, I have two problems with that. One is that you would be going into next year without having set any long-run targets. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "What Jerry is recommending is that we are actually stating the targets--specifically, alternative III--and instead of having some language around it about uncertainty and how the targets may be changed, that we stipulate that henceforth, starting in July 1989, we would assume that the then-current ranges would be automatically extended into the subsequent year but be subject to review in February."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: I thought maybe you would since it says money and credit. If you had one of each I think you could meet the definition as such. I support it even-- 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: Except last July they wanted us to add one. They didn't want us to subtract one last year. 

MR. BLACK. "But I was just thinking about the correct thing to do [according to the Act], not what Congress wanted [in July]."

Full utterance: Yes, I know. But I was just thinking about the correct thing to do [according to the Act], not what Congress wanted [in July].

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: In terms of an analytic exercise, what would it be costing us in terms of progress with regard to inflation and, for that matter, with regard to growth as well? 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: With our baseline Greenbook forecast--extending it informally at this point into 1991 and assuming that growth isn't so rapid as to move the unemployment rate back down in that year but that it will stay in the 6 percent or so neighborhood--our expectation would be that in that environment we'd see a fractional decline in inflation in 1991. But the trend would be turning discernibly downward. Using our quarterly model and not doing a particularly elaborate exercise but leveling out rates--or keeping the federal funds rate about where it is now--the result is that, in essence, we eliminate that downturn in inflation in 1991. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: In 1991? 

MR. PRELL. "And we end up with a lower unemployment rate and eliminate most of that slack that would otherwise emerge."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: The basic question is: Is there any relationship between the slack in the economy and wage and price [behavior]? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: The answer is unequivocally "yes" on the basis of that, which is important-- 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: Now, obviously, we're making our decisions as we go along. Some notion of how much effect we're going to get for various-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: I grant you: Knowing the sign is very important. 

MR. PRELL. "Let me just say, and Larry referred to this, that we have had underway a comprehensive examination of this issue; had it not been for the overload we reached when you requested this briefing, we would have had it done by now."

Full utterance: Let me just say, and Larry referred to this, that we have had underway a comprehensive examination of this issue; had it not been for the overload we reached when you requested this briefing, we would have had it done by now. It will be available before very long. And it will explore all of these specifics as well as amplify what already has been indicated about the various tests that we did to see whether there were structure changes.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HOSKINS.
text: But I do think the statement that Gary Stern made is an appropriate one, at least the way I interpreted it. You may have to clarify this because I interpreted what you were saying as something different than Dick Syron said, and that is that you're not comfortable with the progress in this scenario--that you want lower inflation and we have not made any movement toward lower inflation. MR. [STERN(?)] We don't have a difference in interpretation. 

MR. HOSKINS. "and then we'll move our target ranges down to match it."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BOEHNE.
text: Well, I just wonder if we're getting carried away here with this procedure. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Yes, we are. 
speaker: MR. BOEHNE.
text: My interpretation, Mr. Chairman, of what we did is that we took a straw vote and instead of doing it by raising hands we used our voices. And I view those two as largely equivalent. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: I agree with him. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "and then we'll put on the table a rule in which this Committee can make that judgment as to how we record this."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: Well, it's on our balance sheets. 
speaker: MR. CROSS.
text: It's on our balance sheet as foreign currency. 
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: Right. 
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: Well, in answering that question on the $25 billion did you presume that it jumped to $15 billion as well or is that--? 
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: It doesn't matter which way it's done the way we do it. 

MR. ANGELL. "Now we're claiming that is an open market operation, as I understand it."

Full utterance: Now we're claiming that is an open market operation, as I understand it. Is that correct?

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HOSKINS.
text: But I think we have to gear our monetary policy to the objective that we can achieve. I agree with Dick Syron that credibility is important, and I'm not sure we're maintaining it. I'm not unduly pessimistic about inflation, but we do have an objective of bringing it down and not much seems to be happening. I might quibble on the cost of bringing it down, though. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Kelley. 

MR. KELLEY. "That's clearly slow; it could reaccelerate."

Full utterance: Well, Mr. Chairman, when Mike finished his presentation a little while ago he made the remark that there are a lot of jokers still in the deck to be turned over. I certainly agree with that. But when you're playing a hand of cards there are those things that you know and those things that remain to be seen. If we look at the things that we know, they don't look that bad. Obviously, as the cards turn over, things could change a lot. But we know, looking at interest rates, that we lowered the federal funds rate in December and interest rates have been up ever since then. We have had some tightening done for us by the market. Along with that, the aggregates have now slowed down a lot. I don't want to prejudge or put words in Don's mouth--he hasn't made his presentation yet--but I suspect he thinks they're likely to speed back up. But if they keep doing what they're doing now, then we're going to have a pretty slow rate of growth in the aggregates in 1990. Looking at the gross national product, the best guess is that its growth is now running around 2 percent and the two preceding quarters before that were 1.1 percent and 2.1 percent. That's clearly slow; it could reaccelerate. There has been talk around this table that at a 2 percent growth rate we could make slow progress, but nevertheless progress, on inflation. If you look at inflation as measured by the CPI, we had an appalling first quarter but the two quarters before that were both under 4 percent; and I think the increase is probably slowing down substantially from that bad first quarter now. John talked about the credit crunch. I think everybody would agree that there's something going on out there and we don't know what effect it's liable to have. Nevertheless, there is some constraint and it could be substantial. So, the things that we know, taken all-in-all, suggest that the state of the world is not terribly unsatisfactory. I think our policy pretty much has done what we desired it to do; it's too early to say that it has been ineffective in making some progress on the core rate of inflation. Core inflation could certainly change on the up side and, if it does, we undoubtedly will have to react. But I think that's far from sure. As a consequence, for now "steady-as-you-go" makes sense to me.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. SEGER.
text: And for 1991, I also would keep the same ranges for the main reason that we have another crack at these in February. There are a lot of uncertainties about velocity and the economy in general--the RTC activities and a whole lot of other things. Therefore, there's something to be said for hanging in there with the existing ranges and then, with six months' additional information and knowledge, if we're off we can adjust them at the next Humphrey-Hawkins meeting. Thank you. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Vice Chairman. 

VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN. "So, it's not just a kind of accounting change."

Full utterance: Let me make a general comment first, and that is that I cannot quite shake the feeling that there may be something going on here that's a little more real. Even all the discussion about the RTC represents something very real; and what it represents is that in the prior period there was a heck of a lot of bad debt created in the financial system. So, it's not just a kind of accounting change. What I keep toying with in my mind is that there is perhaps a small possibility that we are going through a phase here where this retrenchment of the financial system, as symbolized by the RTC and the slow growth of bank credit and the slowdown of overall debt, is something quite real and something that need not even be transitory. If you look at the great bulk of experience over recent years, we have had this very substantial disconnection, for example, between the growth of debt in the economy and the growth of GNP. And it turns out that a lot of that disconnection reflects the fact that a lot of that debt was bad debt. It's now showing up as RTC and bank write-offs and junk bond write-offs, etc. So, there may be something here that goes beyond the so-called transitory factors. I tend to take a rather eclectic view of all these Ms, but I am struck that even Mr. Kohn can't explain, no matter how hard he tries, a sizable part of the shortfall in M2 in the second quarter. So, again, I'm not quite sure that we fully grasp, or at least that I fully grasp, all that's going on here in these relationships. For that reason I think we do have to be a bit more cautious about the interpretations that we put on these things. Now, with that general point in mind, Mr. Chairman, for 1990 I would keep M2 where it is at 3 to 7 percent and keep debt where it is at 5 to 9 percent. For 1991, I'd be thinking in terms of 2-1/2 to 6-1/2 percent for M2 and 4-1/2 to 8-1/2 percent for debt. For M3, I'm quite prepared to let you do whatever you feel most comfortable doing. But even in the framework of letting you do whatever you feel most comfortable doing, it's possible that a compromise--in the interest of cohesion in the Committee--might be to put it at 1 to 5 percent for both years. But I have no strong feeling on that at all; I'm quite prepared to let you explain it because basically you've got to explain it one way or another. Either you have to explain why we changed it or you have to explain why we didn't change it. And I would leave that to you.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: Though we still have this velocity shift going on, it's not as much as we had in the third quarter; we have much less in the fourth quarter in a settling down kind of process. 
speaker: MR. SYRON.
text: Ted, can I ask you--this is slightly different than what you assumed--what your view is on the pressure on the dollar under "A" and then "A prime," if we part with the assumption that something is done on the budget deficit? 
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: Which one is which? 
speaker: MR. SYRON.
text: "A" is the traditional "A". "A prime" is "A minus/B," I guess. 

MR. TRUMAN. "We probably would get some adjustment."

Full utterance: Well, I think you would get a reaction with "A," quite pronounced, if you get it all done at once. With the two-step process the way Don described, you might get a reaction with the second step, depending on what the circumstances were at that time. As Sam said earlier and Don suggested, I think there is something built into the market at this time. Sam, you may want to comment again in light of what has been said. We probably would get some adjustment. In some sense there was an adjustment yesterday, essentially anticipatory. The exchange market came back a little today; I think the adjustment may have been overdone.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: If P* is any sort of basic inference, we are significantly better positioned than we were then. 
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: Oh, I understand what position we're in, and that's why-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: We have a lot of room to make a mistake in here. 
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: Yes. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: Bob Parry and I are going to be on next year too [as voting members]! 

MR. MELZER. "I think we could establish a 7 percent funds rate by Friday and then just have a technical adjustment [in the discount rate] and use the appropriate language for that."

Full utterance: In any case, I would like to try to avoid the overshooting not only for that reason but also because I think a volatile monetary policy has other consequences that flow from that. On the discount rate, if it were up to me I would let the 1/4 point show through in open market operations tomorrow and I'd be inclined to cut the discount rate on Friday. And at that point I'd make it very clear that it's simply a technical adjustment to move the discount rate in line with other rates. I think the communication in this other scheme could get a little confusing. I think we could establish a 7 percent funds rate by Friday and then just have a technical adjustment [in the discount rate] and use the appropriate language for that. I'm not concerned about Wayne's concern here. We could be left in the same position if the Board decided not to move the rate on Wednesday and then we would have a situation where, with the authority we are proposing to delegate to the Chairman, we would still have the funds rate coming down close to or possibly below the discount rate. So, I'm not troubled with that. I'd go ahead with the open market operations.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: I think the other point was that we can't reduce the reserve requirements--say, take them down to 8 percent and then put them back again and pay interest on the difference between 8 and 12 or 14 percent or something like that. There was some protection, I believe, in the [law]. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: If we do see a legislative proposal for interest on required reserves, I'm afraid we'll have a [unintelligible] attached to the bank insurance fund. Peter, you mentioned the three-year auction. How did that go today? 

MR. STERNLIGHT. "Quite well."

Full utterance: Quite well. There was strong bidding. I just got a brief report on that and it came out about where we were expecting, at a 6.98 percent average.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KELLEY.
text: Mr. Chairman, I support your recommendation for all the reasons that have been articulated here. I would like at an appropriate time, now or later, to suggest a change in the order of the priorities of our considerations in the operational paragraph. I don't know whether you'd like to pursue that now or do it as a separate item. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Let's do it separately. Governor Seger. 

MS. SEGER. "Both auto sales and production in my judgment are going to be a disaster in this quarter and right now I can't think what is going to bring them off the floor in the next quarter."

Full utterance: I support your view, Mr. Chairman, but I would say that the risk is definitely on the low side if for no other reason than the auto industry situation. As you know, it's responsible for the biggest chunk of the decline in the fourth quarter. Both auto sales and production in my judgment are going to be a disaster in this quarter and right now I can't think what is going to bring them off the floor in the next quarter. That is simply one reason. In addition, there is the confidence factor. I think that is partially related to CNN and the Gulf War but I think there's another big chunk coming just from this nervousness over the financial system. I wish that weren't the case but I think it is. Certainly, a lot of easing has been done. But in order to compensate for the credit crunch, which in my judgment is definitely out there, there will be a need to do still more to offset that. I think it would be good to look at Jerry's idea, too; it strikes me as sort of extraordinary to accommodate a special challenge of this nature, which I haven't seen since the 1930s. So, I would go with [alternative B], asymmetric toward ease.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HOSKINS.
text: I don't like the list personally because I don't think half of the items should be in there. So, I'd go essentially for Bob Black's and Tom Melzer's suggestion and reduce the list. I guess that's 4.b. on page 3 of Don's memo. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Any further comments? 

MR. BLACK. "then we can go into these things."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: But I think it will be most useful to see the early returns out of this episode: the confidence surveys, the new orders for capital goods surveys, the stock market behavior, and the money figures as well. There's certainly a lot of noise in the system now. And even though I do feel that the downside risks have been marginally increased and the potential for larger problems has been increased pretty substantially, I think it's useful to wait until the noise settles down a little and then anything we decide to do might be more clearly heard. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Kelley. 

MR. KELLEY. "And certainly all of economic history and the thrust of analysis will tell us that a double-dip is unlikely."


Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: I think it's a clear improvement over where we stand. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: I would support it as well. I think it's good to have the distinction between long-run objectives and attention to the shorter-term developments in the economic, financial, and monetary areas in the same basic sentence. And I think it's an improvement over what we had. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Syron. 

MR. SYRON. "but I'm just curious."

Full utterance: For the reasons that the Chairman and Bob Parry gave and that Mike Kelley talked about, I support this. It does make it clearer and I like the idea of considering it once a year rather than debating at Committee meetings the exact wording of this from time to time. The only question I have--I'm just curious--is that I'd like to ask Peter how much all the things we put out there are scrutinized. I don't see [this matter] coming up on the screens often. I do see it in newsletters, etc. Given the [directive] publication lags, how big a deal is that? I support doing it but I'm just curious.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Oh no, I'm sorry. 
speaker: MR. LAWARE.
text: You're saying "B" asymmetric? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: "B" asymmetric. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: A hard asymmetric. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: When you invoke the proviso, if you have to, you would go 1/4 point and that's all? 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "I'm sorry if there was any confusion."

Full utterance: Yes. I'm sorry if there was any confusion. I'm recommending "B" asymmetric.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. JORDAN.
text: I know this is a Board matter, not an FOMC matter, but in terms of using ammunition: With the projection for seasonal increases in reserves in addition to the continuing trend of reserveable deposits growing very rapidly, would the Board consider using the ammunition it has, i.e. the bullet of lower reserve requirements? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Do we have room right now? 
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: I think if we lowered them in October we'd have to raise them in February. I would doubt very seriously that we'd have room to get to the next seasonal low point even after the actions we have taken. We could take at look at that this fall, but I'd be skeptical at this point. 

MR. JORDAN. "Peter tried to explain this to me, too, and I simply don't understand it."

Full utterance: The statutory limit is 8 percent and I don't understand the operating point. Peter tried to explain this to me, too, and I simply don't understand it. But the legal ammunition is that you can go down to 8 percent without seeking new legislative authority.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: We have the possibility of collapse in Russia this winter. And we always have the Middle East. So, to [abuse] a phrase, maybe what we're seeing is "deja voodoo," in line with Attila the Hun and the witch doctor. We've been here twice before and I would not be overly optimistic since all we're seeing, really, is an improvement in attitudes. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Melzer. 

MR. MELZER. "The statistics or anecdotal information we have suggest that the Eighth District is growing modestly more rapidly than the rest of the country, but there are no really dramatic changes."


Opinion: no