kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. GRAMLICH.
text: My third point is that the funds rate is low; and if it goes down any more, it will get lower still. [Laughter] I'm just trying to lay this out in small steps! [Laughter] If it gets down much lower, we're soon going to have to confront the alternative or untraditional measures that we've been telling ourselves we have in our quiver that we can use in such circumstances. It's not too soon to start thinking about what we're going to do and also what we will look at to know how well we are doing. I believe we have to think about both and fairly soon. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "We have no choice but to fix the overnight rate because we've tried everything else and nothing else has worked."

Full utterance: May I interject a comment here? Ned and I had a discussion about this yesterday. We have to be very careful, if we're looking at new techniques, not to get ourselves involved in any pegging of intermediate- or longer-term rates. I say that not because we couldn't make it happen but because the problem of unwinding that sort of peg will result in utter chaos. We have no choice but to fix the overnight rate because we've tried everything else and nothing else has worked. Pegging the overnight rate is a fallback position and one that I'm sure we would endeavor to work our way out of if we could. If we decide that we want to move to the intermediate rates to try to support rates, the last thing we want to do is to mention what our goal is because we will never be able to unwind from that if we get locked in to a specific pattern. I agree with Governor Gramlich that it's certainly not too soon to give some thought to these issues. But we have to be careful in determining not only how we phase our way into a particular policy but how we phase our way out. In many respects, the latter is far more difficult than the former.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): neutral
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. JOHNSON.
text: But I think the Japanese limited the effectiveness of their actions by this overtone they used to characterize the steps they were taking as they announced them. 
speaker: MR. FERGUSON.
text: So it was a weakness in the commitment part of it? 
speaker: MS. JOHNSON.
text: Right, and a failure to perceive the expectations part of it. I think they were counting on their statements to help a lot because of what otherwise isn't available to policymakers at zero interest rates. I don't think they really embraced the concept of expectations enough at the time, even intellectually, in terms of the importance of getting expectations to work with the policymakers instead of working against them. 

MR. KOS. "We are fortunate that at least right now we don't have those kinds of problems in the United States, so Vincent and I did not have to delve into that issue in our presentation."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. REINHART.
text: It is the case that the very far ahead forward rates were up a bit up over the intermeeting period. But the ten-year was actually down. So it isn't as if there are some obvious sets of signals there. Nor is it the case if you look at volatilities that we could get from swaptions. The implied volatilities on ten-year instruments are higher, but all interest rate volatilities are a little higher. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "If it is indeed is telling us something, it's obviously very important for policy."

Full utterance: Yes, but President Moskow is raising a question based on looking at that chart. I think he called it scary, and it is scary if you believe what it implies. If it is indeed is telling us something, it's obviously very important for policy. If it is not, it's important that we know that.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FERGUSON.
text: There have been times when the Chairman doesn't refer to them. 
speaker: MR. REINHART.
text: There have been times when they are not even included in the testimony. In the last ten years the Chairman has almost never referred to them in the reading draft of the testimony, but there have been times when they haven't even been in the text of the formal testimony submitted. They are always in the report. 
speaker: MR. GRAMLICH.
text: So do you get asked about them, then? 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "But the major problem is that they are not anything in particular because we haven't a clue what the underlying assumptions are."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MOSKOW.
text: If the jobs report is very strong, as I think it will be, you would be in a position to give a very clear signal that the "considerable period" will not last for long. We have conditioned it already, and my preference would be to get rid of the concept completely and not have it phased out by a reference to "patience." If we have a sentence in our statement that says the Committee believes that it can be patient in removing its policy accommodation, we will still have the problem of removing that sentence sometime in the future. So my preference would be to have you do the explaining during your testimony and to get rid of the time reference completely in the March statement. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Stern. 

MR. STERN. "I support your recommendation on the rate and on the change in language."

Full utterance: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support your recommendation on the rate and on the change in language. I would reiterate one point I've tried to make before--apparently unpersuasively--that further disinflation or even a touch of deflation, if it's stemming from rapid productivity growth, is not necessarily a cause for concern.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): ambiguous
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. LACKER.
text: [Laughter] Let me just comment about alternative C. We're in this evolving economy and communicating with the public, and we expect certain reactions of them and they expect us to have policy evolve and react in a certain way. Alternative C is a zero probability event, and I'm not quite sure I see the value of communicating by describing a counterfactual future that is so far from reality. I think we can find other ways to convey a sense of what looks likely to us going forward. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Yellen. 

MS. YELLEN. "I like the line 6 way of doing that."

Full utterance: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support your recommendation to raise the federal funds rate 25 basis points. I can also support alternative B, although I have significant discomfort with the balance-of-risk statement in line 5. I agree with President Lacker's comment that it has now been made essentially meaningless and can't stay there long. I would simply echo the opinion given by many people around this table that it is very important that we continue to communicate our views and what we know about future policy. I like the line 6 way of doing that. Obviously, we have to change the language as circumstances change and devise at some point an alternative to "measured," but writing an English sentence or two to explain where we think policy is going is, I think, the best thing to do. And I think we need to do that even when we get to the point where the expectation is that policy will remain unchanged and we will be watching news to decide where we go from there. I've never been a fan of the balance-of-risk statement. I know there have been a number of committees that have tried to look at how to revise it. I suppose it's worth doing that again, but my sense is--I agree with President Lacker--that it is fatally flawed. But I believe that communication is very important and we should try to communicate in a less formulaic way.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN GEITHNER.
text: That's not the way you framed it, Mr. Chairman. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.
text: I couldn't have framed it that way. [Laughter] 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN GEITHNER.
text: But I think we haven't changed our view of the outlook enough to justify that significant a change in the signal. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.
text: Intervention, President Fisher. 

MR. FISHER. "At some point we may need to tighten, but let's think of this as the migration from where we were in December."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I think we have to do this against the background of what we said the last time. If you go back to section 2 from December, we were cautious about growth. In section 2 under alternative B now, we're basically saying that we are seeing firmer economic growth. I don't want to overdo this, and I think Vice Chairman Geithner's point is absolutely correct here. Let's think of where we're coming from and indicate the reality of what we've talked about. We are concerned about inflation. Using the word "predominant" excessively emphasizes our concern. At some point we may need to tighten, but let's think of this as the migration from where we were in December. I think the migration is adequately captured in the language that we have in alternative B.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: You're saying that we're worried about the downside. We're all worried about that, but we're going to promote sustainable economic growth without sacrificing long-term price stability. Those are my suggestions, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for putting up with me. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.
text: Always a pleasure. [Laughter] President Lockhart. 

MR. LOCKHART. "I came to the meeting preferring alternative B--50 basis points."

Full utterance: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I came to the meeting preferring alternative B--50 basis points. I certainly can bring myself to support your proposal--75 basis points. I don't view it as a fist pounder, but let me make the case for 50 basis points, at least as I think about it. First, I do think it is a movement that acknowledges financial instability and the growing real weakness. As I argued in my earlier remarks, it may set the scene for decoupling rate policy from liquidity actions if conditions allow. I think the action makes a minimal acknowledgement of inflation risk, and it may signal the view that lower rates can do only so much and that, best case, the market will have to proceed to sort out the market problems and, worst case, the fiscal authorities will have to deal with them. Although I am not a trained psychologist, let me just propose that, in dealing with market psychology, there may be some value in appearing to firm up our rate-movement policy and to set one element in the fluid situation with greater fixity than it has been in recent weeks. That might generate the kind of firming dynamic and even help produce a turn in psychology. That's a lot to ask for simply 50 basis points, but I also prefer the language of alternative A to that of alternative B, and I think Brian said that you could conceivably apply alternative A language substantially to a 50 basis point cut. So in general I like that approach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.
text: One good model is the FDICIA model, for example, which lays out a whole set of criteria under which intervention can be taken and, if intervention is taken, has a set of rules. There are ways through the legal structure to solve some of these problems without our necessarily having to make time-inconsistent promises. 
speaker: MR. LACKER.
text: I agree, and those are mechanisms for legislatively tying our hands, and that ought to be high on the agenda. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BERNANKE.
text: We'll discuss those. Yes, President Plosser. 

MR. PLOSSER. "The IMF went through an extraordinary study effort during the sovereign debt crisis and came up with some very important mechanisms for how to change the contracts that were being written by sovereign countries so as to avoid the IMF's having to step in and look for other solutions, which is, I think, along the same lines."


Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: There is one aspect of this that I just feel I ought to comment on because as a matter of form it concerns me. In form, we have a take-out here after a year, but since the risk-sharing arrangement in the third indented paragraph here extends beyond a year, in substance we're left with the risks of the credit and, therefore, in substance to credit beyond a year. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: For half of this. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: For half of it, that's right. For half of it. 

CHAIRMAN BURNS. "The risk is the Bank of England declares itself bankrupt, and I think that risk is a minimal risk."

Full utterance: Well, I think that's true, but let's be clear about the risk. The risk is the Bank of England declares itself bankrupt, and I think that risk is a minimal risk.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WINN.
text: I'm sympathetic to Governor Lilly's view in terms of the turnaround, but just one word of caution on that score. To what extent are future capital expenditures related, as they have been in the past, to local and state government activities? We've put the financial position of these firms in better shape so that they can move ahead. But to what extent is heavy equipment and construction and all of this related to the big role that local and state government has played--roads, sewers, hospitals, schools, and the rest of it? I don't see that coming back. 

MR. GRAMLEY. "That is the sort of thing we need to keep in mind and keep watching for over the next few months."

Full utterance: We have a projection of a fairly moderate increase in real state and local expenditures for 1977. I think most forecasters anticipate that the state and local sector will not be showing much strength. Well, I think Governor Lilly is talking about business fixed capital, and that is independent in the way we look at the statistics. But that is segregated in the national income. There is an offsetting consideration to be taken into account. I think Governor Lilly's point is one that needs to be kept in mind--that is the implication of the remarks that I made at the end of my prepared statement. But again, I would remind you, Governor Lilly, that that's the sort of thing that we anticipated last year, and it did not happen. I would remind you also that the [Department of] Commerce December survey of plant and equipment outlays for the year, which doesn't have a long history--we've had the record now for about six years--generally speaking does not tend to underestimate capital outlays. Now it could happen this year. That is the sort of thing we need to keep in mind and keep watching for over the next few months.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN BURNS.
text: Mr. Mayo, please. 
speaker: MR. MAYO.
text: Just a question to Lyle. Several months ago we heard quite a bit of discussion on the corporate side that tax liabilities were being piled up in '76, payments were low in '76 based on '75 profits, and the place where this would begin to pinch was in the spring of 1977. I haven't heard a word about that for a month or so now, and I noted nothing in the discussion today, either written or oral, on the subject. Does that mean, Lyle, that this was blown out of all proportion and really isn't significant? 

MR. GRAMLEY. "We've been thinking about that in terms of financial market projections."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. EASTBURN.
text: That's gross rent, that's not net rent, which is a little bit-- 
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: That's right. 
speaker: MR. EASTBURN.
text: Net rent may well have gone down, based on those figures. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BURNS.
text: All right, thank you, Mr. Balles. Mr. Partee now, please. 

MR. PARTEE. "And if you look at the hourly earnings index, why it seems to me the performance is really pretty good."

Full utterance: Jerry, I was surprised how pessimistic your comments were regarding prices. I was surprised because I'm not that pessimistic, obviously. But I wonder whether what you're picking up in the GNP forecast, and second quarter forecast in particular, isn't a reflection of past increases, principally in food prices. If you look at wholesale prices of industrial commodities, the rise is slowing. That's particularly true at the raw stage of industrial commodities, but it's also true of industrial commodities as a group. Indeed the [total] wholesale price index was up quite a lot less in May than before. And I know that the sensitive industrials in our weekly index have been declining in the last couple of months. That's just a few items, but perhaps indicative of reduced pressure in the market. And if you look at the hourly earnings index, why it seems to me the performance is really pretty good. Year over year [in May], the increase was 6.9 percent; [for the] month, the increase was a 5.7 [percent annual rate]. But this far into a recovery, it seems to me that that's a pretty good performance for wages, and it implies that unit labor costs are not, at least at this point, accelerating, looking through the bobbles you get up and down. I assume that the forecast you have given us is largely based on higher food prices. But even there, the impression I had is that the agricultural situation is better, rather than worse, than it was a couple of months ago in basic terms, because it's rained, and the wheat's coming in, and that kind of thing. It might have some temporary effect in holding back meat animals and things like that in the market and give you a little increase in prices. But sort of fundamentally, as I look at the picture, it's improved in the last two or three months with regard to the price outlook, rather than deteriorated. Are you going to comment on that?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: We think that part of our present deficit is cyclical. It will continue to be so next year but perhaps get somewhat worse. But eventually, one would think that other countries would catch up with us. Meanwhile, the short-run effect of an exchange rate move is the familiar J curve. In other words, the Germans sell the same amount of goods at slightly higher prices and realize higher dollar receipts and a bigger surplus, for some months at least. 

MR. HOLMES. "It seems to me that one of the reasons that investment demand has been so sluggish in Germany"

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, if I may add one other point. It seems to me that one of the reasons that investment demand has been so sluggish in Germany [is that], if they see a continual appreciation of the mark against other currencies, they don't quite see where their markets are going to be in the future. I think a further appreciation of the mark could rebound to have an adverse effect on the growth of the German economy, [growth] that everybody, including the Germans and us, wants to see. Which is really the way they're going to cut back on their current economic surplus--by internal growth.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I share the general feeling that we're going to have some slowdown, but the momentum is pretty good. And some slowdown is not a matter of great concern at the moment. This underlying inflationary cost momentum does concern me. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BURNS.
text: Thank you, Mr. Volcker. Mr. Eastburn now, please. 

MR. EASTBURN. "A couple meetings ago I reported on the sentiment of businessmen in our area, which of course is not the most vigorous area in the country, and it's one of concern and remains one of concern."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: This is not going to happen overnight, and so the fact that I argue for discussing it now doesn't mean that I think it would or should go into effect this year. But I do think that the data, the experience, so far show that the high unemployment doesn't bring inflation down. Our projections say that it doesn't have that effect, and I think that we could begin thinking about trying something else. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN BURNS.
text: All right. Mr. Morris next, please. 

MR. MORRIS. "So we're marginally more pessimistic."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, on this business of full employment, I tend to define where we are in terms of the unemployment rate for married men and for heads of households. And if you look at that, it suggests that we're about 1-1/2 percent from full employment, which means that full employment would be measured around Bob Mayo's 5-1/2 percent level because, with a decline of 1-1/2 percent, you'd have the unemployment rate for married men down to 2 percent and for heads of households down to 3 percent. And I think, historically, those levels have been associated with full employment. On the forecast on the outlook, we still tend to be a little more pessimistic than the staff, and I think our difference lies primarily in the consumption sector. That is, we think it's improbable that automobile sales in '78 will exceed the '77 levels, which the staff has projected. It is true that, if you look at the relationship of installment credit to income, we are still well below the peaks reached in '73. But I think the current level of installment credit relative to income is extremely high relative to any other period. If you exclude the '73 period, that relationship is already very high. And whether, starting out from that point, we can sustain a further increase in automobile sales seems questionable to me. And the other factor we're giving some weight to is the one you mentioned earlier--the wealth effect, on consumption, of the decline in the stock market. And I think that while it may be quite appropriate to weigh in other types of wealth, such as land and real estate, I think our observation is that the impact of the stock market is disproportionately [large] in its effect on consumption [relative] to real property and that sort of thing because, for the reason you mentioned, Jim, people look upon stocks as being a liquid instrument, and they typically don't look upon real property in that sense. So, for the year beginning in the fourth quarter of '77, whereas Board staff is projecting a 4.7 [percent] real growth rate, we think it would be more probable, given our outlook on consumption, to have a figure of 4 to 4-1/4. So we're marginally more pessimistic.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN BURNS.
text: Where "we" means what? 
speaker: MR. PARDEE.
text: Well, this is more the U.S. Treasury than the Federal Reserve. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Well, you can't erase the trade deficit, which is growing by leaps and bounds. That certainly would seem to indicate the direction for the dollar, other things equal. And for us to try to resist that in volume--I mean, at first it might seem that we know something that they don't, but later it might just seem that we're being foolish. 

MR. PARDEE. "The Treasury's thinking at this stage is that it won't."


Opinion: no