kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WILLES.
text: I think enough of that program has been [leaked] that people have figured out what they think it's going to be. To the extent that in some sense it's more effective in doing something to prices than people currently expect, it seems to me that that also raises the possibility that it could precipitate substantially slower growth than we're expecting. If people's income and profit potential turn out to be less than they now expect them to be, that's precisely the kind of shock that can lead to a retrenchment in economic activity. So while it may have some impact on prices, it may also have an unexpected impact on output and unemployment. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Bob. 

MR. MAYO. "The way I read the consensus forecast outside of the Fed, our staff forecast for the next year is one of the highest, and I think we are too high."

Full utterance: Mark's last point is an interesting one. I've sensed a little of this, too, Mr. Chairman, in a feeling that businessmen in several areas in the Midwest are more anxious this time around to protect their profit margins than they were in the 1973-74 experience. They still feel a little bit wounded from that. And the net effect of the President's anti-inflation program as it is now interpreted in the market may be some tendency toward greater unemployment. This goes in the face of some of the other things that have been said here. I [would note] also that just about every restaurant in suburban Chicago has a "help wanted" sign up. They just can't get people, even at the lower skill levels; people just don't want to work in that sort of activity. So we have a mixed bag here. Although there have been some things on the good news front since the last meeting, I feel a little more pessimistic than I did a month ago. Again, [as for] taking solace in figures, I'm somewhat of a cynic in that area. But I am a little concerned. The way I read the consensus forecast outside of the Fed, our staff forecast for the next year is one of the highest, and I think we are too high. I come out with 2 to 2-1/2 percent real growth. I don't think there is more than one chance in ten that we can hold the inflation rate next year under 8 percent. There are too many things that are already built in. And following up on my own [unintelligible] on unemployment here, I think our chances of holding the unemployment rate under 6-1/2 percent next year are rather slim.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MAYO.
text: And despite advertising campaigns, I think it can be even slower than the NOW accounts in New England. So I don't see why we need to stick our necks out; I would prefer to stick to the [current] M1 definition. I'm [not] enamored of M1 but I would resist changing it now. I'd wait until we are at a better position to do that, maybe with the new system under Humphrey-Hawkins. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Phil Jackson. 

MR. JACKSON. "With the number of variables that have already been mentioned around the table--and every time somebody speaks they mention another one I hadn't thought of--it strikes me that M1+ is the only reasonable one."

Full utterance: I would argue that the thing to do would be to drop M1. Several reasons lead me to that. First, we do have a new system of projecting the aggregates and, therefore, anything we do today is only going to [be in] effect, for all intents and purposes, over the next two or three months as a long-range policy guide. And in January the Committee will have to reestablish a policy guide for the future. Second, I have for a long time felt that our concepts of money on which we base policy aren't properly reflective of the underlying purposes for which they were originally designed because technical aspects of privileges of certain types of intermediaries have changed and, therefore, our underlying purposes for measuring money this way have been distorted. And it is my hope that the Committee will modify its definitions, not only of M1 but M2 and M3 all across the line. It would be my hope that we'd go forth and modify those definitions beginning with the new Humphrey- Hawkins concept of reporting--and have a good clean slate to start off. Third, as some of you may recall, it is my judgment that we have unfortunately gotten this Committee into a public relations problem. Having chosen targets that are not indicative of the relationship between nominal GNP and M1, we have been unwilling to adjust them--which a reasoned judgment would lead us to do--because of the public relations consequences. And I think dropping M1 is--pardon my language--the easiest way to go. [I'd go] out the back door instead of the front on this subject and not just change it, drop it. Therefore, the public doesn't know whether we did it or didn't do it and you don't have all these public relations [issues]. So I would argue, when you add all those up together, that [we should look at] the M1 that comes closest to defining the transactional concepts of money that M1 was originally designed to measure. With the number of variables that have already been mentioned around the table--and every time somebody speaks they mention another one I hadn't thought of--it strikes me that M1+ is the only reasonable one. I think that's the fairest to the public, to the extent that the public has asked us to address this subject in the intervening months between now and Humphrey-Hawkins, and this would provide a good transition to a new concept.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Yes, tracking it to see how good we are at guessing. How many of you would support that? 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: 5 out of 10. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: I didn't count myself. 

MR. ALTMANN. "I think it's 6."

Full utterance: I think it's 6.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Thank you, John. Ernie. 
speaker: MR. BAUGHMAN.
text: Mr. Chairman, on the general economic picture I think the staff projections are about as defensible a set of projections a s one can put together at the present time, and I would not pick on any particular aspect of them. I have made a concerted effort since our last meeting, in view of my judgment that the prospects were rather good that we would have greater capital expenditures in ' I 9 than was being forecast or than the surveys were suggesting, to engage businessmen in discussion on this point. I have to report that I was unable to persuade even one of them that the prospects for capital expenditures are higher than are currently being forecast. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: In the Dallas area? 

MR. BAUGHMAN. "That's all I have, Mr. Chainan."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Is it L or K? What's San Francisco? It's L. I thought I was right the first time. So I must follow that up. 

MR. MAYO. "I must add for the benefit of everyone else that this T-shirt is being offered to member banks for $ 2 . 0 0 and to nonmembers for $10.00."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KIMBREL.
text: MR. ALTMA". President Mayo. 
speaker: M R . MAYO.
text: Yes. MR. ALTMA". Governor Partee. 

MR. PARTEE. "No, I would remain with $500 million."

Full utterance: No, I would remain with $500 million. MR. ALTMA". Governor Teeters.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: ambiguous
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: I'm a little concerned that the Japanese seem to be pegging it. They sort of put out a target and I don't want to be dragged in unless we're really sure we want to do it. 
speaker: MR. HOLMES.
text: Well, although the Prime Minister said "go back to 200," they found they couldn't do it. And they spent billions. 

CHAIRMAN MILLER. "We're going to have that problem all over again with surpluses."

Full utterance: They're accumulating massive profits now because they've sold their products on the 200 basis. If they don't get it down again, we're going to see price cutting in yen and we're going to have another flood of Japanese imports. We're going to have that problem all over again with surpluses. That's the problem.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: I'm sorry, we just got it down wrong. See, that's why we need to check these. Bob Mayo is for money market. 
speaker: MR. MAYO.
text: Yes. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: And Chuck. 

MR.  PARTEE. "Well, I guess I'll take money market this time."

Full utterance: Well, I guess I'll take money market this time.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: And I'd urge the Committee to be constantly watching the developments in the economy for the turning point at which we can back off. There will not come a time in the next six months at a very minimum in which we can say we have won the fight against inflation and therefore we can lower the rates. I'm sure that will be an argument down the line--that we still have a raging inflation and therefore we should not react to domestic developments. So I would go along with the recommendation in alternative B, with some adjustment in the ranges. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Roos. 

MR. ROOS. "I subscribe, Mr. Chairman, to your introductory remarks."

Full utterance: Yes, sir. I purposely waited until the end of the batting order because up until the last few expressions of opinion I was so wholeheartedly in agreement with everything that was said that I didn't want to express that agreement until everyone was committed verbally to that position. I didn't want to drive others off! I subscribe, Mr. Chairman, to your introductory remarks. I think they express the best analysis of a longer-range strategy that I've heard since I've been a member of this group. You have publicly expressed your determination to do whatever possible with monetary policy over a long range. Certainly we aren't going to bring inflation down in a 6-month period. And certainly we're never going to bring inflation down if we act on a month-to-month, quarter-to-quarter [basis of] fine-tuning. I think it's terribly important, as so many others here have said, that we do something symbolically today to reinforce the credibility of the policies that you have expressed in the short time you've been Chairman. Specifically, I would favor at least the alternative C program. I think we have to move toward widening the fed funds range and freeing interest rates to move more freely. I would perhaps go beyond that, as Mark Willes expressed, by reducing the monetary aggregate ranges even below those in alternative C. But I would not recommend anything more of [unintelligible] than that shown under alternative C.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: SPEAKER(?).
text: We can get them on Sunday M F t . MAYO. We could probably get some of them, but with it being a long weekend in Chicago-- 
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: It's not a good idea if you are going to wait until Monday. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Since you've already got the [request on the discount] rate. 

MR. BALLES. "Mr. Chairman, may I make a strong plea that you allow the rest of us to get in on this [discount rate action]?"


Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: If November comes in weak, we'd probably be satisfied with "C." And we'd also start out with a $1.7 billion initial borrowing assumption. Let's just take those two at the moment. 
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: I don't think Steve's alternative is well specified. It would be 5-1/2 percent for M1 and what would M2 be? 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "That's a straight compromise."

Full utterance: M2 I think would be 8-1/4 percent. That's a straight compromise.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: I'm not aware of that. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Maybe I just picked up the idea. 
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: In effect, Jim, what you've done by the revisions this time is to push the recession into 1980; 1979 is no longer a recession year. What are the chances of [a recession] being deferred another six months? 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: That's not his projection. 

MR. KICHLINE. "It is possible that we will be surprised."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Oh, I don't disagree with that. It's a question of whether one thinks this [degree] of weakness in the economy is reasonable. 
speaker: MR. WILLES.
text: That's right. Now, what I find most puzzling--and I will copy one of Fred Schultz's lines, which I always thought was mine, and that is that I have a very simple mind-- 
speaker: MR. SCHULTZ.
text: Well, some of us will agree with that! 

MR. WILLES. "We ought to respond less rather than more, the greater the uncertainty about the outlook."

Full utterance: I would think, if we agree that the outlook is very uncertain, that rather than arguing for more flexibility we would argue for less. That's because if the time pattern of the economy is very unpredictable, then there's no way we can respond to change it in a predictable way and, therefore, we ought not to be responding. We ought to respond less rather than more, the greater the uncertainty about the outlook. As a consequence, unlike Nancy's and John's earlier suggestion that we do all we can to preserve our flexibility, I would say just the opposite. I think we ought to pick a path that we want to follow for the long term and stick to that path as long as we can unless we receive major information that suggests we're way out of [line] for one reason or another. Of course, rational expectations would say that even if we got such information, it's not clear we could do anything about it and, therefore, we ought not to respond. Having said all that, obviously, I would much prefer the specifications of alternative III. That looks like a very large drop for M-1B from [growth of] 8 percent in 1979 to [a range with an upper limit of] 6-1/2 percent in 1980. But the Bluebook says on the previous page that for the last six months M-1B growth has only been 6.1 percent, so the drop isn't as big as it might appear from the [table] on page 6. So, I would go with alternative III. I must say I am in the group that thinks the range is too wide. I would be concerned if money [growth] dropped, assuming we are measuring anything corresponding to money, down to 3 percent. On the other hand, I would certainly hate to see it above 6 percent. So, I'd prefer a narrower range but would not want growth to go above 6 percent on M-1A or 6-1/2 percent on M-1B.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: That's why. It has money market funds-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: But it has been running higher than 6-1/2 percent, apparently, because you have the implied growth for January to March of 5-3/4 percent. 
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: Yes. The actual growth in M2 is 8.3 percent because, among other reasons, we had this very sharp expansion in money market funds in January, which we've been expecting to slow. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "[We can comment on] any tentative feeling that we have about the second quarter but we don't have to put the second quarter into the directive, and I think it's probably inappropriate to put the second quarter in the directive at this point."

Full utterance: There's a question of procedure we have to decide upon, which is whether to reiterate or change the targets that we had for the first quarter. [We can comment on] any tentative feeling that we have about the second quarter but we don't have to put the second quarter into the directive, and I think it's probably inappropriate to put the second quarter in the directive at this point. So, if people agree with this, the only thing we have to have in the directive is a number for the first quarter.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: Over the long run, of course, we could probably foresee some business desire to restructure balance sheets, but that's a shifting of the borrowing patterns. We simply don't see any bulge, really, in credit demands. 
speaker: MR. WINN.
text: But if you talk to some of these businessmen, they don't have [unintelligible] they can hold out without having to come back in. They are out now. Rates have scared them off and they are using up what they have. 

MR. AXILROD. "It's true that we have them running down their liquid assets."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: In a completely symmetrical world, but I'm not playing in a symmetrical world right now. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: Well, you have taken the fed funds range that is consistent with the staff's alternative B. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: With "B." That is correct. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: In fact, if you want to make the switch, I think we could do it the other way. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: And you want to put in a 9 percent funds rate with consultation at 9-1/2 percent, did you say? 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "I don't know for sure whether it will."

Full utterance: Yes, [we'd consult] before we get there, figuring that that's more than a full [percentage point] drop in the federal funds rate. It may well come next week. I don't know for sure whether it will. It will depend on what our money supply figures show, so we don't know yet. And the significance of what rate we put in there is probably what Roger said--it [determines] when we need a formal vote of the Committee to lower the rate as opposed to a consultation. Well, let's just try it out.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: And they haven't had much improvement on the inflation front, although in some countries they've had a little. On the other hand, they're becoming a little worried about a business slowdown and perhaps a world recession and [there is] some sentiment that easing might be a good idea. But nobody wants to be first. Nobody wants to show the white flag on the inflation front. So they're quite ambivalent. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "I assume the members of this group are aware that there is one quasi-phony component in our current account calculation."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: I'll try to be almost as brief as Governor Rice. I think we can best hit the balance we're looking for, in terms of both the credibility of policy as perceived by the markets and the country on one hand and our concern about aborting the modest recovery, by an intermediate solution. I'd like to suggest something that isn't too different from what Chuck Partee suggested. I think we ought to have borrowing of $700 million, 4-1/4 percent for M-1A, 6-1/2 percent for M-1B, and 8-3/4 percent for M2. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: What was that last one? 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "When I talk to people in the markets, they are not questioning our credibility or the steadiness of our policy at the moment."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MAYO.
text: I'm sure we need that sentence. 
speaker: MR. BALLES.
text: I don't think it tips our hand. It just says if it happens, it happens and we won't resist it. 
speaker: MR. ROOS.
text: I think the last sentence, with the expression of a narrower fed funds range, could be terribly disturbing to some who might view it as a signal that indeed we are moving toward greater emphasis even in the short run on targeting on interest rates. If we narrow the range and set the upper limit at 20 percent--and we are over that now--with a lower limit of 16 percent, I think, that will wave a red flag to those who are suspicious of a possible tendency to move back to our old procedures. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "I don't know which you have in mind."

Full utterance: Well, you obviously raise an important point. It's a substantive point as to whether we do want to avoid further increases in interest rates and also a presentational point that even if we do, do we want to say it this way. I don't know which you have in mind. As I said, I would put in a softening kind of phrase such as "are inconsistent with fluctuations in the federal funds rate in a general range of 16 to 20 percent"--if that's what it is--"taken over a period of time" or something like that to avoid any implication that we're going to sit on it on a day-by-day basis, whether it's above or below. But I don't know whether that helps you very much.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. GRAMLEY.
text: It seems to me, however, that the market is going to interpret your suggestion in a very different way. If the fed funds rate on the day of the Committee meeting is 17.42 percent and we say 300 basis points on either side, the newspapers would say that they have figured out that the Fed's range is 14.42 to 20.42 percent. It makes a lot more sense to say it's 14 to 20 percent. I think that's what they're going to do. Then if we start playing games and say we're going to narrow the range down to 200 basis points on either side because we don't want rates to go up too far, they're surely going to say we are playing the rates instead of the money supply. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "I don't know how important all of this is."

Full utterance: I don't know how important all of this is.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): neutral
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. CORRIGAN.
text: Well, but they're in M2. I don't think it makes-- 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: So are money market funds. 
speaker: MR. CORRIGAN.
text: Well, we can dispute that, but I think this understatement of M-1B is very real. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: I don't know. 

MR. CORRIGAN. "When I put it together, in terms of policy, I would not be allergic to giving a little more weight to M2 in line with one of the points that Steve made."

Full utterance: Well, whether or not it is, I think it is. It just adds further weight to the argument that M-1B is giving us some false signals here. When I put it together, in terms of policy, I would not be allergic to giving a little more weight to M2 in line with one of the points that Steve made. Also, the whole [situation], at least in my mind, argues in the direction of doing the best we can now to keep well within the targets because later on I think it's only going to get harder.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: The figures come in a little late. But if M2 is running 9-1/2 percent--and we won't even know it [currently]--that's within our range of tolerance. If it's clearly running high, it's very important-- 
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: But shouldn't we take a look as to why it's running high? 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Inevitably we have to [unintelligible]."

Full utterance: Inevitably we have to [unintelligible]. Well, let me try this. Have I mentioned all the variables: 7 percent, $1.5 billion, 15 to 21 percent, and a strong M2 caveat.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): ambiguous
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I understand all that; M2 doesn't decline the way it used to when we would run into deposit ceilings. 
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: Well, no, I didn't mean that. What I meant was that interest rates move more rapidly than they used to. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: And interest rates may move more rapidly as a result of that. I don't understand that it follows that M2 is in some sense artificially swelled by this and gives you a-- 

MR. AXILROD. "I said the nontransactions component will rise relative to M-1B in this present environment."


Opinion: no