kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I think it's wrong when it's not actively influencing the direction of what we are doing. 
speaker: MR. BAUGHMAN.
text: And you are pretty sure you won't want it [in again] before a month has passed? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: I hope not. Bob. 

MR. BLACK. "Otherwise, I think we act at the same trigger point."

Full utterance: I do have one technical point--and I hate to prolong this--but it says here that the Manager shall be guided mainly by the relationship between the latest estimates of the aggregates M1 and M2 and "the following ranges..." But when we use a money market directive we have a different trigger point. When we have a monetary aggregates [directive, the Manager] acts when [money growth] deviates significantly from the midpoints of the indicated ranges. When we have a money market formulation, it's when growth appears to be approaching or moving beyond the limits. I think we could take [care] of that very easily by inserting in there "the midpoints" of the following ranges or "the upper and lower limits" of the following ranges. Otherwise, I think we act at the same trigger point.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MORRIS.
text: So I would expect something like 6 to 6-1/2 on prices in that kind of situation and obviously the unemployment rate above 6 percent by the second quarter of the year. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Why are you so sure about a recession? 
speaker: MR. MORRIS.
text: Well, I think we are building up financial pressures in the system. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Because of the financial side. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Thank you, Frank. Ernie. 

MR. BAUGHMAN. "Mr. Chairman, I think we still have significant expansive elements in the economy and I share what I think is the staff's view that the distortions are not yet great enough, and that it will take a fair time for them to become great enough, to terminate the expansive influences."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I think we still have significant expansive elements in the economy and I share what I think is the staff's view that the distortions are not yet great enough, and that it will take a fair time for them to become great enough, to terminate the expansive influences. And I think there is still some possibility of achieving something that might appropriately be labeled a "soft landing" ex the inflation aspect. So I would still [expect] something on the order of 4 percent or just slightly under on GNP, about 7-1/2 percent on prices, and something a bit under 6 percent on unemployment.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: I hope, because the next meeting is the meeting for setting ranges, that we will use the interim time [to look carefully at] the memo so that we'll be prepared to respond to this. I think the proposals are reasonable. It doesn't make sense [currently]. The United States should be grown up. If it's going to intervene, it should intervene for its account like other countries and not expect somebody else to share [the risk]. 

MR. PARTEE. "I think it depends partly, Mr. Chairman, on what you think the intervention is for."

Full utterance: I think it depends partly, Mr. Chairman, on what you think the intervention is for.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. EASTBURN.
text: Jim, I have a question--or really two questions. One has to do with the Greenbook forecast compared with what I understand to be most of the other forecasts around. As near as I can determine, the Greenbook is more optimistic than any other projection, and I wonder if you would speak to that a little bit. Second, it's my understanding that implicit in your relationships between money growth and velocity and GNP is an assumed fairly substantial shift in the demand for money. And I wonder what basis there is for that assumption. 

MR. KICHLINE. "I think a major difference in these forecasts relates to consumer spending patterns."

Full utterance: On the second one, I feel comfortable in talking about it but Steve has developed some material on that and perhaps he might wish to comment on your second question. With regard to the first question--that is, the Greenbook forecast relative to various outside forecasts--of the ones I've seen I think it's quite correct to say that the Greenbook is more optimistic. One of the questions to be asked is to what extent do the assumptions differ in monetary or fiscal policy or other things and that's not always entirely clear, but I suspect that doesn't account for the major difference. As far as I remember for 1979, for example, both Wharton and DRI are fairly close in terms of the Board's staff judgmental projection for the year in total, but the pattern is dramatically different. Both of those forecasts, I believe, show a sharp decline or very sluggish performance in the first half of the year and then [growth] picking up later on. The Board staff forecast doesn't show that slowdown but shows real growth fading throughout the year. So, on average, you come out about the same place, but it's really a very different forecast. We, for one thing, are counting upon an impact of the tax cut; I think perhaps we have a little bit bigger fiscal impact there and that certainly accounts for our first half relative strength compared to others. Secondly, we have made judgmental adjustments for what we believe to be a change in consumer spending attitudes. I think a major difference in these forecasts relates to consumer spending patterns. The evidence over the last couple of years certainly isn't conclusive, and things may change, but it does appear to us that consumers have preferred to acquire goods rather than financial assets in this period of inflation. And that characteristic of trying to acquire goods would carry through into the housing market where I think, adjusted for the interest rates we have assumed in the forecast, we have a fairly optimistic housing forecast. So I think those are the major differences. But it's quite clear to us when looking at the other forecasts that we do rank on the optimistic side. Steve, did you want to comment?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: I think it's very hard to estimate. And remember, M1+ will include all of the ATS accounts whether they're truly transactions accounts or idle balances. It will include any conversion from thrifts to the banks that are put in there in order to raise the minimum size of the account to the point where there are no service charges. But that is a minor problem. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Mark Willes. 

MR. WILLES. "The only way we can make the adjustment is to figure out what we think the most likely adjustment is."

Full utterance: I found Steve's presentation very helpful. I'd like to follow his presentation to make a couple of statements as much by way of making sure I understand what he said as well as arguing what I think is right. If you look first at M1, for example, without adjusting for automatic transfers, there is a question as to whether or not the 6-1/2 is the right ceiling or not. If we didn't face the November 1 problem, then that's what we'd be debating, among other things. And I think we ought to treat that question separately from the question of adjustment for automatic transfers first, because some of us think 6-1/2 is still a right number and we ought to debate whether it should be 6-1/2 or 8. But second, Steve made a very interesting comment when he said that he thought a 4-1/2 percent shift was highly likely. Let's suppose that we had a 4-1/2 percent shift and we maintain an M1 range of 2 to 6 percent. Then that means that you could have, given our current environment, rather than a 6 percent growth in M1 a 1-1/2 percent growth in M1 before you've violated your ranges. So what we would in effect be doing, if you attach much probability to that kind of a shift, is that not only do we not take 6-1/2 as right, but we're willing to live with 10-1/2. And I for one would find that prospect absolutely unbearable. So in making whatever adjustment we make, it seems to me that as a technical matter it might help in terms of policy if we discuss pre-ATS [figures] to see where we come out on that and then discuss the adjustment after that. The only way we can make the adjustment is to figure out what we think the most likely adjustment is. And if you gave equal weight to 1-1/2 [and] to 4-1/2, then the most likely is 3 or whatever. [So I'd] make the adjustment on that basis and then proceed. Otherwise, it seems to me that we run a very serious risk of biasing the results and ending up with a substantial change in policy based simply on a relatively narrow technical matter.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Are you suggesting that you can take the aggregate limit and put it under the procedural instructions? 
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: The aggregate limit would disappear under this proposal. You would not be without some control. 
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: Mr. Chairman, I think it's not [a good idea] to eliminate the [limit on the] aggregate open position. (A) I don't think it's desirable from a public relations standpoint; and (B) I don't think it's desirable from the Committee's standpoint. 

VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "This is the basic limit and I think the Committee probably ought to have one."

Full utterance: I happen to have a preference along with Governor Coldwell on this. This is the basic limit and I think the Committee probably ought to have one. I would swallow the public relations disadvantage and make sure it's big enough, but I could go either way in the end.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Well, there's recommendation 4, which has a great deal to do with the question of whether we can say that what the Committee has done has some relationship with what the President wants done. And I think [following] your suggestion would make it less likely that we'd consider it consistent. 
speaker: SPEAKER(?).
text: And that comes up in recommendation 4? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: I think it does. 
speaker: MR. BALLES.
text: In any case, it comes up in February. 

CHAIRMAN MILLER. "It comes up every meeting because I don't know that you can bind future FOMCs to having only certain spreads."

Full utterance: It comes up every meeting because I don't know that you can bind future FOMCs to having only certain spreads. I think any FOMC can put on any spread they want. New people come on and change their minds.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: In other words, you would not want to expand it to $2 billion. Then the question is: Do you like the proposal in the memo? Paul. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Yes, it is reasonable. MR. AL"N. President Balles. 

MR. BALLES. "I have real reservations about going up to $2 billion, based on a very skeptical attitude regarding decisions on what constitutes excessive movements one way or another vis-a-vis what the market is saying."

Full utterance: I share Chuck's view. I have real reservations about going up to $2 billion, based on a very skeptical attitude regarding decisions on what constitutes excessive movements one way or another vis-a-vis what the market is saying. I'd keep it where it is.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Following Phil, here, the money market directive at the moment. With that high a range, I'm a little worried about an aggregates directive. Again, there's just some uncertainty about what will happen in the very short run. I just looked over Tom's shoulder and New York already has a lower estimate for these aggregates; it might be triggered on the low side before we know it. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: They did before, too. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Well, let's go all the way and say acceptable."

Full utterance: Well, I don't attribute any great weight to that other than the inherent uncertainty in these things. I have been watching those numbers enough that my discount factor is extremely high. The trouble is my discount factor on all these numbers is extremely high in any short-run period. Let me just ask the preferences first. Well, let's go all the way and say acceptable.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): ambiguous
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: It's true that the dollar has been appreciating against most other currencies. But if the market gets in its head that the dollar is really going down, would we be able to stop it without spending a lot more money than we're already spending? That is the question. And let me say that it would make me very nervous to try to control a depreciation at this point, given the underlying malaise. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: But what do we do if the rate really does need to be 170 instead of 180? 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "I don't know what that implies."

Full utterance: Well, [you say] "does need to be." I don't know what that implies.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I don't think there is any question about that. 
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: I have no objections to having a telephone call. I'm a little bothered about saying that [Ml growth] has to be at 8 percent [before we confer] because I think 8 is too high. If it means that we've got to go up to 11-3/4 percent, then I'd rather take the decision now that we're going to go to 11-3/4 percent if [Ml growth] is up in that area. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: Phil, what would your preference be on ranges? 

MR. COLDWELL. "If I had a preference straight out, the range would be 3 to 7 percent, but I'm persuaded that with the present projection 8 percent growth is a possibility."

Full utterance: If I had a preference straight out, the range would be 3 to 7 percent, but I'm persuaded that with the present projection 8 percent growth is a possibility. All I'm saying is that I'd much prefer to make sure that we do use some of the [funds] range if we're approaching that [upper limit]. I just think 8 is too high. If it got up in the 7 percent range, I'd like to see us nibbling toward usage [of the upper part of the funds range].

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MAYO.
text: Well, Sears has gone through particular problems. 
speaker: M R . PARTEE.
text: It seems to me that they were in bad shape about a year ago. 
speaker: M R . MAYO.
text: It shouldn't be used as an example for the whole country. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Wards had a very small change over a year ago. 
speaker: MR. MAYO.
text: Yes, but Penneys and Kmart are still doing fine. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "We wouldn't be here today if we didn't have a problem with the state of the markets, whether international or domestic."

Full utterance: Well, let me say where I think we are even though Emmett is still absent. I appreciate your all standing by so patiently over the past few days, but we've had a few complications putting this together, with some people out of town and so forth. Just in terms of the schedule for today, I think we have to assume that the Board of Governors is going to have to meet after we get finished. And depending upon what we decide, the presidents may want to meet. too, to discuss any reserve requirement changes and what kinds of problems that will create in the short run. [Unintelligible] and we may need to talk about straightening out mechanical problems that may arise [when we implement] any decisions we make. So we can play that by ear as we go along. I don't know how long we're going to have to be here today. We will be here until we arrive at a consensus and proceed [from there]. I'm not sure when we would announce any decision that we make--whether we'd do it late today or Monday morning. Those seem to be the two practical alternatives with the Pope here rather blanketing the area [news] tomorrow and creating a little difficulty [for us1 in terms of an orderly announcement. Let me say that I think there are several dimensions to the current situation. We wouldn't be here today if we didn't have a problem with the state of the markets, whether international or domestic. They were pretty feverish last week--or beginning in the previous week, really. Beginning about 2 weeks ago and carrying over into the early part of what is still this week, the foreign exchange market was in a situation that was clearly not amenable for very long to such techniques as intervention. The markets have turned around some in the past few days, as you know. I think that is almost entirely explicable by the fact that at about the time I returned from Belgrade Treasury officials and others were making some statements that left hanging the possibility of some kind of a package, so the foreign exchange dealers have retreated to the sidelines.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: But let me say that we would be more concerned about a situation where [growth] was tending toward the lower side, 4 percent or below--we can't control these things that closely--and interest rates were rising; we would tend to get aggressive more quickly, providing more reserves. And if it went in the other direction where it was drifting high, if interest rates were falling out of bed and giving us trouble on the international side we would be prompter about getting it back in the range, in terms of attitudes and judgments about the kind of path shifts that we have to make in the reserve numbers in the period. But we would start out with 4-1/2 percent. 
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: I'm not quite sure you said what you wanted to say. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Well, I may have said it wrong, but I think you-- 

MR. COLDWELL. "You mean we should react more rapidly if M1 growth goes up with the interest rates falling than if M1 growth went down and interest rates were rising."

Full utterance: You mean we should react more rapidly if M1 growth goes up with the interest rates falling than if M1 growth went down and interest rates were rising.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: First, I would agree with the Account Manager that this is likely to have [only] minor advantages. But secondly, I would caution the Committee that this is another interruption in the overall picture of [the policy] the Committee is trying to follow. If we add that on top of our redefined aggregates as well as possible daylight overdrafts and additions from the membership bill, we're likely to complicate the figures [further] and they are going to be difficult for people to follow, even our very good staff. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I can't contemplate that possibility. President Willes. 

MR. WILLES. "And yet if we structure that penalty in the right way, in fact, we're not going to give away much in terms of sloppiness in the reserve figures."

Full utterance: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I found Henry's comments and Chuck's comments particularly useful. So I would like to [be recorded as agreeing with] whatever you wrote down for them. I would add one thought, which goes back to the comment that Bob Mayo made. I am not much for gimmicks, either. But if there's a bank relations problem, as many think there is, it just might be possible that the kind of proposal Bill Poole made can be structured in such a way that we don't give much away but present it to the banks as though we are giving them something when we are taking away lagged reserves. His kind of penalty scheme, for example, in terms of the carryover would make it possible to say that we are going to take away lagged reserves but we are going to give banks some flexibility they don't have now. And yet if we structure that penalty in the right way, in fact, we're not going to give away much in terms of sloppiness in the reserve figures. Looked at in that way--unless, as Chuck says, we get the whole thing solved with the bill--it might be useful to consider a gimmick like that simply as a bank relations vehicle. It may be a means to get the advantages and not have the negative bank relations impact that some of us, at least, are concerned about.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. RICE.
text: I find it hard to imagine that whatever inflationary psychology might develop as a result of a temporary expansion in the rate of growth in money would last for a long time in the face of a nominal GNP growth that is roughly twice the rate of growth of the money supply. In other words, if we allow money to grow at 4-1/2 percent against a nominal GNP growth of twice that amount, I find it difficult to believe that inflationary psychology can continue for very long against those facts. Therefore, I am inclined to stick with our current targets. And I would see the period that we're in--where we demonstrate that we are sticking with our course and are maintaining our goal of restricting money supply growth--as an opportunity to educate the public on our operating procedure and what it means as well as on our determination to stick to our goals for growth in the money supply. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Governor Teeters. 

MS. TEETERS. "And we're obviously not going to have very many automobiles built."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I think that is the difference. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: And there was no vote on the 16 percent, as a matter of fact. It was just an understanding that at 15 or 16 percent, whatever it was-- 
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: 16. 
speaker: MR. ALTMANN.
text: The point at which the consultation-- 

MR. WALLICH. "Why don't you let individual members of the Committee call you when they think that Chuck's zone is being approached?"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. ROOS.
text: We will enforce our credibility by being candid. I don't think we ought to play games. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Well, I don't think we ought to associate a change in the ranges--if we think we have good grounds for a change --with playing games or horsing around. All "B" is arguing is that a technical adjustment is required. 
speaker: MR. ROOS.
text: Don't you think, given the tendency of the Open Market Committee in past years toward base drift, that people--or at least interested market participants and others--knew that we were playing games in those days to make ourselves look good? 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "And I'm not arguing for changing the ranges; but I just don't want to associate any change, particularly in this case when we could argue that we have a technical reason for making the change, with playing games."

Full utterance: I think there is something to what you say, looking at history. And I'm not arguing for changing the ranges; but I just don't want to associate any change, particularly in this case when we could argue that we have a technical reason for making the change, with playing games. We said a certain range was valid at one point; I don't think we can say that it's valid forever just because we happened to say it [once]. Don't change the ranges lightly without a good reason is what I think you are saying. Don't revert to changing them automatically because we change them every quarter to take account of what has happened. I just don't want to overstate the case for not changing. Mr. Baughman.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no