kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: Oh, I see, even though in practice there are no exchange controls on at the moment. Still, I don't think that ought to be the main reason for giving a swap line to Have they presented a reason other than prestige why they should have a swap line--a substantive reason? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Well, the argument is that we turned them down ten years ago or thereabouts apparently on the basis that they were members of the sterling area and that they ought to look to London for assistance. They are no longer members of the sterling area so that reason is no longer valid for turning them down. They do have independent reserve management, and it would be of at least modest help to them in reserve management to know they have this backstop. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "So, if we went ahead with came in again, would this change your attitude about giving one to"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: If it reached 13 percent in mid-November and everything is weak, nobody is going to be disturbed about it. If it reached 13 percent two weeks from now, people would be disturbed. You have to assume a certain amount of competence, some minimum level, in the Chairman. 
speaker: MR. SCHULTZ.
text: That's the weak part of the whole thing! 
speaker: MR. BALLES.
text: Paul, I understood a while ago that you were leaning toward putting a numerical target in for M2, with cautionary language following it. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "I'm not leaning either way."

Full utterance: I'm not leaning either way.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BALLES.
text: They say: What can you do for us? And do it soon because if you don't do it soon, it's going to be too late. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: End of story? 
speaker: MR. BALLES.
text: End of story. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Keehn. 

MR. KEEHN. "I admittedly come from an area where there is a very heavy concentration of industries that have been most affected."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. CORRIGAN.
text: On the household-type checking accounts, NOWs and so on, we really don't have much to add. In our area, in terms of Frank's point, we too didn't see many new accounts. It was all existing accounts. The bankers and others we talked to basically made the argument that we have some kind of precautionary phenomenon here, some of it related to the economy and unemployment, some of it related to uncertainties about the interest rate outlook, some of it maybe related to savings flows themselves, and some of it--at least in the case of our own employees in the Bank, based on a little informal survey we did--related just to a desire to build up larger balances to pay off bills incurred in December faster than they might ordinarily do. That's about it. 

MR. AXILROD. "That is one of the reasons we thought [M1] would grow in November and December, way back when."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: For the quarter, it's "around" 8 percent. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: Oh, that's okay. That's March to June you are talking about? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I interpret "around" to mean that I would not be very upset if it went a little above 8 percent for the quarter. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: I would not be either on that [aggregate]. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "I don't have to repeat it again."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: I'm really just not certain, President Guffey. 
speaker: MR. GUFFEY.
text: Well, just in conclusion: "B" is attractive to me, and my own feeling is that a path built upon these dimensions will give us a lower funds rate rather quickly, which will give the kind of relief that I think some around the table are suggesting may be necessary. I would hate for us to give up the quarterly target [for M1], however, at the 3 percent level. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Roos. 

MR. ROOS. "Even if money growth from April to June is zero, second-quarter growth of M1 will be somewhere between 3 and 4 percent."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. GRAMLEY.
text: In trying to provide some way to let money grow a little faster, we ought to look over all the alternatives. One of them is to raise the targets for 1982; another is to leave them where they are but make a clear, public announcement that we're going to permit money growth to exceed that target for reasons having to do with liquidity preference or for technical reasons. The third--and here I think one can make an argument with some cogency that perhaps the idea of continuity of policy over a longer period working toward lower growth of money and credit and toward reducing inflation--could best be presented if we rebased our money growth targets for 1982, taking into account the fact that we undershot so much last year. But again, I don't know which way we can do this and best maintain credibility. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Solomon. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "Stepping back, I think it's worth mentioning that our forecast is significantly different from Jim's."

Full utterance: Well, since I agree with Lyle's presentation, let me try and answer that last question, or at least give my personal view on it. My own view is that we should say that we would tolerate a modest or limited overrun in view of the NOW account behavior, that is NOW account funds not acting as transactions money. The reason I think we should choose that rather than either of the other two options--rebasing or raising the targets--is first of all that raising the target a half point to 6 percent target implies a precision that is almost ridiculous, given the possible swings in velocity in the second half of the year. If we were seriously considering 6-1/2 percent, that might make more sense. But I don't see the point of changing the targets a half point when I think it would be more consistent and better received in the markets if we simply indicated that we would tolerate a modest or limited overrun in view of the NOW account behavior. Stepping back, I think it's worth mentioning that our forecast is significantly different from Jim's. We have significantly higher real growth in the second half and significantly higher inflation. We are almost 1-1/2 points higher on real growth, at 3.9 percent, and almost 2 points higher on inflation. We think inflation will be about 7.3 to 7.5 percent.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: They are not admitting that they will have to. 
speaker: MR. MARTIN.
text: They'll have to. VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON(?). Okay, I move it. 
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: Second. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Now, whether we actually will extend any money before the weekend is something of an open question."

Full utterance: In the absence of any objections, we will approve it. Now, whether we actually will extend any money before the weekend is something of an open question.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. ROOS.
text: How do you respond to that? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Well, with difficulty. 
speaker: MR. MARTIN.
text: Very carefully. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Obviously, you give some sense of confidence as best you can. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Say "I have another appointment." 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Let me say in that connection--and I should have said it more clearly before--that I think this situation is manageable."

Full utterance: Let me say in that connection--and I should have said it more clearly before--that I think this situation is manageable. In a very big sense, I think we are on the verge of victory in what we've been trying to do. It's a delicate situation, but it's also a very risky situation.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Then "in the light of" is not quite right, is it? We mean "resulting from" or "flowing from" or something like that. I thought "in the light of" meant we were doing this because of the poor economy. 
speaker: MR. BALLES.
text: That's what I thought. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: But you are saying credit conditions are affected by-- 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "So, I think it works both ways."

Full utterance: Well, I think one can interpret it either way. The reason we're concerned about this is because of the economy. But it also works in reverse. The economy, and the international economy in particular, is giving rise to the pressures. But we're concerned about the pressures because of economic conditions. So, I think it works both ways.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: I think you should do a mixed bag of short-medium- and long-term issues. 
speaker: MR. STERNLIGHT.
text: Well, Governor, when we buy coupons it is just that. It's not all long-term bonds. We buy the whole range of coupon issues. To intermix bills and coupons I think would be a terribly cumbersome, totally novel, excursion in the market. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "If there is a lot of discomfort about doing it today, it will be done presumably on Thursday or Friday."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I don't know whether that helps you. You pay your money and take your choice! It comes down to balancing out, as so many people have said, the need for providing some protection on the down side, so to speak, against the danger that it's possible to overdo it, as Larry Roos keeps reminding us. The way to reach that judgment is what we're trying to do today. Governor Rice. 

MR. RICE. "If we wait too long, we may not make effective use of this credibility."

Full utterance: I'd like to join all those who feel that interest rates need to come down from their current levels for all the reasons that have been given, both domestic and international. I won't try to go through all those reasons again. I'd just like to say that it's clear to me that real rates are too high to permit a recovery and, therefore, they have to come down from where they are at present. Like Governor Gramley, I don't know to what level they need to come down. And for that reason we ought to try to get them down gradually. We ought to be careful not to overdo it. But at the same time I think we have to do what we can to move rates in the right direction--downward--but gradually. I also agree with Governor Wallich that we have a limited amount of time during which we will be able to maintain our credibility and we ought to use that time wisely. The clock is ticking and we don't want to wait too long to have some effect on the current situation. I would conclude that we had better use some of that creditability soon in order to encourage recovery while we have time. If we wait too long, we may not make effective use of this credibility. Therefore, I would support alternative A in the belief that that will encourage a gradual decline in rates. I also think, if I understood correctly, that alternative B would not result in any decline at all in interest rates from their current levels. Is that correct, Steve?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Then we will go to Mr. Axilrod who will talk about the short-run problem but in the context of the longer-run problem. We will then discuss the longer-run problem and come back to the specifics of what we want to do, which would be tomorrow, if that is agreeable. I don't know if it's more logical or not but for some reason it seemed to me it might be more logical. We could wait for [the Managers' reports] tomorrow or we could do that now. Why don't we-- 

MR. STERNLIGHT. "I can do mine now, Mr. Chairman."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: [in such a way as] to have a massive effect in the short run. If we assumed that in the short run there was nothing we could do about money market funds and all that and that all we could affect was the demand deposits subject to reserve requirements, then we could construct the path in such a way that when money funds went up we would force all this money out of demand deposits. Then the reserve requirement we are dealing with is 10 percent and we wouldn't be trying to affect everything proportionately because we wouldn't believe that's what would happen in the short run. If we did that, of course, we would get massive interest rate effects in an effort to control it. That's what led us to suggest a shadow of 3 percent or something in between. 

MR. CORRIGAN. "I guess I understand."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. ROOS.
text: But I fall out with some of this reasoning in that I believe that if the markets get the impression money is growing too quickly, interest rates are going to shoot up and we're going to be faced with-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: But that is what I'm addressing myself to. If markets have that impression, some people anyway are going to be nervous; I think they are today. But suppose we were in this dilemma where money has to grow faster to keep the GNP up. What are you going to do? 

MR. ROOS. "Well, we may be between a rock and a hard place."

Full utterance: Well, we may be between a rock and a hard place.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: But that's the general strategy. On Brazil, which is not irrelevant even though we have no money in there, the Treasury lent them $1-1/4 billion a couple of weeks [ago], which is the total amount of the Fund compensatory finance and first tranche-- 
speaker: MR. CROSS.
text: Gold tranche. 
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: Gold tranche, reserve tranche. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "In fact, the existing $1-1/4 billion of the first section of Treasury money is to be [repaid] quite promptly out of the Fund drawings in a matter of weeks, if all goes well and according to plan."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. RICE.
text: Maybe the recovery in the underground economy is stronger than-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: A very radical difference. 
speaker: MR. GRAMLEY.
text: That won't even show up in Frank's statistics. 
speaker: MR. FORD.
text: Just thinking about it in terms of a priori logic, with real interest rates coming down, I don't see that the cost of holding cash has changed that much in favor of using more cash. So that wouldn't be a [reason]. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Well, it's not low relative to what it has been in the past when currency wasn't going up this rapidly."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: Let me call your attention, if I might, to the last sentence in Dave Lindsey's memo in which he says it's not clear that Vl will be less predictable over time than V2 even though Vl may take on behavioral characteristics that are different from earlier postwar years. 
speaker: MR. MORRIS.
text: That's faint praise, though. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: I absolutely agree with that; I think that's just what Paul said. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: It has been more predictable over most of our history; it may not be in the future, but I believe the burden of proof is on those who say it won't be. That's a biased viewpoint, as you all probably can guess. 

MR. GRAMLEY. "The arrow is nice and straight; we just don't know which way it's going."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. GRAMLEY.
text: But there's no reason at all why if we have a target of 4 to 8 percent, we can't let the 8 percent happen. If 8 percent happens, 10-1/4 or 10-1/2 percent is easily a reachable measure for nominal GNP. 
speaker: MR. BOEHNE.
text: But M1 is going to be in this associated range below, and we're going to show in the M2 and M3 ranges a drop of 1/2 point, and the companion associated range for total credit is going to go down 1 point. It seems to me that we have three of the four down, which indicates concern about inflation in terms of the long-run goals. And the fact that Ml has to go up and down and all around simply conveys the uncertainty that is characteristic of that aggregate. 

MR. ROBERTS. "And I would be in favor of the 4 to 8 percent."

Full utterance: Well, that isn't exactly right. We've had an excessive rate of growth here for a long period of time; it's continuing at a little more moderate pace. Normally in a business expansion we would moderate that; it's time that we signal that to the market very clearly. And I would be in favor of the 4 to 8 percent.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: An act of faith? 
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: Well, in large part. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: [Unintelligible] starting it; there's no question about it. 
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: Maybe even when it's econometrically derived, it's an act of faith. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Any forecast is an act of faith! 

MR. GUFFEY. "I'd like to step back."

Full utterance: I'd like to step back. You spoke of next year's rates. [In the Bluebook appendix] an increase in rates is shown in the fourth quarter, which I assume is built into your Greenbook forecast. Can you comment on the background of that assumption?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: We see how tolerant you are! 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: In that case you should get [price stability] by 1987. 
speaker: MR. STOCKTON.
text: Well, there are a couple of things to keep in mind about this price stability [scenario] that we're presenting. The first thing is that in the next two years we think we're facing a couple of hurdles that are going to make it difficult to reach price stability: We have a food price shock that is going to be showing up in 1984 and we have a substantial increase in the social security tax. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: How big is that? 

MR. STOCKTON. "So, we get the deceleration occurring in three years but we have to spend the first two years--the next two years--holding down those things that we think are apt to boost inflation."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. RICE.
text: I'd like to say now that I am convinced and that it's probably stronger than forecast. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Governor Martin. 
speaker: MR. MARTIN.
text: Could I ask a question with regard to price changes and the price outlook, Jim? As you know, several of us have had some discussion with regard to futures prices and spot prices and commodity and producer price indexes and so forth. What would be your judgment as to what the spot and futures markets are showing with regard to the first signs of reinflation or the lack thereof? 

MR. KICHLINE. "There is still a good deal of weakness in a couple of markets such as copper and I guess silver and lead."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. ZEISEL.
text: But there is a very widespread, and we think very fundamental, increase in expenditures. And what we have projected is a fairly strong recovery by historical standards. The assumption is that a number of factors have operated to reduce the relative cost of capital--the stock market rise, tax law changes for accelerated depreciation, and so on--and apparently have laid the basis for a considerable recovery in capital outlays. We have it moderating through 1985. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Balles. 

MR. BALLES. "The anecdotal evidence from some of our directors, which of course isn't definitive, has been pretty constant in recent months."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: You get borrowings up to what--$1 billion?--with net borrowed reserves probably a minus. What does maintaining the existing degree of reserve pressure or increasing it or decreasing it mean in that circumstance? 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: Well, what does it mean then to have your second sentence? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: That's precisely why I put the second sentence in brackets. Maybe we can drop the whole thing. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "No, I mean the third sentence where you have "greater reserve restraint.""


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Well, quite a few people have expressed the opinion that it ought to be higher and the question is whether-- 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: I don't feel strongly whether it's 7 to 11 percent or 7-1/2 to 11-1/2 percent. I'm always bothered by 1/2 points. 
speaker: MR. BOYKIN.
text: 8 to 12 percent. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: The markets may overread what that new ceiling is going to mean. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "I don't intend to do so, but--."

Full utterance: I myself would think 8 to 12 percent is too high in the directive. We may be under pressure to release this directive early. You might have that in mind. I don't intend to do so, but--.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. HORN.
text: I think it is important to end up there because inflationary expectations are heating up and are a very serious matter in future inflation as well. I'm for "B" now. I have a nagging feeling that it may take more than that in the future to end up where I would like to end up at year-end. But for the moment I view it as consistent with where I'd like to be. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Governor Partee. 

MR. PARTEE. "I think "B" is all right."

Full utterance: I think "B" is all right. I would point out that "B" has specifications for a number of aggregates and that if the aggregates run stronger--which they might well do in the case of M1 particularly and are already doing in the case of M3--then the question arises as to what to do if they are strong or well above the path. There is language in the directive left over from last time that deals with that and speaks of greater reserve restraint if there is more substantial growth in the monetary aggregates. Now, I think we are all talking about financial market conditions in one way or another as a paramount feature of our discussion this time. I wouldn't support the prominent and extreme billing given to any unusual financial strains in the very first part of the operating paragraph in the directive. On the other hand, I think we could put in a more general phrase about financial market conditions late in the paragraph. That is, it could go down where we are saying that in either case--if we decide to ease or to move higher in terms of rates because of the behavior of the aggregates--such a change would be considered in the context of appraisals of the continuing strength of the expansion, inflationary pressures, financial market conditions, and the rate of credit growth. That also has a desirable attribute in that it includes things other than the Continental problem. We have had a very bad couple of months in financial markets and, indeed, a repetition of that could well give us trouble in an unknown way. It could be a futures market that breaks or something like that. And financial market conditions is a term that could encompass all of that. I don't think we ought to bias the borrowing number toward tightening, as Lyle suggests. I would buy Pres's $900 to $1100 million. I guess I would have assumed that $1 billion means $900 to $1100 million and that there's not much difference from what we now have. I also wouldn't want to prejudge long rates. Lyle made the point that long rates shouldn't be permitted to come down. Well, I think they have gone up quite a bit more than one would have expected as a result of a run toward short instruments in a time of great uncertainty. Should the uncertainty unwind in the weeks to come--which is a possibility, I think, as Steve pointed out--that could mean that people who ordinarily would be in the longer market would commit themselves and we could get a decline in long rates. And I wouldn't resist that. I think it would be a natural market process that ought to be accommodated.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment