kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MARTIN.
text: And may have interest rate effects itself. 
speaker: MR. ROBERTS.
text: I think it's a very great leap to say we're going back to volatility. My impression of the market is that it would receive this favorably, Tony. In fact, the market has already discounted an increased emphasis on M1, which it monitors very, very closely, as you know. I think all these arcane issues of the placement of one thing somewhere else are viewed by the market as rather silly. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "If we follow the Chairman's suggestion on the directive as shown on the paper he passed out, we would be encouraging an increased emphasis on weekly volatility."


Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: That's based on your economic forecast? 
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: On 8 percent nominal GNP growth. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: What did you say for Ml? 
speaker: MR. AXILROD.
text: We've assumed 5-3/4 percent as a point estimate; 5-1/2 to 6 percent seems to me the area-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: But that's with only an 8 percent nominal GNP, which I remind you is lower than everybody's forecast except the staff's. 

MR. CORRIGAN. "In my mind, to the extent that nominal GNP grows faster than that, it would increase the likelihood that more of it would be prices and less of it would be real."

Full utterance: Personally, an 8 percent nominal GNP as a goal--as distinct from a forecast--is very appealing to me because I think the optimum that one could reasonably think about for 1985 is something like 4 percent [real] and 4 percent [on prices]. In my mind, to the extent that nominal GNP grows faster than that, it would increase the likelihood that more of it would be prices and less of it would be real. So, primarily for that reason, if I think about '85 from a policy viewpoint and what we should be shooting for, I come out with around 8 percent nominal. In terms of the targets I am more than a little attracted to Tony's thought, but my initial thought had been 4 to 7 percent for M1. But as I said, Tony's point has some merit. Personally, I would go with 4 to 7 percent, 5-1/2 to 8-1/2 percent, leave M3 where it is, and use 8 to 10-1/2 percent on credit. The bottom of the credit range doesn't matter at all, but I do think that shaving a half point off the top of that has some value. As I've said before, I am really troubled by this explosion of credit that we are seeing. That consumer credit number yesterday is another indication of this. Gosh--a 30 percent annual rate of increase in consumer credit! That's where I would be.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: I recognize that doing this in the public record might have adverse repercussions. For instance, it might affect interest rate expectations adversely. So, perhaps we could have an understanding that we would have a telephone conference. As for symmetry, I would prefer to stay symmetrical. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Miss Seger. 

MS. SEGER. "Also, as I mentioned earlier, the economy is definitely slowing."

Full utterance: I'm leaning toward the A alternative, with my first reason being the performance of the monetary aggregates in the third quarter. When I look at what the various alternatives are expected to produce in the way of monetary growth in the fourth quarter and for the 12 months in 1984, it looks as if even with alternative A the results would be within the longer-run targets with the exception of M3, which would be just outside by a very small amount. Also, as I mentioned earlier, the economy is definitely slowing. I don't believe we are heading straight for a recession but I think there has been a significant slowing. I happen to agree that it's going to continue to be on the moderate side of the spectrum and that would suggest that some easing, as in alternative A, is appropriate. To repeat what a number of people have mentioned, the strong dollar is a consideration here and I hope that we can do something to maybe at least stop its strong advance. Finally, I repeat my continuing concern about the thrifts and the health of the financial system in general. When I look at where the fed funds rate would likely go based on alternative A, as I read the statement here, it looks as if it would go somewhere between 10-1/4 and 10-1/2 percent; and I don't see that as a precipitous drop in interest rates. Maybe it's my bias, having seen a lot of volatility in interest rates, but from where the fed funds rate is now I would say that's on the modest side. Also, I am thinking of the signals that we sent to money market participants this summer when many of them assumed that the Fed had in fact tightened. I don't remember sitting here and voting for tightening. [That was] the conclusion that many of them drew from asymmetrical language. Consequently, I think we got an upward movement in the fed funds rate that in fact exceeded what we were talking about here at the time--at least what I thought we were hoping for. Having said all that, I would prefer to go with some easing and in general what is shown here in alternative A.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: But just how it reflects that is-- 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Well, as I suggested, we could just change the "might" and "would." 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Yes, I know. We could do that. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Or we could change the order of the two parts of the sentence. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Then, we'd put in the sentence with basically the alternative B"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: But they can't. And I don't think in this projection horizon that that will change very much. So, both capacity utilization and the aggregate unemployment rate seem to me to be at levels that would be exerting some downward pressures on price increases. 
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: Thank you. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Boehne. 

MR. BOEHNE. "I can visualize something slower than this; I can even visualize a recession over this time horizon."

Full utterance: I would like to pick up on the uncertainty theme that Governor Martin raised. I think there is uncertainty here; but as I look through the presentation and think about the various sectors, I can visualize this forecast materializing. I can visualize something slower than this; I can even visualize a recession over this time horizon. But I find it very difficult to visualize sufficiently more rapid growth than is in this forecast that would jeopardize the outlook for inflation. As one goes through this, sector by sector, one could make a case for slower consumer growth but it's hard to make a case for booming consumer growth. In the investment sector, I think it's the same kind of outlook and it's the same in the government sector. The foreign sector may be less of a drag, but it is still going to continue to be a major drag. Even if we got somewhat faster growth, it's hard to see that bringing about a significant increase in inflation above this forecast. The major source of inflation in here comes from the foreign side. Someone made the point earlier, with which I agree, that those margins are big and fat in terms of what's being imported into this country. And this is a very lucrative market. So I am much less fearful of that kind of import inflation being as serious as is [suggested] here. The other point I would make is about the tone that I sense out there. My District has been, I think, one of the most upbeat Districts in recent quarters. I think that has been true up and down the Atlantic coast. That area has been more upbeat than other parts of the country. I have sensed a change in that tone. I sensed the beginning of a change the last time we met; but I sense it even more strongly now that there is a definite scaling down of the outlook for the rest of the year and in 1986 by a whole range of businesses. The only strong sector in my District now is real estate and construction, and I think that has a definite time limit. Like every place else, there has been weakness in manufacturing, but it has now spread to retailing and to some of the services. So, if you look at the objective evidence that is here and at the change in the tone--even granted the uncertainty that is present--it seems to me that there is more chance that we are going to end up on the softer side of this forecast than on the too strong side of it.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: What they must have done in that Citicorp report, which was not clear to me, was to look just at the gross effect. 
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: Yes. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: It was surprisingly large; I wish I could remember that percentage because it shook me. I ought to remember it, but senility has overtaken me and I can't. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: You need a computer! 

MR. BLACK. "I may be too old for that!"

Full utterance: I may be too old for that!

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: If I do, I could just plant a question; that's easy. But if I don't, I need some natural occasion to-- 
speaker: MR. MARTIN.
text: If we say it this way, isn't there a slight implication that we're leading up to putting M1 in the future into a monitoring range or something of that sort? If we go out of our way to say this, aren't we saying: "Next week, folks, we are going to put M1 on a monitoring--." 
speaker: MR. MORRIS.
text: I would hope so. 

MR. BLACK. "If you are right, Pres, you have just changed my whole view."

Full utterance: If you are right, Pres, you have just changed my whole view.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Parry. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: Jim, on chart 21 where you talked about the impact of lower oil prices, it seems to me that the pattern of effects is a little puzzling. Wouldn't one expect, for example, that the impact of lower oil prices on real GNP would be felt more in 1987 than 1986--that it takes time for these oil prices to work their way through in terms of increased income for people to spend and lower costs for corporations to increase their spending? I would say the same thing, but maybe with not quite the same lag, about the deflator. It isn't only the direct effect of lower oil prices on inflation; there are many indirect impacts that probably would show up more in 1987 than in 1986. 

MR. KICHLINE. "Our best sense is that we will get some of the direct effects"

Full utterance: I think that's right. We have rounded these numbers and you caught the right direction in which things were rounded; actually, on the lower oil price side the effect is about .35 or so and I rounded it up to a half and for 1987 I rounded it down. But the sense really is that the real impacts will take a while to feed through. That's true on the prices too, except that there is a bigger question on prices. The Board's quarterly model that we used here has a much larger impact on prices in 1987 and very little in 1986; we judgmentally adjusted some of these because we think there will be substantial pressure and the direct effects will come along in a major way. So, in effect, we fiddled with the numbers there. Our best sense is that we will get some of the direct effects [in 1986] but that the important feedback effects will filter through on into 1987.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KICHLINE.
text: The Board's quarterly model that we used here has a much larger impact on prices in 1987 and very little in 1986; we judgmentally adjusted some of these because we think there will be substantial pressure and the direct effects will come along in a major way. So, in effect, we fiddled with the numbers there. Our best sense is that we will get some of the direct effects [in 1986] but that the important feedback effects will filter through on into 1987. 

MR. PARRY. "I like your model forecast."

Full utterance: I like your model forecast.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: When I look at the differences that we have in residential investment, I actually think that I would be more comfortable with the Board staff's forecast; consequently, we might even conclude that our forecast would be even stronger relative to the staff's than I first thought. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Let me just interject for a moment to remind people that you get a chance immediately after this meeting to revise the forecasts [you have submitted]. You all have made some comment, but I don't know when you look at them whether you'll change them or not. What unemployment rate are we talking about here? Are we talking about the civilian or the total? 

MR. KICHLINE. "The difference is a tenth and when push comes to shove, to be consistent with the Administration, at the end of the report we will just add a tenth to whatever anybody gives us."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FORRESTAL.
text: Did we? That was my question. Did we set a target at that time? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Sure, we did. 
speaker: MR. JOHNSON.
text: We could keep the 3 to 8 percent, but [unintelligible] July. 

MR. MORRIS. "We should say we are going to monitor M1 and we are going to monitor debt, but we are not going to set ranges for either of them."

Full utterance: I think Manley's idea is the right one. We should say we are going to monitor M1 and we are going to monitor debt, but we are not going to set ranges for either of them. We are not going to set any monitoring ranges.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: You can see that M1A elasticity over a one-year period is roughly comparable to that of M2. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: The last paragraph on page 15 is a good one to read on that. For me, it's easier to interpret that sort of thing than to look at the elasticity tables. It says that a 50 basis point change in market interest rates would alter M1A growth and its velocity by less than 1/4 of a percentage point at an annual rate in the short run and about 1/2 of a percentage point over the year--not perfect, but not bad by the standards of the other possibilities, I think. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Do we have any confidence, assuming that one was going to have a target for M1A, about where it should be? 

MR. BLACK. "I was going to ask Mr. Kohn what he thinks it ought to be."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: If it really has a lot of interest elasticity, I am not sure what the exhumation means. 
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: Well, that may change some over time. I hope-- 
speaker: MR. JOHNSON.
text: The one thing that might be possible, if we want to have any kind of picture at all to illustrate it, would be to have two sets of parallel lines imposed on the same graph instead of having a cone shaped target. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Have three-dimensional graphs? 

MR. JOHNSON. "One would be associated with stable interest rates and the other would be associated with volatile interest rates."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. SEGER.
text: Six months have gone by and I guess I'm still not convinced that we can readily say with great confidence that there's going to be a major difference in impact on the economy with "I" versus "II". So that leaves me with the psychological side. I guess if you think that this is the kind of thing that will send a big message to the world out there that we're tough rather than weak on inflation--I happen to think they look at a lot of things and not just our ranges--I could reluctantly go with "II". But I still think a more honest presentation would be just dealing with round numbers, say, 6 to 9 percent. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Stern. 

MR. STERN. "But our model also has a somewhat stronger picture of the economy than the Greenbook forecast; if you were to plug in something akin to the Greenbook forecast I think you'd get something comfortably within that alternative II range for M2."

Full utterance: I favor alternative II as well. For what it's worth, our model suggested that M2 growth would probably turn out to be near 8 percent in the year ahead. But our model also has a somewhat stronger picture of the economy than the Greenbook forecast; if you were to plug in something akin to the Greenbook forecast I think you'd get something comfortably within that alternative II range for M2.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): ambiguous
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HELLER.
text: In my mind at least, debt should be more among the categories of things we are monitoring: prices, growth, interest rates, exchange rates. Debt should be in that category rather than as a target variable. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: I am not trying to make it a target variable. I am just concerned that we have had it in there, in effect, as a target variable. And it has been behaving in ways that I think over the long run raise some very difficult questions. 

MR. ANGELL. "I don't know where we would begin."

Full utterance: I don't know what handle we have. There isn't any margin requirement handle that would work. I don't know where we would begin.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: I think there is a tendency for these things to cumulate. So, whether it's in terms of forecasts--and not Wall Street forecasts, but forecasts from any number of sources around the country--or what is in the actual statistics themselves, I come away with the view that either actual or forecast rates of inflation have stepped up by something in the area of a half point and maybe even as much as a point. We are looking now at consumer price increases, excluding food and energy, probably on the up side of 4-1/2 percent. It doesn't take a lot to get to 5 percent; and once you get to 5 percent, I think the argument that it will wash out becomes that much more questionable. So, I think there is a change on the inflation side. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "We seem to have disagreements about some facts and analysis."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: We're expecting a fairly low inflation in fixed investment prices this year. In fact, that computer factor that I mentioned for the second quarter would put equipment price inflation at essentially zero in that period. So it may be that they're not that far off; but looking at nominal spending, the trajectory implied to get their annual total is far steeper than we have in the forecast. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: Yes. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Keehn. 

MR. KEEHN. "I also have a question about the consumption expenditures, which I think look on the low side, particularly for 1988."

Full utterance: I also have a question about the consumption expenditures, which I think look on the low side, particularly for 1988. Cross-referencing a bit between [components of] the Greenbook forecast, specifically for autos, Mike, you are forecasting an increase in auto sales next year yet durable expenditures seem awfully soft. Maybe I missed it but what is your number for autos?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FORRESTAL.
text: So, we may get some equally bad trade numbers. And, as the Gramm-Rudman fiscal policy debate goes on in the Congress and we don't get anything out of that, I think there's going to be a reaction in the bond market as well. It seems to me that the market is looking for every snippet of bad news that it can find and reacting to that, rather than trying to find something positive in the scenario. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Thank you. President Keehn. 

MR. KEEHN. "Employment, for example, is very consistent with the national numbers."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HELLER.
text: I think that's a little strong. It's certainly getting a lot slower. Maybe we could just drop "forward indicators pointing to continuing gains." 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: It is not "pointing"; it's "pointed". 
speaker: MR. HELLER.
text: Yes, "pointed". 

MR. KELLEY. "No, that's an important difference."

Full utterance: No, that's an important difference.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS.   SEGER.
text: Okay. 
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: [No transcript record exists of Mr. Lindsey's remarks, in which he summarized a memorandum (circulated to the FOMC on October 29, 1987) that he co-authored with Mr. Gillum. See appendix for the memorandum and a covering note from Mr. Kohn.] 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Mr. Sternlight, would you like to add anything? 
speaker: MR. STERNLIGHT.
text: I don't think so. 

MR. JOHNSON. "I understand what you said, but the only question I have is: If there is a seasonal component to seasonal borrowing of any sort, why have it in there?"

Full utterance: I understand what you said, but the only question I have is: If there is a seasonal component to seasonal borrowing of any sort, why have it in there? If it has no effect whatsoever on the variation, what is the point of having it in there unless it's just more confusing or more complicated at this stage to pull it out?

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: It's the currency that's bothering you? 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: Well, it's partly the currency, but it's also the crazy quilt pattern of the relationship between reserves and other things because of a crazy tiering of reserve requirements, and the reserves on nonpersonal deposits and certain Euro-liabilities, and all the rest. If you had a clean, plain-vanilla kind of structure of reserve requirements that would help a bit, because one problem you get into here that complicates it further--beyond the currency problem--is the so-called multiplier between the reserve component of the base and "money". 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Of course--because of the huge differences in the reserve requirements on the various different elements. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: That's what I mean by the crazy quilt structure of reserve requirements. 

MR. MORRIS. "But it was a politically determined structure of reserve requirements."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. SEGER.
text: Having said all that, I would like to go with the modest easing identified as alternative "A". 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: What's the borrowing with that? 
speaker: MS. SEGER.
text: Well, because of the sloppiness of the relationships, I'm not sure what that would be. I guess I would just concentrate on a fed funds rate of somewhere between 6-1/2 and 6-3/4 percent. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Morris. 

MR. MORRIS. "With regard to operating procedures, I would stay with our current stance of trying to stabilize the funds rate over the next few weeks in the 6-3/4 - 6-7/8 percent area."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I think you're right that, at least temporarily, we're really locked into a no-change policy, which I would interpret as alternative "B". I would make the directive symmetric. With regard to operating procedures, I would stay with our current stance of trying to stabilize the funds rate over the next few weeks in the 6-3/4 - 6-7/8 percent area. But once the Desk has concluded that the year-end adjustment is over and the relationships appear to be moving back toward normality, I would move to option (4), our pre-October 19 operating procedure, with a borrowing level of $300 million.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction