kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. POOLE.
text: I think we are now at about the outer time limit of being able to make a credible case that we are simply undoing some of the policy easing from last fall. The more distant in time that becomes, the less credible it will be to appeal to that as a way of providing some cap on market expectations of where this tightening process might take us. But if we have some bad luck on some of the inflation numbers coming in over the next few months, I believe we will find it difficult to manage under those circumstances. And that is why I believe it would be better to get ahead of the curve now. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Moskow. 

MR. MOSKOW. "Mr. Chairman, I agree with your recommendations of an asymmetric tilt and an immediate announcement."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I agree with your recommendations of an asymmetric tilt and an immediate announcement. I am concerned about the high level of aggregate demand and the related outlook for inflation. It is important that we show we are concerned about inflation and are ready to take action. In my view, this step will help us to maintain our credibility. There were a couple of considerations mentioned by Don Kohn that I thought were important. He said if we change the tilt we should announce it if we think: (1) it is a significant change in our thinking; and (2) if the absence of this step would mislead the public. My assessment is that the current situation fits both of those criteria. So, I think it is important that we change the tilt and announce it right away.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. JOHNSON.
text: However big it is, Ted, it's a lot smaller than what people thought it was earlier, I think. 
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: No, I don't think it's very much smaller. 
speaker: MR. JOHNSON.
text: Well, it's smaller. So what I'm saying is that the market people see the financing requirements as less than they did before. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: In my judgment, if we have external debt of 40 percent of GNP we're in real trouble. 

MR. JOHNSON. "There are plenty of countries that finance that quite easily as long as it's going for sustainable private-sector investment."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. GUFFEY.
text: Not in any size [unintelligible]. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Not aggressively, no. We have this not terribly aggressive [unintelligible]. But I think the attitude to begin with is that there is a concern about this repetitive appreciation of the dollar and the dollar reaching levels that seem-- 
speaker: SPEAKER(?).
text: Overdone. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "But that--"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. PHILLIPS.
text: So, I'd rather see a bit of a conjunction in the message that on the one hand we're going to ease to try to deal with the economy but at the same time we are making a statement about inflation with respect to our longer-run objectives. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President McTeer. 
speaker: MR. MCTEER.
text: Mr. Chairman, I support your recommendation primarily because I don't have a better idea. But I share Governor LaWare's sentiment that it's rather tricky trying to enhance our credibility by admitting that we don't know what is going on. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Lindsey. 

MR. LINDSEY. "If in fact we go up [to Congress] and say that we are uncertain about where things are temporarily, that's one thing."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. STERNLIGHT.
text: Certainly one can look at some periods last year, like the August-September period, and say that we surely should have moved the path more. I think one can come to a different conclusion about last spring when the adjustments were on the other side. Some regular upward adjustments of the nonborrowed path might have helped us restore [monetary] growth more rapidly, but that could have sent us into even stronger growth by the third quarter and perhaps would have been unwise in retrospect. So, it's not clear that on all occasions more rapid adjustment would have been the answer. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "Each month during that autumn period all the projections said it was going to level off this month."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I would agree with that. We'll see whether it has had a partial recovery; I'm not sure it will return to full health. We would have to have one heck of an increase in the economy in the next 3 to 6 months, which is contrary to the projections we have before us. 
speaker: MR. MARTIN.
text: 12 percent nominal. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Mr. Black can defend it. 

MR. BLACK. "I think you just put your finger on the key issue: What it is going to do from now on."

Full utterance: No, I'm going to admit, Mr. Chairman, that it has been rather sick; I guess in retrospect I should have recognized that it was sick sooner than I did. But I don't think that's the key issue. I think you just put your finger on the key issue: What it is going to do from now on. We have been through a very unusual period. We have had a sharp decline in inflation and inflationary expectations; we have had extensive deregulation in the depository markets; and we may have had a decline in real interest rates. This certainly has done something to change it for the time being but it may be the case that in the future it will resume some of its former characteristics. It may be that it will proceed at a lower rate of secular growth. For example, if we have had an element of savings introduced into the NOW accounts and other checkable deposits, as I assume we have, and if this has brought about some improvement in cash management policies, as I think it has, then that may mean that all we are really going to have after we are through this period--which is largely behind us, I think--is a slower rate of growth in velocity on a secular basis. And if that is the case, then that can be as predictable as it has been in the past. The paper certainly implies that just because it's slower, it doesn't mean that it is worthless. The truth of the matter is, of course, no one knows for sure what it is going to do. So that suggests that we ought at least to weigh with caution the idea of throwing it out completely, because for long periods of time in the past it has been a rather useful thing to look at. I agree with Pres that a divisia index makes sense conceptually; I have always felt that that made more sense than anything else since obviously M1 is not the only thing that has some characteristic of money. There are a lot of things that do. And if we could somehow or another get the right weighted average, conceptually, that to me is the kind of thing that we want. Because if we don't target something of that sort, then all we have left is interest rates and that involves a necessity of saying what the appropriate level of interest rates is. That is very difficult for anybody to do and there is nothing in theory or in empirical studies that suggests what the appropriate level ought to be. But when we get to these divisia indexes I guess there is going to be a problem of data availability and also probably a problem of control of these--although I am hopeful that we can move in that general direction because that's what all my instincts tell me is really the best way for us to go.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. JORDAN.
text: In that light, I still believe that the more costly mistake to correct will be the one that occurs if it turns out that excess demand growth does not in fact slow down. The analysis so carefully done and mathematically developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern basically says that we sometimes should base decisions on something that we not only do not believe and definitely do not want, but that is still the wisest course of action. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Boehne. 
speaker: MR. BOEHNE.
text: I support a "no change" policy, and I think the risks have shifted sufficiently to justify a symmetric directive. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Moskow. 

MR. MOSKOW. "So, I would have a slight preference for an asymmetric directive but I can support a symmetric directive."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I support your recommendation for "no change" in policy. On the directive, it is a close call. I think that on balance the risks are still marginally on the upside. So, I would have a slight preference for an asymmetric directive but I can support a symmetric directive.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. TRUMAN.
text: First, the rate went through that level and then it came back. And so some of the psychological aspects of operating close to 100, but above it, were removed. That does not remove the point that Peter made about possible consequences of a large adjustment below that in the absence of any actions by the monetary authorities. 
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: The dollar had traded briefly below 100 in rather discrete increments and we had all seen 99 on the screen several times; it did not stay there very long. So, it was a sort of episodic venturing below 100. 

MR. JORDAN. "But the dollar now is not consistent with the objective."

Full utterance: Focusing on your reference to market participants, the magic number, and psychological aspects, I want to follow-up on something that Al Broaddus was referring to--the perception of success or failure. In a technical sense, it doesn't matter to me whether you sell $800 million of assets denominated in yen and deutschemarks and Joan Lovett rather mechanically buys assets denominated in U.S. dollars of the same amount in order to maintain the funds rate. So, what happens is that the Fed is just going to make the portfolio substitution. But people don't see Joan's actions; they see your actions. Suppose the perception is that our objective was to influence the rate--that we had a price objective and were trying to prevent the dollar from falling further or to cause it to rise, not trying to do something as Governor Blinder mentioned about disorderly markets. But the dollar now is not consistent with the objective. If we have a repetition of those, it makes the Federal Reserve look impotent because markets see what Peter does but they do not see what Joan does. And if we have several of those over a period, our image of being able to influence markets will be tarnished.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: That's loss since the last examination, which was 6 months ago. 
speaker: MR. KEEHN.
text: Right. That's as opposed to the deterioration of the assets themselves; it's a very significant amount. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I think we can return to these questions, but I just don't want to interrupt the continuity of the market discussion entirely. Are there any other questions? 

MR. PARTEE. "certainly couldn't have been much worse than it was and looks like a continuing problem, and it doesn't seem to have shaken the market any more."

Full utterance: It is true, isn't it, that we've had a couple of bad bank reports? certainly couldn't have been much worse than it was and looks like a continuing problem, and it doesn't seem to have shaken the market any more.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
text: How much of that sentiment there is, nobody knows, but I believe that there is some. In my view, it is very important that we not do more than 25 basis points and that we not touch the discount rate because there is sufficient uncertainty that, even though I happen to agree that your hypothesis is likely to turn out to be right, I think we should proceed cautiously. While I am very much a member of the opportunistic school for achieving price stability, I am a near-fanatic believer in achieving price stability. I think that the 25 basis point move leaves our price stability drive very much intact. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Blinder. 

MR. BLINDER. "I don't see a reason to keep it there."

Full utterance: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am one of those opportunists who think that we have the real funds rate too high. As you said, it's higher than it was at the peak of our tightening. I don't see a reason to keep it there. I hope you will allow me to agree with the reasons that you gave for lowering the rate without signing on to your brave new world scenario, which I am not quite ready to do. I do agree 100 percent with all your reasons--the level of real interest rates, a weaker forecast than that in the Greenbook, and the minimal inflationary dangers. I definitely want to underscore that we are quite fortunate to be sitting here on December 19--ironically, we are quite fortunate, but the country is not--able to take this action and disassociate it entirely from the budget negotiation process, which I think is a very good thing for the Federal Reserve. Do it now.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: And, of course, we've had very little increase in the implied forward rates in the long end of the curve; much of it is intermediate. Nonetheless, when considering when to switch from accommodative to neutral I would note that the current favorable outlook for stronger growth does provide a credible environment in which to consider such a move at a time when I think many people would suggest the risks are on the up side. I will also simply say that it's worth noting that the Administration forecast is, of course, for short rates to go up above inflation next year. Thank you. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Kelley. 

MR. KELLEY. "I see very little evidence of an important change."

Full utterance: Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm about where I've been for some months now. I see very little evidence of an important change. My definition of that in my lexicon would be a moderate growth expectation, fits and starts, a surge perhaps here in the fourth quarter but not sustainable, with a slow acceleration--in fits and starts--over time. I think there are enough positives in the forecast to sustain that growth, not the least of which would be a continued reduction in your famous head winds. In all probability all of the positives will sustain that moderate growth path. I think we have to recognize that there exist considerable restraints in that forecast that should prevent an upside breakout, [including] fiscal restraint, the further impact of new taxes, and a saving rate that is already at the bottom of its historical range. Also, restructuring continues and defense [outlays] will continue to decrease; net exports will not be helpful and may decrease or get worse as well; and intermediate and long rates have shown some spontaneous rises. I emphasize that I come out on the positive side of this, but I do think we have to recognize that there are some pretty powerful restraints out there. I'll relate one anecdote that I would share with those who weren't there. The Federal Advisory Committee was in here a week or so ago and they were asked what their forecast for the economy was. They had a very, very strong consensus at between 2-1/2 and 3 percent centering on about 2.8 percent. Just to see what it might elicit, we said: Okay if that's the consensus, think contrarian a little bit and tell us where you would see the risks to that forecast. Interestingly enough, the way I heard it--others who were there may have heard it differently--they were almost unanimous in seeing the risks on the down side, not the up side, for whatever that's worth. On inflation, I just don't see any pickup visible. Inflation is still falling on a year-over-year basis by almost every measure. We still have slack in the economy, although capacity utilization may have to come off of that list with this latest report. But certainly [we have slack] in labor markets and world activity generally and sentiment continues to be weak. So, I see no reason to look to a short-term move in that regard. In short: Steady as she goes.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON.
text: That ought to be an IMF compliance standard! 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: That's an unusual hazard. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: It's indicative of the hazards that they run. I don't know [the details]; all I read was a newspaper report that he's too friendly with the foreign banks. But it is some indication of the difficulty of managing these programs. 

MS. TEETERS. "Didn't a judge down there overturn one of the restructurings?"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: But in the year-end environment-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: If they had those expectations, wouldn't you expect to see it more pronounced in the 2-year swap? It depends on whether it's solely a mortgage hedging operation, and it's obviously not. But the way you described it there was a sort of broader soft landing, monetary ease notion. If that were the fundamental concept from which they were dealing, wouldn't one have expected the 2-year swap rate to go down more? 

MR. FISHER. "That is, the overall hedging market at the short end of the yield curve is so much deeper than at the current longer end of the yield curve, the 10-year, that the result is this exaggerated swing."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. JOHNSON.
text: But then I think it would become clear to the market if we got to that point. If I were a market participant and I were sitting out there seeing the Federal Reserve talking about price stability and yet selling massive amounts of dollars, I think eventually I'd decide that was a joke as a policy. It seems to me that our policies have to be reasonably complementary and that we have to make some stand ultimately if the amount gets beyond the point of reason. I'm not saying that within a range we should not participate and act in a practical way on disorderly markets, as Ed Boehne said. But what do you do when you build up $50-$60 billion of foreign exchange reserves? 

MR. BLACK. "The other is that members of Congress become concerned about the losses and try to exert political pressure on us so that we don't have to take those losses, which would mean pressure to ease policy."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. LACKER.
text: Today's meeting, I think, was an excellent example of that. Third, I view the purpose of the minutes as a means to communicate to the public the deliberations that occurred at the meeting, rather than the deliberations of the Committee-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: No, that is not the purpose. The purpose is essentially to give the reasons why we voted the way we did. 
speaker: MR. LACKER.
text: Well, that's a different philosophy; I'll grant that. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "We can't get around it."

Full utterance: It has always been that way. The point is that, if you divide the Committee into two separate groups and then discuss what those who voted on the particular statement thought and what those who didn't vote thought, we are actually no longer talking about the Federal Open Market Committee. The Federal Open Market Committee is composed of the twelve members who have the right to vote at a particular time. That's the law. We can't get around it.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. COLDWELL.
text: Mr. Chairman, I have been on both sides of the fence. I think there have been times when intervention has been desirable. If we're going into this we ought to go into it in a major way; I would not want to go into this if we're going to fritter away a few hundred million. I think we ought to embark on a program of this character with the Japanese expecting to spend at least $4 billion. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN MILLER.
text: Between the two combined you mean. 

MR. COLDWELL. "The Treasury and us."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: I would see at least as much danger there. It will be delicate to write it. I could easily write this in a way that locked us in more than we might want to be locked in to a lowering of M1 if we saw any sign of increasing inflationary pressures. I don't want us to be locked in too much either. 
speaker: MR. ANGELL.
text: Well, I think we should create that expectation. 

CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. "My principal concern is that we should warn them that under those circumstances, which may or may not eventually occur, we expect a pretty low Ml."

Full utterance: I think people have to be warned. My principal concern is that we should warn them that under those circumstances, which may or may not eventually occur, we expect a pretty low Ml.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BLACK.
text: I think we have a real opportunity here to make significant progress--the best we've had since I've been around. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: The coffee is here and I neglected to take the break; I notice everyone is running for coffee, so why don't we take a short break and come back in 5 minutes? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Parry. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: Mr. Chairman. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Begin, s'il vous plait! 

MR. PARRY. "Like the Greenbook, we expect a decline in inflation over the next year and a half."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. WALLICH.
text: I would agree with that. 
speaker: MS. TEETERS.
text: Mr. Chairman, maybe Steve could explain to us how he intends to operate. It might help us decide what kind of numbers we put in. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN VOLCKER.
text: Well, how he intends to operate depends upon what we decide here. 
speaker: MR. PARTEE.
text: Bring in borrowings. 

VICE CHAIRMAN SOLOMON. "If we want to defer that easing, okay, we can defer it."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MACDONALD.
text: Many businessmen, however, are apprehensive about [the economy] later in the year. People are especially concerned about the consumer being over-extended in the housing market. The strengths in our District include steel and machine tools, but inflation continues to be the overriding source of concern for everybody from the consumer to the manufacturer. Among the unknowns are energy, the Iranian situation, and wage settlements coming up this year. For these reasons I would not suggest easing policy; I'd wait until we can better judge the economy and the slowdown in the Ms. I agree with President Volcker on a 1 to 4 percent M1 range and a 4 to I percent M2 range, and [then] following alternative B in the Bluebook. 

CHAIRMAN MILLER. "Dave."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: So at this point I think one should be cautious in anticipating a really radical shift in productivity gains. 
speaker: MR. SYRON.
text: A question for Tom Simpson: In your discussion, you talked about the balance sheet restructurings of both households and corporations. This is not a well-defined question, but do we have some notion even in a generalized sense of how much more desire there might be to do that? I'm trying to get to how much intermediated versus nonintermediated funds are going to the open market in this area with some vague presumption of conditions in the market remaining about as they are now. 

MR. SIMPSON. "And the announcements of reverse LBOs and so forth suggest that there still is more room to go in that area."


Opinion: no