kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: I would do the same thing--the next morning, though. 
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: So, all you're doing basically is speeding up the announcement process by two or three hours. Right now it comes out at 11:30 a.m. the next day, and you want to do it at 9:00 a.m. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: It's not always clear. 

MR. MCDONOUGH. "We let the market assume that we've eased."

Full utterance: It doesn't in fact come out. We let the market assume that we've eased. I think there would be an additional benefit because sometimes it isn't altogether clear how much we've eased and it takes us a day or two of fiddling around with repos and matched-sales in order to convince the market what exactly was done. To the degree that there's a benefit in not confusing markets, I think we would actually get a plus from this approach.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KELLEY.
text: Maybe they will come sooner than we think. They're probably going to be on the up side, but it's too soon to be totally confident of that. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Mullins. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: Well, I don't have much to add. I agree with Larry that we've had a great year; we didn't know it. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "We didn't appreciate it."

Full utterance: We didn't appreciate it.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KELLEY.
text: They're probably going to be on the up side, but it's too soon to be totally confident of that. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Mullins. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: Well, I don't have much to add. I agree with Larry that we've had a great year; we didn't know it. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: We didn't appreciate it. 

MR. MULLINS. "We didn't appreciate it."

Full utterance: We didn't appreciate it. We only learned about it in the last week or two, but we should take the next week off and celebrate. I agree with Governor Angell that we should think about why we had such a good year. It's certainly not money growth; the economy has been growing on velocity increases, whatever that is. And it's certainly not employment growth either; the economy has been growing on productivity increases. So, as best I can figure out, the economy has been running on fumes so far in '92. I don't think the numbers have changed much from what we expected earlier in the year even with the ups and downs. So far growth for the year is only 2.6 percent, which is pretty good; and we probably will do a little better than that. I suppose one of the motivating factors could be the election psychology. One would hope that it would turn out better here than it did in the United Kingdom and other places where they've had that phenomenon. I suppose there is the upside risk that Jerry mentioned of sound budgetary policies at the federal level. I guess I have a lot of confidence that that's not too great a risk. [Laughter] We do seem to be lifting ourselves gradually out of the mire. I see nothing robust even in these latest numbers and no real signs yet that we may be approaching an overly robust upturn. The risk is that, despite the slack the staff talks about, we don't have nearly so much slack as after the last recession when unemployment was 10 percent and capacity utilization was probably 70 percent. In terms of sustainability, I'll feel a lot more comfortable when we do get employment growth; also, some money and credit growth would be nice. We probably have had some marginal tightening from the dollar and from the increase in short- and intermediate-rates as near-term inflationary expectations have fallen. I also think the reduction in long rates could well be reversed very quickly once we see the character of Congress's pent-up demand for spending as this process gets started. To me one of the interesting things we're going to have to face is the coming collapse of M2 growth again. In February, the next time we meet, we could well have had two months of zero M2 growth and once again be back in that debate over what sort of policy we're following at the time we decide on next year's ranges. I would just conclude by saying that we should take the rest of the week off and celebrate a job well accomplished!

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. SYRON.
text: One strong sector has been the nonbank financial services sector, particularly in greater Boston. That has had an impact not only on the housing market, which has stabilized and actually turned up a little, but also on the commercial real estate market, which also has stabilized. However, [commercial rentals] have stabilized at around $22 a square foot, I'd say, for top Class A space, which translates to the space being worth somewhere around $120 to $150 a square foot; it was built at $250 to $400 in a lot of cases. So, there is an adjustment clearly going on. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: They doubled [in] New England dollars! 

MR. SYRON. "Now, we think in a simple two-sector model a lot of this stuff was produced in the defense sector and it wasn't entering the measurements for consumer prices anyway."


Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: It's not entirely separable from those features of the economic system that relate to how much pressure we get on wages and prices at given measured levels of unemployment. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: Well, to the extent that the NAIRU doesn't change, it clearly has significant implications. 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: Well, all things equal, if we held to our assumption of the NAIRU of 6-1/2 percent or a shade less and we had unemployment at 6.8 percent, and looked at those numbers very, very finely, that would be enough slack, presumably, to give us some modest edging off in the inflation rate over the coming year or two. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: Thank you. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Lindsey. 

MR. LINDSEY. "Mike, I note that in the forecast there is a roll-back at the long end of about 1/2 percentage point, but suppose that doesn't happen."

Full utterance: Mike, I note that in the forecast there is a roll-back at the long end of about 1/2 percentage point, but suppose that doesn't happen. How would that change your forecast?

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: I think they have about a half percentage point increase in the funds rate in the second half of this year and nothing after that. 
speaker: MS. MINEHAN.
text: Yes, they actually have rates backing off, I think. 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: Right, I think they have some modest easing next year and bond yields come down a bit more than in our forecast, and yet they have somewhat weaker growth over the next six quarters. In terms of what a more gradual rate increase would produce if one used our quarterly model, the distinctions, as I hinted in my remarks, would be modest. 
speaker: MS. MINEHAN.
text: Too short of a period of time perhaps? 

MR. PRELL. "Well, we are talking about rather small differences."

Full utterance: Well, we are talking about rather small differences. A 1 percentage point change in the funds rate done immediately according to our quarterly model will only take several tenths off GDP growth by the second half of 1995. And it only means a couple of tenths or so on the CPI. So, if you simply select a more gradual rise, the differences are going to be even smaller. I guess what we are suggesting is that, in our judgment, the tilt begins to be most likely in an upward direction in terms of inflation right now, that is, given that we feel we are essentially at full employment.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: This gets back to the second risk that came out in response to Michael Moskow's question. I suspect that may subject us to even more criticism inasmuch as Congress and the American people apparently strongly oppose extending credit to Mexico. In effect, one could argue that we would be participating in an effort to subvert that will of the public, if you will. I do not want to be too dramatic in stating that. This could cause a re-evaluation of the institutional structure of the Fed in a very fundamental and broad way. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "I see that Larry Lindsey is shaking his head as I am talking."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. STERN.
text: I would not change the M2 range. After listening to Don, the explanation for changing the M3 range seems straightforward, and in that sense I would go ahead and do that. I don't think that would cause any problems with your testimony. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: I agree with that. M2 is the crucial aggregate. 

MR. STERN. "Another related and important issue has to do with public support for any objective that we adopt, whether it is mandated by statute or we do it ourselves."

Full utterance: With regard to some of the issues that Al Broaddus raised, I think his points are well taken. We ought to be looking at monetary policy as it relates to inflation. My reservations have to do with my impression that a couple of his points in some sense jump the gun. They have to do with two issues in particular. Don Kohn raised a question about the quantification of the benefits of price stability and indicated--or at least I took his comments to mean--that the evidence was mixed and uncertain. If we started doing present value calculations, depending on what estimates we believed, we might find significant benefits or we might find that the benefits are rather small relative to their cost. I happen to believe that there are benefits there and that they are sizable, but I think it is incumbent upon us to make that case more compellingly than we have to date. I don't see any way around the difficult research that probably involves. Another related and important issue has to do with public support for any objective that we adopt, whether it is mandated by statute or we do it ourselves. To some extent, it falls on us to build the public support for a price stability objective. I don't think that support is totally lacking, but I don't believe there is any great conviction among the public at large that price stability ought to be the preeminent objective of monetary policy. Until we put together some of that evidence I was referring to earlier, I think moving way out ahead and trying to bring the public with us might be very difficult. So, for the reasons that I stated, I would be cautious at this juncture about going down that path. I do think there are issues there, and I suggested before that we ought to be discussing and looking at them and probably finding some research to do. I am concerned about moving too far too quickly.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: We might be thinking about the need to revise our approach for 1996 and perhaps begin to move our time horizon further out. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: We probably will have to respond to a bill on the Hill at some point. Our response will have to capture the view of this Committee in its various aspects as they have been raised, largely pro and con, by you, Al Broaddus, and the rest of us. It is going to be our one shot at the legislation, and I am a little concerned that if we don't focus on this issue, we could suddenly find ourselves with significant mandated revisions in what we do. Those revisions may not involve what we wanted, and in retrospect we may find that we could have gotten a different and more favorable outcome. 

MR. MELZER. "The more leadership we exercise in this, the better off we are going to be in terms of the ultimate outcome."

Full utterance: I agree and I felt that way when we talked about this in February. The more leadership we exercise in this, the better off we are going to be in terms of the ultimate outcome. There are different points of view on this issue, but I think it would be very unfortunate if, for example, we got to a year from now and we were debating how we might adjust the M2 and M3 ranges and never got to this topic. Price stability is what a central bank is all about. We ought to be quite explicit about that commitment, and we ought to discuss how we might achieve it operationally. So, that is very consistent with the sorts of topics that Al is raising. Ultimately, I think it would improve our accountability, which would in turn improve our performance and lead to higher economic growth and employment than we otherwise would have achieved. Gary Stern made some good points about documenting that case. I think that is becoming increasingly urgent, as pointed up by this discussion today, and it is something we have to pursue.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BROADDUS.
text: That might beg some questions about what price stability is, but that's okay because we need to confront those one way or another in any case. If I may be a little more specific, it might be useful, say, with a horizon that runs out to the year 2000, to flesh out how you might interpret an opportunistic strategy under certain kinds of assumptions and what that might mean in terms of some price measure like the CPI. Perhaps as another alternative, you might add something that is a little more like our traditional inflation targeting with more specific numerical goals, year by year. That kind of structure might allow us to get a little more quickly to some of the questions with which we really need to grapple. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Minehan. 

MS. MINEHAN. "Does a price stability goal mean holding the line where we are and taking advantage of opportunities to get inflation lower, or does it mean some forward-looking policy to drive inflation down with all that implies about how we measure it."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. PHILLIPS.
text: It would eventually work its way into GDP at some point. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Over the long run, oil prices would work their way through but never fully. That's because there would be a significant shift to domestic natural gas. The economy would go back to using more coal, and we would have much smaller cars. So, the higher oil prices would filter through only partly. 

MS. PHILLIPS. "But focusing on GDP, you are still going to be addressing the question of an external oil shock."

Full utterance: But focusing on GDP, you are still going to be addressing the question of an external oil shock.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MCTEER.
text: We certainly do not want to give the M's too much external play nor to give the impression that we are once again targeting any of them. On the other hand, not only do I think we should be watching them more internally than I believe we have been lately, I also believe that we should make occasional references to them publicly along with other things so that they do not die out in the public mind. It helps greatly in the rhetoric when tightening becomes necessary to be able to say we are having to tighten because the monetary aggregates are growing at an inflationary rate. That sounds a lot better than saying that we have to tighten because the economy is growing and because employment is growing and unemployment is too low. So, money is a very useful thing to have in our tool kit, and we ought to keep it before the public--we have to "use it or lose it." 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "As soon as we start to use it in that context, then when M2 starts to grow at a far slower rate, though we may not think that means anything, we have put it in play and the devil will come back to collect his dues."

Full utterance: As soon as we start to use it in that context, then when M2 starts to grow at a far slower rate, though we may not think that means anything, we have put it in play and the devil will come back to collect his dues.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): neutral
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BROADDUS.
text: They do not really pose the kinds of risk to the economy that some of our actions necessarily did in the mid-1980s when we were indeed tightening policy in an effort to reduce inflation at a time when our credibility was relatively low. I realize that while these points may make good economic sense and may be persuasive to some people, putting a pretty face on a funds rate increase is a tough sell when we are dealing with the media or Congress or the general public for that matter. I think we need to find a way to get this message across and to be persistent in doing so. I thought you made some similar points very effectively in your NYU speech, Mr. Chairman. We need to do more of that whenever we get the chance, and it strikes me that your upcoming testimony might be a good opportunity for another tutorial. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "That is effectively what our argument is, and it is the right argument."

Full utterance: I think we were well aware of what would happen when we shifted to an explicit federal funds rate target. As you may recall, we fought off that apparently inevitable day as long as we could. We ran into the situation, as you may remember, when the money supply, nonborrowed reserves, and various other non-interest-rate measures on which the Committee had focused had in turn fallen by the wayside. We were left with interest rates because we had no alternative. I think it is still in a sense our official policy that if we can find a way back to where we are able to target the money supply or net borrowed reserves or some other non-interest measure instead of the federal funds rate, we would like to do that. I am not sure we will be able to return to such a regime and in the process create a whole new army of Fed watchers who interpret what we are doing, but the reason is not that we enthusiastically embrace targeting the federal funds rate. We did it as an unfortunate fallback when we had no other options, and I think the consequences are much as we anticipated. The way to get around this problem is to meet it head on, and instead of saying that we are moving rates up to curb inflation, we should say that we are moving them up to sustain long-term employment growth. That is effectively what our argument is, and it is the right argument. It involves bypassing the intermediate inflationary imbalances issue in a lot of these discussions. My opinion is that from a public relations point of view it is very hard to sell low inflation when we already have low inflation. It works only in a period like the late 1970s when everyone was terrified of the consequences of inflation and the Federal Reserve effectively had a mandate. We do not have a mandate now, and the reason is that we have been successful. It is the fallout of being successful that we have to handle. It is a very difficult and complex public relations issue. But we have to realize that if we fail to succeed in the public relations, we may still have to move ahead and do what we have to do and take the consequences. We still have to do our job.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Minehan. 
speaker: MS. MINEHAN.
text: On the Japanese situation again, we received what I thought was a fascinating paper on the policy options available to the Japanese. It certainly emphasized the fact that they need to do something that is fairly aggressive and strong on the fiscal side. The paper also discussed the topic that Al Broaddus brought up, namely, the potential for a depreciating yen to lead over some period of time to a recovery through an expansion in exports. In that regard, I was wondering whether the yen has actually depreciated on a trade-weighted basis. 

MR. TRUMAN. "In fact, that is part of the argument."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: People knew they were dabbling in that sector of the markets, but everyone including a lot of the press had thought of LTCP as a fixed-income shop. Some of the firms who looked at LTCP's position in more detail than I, who had the weekend to investigate, felt that the preponderance of the exposure, if one uses the $3 to $5 billion number, that needed to be stabilized was the equity position and the equity volatility position. That's in trades with LTCP in total-rate-of-return swaps. A lesser part of the losses was in the fixed-income financing area. So, the bigger risk was this huge equity volatility position that LTCP had taken on. 

VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. "I do not know the answer at this point."

Full utterance: One of the things that we have to be able to say to Congress is whether the state-chartered banks that we supervise participated in the equity piece or not. I do not know the answer at this point.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: I need a vote on my operations during the period. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Would somebody like to move approval? 
speaker: MS. MINEHAN.
text: So move. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
text: Second. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Without objection. 

MR. FISHER. "I have two other items, which I hope can go a little more quickly."

Full utterance: I have two other items, which I hope can go a little more quickly. First, I need a vote authorizing renewal of our swap agreements with the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Mexico. By my silence and your inaction, all our other swap arrangements would lapse as described in Mr. Truman's memo and my memo to you of September 28. This is consistent with what we have discussed in recent years. Karen Johnson is working with other central banks to insure that the announcement of this action in the FOMC minutes that will be released shortly after the December meeting will be consistent with statements that might be issued by other central banks. That issue is still being worked on. With regard to the second item, I am seeking your approval of an amendment to the Domestic Authorization to allow repo operations of up to a 60-day maturity. This was explained in my memo to you of November 10. I would be happy to answer questions on either of those two items. I seek your vote on both.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no