kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: As to the risks: Obviously, they're manyfold and very substantial. If I had to characterize them for the very near term, I'd put a small interval around the minus 2 percent and say that is what we think is the most likely result. My judgment would be that the tail [of the probability distribution] is probably a bit longer and a bit thicker going to the down side but that we have a significant [mass] of the probability around this moderate drop--I don't know if a drop is ever moderate--of 2 percent or something close to the magnitude that we have in the fourth quarter. 
speaker: MR. SYRON.
text: There is never an awful lot of comfort in these things, but are you much more uncomfortable in terms of your distribution about how long it takes to come back--whether it's two quarters, three quarters, etc? 

MR. PRELL. "We are not able to point to very clear-cut real impacts at this juncture that we can say are obviously attributable to the credit situation."

Full utterance: Well, we're sort of captives of our key assumptions. And oil, given the movement we have forecast, is a quite powerful influence. So the broad contours here seem right to me in light of that assumption. Now, as to how one might want to alter that in light of one's geo-political-military assessments, obviously, there's a tremendous range of possibilities. I think there is a lot of sense to assuming that at some point over the next 6 to 9 months we will have a significantly lower oil price either after military conflict or in the absence of military conflict. But the timing of that and what might happen in between is hard to say. So, that obviously complicates things. As to the credit picture, as we've said all along, this is just very hard to translate into GNP points. We are not able to point to very clear-cut real impacts at this juncture that we can say are obviously attributable to the credit situation. For example, in nonresidential construction, which is where everyone thought the most direct hit would be, it isn't really obvious there yet. We can see the contracts and permits data suggesting some weakening, but there seems to be a pretty long pipeline and there isn't a sign of an enormous drop right now. We're predicting that we will see some significant weakness in construction put-in-place in the next two months' reports. But this is hard to predict.

Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Why don't we adjourn for coffee and come back in 10 minutes. 
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: [Statement--see Appendix.] 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Questions for Don? 
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: Don, I noticed in the money projections in the Bluebook that there's a very dramatic difference when you get out to February and March between alternatives A and B, much more so than I think we normally see. Do you want to comment on that? 

MR. KOHN. "We tried to stick with about a normal difference."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: Now, I think you're right that the churning around year-end is a problem; and my view is that if we're going to do something, we probably ought to do it in the next couple of days to get it out there and done with and then pretty well even keel it through this potentially difficult period around year-end. But I don't see why it can't be done in the next few days. 
speaker: MR. STERNLIGHT.
text: I would agree that it can be conveyed. I think something about like that move is what a number of people in the market expect. That would also help in being able to convey [an intention] like that. 

MR. BLACK. "If we did this, you don't think it would provide an undue degree of surprise, do you?"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: And then a cut in the ranges in February will be more than symbolic and the timing might be precisely what we need. So, I'm quite comfortable with reaffirming the ranges in alternative II but, as I said, I do take seriously your point about the need to look at that closely in February. Indeed, things could turn out such that both substantively and symbolically a cut in the ranges then could be just what the doctor ordered when we need it most. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Melzer. 

MR. MELZER. "The credibility point is the major argument in favor of it."

Full utterance: In terms of the strategies laid out, I'd favor strategy II, the tighter one, and flowing from that alternative III in terms of the ranges. We're talking about a long-term approach to strategy here, and that underlines our commitment to price stability, which I think is the one thing we really can influence in the long run. The credibility point is the major argument in favor of it. It seems to me that we could get the most positive impact by making a move now. I agree with Jerry: Our actions are more important than the symbolism of this. But I think if we change it in February, it's going to be because we're perceived to be on the run; and I don't know whether we buy a lot at that point in time. Some of the arguments that I've heard I'm not particularly persuaded by--for example, gradualism. We've been at this for four years and I think we ought to keep down that path. I agree with what you said, Mr. Chairman, and with what Lee said: There's some distance to go here. And I think this is the time to try to consolidate some of the gains. In terms of this issue about a top end of 6 percent somehow constraining our ability to act if the economy is weaker than we expected--and this picks up on Jerry's point--we're already "acting" quite a bit now; we have projections in the Bluebook of M2 growth moving up to a 6 percent rate, which is 50 percent higher than what we've averaged over the last four years. So, we're doing our part in trying to assure a recovery. In fact, I would agree with Jerry that what we have to be thinking about is: When do we take some of that rope back in? On the final point that I've heard some arguments that I don't necessarily agree with, I'd add the financial fragility point. I don't think the conduct of monetary policy, so long as we're providing adequate liquidity to the economy, is really the appropriate tool. I think we can look ourselves in the mirror and say that we've been doing our part on that score. I don't disagree that there are problems out there, but I think there are other policy approaches that need to address those. If you step back and look at them, the problems that we're having with the financial system are really the products of a monetary policy that sowed the seeds for inflation, and a lot of the problems are inherent now as inflation is coming down.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MS. LOVETT.
text: It's one of the foibles of having a federal funds rate objective that gets narrower and narrower. That did happen on a couple of occasions and we didn't want to have to drain the reserves if we could avoid it. So, the fact that the perception out there was that at certain rate levels and at certain times we didn't have a tolerance [for actions] that would cause people to bid the rate up is part of what one has to call the "market dynamics." 
speaker: MR. JORDAN.
text: You could now be in [a similar] position in the opposite direction. With the funds rate at 3-7/8 percent if you saw a need to drain, [you would] feel compelled to add reserves--to do something that is not really consistent with supplying reserves--in order to avoid giving a wrong signal. 

MS. LOVETT. "There isn't anyone out there who expects that the Committee is going to be firming policy, so there's more tolerance for a funds rate that deviates to the high side of the expected level than there would be for a funds rate that deviates to the low side."

Full utterance: Well, we have a little more flexibility on one side of the rate depending on the state of market expectations. There isn't anyone out there who expects that the Committee is going to be firming policy, so there's more tolerance for a funds rate that deviates to the high side of the expected level than there would be for a funds rate that deviates to the low side. So, actually, we have throughout this period felt somewhat more comfortable with having our operations be a little loose on the up side--that is, letting funds trade at higher levels without necessarily going in and offsetting it. Whereas on the low side we wouldn't feel as comfortable because if there were any direction to policy in this period, that's the way the market thinking has been. MR..JORDAN. That asymmetry, though, is due to market perceptions that we are conditioned by real magnitudes; they think we're responding to things we can't control anyway. But the follow-up question is this: Over this last week the market tried to [interpret] that failure to cut the funds rate, in a reserve supplying sense, as a relative tightening of policy. From the Desk perspective, would you view it as tighter?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR.   LINDSEY.
text: My third question about what you were saying is: Are you going up there with no anchor at all? In other words, if you say that temporarily we're not looking at M2, I think Milton Friedman and others have-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: No, I'm not saying that. 
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: Oh, good. Okay. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "To say it is meaningless is a statement of knowledge."

Full utterance: We are saying that we are looking at it. We're saying nothing more than we have basically said [before]. In other words, we are not saying it is meaningless. To say it is meaningless is a statement of knowledge. What we're saying is that something that had relationships has gone off the track. That basically stipulates that for this particular time it has no meaning; it is a state of knowledge we don't have. Indeed, it may be reflecting something quite significant, but we don't know that.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: There could be a tradeoff between the direct effects of lower taxes on income or higher expenditures on activity that would eliminate the need and probably tend to elevate long rates relative to what they are in our scenario. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: Indeed, last year during the first-quarter debate [on fiscal packages] the long bond went up 60 basis points. 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: Yes. It's an open question, of course, whether rates are now higher than they would otherwise be if there were not already considerable concern about the possibility of some significant enhancement in the size of the budget deficit. So, it's a little [hard] to sort out what the effects would be; but I can envision circumstances, as you're suggesting, in which the bond markets would be adversely affected at least temporarily. 

MR. MULLINS. "Or at least we wouldn't get the 75 basis points decline; rates would stay constant."

Full utterance: Or at least we wouldn't get the 75 basis points decline; rates would stay constant.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HOENIG.
text: Going back to your issue that the public has a right to know at some point, I think we have had in the past, as I've read this material, a position that says, yes, we would be willing to accommodate them with a detailed memorandum of discussion again if we could have some assurances that there wouldn't be premature release of that material to the public through a FOI request. That issue still stands and we can be consistent with protecting the deliberative process and making [a detailed transcript] available if they're willing to protect that over time. And, as we apparently did in the past, we can make some compromise in terms of what others are talking about here--releasing the results in a more timely way than we do now, which is waiting until after the next meeting. That may be of more value in essence to the public than having the TV cameras in here. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Syron. 

MR. SYRON. "Pretty clearly, we all agree to that."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN CORRIGAN.
text: I think the press conference option is a very slippery slope. And if it ever slid into the perception that the Fed was marketing itself in some sense, I think it would be disastrous. And doing [press conferences] I don't think will cut off the kinds of [problems] Gary was referring to. So I am very dubious about that. But I know that is clearly an area where reasonable men and women can differ. 

MR. MULLINS. "[We can see] if there is anything else we might find useful--as opposed to the way we looked at it, which was to start with the assumption that openness is a threat to the quality of monetary policymaking, as it clearly is in a number of these areas."

Full utterance: Okay, that was very useful. The subcommittee will reconvene in the future. I guess I heard about the same type of disagreement [we had in the subcommittee] on the "E" issue on federal funds rate announcements. That's something we'll take another look at given the issues that have been raised. A number of issues have been brought up that were not raised by the subcommittee. Also the issue of whether there isn't something else we could do, like press conferences, is worth looking at. The experience of the Treasury and others who have gone to that is that it's tough to get [the genie] back in the bottle. Is there something we could gain in terms of the perception of the reality? I think we should take a look at that with some caution. Again, maybe the early policy record disclosure--the question there is how early could we do it--would make a difference. But that would get us into the problem of [using] the asymmetric directive and things of that nature. We will continue to compile [the information referred to in] the appendix because I think it is worthwhile to have a sense of where we fit within the broader context of other institutions. Another thing we'll look at is the point that Jerry Jordan raised, which is that another way to look at this whole area is [to consider] what we could do that would contribute positively to the quality of monetary policymaking. [We can see] if there is anything else we might find useful--as opposed to the way we looked at it, which was to start with the assumption that openness is a threat to the quality of monetary policymaking, as it clearly is in a number of these areas.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KEEHN.
text: I'd prefer to do it without the executive summary. I understand what Susan and Mike are saying, but I can't think of a time--again to use the private sector context--when I've seen private sector minutes with an executive summary. And I think the more we make it consistent with such minutes, the better off we are. So, I'd do it without the summary. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: Al. 

MR. BROADDUS. "Of course, we can answer them when we get them, but if we write the answer out to begin with, it might be clearer."

Full utterance: I would recommend that we make some brief announcement about the change because inevitably there are going to be questions. Of course, we can answer them when we get them, but if we write the answer out to begin with, it might be clearer. I also had a question. Will the subcommittee continue to exist? Will some of the issues we discussed at the last meeting, such as the release date and the possibility of doing something like the Memorandum of Discussion, still be on the table?

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. JORDAN.
text: Is this an objective or is this a prediction? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: This is a prediction and I've made a very special point to avoid any implication that any of these [data] are goals. [We do this] because we are required by statute to present this sort of [stuff]. If we ever put down actual goals, then we really will have problems. So we fudge it for the Committee as best we can. 

MR. JORDAN. "Our objective is to go to price stability, but we're predicting that the rate of inflation is going to be sticking in the 3 to 3 plus percent area."

Full utterance: How do you handle that then when it says that the Committee's policies are related to inflation? Our objective is to go to price stability, but we're predicting that the rate of inflation is going to be sticking in the 3 to 3 plus percent area.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. ANGELL.
text: But unfortunately there are some instances in which that is the case. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: I was going to ask Don for a few remarks relative to this question because I think we have to make a statement. Do we want to issue something? I think, substantively, it's bound to inhibit somewhat this organization's function. Don. 

MR. KOHN. "By constraining [the ability of] the Committee to take actions to go to an asymmetric directive or off asymmetry to symmetry, it would in some sense remove by very small amounts some of the flexibility of the Committee."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I perhaps just ought to remind the Committee very briefly that on several occasions over the last six or eight months it did consider this question of whether it should release information immediately. We had a Mullins' subcommittee on this and a full and open discussion on the issue. While a few members of the Committee tended to favor immediate release, they were, I think, a minority; certainly, no one moved to change the situation. The concerns of the Committee at the time were the questions of flexibility in policymaking, whether an immediate announcement of a directive, say, like the asymmetric directive in May, would constrain the Committee from going to asymmetry because they wouldn't want the announcement effect. In fact, the effect was that it did have markets raising interest rates; if they weren't sure, they were going to raise rates. By constraining [the ability of] the Committee to take actions to go to an asymmetric directive or off asymmetry to symmetry, it would in some sense remove by very small amounts some of the flexibility of the Committee. That was the concern the Committee had. The other issue that you need to think about if you're considering going to an immediate release is what to release. If in May, for example, right after its meeting the Committee had released the fact that it had gone to an asymmetric directive would that have significantly called off the reporters? One has to wonder. At least I would have to wonder whether the reporters wouldn't be all over the Committee members wondering why you had done it and under what circumstances a change would be made. [But] it would help [to release such information] and in most meetings it would stop right there, I think, once the Committee announced its decision. But then you do have the question of what you release along with that and how far to go. So, there are a couple of issues that were raised when the Committee last discussed this.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HOENIG.
text: We also expect modest inflation, about the same as the Greenbook. Some of that comes from a little stronger growth in business fixed investment and a little more accumulation of inventories, but basically we see very modest growth going forward. Because of our stronger growth projections, we see employment being a little better than what the Greenbook shows but, again, not enough to change how we view the economy into 1994. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Thank you. President Boehne. 

MR. BOEHNE. "And that's a new kind of attitude."

Full utterance: The Philadelphia region has improved a little but it continues to grow modestly and still, I think, lags the nation. Employment growth is sluggish and attitudes remain cautious, neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Where there has been some improvement is in the manufacturing sector, which has been a major drag on the economy. It's not that it's going up so much; it's that it has tended to stabilize after several months of decline. Also, New Jersey, which has been one of the hardest hit states in the country, appears to be improving. The weakest sector there was construction, and both residential and nonresidential are showing some signs of growth although from very low levels. Also, New Jersey had a good tourism summer and that has been a positive. More generally, I'm picking up the same kinds of vibrations that Si is in the commercial real estate market: That investment in real estate is beginning to look relatively attractive because other alternatives aren't so good. It has been a long time since I've heard the term REIT in our board room but I'm now hearing it again, which isn't all good news. We went through the REIT problems of 20 years or so ago. But this noise we hear about some improvement in commercial real estate is not for this year or next year so much as later in the decade. District bankers report weak commercial loan demand. However, when we pursue that a little more, they are beginning to wonder how they will finance a pickup in loan demand when it comes. And that's a new kind of attitude. They're worried about the runoff they've seen in deposits and whether they can get enough deposits back to fund what they think someday will be an upturn in loan demand. On the national economy, I think the fundamentals are about the same and will likely continue to be the same: moderate growth, subdued inflationary pressures, employment growth insufficient to cause a significant drop in unemployment, and cautious attitudes. I don't believe there's very much that monetary policy can do to alter that outlook even if we wanted to. But I think the respite from criticism that we've had in recent months is likely to come to an end. Impatience is going to be our greatest foe in the next few months. And I suspect that we will increasingly have to defend a no change policy as the restlessness over this rather disappointing employment growth continues to build.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Well, I thought the memorandum was really quite useful. I think the results that were obtained showed a fairly extensive advance in the state of knowledge in this area. 
speaker: MR. BEEBE.
text: I might add that the survey data even at moderate rates of inflation--U.S.-type rates--do indicate that the standard errors and the uncertainty of the forecasters rise with the level of inflation. So even at reasonable rates of inflation there is some evidence now that the level of inflation and inflation uncertainty are related. And that gets back to the distribution issue that Mike alluded to. 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "If not, before we go on to the substance of our meeting, the conventional [agenda], Sandra Pianalto is here for the first time and we'd like to welcome her."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: The point I was trying to make was that if you do delay and inflation expectations in particular get going, you're going to have to raise rates not only to cover the higher inflation expectations but-- 
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: But even more. 
speaker: MR. KOHN.
text: -- if you have a certain inflation target you're going to have to overshoot to get that down again. But I don't have a rule of thumb. It would depend on where you were in the cycle and how far you-- 

MR. LINDSEY. "The only case I can think of was '66 where the Fed [implemented] just one small increase."


Opinion: no