kakeith406/op-fed huggingface dataset:
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FORRESTAL.
text: So, I think no change in policy is clearly the right prescription. I have a preference for symmetry, if only on a theoretical basis, in the sense that it seems probable to me that we will not move in either direction, and that in my mind calls for a symmetric directive. However, having just had an asymmetric directive, I can understand that there may be some problems in moving to symmetry. So, I would certainly not object to asymmetry, particularly in view of your statement that it wouldn't presuppose any policy action. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Parry. 

MR. PARRY. "Mr. Chairman, I would support your recommendation."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I would support your recommendation. I think a case could be made for symmetry but, given where we are today and also given my own utility function with regard to inflation, I would just as soon [retain] the asymmetry.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Boehne. 
speaker: MR. BOEHNE.
text: I think the case for a steady policy is a strong one, and you've laid it out. On the issue of symmetry or asymmetry, if one looked just to the decision today without regard to what happened in the current [intermeeting] period, I think one could make an intellectual case for symmetry. But having moved to asymmetry, I think the balance of the evidence says we ought to stay where we are with the asymmetry. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Keehn. 

MR. KEEHN. "And, therefore, I think what you recommend is appropriate."

Full utterance: While I might have had a slight preference for symmetry, I very much support your recommendation primarily for the reason Al Broaddus mentioned. If there were another leak reflecting a change from asymmetry to symmetry this time, it would be very awkward in the marketplace. And, therefore, I think what you recommend is appropriate.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. OLTMAN.
text: I support your recommendation, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps if we were starting from scratch, I would have some preference for symmetry but I don't think we ought to change [from asymmetry]. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Vice Chairman. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: I support your proposal, Mr. Chairman, and I also agree with Tom Melzer's arguments as well. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Angell. 

MR. ANGELL. "Well, I'm clearly not in tune with the other members of the FOMC."

Full utterance: Well, I'm clearly not in tune with the other members of the FOMC. I don't see any need to wait for any information. The markets provide indications every day as to whether or not we've provided more liquidity than is called for. And when we lowered the fed funds rate from 4 percent to 3 percent, my guess is that made very, very little difference in the rate of real GDP growth. The destabilizing factors that have led people to hold, shift, or use their balances as much as they have was, I think, a drag against the stimulus that was already in place. A 4 percent fed funds rate already was providing a lot of stimulus. We already had pegged the fed funds rate well below the natural rate of interest. We now have evidence, and we see it in our own staff's forecast, that the expected rate of inflation has moved up 0.6 or 0.7 percent just [since the May FOMC] meeting. Now, in that environment, policy is not stable. We do not have the same policy that we had at the last meeting because the real rate of interest by our best estimate has fallen to even more sharply negative territory. We clearly see in the price of gold that people are making bets out there. And we continue to lock in to a fed funds rate that will only aggravate that kind of speculation and it only detracts from the role of the U.S. currency as the stable currency for the world. The cost to the world of the United States pursuing inflationary policies in the late 1960s and the 1970s is unbelievable. We're still paying the cost because many other central banks with no confidence in us think they have to be Rambo-like in beating their chests because in some sense they've got a track for the inflation-induced environment that the Federal Reserve as the world's reserve currency provides. This is the time for us to move real interest rates back at least to zero. I would be satisfied to do a measly 1/4 percentage point, which would not get us back to zero, but there would be intervention value in that. There wouldn't be any harm in it. Is there anyone who really believes the U.S. economy, regardless of what is done on the fiscal [side], is going to suffer because the funds rate goes up from 3 to 3-1/4 percent? Now, I read Henry Kauffman, as many of you must have, and it's just absurd. Well, I must be the one that's absurd! Thank you.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: So that's not based upon any strong opinion? 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: No. 
speaker: MR. MULLINS.
text: With the edited transcript we might provide some sense that we're being more forthcoming even though it conveys the same information as the MOD. Okay, thank you. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Melzer. 

MR. MELZER. "We'd have the litigation and ultimately be subjected to some judgment in the courts."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. LAWARE.
text: So if they needed all of this to overlook the historic performance, will they not insist on having it prospectively? 
speaker: MR. MATTINGLY.
text: Chairman Gonzalez's letter says he wants to work out an agreement on that with this Committee. 
speaker: MR. LAWARE.
text: So it seems to me that that's another issue we have to address: Not just what we're going to release to the public, possibly in the form of a Memorandum of Discussion, but whether in fact there's going to be a demand that we continue to release tapes and transcripts as they are generated in the process of doing the Memorandum of Discussion, regardless of what the Archivist says. [I say that] because, as I understand you, Congress can ask for anything it wants. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Kelley. 

MR. KELLEY. "Virgil, I wonder how much more comfort we might have if it were possible to get something in the way of a firm official position from the Justice Department relative to FOIA and the Archivist relative to the [Federal] Records Act."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Parry. 
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: Mr. Chairman, I think it is quite likely that after the current quarter we will see more moderate growth next year and, therefore, I could support alternative B. It's a little hard for me to reach the conclusion that the risks are symmetrical, which leads me into the direction of thinking that there is a case for asymmetry toward restraint. But I could easily buy the symmetry if I also would get what Ed Boehne offered. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Broaddus. 

MR. BROADDUS. "In this regard I think the 1/2 point backup in long-term interest rates we've seen recently is a warning."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I certainly respect your position but, as I said earlier, I think the accumulation of positive economic news that we're seeing now is really quite extraordinary. And in this situation I think the time has come to let real short-term interest rates rise in order to make this expansion a sustainable one and keep it from getting out of hand on the up side. And I really think we need to move now. I recognize that there are certainly arguments for not moving yet, but the fact is that there are always such arguments. And we know from long experience that we can get into a lot of trouble if we wait too long. If we [wait] this time, we risk a significant deterioration in inflation expectations and we risk a further backup in long-term interest rates. And my view is that the risks of that kind of outcome would harm the economy; [the cost in terms of] growth of jobs and production and the general health of the economy is significantly greater than a moderate tightening of monetary policy. And when I say moderate tightening, I have in mind something like a 1/4 point on interest rates. I know this is a turn in direction and I know that's important. But a 1/4 point increase is not exactly a lethal weapon. In this regard I think the 1/2 point backup in long-term interest rates we've seen recently is a warning. We still have time to heed it. I realize, of course, that this is a difficult time for the Fed; we are under attack on a number of fronts. But in my view that makes it all the more imperative that we signal clearly and promptly that we're not going to be distracted from our principal longer-term objective. So, I would favor a 1/4 point increase in the funds rate now.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: Mobile homes run a quarter of a million a year, so if you tacked on 100,000 or 200,000 houses as prefabs or whatever, that third would be easily attainable. I just don't know. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: You are quite right. It is attainable if they include mobile homes. 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: I'll try to get more precise data. 

MR. LINDSEY. "I wonder if that adjustment would change your conclusions about a rebound in homeownership?"


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: The same thing could happen with the term "reserve restraint." In saying a slight change, the "slight" may equivocate-- 
speaker: MR. MELZER.
text: Yes. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Tom, let me just say that that's an interesting issue, but that's a very major question and I would hate to have that decision made at today's meeting. I almost prefer to stay with Governor Lindsey's suggestion and then when we get to the final decisions make that judgment. 

MR. MELZER. "Our practice is going to lock us into that because my sense is we won't get back to these other disclosure issues for some months, and there may be other actions to announce in the meantime."

Full utterance: Okay. I'm just expressing some views at this point. The other point I would make is that I'm not sure I agree with what Larry Lindsey was saying. We are doing something here that, if it's done well and announced properly, will have a very positive public effect. Our practice is going to lock us into that because my sense is we won't get back to these other disclosure issues for some months, and there may be other actions to announce in the meantime. So, our provisional behavior is in effect going to set the precedent and lock us into a policy, and it will be anti-climatic when we announce it. Personally, I think we can get much more mileage out of announcing the fact that this decision has been made and just get it done. In effect, we are trading it away anyway, so why not announce it and try to get some public relations benefit out of it. The other thing I would say in such an announcement is that we continue to have our disclosure practices under review, because I think there are some other disclosure issues that in due course need to be reviewed.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PARRY.
text: From my viewpoint if there ever was a good time for asymmetry, this is it. I also feel that having a conference call perhaps toward the end of the month is a good idea. It would give us an opportunity to review some of the statistics that are coming out, but in addition it would be an opportunity for you to share with us some of your own views about the testimony, which will have been completed as well. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: I forgot about that; that is an important point. It might be useful, irrespective of what is going on, just to have a telephone conference after Humphrey-Hawkins. 

MR. PARRY. "In fact, such a number probably would be one I would want to react to least."

Full utterance: Right. As far as an announcement is concerned, I think one is probably necessary following this meeting. It seems to me that to announce the fact that the meeting is over is subtle enough that I am sure markets could deal with that! Finally, unless I am missing something, the discussion about waiting until a bad CPI number comes out is one I am very troubled by. It seems to me that we spent the last six months telling people that we can't wait for bad inflation news before we act, that it takes 12 to 18 months for policy to have an impact on inflation. The tactic of waiting until a bad number comes out, for whatever purpose, is just an incorrect approach. In fact, such a number probably would be one I would want to react to least. Thank you.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): ambiguous
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. KEEHN.
text: May of last year comes to mind in that context. So, as long as we have a good sense as to what we want to do with policy, I think that is all we really need to operate. Therefore, I prefer symmetric language, but I don't feel that strongly about it. In terms of the announcement, it is a bit of a dilemma, but the choice that Ed Boehne suggests seems to be a good way of dealing with that particular problem. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Governor Kelley. 

MR. KELLEY. "It's not necessary for us to achieve precision there."

Full utterance: I support your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, with "B" asymmetric. As far as an announcement goes, I like Ed Boehne's suggestion also. I would like to add that I don't think it's desirable that we tie ourselves into knots here trying to define asymmetry. It's not necessary for us to achieve precision there. To me, it's just a broad indication of a bias, or a leaning, or a concern, or whatever qualitative word you want to use, and that is quite adequate and quite useful to have available. I am comfortable to leave it at that.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: It could come from either side. 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
text: I think it might be worth reminding the Committee that the present Minister of Trade and Industry has in fact had some very tough comments to make, and he would be the official who could very well be deemed to be the appropriate spokesman from their side. 
speaker: MR. FISHER.
text: I would remind the Committee--as I think I mentioned at our last meeting--that when the dollar dropped July 30th, 31st, and August 1st on the announcement of Super 301, my view was that rhetoric coming from the Japanese side had caused that drop, albeit as I mentioned last month in rather thin markets in New Zealand. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Forrestal. 
speaker: MR. FORRESTAL.
text: Peter, on the memorandum, what kind of increased risks do we incur by moving to a private party and not working with the central bank? 

MR. FISHER. "We would be doing that ourselves at some remove from German market custody arrangements."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
text: So then somebody could write a learned article about the hawks and the doves and who did what to whom, and that at the end of the day we did 25 basis points because we couldn't decide which of the other things to do. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: You mean the hawk and the dove combine as a turkey. [Laughter] 
speaker: VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH.
text: So, Mr. Chairman, I firmly agree that "B" tilted toward tightening is the appropriate policy decision. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Hoenig. 

MR. HOENIG. "Mr. Chairman, I would support your recommendation."

Full utterance: Mr. Chairman, I would support your recommendation. However, I would note that there are inflationary pressures in train. I think they are fairly evident, and we might be well served if we were to act sooner. Therefore, I would support your asymmetric proposal, and if the data come out at all strong, I would encourage you to move before the November meeting.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): entailment
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. HOENIG.
text: We already are seeing inflationary pressures, not just at the early stages of production but at the final stages as well. As Bill McDonough said, inflation starts out very slowly, and that is what we are seeing. On a year-over-year basis, virtually all the price indices as well as the employment cost index and average hourly earnings have either bottomed out or are showing increases in recent months. So, it seems to me that the issue before us now is not whether inflation will be picking up, but how much and over what time horizon. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Boehne. 

MR. BOEHNE. "With timely actions going forward, we have a good chance of keeping inflationary pressures in check and the expansion on track."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: [Laughter] 
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: Even though you have not been asked, it has been reported that you have agreed! 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Agreed to what? 
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: To umpire zipswitch. [Laughter] 

CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. "But there is where I think our problem is."

Full utterance: Terrific! In answer to your question, Ted is exactly right. The risk is not a financial risk that we have here, but we do have a risk. The risk is essentially political--not in the sense that we are subjected to political pressures. It is in the fact that people are trying to get us to do things that I suspect cannot possibly be done effectively, efficiently, or otherwise. That is a problem that we are going to have to confront. I am not sure exactly how we are going to come out of this, or how we will handle it. But there is where I think our problem is. Anyone who has some great ideas is welcome to throw them in, especially if he or she can explain to me what the game of zipswitch is all about!

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. BROADDUS.
text: A longer time frame would probably be more appropriate given the lags, Mike, and that's why I said 1996-1997. Again, I am not talking about trying to control the inflation rate in any mechanical way; we can't do that. I am simply saying that we would make a statement that we would evaluate all of our short-term policy actions over this period of time--especially those in the near term where the lag is long enough presumably to have some effect on the inflation rate during the two-year period--in a way that would bias the outcome toward this result. 
speaker: MR. KELLEY.
text: I am going to be very disappointed if we don't achieve your guideline in 1996, and I have some confidence that we will. But I think that will be a result of developments and polices that are already in train. 

MR. BROADDUS. "Still, making it explicit in this way imposes discipline."

Full utterance: Still, making it explicit in this way imposes discipline. It adds a degree of credibility and accountability that I think we don't have now. It would move us a step forward. I don't think it's revolutionary. It will never solve all our problems, put it's a step in the right direction.

Opinion: yes
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. LINDSEY.
text: I would suggest that we think hard about that issue; that would be one of the clearer lines in the sand that we would have to draw. I remember in our discussion of the Mexican bailout that we all knew we were going a bit out on a limb for a year. We viewed that as a long time, and we certainly did not want to go beyond a year. If we are going to focus on this and we want to avoid the appearance of an extension of credit, I would think that the duration has to be a lot less than a year. Maybe it should be a matter of weeks. 

VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. "On the other hand, our not having that tool available to us is a product of the fact that in the 1970s, whenever it was, nobody thought we would need it, so we did not get it."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: I do not have any particular insight on that, but that may be one aspect of the situation that should make one cautious about jumping to conclusions. But on the face of it-- 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: Is there any correlation between the saving rate and the statistical discrepancy? 
speaker: MR. PRELL.
text: I cannot give you an answer to that off the top of my head. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: I would assume that Commerce would be doing that sort of analysis in looking for the causes of the statistical discrepancy and presumably making adjustments where they could. 

MR. PRELL. "While we do not see clear evidence that by historical standards people are unusually uncertain at this point about job prospects, there remains some general sense that all is not well and that jobs are not secure, so there could be some rise in precautionary saving levels."


Opinion: no
Prior discussion:
speaker: MR. MEYER.
text: Let me suggest a few possibilities. First, it might be appropriate for the Chairman to note in his upcoming Humphrey-Hawkins testimony that the Committee is moving toward paying somewhat closer attention to money growth, if there is some agreement here that that is the case. Second, perhaps we could ask the staff to adjust the alternative II ranges to make them more consistent with the Committee's forecast and for them to think more about how to accomplish this. Third, perhaps we should retain the alternative I ranges at this meeting but keep track of the adjusted alternative II ranges and see how useful they are relative to forthcoming developments in M2 as we think about our policy choices over the months ahead. 
speaker: CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN.
text: President Minehan. 

MS. MINEHAN. "That is a good thing."

Full utterance: I come at this issue from a position that is opposite from Governor Meyer's and closer to yours, Mr. Chairman. I think that the value of the aggregates in terms of communications focuses on the long term rather than the short run. I went back to look at the original language of the Humphrey-Hawkins legislation, and I concluded that the focus of that language is on communicating the ranges that the Committee plans for various aggregates. Since the enactment of that legislation, the Committee has been explaining how difficult it is to plan for any of the aggregates and how they are affected by numerous variables. It seems to me that for short periods of time, like a half year for 1998 and a full year for 1999, we are better off focusing on our longer-term goals rather than trying to project or establish plans for variables that are subject to an enormous amount of change, as evidenced by all the factors that we talked about earlier. I think the communications value of these aggregates is better if they focus on longer-run objectives. I also think that by keeping the ranges where they are, we do not lose the value of M2 in our own deliberations. The point was made earlier that it is widely recognized that monetary targets are not intermediate variables. They are in the array of variables that we look at to determine what is going on. We may be able to look at them with more confidence now that relationships seem to have stabilized a little. That is a good thing. But that does not mean that we have to change these ranges just because we are looking at them with somewhat more seriousness and perhaps using them to a greater extent than we did before. I think the communications value of these is exactly the way you put it. I could go with either alternative I or alternative III. My inclination is to stay where we are.

Opinion: yes
About monetary policy: yes
Stance toward easing (NLI): contradiction