justicedao/ipfs_state_laws huggingface dataset:
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.085. Definitions with respect to culpability. As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and ORS 166.635, unless the context requires otherwise: (1) Act means a bodily movement. (2) Voluntary act means a bodily movement performed consciously and includes the conscious possession or control of property. (3) Omission means a failure to perform an act the performance of which is required by law. (4) Conduct means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state. (5) To act means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act. (6) Culpable mental state means intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence as these terms are defined in subsections (7), (8), (9) and (10) of this section. (7) Intentionally or with intent, when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described. (8) Knowingly or with knowledge, when used with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so described exists. (9) Recklessly, when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. (10) Criminal negligence or criminally negligent, when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. [1971 c.743 7; 1973 c.139 2] Note: See note under
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.090. [Amended by 1967 c.372 11; repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.095. Requirements for criminal liability. (1) The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which the person is capable of performing. (2) Except as provided in ORS 161.105, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.100. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.105. Culpability requirement inapplicable to certain violations and offenses. (1) Notwithstanding ORS 161.095, a culpable mental state is not required if: (a) The offense constitutes a violation, unless a culpable mental state is expressly included in the definition of the offense; or (b) An offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement for the offense or for any material element thereof. (2) Notwithstanding any other existing law, and unless a statute enacted after January 1, 1972, otherwise provides, an offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code that requires no culpable mental state constitutes a violation. (3) Although an offense defined by a statute outside the Oregon Criminal Code requires no culpable mental state with respect to one or more of its material elements, the culpable commission of the offense may be alleged and proved, in which case criminal negligence constitutes sufficient culpability, and the classification of the offense and the authorized sentence shall be determined by ORS 161.505 to 161.605 and 161.615 to 161.655.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.110. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.115. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability. (1) If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. (2) Except as provided in ORS 161.105, if a statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required and is established only if a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence. (3) If the definition of an offense prescribes criminal negligence as the culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish a culpable mental state, it is also established if a person acts intentionally. (4) Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of an offense unless the statute clearly so provides.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.120. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.125. Drug or controlled substance use or dependence or intoxication as defense. (1) The use of drugs or controlled substances, dependence on drugs or controlled substances or voluntary intoxication shall not, as such, constitute a defense to a criminal charge, but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence that the defendant used drugs or controlled substances, or was dependent on drugs or controlled substances, or was intoxicated may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged. (2) When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the defendant, due to the use of drugs or controlled substances, dependence on drugs or controlled substances or voluntary intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which the defendant would have been aware had the defendant been not intoxicated, not using drugs or controlled substances, or not dependent on drugs or controlled substances, such unawareness is immaterial. [1971 c.743 11; 1973 c.697 13; 1979 c.744 6] PARTIES TO CRIME
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.150. Criminal liability described. A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the persons own conduct or by the conduct of another for which the person is criminally liable, or both.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.155. Criminal liability for conduct of another. A person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person constituting a crime if: (1) The person is made criminally liable by the statute defining the crime; or (2) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime the person: (a) Solicits or commands such other person to commit the crime; or (b) Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime; or (c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the crime, fails to make an effort the person is legally required to make.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.160. Exclusion of defenses to criminal liability for conduct of another. In any prosecution for a crime in which criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to ORS 161.155, it is no defense that: (1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any crime based upon the conduct in question or has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime; or (2) The crime, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons to which the defendant does not belong, and the defendant is for that reason legally incapable of committing the crime in an individual capacity.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.165. Exemptions to criminal liability for conduct of another. Except as otherwise provided by the statute defining the crime, a person is not criminally liable for conduct of another constituting a crime if: (1) The person is a victim of that crime; or (2) The crime is so defined that the conduct of the person is necessarily incidental thereto.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.170. Criminal liability of corporations. (1) A corporation is guilty of an offense if: (a) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the corporation and the offense is a misdemeanor or a violation, or the offense is one defined by a statute that clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose criminal liability on a corporation; or (b) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or (c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or knowingly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the corporation. (2) As used in this section: (a) Agent means any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation. (b) High managerial agent means an officer of a corporation who exercises authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees, or any other agent in a position of comparable authority.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.175. Criminal liability of an individual for corporate conduct. A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which the person performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in the persons own name or behalf. [1971 c.743 17] JUSTIFICATION
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.190. Justification as a defense. In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in ORS 161.195 to 161.275, is a defense.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.195. Justification described. (1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is required or authorized by law or by a judicial decree or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of official powers, duties or functions. (2) As used in subsection (1) of this section, laws and judicial decrees include but are not limited to: (a) Laws defining duties and functions of public servants; (b) Laws defining duties of private citizens to assist public servants in the performance of certain of their functions; (c) Laws governing the execution of legal process; (d) Laws governing the military services and conduct of war; and (e) Judgments and orders of courts. [1971 c.743 19] Note: See note under
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.200. Choice of evils. (1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when: (a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and (b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. (2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. [1971 c.743 20] Note: See note under
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.205. Use of physical force generally. The use of physical force upon another person that would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances: (1)(a) A parent or legal guardian of a minor child may use reasonable physical force upon the minor child when and to the extent the person reasonably believes the physical force is necessary to maintain discipline or promote the welfare of the minor child, unless the physical force constitutes abuse as defined in ORS 418.257 or 419B.005. (b) Personnel of a public education program, as that term is defined in ORS 339.285, may use reasonable physical force upon a student only to the extent that the application of force is consistent with ORS 339.285 to 339.303 and is not corporal punishment as defined in ORS 339.250 (9). (2) Subject to ORS 161.237 and 421.107, an authorized official of a jail, prison or correctional facility, including a youth correction facility as defined in ORS 162.135, may use physical force when and to the extent that the official reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order and discipline or as is authorized by law. (3) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under the direction of the person, may use physical force when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order, but the person may use deadly physical force only when the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury. (4) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical self-injury may use physical force upon that person to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to thwart the result. (5) A person may use physical force upon another person in self-defense or in defending a third person, in defending property, in making an arrest or in preventing an escape, as hereafter prescribed in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971. [1971 c.743 21; 1981 c.246 1; 2011 c.665 10,11; 2013 c.133 4; 2013 c.267 4; 2019 c.267 7; 2019 c.333 2; 2020 s.s.2 c.3 2; 2023 c.27 1] Note: See note under
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.209. Use of physical force in defense of a person. Except as provided in ORS 161.215 and 161.219, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person for self-defense or to defend a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force, and the person may use a degree of force which the person reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.210. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.215. Limitations on use of physical force in defense of a person. (1) Notwithstanding ORS 161.209, a person is not justified in using physical force upon another person if: (a) With intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, the person provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that person. (b) The person is the initial aggressor, except that the use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person the intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful physical force. (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (d) The person would not have used physical force but for the discovery of the other persons actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression or sexual orientation. (2) As used in this section, gender identity has the meaning given that term in ORS 166.155.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.219. Limitations on use of deadly physical force in defense of a person. Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.209, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person unless the person reasonably believes that the other person is: (1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or (2) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary in a dwelling; or (3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force against a person.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.220. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.225. Use of physical force in defense of premises. (1) A person in lawful possession or control of premises is justified in using physical force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate what the person reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by the other person in or upon the premises. (2) A person may use deadly physical force under the circumstances set forth in subsection (1) of this section only: (a) In defense of a person as provided in ORS 161.219; or (b) When the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the commission of arson or a felony by force and violence by the trespasser. (3) As used in subsection (1) and subsection (2)(a) of this section, premises includes any building as defined in ORS 164.205 and any real property. As used in subsection (2)(b) of this section, premises includes any building.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.229. Use of physical force in defense of property. A person is justified in using physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission by the other person of theft or criminal mischief of property.
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.230. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.233. Use of physical force by peace officer. (1) A peace officer may use physical force upon another person only when it is objectively reasonable, under the totality of circumstances known to the peace officer, to believe: (a) That the person poses an imminent threat of physical injury to the peace officer or to a third person; or (b) That the use of physical force is necessary to: (A) Make a lawful arrest when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a crime; or (B) Prevent the escape from custody of the person when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a crime. (2) A peace officer may use physical force upon another person under this section only to the degree that the peace officer reasonably believes necessary to prevent physical injury under subsection (1)(a) of this section or to carry out a purpose described in subsection (1)(b) of this section. (3) Prior to using physical force upon another person, if the peace officer has a reasonable opportunity to do so, the peace officer shall: (a) Consider alternatives such as verbal de-escalation, waiting or using other available resources and techniques if reasonable, safe and feasible; and (b) Give a verbal warning to the person that physical force may be used and provide the person with a reasonable opportunity to comply. [2020 s.s.2 c.3 7]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.237. Use of physical force involving pressure on throat or neck by peace officer or corrections officer. (1) Notwithstanding ORS 161.233, a peace officer or corrections officer is not justified in any circumstance in knowingly using physical force that impedes the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying pressure on the throat or neck of the other person except in circumstances in which physical force is justified under ORS 161.209 and 161.215. (2) Notwithstanding ORS 161.233, it is not reasonable under any circumstance for a peace officer or corrections officer to knowingly use physical force that impedes the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying pressure on the throat or neck of the other person except in circumstances in which physical force is justified under ORS 161.209 and 161.215. (3) As used in this section, corrections officer means a guard, peace officer or other official employed in a jail, prison or correctional facility, including a youth correction facility, who primarily performs the duty of custody, control or supervision of individuals charged with or convicted of a crime or otherwise confined under a court order. [2020 s.s.1 c.3 2; 2020 s.s.2 c.3 1,10]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.240. [Repealed by 1971 c.743 432]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.242. Use of deadly physical force by peace officer. (1) A peace officer may use deadly physical force upon another person only when it is objectively reasonable, under the totality of circumstances known to the peace officer, to believe that the person poses an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to the peace officer or to a third person and the use of deadly physical force is necessary to: (a) Make a lawful arrest when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a violent felony; (b) Defend the peace officer or a third person from the imminent threat of death or serious physical injury; or (c) Prevent the escape from custody of the person when the peace officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a violent felony. (2) Prior to using deadly physical force upon another person, if the peace officer has a reasonable opportunity to do so, the peace officer shall: (a) Consider alternatives such as verbal de-escalation, waiting, using other available resources and techniques if reasonable, safe and feasible, or using a lesser degree of force; and (b) Give a verbal warning to the person that deadly physical force may be used and provide the person with a reasonable opportunity to comply. (3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section constitutes justification for reckless or criminally negligent conduct by a peace officer constituting an offense against or with respect to innocent persons whom the peace officer is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody. (4) As used in this section, violent felony has the meaning given that term in ORS 419A.004. [2020 s.s.2 c.3 8]
ORS Chapter 161 — General Provisions

ORS 161.245. Reasonable belief described; status of unlawful arrest. (1) For the purposes of ORS 161.233 and 161.242, a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense means a reasonable belief in facts or circumstances which, if true, would constitute an offense. (2) A peace officer who is making an arrest is justified in using the physical force prescribed in ORS 161.233 and 161.242 unless the arrest is unlawful and is known by the officer to be unlawful.