Preference falsification

**Preference falsification** is the act of misrepresenting a preference under perceived public pressures. It occurs when people publicly express a different preference from the one that they really have. People frequently tell different preferences to others from the ones that they hold privately. Only when they have a cover such as anonymity will they tell their real preference in studies such as opinion surveys. Pollsters can use techniques such as list experiments to uncover preference falsification.

The term preference falsification was coined by Timur Kuran in a 1987 article, "Chameleon Voters and Public Choice." On controversial matters that lead to preference falsification, he showed there, widely-disliked policies may appear popular. The distribution of public preferences, which Kuran defines as public opinion, may differ greatly from private opinion, which is the distribution of private preferences known only to the individuals themselves.

Kuran developed the implications of this observation in a 1995 book, _Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification_. The book argues that preference falsification is ubiquitous and has huge social and political consequences. It provides a theory of how preference falsification shapes collective illusions, sustains social stability, distorts human knowledge, and conceals political possibilities. Collective illusions is an occurrence when most people in a group go along with an idea or a preference with which they disagree because they incorrectly believe most people in the group to agree with it.

## Further reading

- Chapkovski, Philipp; Max Schaub (2022). "Solid support or secret dissent? A list experiment on preference falsification during the Russian war against Ukraine." _Research & Politics_ _9_(2): 1-6.
- Cook, Philip; Heilmann, Conrad (2013). "Two types of self-censorship: Public and private." _Political Studies_. _61_(1): 178–196.
- Crabtree, Charles; Kern, Holger L.; Siegel, David A. (2020). "Cults of personality, preference falsification, and the dictator’s dilemma." _Journal of Theoretical Politics_, _32_(3): 409-434.
- Duffy, John; Lafky, Jonathan (2021). "Social conformity under evolving private preferences." _Games and Economic Behavior_. _128_: 104–124.
- Frank, Robert (1996). "The political economy of preference falsification." _Journal of Economic Literature_. _34_(1):115–123.
- Jiang, Junyan; Yang, Dali L. (2016). "Lying or believing? Measuring preference falsification from a political purge in China." _Comparative Political Studies_. _49_ (5): 600–634.
- Kalinin, K. (2018). "Linking preference falsification and election fraud in electoral autocracies: The case of Russia." _Political Studies_, _66_(1), 81-99.
- Loury, Glenn C. (1994). "Self-censorship in public discourse: A theory of 'political correctness' and related phenomena." _Rationality and Society_. _6_ (4): 428–461.
- Rose, Todd (2022). “Collective Illusions: Conformity, Complicity, and the Science of Why We Make Bad Decisions.” Hachette Book Group. ISBN 978-0306925689
- Valentim, Vicente. “Political Stigma and Preference Falsification: Theory and Observational Evidence.” The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1086/729966.