Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East
2010-09-01

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 On Middle Eastern cases, cf., inter alia, O. Schlumberger (ed.) (Citation2007) Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press); and the overview article by Valbjørn and Bank in this issue. 2 An even more radical view suggests that the use of force itself is conditional upon a minimum degree of legitimacy, see C.V. Haldenwang (Citation2007) Legitimacy—The Neglected Core of Governance, unpublished manuscript (Bonn: German Development Institute). The problem with this argument relates to the fact that legitimacy, if used as an empirical-analytical category, must distinguish between different possible addressees of claims to legitimacy. But an elaboration of this discussion is beyond the scope of the present article. 3 B. Gilley (Citation2009) The Right to Rule. How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 45. 4 M. Hudson (Citation1977) Arab Politics: In Search of Legitimacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 5 M. Levi (Citation2006) Why We Need a New Theory of Government (Presidential Address to the 2005 annual APSA Conference) Perspectives on Politics, 4(1), p. 13. Available at http://www.apsanet.org/media/PDFs/2005AddrLevi.pdf, accessed March 29, 2010. 7 S. C. Angle (Citation2005) Decent Democratic Capitalism, Political Theory, 33(4), p. 519. 6 CitationO. Schlumberger, Political Liberalization, Regime Stability, and 'Imitative Institutions': Towards a Formal Understanding, paper presented to the 6 th Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, organized by the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2004. 8 M. Weber (Citation1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr). 9 Note, however, that my point with regard to Weber here is not how he typologizes legitimacy, but how he defines it, namely as the belief in legitimacy or Legitimitätsglaube. 10 D. Easton (Citation1965) A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley). 11 S. M. Lipset (Citation1960) Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Anchor Books). 12 D. Easton, A Systems Analysis, p. 268. 13 D. Easton, A Systems Analysis, p. 278. A deeper theoretical discussion about both understandings is beyond the scope of this article. Also, I must refrain here for space reasons from a discussion that terminologically differentiates clearly between legitimacy and its 'relatives,' such as trust, consent, domination, manipulation or the Gramscian understanding of 'egemonia.' Both can be found in Oliver Schlumberger (Citation2009) Nondemocratic Legitimacy. Theoretical Frame and Some Thoughts on Arab Middle Eastern Cases, paper presented to the Fifth General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) (Potsdam, Germany, 10–12 September 2009). 14 Originally: A. Tversky & D. Kahneman (Citation1981) The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science, 211, pp. 453–458; cf. also R. Benford & D. Snow (Citation2000) Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, Annual Review of Sociology, 26, pp. 611–639; D. Snow & R. Benford (Citation2000) Clarifying the Relationship between Framing and Ideology, Mobilization. An International Journal, 5(1), pp. 55–60. 15 D. Chong & J. Druckman (Citation2007) Framing theory, Annual Review of Political Science, 10, p. 104. 16 Cf. also J. Druckman (Citation2004) Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, American Political Science Review, 98(4), pp. 671–686. 17 Gilley, The Right to Rule. 18 Druckman, Political Preference Formation, p. 684. 19 F. Ferrarotti (Citation1978) Legitimacy, Hegemony, and Domination: Gramsci—With and Versus Lenin, in B.D. Denitch (ed.) Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage), p. 110. 20 Schlumberger, Political Liberalization. 21 See for instance A. Bank (Citation2004) Rents, Cooptation, and Economized Discourse: Three Dimensions of Political Rule in Jordan, Morocco and Syria, Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 14(1/2), pp. 155–179, which differentiates between strategies geared toward elites on the one hand and larger parts of society on the other. 22 Such effects have been dramatic even in democratic contexts where citizens have access to alternative sources of information. We therefore may assume them to be bigger yet in non-democracies where political elites control this process to a structurally higher degree than in democracies. 23 N. Machiavelli (Citation2001)[1513–17] Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, [Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Niccolò Machiavelli], ed. F. Bausi (Rome: Salerno Editrice), lib. I, cap. 1; (trans. from Italian by the author). 24 D. Beetham (Citation1991) The Legitimation of Power (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan) suggests revolutionary or mobilizational legitimacy as another potential source of legitimacy. Revolutions against some sort of ancient regime, national liberation struggles, or other forms of mobilizing processes can unite large parts of a population and thereby give credibility to an authority. Yet, all revolutionary moments lose momentum at some point, and consequently, 'mobilizational legitimacy' decreases as well. However, it occurs to me that mobilization is a mode of legitimation rather than a type of legitimacy. After all, any mobilization has to provide some mobilizing content—and this often tends to be ideology—and less so religion as such because religion, when used to mobilize politically, is used as an ideology. 25 Gilley, Right to rule, pp. 44ff. 26 Arguably, it is not real differences in welfare that matter most for changes in legitimacy, but perceived ones. Absolute increases in welfare, if perceived to be relative losses, may lead to decreases in legitimacy. It is not enough, therefore, to measure quantitatively whether such increases or decreases in welfare take place; rather, the perception of the population must be taken as a baseline for assessing this category. On unintended political consequences of rapid economic growth, cf. Mancur Olson's classic article, M. Olson (Citation1963) Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, Journal of Economic History, 23(4), pp. 529–552. 27 L. Wedeen (Citation1999) Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 28 Dent uses the term in its original meaning, i.e., with respect to minority groups' policies within a larger independent entity while current usage of the term comprises a broader understanding; see M. Dent (Citation2004) Identity Politics: Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence (London: Ashgate). 29 Hudson, Arab Politics, p. 4. 30 Thus, it is not in the understanding of legitimacy itself that Hudson follows the philosophical-normative tradition; he explicitly operates with a Weberian understanding of legitimacy. His normative bias rather lies in the determinism with which modernization theory expected certain features of socio-political development to take place universally. This ultimately also implies that it is democratic institutions and procedures only which could legitimize political rule and thus maintain regimes stable over time. No wonder, thus, that he concludes with the re-iteration of a perceived severe legitimacy crisis in the Arab world. 31 Gilley, Right to rule, p. 45f. 32 Of course, alternative differentiations can be imagined (e.g., Bank, Rents, Cooptation), but for reasons beyond the scope of this article these are the four that I maintain have had the largest durable impact on domestic legitimacy in the Arab world over the past three decades. 33 A. Bligh (Citation1984) From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press) provides a good historical account of the alliance between the al-Sáud and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. 34 Among the most obvious areas of such influence is education, where the 'ulama' have exerted major influence from the design of curricula to the contents of textbooks used in Saudi schools. 35 For an overview of developments within the Saudi Islamist opposition, see S. Lacroix (Citation2006) Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi-Arabia, in P. Aarts & G. Nonneman (eds) Saudi Arabia in the Balance. Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (New York: New York University Press), pp. 35–56. 36 On the development, strength and influence of the Moroccan Islamist opposition, cf. E. Wegner (Citation2007) Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence: The Moroccan Win-Win Situation,' in O. Schlumberger (ed.) Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 75–89. 37 This does not mean that religion plays no role in politics. Of course, all regimes have to pay tribute to their populations' expectations and thus have to devise policies that aim at balancing 'Islam' and 'the State.' But this is not equal to pro-actively building legitimacy on religion as a core pillar; rather, it can be interpreted as part of the well-known neopatrimonial 'juggling act.' For discussion of balancing various social forces in a way that no counter-hegemonic center of power emerges, see further D. Brumberg (Citation2002) The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy, Journal of Democracy, 13(4), pp. 56–68. 38 Note, however, that whether this negatively influences the overall degree of regime legitimacy cannot be stated. 39 Gilley, Right to Rule, p. 45. 40 Note that of the Middle Eastern states included in the Gilley sample only Iran (plus possibly Jordan and Morocco, but both with question marks) qualify as 'Islamic states,' not so Egypt and certainly not Algeria. Gilley's ad-hoc categorization is therefore overly rough—and so is his guess of the consequences that must be rejected. 41 Wedeen, Islamist Inclusion. 42 M. Valéri (Citation2007) State Building, Liberalization from Above, and Political Legitimacy in the Sultanate of Oman, in: O. Schlumberger (ed.) Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 147. 43 M. Valéri (Citation2007) State Building, Liberalization from Above, and Political Legitimacy in the Sultanate of Oman, in: O. Schlumberger (ed.) Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p. 149. 44 M. Valéri (Citation2007) State Building, Liberalization from Above, and Political Legitimacy in the Sultanate of Oman, in: O. Schlumberger (ed.) Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press) 45 For the best account of this phase of Emirates' history, cf. F. Heard-Bey (Citation1982) From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition (London: Longman); see also the insider's view by M. Al-Fahim (Citation1998) From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi (London: I. B. Tauris); Al-Fahim was a personal friend of Sheikh Zayed. 46 M. Field (Citation1976) A Hundred Million Dollars a Day: Inside the World of Middle East Money (Westport, CT: Praeger). 47 For example, J. Brownlee (Citation2007) Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies, World Politics, 59(4), pp. 595–628. 48 P. Brooker (Citation2000) Nondemocratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (Houndmills: Macmillan), p. 147. 49 The same holds also for Libya's eclectic combination of socialism, Arabism, Third Worldism, and Islam. 50 A good account of Arab nationalism is A. Dawisha (Citation2003) Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Among the large body of literature, cf. also R. Baker (Citation1978) Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); and, on Arab nationalism, P. Vatikiotis (Citation1978) Nasser and his Generation (London: Palgrave Macmillan); cf. E. Khoury (Citation1970) The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary Progressive States (The Hague: Mouton); and on Arab socialism, see B. Hansen (Citation1975) Arab Socialism in Egypt, World Development, 3(4), pp. 201–211. 51 Plus a loosely associated North Yemen which, in contrast with Syria, never had given up sovereignty. 52 Other examples include the Arab Federation (between Jordan and Iraq, 1958); the Federation of Arab Republics (Egypt, Syria, Libya, 1972–1977); or the proposed but never established Arab Islamic Republic (between Tunisia and Libya, 1972). 53 Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation, p. 367. 54 See further H. Mahdavi (Citation1970) The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in: M. A. Cook (ed.) Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 428–466; cf. CitationH. Beblawi & G. Luciani (eds) (1987) The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm). 55 G. Luciani (Citation1987) Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, in: G. Luciani & H. Beblawi (eds) The Rentier State (Kent: Croom Helm), p. 62. 56 It thereby also helps to explain the paradoxical longevity of Arab regimes—in contrast with many sub-Saharan African cases of neopatrimonialism, which collapse due to financial problems. 57 R. Brynen (Citation1995) The Neopatrimonial Dimensions of Palestinian Politics, Journal of Palestine Studies, 25(1), pp. 23–36. 58 B. Korany (Citation1986) Political Petrolism and Contemporary Arab Politics, 1967–1983, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 21(1–2), pp. 66–80. 59 O. Schlumberger (Citation2008) Structural Reform, Economic Order, and Development: Patrimonial Capitalism, Review of International Political Economy, 15(4), pp. 622–649. 60 On Jordan's economic reform, see O. Schlumberger (Citation2005) Economic Reform and Economic Order in the Arab World: Patrimonial Capitalism, chapter 7. Available at http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn = 976428431, accessed April 14, 2010. 61 T. Richter (Citation2007) The Political Economy of Regime Maintenance in Egypt: Linking External Resources and Domestic Legitimation, in: O. Schlumberger (ed.) Debating Arab Authoritarianism. Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp. 177–193. 62 While I have limited myself here to a discussion of economic issues, performance, arguably, is not necessarily restricted to the provision of economic well-being to important parts of or entire populations. More research is needed on various dimensions of non-material well-being (such as, for instance, a regime's gains in international reputation) and their effects on regime legitimacy. 63 Cf. the remarks below on regional non-state Islamist contenders who manage to mobilize masses, implicitly or explicitly, against the regimes with the help of religion. 64 Well-known examples include North Korea, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. 65 S. Nanes (Citation2008) Choice, Loyalty, and the Melting Pot: Citizenship and National Identity in Jordan, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 14(1), pp. 85–116. 66 A. Shyrock (Citation2000) Dynastic Modernism and its Contradictions: Testing the Limits of Pluralism, Tribalism, and King Hussein's Example in Hashemite Jordan, Arab Studies Quarterly, 22(3), pp. 57–80. I am grateful to André Bank for alerting me to this point.